

# COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

## United Republic of Tanzania: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011–2014) Evaluation Report

October 2015

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Commissioned by the

**WFP Office of Evaluation**

Report number: OEV/2015/005



**World Food Programme**



## **Acknowledgements**

The evaluation team is very grateful for all the assistance provided during the assignment by Miranda Sende and Mar Guinot of WFP OEV, and by the Country Office in Dar es Salaam. We particularly acknowledge the advice and guidance of the Country Director Richard Ragan and the Deputy Country Director Jerry Bailey and the hard work and constructive support of Inka Himanen, Juvenal Kisanga, Marina Negroponte, Farida Mohamed and many CO colleagues for helping us with the evaluation logistics, as well as ensuring that information and contacts were available to the team. We thank all those at HQ, OMJ RB, the CO, the Dodoma and Kasulu sub offices and elsewhere who gave generously of their time during the briefing, inception and evaluation missions. We also acknowledge with thanks the contributions of WFP partners and beneficiaries who kindly took the time to give us ideas and information.

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## Fact Sheet: WFP's Portfolio in Tanzania

Timeline and funding level of Tanzania Portfolio 2011 - 2014					
Operation	Time Frame	2011	2012	2013	2014
PRRO 200603 - Food Assistance for Refugees	Jul 14 - Jun 16 (+ 1 BR)				Req: 36,115,584 Rec: 16,466,352 <b>Funded: 45.6%</b>
PRRO 200325 - Food Assistance for Refugees in the Northwest	Jan 12 - Jun 14		Req: 50,440,696 Rec: 41,511,894 <b>Funded: 82.3%</b>		
CP 200200 - Country Programme	Jul 11 - Jun 15 (+ 6 BR extended to Jun 2016)		Req: 162,794,267 Rec: 67,676,392 <b>Funded: 41.6%</b>		
PRRO 200029 - Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Households Among the Host Populations in North-Western Tanzania	Jan 10 - Dec 11		Req: 43,948,689 Rec: 41,940,751 <b>Funded: 95.4%</b>		
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		37,644,000	38,090,000	32,457,000	12,738,798
% Direct Expenses: Tanzania vs. WFP World		1%	1%	1%	0%
Food Distributed (MT)		48,984	41,752	34,338	19,570
Total no. of Beneficiaries (Male)		570,531	467,304	386,835	317,332
Total no. of Beneficiaries (Female)		597,822	458,930	414,151	346,543
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		1,168,353	926,234	800,986	663,875


Source: SPRs 2011-14, Funding levels given up to December 2014. Requirements (Req.) and Contributions Received (Rec.) are in US\$

### Distribution of Portfolio Activities and Strategic Objectives



	HIV/TB	School Feeding	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/FFA	SOs
<b>PRRO 200603</b>			X	X		1,4
<b>PRRO 200325</b>	X	X	X	X		1,3
<b>PRRO 200029</b>	X	X	X	X	X	1,3,4
<b>CP 200200</b>	X	X	X		X	2,4,5
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>	1%	67%	16%	11%	5%	

Source: WFP SPRs 2011-14

### % of actual beneficiaries by activities 2011-14



### Top 5 donors: USA (37%), UK (26%), Multilateral (17%), UN Common Funds and Agencies (10%), Canada (9%)



Source: WFP Resource Situation Documents up to May 2015

## Executive Summary

### Introduction

### Evaluation Features

1. This country portfolio evaluation (CPE) covered all WFP operations in the United Republic of Tanzania from 2011 to 2014, and the 2011–2015 country strategy, which was extended to 2016. It assessed WFP’s alignment and strategic positioning; the factors in and quality of its strategic decision-making; and the performance and results of the portfolio. The CPE was undertaken by an independent evaluation team, which conducted fieldwork in April 2015. The team complemented data analysis and document reviews with interviews of 300 stakeholders from diverse groups. An in-country workshop was held in July 2015 to present the evaluation findings to 50 stakeholders.

### Context

2. While the United Republic of Tanzania is a low-income country, its economy is growing quickly, with average gross domestic product growth of 6.9 percent between 2004 and 2012.<sup>1</sup> However, poverty and livelihood insecurity remain severe for many Tanzanians.<sup>2</sup> Approximately 33 percent of the rural population lives below the poverty line, as do 24.5 percent of households headed by women.<sup>3</sup>

3. During the evaluation period, the food security situation improved, but food security gains did not match the country’s economic growth. According to WFP’s 2012 comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis, 730,000 households – 8.3 percent – were food-insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity in 2010 and 2011. The development strategies of the past five decades, and the contributions of the international community to them, have had limited success.

4. However, the Government’s policy, systems, capacity and resources became significantly sounder and more comprehensive. Through the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), the Government rapidly developed safety net systems as part of a broader social protection strategy focused on moving from labour-intensive public works to targeted cash transfers. As a result, there was less need for direct food assistance from WFP. During the review period, in all emergency contexts that did not involve refugees, the Government was able to provide all required direct assistance independently.

5. Conflicts in neighbouring countries resulted in periodic influxes of refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. By the end of 2014, 60,000 refugees, mostly from DRC, remained – down from 100,000 in 2011.

6. The United Republic of Tanzania is one of the United Nations’ pilot Delivering as One countries. A single United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) is being implemented from 2011 to 2016, with a common country programme document that includes WFP’s work.

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<sup>1</sup> International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2014. “IMF Regional Economic Outlook”. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo1012.pdf>; World Bank. 2014. World Bank Databank. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DY.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS>.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Government’s population and housing census, the country’s population was 45 million in 2012.

<sup>3</sup> National Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Tanzania in Figures 2012”, page 22. Dar es Salaam.

## WFP Strategy and Portfolio

7. WFP's country strategy 2011–2015 identified three priorities: emergency humanitarian action; food security and nutrition support; and community investments in food security support. The country strategy was implicitly relevant to humanitarian and development needs, but it did not present an explicit theory of change explaining the assumptions made at the planning phase regarding the inputs and activities to lead to the intended results. Its references to the WFP Strategic Plan and Strategic Objectives were brief. The strategy's design assumptions included programme integration across activities and geographic focus to achieve concentrated and integrated programmes and hunger solutions. WFP activities were meant to make a significant difference in selected districts. The other assumption was for hand-over to Government and partners, as shown in the strategic framework.

8. Guided by the country strategy, the portfolio comprised three protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) and one country programme (CP). Whereas much of the funding needed for PRRO support to refugees was received, the CP suffered a shortfall, with funding slightly above WFP's recent average of 40 percent.<sup>4</sup> The portfolio also included a Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot, which was launched in 2009 and resourced through a trust fund. Funding shortfalls were a major cause of sub-office closures and a reduction in WFP staff from 150 in 2013 to 100 in 2014

**Table 1: Funding of Country Portfolio 2011-2014 by Programme Category.**

Type of operation	Number of operations	Requirements (USD)	% of requirements by project type	Actual received (USD)	% of requirements received
PRROs	3	130 504 969	44.50	99 918 997	76.56
CP	1	162 794 267	55.50	67 676 392	41.57
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>293 299 236</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>167 595 389</b>	<b>57.14</b>
<b>P4P EXTRA-BUDGETARY FUNDS (USD)</b>					
	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>Total</b>
	1 227 328	552 531	845 140	950 523	<b>3 575 522</b>


Sources: WFP's "The Factory" and WFP country office data.

<sup>4</sup> See the Office of Evaluation's "Operation Evaluation. Orientation Guide for Evaluation Companies: Key facts about WFP and its operations", available at <http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp262593.pdf>

9. Successive PRROs ran during the evaluation period, with reduced scope following the closure of a camp for Burundian refugees in 2012. The PRROs provided food assistance to refugees as part of a system of support involving several United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations. Between 60 and 80 percent of the logistics efforts of country office staff were devoted to receiving and forwarding food shipments for WFP operations in other countries, such as DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and Zambia.

10. The CP focused on: i) food security and nutrition support for people living in environmentally fragile and chronically food-insecure areas, with district-wide interventions; and ii) linking smallholder farmers to markets through P4P, and strengthening food security and nutrition information systems.

**Figure 1: Portfolio beneficiaries and tonnage, by operation, planned and actual**



\* The number of beneficiaries by operation equals the average number of beneficiaries per year of the operation over the evaluation period 2011–2014.


Source: WFP standard project reports 2011–2014

11. The main components of the portfolio were food assistance for assets (FFA), school feeding, blanket supplementary feeding and targeted supplementary feeding to support mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN), emergency relief (with general food distribution) and support to HIV and AIDS clients. In addition, a 2012 pilot project in Mtwara Region used cash-based transfers to promote MCHN.<sup>5</sup> Figure 1 shows the planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage; Figure 2 shows planned and actual beneficiaries by activity. These data indicate that: i) beneficiaries and tonnage were significantly less than intended; and ii) FFA and school feeding were the largest components.

<sup>5</sup> WFP. 2012. “Cash Transfer Pilot Project Safety Net to Promote Mother-and-Child Health and Nutrition in Mtwara Rural District of Tanzania”.



**Figure 2: Total planned and actual beneficiaries by activity, 2011–2014**



Source: WFP standard project reports 2011–2014

## Evaluation Findings

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

12. WFP’s food assistance to refugees was operationally relevant, directly addressing food insecurity. The school feeding, FFA and nutrition activities were also operationally relevant, targeting the country’s most food-insecure areas. The operational relevance of the P4P activity was less direct, as participants were – as intended – not the poorest in the community and the activity was not restricted to the most food-insecure areas.

13. Strategically relevant activities in a WFP portfolio complement integrated national approaches to sustainable social and economic development – especially to ending hunger and food insecurity. Achievements in this area were only modest: the country strategy and the CP were aligned with national policies and strategies, but the portfolio did not achieve the integration required for full strategic relevance. As a result, the portfolio lacked a clear path to sustainability or hand-over – a crucial part of the implicit theory of change in the country strategy. P4P was an exception, although its direct contribution to enhanced food security was difficult to discern. Vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) activities were another exception, with significant capacity development among participating government agencies.

14. Despite earlier efforts with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training to move towards a community-driven, home-grown school feeding model, WFP continued to focus on externally sourced food. This approach had to be scaled down and then terminated as funding ran out without an effective hand-over strategy. By the end of the review period, WFP and the Government had diverged on school feeding policy and WFP's policy influence waned thereafter; the reasons for this are not clear. There appear to have been weaknesses in WFP's engagement of the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, especially in 2014.

15. The United Republic of Tanzania made progress with an integrated social protection strategy and framework during the review period, with strong donor support. WFP was aware of these developments and engaged with the TASAF – notably in the 2012 Mtwara cash transfer pilot and the development of work norms. However, interviews and documents indicate that WFP did not engage in policy development or utilize its potential for technical assistance in this area as thoroughly as might have been expected, especially given the country strategy's commitment to supporting productive safety nets and the CP's focus on an integrated approach to district-level food assistance for safety nets.

16. Most informants reported that WFP engaged constructively in the nutrition agenda. The P4P experience demonstrated that, with adequate resources, WFP is capable of proactive and positive engagement in the national agenda. Delivering as One offered a major opportunity for – and challenge to – the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's portfolio. Although stakeholders confirmed WFP's constructive engagement in this process, they also reported that “Delivering as One fatigue” set in as the country office concluded that the costs of the process outweighed the benefits. There is little evidence that the alignment achieved through Delivering as One resulted in greater operational synergy between WFP and other United Nations agencies, or improved strategic positioning with regard to government programmes or the contributions of the United Nations as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

### **Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making**

17. The portfolio outlined in the 2011–2016 country strategy was based on sound analysis, but sectoral analysis during design and implementation was uneven. Funding and operational considerations took precedence over analytical inputs for operation and activity design. There is no evidence of substantive analysis of gender issues in the 2011-2016 country strategy or operation design – nor of any overarching gender strategy in the portfolio.

18. Monitoring of WFP's cash transfer pilot project demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of cash transfers.<sup>7</sup> The evaluators found strong support for the use of cash when assisting refugees. International evidence also suggests that cash transfers are more cost-effective than in-kind transfers. However, the country office did not carry out sufficient analysis to reach a conclusion, assuming instead that vouchers were more appropriate than a direct shift to cash transfers.

19. Portfolio implementation was steered by operational priorities, with little evidence of strategic adjustments. The operational strategy was generally sound, with decisions on logistics and humanitarian action to support refugees resulting in effective assistance. Regarding the country strategy's broader intention for an

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<sup>6</sup> This finding is consistent with “Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One” (United Nations, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Standard Project Reports 2012 and 2013.

integrated and focused approach that supports the Government to end hunger in the country, strategic decision-making was less evident. Because of WFP's perpetual resource constraints, many decisions taken from year to year were driven by funding considerations.

20. Despite weaknesses, including in reporting on its VAM work, WFP's activity monitoring was generally adequate during the review period. However, learning and adaptation from the data collected were less consistent. Monitoring at the Nyarugusu refugee camp led to some changes in strategy and method, such as the decision to register women as the recipients of food rations. The nutrition component of the portfolio also benefited from WFP's participation in, and learning from, monitoring activities. There is less evidence that school feeding and FFA activities benefited from analysis of monitoring data.

## **Portfolio Performance and Results**

### **Outputs**

21. Outputs in the non-refugee portfolio were significantly affected by funding constraints, although the shortfall in assisted beneficiaries was proportionally less than the reduction in food assistance. The percentage of the planned number of children receiving school meals declined from 96 percent in 2011 to 65 percent in 2014, and school feeding days declined from 100 percent of the planned number in 2011 to 82 percent in 2013. The number of school feeding days was also less than planned in 2014, but reports do not state how much.

22. However, WFP achieved substantial FFA outputs of a satisfactory technical standard that put communities at centre stage, benefitting 27 percent of chronically food-insecure people in eight regions.<sup>8</sup> For nutrition activities, funding was one of several factors that drastically reduced the number of supplementary feeding beneficiaries below target. Other factors included late roll-out, changed admission criteria and the low number of malnourished pregnant and lactating women. After a slow start, P4P achieved impressive outputs. Outputs related to supporting refugees were generally close to target and of satisfactory technical quality. Monitoring reports showed that Sphere humanitarian standards were met in the Nyarugusu refugee camp.

### **Efficiency**

23. WFP made good progress in improving operational and logistics efficiency, largely avoiding pipeline breaks and cutting costs through attention to detail and enhancing its logistics strategy; direct support costs were cut by 18 percent in 2013 and 21 percent in 2014. Through its attachment to the distant regional bureau in Johannesburg, the country office continued to incur higher staff travel and related costs than would have been the case had it been attached to the regional bureau in Nairobi.

24. Efficiency was less evident in the design of the portfolio. Spatial efficiency/geographic concentration and – outside the refugee camp – institutional efficiency/collaboration with partners were inadequate. There was little evidence of Delivering as One activities outside Dar es Salaam, and even there, the CPE could not attribute any enhanced WFP efficiency to Delivering as One.

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<sup>8</sup> WFP Standard Project Reports.

25. WFP did not analyse the cost-effectiveness of all its activities. Nevertheless, at USD 23 per child,<sup>9</sup> the unit cost of school feeding in this portfolio was competitive with costs per child in other low-income countries, which range from USD 20 to USD 117.<sup>10</sup> Evidence of cost-effectiveness was less clear for the nutrition interventions, but arrangements for transporting nutrition commodities were efficient, and stock management was good.

### **Synergy and Multiplier Effects**

26. Activities to support refugees comprised integrated programmes that were linked to each other and to the complementary inputs of partner agencies. The rest of the portfolio was designed as an integrated package of activities that focused on selected food-insecure districts to achieve synergy among activities and to optimize WFP's impact on vulnerable people. As a result of funding shortages and the country office's view that broader coverage in fewer districts would lower WFP's profile and credibility, standard project reports show that this integrated, district-wide approach was not effective – undermining the main strategic thrust of the 2011–2016 country strategy. Complementarity with partners other than the Government was limited, and activities turned into the “silos” that their design had sought to avoid.

27. Despite the 2011–2016 UNDP and the significant commitment of senior country office staff to Delivering as One in Dar es Salaam, document review and interviews with WFP and partner staff yielded little evidence of synergies or multiplier effects; institutional silos persisted.

### **Gender**

28. Without making a significant impact at the national policy level, portfolio implementation contributed to a reduction in gender gaps and stronger awareness of women's rights and management capacity at the field level. For example, WFP and its partners at Nyarugusu refugee camp issued ration cards in women's names, and a woman chaired the camp leadership committee. However, interviews indicated that the WFP portfolio lacked adequate resources to achieve more meaningful implementation of the Gender Policy, in alignment with national priorities, including at the community and beneficiary levels.

### **Effectiveness and Sustainability**

29. Food assistance and related support to refugees were largely effective. The 2014 camp nutrition survey at Nyarugusu shows that global acute malnutrition dropped from 2.6 percent in 2010 to 1.4 percent in 2014, while stunting rates decreased from 48 to 40.7 percent. However with growing prospects for support to medium- and long-term refugees shifting to the use of vouchers or cash – as explored by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2014 – the comparative advantage of WFP's support to all but the early emergency needs of refugees is not certain.

30. Elsewhere, focus group discussions with teachers, parents and other local stakeholders indicated satisfaction with the outcomes of WFP school feeding, including perceived increases in enrolment, attendance, concentration and

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<sup>9</sup> WFP country office data, March 2013.

<sup>10</sup> WFP. *State of school feeding worldwide*, 2013.

performance. However WFP data showed declining attendance and enrolment for girls and boys at WFP-supported schools. These data reflect national trends exacerbated by the declining number of feeding days and removal of the mid-morning meal in early 2013. By the end of the review period, the prospect for sustainable results from the portfolio's school feeding work had deteriorated as policy dialogue with the Government had virtually ceased.

31. WFP reported substantial achievements in capacity development, primarily at the technical and operational levels. While portfolio operations typically emphasized training in technical and management skills, outcomes varied. Those trained to carry out temporary activities such as FFA, or activities that were not sustainable, such as school feeding, reported uncertainty about how to retain and apply their new skills. When the relevant activities continued, the capacity development results were more positive.

32. FFA activities in the portfolio were partly effective: although the field assessment and interviews indicated that they were technically adequate and useful in addressing food insecurity, they had only a limited effect on beneficiaries' resilience to livelihood shocks and stresses. Levels of production and income remained low, alternative livelihood and coping strategies limited, and community support systems weak. Lack of baseline data precluded conclusive findings on the effectiveness of MCHN work, which was ultimately carried out on a small scale. Interviews and a review of health facility registers showed overall satisfaction with nutrition outcomes, with health-seeking behaviour of mothers and young children increasing in catchment areas.

33. Interviews and operational records show that P4P was effective in strengthening the participation of smallholder farmers – albeit not the poorest ones – in national agricultural markets. Efforts were made to build a sustainable institutional framework for enhanced involvement by farmers' organizations. In 2014, P4P worked with 28 farmers' organizations in ten districts, representing 18,000 farmers; however only one third were selling through P4P channels. While progress has been commendable, it is too early to celebrate P4P's achievements until some years after WFP's direct involvement has ceased.

## **Conclusions and Overall Assessment**

34. Overall, the United Republic of Tanzania country portfolio between 2011 and 2014 was characterized by technical competence – strong work was done by dedicated staff – but strategic drift. Although its design was well aligned with national and United Nations planning frameworks, there were evident shortcomings in the portfolio's strategic positioning. The country strategy emphasized programmatic integration in selected areas, but this was not achieved, other than in WFP's effective support to refugees. The analytical foundation for the portfolio laid out in the country strategy was sound, but sectoral analysis during the design and implementation stages was uneven. Funding contingencies and operational considerations often took precedence over analytical inputs for operation and activity design.

35. The portfolio achieved a degree of operational effectiveness. Work through the PRROs sustained the lives of thousands of refugees. Nutrition work was effective for individual beneficiaries, but not more broadly. School feeding appeared to be effective for the pupils it supported, enhancing attendance and easing the nutrition burden on poor families. FFA activities were partly effective. However, because WFP

did not adequately engage in the development of national approaches to address food and livelihood insecurity, the sustainability of the portfolio's results was limited.

36. The shortage of funds that was a major cause of this limitation could have been used to stimulate new thinking about WFP's role and approaches. Instead, it simply led to dwindling outputs and a shrinking presence. The country strategy also emphasized hand-over and, implicitly, exit. While exit was forced on WFP in some circumstances, hand-over was not effectively achieved – except in the P4P pilot, in which interviews showed that new structures and systems could continue to develop without further WFP involvement.

37. Nothing should be taken for granted about WFP's next steps in the United Republic of Tanzania. Basic questions must be answered in charting the way forward. Those basic questions include the following:

38. What is WFP's comparative advantage and future role in supporting refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania? Should this role be restricted to first-line emergency aid before voucher or cash systems, and their supporting market arrangements, are in place?

39. What is WFP's comparative advantage in developmental support to food-insecure Tanzanian populations? If WFP continues to increase its focus on technical advice and associated capacity development, can it present a convincingly strong profile in the relevant technical areas to attract funding for its continued presence in the country?

40. Most important, the evidence from this CPE implies that WFP's strategic positioning will have to adapt to the possibility that WFP no longer has a role in the United Republic of Tanzania beyond emergency response and associated logistics capacity for the country and its neighbours. In the next round of planning and resource mobilization for the country, WFP should consider a potential exit and offer a comprehensive justification for any continued presence.

## **Recommendations**

41. **Recommendation 1:** With support from the regional bureau and the Social Protection and Safety Nets Unit at Headquarters, the country office should redefine and restructure any future food assistance – outside humanitarian food assistance and the P4P agricultural marketing initiative – within the national social protection framework of the United Republic of Tanzania.

42. Food assistance should be conceptualized, structured, designed and delivered through the national social protection framework and system. Even with WFP's inadequate engagement during the review period, the Government and its partners have made progress with an increasingly comprehensive social protection system under the auspices of TASAF. The types of food assistance and related transfer modalities that WFP provides can fit into this system.

43. **Recommendation 2:** The country office, with support from the regional bureau and the Policy and Programme Division at Headquarters, should apply as much flexibility as possible in the design, resourcing and management of any further programme of food assistance so that it becomes a tool for creative, proactive support to the Government. Any further food assistance programmes should be based on a strategic analysis of WFP's comparative advantages and appropriate roles in the country. To enable this:

- WFP should explore how to maximize the delegation of authority for Budget adjustments and the use of programme funds; and
- 2016 should be a transitional year and be programmed accordingly, such as by extending the CP pending a new country strategy.

44. **Recommendation 3:** In the United Republic of Tanzania, WFP should shift from operations to advice in its food-assistance work. With support from the regional bureau and the Policy and Programme Division at Headquarters, the country office should focus on:

- operational services, including procurement and logistics to support humanitarian transfers in the country and the region;
- technical assistance, notably on cash and voucher transfers, and social protection; and
- transfers of food only in refugee emergencies and other crises that the Government cannot handle alone.

45. **Recommendation 4:** The country office, with support from the regional bureau and the Humanitarian Crises and Transitions Unit at Headquarters, should ensure that any future support to refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania is based on reappraisal and justification of WFP's role and comparative advantage in medium- and long-term food assistance.

46. A new proposal for support to refugees should explicitly address the possibility of WFP ceasing to engage in food assistance for medium- and long-term refugees. Plans should include a transitional period of hand-over to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and possibly other international organizations, and exit from all but frontline emergency assistance to refugees and supplementary feeding of vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating women and young children, in which it has a comparative advantage.

47. **Recommendation 5:** In consultation with the regional bureau and the Policy and Programme Division at Headquarters, the country office should work to optimize the value of Delivering as One in the United Republic of Tanzania:


- WFP should undertake a corporate review of its experience with Delivering as One to clarify its corporate position and responsibilities at different levels.
- As the United Nations prepares for the second phase of Delivering as One and a second UNDAF, the country office should work with partner agencies to find new ways of achieving the recommendations of the 2012 global Delivering as One evaluation, focusing on better support from the United Nations system to programme countries and the simplification and harmonization of business practices.<sup>11</sup>

48. **Recommendation 6:** With support from the regional bureau and the Gender Office at Headquarters, the country office should ensure that in its future food assistance advisory services it specifies how WFP's Gender Policy (2015–2020) will be implemented in each activity. The country office should also prioritize the resourcing of Gender Policy implementation.

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<sup>11</sup> United Nations. 2012. "Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One".

# Map of Country Programme activities, Tanzania, 2011–2014





## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. Evaluation Features**

2. This Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) is an independent study commissioned by the Office of Evaluation (OEV) of the World Food Programme (WFP). The full terms of reference (TOR) are at Annex A. CPEs address the full set of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to guide strategic and operational decision-making. CPEs address three key evaluation questions, as follows:

- *Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy & Portfolio.*
- *Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making.*
- *Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio.*

3. The United Republic of Tanzania has been selected for an independent evaluation managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) as part of its ongoing series of CPEs which seeks to provide systematic evaluation coverage of WFP's country presence. There has been no previous evaluation of WFP's full portfolio of activities in Tanzania. This evaluation covers the period 2011–2014. It comes at an opportune time, as planning begins for successors to the current Country Strategy (CS), Country Programme (CP) and protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO); the current CS, CP and PRRO may be extended to December 2016. The CPE is an opportunity for the Country Office (CO) to benefit from an independent assessment of its operations in order to optimise alignment of the CS to the new WFP Strategic Plan (SP) 2014–2017, at a time when the second UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) is being prepared and Tanzania's 2016–2021 Five Year Development Plan is getting under way.

4. The evaluation field work was conducted by an independent team of two local and three international consultants. Methodology was elaborated in the Inception Report (Turner et al., 2015) and is summarised at Annex B. The evaluation matrix, which elaborates the key questions and guides the presentation of findings, is found at Annex C. Fieldwork in Tanzania took place during April 2015. In addition to meetings in Dar es Salaam, evaluation team members visited five Regions in Mainland Tanzania (Arusha, Dodoma, Manyara, Singida and Kigoma). The team augmented the review of available data and documents with extensive interviews and discussions with over 300 people connected with the portfolio. Annex D lists those consulted during the inception and main evaluation phases.

5. Chapter 0 of this report presents the evaluation's findings in answer to the three main evaluation questions and the more detailed questions presented in the matrix. The material presented in that chapter is supported by a series of thematic annexes (Annex G – Annex L). Chapter 3 sets out the conclusions that the evaluation team draws from those findings, and the recommendations that it makes to WFP about its work in Tanzania.

### **1.2. Context**

6. This section provides an overview of significant economic, social and policy factors that have affected the Tanzania country portfolio and are relevant to the evaluation. A further overview of key developments in Tanzania and within WFP is presented in the portfolio timeline (Table 10 in Annex E) and context timeline (Table 12 in Annex F).

7. The United Republic of Tanzania, located in East Africa, shares borders with eight countries to the North, South, and West, and the Indian Ocean to the East. The 2012 census indicated a total population of 44.9 million (m) – of whom 1.3m live in Zanzibar – with an annual growth rate of 3 per cent and the under-15 age group representing 44 per cent of the total (NBS, 2012).

### *History, governance and planning*

8. Tanzania is a union formed in 1964 between mainland Tanganyika, which achieved independence from the British in 1961, and Zanzibar. The latter remains semi-autonomous with its own president and parliament.

9. There has been a gradual increase in political pluralism, but the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the longest reigning ruling party in Africa, remains dominant in government and parliament. Tanzania's current president, Jakaya Kikwete, was elected on 21 December 2005. Women's representation in parliament was 36 per cent following the 2010 general elections. The next presidential, parliamentary and local elections will take place in October 2015.

10. The government has taken a variety of steps towards good governance and anti-corruption through its National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan, but despite these efforts, Tanzania continues to suffer from widespread corruption (NBS, 2012). Tanzania ranks 119 out of 175 in the 2014 Transparency International Perceptions Index.

11. The long-term development goals of Tanzania are established by the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025, which was adopted in 1999. It envisages Tanzania's graduation from a least developed into a middle-income country, having eliminated abject poverty and maintaining a high economic growth rate of at least 8 per cent per annum. The medium-term goals are set in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP, GOT, 2010), also known by the Swahili acronym MKUKUTA. NSGRP II has been implemented between 2010/11 and 2014/15. The focus is on accelerating economic growth, reducing poverty, and improving the standard of living and social welfare of the people of Tanzania, as well as on good governance and accountability. Gender equality and women's empowerment form a major component of MKUKUTA II and its counterpart MKUZA II in Zanzibar under the goals on governance, education and health.

12. Tanzania has been implementing an ambitious local government reform programme since the end of the 1990s with a policy of decentralisation by devolution. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (GOT) is administratively divided into 30 Regions – 25 on the mainland and five in Zanzibar. Regions are divided into districts (156 districts on the mainland and 10 districts in Zanzibar), which are then further sub-divided into wards and villages. District and urban councils have autonomy in their geographic areas.

### *Economy and poverty trends*

13. Tanzania is classified as a low-income country, ranking 159 out of 187 in the 2014 UNDP development index. It has a fast growing economy with an average GDP growth rate of 6.9 per cent in the period 2004–2012, compared to 4.2 per cent for all Sub-Saharan countries (World Bank, 2014 and IMF, 2014). Agriculture is a prominent component of the Tanzanian economy, accounting for 27.6 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2012a), although the fastest growing sectors in 2013 were communications (22.8%), financial intermediation (12.2%) and construction (8.6%) (GOT, 2013a: 3).

14. The headcount poverty rate of Tanzania (based on monetary household consumption estimates) in 2011/2012 was 28.2 per cent, down from 35.6 per cent in

2000. There are growing rural-urban differences within the country, with poverty highest in rural areas. About 33.3 per cent of the rural population live below the poverty line, as do 24.5 per cent of female-headed households (GOT, 2013a: 22). Per capita income has increased from USD 652 to USD 742 in 2013 (GOT, 2014a: 3).

15. Tanzania has made efforts to advance gender equality, although challenges remain. The country ranked 125th out of 155 countries on the Gender-related Development Index for 2009 (UNDP, 2013), but also ranked 66th out of 136 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report, 2013 (World Economic Forum, 2013: 355). Women's labour force participation is quite high (88.2 per cent in 2011 against 90.0 per cent for men). Women face challenges in economic empowerment and continue to be more likely than men to be poor and illiterate and to be subject to gender-based violence. They usually have less access than men to medical care, property ownership, credit, training and employment (AEO, 2013).

16. Tanzania as a whole was not strongly affected by the international food price crisis of 2007–2008, and benefited from some donor funding meant to help poor countries react to the global economic turmoil of that period – notably the Financial Crisis Initiative (FCI) that helped fund an expansion in WFP school feeding work (¶104 below). The crisis drove an estimated 0.5–1.0 per cent of the national population, living mainly in urban areas, into poverty, defined in terms of the national poverty threshold (Kiratu *et al.*, 2011).

### *Vulnerability and response*

17. Tanzania's main disaster hazards are epidemics, floods and droughts. The country's ten year moving average of disasters for 2005–2014 was two events causing a total 19 deaths (PreventionWeb, 2015). However, droughts are estimated to have been responsible for over 90 per cent of all people affected by natural hazards in the past two decades. Over the evaluation period, 1m people in North East Tanzania were affected by drought in 2011, 50,200 people (particularly in Dar es Salaam) were affected by floods following unprecedented rainfall in 2011, and in 2014 30,000 people were affected by floods in the central Regions of Dodoma and Morogoro.

18. Current climate variability, such as the major droughts of 2005/06 and the major floods of 1997/98, has already had significant economic costs in Tanzania. The 2005/06 drought affected millions of people and imposed estimated costs of at least 1 per cent of GDP. Analysis of recent climate trends reveals that climate change poses significant risks for Tanzania. Climate change scenarios across multiple general circulation models show increases in country average mean temperatures of 1.3°C and 2.2°C projected by 2050 and 2100, which will alter the distribution of the agro-ecological zones. The effects of climate change are expected to cost almost 2 per cent of GDP annually by 2030 (DFID, 2011). The government has responded with a National Adaptation Programme of Action (GOT, 2007) and, building on that programme, a National Climate Change Strategy that “presents Tanzania with an opportunity to address climate change adaptation and participate in the global efforts to reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions in the context of sustainable development” (GOT, 2012b: ii).

19. Co-ordination of disaster management activities in Tanzania is the responsibility of the Disaster Management Department located in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO-DMD). The DMD seeks to ensure that in times of disaster, appropriate response systems, procedures and resources are in place to assist those afflicted. It is also in charge of co-ordinating disaster risk reduction and preparedness efforts and activities. The Tanzanian government has recently agreed a new Disaster Management Act that will establish a new Disaster Management Agency.

20. The National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) aims to maintain a national optimal level of food reserves to address local food shortages and respond to immediate emergency food requirements. WFP has not been required to provide emergency food assistance to Tanzanians since 2007.

### *Refugees*

21. Civil strife and ethnic conflicts in neighbouring countries have resulted in a major influx of refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) into Tanzania. The country hosted up to 600,000 refugees in 1994. Renewed stability over the past two decades created opportunities for refugees to return home. The Mtabila camp, where most Burundian refugees were accommodated, was closed in 2012. By the end of the review period, the remaining 65,000 refugees (primarily from DRC) resided in Nyarugusu camp in Kigoma region. The United States Government recently agreed to resettle more than 30,000 Congolese (DRC) refugees from Tanzania over the coming years as part of a regional resettlement strategy (UNHCR, 2015). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and WFP have been assessing protracted refugee situations like Nyarugusu. These assessments have led *inter alia* to recommendations for the development of “more plausible pathways to self-reliance and durable solutions” (WFP, 2013).

22. The Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for refugee issues in terms of the Refugees Act of 1998; WFP, along with UNHCR and other agencies, provides support. Tanzanian policy does not allow refugees to go more than four kilometres from the camp boundary.

### *Health and Nutrition*

23. In Tanzania, life expectancy at birth was estimated in 2013 to be 61 years. Under-five and infant mortality have declined significantly in the country, with rates falling from 61 to 52 deaths per 1,000 live births between 2010 and 2013. The country is on track for achieving Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 4 of reducing child mortality by two thirds. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevalence in the country has also declined over the same 2010–2013 period, falling from 5.5 to 5 per cent of the population aged 15–49. However, the prevalence still remains high in some Regions (up to 15 per cent). Women in Tanzania are particularly affected by HIV and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), comprising 60 per cent of those infected (2013). Malaria is a major public health concern for all Tanzanians, especially for pregnant women and children under age 5. It is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality among outpatients and inpatient admissions (PMI, 2011).

24. The diet in Tanzania is based on cereals (maize and sorghum), starchy roots (cassava) and pulses (beans). Consumption of micronutrient-dense foods such as animal products and fruit and vegetables is low and consequently micronutrient deficiencies, such as iron deficiency anaemia, are widespread. In 2010, about one third of children between 6–59 months were iron and vitamin A deficient, and 59 per cent of children were anaemic. Stunting rates reported in 2014 (34.7 per cent nationally) were significantly lower compared to 2010 (42 per cent). The level of stunting in 2014 varied according to World Health Organisation (WHO) classification, from ‘very high’ (>40 per cent) to ‘high’ (30–39 per cent). For Mainland Tanzania, 2014 survey results show a level of chronic malnutrition considered ‘very high’ – exceeding the 40 per cent threshold – in nine Regions, including Dodoma, which had 45 per cent. With regard to wasting, the 2014 nutrition survey results show a level of global acute malnutrition (GAM) considered by WHO as ‘acceptable’ (0–4 per cent) in all Regions of Tanzania Mainland except Dodoma, where the GAM level was 5.2 per cent. The prevalence of underweight in 2014 was ‘medium’ in terms of WHO criteria for level of public health

significance (10–19 per cent). At national level, the prevalence of underweight is used for monitoring MDG 1, ‘Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger’. Tanzania is very close to reaching its target for 2015 (12.5%) with a national prevalence of 13.4% in 2014 (TFNC, 2012, TFNC, 2014, WHO, 2014).

25. Both the 2010 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS, 2010) and the 2014 National Nutrition Survey (TFNC, 2014) show regional differences in malnutrition. In 2010, the highest rates of GAM could be found in Dodoma and Singida Regions. In 2010, Dodoma was one of the four Regions where stunting exceeded 50 per cent.

26. Recent government commitments include adoption of a national nutrition strategy (2011–2016) (GOT, 2012a); endorsement of a costed implementation plan for the strategy in 2013; incorporation of the nutrition assessment, counselling, and support (NACS) approach into its national HIV Care, Treatment, and Support Programme; and preparation of a new National Nutrition Policy (awaiting approval). Tanzania joined the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement in 2011, with President Jakaya Kikwete participating in the SUN Movement Lead Group and making a National Call for Action on Nutrition in May 2013. There is now a nutrition focal point in each district in Tanzania, although the allocation of adequate resources for nutrition programmes remains a challenge.

27. Stunting prevalence in Nyarugusu refugee camp was higher than the national average, with 46 per cent of children examined in 2012 stunted, falling to 41% in 2014. Of children under five years old, 38 per cent were estimated having anaemia in 2010 and 33 per cent in 2014. Among non-pregnant women, 31.2 per cent had anaemia in 2010 and 21 per cent in 2014. Malnutrition in the camp stems largely from poor infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices (UNHCR et al., 2012). Stakeholders also carried out two nutrition surveys in the camp that show the nutrition situation at the start and at the end of the evaluation period. The prevalence of GAM was relatively low in 2012 and 2014 (2.6 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively) and remained under the UNHCR 10% threshold for refugee settings and below the 5 per cent WHO threshold (WFP, 2015g).

### *Food Production*

28. Tanzania’s main food crops are maize, cassava and rice. Productivity is generally low, and value chains for food commodities are still underdeveloped. The agriculture sector has grown more slowly than the industry and service sectors, although on average the country is now self-sufficient in grain, with strong growth in the grain sector in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Underdeveloped markets, market infrastructure and farm-level value addition are among the constraints on agricultural productivity in Tanzania (FAO, 2013: 47).

### *Food Security*

29. Overall, Tanzania’s food security situation is improving, but food security gains are not matching national economic growth. According to the WFP 2012 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), 730,000 (8.3 per cent) of households in Tanzania were “food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity” in 2010–2011 (WFP, 2013g). This was a slight drop from 9.8 per cent in 2008–2009. Female-headed households (FHH) accounted for 26 per cent of all households nationally, and were slightly more prone to experiencing food insecurity and other forms of material and social poverty. Rural households are more exposed to food insecurity than urban households. Food insecurity varies geographically. Food shortages in the 2012 CFSVA were more commonly reported by households situated in Tanzania’s drought-prone bimodal rainfall zone (north and west) than those in the unimodal zone (south and east) (WFP, 2012g). According to assessments by the

Tanzania Food Security and Nutrition Analysis System (MUCHALI) and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET; see, for example, FEWS NET, 2015) there were no widespread food or livelihoods crises during the evaluation period.

30. The Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) 2011/12 – 2020/21 is the implementation plan for Tanzania’s compact under the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme. Recently somewhat overshadowed by the “Big Results Now programme” (BRN), for which agriculture is one of six priority sectors, it puts emphasis on investments in rural infrastructure and assets, including irrigation schemes, feeder roads and the sustainable use of natural resources, as a key component of a strategy to improve agricultural production and food security.

### *Education and school feeding*

31. Since 2000, largely due to the introduction of free primary education, there has been a 72 per cent increase in enrolment (some 2.2 million additional learners between 2001 and 2004), enabling the government to achieve its target of universal access. The 2011 primary enrolment dropped to 94 per cent from its peak of 97 per cent in 2006, with completion rates also falling from 69.3 per cent to 64.4 per cent. The quality of education remains low, with large class sizes, poor teaching methods and shortages of materials (World Bank, 2012). Primary school enrolment ratios for girls and boys are almost equal, though the gender balance deteriorates for secondary school, with 88 girls to every 100 boys enrolling in secondary school in 2012. Dropout rates in Tanzania’s primary schools averaged 4.5 per cent and in secondary schools were 13.8 per cent (GOT, 2014b: 36). Although absenteeism is the highest single reason for dropouts in primary (75.7 per cent) and secondary schools (76.1 per cent), early pregnancies (4.4 per cent) and marriage continue to contribute significantly to school dropouts (GOT, 2014b: 36).

32. The government’s education strategy and policy framework are set out in the Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP II). The education sector is struggling with various quality-related issues, but efforts are ongoing to improve learning outcomes. In December 2012 the Government of Tanzania officially embarked on the BRN programme and selected six national key priority areas, including education (GOT, 2013c). By 2014, Tanzania had finalised the “BRN in Education programme”, which will fast track quality improvements in primary and secondary education to ensure that students are not just going to school but also actually learning.

33. The notion of school feeding (SF) was incorporated in the 1995 “Education and Training Policy” (GOT, 1995), but this policy does not provide guidance on how it could be implemented. The ESDP anticipates the introduction of community-funded SF schemes (GOT, 2008). MKUKUTA II articulates how a SF programme with community involvement would promote equitable access to education for all (GOT, 2010). The National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) 2011–2016 prioritises interventions targeting children under five years and women of reproductive age, but recognises the importance of promoting good nutrition in other groups – which include school age children.

### *Social protection*

34. The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) is a Government of Tanzania funding facility that aims to address chronic poverty and food insecurity. In its first two phases (2000–2004, 2005–2013), TASAF interventions focused mainly on developing community level assets in the form of medium-scale infrastructure projects, for example community dams.

35. TASAF III (first phase 2013–2016) saw a change in emphasis through a focus on supporting interventions that enable poor households to increase income and opportunities while improving consumption (Davies et al., 2012). TASAF III aims to do this through:


- a national safety net component targeted at the poorest and most vulnerable groups that will provide cash transfers linked to pregnant and lactating women’s attendance at health facilities and households sending children to schools, and wages linked to participation in public works;
- community-driven interventions that enhance livelihoods and increase incomes (through community savings and investments);
- targeted infrastructure development and capacity building.

36. TASAF III aims to provide sustained support to about 250,000 households over the first five years of implementation through a targeted cash transfer programme and a labour-intensive public works scheme. It is supported by World Bank funding equivalent to USD 220 million, DFID support equivalent to approximately USD 18 million, and USAID funding of USD 0.45 million.

### *The Aid Landscape*

37. The economy of Tanzania still depends relatively heavily on official development assistance (ODA): USD 70 per capita in 2013, compared to USD 128 in South Sudan, USD 92 in Rwanda, USD 45 in Uganda and USD 41 in Ethiopia in the same year. Between 2010 and 2014 net ODA received accounted for 41.4 per cent of central government expenditure and in 2012 net ODA received accounted for 10.3 per cent of gross national income. Between 2012 and 2013, the largest ODA source was the United States, disbursing USD 651.4m, mainly through a three-year Millennium Challenge Compact that concluded in 2013 (OECD, 2014). Figure 1 below shows the top five donors to Tanzania in 2012–2013 (OECD does not provide data for other years in the review period). Total investments in Tanzania were above USD 8.7 billion in 2012, and USD 11.37 billion in 2013. Foreign direct investment in 2013 was around USD 1.88 billion, up from USD 1.8 billion in 2012.

**Figure 1** Top five donors of gross ODA Tanzania 2012–2013 (USD million)



Source: OECD, 2014

38. The United Nations Delivering as One (UN DAO) reform comes in response to the changing aid environment – an attempt to translate the Paris and Accra principles of aid effectiveness into practice. The initiative involves streamlining programmes, focusing on areas where the UN can have an impact, reducing duplication of efforts, and making more effective use of human and financial resources. The One UN Programme approach involves collaboration between UN agencies and partners, requiring joint work plans, joint budgets and defining common results.

39. At the end of 2006, eight countries, including Tanzania, volunteered to pilot the “Delivering as One” approach. UN Tanzania was therefore mandated to innovate and experiment with ways of planning, implementing and reporting as One for enhanced coherence, effectiveness and efficiency across four pillars: One Programme, One Leader, One Budget and One Office (harmonisation of business practices). The One Voice (joint communications) was subsequently added as a component at country level. Between 2008 and 2011, UN Tanzania initiated nine Joint Programmes (JPs) under the auspices of the One Programme and two JPs related to the One Office and the One Voice. The JP modality encouraged the 14 Participating UN agencies (PUNs) to work together.

40. From July 2011 to June 2015 (later extended to 2016), the UN in Tanzania is operating under a single business plan: the UNDAP. This has been extended to 2016. With a Result Monitoring Framework, the UNDAP incorporates a Programme Results Matrix and a complementary Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix which includes indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification. The UNDAP also incorporates a DAO Matrix that defines the strategic results and actions of the reform process. Tanzania has also produced a Common Country Programme Document (CCPD), which incorporates a common narrative with agency-specific components, results frameworks and resource requirements for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and WFP. Since 2007, donors have invested over USD 90m in UN Tanzania’s programmes through the One Fund, in addition to channelling funds to individual UN agencies. An independent evaluation of the 2011–16 UNDAP



(commissioned by UNDP) was being finalised at the time of this CPE. However, neither the report nor preliminary findings were available to the CPE team.

### 1.3. WFP's Portfolio in Tanzania

#### Overview and funding of the portfolio

41. WFP has been present in Tanzania since 1963, with 84 operations and a total budget over the period of USD 1,625m. This support has been to emergency, recovery and development operations.

42. The evaluation period (2011–2014) covers the operations implemented under the current CS, 2011–2015 (extended to 2016). During this period there have been a Country Programme (CP 200200) and three successive Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO 200029, 200325 and 200603). Table 1 below gives an overview of operations during the period and of funding for them. The total budget for the portfolio was USD 293,299,236, with 57.14 per cent of the funding received. The top source of funding for the CP was through multilateral funds<sup>12</sup> and UN Common Funds and Agencies (USD 16,030,447 and USD 9,892,062 respectively). The PRROs were largely funded by the USA and UK (USD 33,137,319 and USD 28,676,992 respectively). Annex E gives additional information on the portfolio, which also included the Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot programme: Tanzania was one of the 20 countries selected for engagement in this pilot, and one of four in which detailed impact evaluation was undertaken. A total of USD 3,575,522 of extra-budgetary funds was confirmed for Tanzania to support WFP P4P activities between 2011 and 2014 in the country (see Table 2 below). In 2012–2013, the CO, at the request of TASAF, carried out a cash transfer pilot in Mtwara Region, linked to the nutrition activities in the CP. Approximately USD 200,000 was used for this pilot project.

**Table 1 Tanzania Portfolio 2011–2014 by Programme Category**

	<b>No. of Operations</b>	<b>Requirements (USD)</b>	<b>% of requirements by project type</b>	<b>Actual received (USD)</b>	<b>% Requirements vs Received</b>
Relief and Recovery (PRRO)	3	130,504,969	44.50%	99,918,997	76.56%
Country Programme (CP)	1	162,794,267	55.50%	67,676,392	41.57%
		293,299,236	100.00%	167,595,389	57.14%

*Source:* WFP Resource Situation Documents. The table represents all operations within the evaluation period 2011–2014. However, PRRO 200603 and CP 200200 both continue beyond the evaluation period (PRRO 200603, 2016 and CP 200200, 2015), and PRRO 20029 started before the evaluation period (2010). The table includes data for total requirements and requirements received for the full period of these operations, taken from the latest Resource Situation Documents provided.

<sup>12</sup> Defined by WFP, 2013k as “a contribution, for which WFP determines the country programme or WFP activities in which the contribution will be used and how it will be used, or a contribution made in response to a broad-based appeal for which WFP determines, within the scope of the broad-based appeal, the country programme or WFP activities in which the contribution will be used and how it will be used, and for which the donor will accept reports submitted to the Board as sufficient to meet the requirements of the donor”.

**Table 2 Extra-budgetary funds confirmed for P4P activities in the period 2011–2014**

Grant No.	2011	2012	2013	2014	TOTAL
10018288	-	-	99,660.00	-	<b>99,660.00</b>
10003314	1,227,328.28	552,530.52	745,480.10	646,963.14	<b>3,172,302.04</b>
10022796	-	-	-	303,560.00	<b>303,560.00</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,227,328.28</b>	<b>552,530.52</b>	<b>845,140.10</b>	<b>950,523.14</b>	<b>3,575,522.04</b>

Source: CO data.

### Evolution of WFP strategy and portfolio

43. In April 2010, WFP produced a CS for Tanzania, covering 2011–2015. It identified three strategic priorities for the period: emergency humanitarian action; food security and nutrition support; and community investments in food security support. While these were all established areas of WFP effort in the country, the CS innovated, *inter alia*, by “integration of the various projects into an overarching framework”; “concentration of both geographic and programmatic focus for some programmes”; and “identification and targeting of focus communities for concentrated and integrated programmes on hunger solutions and disaster risk reduction... this... would represent a significant shift from a ‘project approach’ to a ‘solution approach’...” (WFP, 2010a: 3). These ideas reflected some of the recommendations of an evaluation of the CP then under way. Guided by the new CS, the 2011–15 CP 200200 started in July 2011.

44. CP 200200 focuses on two priorities. The first is food security and nutrition support (CS strategic priority 2, linking to Strategic Objectives (SOs) 2, 4 and 5 in the 2008–2013 WFP Strategic Plan) for people living in environmentally fragile and chronically food-insecure areas who face recurrent hunger periods, struggle to access food and to meet their basic food and nutrition needs, are more vulnerable to shocks, and require direct assistance. Components under this priority include SF, food assistance for assets (FFA), nutrition support and support to HIV/AIDS patients (2011–2012 only). The second comprises investments in community food and nutrition security (CS strategic priority 3, linking to SOs 2 and 5) for communities that are able to meet their basic food and nutrition needs but require further investment to ensure future food security and reduced vulnerability. Components include enabling government policy for hunger and nutrition solutions, linking smallholder farmers to markets through the P4P programme and strengthening food security and nutrition information systems.


45. The PRROs ran successively through the evaluation period, working towards CS strategic priority 1. PRRO 200029, which started in January 2010, ended in December 2011. This PRRO targeted over 98,000 people in two camps in Kigoma region, aiming to improve the food security and nutritional situation among refugees and protect the livelihoods of food-insecure households within the host population (aligned with SOs 1, 3 and 4 in the 2008–2013 WFP Strategic Plan). This operation was followed by PRRO 200325, which started in January 2012 and continued to provide essential food support for refugees in camps, as well as support to HIV/AIDS patients in and around the camps (aligned with SOs 1 and 3). During this period the majority of Burundian refugees were repatriated and Mtabila camp was closed, leaving the remaining Burundian and Congolese refugees in Nyarugusu camp, the sole refugee camp in Tanzania. PRRO 200603 started in July 2014, providing food assistance to the remaining 70,000 refugees and aligned with SOs 1 and 4 in the 2014–2017 Strategic Plan. During this PRRO, WFP and UNHCR began to explore a voucher component for the refugee programme. This is because Nyarugusu is located in a food-surplus region

“and alternative means of assistance may improve support for the refugees” and could “revitalise the local economy and encourage self-reliance” (WFP, 2013d: 3, 9).

46. Table 10 in Annex E summarises the evolution of the portfolio. Figure 2 shows the changing balance in terms of beneficiaries and tonnages for different activities, with a general trend in reducing beneficiary numbers, although the numbers of nutrition and general food distribution beneficiaries peaked in 2014 (see also 0 above). The decline reflects the funding shortfall of the CP. WFP reduced the number of schools in the SF programme from 1,167 to 640 and reduced the programme from covering six Regions to covering two. (In two other Regions, 23 boarding schools continued to be supported.) FFA coverage also declined from 2012, and from 2014 it was limited to district partnerships located in five regions.

47. In addition to the conventional elements of the portfolio described above, WFP’s P4P pilot was a significant feature during the period under review. Its aim was “to explore programming and procurement modalities that have the best potential to stimulate agricultural and market development in a way that maximizes benefits to smallholder farmers” (WFP, 2009h: 4). The initiative was referred to in the CP document (WFP, 2011b: 6) but P4P activities were separately funded under the global budget for the pilot. From 2009, the P4P team worked to strengthen WFP’s and subsequently other organisations’ procurement of food crops from smallholder farmer organisations. These numbered 28, representing 18,000 farmers, by 2013 (see ¶133 below). The global pilot was initially funded to 2013. A no-cost extension funded continuation of the activities in 2014.

**Figure 2 Portfolio beneficiaries and tonnage, planned and actual by operation<sup>13</sup>**



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–2014


### WFP presence in Tanzania

48. Figure 3 below reflects the decline in WFP staff in Tanzania following funding shortfalls in the Country Programme. In 2014, WFP closed its sub offices in Arusha and Kigoma, which affected programme coverage in four Regions (Arusha, Manyara, Kilimanjaro and Tanga). The 2014 SPR for the CP reported these closures in the context of funding shortfalls (WFP, 2015b: 6), although the relevance of the Kigoma sub office was declining with most refugee issues being handled from the Kasulu sub

<sup>13</sup> Number of beneficiaries by operation = average number of beneficiaries per year of the operation over the evaluation period 2011–14.

office and, according to CO informants, only 15–20% of DRC shipments being handled from there. According to the CO, the staff cuts resulted from a 2013 review that was conducted because of the funding constraints.

**Figure 3 WFP Tanzania Staffing 2011–14**



Source: WFP, 2015i

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1 Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

49. Evaluation questions (EQs) 1 – 6 in the evaluation matrix (Annex C) address the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP’s 2011–2016 CS (WFP, 2010a) and portfolio. In answering these questions, the CPE assesses the content and direction of the CS and of the portfolio, which should have been guided by it. The CS did not present an explicit theory of change explaining the assumptions made in planning for inputs and activities to lead to intended results. It is hard to identify even an implicit explanation of how and on what assumptions it expected its vision to be achieved. Its references to the WFP Strategic Plan and Objectives were brief. Two key features of the strategy can be seen as design assumptions, since failure to achieve them would presumably mean that it had not been adequately implemented. One (set out in the summary rather than the main text) is the emphasis on programmatic integration and geographic focus, achieving, *inter alia*, “concentrated and integrated programmes and hunger solutions” (WFP, 2010a: 3). The other is the ultimate objective, shown in the strategic framework, of “hand-over to government and partners” (linking to the commitment of the Paris Declaration, mentioned in the CS and affirmed in the 2011–2016 UNDAF, that “reliance on national systems should be promoted” (UNCT Tanzania, 2011a: 41)). The CPE assesses the extent to which these implicit assumptions were fulfilled.

#### Relevance to Tanzania’s humanitarian and development needs

50. Rooted in analysis of country context, priorities and lessons learned that occupied 14 of its 23 pages, the 2011–2015 CS was implicitly, though not explicitly relevant to Tanzania’s humanitarian and development needs. Relevance was not mentioned in the document, but the three strategic priorities that it identified (¶43 above) clearly addressed those needs. The first priority, emergency humanitarian action, was strongly relevant in the context of Tanzania’s refugee case load. The second, food security and nutrition support, focused on the continuing, real challenges of hunger and undernutrition facing some of the country’s own population. The relevance of the third priority, community investments in food security support, lay in national and WFP hopes for strategies that would build sustainable food security in Tanzanian livelihoods.

51. The CS stated that it was “informed by the unfolding UNDAF process to ensure consistency and alignment with it” (WFP, 2010a: 34). The focus of UNDAF I was on “strengthening the country’s enabling environment, building national capacity to deliver basic services and effectively deliver pro poor growth, and humanitarian assistance...” (UNCT Tanzania, 2011a: 25). Likewise, the WFP CS placed a strong emphasis on supporting government capacities and the implementation of nationally led programmes (WFP, 2010a: 16, 19). However, WFP remained strongly engaged in the direct provision of commodities (although it did also provide some technical assistance).

52. The strategic focus of WFP’s **vulnerability assessment and mapping** work on strengthening national food security and vulnerability systems is widely appreciated as relevant to both humanitarian and development needs in Tanzania (Annex G). However, some informants believe that, through its contribution to GOT-led VAM in Tanzania, WFP should have focused more on identifying pockets of food insecurity in surplus food producing areas of the country.

53. The **school feeding** commitment in the 2011–2016 CS was based on statistics dating from several years earlier (Annex G). With 95 per cent enrolment at primary

schools by mid-2011 (information not yet available when the CS was written), it was debatable how much more WFP could contribute with regard to enrolment. However, the targeting of SF interventions on Regions with lower net attendance ratios was relevant to development needs. Targeting was done in collaboration with the MOEVT, based on food security indicators combined with enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates and remoteness of schools. The schools under WFP's programme in Tanzania were located in five Regions, in 16 drought-prone, food-insecure districts of central and northern Tanzania (see map on page xii; following local government reorganisation in 2013, the coverage was 19 districts in six Regions).

54. Review of the 2010 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) and the 2014 National Nutrition Survey shows that the contents of the portfolio were relevant to the **nutrition** challenges facing Tanzania (¶23 – ¶25 above; Annex I below; DHS, 2010; TFNC, 2014). *Inter alia*, micronutrient deficiencies remained significant and IYCF practices (both addressed in the portfolio) were sub-optimal. The surveys showed significant regional differences in nutrition status, with WFP appropriately targeting the worst affected areas (Bahi, Chamwino, Singida Rural and Ikungi districts in Dodoma and Singida Regions). Interventions were also relevant to the nutrition status of refugees in the Nyarugusu camp, where stunting remained an area of concern and there were significant levels of anaemia in children aged under five (UNHCR et al., 2012; WFP, 2015g).

55. Many interviewees acknowledged that WFP's **FFA** projects were highly relevant to Tanzania's chronically food insecure population and to communities and households that are vulnerable to natural disasters, volatile food prices and other shocks (Annex J). The community assets supported, such as irrigation schemes, contour terraces and market access roads, were considered to be appropriate to the environmental and economic context and were identified as priorities by communities and districts (i.e. in District Development Plans).

56. FFA projects were targeted at the Regions with among the highest levels of chronic food insecurity and vulnerability to natural disasters in the country (see map on page xii; WFP, 2010d). Table 3 provides data on the coverage of the chronically food insecure population<sup>14</sup> by WFP FFA projects in each region where they were implemented. It shows that overall 27% of chronically food insecure women and men benefited from FFA activities<sup>15</sup>. There is, however, significant variation between Regions. While almost three quarters of the chronically food insecure population did not benefit from WFP FFA projects, it should be noted that some of them would have been beneficiaries of TASAF projects and some would have received emergency food assistance from the NFRA at times of acute crisis. No data were found on the number of chronically food insecure people remaining without any form of support in meeting basic food needs and strengthening their livelihoods.

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<sup>14</sup> The chronically food insecure population is considered to be the people with poor food consumption plus the people with borderline food consumption in the 2010 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (WFP, 2010d). Data are only available at Regional, not at district level due to limitations in sample size during the CFSVA.

<sup>15</sup> FFA beneficiaries are those people who benefited from food rations (i.e. FFA participants plus family members). In the absence of more detailed monitoring data, they might also be considered as part of the community that benefits from the asset which was constructed or rehabilitated.

**Table 3 Chronically food insecure people benefiting from WFP FFA projects by Region**

	Number of chronically food insecure (WFP, 2010d)			Number of FFA beneficiaries 2011–2014			Percentage of chronically food insecure benefiting from FFA		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Manyara	224,630	207,357	431,987	18,873	15,441	34,314	8	7	8
Dodoma	222,738	205,611	428,348	76,099	73,114	149,213	34	36	35
Arusha	140,139	129,364	269,503	49,053	55,315	104,368	35	43	39
Singida	110,159	101,689	211,848	1,761	1,094	2,855	2	1	1
Mwanza	149,274	137,796	287,069	39,089	40,684	79,773	26	30	28
Shinyanga	68,663	63,383	132,046	51,775	31,932	83,707	75	50	63
Kilimanjaro	61,002	56,311	117,313	16,798	17,483	34,281	28	31	29
Tabora	79,871	73,729	153,600	35,808	29,297	65,105	45	40	42
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,056,476</b>	<b>975,240</b>	<b>2,031,716</b>	<b>289,256</b>	<b>264,360</b>	<b>553,616</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>

Sources: WFP, 2010d, SPRs.

57. Most Tanzanians interviewed considered that the provision of food for work is more appropriate than cash for work because of fears that cash will be ‘misused’, i.e. spent on non-essential items. Significant interest was expressed by communities, farmers’ organisations (FOs) and district officials in vouchers as an alternative to in-kind food rations as means of promoting local production and trade, whilst ensuring that people are able to access essential needs. On the other hand, the evaluation of the WFP 2012–2013 conditional cash transfer pilot project (¶ 97 below) found that 81 per cent of the cash received was spent on food, 3 per cent on medical and health services, 6 per cent was saved and 4 per cent was used on non-food items, e.g. clothes (WFP, 2014a).

58. Through **P4P**, WFP has been working since 2009 to strengthen Tanzanian farmers’ access to commercial markets, initially through efforts to source more of its own food requirements within the country and later through the promotion of links between smallholder farmer organisations, the NFRA and other buyers. This was a clearly relevant way of meeting humanitarian and development needs within and beyond the country: much of WFP’s procurement in Tanzania is for use elsewhere (¶143 below). The programme began with a focus on north central parts of the country with high concentrations of livelihood insecurity, but later spread elsewhere because drought reduced marketable surpluses in the original target areas (see map on page xii).

59. As Annex L shows, design of the 2011–2016 CS and the portfolio made the usual references to **gender**. The status and progress of women and girls as beneficiaries within refugee camps and Tanzanian society, and as members of those communities, have been monitored and documented. In this context, gender-relevant interventions were designed – for example, promoting the role of women as registered recipients of PRRO food rations, as members of school food management committees and as workers and managers in FFA projects.

### **Alignment with national agenda and policies**

60. The 2011–2016 CS set out the national policy and strategic frameworks “that guide WFP’s country strategy and support food security”. It referred to Vision 2025, MKUKUTA II and various agricultural strategies and programmes such as the TAFSIP) 2011/12 – 2020/21 (WFP, 2010a: 9). It showed a ‘strategic framework’ diagram of the links between the national agenda and policies and the proposed

content of the CS (see Figure 11, Annex K below). On paper, at least, the portfolio was well aligned with national intentions.

61. It is an open question, however, what national intentions were with regard to the overall role of UN agencies and development partners (DPs). Tanzania's dependence on ODA remains heavy (¶37 above). National ownership of the development process, and the supportive rather than directive stance of the UN and DPs, is clear. There were no specific guidelines in national policy or macro level programming (such as MKUKUTA II) about the role(s) that WFP should play or how the organisation might link policy and capacity development support to an exit strategy.

62. WFP's **VAM** work has been aligned with national agenda and policy for food security assessment, and contributed significantly during the review period to the development of GOT capacity in this area despite experiencing significantly reduced resources compared to the preceding period (Annex G). However, interviews indicated that WFP's VAM work plan was not optimally aligned with that of the Food Security Division (FSD) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives (MOAFC). It could include working closely with the post-harvest team as well as the crop monitoring and early warning unit. VAM efforts were focused at the national level. There are increasing requests for support from the MOAFC and PMO-DMD to scale up such capacity building support at LGA level.

63. It is important for WFP to be engaged in preparedness activities as well as responses to food deficits. WFP is also a member of the Tanzania Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) technical working group and participated in the integration of the IPC approach into the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessments (CFSNAs). However, some stakeholders would prefer WFP's global level commitment to the IPC approach to be more strongly translated into technical support at country level in Tanzania.

64. References to **school feeding** in national policy are sparse (Annex G). The 2011–2016 CS did mention that it featured in the education sector of MKUKUTA II, but not that national policy emphasised community involvement. The CP referred to the inclusion of SF in national education and training policy, but did not mention that this policy dated from 1995.

65. When most of the portfolio was designed, no updated **nutrition** policy or strategy existed in Tanzania to guide WFP's nutrition-specific interventions. WFP's nutrition portfolio aligns with the 1992 Food and Nutrition Policy, although according to informants this policy was rather outdated by 2011, following a significant change in the policy environment and in the national nutrition situation. The NNS 2011–2016 was finalized mid-2011 with input from various stakeholders, including WFP (according to interviewees). Although mostly designed prior to the validation of the NNS 2011–2016, the portfolio was already in line with it (Annex I). WFP nutrition interventions were also in line with Vision 2025, MKUKUTA II and the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2005–2015 (TFNC, 2012; SUN, 2013).

66. The 2011–2016 CS and the CP indicated that transition to nationally owned safety net programmes was a top priority of WFP. This intention is also reflected in the 2011–2016 UNDAF. It was therefore to be expected that there would be close association between WFP's **FFA** programme and nationally owned programmes, such as TASAF. The community assets supported by WFP are also promoted within national poverty reduction strategies and plans such as the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan. The WFP FFA programme is very similar in objectives and approach to the public works component of the national TASAF initiative. While there has been practical collaboration between WFP FFA and TASAF activities at field level (e.g. the Madege irrigation scheme in Kondoa District), there is limited evidence of



alignment at national level – although WFP was engaged in the early design stages of TASAF III and helped to define work norms for TASAF labour-intensive public works programmes. However, in other fields WFP did engage effectively with government ministries and departments at the national level, e.g. in supporting the development of the new Disaster Development Act and building capacities in vulnerability and early warning analysis.

67. WFP’s **P4P** efforts across the whole review period have been broadly in line with the national agenda and policies for agricultural development. As in many countries, policy and programmes for agricultural marketing have been complex and challenging. Interviews indicate that state interventions in crop markets through the NFRA under the national agricultural subsidy strategy, and consequently the role of the NFRA, are criticised in some quarters as an unnecessary drain on national resources. Nevertheless, this is a sector in which WFP built strong alignment with government priorities.

68. There is no evidence of divergence by the 2011–2016 CS and portfolio from national **gender** policy, but also little evidence of proactive convergence (Annex L). The CS mentioned gender as a cross-cutting programme priority and described it as “an integral part of all programme areas” (WFP, 2010a: 17), but did not elaborate. The CP only stated that gender mainstreaming was one of the five 2011–2016 UNDAF programming principles (WFP, 2011b: 4). Interviews revealed little understanding of how gender is addressed by the new NNS and concern in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children that there was not closer liaison with WFP.

### **Alignment with other development partners**

69. Under the heading “comparative advantages”, the 2011–2016 CS stated that “partnerships form the bedrock of WFP programmes” (WFP, 2010a: 14). The CPE found varying levels of evidence of these partnerships in different parts of the portfolio.

70. UN Delivering As One offered a major opportunity – and challenge – for the alignment and strategic positioning of the WFP portfolio in Tanzania during the review period. Informants consider WFP to have engaged constructively in the development and implementation of **UNDAF I** (2011–2016). A common country programme was agreed between UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP aligned with the UNDAF. However, there is no evidence that this resulted in significantly more productive alignment and synergy between all these stakeholders, nor in enhancement of WFP’s strategic positioning relative to GOT programmes or the contributions of the UN as a whole, nor in co-ordinated programming at community level targeting the same beneficiaries. There is a perception that WFP was more engaged in DAO processes during the first year or two of the UNDAF but its participation waned subsequently. This reflects a general trend amongst the participating agencies. In terms of the development of the new UNDAF (2016–2020), on the one hand it is appreciated that WFP is not trying to ‘impose’ itself, but on the other hand some interviewees expressed concern that WFP is not engaging sufficiently in strategic discussions about how the UN can better provide co-ordinated and coherent support to the GOT and other national stakeholders (Annex K).

71. WFP co-chaired the UN Emergency Co-ordination Group throughout the 2011–2016 UNDAF period to date, as well as chairing the Emergency Programme Working Group (EPWG, which focuses on government capacity building in disaster management). Some stakeholders, including in government departments, consider that WFP’s leadership of the EPWG has not been as strong as it might have been and that this is disappointing given that there is still a need for co-ordinated capacity development support from the UN.

72. In contributing to the Tanzania Food Security and Nutrition Analysis System (MUCHALI, co-chaired by the PMO-DMD and the MOAFC), WFP's **VAM** service collaborates with a number of DPs (Annex G). These include FAO, WFP, UNICEF and a number of international NGOs. WFP's approach of supporting multi-stakeholder, consensus-based assessments and analysis, in addition to conducting its own assessments for its own programming, are highly regarded. However, some government stakeholders consider that WFP could feed in more of its own information on the food security situation and its assistance activities, e.g. SF, to inform collective situation analysis and the coordination of activities.

73. The 2011–2016 CS made no reference to other partners working with government in the **school feeding** sector; in fact there were few such partners (Annex G). However, the CP envisaged ongoing collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT) in developing a national SF strategy and guidelines.

74. WFP's **nutrition** work involved a significant degree of alignment with other DPs, notably in the allocation of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) support to WFP through its supplementary feeding programme and of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) support to UNICEF – with children whose therapeutic feeding under the latter was completed being eligible to transfer to supplementary feeding by the former (Annex I). Work in the Nyarugusu refugee camp was closely integrated with that of international and national partners and their respective roles, such as UNHCR (overall responsibility for refugees), the Tanzania Red Cross Society (TRCS: health services) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC: protection, gender and other social support).

75. The strong development of **P4P** during the review period marked a different kind of strategic positioning for WFP in Tanzania, developing its profile as an agricultural development agency. While this profile was focused on enhanced profitability and enhanced crop marketing systems for smallholder farmers, with evident benefits for those producers and for the National Food Reserve Agency, it raised apparently unanswered questions about what this positioning meant in relation to other UN agencies, notably FAO. Whatever its success, the P4P pilot remained a strategic outlier in the 2011–2014 portfolio.

76. The CPE assessed whether the nutrition interventions at Nyarugusu were in adherence with the **SPHERE international humanitarian principles and standards for nutrition** (Sphere, 2011). The project documents do not specifically refer to SPHERE or other international humanitarian principles but monitoring reports do consider SPHERE standards. In 2012, most nutrition-related standards of SPHERE were considered to be satisfactory although it was reported that the number of health posts was not sufficient, following which TRCS constructed new health posts (UNHCR *et al.*, 2012). Adherence to SPHERE standards was also assessed during the 2014 camp nutrition survey, which concluded that the health and nutrition indicators met these standards, including those for the performance of the Supplementary Feeding Programme (SuFP) and blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) (WFP, 2015; see ¶123 and ¶127 below). Through its commitment to the 2011–2016 UNDAF and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, WFP also aligned itself with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (UNCT Tanzania, 2011a: 4).

77. The CPE did not identify any examples of field level collaboration between WFP and other UN agencies in **FFA** activities. The field-level presence of other UN agencies in WFP's area of operation is minimal. However, interviewees in other agencies considered WFP's FFA programme to be coherent with the objectives and activities in the 2011–2016 UNDAF.

78. WFP worked closely with other DPs on **gender** issues in the refugee camps, notably IRC (nominated by UNHCR as lead agency on gender and protection issues at Nyarugusu).

79. Outside the refugee context, collaboration with **NGOs** included work with international NGOs on the Tanzania Food Security and Nutrition Analysis System (MUCHALI: Annex G ¶8). Opportunities to link with PANITA, a national civil society nutrition network, were reportedly missed, and there was no official collaboration with the Mwanzo Bora Nutrition Programme (Annex I ¶64). In northern and central Regions, FFA activities were implemented through a national NGO, the Arusha Archdiocesan Integrated Development and Relief Office (AAIDRO) and WFP collaborated with nine other NGOs in FFA and school feeding activities.

### **Alignment with WFP strategy and standards**

80. Over the review period, WFP's strategies and policies evolved, as it adapted to the changing international aid climate and new perspectives on food security and nutrition. The leading theme in the Strategic Plan 2008–2013 was the shift from food aid to food assistance, and in the Tanzania 2011–2016 CS and the CP this shift was explored.

81. As noted in ¶49 above, the 2011–2016 CS did not offer any analytical cross reference to the Strategic Objectives of the 2008–2013 WFP Strategic Plan. A diagram (WFP, 2010a: 18) did offer a schematic linkage of the SOs to the “Country Programme” and “humanitarian response” respectively, with SO5 unsurprisingly associated with the former; SOs 1 and 3 the latter; and SOs 2 and 4 spanning the two. The only portfolio component planned since the adoption of the Strategic Plan 2014–2017 was PRRO 200603, which did explain its alignment with SOs 1 and 4. As explained in ¶193 below, portfolio design and monitoring did not refer explicitly to the relevant corporate Strategic Results Frameworks.

82. **VAM** work in the Tanzania portfolio closely follows corporate VAM approaches and methods, which date back to the formation of the VAM service in 1994 (Annex G). Prior to the evaluation period, WFP had significant resources to support VAM activities, from the global WFP Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC) project as well as through programme funding for emergency operations (EMOPs) and responses to the global food price and financial crises. However, during the evaluation period VAM activities have been very poorly resourced. This has meant that WFP was unable to engage in as many multi-stakeholder processes as it would have liked.

83. The WFP VAM staff in Tanzania demonstrated a strong awareness of relevant corporate guidelines (e.g. on CFSVAs, Emergency Food Security Analyses (EFSAs), market analysis, and the 3-pronged approach to resilience analysis and programming) as well as international standards (e.g. SPHERE, IPC). In general, they have been well used to inform internal assessments and external capacity development activities. However, one informant did suggest that the corporate 3-pronged approach could be used more, to guide WFP's FFA and other programming and to inform national government information and planning systems. CP design linked FFA work to SOs 2 and 5 in WFP's 2008–2013 Strategic Plan (WFP, 2011b: 13–14).

84. The **school feeding** interventions designed before and during the early part of the review period were guided by WFP's corporate SF policy of 2009 and by the 2010 guidance note on SF and nutrition (WFP, 2009g and WFP, 2010f). Although the 2013 revision of the SF policy had not yet been produced (WFP, 2013e), the activity broadly conformed with its intentions (Annex G). CP design tied the SF activity to SOs 4 and 5 in the Strategic Plan (WFP, 2011b: 12–13).

85. The 2011–2016 CS and much of the portfolio were developed prior to the publication of the 2012 WFP corporate strategy on **nutrition** and relevant guidelines (WFP, 2012f; WFP, 2012e). Some early alignment with these corporate policies could nevertheless be detected, and the CP linked this activity to SOs 4 and 5 in the then Strategic Plan (WFP, 2011b: 14–16). The 2010 WFP nutrition policy calls for a comprehensive approach to prevent stunting, which was applied in the CP (supplementation with Super Cereal, nutrition and health education, capacity building and support to food fortification). The 2012 Nutrition Policy specifies that specialised food supplements can be part of a stunting approach, especially in countries where the prevalence of stunting is at least 30 per cent. This approach was applied in Tanzania, which had 42 per cent stunting in 2010 (DHS, 2010). The CP also aligned its geographic focus with corporate policies’ emphasis that stunting prevention programmes should be targeted to areas with high stunting rates, high poverty and high food insecurity.

86. As part of a global WFP pilot, the **P4P** component of the portfolio was explicitly in line with a corporate strategy to strengthen the organisation’s role in agricultural development, building on its “commitment to enhancing the development impact of its procurement” as formalised in its 2008 – 2013 Strategic Plan (WFP, 2012m: 4).

87. The portfolio’s formal alignment with corporate **gender** policy was not very meaningful. Gender Focal Points had very few resources with which to work. Capacity development within the CO was similarly restricted, as was overall implementation of corporate policy. PRRO and CP documents during the review period made no reference to WFP’s **humanitarian protection policy** (WFP, 2012j). Instead, PRRO documents stated simply that protection issues in refugee camps were the responsibility of UNHCR (see also ¶36, Annex L).

### **Strategic positioning**

88. WFP’s **VAM** capacity building activities (¶82 above) have been very much focused on early warning and emergency assessment to inform disaster management responses. A number of CPE interviewees suggested that WFP should have done more to support improved government and multi-stakeholder monitoring of chronic food insecurity to inform social protection and climate change adaptation policies and programmes. This was considered by some to be an opportunity that WFP missed.

89. The CP’s intention to work with the GOT to develop a national **school feeding** strategy and guidelines was reflected in the 2011–2016 UNDAF (UNDAO, 2014; UNDAO, 2011). There is minimal national policy guidance on SF in Tanzania but the CP and the 2011–2016 CS failed to mention the focus of community involvement in the national policy documents. In practice, there is little evidence of a strategic partnership between WFP and the MOEVT. By the end of the review period, WFP’s positioning in this sector could not be described as ‘strategic’. From active and encouraging beginnings that culminated in President Kikwete’s visit to the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger in Brazil, WFP and the GOT drifted apart and the organisation’s influence on the national agenda appeared to evaporate. Government put a significantly stronger emphasis on community-based approaches than WFP, with its continuing deliveries of externally sourced commodities to schools.

90. EQ5 (Annex C) asks what WFP’s comparative advantage is in Tanzania. WFP had some specific comparative advantages with regard to **nutrition**. In Tanzania it was the sole agency providing specialised nutritious foods (Super Cereal) through direct feeding programmes in health centres, and there was thus little risk of overlap with other organisations and agencies. Design documents indicate how its nutrition portfolio was aligned with the UNDAF 2011–2016, including the linkages between the

respective logical frameworks and identifying WFP's comparative advantage in nutrition (Annex I).

91. With **HIV** prevalence in Nyarugusu camp at only 1 per cent, support to people living with HIV and AIDS, as well as those co-infected with tuberculosis, was discontinued during the review period, with an apparent intention that government would take over special support to this group – which did not occur. Stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation mission regretted this decision and argued that people on anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS) for tuberculosis in the camps are much more vulnerable as no other agency is providing them the supplementary nutritious food that their vulnerability warranted (key informant interview (KII); WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d).

92. The national agenda for “viable productive safety net programmes which target the most vulnerable and food insecure” (to quote the 2011–2016 CS) was taking new and more purposeful shape in Tanzania during the review period, as a clearer social protection strategy developed under TASAF and some development partners began to work with the GOT on a productive social safety net (PSSN). This had the makings of what WFP itself aimed at in its CS: “an integrated and focused approach that supports the Government to end hunger in the country”. A number of informants felt that WFP should have used its **FFA** operational experience more to influence the national social protection agenda. It did hold discussions with TASAF about the appropriateness of cash transfers and possibility of WFP implementing TASAF public works projects. However, these discussions did not lead to any conclusions on collaboration during the review period.

93. Expertise in large-scale food procurement and management is arguably a global comparative advantage for the organisation. Through **P4P** it sought to use this strength to position itself as a promoter of commercial links between smallholder farmers and crop markets. WFP has sought to build a strategic position, and strengthen its profile, as expert facilitator of agricultural market development that benefits smaller producers.

## **2.2 Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-making**

94. Evaluation Questions 7–10 in the evaluation matrix (Annex C) explore the factors and quality of strategic decision-making in the portfolio. They ask how thoroughly WFP analysed hunger challenges, food security, nutrition and gender issues in Tanzania; what factors influenced WFP's decision-making in these fields; what influence WFP had in promoting these issues on the national agenda and helping to develop the needed capacity; and how much WFP learned from experience and adapted to changing contexts.

95. The 2011–2016 CS presented a thorough analysis of food security challenges in Tanzania and of WFP experience in tackling them. This was based primarily on secondary sources rather than on WFP's own studies, although some of the latter work was also quoted (WFP, 2010a: 8), and VAM findings were quoted extensively in presentation of the rationale for focusing much of the effort on the more drought-prone, food insecure Regions. The appropriate conclusion of this CS analysis was that WFP should strive for “an integrated and focused approach that supports the Government to end hunger in the country” with “viable productive safety net programmes which target the most vulnerable and food insecure” as the core mechanism in this approach (WFP, 2010a: 14, 16).

96. All this analysis should preferably have culminated in a CS presenting a convincing theory of change explicitly linked to corporate Strategic Objectives. As shown in ¶49 above, it did not. There is no formal requirement for a CS to include a

theory of change, and this CS did not present one, or set out its critical design assumptions. It did have important strategic elements, whose fulfilment this CPE assesses. But most of the strategic analysis presented in this section was undertaken at subsidiary levels of portfolio design and implementation. Assessment of the work done at those levels shows that little attention was given to synergies between operations or activities (see ¶153–154 below). This made it harder to achieve the 2011–2016 CS’s intention of locally integrated approaches to food assistance.

### **Analysis and factors influencing decision-making**

97. During the review period WFP conducted no external programme evaluations in Tanzania. On the request of TASAF, it undertook a cash transfer pilot in Mtwara, which is among the Regions with high prevalence of chronic food insecurity and micronutrient deficiency (WFP, 2012n). The cash pilot followed recommendations of the WFP Transfer Modality Review in Tanzania (January 2011), the district-level Market Assessment (February 2011) (Ndaw, 2011) and the Programme Response Identification Study (Mayer & Kambarangwe, 2011) which identified a favourable context in terms of market function, food availability, physical access, beneficiary preferences, inflation, prices, financial transfers, and security.

98. During the evaluation period, WFP, in collaboration with UNHCR, the government and partners, also conducted a feasibility study in Nyarugusu camp under the PRRO to assess the suitability of cash/vouchers as a new modality of food assistance to the refugee operation. The study took into consideration issues related to protection, gender-based violence, intra-household dynamics, and the concerns of people with disabilities and of youth. The study also covered an in-depth analysis of food production in the region and markets, and their capacity to increase supply without affecting local consumers (WFP, 2014n). It led to a decision to work towards the introduction of cash-based transfers.

99. Other analytical work was relatively sparse in the portfolio, beyond WFP’s customary use of CFSVAs and its use of vulnerability assessment and mapping (VAM) work to guide its targeting and of Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs) and other monitoring of refugee status under the PRROs. (No full CFSVA took place during the review period; only a desk-based update in 2012 of the 2010 CFSVA.) However, WFP’s well-established VAM capabilities and outputs were extensively used in preparation of the 2011–2016 CS and the CP (WFP, 2010a, WFP, 2011b). WFP has certainly used its comparative advantages in terms of its technical capacities for VAM at global, regional and national levels. But the lack of documentation on VAM (particularly capacity development) activities, outcomes and impacts not only risks concealing a valuable component of WFP’s portfolio but also may hinder strategic thinking about the future direction of VAM and how it might inform the overall strategy of WFP in Tanzania (Annex G).

100. WFP informants at country and regional levels believe that there is a need to shift VAM work in line with the WFP corporate Strategic Plan. They feel that the VAM work was not as influential as it might have been in ensuring that the capacity development and policy influencing approach outlined in the CS was operationalised.

101. Nutrition interventions were based on careful analysis of available national survey data (¶105 and Annex I below). The global evaluation of the P4P pilot, with its special impact assessment focus on Tanzania and three other countries, was a significant feature of P4P implementation, partly because it was so protracted. Ongoing analysis of the P4P experience led, *inter alia*, to a ‘strategy refresh’ that broadened the pilot’s focus from the originally selected districts (¶118 below).

102. It is unclear what influence the 2011–2016 **UNDAP** had on WFP’s 2011–2016 CS and activities in Tanzania. WFP did take on additional tasks such as support to the common UN IT platform. However, it was difficult to identify any programme activities or approaches which were a consequence of DAO. The funding received from the One UN Fund was received on time and did enable WFP to expand the coverage of its SF, FFA and nutrition activities to a larger number of people than would have otherwise been the case. However, CO informants suggest that any benefits of the DAO process are vastly outweighed by the negative impacts and opportunity costs of engaging in UN co-ordination meetings and processes.

103. Many informants perceive that UN agencies, including WFP, merely categorised their planned activities under common outcomes and goals in the UNDAP. The UNDAP is considered to be inadequately based on the sort of joint analysis and planning that would lead to co-ordinated strategic decision-making.

104. In the case of **school feeding** (Annex G), an analysis of portfolio design gives the impression that strategic choices might have been guided more by availability of resources than by a detailed review of the situation and the country’s needs. Funding was a major influence on WFP’s strategic choices in this sector. The availability of a major 2009 grant of USD 34.6m under the FCI of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) meant that WFP could scale up all the components of the new CP, including SF. There was little detailed analysis of technical data and rationales for the strategies adopted, for example the piloting of micronutrient powders (MNPs) in school meals and links with government’s deworming programme. Nor is there evidence of WFP analysing the opportunities for integrating SF efforts with national social protection policy, programmes and systems – despite the initial presentation of this activity as contributing to safety nets.

105. Design documents show thorough causal analysis for **nutrition**, although this exercise was hampered by limited availability of recent data, especially for the 2011–2016 CS – which was based on the 2004 TDHS and 2010 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA). During preparation of the CP, more updated nutrition information could be used, based on the 2010 TDHS. The design of the nutrition interventions for the refugee camps was duly based on the findings and recommendations of surveys carried out there, such as the 2010 and 2012 nutrition surveys, the 2010 and 2012 Joint Assessment Missions, the 2011 and 2012 community and household surveillance (CHS) exercises and various post distribution monitoring surveys (Annex I).

106. The strategic direction of **FFA** activities was informed by WFP’s own vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) as well as the food security assessments and analysis carried out by the national government with the support of WFP. At field level, WFP’s Community Managed Targeting and Distribution (CMTD) approach was used to select beneficiaries and manage food distributions (WFP, nd). Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities have had an influence on FFA activities and methods of implementation. The evaluation of the 2007–10 CP influenced FFA activities in the subsequent portfolio, e.g. concentration of projects in a smaller geographical area. WFP’s own Comprehensive Monitoring Exercises have also led to adjustments in implementation approach. However, the major factor affecting FFA strategy has been the availability of funding, which meant a significantly larger scale of operations during the first half of the review period than the second.

107. The evidence is mixed regarding the relative appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of in-kind food, voucher and cash **modalities**. Beneficiary interviews indicated strong support for food transfers by FFA projects. There is a large body of evidence from other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that cash transfers are effective in

assisting poor and vulnerable people to meet basic food and non-food needs and strengthen their livelihoods in socio-economic contexts similar to Tanzania. The evaluation of WFP's cash transfer pilot project in Mtwara also demonstrated such outcomes (¶97, 57, 158, 172). There is strong support for the use of cash in the refugee context. The international evidence also suggests that cash transfers are more cost-effective than in-kind transfers. WFP Tanzania did not do enough analysis to reach a conclusion on this key question. Instead, it continued to assume that vouchers (i.e. transfers redeemable for food, not cash, at approved retail points (WFP, 2014s: 10)) are the appropriate modality, rather than a direct switch to cash transfers (for example through Tanzania's now ubiquitous mobile banking, which can also be used for a voucher system).

108. The CO's decision-making with regard to **P4P** was guided by the corporate strategy for this global pilot – which also allowed for country-level discretion according to national circumstances. Due consideration was given to local policy and institutional structures, as framed by Tanzanian legislation: for example, the realisation that the Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOs) were not entitled to engage in marketing, and the WFP should therefore facilitate the establishment of Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Societies (AMCOs) to do this on their behalf. Interviews indicate that environmental factors also affected the development of P4P in Tanzania, necessitating support to groups far away from the original focus zone of food insecurity in the centre of the country. Prior to the evaluation period, drought and low production there meant that P4P procurement had to expand to three groups (out of a total of 28) located in areas of higher rainfall and output.

109. As noted in ¶68 above, there is no evidence from the 2011–2016 CS or the CP of **gender** issues having been thoroughly analysed during programme design, although gender differentials have been monitored during portfolio implementation, leading to some adjustments in strategy (Annex L).

110. A different type of strategic analysis was probably uppermost in the minds of CO management from month to month. This concerned the maintenance of WFP operations in Tanzania in the face of significant **funding constraints**, particularly for the CP (see Table 10 and Table 11 in Annex E). As WFP has noted, “if a project has high fixed costs within LTSH [landside storage, transport and handling], ODOC [other direct operational costs] and DSC [direct support costs] and actual funding levels are much lower than anticipated when the budget plan was prepared, the country office will be expected to review its costs and make cuts where possible (close sub offices, reduce staffing, etc.)...” (WFP, nd(d): 35). This is indeed what this medium-sized CO had to do in 2014 (¶48 above). While global funding shortfalls against budget plans have averaged 40 per cent for WFP in recent years (WFP, nd(d): 35), the shortfall for the 2011–2016 Tanzania CP is currently 60 per cent (Table 1 above). Outside the context of humanitarian support to refugees, the increasingly urgent strategic challenge to the CO was how to fund effective operations at a meaningful scale – or, potentially, to switch more explicitly to pilot and advisory modes. This potential is explored in chapter 3 below.

111. A final, important influence on strategic decision making was the planning and implementation structure imposed for non-humanitarian elements of the portfolio by the CP format. Implicit in that format is the assumption that a set of activities can be identified, justified, funded and implemented in a reasonably standard and consistent manner for several years. In the Tanzania portfolio, as the 2011–2016 CP progressed, this assumption became steadily less true. Instead, there was a growing need for flexibility, reduced direct implementation and increased emphasis on technical assistance, policy work, advisory services and facilitation: arguably, from food assistance to food advice. While budget revisions do provide a mechanism for



periodically adjusting a CP, they are not a sufficiently agile means for a CO to maximise WFP's contribution in contexts like Tanzania. Interviews indicate a growing frustration in the CO with what began to feel like an outdated and constraining implementation framework. Interviews at HQ suggest that there may be similar sentiments at corporate level about the need to explore alternative design and delivery formats for WFP's services.

## **Learning and adaptation**

112. At an operational level, the monitoring of food insecurity and livelihood vulnerability that WFP's **VAM** service undertook or contributed to from year to year was an ongoing source of data for adjustments of food assistance during portfolio implementation. In the refugee camp, for example, CFSVAs and CHS studies have been used to analyse changes in refugee and host population vulnerability and coping mechanisms. This information is complemented by informal surveys and reviews of secondary data. (Annex G).

113. Partly because of the integrated partnerships through which WFP was engaged in support to **refugees**, monitoring processes at Nyarugusu did lead to changes in strategy and method from time to time, as in the decision to register women as the recipients of food rations.

114. In the field of **school feeding**, the CO was alert to global strategic and policy developments and worked closely with the GOT during the early part of the review period in an apparent move away from approaches dependent on externally supplied food. But its own adaptation was slowed by the strong funding for commodity procurement provided by the large FCI grant. By the end of the review period, WFP had not learned how to adapt to much narrower funding opportunities, and appeared to have no way to move forward in this field. Its resourcing strategy was reactive rather than proactive.

115. Key nutrition partners all agreed that WFP was an active member of **nutrition** working groups and the dedicated task forces that supported the delivery of several reviews and surveys between 2011 and 2014 (Annex I). In response to the 2012 Nutrition Landscape analysis series, WFP started implementing the planned maternal and child health and nutrition (MCHN) activities in Dodoma (TFNC, 2012). Interviewees felt that WFP had done less to respond to the recommendations of the 2013 Nutrition Public Expenditure Review (PER) which called for the development of capacity of nutrition officers and institutions and improve co-ordination especially at decentralized level (GOT/MOF, 2014). Overall, stakeholders working in the refugee camp appreciated that WFP had adapted its nutrition work following the recommendations made in the two JAMs and those of the respective nutrition surveys. WFP staff were also technically involved in the 2014 National Nutrition Survey and the revision of the National Nutrition Policy.

116. The evaluation of the 2007–10 country programme influenced **FFA** activities in the portfolio under review, e.g. concentration of projects in a smaller geographical area (Annex J). WFP's own Comprehensive Monitoring Exercises have also led to adjustments in implementation approach. For example, the 2010 FFA monitoring report recommendation that future FFA projects should be integrated into District Development Plans was implemented from 2011 and has contributed to increased local government ownership and follow up.

117. However, WFP's FFA monitoring reports were infrequent and variable in quality. A baseline survey was carried out in October – November 2011 (WFP, 2011j). Comprehensive monitoring exercises were carried out in 2012, 2013 and 2014 with data compiled and reports produced for each district. But an overall summary report

was only produced in 2014 (WFP, 2014k). This report was of poor quality with many findings cut and pasted from an FFA monitoring report produced in 2010.

118. As a pilot, **P4P** was designed to be a learning process. The early part of the review period was certainly a time of intensive exploration and enquiry as appropriate legal and institutional modalities were identified (Krieger, 2014: 7), leading to a 'strategy refresh' that expanded district coverage (¶108). Tanzania was one of four P4P countries chosen for detailed impact evaluation (WFP, 2015h, Africare, 2014, and Krieger, 2014). According to interviews, that evaluation was protracted and not wholly conclusive (Krieger, 2014: 8). At the end of the review period, a further learning process was launched in Tanzania, Malawi and Rwanda: WFP's Patient Procurement Platform aims to work across the whole value chain, helping to increase productivity and profits and promoting links with private sector buyers, building on the post-harvest support that P4P provided (WFP, 2014l).

119. During portfolio implementation, WFP showed a degree of learning and adaptation with regard to **gender** (Annex L) – for example in the switch (in consultation with UNHCR and other partners) to making women the registered food recipients at the Nyarugusu refugee camp, and in its prioritisation of community projects with strong female participation for FFW support.


### **2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results**

120. Analysing the performance and results of the WFP portfolio under review, this section answers EQs 11 – 16 in the evaluation matrix (Annex C). After a summary of outputs achieved, it begins with an assessment of efficiency (EQ11) and then addresses some cross-cutting issues: gender (EQ13), synergy and multiplier effects and opportunities (EQs 14 – 15). It then presents findings on the effectiveness and likely sustainability of the activities undertaken (EQs 12 and 16).

#### **Outputs**


121. A summary of portfolio outputs is presented below, starting with two figures that present summary information on beneficiaries and tonnage. Figure 2 above also illustrates portfolio beneficiaries and tonnage by operation and further information is available at Annex E, Annex G, Annex H, Annex I and Annex J (see also o above).

**Figure 4** Planned and actual beneficiaries by year, 2011–2014



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–2014.

**Figure 5** Planned and actual food distributed by year, 2011–2014



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–2014.

122. Lack of data hampers precise reporting of VAM work (¶137 below). Table 14 at Annex G lists vulnerability assessments in which WFP participated during the review period. Overall, informants confirm that, despite the limited resources available during the four-year period, VAM activities had a demonstrable effect in informing WFP’s own programming and supporting government-led and multi-stakeholder processes. The technical and logistical support provided by WFP for MOAFC CFSNAs is highly appreciated. However, there is disappointment that this was limited to the areas where WFP had sub offices and national level coordination.

123. **General food distribution** (GFD) supported approximately 86,000 refugees annually. A total of 72,000 metric tons was distributed through this component during the evaluation period (see Table 4 below).

**Table 4 GFD: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**

	Beneficiaries						Tonnage	
	Planned			Actual			Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	Total	Total
2011	49,000	51,000	100,000	49,708	51,737	101,445	20,725	22,671
2012	49,000	51,000	100,000	51,667	53,905	105,572	24,297	19,820
2013	39,200	40,800	80,000	33,040	35,938	68,978	18,891	15,197
2014	39,200	40,800	80,000	33,364	36,303	69,667	16,300	14,506
<b>Total</b>	44,100	45,900	90,000	41,945	44,471	86,416	80,213	72,194

Source: WFP SPRs 2011–2014

124. The GFD ration saw very little change over the review period. With the provision of cereals (in most cases maize), pulses, CSB or Super Cereal, (fortified) vegetable oil and salt, GFD provided the minimum dietary requirement of 2,100 Kcal per person per day. The inclusion of CSB or Super Cereal in the GFD ration was meant to address the high levels of anaemia and compensate for refugees' limited access to micronutrients. In July 2014, an additional 50g of Super Cereal with sugar was introduced in the GFD ration for children 24–59 months to prevent micronutrient deficiencies and acute malnutrition. Partnerships were effectively established with various NGOs for food distribution, health and nutrition programmes, water and sanitation, rights and protection (¶174 above). WFP contracted the food management out to international NGOs (first World Vision, then the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) from January 2014). Most of the partnerships were established over the years and resulted in an effective synergy. Regular co-ordination meetings allowed for updates on any issues and understanding of the food needs in the camp.

125. The coverage of the CP **school feeding** activity declined over the review period. This was mainly due to funding constraints. In 2012 the FCI funds were exhausted. Although other financial contributions were made to the CP, available funding would not allow maintaining the number of WFP-assisted schools. WFP and the MOEVT developed a plan anticipating a gradual phasing down of the SF activity. In 2013, SF remained operational in the originally targeted 16 districts, but the number of schools and children supported was reduced. Late that year, a second budget revision to the CP was approved and allowed the modification of the SF ration by removing the mid-morning porridge and continuing the provision of maize, pulses and oil for lunch. In 2013, the number of feeding days was also 18 per cent fewer than planned. In May 2014, additional funding constraints led to another reduction in the number of schools assisted. SF was discontinued in 40 per cent of the schools assisted. Only half of the planned beneficiaries received a meal a day. The number of schools receiving assistance dropped from 1,167 to 640. The CO also explained the reduction of the number of children covered in 2014 by declining school enrolment figures, in accordance with a national trend (WFP, 2013a; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2014b). Interviews with district authorities and school authorities indicate that the quality of the food commodities remained high, while delivery of these commodities was considered

satisfactory and timely. Some 2,000 – 2,200 children in host communities near the refugee camp also received two school meals a day. The CO distributed 48,474 metric tons under this activity (Annex H).

126. The CP provided ongoing support to the MOEVT in developing a national SF strategy and in developing capacity at central and district level to train education officials to manage SF activities. However, the intensity of these interactions declined over the review period.

**Table 5 Country Programme: children receiving school meals**

	Planned			Actual			% reached
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2011	319,644	332,556	652,200	316,840	312,273	629,113	96.5%
2012	335,814	349,386	685,200	312,180	310,011	622,188	90.8%
2013	352,408	366,792	719,200	265,477	270,550	536,027	74.5%
2014	370,048	385,152	755,200	237,849	248,756	487,606	64.5%

Source: WFP Executive Briefs and Standard Project Reports (SPRs).

127. **Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition:** during the evaluation period, WFP implemented a Supplementary Feeding Programme (SuFP) for children and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) attending health facilities in prioritised districts in Dodoma (Chaminwo and Bahi) and Singida Regions (Singida Rural and Ikungi). Beneficiaries received a monthly ration of Super Cereal and fortified vegetable oil to improve their nutritional status, complemented with nutrition education. WFP had to drop the preferred Super Cereal Plus for children, for financial reasons. The SuFP programme aimed to supplement about 12,000 children under 5 and PLW (Annex I provides detailed data). The actual number of beneficiaries was lower than planned, with a very low coverage of PLW (less than 3 per cent in 2012 and 2013). SPRs explained this by i) changes in the admission criteria; ii) lack of accurate population estimates at district level; iii) the low number of malnourished PLW; and iv) absence of the planned baseline survey. Planning figures were not revised during the review period (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b). The same services were provided to children and PLW with MAM in refugee camps until July 2014. The number of refugee beneficiaries who received support in 2011 was high, but remained lower than planned starting from 2012. Reasons provided by WFP were: i) initial PRRO resource constraints (2012) and ii) a low prevalence of acute malnutrition among the refugee community (2012 and 2013). Considering that the prevalence of MAM remained below the WHO threshold, support for MAM was stopped in July 2014.

128. **Stunting prevention:** in the same four priority districts, the Mother and Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN) programme was implemented to prevent chronic malnutrition. Table 19 and Table 20 at Annex I provide data on the planned and actual beneficiaries under the stunting prevention programmes. A take-home ration of fortified blended food was given to PLW six months before and after delivery, and to children aged 6–23 months who attended health facilities, and complemented with nutrition education. Overall, food distributions rolled out much later than planned, resulting in low coverage of stunting interventions until 2013. In the refugee camps, stunting prevention started as a Blanket Supplementary Feeding (BSF) programme in 2012. As observed during the evaluation, food distribution for pregnant women was

carried out weekly and accompanied by nutrition education: informants stated that the schedule of women's visits to distribution centres was already too intensive for this to be included (although some counselling was provided during regular mother and baby health check-up visits). Distribution of food supplements for lactating women and children aged 6–23 months was carried out on a monthly basis without nutrition education. The programme rolled out in May 2013, which accounted for low coverage rates in 2012 and 2013. In addition, a shorter six-month conditional cash transfer pilot was implemented in Mtwara (¶97, 57 above and Annex I ¶35 below).

129. **HIV and AIDS:** Table 19 at Annex I describes the number of HIV positive beneficiaries who were reached under the portfolio. Over 100% of planned beneficiaries were reached, but the total number remained low because it was anticipated that food assistance to patients enrolled in antiretroviral therapy (ART) would only be continued under the CP through co-operating partners for six months. Thereafter, it was intended that support would be picked up by other organisations, and monitored by WFP for a further six months. There is no evidence that the intended hand-over was concluded as planned. In the refugee camp, people enrolled in ART and prevention of maternal to child transmission (PMTCT) continued to receive fortified take-home rations, but this was discontinued in June 2014 (WFP, 2011c; WFP, 2012d; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d; WFP, 2014b; WFP, 2015).

130. During the evaluation period WFP implemented a total of 382 FFA projects across eight Regions of Tanzania. The number of beneficiaries,<sup>16</sup> the amount of food distributed and the number of assets created were all significantly lower than planned. Figure 4 on page 27 shows that WFP aimed to reach 490,000 men and 510,000 women with FFA activities (total planned value estimated at USD 65,635,858). In reality, WFP reached 289,256 women and 264,360 men (55% of the planned total). The SPRs attribute this to funding constraints, which led WFP to consolidate its FFA intervention areas in 2013 and again in 2014. Table 23 in Annex J shows that the percentage of planned beneficiaries reached declined dramatically in 2013–2014. It also indicates that 14,247 metric tons of food was distributed (versus 90,000 planned) over the four-year period, thus achieving only a 15 per cent coverage for the FFA programme. WFP SPRs attribute the differential to funding constraints.

131. Table 6 below shows the increased diversity in the types of assets supported by WFP in 2014 compared to previous years. FFA activities included soil and water conservation measures, construction and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, fish farms and market access roads. Other activities aimed at environmental protection through tree planting and land rehabilitation as well as the provision of water supply for both livestock and domestic use. There were significant differences between the quantity/scale of planned and actual assets created.

132. Field observation indicated that FFA work has been done to a satisfactory technical standard in Tanzania, and was endorsed by a wide range of informants including District Executive Directors, technical officers, village leaders and beneficiaries. Assessed in terms of the 'five keys to success' in FFA projects formulated during earlier evaluations (WFP, 2013h), this work did show evidence of "putting communities and people, particularly women, at the centre of planning", and of having been designed on the basis of "an understanding of the local context, landscape and livelihoods" (Annex J). M&E were generally satisfactory, "making sure quality standards for food distributions and assets created are met". Through a 'Local Level Participatory Approach', there was some contribution to "strengthening of local and

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<sup>16</sup> The CPE refers to the number of FFA beneficiaries rather than FFA participants to be consistent with the CP SPRs. Furthermore, reference to beneficiaries is more useful when describing the number of people reached by WFP with its food assistance and benefiting from assets created.

government institutions' capacities". However, there was less evidence of "integrating with other activities (partnership) and scaling-up". Beneficiaries compared TASAF's labour-intensive public works (LIPW) programmes unfavourably with WFP's FFA, and called for the latter to be continued on a larger scale.

**Table 6 FFA assets created**

2011			2012			2013			2014			Total		
P	A	%	P	A	%	P	A	%	P	A	%	P	A	%
Kilometres of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help)														
192	152	79.2	307	182	59.3	307	155	50.5	60	30	50	866	519	59.9
Number of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3,000–15,000 m <sup>3</sup> )														
						9	6	66.7	15	15	100	24	21	87.5
Number of excavated community water ponds for livestock uses constructed (3000–15,000 m <sup>3</sup> )														
									15	15	100	15	15	100.0
Number of fish ponds constructed (FFA) and maintained (self-help)														
			60	60	100				1	1	100	61	61	100.0
Number of tree seedlings produced														
									30,000	15,000	50	30,000	15,000	50.0
Volume (m <sup>3</sup> ) of irrigation canals constructed/rehabilitated														
									12,442	10,058	80.8	12,442	10,058	80.8
Number of assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place as a result of project assistance														
130	130	100	169	169	100				87	87	100	386	386	100.0

P = planned A = actual % = percentage actual of planned

Source: CP SPRs.

133. As explained in ¶118 above, **P4P** took time to gain traction. The targets of its country investment plan (CIP) were not met (Table 7). Nevertheless, by the end of 2014 (an extension year following the originally planned end of the pilot in 2013), it was working with 28 farmers' organisations (FOs) in ten districts, representing (in 2013) some 18,000 farmers. However, only some 6,000 of these were actively participating and selling through P4P channels (although some may also have been marketing to private buyers). P4P participants have typically held more land (5–10 ha) than originally intended (the target was farmers with 2–5 ha). Focus group discussions confirmed that, as intended, P4P does not directly benefit the poorest rural people, although some of the latter group arguably benefit from employment by commercial farmers.

**Table 7 P4P performance against Country Investment Plan, 2009–2013**

	CIP target mt	Actual mt	% of target
Maize from NFRA	34,500	13,300	39
Maize from P4P FOs	15,850	10,459	68
Beans from P4P FOs	5,425	1,581	38
P4P FO sales to NFRA	3,640	2,500	69

Source: WFP, nd(b)

134. In the extension year of 2014, 'P4P' FOs sold several times more to the NFRA than in 2013, with those in Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Manyara Regions selling the most. Based on previous experience, NFRA asked WFP to work with three other agencies to link smallholder farmers to its procurement programme. Results to date for 2014 are shown in Table 8.

**Table 8 Farmer organisation sales to NFRA, 2014 (P4P & other)**

Partner	Total FOs targeted	NFRA contract quantity mt	Quantity delivered to NFRA to date mt	Performance against target %
WFP (P4P)	24	9,200	12,555	136
FO	70	3,360	2,720	81
International NGO	22	6,900	3,023	44
Value chain project	49	13,100	6,062	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>32,560</b>	<b>24,360</b>	<b>75</b>

Source: CO data.

### **Influence on the national agenda and capacity**

135. The CP stated that strengthening Tanzanian food security and nutrition information systems should be a strategic focus (WFP, 2011b: 6–7). This followed the 2011–2016 CS statement that increased efforts at capacity building and hand-over of vulnerability analysis and mapping to the government, partners and national institutions were considered a strategic priority and that capacity development was one of WFP’s comparative advantages (WFP, 2010a: 4). A central mechanism for sustainable influence on the national agenda, “supporting the Government to end hunger in the country”, is capacity development at strategic and operational levels in the public, parastatal and private sectors. Between 2011 and 2014, WFP did record substantial achievements in capacity development, primarily at the technical and operational levels. From VAM specialists in central government through NGO staff in refugee camps, Regional and district nutrition personnel to members of SACCOSs, AMCOSs and community FFA management committees, WFP operations typically emphasised training in the necessary technical and management skills. Results varied. If the skills were tied to temporary activities such as FFA projects, or activities that should have been sustainable but have turned out otherwise, like SF, interviews show that those trained are now uncertain how they can retain and apply what they learned. If the relevant activities have proved more sustainable or remain ongoing, the capacity results are (so far) more positive.

136. During the evaluation period, a major focus of WFP’s **VAM** capacity development activities was support to the MOAFC Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Section (CMEWS) for its biennial assessments, continuing support already provided for many years.

137. Despite VAM being a strategic focus for WFP in Tanzania, particularly in terms of capacity development, there are no VAM-related outcomes or performance indicators in the CP logical framework. Furthermore, there are no reports on VAM-related activities, outputs and outcomes in SPRs on the portfolio under review.

138. WFP’s influence on the national **school feeding** agenda declined during the review period (Annex G). There was evidence of a constructive relationship with the GOT in 2011–2013 during the development of a national community-based SF strategy. Senior Tanzanian officials (including the President) visited the Brazil Centre of Excellence Against Hunger. A national action plan was drafted for a SF programme that would emphasise home-grown SF. During 2012, WFP initiated capacity assessments using the World Bank’s Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) to benchmark standards of good practices toward sustainable SF programmes. Links and influence weakened from late 2013, and discussions stalled in 2014. In 2013, WFP and the Centre of Excellence carried out various high-level interventions to ensure that the draft action plan would be validated. These efforts were



unsuccessful. In 2012–2013, WFP, the MoEVT, the World Bank and the Partnership for Child Development (PCD) worked on a joint proposal to pilot some home-grown SF (HGSF) activities. Sensing little government buy-in (probably due, in turn, to government perceptions that WFP was not committed to its policy priorities (¶104 above)), projects were slowed down later in 2013. Also in 2013, because WFP sensed that communities in most food-insecure districts could not bear the food and additional costs to implement a SF programme alone, WFP worked with the local government authorities (LGAs) to ensure that SF and some of its associated activities would be integrated into district government work plans and budgets. Although SPRs refer to these efforts, they are not specific about the results in terms of absorption into LGA work plans and budgets.

139. Interviews with **nutrition** stakeholders at national level reveal that WFP was proactive in moving some strategic agenda points forward, while supporting discussions on others. WFP was a strong promoter of the SUN movement in the country, supported the ‘Presidential Call for Action on Nutrition’ and was a strong supporter of the national fortification agenda. But overall, stakeholders interviewed also remarked that human resource limitations did not allow WFP to be as proactive as might have been needed (Annex I; WFP, 2014m). They felt that there were some nutrition areas where it might have had more influence on the UN DAO strategy and/or the 2011–2016 UNDAF: the prevention and treatment of MAM, food fortification and nutrition surveillance. WFP also hosts Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and undernutrition (REACH) and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), which informants considered a strong sign of WFP’s involvement in the nutrition agenda. Through the CP and at Nyarugusu, WFP also explored the use of cash or vouchers as approaches to increase health seeking behaviour and to reduce micronutrient deficiencies and stunting (Murray, 2014).

140. Interviews show that **P4P** had a direct influence on the national agricultural marketing agenda by building links between NFRA and smallholder farmer organisations. NFRA found these groups attractive partners because, with P4P help, they were ensuring good quality produce and performed a number of the preliminary tasks that NFRA otherwise had to do itself at its seasonal buying points. The programme also helped to build administrative, managerial and strategic capacity in SACCOSs, AMCOSs and NFRA. As noted above, some interviews also questioned the subsidy policies that NFRA implements – and, by implication, the possibility of P4P building smallholder farmer dependence on them, although P4P has encouraged links to other buyers too.

141. Although WFP was proactive on **gender** issues during implementation at community level (Annex L), there is no evidence of its having contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda or developing national capacity in this sector.

## **Efficiency**

142. Interviews with and data supplied by the CO indicate that operational efficiency was enhanced during the latter part of the review period. Expenditures in the direct support costs (DSC) category were reduced by 18 per cent in 2013 and by a further 21 per cent in 2014. Use of the Forward Purchase Facility, electronic payment systems, revised banking arrangements using local banks and foreign exchange arrangements, new fleet management and vehicle leasing, electricity, water and paper savings and a ‘green awareness campaign’ all helped to cut CO costs, although an important part of the DSC savings presumably accrued from the staff cuts and sub office closures of 2014. Interviews indicate that shortfalls in CP funding made every kind of saving doubly important for the CO, which is why multiple efforts were made to trim operational expenditures. While resourcing was an ongoing factor in strategic decision-making

(¶110 above), the efficiency dimension of DSC was less significant in portfolio management than the overall challenge of achieving effective operations with resources that were dipping towards the survival level for non-humanitarian WFP work in Tanzania. The effect of sub office closures on WFP's field presence and effectiveness varied. The work previously done at Kigoma could be picked up by the Kasulu sub office. According to interviews, the Arusha closure had broader effects. The exit and hand-over strategy was hasty and incomplete. Almost all monitoring of FFA and SF activities formerly supported from Arusha ceased after mid-2014. Training of teachers and LGA staff for sustainability purposes appeared unlikely to have long-term benefits. SF activities from Arusha ended too abruptly for effective hand-over.

143. Logistical efficiency was a major concern for the Tanzania CO: staff reported that 60–80 per cent of their logistical effort was on shipments to other countries, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo. CO data show that 15 per cent of dispatches handled from Dar es Salaam during the review period were for Tanzanian destinations. There were constant efforts to streamline customs clearance processes and to monitor and reduce road transport costs. The Isaka depot is no longer an efficient trans-shipment point, and increasing use was made of the Dodoma depot towards the end of the review period.

144. The CO succeeded in minimising pipeline breaks during the review period. Only one break is mentioned in all the SPRs on the portfolio, 2011–2014: a break in Super Cereal provision to refugees in 2011 due to late arrival of the commodity in the country (WFP, 2012b). There was a three month reduction in GFD rations in 2012 due to a funding shortage. In 2014, there was another minor break due to production priority being given to Ebola emergency countries. Also that year, a pipeline break was reportedly averted by timely use of the Forward Purchase Facility (FPF: WFP, 2015d).

145. One persistent operational inefficiency arose from the placing of WFP Tanzania under the Regional Bureau (RB) in Johannesburg (RBJ). Whereas a meeting in the Regional Bureau in Nairobi (RBN) can be accomplished in a day, including travel, a meeting in Johannesburg requires three days, with higher travel costs. It was reportedly decided some years ago to balance workloads between RBs, with DRC and Tanzania being assigned to RBJ. (One of the main destinations of commodities handled by the Tanzania CO is DRC, which, like Tanzania, is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).) Although it costs more time and money to work with Johannesburg than with Nairobi, CO interviewees expressed satisfaction with the interaction and engagement that they experienced with RBJ and felt that, on balance, a shift to affiliation with RBN would not be beneficial.

146. Despite various enhancements in operational efficiency, there is less evidence that cost-effectiveness analysis was factored in during the design of the portfolio, which took place in an earlier period of comparatively strong resourcing for the CO. There was no overall analysis during design or implementation that could support conclusions about the cost-effectiveness of WFP's expenditure of USD 167m in achieving the intended outcomes of the portfolio under review (see Table 1 above).

147. While costs were closely monitored from a financial management perspective, they were not analysed from the perspective of strategic efficiency, i.e. effectiveness or the cost per result. This has at least two dimensions. Spatial efficiency means the spatial concentration of portfolio activities in order to optimise synergy, multiplier effects and integrated impact on beneficiary livelihoods. Although the CP was committed to a "food assistance safety net approach... on a district-wide basis" (WFP, 2011b: 3), there was only limited achievement of this goal, due partly to funding constraints. There was not enough money to permit full, district-wide implementation of an integrated set of activities, even in a very small number of target districts.

Institutional efficiency means complementarity of WFP and other agencies' interventions, so that aggregate results are more than the sum of the parts. The CPE finds below that this was not achieved. Silos persist. The CPE also finds no evidence (below and Annex K) that UN DAO contributed to any enhancement of efficiency in the WFP portfolio.

148. WFP did not analyse the cost efficiency of its **school feeding** activities (Annex G). Based on CO calculations, the annual total cost per child of SF is estimated at USD 30. Interviews indicate that, with removal of the Super Cereal mid-morning snack in March 2013, the cost went down to USD 23 per child per year. The Tanzania SF cost is competitive with other low-income countries, which have costs that vary between USD 20 and USD 117 per child. Global WFP average cost is estimated at USD 40 per child per year over the period 2008–2012 (WFP, 2013o). WFP contributed to enhanced efficiency by promoting fuel efficient stoves and proper food management. However, it did not systematically monitor GOT deworming efforts, aimed at ensuring that SF nourishes the child rather than the worms.

149. The CPE did not carry out cost effectiveness analysis of the **nutrition** programming. Although it is relatively easy to identify the cost of specialised food commodities and the provision of specialised tools (scales, registers, behaviour change communication (BCC) material), it is more complicated to calculate unit costs of other related programmatic costs such nutrition training, supervision and monitoring, transport of commodities and WFP staff support. Nevertheless, it was possible to assess some efficiency issues (Annex I). WFP assessed use of the semi-government Medical Stores Department (MSD) and deemed it too expensive. Stock losses were reported to be minimal (WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b). By the end of the evaluation period, WFP was able proactively to support mass food fortification, which is globally considered as a cost-effective intervention (see Annex I, ¶58). In 2013, WFP launched a cash and voucher (C&V) feasibility study in order to assess the potential of using of this modality to diversify the diet and improve access to nutrient dense foods from the markets. Setting up a C&V pilot would allow WFP to tap into a wider choice of options, which might be more cost-effective, although cost-effectiveness studies of various strategies (cash/C&V/food commodities) are scarce.

## Gender

150. Without making a significant impact at national policy levels, portfolio implementation did contribute to the reduction of gender gaps, and a stronger awareness of women's rights and management capacity, in its implementation at field level (Annex L). For example, sensitisation of leaders at Nyarugusu refugee camp was applied as a measure to ensure that women were encouraged to participate in Food Distribution Committees, and to control food management at the household levels. This resulted in 12 women (46 per cent) being appointed to the Food Distribution Committee in Nyarugusu camp. Most significantly, WFP and partner agencies at the camp arranged the shift to issuing ration cards in women's names rather than those of male household heads. A woman now chairs the camp leadership committee.

151. Elsewhere, WFP has promoted women's participation and leadership in SF, FFA and P4P activities, although it is not clear who in the CO analyses gender indicators at portfolio level to build on the gender disaggregated data streams supplied by the M&E Unit and reported, for example, in the SPRs. There is some evidence from field observation and project documentation that gender barriers have been partially lowered. Nevertheless, at the household level cultural norms, values and influences still favour men. FFA has food committees and Asset Management Committees where a 50/50 representation of women and men is upheld. According to the 2014 SPR, FFA targeting was gender sensitive and prioritised female-headed food insecure households.

Some CPE informants claimed that the focus placed by WFP on gender equity was positively influencing gender roles in communities, with increasing numbers of women participating in management committees and decision making. A 2012 evaluation found that the P4P programme was gender blind (WFP, 2011k). Following remedial action, P4P now has a strong capacity-building component that has advised women as well as male farmers on how to grow quality crops and on warehousing and other measures.

152. During the review period, WFP's Gender Focal Points (GFPs) were appointed on the basis of interest in gender mainstreaming issues and/or the nature of the programme components they were engaged in. They were given some short gender training opportunities (e.g. on protection of women refugees and gender-based violence issues), but these diminished towards the end of the period. Uncertainty persists as to the precise roles of a GFP, and the lack of training constrains the effectiveness of the position. Interviews indicate that full implementation of the corporate gender policy was restricted by the lack of funding for gender mainstreaming initiatives proposed by the CO.

### **Synergy and multiplier effects in the portfolio**

153. Despite the integrating intent of the 2011–2016 CS and of CP design, there is limited evidence of the portfolio achieving synergy or multiplier effects. Partly this is because funding restrictions limited the intensity of the district-level engagement that was envisaged. As noted above (¶112), VAM did provide an important data and analysis service across the portfolio, without necessarily contributing to synergy or multiplier effects. Apart from the achievements of P4P in strengthening the opportunities for local procurement of commodities used in the PRROs and in SF, there has been little operational complementarity between the activities in the portfolio. This precluded achievement of a major intended feature of the CS: “concentrated and integrated programmes and hunger solutions” (¶49 above) and negated a key assumption in the strategy's implicit theory of change: that effectiveness would be achieved by focus and integration.

154. Interviews offer a mixed picture of **P4P's** links with the rest of the portfolio. It was not part of the CP, and was resourced through a trust fund. While initially set up as a stand-alone pilot programme, P4P did begin to look at linkages globally – for example with home-grown SF – from 2011. In Tanzania, a limited amount of P4P procurement went to the PRROs and WFP SF, but there is no evidence of multiplier effects with these or other components of the portfolio.

### **Synergy and multiplier effects with development partners**

155. WFP collaborated with a number of DPs in joint VAM activities with GOT (¶72). Interviews indicate that a degree of synergy was developed in this collaboration, with the whole of the various agencies' contributions exceeding the sum of its individual parts.

156. Informants generally consider WFP to be sceptical but supportive of the DAO process (Annex K). WFP was reported to have played a positive role, working together with other agencies, in a number of areas such as supporting the closure of refugee camps in collaboration with UNHCR and government authorities. WFP's support to the development of the common IT platform was particularly appreciated, even though it appears it will not be widely adopted by UN agencies. WFP is also reported to have played a valuable role in chairing the UN Operations Management Team. However, no evidence was found of real synergies having occurred between the portfolio activities of WFP and other agencies.

157. Concerns were expressed that WFP and FAO did not work together as closely as they should have. WFP was primarily focused on operational activities while FAO was mostly engaged in policy development. Areas where there might have been greater collaboration included FAO advice on WFP's activities to promote food production and marketing, as well as on building capacity in the IPC approach to food security analysis. Likewise, some stakeholders believe that WFP missed opportunities to do more joined-up work, for example with UNICEF in the education sector. 2011–2016 UNDAF commitments for WFP to support the GOT in developing SF were not successfully fulfilled.

158. Interviews indicate that WFP did not fully grasp an emerging opportunity for collaboration with DPs, as they and the GOT worked to build a comprehensive social protection strategy for Tanzania. With limited resources forcing a preoccupation with operational priorities in the field, WFP was not an active participant in discussions to develop a PSSN linked to TASAF, although it had some engagement early in the review period (¶66 above) and in 2012 it did undertake a pilot cash transfer programme in Mtwara, using mobile phones, on behalf of TASAF.

159. In the Nyarugusu refugee camp, partnerships were effectively established with various NGOs for food distribution, health and nutritional programmes, water and sanitation, rights and protection at the refugee camps (Annex I). WFP contracted the food management out to international NGOs and collaborated with all other partners operational in the camp. Most of the partnerships were established over the years and resulted in an effective synergy.

160. Elsewhere, synergies were built with the MOHSW's basic health delivery system. The delivery of MCHN and SuFP was embedded in the GOT's reproductive and child health (RCH) services at health facilities and helped to enhance results of RCH.

161. The 2011–2016 UNDAF had a clear division of responsibilities between WFP, UNICEF and WHO, but different geographic intervention areas did not allow UNICEF and WFP to collaborate at an operational level. Health facilities in Dodoma clarified that, although WHO was also supporting RCH departments within some of their facilities, they did not observe any synergy or common approach by WFP and WHO. Through REACH, WFP worked with other UN agencies to improve capacities for nutrition surveillance. WFP also supported the GAIN Marketplace project. It was considered by stakeholders as an active partner in the Development Partner Group (DPG) on nutrition, which it co-chaired in 2014. Overall, the 2012 Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One (UN, 2012a) concluded that evidence for more efficient, effective and sustainable support by UN agencies as a consequence of DAO was limited. This CPE reached the same conclusion in 2015.

## **Effectiveness and sustainability**

162. This section addresses EQs 11 and 15 in the evaluation matrix (Annex C). For most components of the portfolio, incomplete comments can be made about effectiveness in terms of the outcome indicators specified in operations design. Assessing sustainability is largely a matter of professional judgement.

163. As noted in ¶97 above, the portfolio lacked specific outcomes for **VAM** activities, which means that assessment of their effectiveness must be more subjective. Compared to some other components of the portfolio, the VAM team focused strongly on capacity development activities, in addition to supporting WFP's own programming. Overall, the evaluation team judges that VAM capacity building activities during the review period had a sustainable impact on the approaches and capacities of government systems, building upon the more intensive efforts in previous years. As noted, WFP CFSVA and CMTD approaches have, at least in part, been integrated into the work of

the MOAFC CMEWS and PMO DMD. However, informants suggested that these national systems themselves might not be sustainable if there is not a greater focus on building capacity at local level.

164. The CP **nutrition** programmes are monitored on a monthly basis. However, it is not easy to assess performance against planned nutrition outcomes, as outcome indicators were repeatedly revised (see Table 17 in Annex I). Interventions against stunting only started in 2013, which is why no progress was reported on an MCHN indicator until 2014. The planned MCHN baseline study was not carried out and no outcome indicators related to infant and young child feeding practices were available until 2014, when one – Minimum Acceptable Diet – was measured.

165. Interviews with health facilities and a review of a sample of related health facility registers show overall satisfaction with the SuFP outcomes and more specifically related to the reduction of the supplementary feeding default rate and improved recovery rate among the enrolled beneficiaries – which is also confirmed by WFP monitoring data such as those in the SPRs. Reported benefits include reduced default rates and a marked decrease in the incidence of low birth weight. The default rate for SuFP remained under 2 per cent throughout the evaluation period and was attributed to families leaving their communities. The incidence of low birth weight was measured in the 2011 and 2012 SPRs (with respectively 17 per cent and 15 per cent of live births under 2,500 grams). Ambitious targets, possibly in line with corporate objectives, were set for stunting by the CP: 70% of children 6–23 months consuming a minimum acceptable diet, for example, while in fact the level changed from 21 per cent in 2010 to 20 per cent in 2014. However, stunting at the Nyarugusu refugee camp decreased from 48 per cent in 2010 to 40.7 per cent in 2014.

166. Discussions with health care providers supported by WFP indicated that health-seeking behaviour for mothers and young children in their catchment area increased. They feel this is attributable to the provision of fortified foods. In line with WFP guidelines, the initial target for SuFP duration was 60 days (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012e). However, review of a sample of health facility registers revealed that the recovery of the children who were malnourished was relatively slow, especially at the onset of the evaluation period, with subsequent re-enrolment of patients after six months. WFP was aware of re-enrolment issues and reinforced supervision in 2013, which resulted in a drastic drop in re-enrolment rates. No data are available on whether MCHN activities increased access to health services.

167. Despite the positive performance, the coverage of nutrition interventions was limited compared to the scale of need in the target Regions. Through its SuFP, WFP supported about 1,300 malnourished children aged under five in Dodoma and Singida in 2014. For that same year, the 2014 NNS estimated that about 40,804 children under five were moderately malnourished in these two Regions combined. Despite some promising results of the programmes at facility level, WFP interventions might not have greatly influenced malnutrition rates at district or Regional level.

168. Nutrition interventions in the refugee camps were considered successful by local authorities and health facilities, which is also confirmed by the 2014 camp nutrition survey and respective SPRs. The age specific mortality rate for children and crude mortality rate in the camp remained low, although this cannot be only attributed to WFP-supported interventions. Supplementary feeding recovery rates were high throughout the review period. Although treatment of MAM does not directly affect GAM rates, it is notable that the camp nutrition surveys show a drop in prevalence of GAM from 2.6 per cent in 2010 to 1.4 per cent in 2014, and a reduction in stunting (48 per cent in 2010, 46 per cent in 2012 and 40.7 per cent in 2014). Anaemia among

children under 5 dropped from 38 per cent in 2010 to 33 per cent in 2014 (UNHCR *et al.*, 2012 and WFP, 2015g; see ¶4 in Annex I).

169. Under the CP, nutrition interventions were implemented as part of the RCH services of public health facilities. WFP delivered various operational trainings, which were directly delivered to the district and health facility implementers. Discussions with health care providers indicate that they have now incorporated malnutrition screening and nutrition education as part of the RCH services, but that they will remain dependent on WFP to provide the Super Cereal. Most training was provided at the start of the programme (2011) and prior to the 2012/2013 introduction of MCHN, although one course was held in December 2013. Considering high turnover of health staff and Community Health Workers (CHWs), local stakeholders did indicate the need for annual training sessions and regular refresher trainings.

170. As mentioned above, WFP remained responsible for the delivery of specialised food commodities to the health facilities, which makes the SuFP and the MCHN model less sustainable. Distributing CSB through the MSD was considered but not adopted because of regular pipeline breaks and related costs. WFP did not explore closely whether strengthening the government logistics system would have been feasible and worthwhile.

171. Activities to support capacities at district and Regional level to improve nutrition planning, budgeting and coordination are planned for 2015, but were not carried out during the evaluation period.

172. The cash transfer pilot that the CO carried out in Mtwara from August 2012 to March 2013 was not designed with conventional outcomes, but was considered successful as a learning exercise – not least because of some predictable initial operational problems (see Annex I, ¶26, 35, 53; Annex J, ¶12,76 below). However, although the findings of the pilot were presented and discussed in detail with government, the latter did not decide on further action at the time (WFP, 2015b).

173. The effectiveness of **school feeding** is difficult to assess because of its many potential benefits, which fall into four main categories: safety nets, education, nutrition and local income-generation. Focus group discussions with school teachers, parents, school committees, district and ward authorities revealed that perceived benefits included marked educational effects (enrolment, attendance, concentration and performance and drop-out rates), while the benefits also reached beyond schools. The small number of schools visited during the evaluation mission reported that, in general, attendance had improved since the start of the intervention. Discussions with communities and local authorities in 2012 and during this CPE indicated that school meals ease the burden on families, allow them to save money and guarantee children a meal. However, WFP SPRs, as summarised in Table 9 below and Table 16, Annex H, reported a decline in school attendance and enrolment in WFP-assisted schools. The 2014 SPR argues that the WFP-supported schools followed the national trend. It also explained that for the majority of WFP-assisted schools, the removal of the mid-morning meal in early 2013 had a negative impact on school attendance. Not all outcome indicators were measured annually. Available data do not permit an assessment of whether there was a difference in attendance between days when school meals were served and days when they were not.

**Table 9 CP school feeding: progress in reaching outcome indicators**

	Baseline value	Indicator values : Achievements			
		2011	2012	2013	2014
Attendance rate (boys) in WFP-assisted schools	95.87	92.3	92.16	89.1	87.4
Attendance rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	95.53	92.54	92.94	90.2	89.5
Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	-9.3	-2.99	-1.48	-15.9	-2.4
Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	-5.4	-3.57	-0.75	-13.6	-1.7
Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	0.99	0.98	0.99		
Drop-out rate boys in WFP-supported schools					1.8
Drop-out rate girls in WFP-assisted school					1.42
SF national capacity index	<i>New indicator: first data were to be collected mid-2015.</i>				
Pass rate boys in WFP-supported schools					25
Pass rate girls in WFP-supported schools					20
Retention rate boys in WFP-supported schools					98.12
Retention rate girls in WFP-supported schools					98.52

Sources: CP SPRS 2011–14

174. Some aspects of the SF activities promoted sustainability. These included engagement with the GOT during the first part of review period and the operational training provided, mostly in 2011 (and earlier). Communities were at least partly involved and engaged, but this engagement was not consistent (Annex H). Phasing out in 2012–2014 was primarily a response to funding shortages rather than a fully structured hand-over to the GOT and communities; but termination of the mid-morning snack in 2013 did increase community responsibility. Local workshops were held to discuss the transition, but the last year of the review period coincided with a breakdown in communications at national policy level as the GOT seemingly lost interest in interaction with WFP on this subject, again jeopardising the sustainability of WFP’s SF work. The potential for linking P4P with a home-grown SF strategy was emphasised in the draft action plan for a national SF programme, but 2014 ended with no clarity on whether or how this plan would be taken forward.

175. Annex J assesses the effectiveness of **food for assets** activities in the portfolio against the three relevant outcomes in the logical framework for the operation. On the basis of progress reports and field observations it concludes that outcome 3, “adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households at risk of falling into acute hunger”, was generally achieved. So was outcome 4, “hazard risk reduced at community level in targeted communities” – although, contrary to claims made in WFP monitoring reports, there is limited evidence to suggest that the improvements in livelihood and food security were adequate to increase resilience to major shocks and stresses in the future. The absolute levels of production and income are still low,



alternative livelihood and coping strategies are limited and community support systems remain weak. There was no evidence of achievement of the vaguely worded outcome 5, “broader policy frameworks incorporate hunger solutions”. Such limitations have also been noted by WFP in other countries and lessons learned have recently been captured in new corporate policies and guidance. Reference to the recently approved WFP policy on resilience (WFP, 2013h) and the use of WFP’s 2014 manual on FFA (WFP, 2014c) may help to enhance longer-term impacts on food security and resilience, in any future activities.

176. As individual projects have mostly been built to an adequate technical standard and responsibility for maintenance has normally been taken on by village committees and district authorities, the FFA structures observed in the field look likely to be sustainable. Whether the FFA approach would be sustainable would depend on its integration with national LIPW strategies within the overall social protection framework – specifically, the emerging PSSN programme. While a 2014 SPR committed WFP to exploring this (WFP, 2015h), there is no evidence that much was achieved in this regard by the end of the review period.

177. At the end of the review period, following a year of extension, the future of **P4P** support in Tanzania was uncertain. The sustainability outlook for its results to date was mixed. The programme had introduced a promising new way of doing business with small FOs supplying the NFRA and, to some extent, the larger private sector buyers at competitive, fair prices. There had been significant infrastructural and capacity development, most notably in the SACCOSs and the revived AMCOSs, some of whose members told the CPE that they were branching into other marketing channels beyond the NFRA. They also stated that it had been better to do business with WFP directly. While WFP, NFRA and FO informants all acknowledge imperfections in NFRA procurement and payment procedures, transferring to NFRA procurement was appropriate from a sustainability perspective. Some of the links and new income generation would continue even if P4P does not. However, agricultural marketing and farmer co-operative development have always been fraught with challenges, and it would be rash to suggest that sustainability has been assured by these relatively few years of P4P input.

### 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 3.1 Overall Assessment

##### Alignment and strategic positioning

###### *Context*

178. WFP and Tanzania are about the same age. Both recently marked their first half century. As they began their sixth decade, the country presented many of the challenges and opportunities facing WFP globally. WFP's portfolio in Tanzania was dominated during the review period by two factors that are likely to remain central to the organisation's challenges there.

179. The first factor was the situation beyond Tanzania's borders. Since independence more than half a century ago, the country itself has been generally stable. The opposite has been true in several neighbouring (and more distant) states, compounding the food insecurity of many citizens in such countries as the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and Somalia. There were two consequences. First, WFP in Tanzania therefore had (and is likely to continue to have) a major role as logistics hub and agent for the organisation's operations in these other countries (¶143 above). During the review period, the country portfolio was only part of the work load of the CO. Secondly, Tanzania had to continue its role as a haven for refugees from conflicts in neighbouring states. While it was possible to close the Mtabila camp in 2012 and repatriate most of the Burundian refugees, WFP had to continue an important role through its PRROs in support to Congolese refugees at the Nyarugusu camp. The context for this country portfolio was thus one in which WFP's traditional strengths in logistics and humanitarian food assistance were still much in demand.

180. The second contextual factor lay within Tanzania's borders. As noted, the review period was roughly 50 years after the nation's independence (and half a century since WFP started work in the country). Poverty and livelihood insecurity nevertheless remained severe for many Tanzanians. The development strategies of several decades, and the contributions of the international community to them, had been inadequate. At the same time, government policy, systems, capacity and resources were significantly stronger and more comprehensive by the 2011–2014 period under review here. There was less and less need for direct food assistance by WFP. In all local emergency contexts during the review period, the GOT was able to undertake all the required direct assistance itself. In cases of chronic food insecurity, some direct WFP food assistance continued, but the overall context was one in which GOT systems and frameworks were increasingly comprehensive and the main need from external agencies – apart from funding, which WFP could not give – was for technical assistance. The challenge for WFP was to focus more on such technical assistance in strengthening food security, with a particular focus on helping chronically malnourished and food insecure people meet their immediate food needs.

181. This challenge was compounded by the funding context for WFP's work in Tanzania. While WFP's role in helping to meet the needs of refugees through its PRROs was generally well recognised and well funded by the international community, funding for the CP was more uneven. Following the financial crisis of 2008, major new funding became available through USAID, enabling WFP to continue fairly conventional modalities through its SF and food for assets (FFA) activities on a substantial scale. More broadly, however, donors were unconvinced about WFP's suitability for sustainable livelihoods and food security work in Tanzania or had to divert their funds to more pressing problems in other countries, or both.

## *Relevance*

182. For the purposes of this overall assessment, it is useful to distinguish between the operational relevance of a WFP portfolio and its strategic relevance.

183. Operationally relevant activities in a WFP portfolio make a direct contribution to addressing food insecurity. The food assistance to refugees clearly did this. The SF, FFA and nutrition activities in the rest of the portfolio did so too, being targeted on the more food insecure areas of the country. The operational relevance of the strong P4P activity was less direct. It clearly developed ways of strengthening Tanzania's smallholder farming sector, building its access to markets and its capacity to engage with them competently. The immediate benefit was to small commercial producers who were already food secure. Indirectly, less secure rural people are likely to have benefited through increased agricultural employment. P4P strengthened WFP's potential for operational relevance in terms of Pillars 3 and 4 of the Zero Hunger Challenge: "all food systems are sustainable" and "100% increase in smallholder productivity and income".

184. Strategically relevant activities in a WFP portfolio make complementary contributions to integrated national approaches to sustainable social and economic development – inherent in which, of course, are an end to hunger and food insecurity. After half a century of independence, Tanzania was building these approaches (most notably in social protection) and there were better opportunities for the WFP portfolio to achieve this strategic relevance. Achievements in this regard were only modest. The 2011–2016 CS and the CP could demonstrate alignment with national policies and strategies, but the portfolio did not develop the deeper integration required for full strategic relevance. As a result, the review period ended without clarity about sustainability or hand-over (negating a key part of the implicit theory of change in the CS), and a general regret that the activities could not have been better funded, or implemented on a larger scale. P4P was an exception to this, although its direct contribution to enhanced food security was harder to discern. VAM activities were a second exception. The gender dimension of WFP activities was more operationally relevant than strategically relevant: proactive and useful among the communities and officials with whom WFP worked, but making little visible contribution to national gender strategy or achievements.

## *Alignment and strategic positioning*

185. A conclusion from this assessment of the Tanzania portfolio is that alignment and strategic positioning are not necessarily the same. Overarching policy documents – be they a national poverty reduction strategy like MKUKUTA II or a corporate Strategic Plan – are by their nature broad and accommodating. Demonstrating the alignment of a CS or a CP with such documents may be little more than a paper exercise. Even if WFP's CS may be considered to be well aligned with the country's priorities and UNDAF outcomes (§51 above), its implementation did not fully match this alignment. Appropriate strategic positioning requires strategic relevance of the type outlined above. There were two key areas in which this was lacking in the portfolio under review, weakening WFP's strategic positioning.

186. First, policy and programmatic collaboration in SF had an encouraging start during the review period, but WFP and the GOT had drifted apart by its end. Evidence on the reasons for this is not fully conclusive. There appear to have been weaknesses in the MOEVT's engagement with WFP, especially in 2014. Meanwhile, despite its earlier policy efforts with the Ministry to move towards a community-driven, home-grown SF model, WFP's own activity continued to focus on externally sourced commodities – an

approach that had to be scaled down (and later terminated) without an effective hand-over strategy.

187. Secondly and more broadly, Tanzania was moving ahead with an integrated social protection strategy and framework during the review period. WFP was aware of these developments and engaged in a certain level of interaction with TASAF – notably through the 2012 cash transfer pilot in Mtwara. But it did not engage with policy development, or orientate its potential for technical assistance in this field, as thoroughly as might have been expected, given the commitment of the 2011–2016 CS to support productive safety nets (WFP, 2010a: 19) and the focus of the CP on an integrated “food assistance safety net approach” at district level (WFP, 2011b: 3). WFP’s expertise in labour-intensive public works and in addressing the nutritional needs of the most food-insecure among the population should have given it a leading support role in the development of Tanzania’s new PSSN programme and the rest of the social protection system in the country. Despite some contributions (¶166 above), this was not achieved during the review period. WFP’s strategic positioning in Tanzania was therefore significantly impaired.

188. At the time of this CPE, WFP faces deep new questions about its strategic positioning in Tanzania. It must prepare a new CS. If it believes that a new Country Programme is warranted, it must prepare that, in line with the new CS, in the context of emerging but far from concluded corporate debate about the future format and status of CPs in WFP (¶111 above). The new CS and possible CP would take effect at a time (2016) when WFP will be debating its overall corporate strategy as it prepares a new Strategic Plan (SP). That new SP, effective from 2017, will presumably be based on fresh and fundamental appraisal of WFP’s mandate, roles and comparative advantage. While strategy and planning in 2015 for Tanzania cannot anticipate that next SP, it should probe existing assumptions about these basic issues as deeply as possible. Nothing should be taken for granted about what WFP does next in Tanzania.

## **Factors and quality of strategic decision-making**

### *Analysis*

189. Although the analytical foundation for the portfolio in the 2011–2016 CS was sound, sectoral analysis during detailed design and implementation was uneven. Funding contingencies and operational considerations generally took precedence over analytical inputs to operational and activity design. There is no evidence of any substantial analysis of gender issues in the 2011–2016 CS or operations design, or of any overarching gender strategy in the portfolio. Nor did WFP conduct enough analysis in Tanzania to generate evidence substantiating its continuing preference for vouchers as a transfer modality, rather than cash. Further work is needed to warrant this preference and provide a rationale for continued engagement by WFP in support that does not involve the physical delivery of food. These should build on the Mtwara cash transfer pilot and relevant corporate policy and analysis (WFP, 2008b, WFP, 2011, Majewski et al., 2014).

### *Quality of strategic decision-making*

190. Implementation of the portfolio under review was dominated by operational priorities. In this narrow sense, operational strategy was generally sound. Decisions about logistics and humanitarian action (to support refugees) were professionally made and effective. In the broader sphere of “an integrated and focused approach that supports the Government to end hunger in the country”, strategic decision-making was less evident. Manifesting the perpetual insecurity of WFP (which has no core budget) with regard to resources, many of the decisions taken from year to year through the

review period were driven by funding considerations. With hindsight, funding constraints should have been a primary determinant of the shape and direction of portfolio activities, leading WFP to focus more effectively throughout those four years on capacity building that would lead to hand-over and exit from the direct, commodity-based support to beneficiaries that continued to characterise most of those activities. Instead, and perhaps because of the timing of the Financial Crisis Initiative grant received from USAID, ‘business as usual’ tended to eclipse urgent analysis about different ways forward. There was agile decision-making in the (adequately resourced) P4P pilot, notably in the switch from SACCOSs to the more legally appropriate AMCOSs. Overall, however, the review period ended with uncertainty about how to continue a CP operation in Tanzania with such disappointing levels of funding, rather than confidence about how WFP expertise could be deployed in the evolving national context of 2015–2020. The ultimate strategy of turning a crisis into an opportunity was not effectively deployed in this portfolio.

191. There has not been an adequate shift in the focus of VAM in terms of assessing the feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of different food assistance modalities or supporting national systems to monitor chronic food insecurity, risk and vulnerability as a basis for social protection programmes. Such a shift is justified not only by the WFP corporate Strategic Plan but also by the nature of food insecurity in Tanzania, in the context of growing national resources and capacities.

192. Furthermore, WFP’s own programming and its national policy influencing strategy may have been constrained by the lack of an overall analysis of the food system in Tanzania. WFP’s current portfolio includes activities that aim to increase the production and marketing of food by small-scale food producers as well as activities to meet the short-term food needs of food insecure households. An understanding of the current national food system in Tanzania is critical for the development of appropriate strategies for small-scale food producers with poor consumers.

### *Monitoring and learning*

193. Despite some weaknesses, for example in the monitoring of its own VAM work, WFP’s monitoring of its activities was generally adequate during the review period (¶99, 106, 112, 143, 164; Annex G ¶19, 28; Annex H ¶22, 23; Annex I ¶37). Logical frameworks for operations were aligned with corporate Strategic Plans, but not explicitly with the relevant Strategic Results Frameworks. SPRs did not refer to the latter either.

194. Learning from the evidence collected was less consistent. While individual specialists in the CO were able to apply some analysis and strategic decision-making to their respective sectoral portfolios, the overall syndrome during the review period was of declining resources restricting effort to core operational management tasks. Paradoxically, many organisations with inadequate funding devote the resources they do have to keeping existing operations going. They find it difficult to reallocate those resources to more fundamental reappraisals of strategy. In the case of WFP, the CP format, which commits the CO to a specified package of activities for several years, arguably limits the scope for such reappraisals; although budget revisions do of course allow some flexibility (¶111 above).

## **Portfolio performance and results**

### *Outputs*

195. Outside the refugee sector, and most notably in nutrition and SF, portfolio outputs were significantly affected by funding constraints – although the shortfall in

beneficiaries against plan was proportionally less than the reduction in actual against planned tonnages (Figure 2 on page 11 above).

196. WFP achieved substantial FFA outputs to a satisfactory technical standard that also put communities centre stage, as intended, in the planning, design and management of the projects carried out. After a slow start, P4P achieved impressive outputs, although large numbers of members in the participating farmers' organisations were not actually selling crops through P4P channels, and those who were had larger land holdings on average than P4P planning had envisaged. Outputs to support refugees were generally close to target and of satisfactory technical quality.

### *Efficiency*

197. Between 2011 and 2014, WFP made good progress enhancing operational and logistics efficiency in Tanzania, cutting costs through attention to detail on numerous fronts as well as enhanced logistics strategy.

198. Efficiency was less thoroughly addressed in the design of the portfolio. Not enough was achieved with regard to spatial efficiency (geographic concentration) or (outside the refugee camp) institutional efficiency (synergistic collaboration with partners). No efficiency enhancements could be attributed to UN DAO. It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess the inputs and outputs associated with WFP's engagement in DAO, but the likely conclusion would be that the process has reduced efficiency.

199. WFP did not analyse the cost efficiency of its activities. The unit cost of SF in this portfolio was clearly competitive by international standards. The evidence was less clear for the nutrition interventions. But it can be argued that, by sinking below the threshold for significant impact among the general population of even a single district, the CP nutrition work had by definition become inefficient.

### *Gender*

200. Performance and outputs with regard to gender mirrored the overall character of the portfolio under review. There were some significant achievements with regard to gender equality and empowerment of women at operational level, and few at the strategic level of national policy and institutions. In the generally gender-responsive implementation of various aspects of the portfolio, WFP strengthened women's and men's understanding of women's rights and abilities, and helped them to take more prominent positions in management and leadership. A proactive and coherent approach to gender across the portfolio was limited, however, by funding restrictions.

### *Synergy and multiplier effects*

201. To fulfil their humanitarian purpose within the boundaries of the camps, portfolio activities to support refugees comprised integrated packages of effort that had to link to each other and to the complementary inputs and roles of other agencies. The rest of the portfolio was designed as an integrated package of activities that would focus on selected food insecure districts and achieve synergy among those activities in order to optimise the beneficial impact on chronic (and in some cases acute) vulnerability. Largely but not entirely due to funding shortages, this integrated, district-wide approach was not achieved – undermining the main strategic thrust of the 2011–2016 CS and its whole theory of change, to the extent that such a theory can be inferred. Complementarity with partners other than government was also limited. Sectorally and institutionally, activities turned out to be the silos that their design had sought to avoid. Ironically, the P4P pilot – a slightly detached part of the portfolio – actually showed the

most evidence of synergy and multiplier effects, linking to WFP procurement and building a strong and productive partnership with the NFRA.

202. UN DAO should have been a prominent opportunity for WFP to achieve synergy and multiplier effects in its portfolio, through collaboration with other UN agencies in a structured interaction with the GOT. Despite the structure of the 2011–2016 UNDAF and the major effort committed by senior CO staff to co-ordination processes in Dar es Salaam, there is limited evidence of any such results having been achieved. Institutional silos remain obstinately upright. Most significantly, WFP did not adequately grasp the emerging opportunity to build synergy with the GOT, UN agencies, the World Bank and bilateral DPs like DFID in building the national social protection system.

#### *Influencing the national agenda and capacity*

203. The national social protection agenda developed significantly in Tanzania during the review period. However, although it did interact with TASAF, *inter alia* through the 2012 cash transfer pilot in Mtwara (¶197 above), WFP did not significantly influence this agenda or related capacity – which should have been the core strategic agenda for its portfolio.

204. The national nutrition agenda also developed significantly between 2011 and 2014, most notably through Tanzania’s enthusiastic membership of the SUN movement, in which WFP was also active. While there were issues on which WFP might have been more proactive in national policy discussions, the organisation was seen overall as having engaged constructively with this agenda during the review period. In SF, on the other hand, WFP’s engagement and influence waned.

205. P4P experience in this Tanzanian portfolio demonstrated that, with adequate resources, WFP is well capable of a proactive and positive engagement with the national agenda. Overall, however, outside the VAM sector, its contributions to national capacity development were largely limited to the technical and operational levels in the areas and the governmental and non-governmental field agencies with which it was working. The sustainability of this enhanced capacity was linked to that of the activities to which it was linked. Where there was uncertainty about the maintenance of activities or assets following WFP withdrawal, this was matched by doubts about whether individual and institutional capacity could be sustained.

#### *Effectiveness and sustainability*

206. Effective work through the PRROs saved and sustained the lives of many thousands of refugees. Further afield, citizens of many less stable countries in central and eastern Africa could be supported by WFP because of the effective logistical work done by the CO in Tanzania. Sustainability is not to be desired for such activities, in the sense that both the refugees and their hosts would wish that return to their home countries would cancel the need for any further such work.

207. Nutrition work elsewhere was effective for individual beneficiaries, but not in any broader sense. As it was ultimately carried out on such a small scale, its significance was correspondingly limited. Nor were steps taken towards sustainable results by adopting modalities that the GOT would continue or replicate. SF, on the other hand, was achieved on a larger scale, and was probably effective for the pupil generation it supported in enhancing attendance and easing the home nutrition burden on poor families. However, the effective hand-over to government envisaged by the 2011–2016 CS was not achieved.

208. FFA activities in the portfolio were partly effective. Although technically adequate and useful in redressing food insecurity during implementation, they had

only a limited effect on beneficiary households' and communities' resilience to climate change and the associated livelihood shocks and stresses.

209. P4P work was effective in strengthening smallholder farmer participation in national agricultural markets and starting to build what could be a sustainable institutional framework for this enhanced involvement by farmer organisations. P4P capacity and systems development with the NFRA made an important contribution to that institution's development and to its service to Tanzanian agriculture. While P4P's progress was commendable, it would be premature to celebrate the achievement until some years after direct WFP involvement in this strengthened system has ceased.

210. Overall, and in keeping with the organisation's global profile to date, the Tanzania portfolio between 2011 and 2014 achieved a degree of operational effectiveness – supported by often strong technical competence, and restricted, except in support to refugees, by severe funding shortages. Because WFP did not engage adequately with the strategic content and direction of national approaches to food and livelihood insecurity, the sustainability of the portfolio's results was limited.

211. The causal logic underpinning the implicit theory of change in the 2011–2016 CS was only sparsely specified. The two key design features of that strategy were geographic focus, and integration of activities within the selected areas to achieve synergy; and “hand-over to government and partners”. The unwritten assumption was that success would depend on achievement of these two key elements. Despite often strong operational performance, it must be concluded that neither was fully accomplished. Lack of funding and weaknesses in activity design and implementation meant that there was limited connectivity between SF, MCHN, FFA and P4P activities. SF links with government dwindled to an uncertain silence, without effective hand-over of an agreed approach. Links from FFA to government social protection programmes remained preliminary. There was little hand-over of the very small-scale MCHN approaches or modalities. P4P made the most progress in hand-over to government and private sector partners.

### **Fundamental questions and challenges**

212. It is not in the scope of this CPE to assess the appropriateness of WFP's global corporate stance, mandate or approaches as set out in its SPs (2008–2013 and 2014–2017). Broad debates continue, for example, about the meaningfulness of the transition from food aid to food assistance. Donors remain sceptical in Tanzania about WFP's comparative advantage in the developmental parts of its portfolio. Questions could be raised about the extension of the portfolio, through P4P, into agricultural marketing development (although this is clearly sanctioned by the current SP (WFP, 2013i: 14, 16, 18). While this CPE is not intended to engage directly in such corporate debates on WFP's overall strategic positioning, it should serve as a reminder that basic questions must be asked and answered in charting its way forward in Tanzania. Those basic questions should include the following.

213. What is WFP's comparative advantage and future role in support to refugees in Tanzania? If, as increasingly judged appropriate, much of that support shifts from direct transfer of food to the use of vouchers or cash, will WFP be the most competent agency available to provide support in such ways? Or should its role be restricted to first line emergency food deliveries if voucher or cash systems, and their supporting market arrangements, cannot immediately be used?

214. What is WFP's comparative advantage in developmental support to the food insecure among Tanzania's population? As national systems, increasingly co-ordinated in a social protection framework, become ever more comprehensive and capable, how can WFP – as part of the UN system – add value? If, as the context suggests, it focuses



increasingly on technical advisory roles and associated capacity development functions, can it present a convincingly strong profile in the relevant technical areas and so attract funding for its continued presence in Tanzania?

215. Most fundamentally, therefore, WFP's strategic positioning in Tanzania – as set out in the next CS – will have to address the null hypothesis – implicitly considered proved by some development partners and funding agencies – that the organisation no longer has a role in Tanzania beyond emergency response and associated logistical capacity for this country and its neighbours. The natural strategic response for WFP would be defensive, arguing that such a conclusion cannot possibly be warranted. A more appropriate response would be constructive, openly addressing the idea and building the rationale for forthcoming programmes from a fundamental analysis of context, need and comparative advantage.

216. While sustainability and hand-over to national systems are well established principles in WFP's programming for Tanzania, its strategic positioning will need to refer more explicitly to exit as the new CS and possible CP proposal are developed. The natural institutional tendency is to assume or encourage the evolution of mandates and roles. An organisation does not leave; it does new things. But in the next round of WFP planning and funding proposals for Tanzania, it will be necessary to address potential exit directly and to offer a comprehensive justification for a continued presence.

### **3.2 Recommendations**

217. This section presents the overall recommendations arising from this evaluation for the work of WFP in Tanzania. Several of the thematic annexes (Annex G – Annex L) close with ideas for the future. These are not formulated as formal recommendations, but are a supplementary input for WFP's consideration as it plans its operations from 2016 onwards.

218. These recommendations are framed within the context and mandate of the CPE (¶212 above). They are not mandated to propose change to WFP corporate strategy. But they recognise that they would be implemented in a time of continuing challenges and change for WFP as a whole, during a period when the next Strategic Plan is being prepared, debated and carried out.

**R1. With support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division, Safety Nets and Social Protection Unit), the CO should redefine and restructure any future food assistance contribution in Tanzania (outside its humanitarian food assistance and its P4P agricultural marketing initiative) within the national social protection framework.**

219. Food assistance in Tanzania should be conceptualised, structured, designed and delivered through the national social protection framework and system. With inadequate engagement by WFP during the review period, the GOT and its development partners have been moving forward rapidly with an increasingly comprehensive social protection system under the auspices of TASAF. The types of food assistance and related transfer modalities in which WFP specialises can fit constructively into such a system.

**R2. The CO, with support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division), should apply as much flexibility as possible in the design, resourcing and management of any further programme of food assistance in Tanzania so that the programme as a whole becomes a tool for creative, proactive support to the GOT - based on profound strategic analysis of WFP's comparative advantage and appropriate roles in Tanzania.**

**R2a. To enable this, WFP should explore how to maximise delegation of authority for adjustments to budgets and the use of programme funds.**

**R2b. 2016 should be seen as a transition year to be programmed accordingly.**

220. Experience with the 2011–2016 CP has provided added support for the view that the CP format is now a less suitable framework for WFP's non-emergency operations than it may have been when it was introduced. WFP is beginning to consider corporately how to develop new programme frameworks that may offer more flexibility. The Country Strategic Plan might absorb and supersede CPs and PRROs. In Tanzania, outside support to refugees, a focus on technical advisory and institutional and capacity building services should lead to a much smaller budget.

**R3. In Tanzania, WFP should shift from operations to advice in its food assistance services. With support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division), the CO should focus on:**

- **Operational services including i) procurement and logistics to support humanitarian transfers in Tanzania and other countries; and ii) logistics support to the UN system.**
- **Technical assistance, notably on cash and vouchers and social protection.**
- **Transfers of food, only in refugee emergencies and in any other crises that government cannot handle alone.**

221. Outside the humanitarian sector, direct commodity delivery by WFP within Tanzania has run its course. After completion of the current CP in 2016, WFP should cease such activities and focus instead, if required, on technical advisory services to the relevant agencies of government. The recommended shift to a specialist advisory mode does not preclude direct WFP involvement in pilots of transfer modalities, like the one it undertook for TASAF in 2012. But in any future such pilots the transfer of resources should be undertaken by a GOT (or GOT-commissioned) agency, and not by WFP.

222. Each component of any programme should specify an exit strategy, linked to an overall statement of a phased exit strategy for the organisation in Tanzania. The last phases of this withdrawal – from emergency humanitarian assistance – would presumably be set in the indefinite future. Earlier phases could be during implementation of this next programme, or at its close.

**R4. The CO, with support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division, Emergencies and Transitions Unit) should ensure that any further programme of support to refugees in Tanzania is based on a fundamental reappraisal and justification of WFP's role and comparative advantage in medium- and long-term food assistance to them.**

223. A new proposal for support to refugees should explicitly address the possibility that WFP would cease to engage in food assistance to medium- and long-term refugees, dedicating a transitional period to hand-over to the Ministry of Home Affairs (and possibly other international agencies), and exit from all but front line emergency assistance to refugees and the provision of any supplementary feeding (for example to PLW and young children) that no other agency is better equipped to supply.

**R5. In consultation with HQ (Policy and Programme Division) and the RB, the CO should work constructively and proactively to optimise the value that UN DAO should add to WFP and UN partners' contributions in Tanzania. In order to optimise the synergistic value:**

**R5a. WFP should undertake a corporate review of WFP's experience with DAO, to clarify its position and responsibilities.**

**R5b. As the UN prepares for a second generation DAO and an UNDAP II in Tanzania, the CO should work with partner agencies to find fresh ways of achieving the recommendations of the 2012 global DAO evaluation, in particular those referring to better UN system support to programme countries and the simplification and harmonisation of business practices (UN, 2012b: 24-25).**

224. Given the low returns that UN DAO and the 2011–2016 UNDAP processes have yielded for WFP so far – after enormous and often distracting inputs of senior and middle management time – it is now tempting for the CO to keep a low profile and minimise its effort. Instead, it is recommended that, with the support of Headquarters, the CO should work with partner agencies to find fresh ways of minimising the bureaucratic burden of DAO, optimising the synergistic value that it should be able to add, and focusing on what should be the core purpose: joint action by UN agencies that finally starts to break down the silos in which they still too often operate.

**R6. With support from RB and HQ (Gender Office), the CO should ensure that in its future focus on food assistance advisory services in Tanzania, it specifies how the 2015-2020 gender policy will be implemented for each activity/operation. The CO should give priority to the resourcing of this implementation**

225. During the review period, the work of Gender Focal Points has been crippled by funding shortages. Under a redefined food assistance programme and associated budget (see R2), and with the guidance of the new corporate gender policy, it should be feasible to provide this key element of WFP expertise with adequate resources.

## Annexes

### Annex A Terms of Reference (excluding annexes)

#### 1. Background

1. The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide background information on Tanzania and the WFP portfolio in the country.

##### 1.1. Introduction

2. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation. CPEs help Country Offices (CO) in the preparation of Country Strategies (CS) and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations.

3. The WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) will be implementing a CPE in Tanzania in 2015. This evaluation will include all WFP activities implemented in the country during the 2011-2014 period. Tanzania was selected on the basis of country-related and WFP-specific criteria. Tanzania falls in the category of countries where WFP has a relatively important portfolio and where WFP CO would benefit the most from a CPE for future programming.

##### 1.2. Country Context

4. The United Republic of Tanzania is bordered by Kenya and Uganda to the north; Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC) to the west; and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south.

5. According to the 2012 census<sup>17</sup>, the country's population was 45 million inhabitants with an annual growth rate of 3 per cent and the under-15 age group representing 44 per cent of the total. Population distribution is extremely uneven, with density varying from 1 person per square kilometre (sq. km<sup>2</sup>) in arid regions to 51 per sq. km<sup>2</sup> in the mainland highlands, to 134 per sq. km<sup>2</sup> in Zanzibar.

6. Tanzania is classified as a low-income country, ranking 159 out of 187 countries in the 2013 UNDP development index. The economy has continued to perform strongly, with current growth of gross domestic product (GDP) at around 7 per cent and inflation declining to single digits. The main drivers of growth include telecommunications, transport, financial intermediation, agriculture, manufacturing, construction and trade.

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<sup>17</sup> Population and housing Census, 2012, National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania

7. **Poverty trends.** 2012 World Bank data<sup>18</sup> indicate high poverty in Tanzania (28.2 per cent overall)<sup>19</sup>. Poverty remains overwhelmingly in rural areas (33.3 per cent) where about 70 per cent of the poor population live (see key social indicators in annex 2). As the population is growing, the absolute number of the poor raises concern. Indicators of income poverty, human resources, survival and nutrition and the Human Development Index (0.476 in 2012), clearly shows growing rural-urban divide. There are also disparities across and within regions and districts in poverty status. Disparities are explained by the pattern in the distribution of population, endowment in natural resources, climatic conditions, as well as in the distribution of infrastructure, such as transport, schools and health facilities.

8. **Refugees.** Civil strife and ethnic conflicts in neighbouring countries have resulted in a major influx of refugees (from Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC) in Tanzania with the country hosting up to 600,000 refugees in 1994 especially in the North-western Kigoma and Kagera regions. Renewed stability over the past two decades has created opportunities for the majority of these refugees to return home. The remaining 70,000 reside in Nyarugusu camp (Kigoma region), which primarily hosts refugees from the DRC and a small group from Burundi. Most of the Congolese refugees originate from the South Kivu where the security situation remains volatile. It is unlikely that these refugees will be able to repatriate under the current circumstances.

**Table 1: Top 10 Natural Disasters in Tanzania for the period 2005 - 2014**

Disaster	Date	Total Affected
Drought	2006	3,700,000
Drought	2011	1,000,000
Flood	2011	50,200
Flood	2009	50,000
Flood	2014	20,000
Flood	2006	19,000
Flood	2005	10,548
Flood	2014	10,000
Flood	2011	9,000
Flood	2008	7,957

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

9. **Natural disasters.** Tanzania's main natural disaster hazards are epidemics floods, droughts and earthquakes. Between 1980 and 2010, around 73 natural disasters occurred in the country of which 27 were epidemics, 26 floods, 5 earthquakes and 7 droughts. However, no other single natural disaster has affected more people than droughts, which are responsible for over 90 per cent of all people affected by natural disasters in the past two decades<sup>20</sup>. In 2006, a severe and

<sup>18</sup> World Development Indicators: <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.7>

<sup>19</sup> Not disaggregated by sex

<sup>20</sup> Prevention Web, 2010

prolonged drought caused food shortages affecting 3.7 million people in 2006 and 1 million people in 2011 (table 1).

10. **Agriculture.** Forty-five per cent of the country's GDP is derived from agriculture and about 70 per cent of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood, making it the country's largest employment sector. Around 12 per cent of the land is arable, but only 2 per cent is planted with permanent crops. Growth of the agriculture sector is estimated at 4.3 per cent in 2013, driven by increased production of the major food crops, including maize, paddy, millet/sorghum and cassava. The agriculture sector is heavily dependent on weather and is poorly mechanised. It is estimated that only about a fifth of the area with high irrigation potential is currently under irrigation. Growth of the agriculture sector also continues to be constrained by existing infrastructure gaps, including poor road transport – especially in rural areas – and lack of storage facilities.

11. While at the national level, Tanzania is food self-sufficient with some areas experiencing surplus mainly in cereals<sup>21</sup>, there are still localized food deficits at regional, district, and household level.

12. **Food Security.** According to the WFP 2012 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), 730,000 households in Tanzania were food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity (8.3 per cent of all households in 2010-11), of these, around 150,000 households (or 1.7 per cent of all households) were considered chronically food insecure. This represents a slight decrease from the first CFSVA (2008-09), in which 10 per cent of households were classified food insecure. Female headed households (FHH) accounted for 26 per cent of all households nationally and were slightly more prone to experiencing food insecurity: in 2010/2011, 11.4 per cent of FHH were classified as having a poor dietary intake compared with 7.2 per cent of male headed households. Food insecurity is intrinsically linked to poverty: two thirds (66 per cent) of food insecure households fell below the poverty line vs. 18 per cent of all households in Tanzania. The country's poor farming households need better livelihood support such as access to credit and training so they can improve their agricultural inputs and techniques, increase yields.

13. **Health and Nutrition.** Life expectancy at birth was estimated in 2013 to be 61 years. Tanzania is on target for achieving MDG4 of reducing child mortality. While under-five mortality rates have declined from 128 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 68 per 1,000 live births in 2011, infant mortality has also declined (from 68 to 51 per 1,000 live births) during the same period. Likewise, maternal mortality declined significantly, with 454 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010 compared to 578 in 2005. While progress has been made in reducing the incidence rate of HIV/AIDS to 5.1 per cent (compared to 5.7 per cent in 2007)<sup>22,23</sup>, it remains as high as 15 per cent in some regions. Women in Tanzania are particularly affected by HIV/AIDS (6.2 per cent women and 3.8 per cent men). Currently, Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) is offered in more than 65 per cent of health facilities countrywide. Notable achievements have also been recorded in increasing access to antiretroviral therapy for treatment of affected persons. The number of

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<sup>21</sup> According to a FAO study, in the period 2002-2011, the agriculture sector has managed to produce between 5 and 19 per cent more than the normal national aggregate food requirements for basic cereals. FAO-MAFAP (2013). Review of Food and Agricultural Policies in The United Republic of Tanzania 2005-2011.

<sup>22</sup> 2010/2011 Demographic and Health Survey and the 2011/2012 HIV and Malaria Indicator Survey

<sup>23</sup> /2011 Demographic and Health Survey

health facilities providing and reporting HIV care and treatment services increased from 1,100 in 2011 to 1,176 in 2012.

14. Although progress has been made in improving child survival, malnutrition remains a serious challenge. The high prevalence of stunting and micronutrient deficiencies, such as iron deficiency anaemia, are the main nutritional problems<sup>7</sup>. Forty-two per cent of under-five children are stunted. The prevalence of stunting is much more common among rural children. The Southern Highlands zone stood out as exhibiting very high rates across all its regions: Iringa (52 per cent), Rukwa (50 per cent), Mbeya (50 per cent). Other regions reporting high stunting prevalence included Dodoma (56 per cent) and Lindi (54 per cent). Children in rural areas were more likely to be stunted (45 per cent) than their urban counterparts (32 per cent). Stunting was more prevalent in poorer households and those in which the mother had little or no formal education. Nationally, 5 per cent of children were wasted and 1 per cent severely wasted. Zanzibar had a higher prevalence of wasting than mainland Tanzania (12 per cent vs. 5 per cent). Nationally, 16 per cent of children were underweight. Prevalence was higher for rural children (17 per cent) than urban (11 per cent), and Zanzibar children were more likely to be underweight than their mainland counterparts (20 per cent vs. 16 per cent). In mainland Tanzania, Arusha (in the Northern zone) had the highest rate of underweight children (28 per cent).

15. Micronutrient deficiencies, especially anaemia, are prevalent in Nyarugusu camp among refugee children under-5 and women. The 2012 joint nutrition survey<sup>24</sup> showed 38 per cent prevalence of anaemia among children aged 6–59 months; prevalence among pregnant women was 37 per cent, and among non-pregnant women 31 per cent.

16. **Education.** The 2011 primary enrolment has dropped to 94 per cent (compared to 95 per cent in 2010 and the 2006 peak of 97 per cent) and so has the completion rate (from 69.3 per cent to 64.4 per cent). Although improving (from 1:51 in 2010 to 1:48 in 2011), the teacher/pupil ratio indicates large class sizes. The quality of education remains low, opportunities for skills development are limited. Key challenges include fostering an enabling learning environment, remedying the shortage of teachers and equipment, and providing incentives for teachers, especially in remote areas with limited access to roads<sup>25</sup>.

17. **Gender issues.** Tanzania has made some commendable progress in advancing gender equality. Primary school enrolment ratios for girls and boys are almost equal<sup>26</sup>, though the gender balance deteriorates with transition to secondary and higher levels. The share of girls enrolled in secondary schools increased from around 30 per cent in the last decade to 46.3 per cent in 2012. However, the challenge remains with regard to retention and performance of girls at all levels of education. In addition, early pregnancies and marriage continue to contribute significantly to school dropouts among girls in both rural and urban areas. Women's labour force participation is also quite high (88.2 per cent in 2011 against 90.0 per cent for men) with a narrow gender gap of about 2.3 per cent, although the gap in skilled labour is larger<sup>27</sup> (22 per cent). Meanwhile, women's representation in Parliament (36 per cent after the 2010 general elections) is relatively high. Domestic violence against women is still prevalent. While Tanzania has undertaken major

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<sup>24</sup> Nutrition Survey carried out in Nyarugusu by WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and TRCS, October 2012

<sup>25</sup> African Economic Outlook, 2013

<sup>26</sup> UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP 2011–2015)

<sup>27</sup> -2015 UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP 2011–2015)

reforms (including legal reforms of family and land laws) to protect women's rights, inequalities persist. Women also face challenges in economic empowerment and access to decision-making at all levels and there are many laws and customary practices that remain discriminatory against women. They continue to be more likely than men to be poor and illiterate, to be subject to gender-based violence and usually have less access than men to medical care, property ownership, credit, training and employment<sup>11</sup>.

18. **Tanzania's Policy Framework.** The long term development goals of Tanzania are established by the Tanzania Development Vision 2025. The medium term goals are set in the National Strategy for Growth & Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), which defines the country's development objectives for period 2011–2015.

19. The 2011–2014 evaluation period has witnessed changing priorities with the Government launching in 2013, the Big Results Now (BRN) which shapes the national priorities for 2013/2014-2016/2017. This change has significantly influences the international community's assistance, calling for a shift in several UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP 2011–2015) priorities and activities to align with the Government's new focus.

20. In relation to agriculture, the sector's major development programmes are the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP)<sup>28</sup> for Tanzania Mainland; the Agricultural Sector Plan (ASP) for Zanzibar and Tanzania's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). In 2011, the Government of Tanzania launched the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP). TAFSIP is described as a sector-wide approach to co-ordinate and harmonise the resources needed to accelerate implementation of existing initiatives and to launch new ones that address national, regional and sectoral development priorities.

21. In recent years, nutrition has gained prominence on Tanzania's policy agenda. Two strategic papers –the National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) for Tanzania Mainland<sup>29</sup> and the Zanzibar Food Security and Nutrition Policy (ZFSNP)<sup>30</sup> – set the agenda for all Tanzanians to achieve an adequate nutritional status. Through key partner initiatives including the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN)<sup>31</sup> and Feed the Future programmes, the government is setting the stage for interventions such as feeding practice support for mothers, food fortification and micronutrient supplementation.

22. The education and Training Sector Development Programme (ESDP) provides the framework for implementation of education and training goals. The programme particularly seeks to 1) enhance partnership in the provision of education and training, 2) improve quality education 3) increase access to education by focusing on equity issue with respect to the needs of women, groups and regions.

23. The Government policies in the health sector including HIV/AIDS are the National Health Policy and the National Policy on HIV/AIDS. In addition, some major milestones in the health sector were the formulation of the Ten-year Primary

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<sup>28</sup> ASDP phase 2 was to be approved in 2013 but its draft is still being discussed and will likely be shifted to 2015. The current Government has approved new programmes recently (Big Results Now; Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania) and but it is not yet clear whether they are consistent with ASDP and how they will fit in. This lack of clarity will affect the agricultural sector, the food and nutrition security and influence UN and WFP country strategies and priorities in Tanzania.

<sup>29</sup> The NNS was launched in 2011.

<sup>30</sup> April 2008.


<sup>31</sup> The SUN movement in Tanzania provides a platform and momentum for nutrition and nutrition-sensitive interventions, as well as for health-specific interventions.



Health Services Development Programme 2007–2017 (in Kiswahili, MMAM) and the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2008– 2015 (HSSP III).

24. **International assistance.** The economy of Tanzania still depends heavily on official development assistance (ODA). Foreign assistance accounted for approximately 10 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) in the period of 2009–2013<sup>32</sup>. From 2009–2013,<sup>33</sup> Tanzania has received a total net ODA of US\$ 6.5 billion (see graph 1), an annual average of US\$ 1.6 billion. Total humanitarian aid contributions for the same period amounted to about US\$ 4 billion (see graph 1). Over the same period, the largest ODA source has been the International Development Association (the World Bank), the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU). Other donors include the USA, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Japan, and the African Development Fund.

**Graph 1: International Assistance to Tanzania, 2009–2013**



25. The United Nations in Tanzania is one of eight UN country offices in the world to pilot the Delivering as One (DAO) reform. The DAO reform comes in response to the changing aid environment - to translate the Paris and Accra principles of aid effectiveness into practice. It also aims to reaffirm the UN’s position as a relevant actor in the field of development. In Tanzania, this translates into the UN’s four-year business plan, the 2011–2015 UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) extended to 2016, which articulates the contribution of the UN to Tanzania’s national development priorities and international commitments, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability to Government and Development Partners. Emergency and Disaster (E&D) response in Tanzania is co-ordinated centrally from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to ensure priority attention from the highest level of the executive. In-line with international best practice, line ministries are required to co-ordinate their E&D response through the E&D directorate in the PMO/Chief Ministers Office.

<sup>32</sup> World bank databank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS>

<sup>33</sup> Information not available for 2014

26. The UNDAP incorporates a Programme Results Matrix and a complementary Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix which includes indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification. UNDAP also incorporates a Delivering as One Matrix which defines the strategic results and actions of the reform process. There is also a database “Results Monitoring System (RMS)” which tracks all activities and progress of the participating agencies under UNDAP. In addition to the above, Tanzania has produced a Common Country Programme Document (CCPD), which incorporates a common narrative with agency-specific components, results frameworks and resource requirements for UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP.

## **2. Reasons for the Evaluation**

### **2.1. Rationale**

27. Since the corporate WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013)<sup>34</sup> (see annex 3), WFP is shifting emphasis from food aid to food assistance, calling for more strategic programming and opening greater opportunities for effective partnerships in the fight against hunger, and encourages coherence of WFP programmes with the UN system at the country level and alignment with government policies, strategies and priorities.

28. There has been no evaluation of WFP’s portfolio of activities in Tanzania, the CPE is the opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its operations in order to optimize alignment to the new strategic plan 2014-2017.

29. The CPE will assist the Tanzania CO in reviewing past performance. It will also inform CO programme planning and formulation. The current WFP Country Programme (CP) runs from 2011-2015 and the same timeframe applies for WFP’s CS 2011-2015 developed by the Tanzania CO. The evaluation findings will inform WFP Tanzania for the next CP to be submitted to the Executive Board (EB June 2016) and CS. The evaluation will also inform the design of the new protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 2016-2018) to be submitted to EB February 2016.

### **2.2. Objectives**

30. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Tanzania (accountability); and
- determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself Tanzania form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

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<sup>34</sup> WFP Global Strategic Plan 2008–2013 had five Strategic Objectives; SO 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; SO 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures; SO3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post disaster or transition situations; SO 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition; SO5: Strengthen countries’ capacity to reduce hunger through handover strategies and local purchase.

### **2.3. Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation**

31. A list of stakeholders at project level is available in annex 4 and their interest in the evaluation is summarised in table 2. The evaluation team will do further stakeholder analyses in the inception phase.

**Table 2: Stakeholders and their interest in the Tanzania CPE**

Stakeholders	Interest in the WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation
<b>Internal stakeholders</b>	
Country Office	The CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, it has a direct stake in the evaluation and will be a primary user of its results to reposition WFP in the country context, if necessary, and readjust advocacy, analytical work, programming and implementation as appropriate.
Regional Bureaux and Headquarters Management	Both have an interest in learning from the evaluation results, especially regarding unique aspects such as the experience with the one UN pilot and linkages with CAADP.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	Presentation of the evaluation results will inform Board members about the performance and outcome of WFP activities in Tanzania 2011-2014 in the context of the One-UN.
<b>External stakeholders</b>	
Beneficiaries (women and men). Refugees in camps, people with poor food consumption score, malnourished children and pregnant/lactating women, undernourished PLHIV enrolled in ART, primary school children and smallholder farmers	As the ultimate recipients of WFP assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. They will be consulted during the field mission.
Government of Tanzania / the Prime Minister's Office, line Ministries, relevant departments at decentralized levels (Agriculture, Education, Health, Home Affairs, etc.) and District Councils.	The Government of Tanzania has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with their priorities, those of others and meet the expected results. Various Ministries and other relevant bodies are direct partners of WFP activities at project level (refer to annex for details).
Public agencies or other government departments	Public agency/departments such as the National Food Reserve Agency and the Tanzania Social Action Fund as WFP's partners also have a direct interest in the CPE.
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) international, national and local organisations	NGOs are WFP partners while at the same time having their own activities. The results of the evaluation might affect the WFP activities and therefore the partnerships.
Donors	WFP activities are supported by a large group of donors. They all have an interest in knowing whether their contributions have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work is effective in alleviating food and nutrition insecurity of the most vulnerable groups.
One-UN Country team	WFP is partnering with various UN Agencies under the one UN pilot to implement its activities, which therefore have a direct interest in the findings of the evaluation. In addition the results of the evaluation can be used for the development of consolidated annual plans.

### 3. Subject of the Evaluation

#### 3.1. WFP's Portfolio in Tanzania

32. WFP has been present in Tanzania since 1963 with 84 operations including support to emergency, recovery and development operations.

33. WFP uses an operating model based on single operations of different nature and duration, which can follow one another or overlap. The four traditional operation types are the emergency operation (EMOP), the PRRO, the development project or CP and the special operations (SO). A limited number of activities can also take place outside of the traditional operations framework. These are typically smaller in scale, focus on innovative projects for the same operations and are financed through extra-budgetary resources such as grants or trust funds (see table 4).

34. The WFP portfolio to be evaluated comprises operations implemented under the current WFP's CS 2011-2015 including, the CP 200200 and the three successive PRRO 200029, 200325 and 200603<sup>35</sup>. Refer to below Tanzania portfolio overview (table 3).

**Table 3: Tanzania portfolio overview 2011-2014**

Operation type	Operation number	Title	Time frame	US\$ Req.	US\$ Rec.	% Funded	Project Activities/ Components
CP	200200	Country Programme	Jul 11 - Jun 15	162,679,123	62,023,532	38.1%	Component 1: Food for education. Component 2: Food for Assets. Components 3 and 4: Supplementary feeding. Component 5: HIV and AIDS. Linking smallholder farmers to markets. Strengthening food security and nutrition information systems.
PRRO	200603	Food Assistance for Refugees	Jul 14 - Jun 16	35,938,823	14,226,376	39.6%	GFD, Blanket supplementary feeding
PRRO	200325	Food Assistance for Refugees in the Northwest	Jan 12 - Jun 14	50,440,696	41,511,894	82.3%	GFD, Supplementary feeding and blanket supplementary feeding, School feeding, PLHIV
PRRO	200029	Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Households Among the Host Populations in North-western Tanzania	Jan 10 - Dec 11	43,948,689	41,940,751	95%	GFD, Supplementary feeding, FFA/FFT, School Feeding, HIV and AIDS

Source: Project Documents, SPRs, Resource ~~err~~ 2014 Situations November

<sup>35</sup> The evaluation will cover the last year of PRRO 200029 and the first six months of PRRO 200603. It will not cover the former CP 104370, which ended in June 2011.


**Table 4: Extra-budgetary funds confirmed for Tanzania during the evaluation period**

Recipient Country	Grant Key	2011	2012	2013	2014
Tanzania, United Republic of	10014696	100,371			
	10017686		105,454		
	10019011			104,861	
	10022241				179,376

Source: WFP Government partnerships Division PGG

35. Contributions received so far for the entire portfolio amount to \$159.7 million against total requirements of \$293 million (54.2 per cent) (refer to table 5 for the timeline and funding level of the Tanzania portfolio). Graph 2 shows a repartition of the main WFP donors (USA, UK, Canada, UN CERF and the EU). From 2011 to 2013, WFP reached 2.9 million beneficiaries<sup>36</sup> with a total of 125,000 metric tons (mt).

**Graph 2: Top five donors of WFP portfolio in Tanzania**



<sup>36</sup> Cumulative total reached during the evaluation period.

**Table 5: Timeline and funding level of Tanzania portfolio operations 2011-2014**

PRRO 200603 - Food Assistance for Refugees	Jul 14 - Jun 16				Red: 35,938,823 Rec: 14, 226, 376 <b>Funded: 39.6%</b>
PRRO 200325 - Food Assistance for Refugees in the Northwest	Jan 12 - Jun 14		Req: 50,440,696 <b>Funded: 82.3%</b>	Rec: 41,511,894	
CP 200200 - Country Programme	Jul 11 - Jun 15		Req: 162,679,123 <b>Funded: 38.1%</b>	Rec: 62,023,532	
PRRO 200029 - Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Households Among the Host Populations in North-Western Tanzania	Jan 10 - Dec 11	Req: 43,948,689 Rec: 41,940,751 <b>Funded: 95%</b>			
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		37,644,000	38,090,000	32,457,000	n.a.
% Direct Expenses: Tanzania vs. WFP World		1%	1%	1%	n.a.
Food Distributed (MT)		48,984	41,752	34,338	n.a.
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		1,168,353	926,234	800,986	n.a.

Source: last SPR available in 2014, Resource Situations November 2014, APR 2009 – 2013. Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are in US\$

36. WFP activities in Tanzania are based on the WFP's CS 2011-2015, focusing on: i) ensuring continuity and building on experience and best practices from previous programmes; ii) prioritizing food-insecure areas and the most vulnerable households; iii) supporting a demand-driven and participatory approach; iv) enhancing strategic and local partnerships; v) ensuring alignment and coherence with government policies and strategies related to agricultural development, nutrition and food security; vi) supporting the government goals for environmental sustainability and climate change adaptation/mitigation; vii) equitable access to quality education at all levels for boys and girls; viii) improving survival, health, nutrition and well-being, especially for children, women and other vulnerable groups; and ix) providing adequate social protection and rights to vulnerable groups. The CS 2011-2015 aims at contributing to Government priorities/goals within the UNDAF framework.

37. The 2011–2015 CP 200200, which started in July 2011, is a follow-up of the former CP 104370, which ended in June 2011. It has a large capacity-development component that includes Purchase for Progress (P4P) and school feeding. It also includes Nutrition interventions targeting children and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) as well as a Food for Assets Component.

38. PRRO 200029 ended in December 2011 and was followed by PRRO 200325, which started in January 2012 (and ended in June 2014). These projects contribute to improved food security among refugees and supports the host communities. Relief activities include General Food Distributions; targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) for moderately malnourished children, PLW and people living with HIV (PLHIV); and ii) blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) for children aged 6–24 months and PLW regardless of nutrition status for prevention of undernutrition. Early-recovery activities for host communities include support for school feeding and vocational training for orphans, PLHIV and moderately malnourished children and PLW.

39. PRRO 200603, a follow-up of PRRO 200325, with planned start date in July 2014, aims to provide food assistance to 70,000 refugees in camp through fortnightly general food distributions. To address stunting and ensure that acute malnutrition does not increase WFP will provide blanket supplementary feeding for PLW and children under 2; children aged 25– 59 months will also receive nutrition assistance in order to maintain their nutrition status. With support from the Government, WFP and UNHCR plan to explore a cash and voucher (C&V) component in 2015 for the refugee programme.

40. These operations and projects of the portfolio contribute to one or more of the five strategic objectives (SOs) defined in the WFP corporate Strategic Plan as summarized the table below. During the inception phase, the evaluation will develop a conceptual framework that show the links with the UNDAF as well.

**Table 6: Distribution of portfolio activities by beneficiaries / Strategic Objectives**

Activity Operation	HIV/TB	Food for Education	Nutrition	G	FFW/FFT/ F
PRRO 200603			X So1, So4	X S	
PRRO 200325	X S	X S	X So1, So3	X S	
PRRO 200029	X S	X S	X So1, So4	X S	X S
IR - EMOP 200100				X S	X S
CP 200200	X So4, So5	X So4, So5	X So2, So4, So5		X So2, So4, So5
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>	1 %	5 %	1 %	1 %	2 %
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>	1 %	6 %	5 %	1 %	1 %

Source: WFP Dakota 2013, SPRs, PDs

\* Refers to the Strategic Plan 2008 - 2013

N

- beneficiaries figures will be available as of March 2015

41. The joint UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP evaluation of the Great Lakes Emergency Operation (1998), the thematic evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) Category (2004) and the evaluation of the Great Lakes Regional PRRO 6077.00 and 6077.01 (2002) all pointed to WFP's significant and timely contributions in helping the government respond to crisis as well as to transition from relief to development. Another conclusion was that partnerships were critical to the implementation of all activities and particularly in emergency setups to respond



quickly to the needs of vulnerable groups. The evaluation of WFP's HIV and AIDS interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa (2008) found that the Programme had a distinctive role in providing food and nutritional support for food-insecure PLHIV and households affected by AIDS. However, it concluded that the organisation needed to address several issues raised relating to human resources, targeting of beneficiaries, food distribution management, and modalities to improve effectiveness and efficiency of its HIV/AIDS programmes.

42. The evaluation on How WFP Country Offices adapt to change (2012), established that the shift from a food aid to a food assistance approach has opened a wide range of possibilities for change if WFP was ready to adopt a more dynamic problem-solving culture for organizational change, to facilitate resolution of the challenges faced.

43. The evaluation of WFP Tanzania CP 10437.0<sup>37</sup> which examines programme activities from 2007 to 2009 found that nutrition, education and FFA interventions are contributing to improved food security at the individual and households levels and that they were likely to have a long-term impact.

44. The OEV synthesis summary report of the joint UNHCR/WFP impact evaluations on the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations<sup>38</sup> makes five strategic recommendations for various parties: WFP and UNHCR should develop a strategy and management mechanisms for the transition to self-reliance, using a more holistic approach and establishing the partnerships necessary to achieve it at the corporate and country levels; the Inter-Agency Standing Committee should forge an action plan to enhance the architecture for accountability in this shared responsibility; United Nations country teams should engage livelihoods actors and build political will for a new approach; and donors should overcome funding barriers.

45. According to the 2012 independent evaluation of "Delivering as one", stakeholders recognized the positive effects of UN engagement on national ownership and leadership. However, strong national co-ordination mechanisms need to be consolidated and links between individual UN organizations and line ministries strengthened and expanded. The evaluation also concluded that both national and UN system planning and monitoring and evaluation capacities at country level should be further reinforced. There is also a need for comprehensive harmonization of business practices, particularly in financial management, accounting standards and human resources rules and regulations to ensure further efficiency gains and reduced transaction costs.

### **3.2. Scope of the Evaluation**

46. The timeframe for the Tanzania CPE is 4 years (2011-2014). In light of the strategic nature of the evaluation, the focus shall not be on assessing individual operations but rather to evaluate the WFP portfolio as a whole, its evolution over time, its performances, and the strategic role played by WFP in Tanzania, including the relationship of a) WFP's CS 2011-2015 with the UNDP 2011-2015, b) WFP's CS 2011-2015 with the portfolio of operations and c) WFP's CS 2011-2015 with WFP corporate policies.

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<sup>37</sup> Final Evaluation report in July 2010

<sup>38</sup> Final report in January 2013

47. The evaluation will also review the analytical work conducted by WFP in collaboration with its partners, over the evaluation period, as well as WFP's participation in strategic processes, to determine the extent to which it contributes to WFP priorities and objectives in the country and enables a strategic positioning of WFP (in supporting, complementing the work and strategies of others). The evaluation will also assess the performance of the P4P initiative<sup>39</sup>.

48. The geographic scope includes all areas covered by the portfolio (refer to country map). The field work, however, will focus on a limited number of regions/sites and transparent selection criteria will be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

## **4. Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology**

### **4.1. Evaluation Questions**

49. The CPE will be addressing the following three key questions, which will be further detailed in a matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions.

50. **Question one: Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy & Portfolio.** Reflect on the extent to which: i) their main objectives and related activities have been relevant to Tanzania's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities and; ii) their objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies; iii) their objectives have been coherent and harmonised with those of partners, especially UN partners within the UNDAF, but also with, bilateral and NGOs; iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignment and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; and v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies and with UNDAF.

51. **Question two: Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making.** Reflect on the extent to which WFP: i) has analysed (or used existing analysis of) the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues in Tanzania<sup>40</sup> - including gender issues; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues; iii) identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy, and how they were considered and managed when the CS 2011-2015 was developed by the CO; and iv) to what extent did the UNDAF process contribute to WFP's strategic decision-making.

52. **Question three: Performance and Results of the WFP portfolio.** Reflect on: i) the level of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control); ii) the extent that WFP's assistance has contributed to the reduction

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<sup>39</sup> Tanzania is a country case study for the WFP 2008–2013 Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative (2014).

<sup>40</sup> For different sub-groups including children under 2, Pregnant and Lactating Women (PLW), adolescents and refugees population.

of gender gaps in relation to access to and control over food, resources, decision-making and livelihood opportunities; iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners especially UN partners in this DAO context, and also with, bilateral and NGOs at operational level.

## 4.2. Evaluability Assessment

***Evaluability*** is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.

53. The CPE will benefit from the WFP evaluations mentioned in chapter 3.1. It will also benefit from other evaluations managed by OEV where Tanzania is a case study in several policy, thematic and strategic evaluations<sup>41</sup>. The final report of the ongoing evaluation of the WFP 2008-2013 P4P Pilot Initiative will be available in November 2014. Tanzania is also a country case for the ongoing thematic evaluation: Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and undernutrition (REACH), thus joint efforts to combat maternal and child undernutrition as well as WFP's specific role will be captured.

54. Concerning UN collaboration and the DAO context in Tanzania, the evaluation team will benefit from the work of the independent evaluation of lessons learned from the DAO Pilot countries conducted in 2011-2012<sup>26</sup>. UNDP documents, including the UNDP Delivering as One Matrix will also be key reference documents for the team.

55. The evaluation team will have access to several assessments, surveys and evaluations undertaken by WFP, UN agencies, NGO and the Government. These include, but are not limited to, WFP's comprehensive food security and vulnerability analyses (CFSVA 2012 and 2010) and the joint assessment missions (JAM 2013 and 2010) of UNHCR, WFP and the Government for the refugee camps. UNDP Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Tanzania (2014) and IFAD country programme evaluation in Tanzania (2014) are also considered to be relevant sources. Other secondary datasets were generated by the Tanzania National Panel Survey (NPS) as part of the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) in collaboration with the Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). There are nutrition surveys available such as the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS 2010/2011), micronutrient deficiencies analyses and other WFP/UNICEF/UNHCR and Government nutrition surveys for refugees (2012 and 2010).

56. OEV will share with the evaluation team an extensive online library (annex 5) of relevant documents dealing with key aspects of the government, partners and WFP strategies and programmes. The CO and its co-operating partners regularly conduct

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<sup>41</sup> The Joint UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP Evaluation of the Great Lakes Emergency Operation (1998); the thematic evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) Category (2004); the evaluation of the Great Lakes Regional PRRO 6077.00 and 6077.01 (2002); WFP's HIV and AIDS interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa (2008); How WFP Country Offices adapt to change (2012) and; WFP 2008-2013 Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative (2014). <sup>26</sup> The 2012 independent evaluation of "Delivering as one" covering period 2006-2011.

project monitoring including for output and some outcome indicators. In addition, Standard Project Reports (SPRs) are prepared for each operation.

57. Each operation has its own logical framework and the formulation of the operations at different points in time refers consequently to different strategic plans. The 2008-2013 Strategic Plan as well as the subsequent 2014-2017 Strategic Plan should be used as main references for the discussion on strategic alignment of the overall portfolio, as well as its related strategic results.

58. As already mentioned, there is an existing WFP CS 2011-2015 developed by the CO in Tanzania, which will also serve as a reference to the Evaluation Team.

59. Considering that the evaluation scope covers a 4-year period (2011-2014), staff turnover and possible loss of institutional memory for specific interventions may impede on the identification of factors that have motivated some strategic decisions/choices.

60. An evaluability gap could exist on both quantitative and qualitative data if some indicators (mostly at outcome level) reflected in the project logframes are not available or reported on.

### **4.3. Methodology**

61. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact<sup>42</sup>, sustainability and connectedness.

62. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design a complete methodology to be presented in the Inception Report, with annexes covering data collection instruments. The methodology should:

- Build on the logic of the portfolio and on the common objectives arising across operations;
- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions presented in 4.1. A model looking at groups of “main activities” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
- Take into account the opportunities and limitations to evaluability pointed out in 4.2 as well as budget and time constraints.

63. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, existing secondary data) and using a mixed methodological approach (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. The sampling technique to impartially select the regions to be visited and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

### **4.5. Quality Assurance**

64. WFP’s evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists.

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<sup>42</sup> Where available from secondary data

EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OEV Deputy Head will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

65. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

## 5. Organization of the Evaluation

### 5.1. Phases and Deliverables

66. The evaluation will take place in 5 phases summarised in table 7. A detailed timeline is available page 19.

**Table 7: Summary Timeline - key evaluation milestones**

Main Phases	Timeline	Tasks and Deliverables
1. Preparatory	<b>September / December 2014</b>	Draft and Final TOR Evaluation Team selection & contract Compiling e-library
2. Inception	<b>January / February / March 2015</b>	Briefing at HQ Document Review Inception Mission and inception report
3. Evaluation, including fieldwork	<b>April 2015</b>	Evaluation mission, data collection Exit debriefing Analysis
4. Reporting	<b>May / June / July 2015</b>	Report Drafting In-country stakeholders' workshop Comments Process Final evaluation report
5. Dissemination	<b>August 2015 onwards</b>	Summary Evaluation Report Editing / Evaluation Report Formatting Management Response and Executive Board Preparation

67. During the **inception phase**, the briefing in WFP HQ in Rome gives the opportunity to OEV to brief the evaluation team on the approach and for the evaluation team to meet the various technical units (three days for briefing and one day for on-site teamwork). The **inception mission** is conducted jointly by the team leader and the evaluation manager in Dar-Es-Salaam. Its main objective is to develop the evaluation work plan and the evaluation approach with the CO, the main stakeholders in the government, UN agencies, donors and NGO partners. The **inception report's** main objective is to ensure that the evaluation team has a good

understanding of the scope of work in the TOR and has developed a coherent methodology for the main evaluation phase. The **evaluation mission** will consist of fieldwork in Tanzania focusing on various areas identified in the inception report. The mission will start with a briefing with the CO and other stakeholders to inform them on the evaluation. Several debriefings will take place to present the preliminary findings and conclusions: an exit debriefing for the CO at the end of the mission; a debriefing for WFP stakeholders (CO, RB and HQ Units) and; after submission of the draft evaluation report, the Team Leader will travel in-country to participate to a **stakeholders' workshop** to present the findings, conclusions and recommendations to the CO and other stakeholders. The evaluation team will analyse and present the data collected throughout the evaluation process in the **evaluation report**. The **executive summary** of the evaluation report (SER) will be the core of the report to be presented at the WFP Executive Board in November 2015.

## 5.2. Evaluation Team Composition

68. The specific skills required from the evaluation team are summarized in table 8.

**Table 8: Evaluation team required skills**

Role	Evaluation tasks and required skills	Experience required	Evaluation questions relevant
Team Leader (TL)	Team co-ordination, leads the formulation, implementation and reporting. <b>The TL should be an expert in one of the below key sectors.</b>	Experience in Evaluation; Expertise in one of the area below; Knowledge/experience of humanitarian situations; especially, refugee situations; Relevant knowledge of the Tanzanian context; Excellent synthesis and reporting skills.	All
Agriculture / Food security Expert	Focus on food security and livelihoods, including food security assessments, targeting, and relevant M&E systems; FFA/W/T programmes, livelihood support; UN joint programming in Economic Growth and in Environment and Climate change.	Knowledge of Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) tools; Familiarity with food assistance modalities (cash and vouchers, FFA/W/T), market infrastructure, post-harvest handling and value addition, local purchase, livelihood support.	2 and 3
Nutritionist	Focus on nutrition interventions, nutrition assessments and monitoring systems; UN joint programming in nutrition. An understanding of regional/Tanzania nutrition landscape analysis including the REACH mandate.	Knowledge on broad issues on under-nutrition, including familiarity with the latest evidences in nutrition (Lancet 2008 & 2013) and with the Global Momentum (SUN Movement).	2 and 3
Education and School feeding Expert	Focus on school feeding; education in development settings; the education sector in Tanzania; UN joint-programming in education; Capacity building.	Knowledge of WFP school feeding programme activities, guidelines and policies, especially in relation to capacity building and handover.	2 and 3
Research/Data Analyst	Responsible for collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative information from different sources; analysing trends, creating graphs for reports/presentations.	Data collection and analysis; quantitative and qualitative analysis for evaluations; excellent analytical and technical abilities.	

67. The evaluation team should be gender balanced. All the team members should be gender conscious, with at least one senior team member with specific gender skills, as the evaluation will have to be equity-focused.

68. National expertise is expected to be part of the team. International team members should have knowledge of the country. Technical expertise related to the scope is essential.

69. Team members should not have been significantly involved in work for WFP Tanzania CO nor have other conflicts of interest. Evaluators will act impartially and respect the code of conduct of the profession.

70. All evaluation products will be produced in English. Excellent synthesis and reporting skills is essential (particularly for the Team Leader) for the three core products: the inception report, the PowerPoint presentation of the preliminary findings and the evaluation report including, the SER.

### **5.3. Roles and Responsibilities**

71. This evaluation is managed by OEV. The evaluation manager, Miranda Sende, has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. She is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team/firm; preparing and managing the budget; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. She will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

72. The WFP CO is expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Tanzania; set up meetings and organize field visits and provide logistic support during the fieldwork and arrange for interpretation if required. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report.

73. Relevant WFP stakeholders at HQ and RB (through teleconference) are expected to be available for interviews/meetings with the evaluation team and to comment on the various reports throughout the evaluation process.

74. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

### **5.4. Communication**

75. A communication and learning plan (see annex 6) will be refined by the EM in consultation with the evaluation team during the inception phase to include details about the communication strategy. Communications mechanisms drawn in EQAS will be followed. An internal reference group (IRG) will be established for the evaluation to serve as contact point for communication with WFP stakeholders. The Tanzania CPE process will also benefit from the contribution and review of IFAD and UNDP Evaluation Offices. These UN agencies will form the external reference group (ERG).

76. Initial findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team will be shared with stakeholders during debriefing sessions at the end of the mission. This feedback is important to verify the findings of the team with stakeholders, to give them the opportunity to clarify issues and to ensure a transparent evaluation process.

77. The evaluation report will be posted on the internet and briefs disseminated. The CO is considering a workshop after the evaluation has been completed to discuss the conclusions and recommendations and determine follow-up actions with its partners.

78. Once the evaluation is completed, OEV will ensure dissemination of lessons through various means such as inclusion in the annual evaluation report, presented to the Executive Board, and through presentations made in relevant meetings.

### **5.5. Budget**

79. The evaluation will be financed from the Office of Evaluation's budget at a total cost of US\$ 239,000. This budget will cover the costs related to consultants' honorarium or company's rates, international travels and logistics as well as OEV staff travel costs.



## **Annex B Methodology**

### **Introduction**

1. The methodology for this CPE was fully set out in the Inception Report (IR) (Turner *et al.*, 2015). This Annex summarises the methodology adopted and comments on the team's experience in conducting the evaluation.

### ***Evaluation guidelines and standards***

2. WFP OEV's EQAS guidelines for country portfolio evaluations provided a strong procedural and methodological framework. Their clear templates for the inception report and evaluation report continue to be a valuable guideline. The OECD DAC and UNEG evaluation standards were adhered to. The evaluation employed the evaluation criteria according to WFP standard practice, as set out in the OEV Technical Note on the subject (WFP OEV, nd(b)).

### **Evaluation Matrix**

3. The evaluation team took the key evaluation questions from the TOR (see Annex A above) and broke these down into a more detailed series of evaluation questions (EQs). The evaluation matrix at Annex C shows these questions and amplifies the points addressed in answering each of them, as well as the analysis and indicators used for this purpose; the main sources of information; and the data collection methods. The detailed EQs and the matrix were designed to ensure balance between the three overarching key EQs as well as an intuitively logical sequence of enquiry. Taken together, the main report above and the thematic annexes below attempt to answer all the detailed EQs and the sub questions that they contain.

### **Methodology and data collection instruments**

#### *Data Collection/Instruments*

4. The main instruments for assembling data and stakeholder views were:
- **Document/literature review.** The bibliography now at Annex N is drawn from a much larger e-library of documents gathered with the support of OEV and the CO.
  - **Review of secondary data.** The e-library includes a comprehensive collection of WFP's internal data, including SPRs and annual work plans, together with country-level data on performance in the various sectors in which WFP is engaged. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to collect additional quantitative primary data, but the team drew systematically on earlier studies. In the case of this Tanzania country portfolio, however, there were no external evaluations from the review period on which the CPE could draw.
  - **Key informant and stakeholder interviews** were the main form of primary data collection. Interview targets were identified during the inception mission, during subsequent e-mail correspondence and during further investigations in the course of the evaluation mission itself. A substantial number of interviews were already conducted during the inception phase, and this work was not repeated during the main mission. All interviews were treated as confidential and were systematically written up by team

members and shared through a compendium in a confidential section of the e-library. The compendium facilitated triangulation of different interviewee recollections and perspectives.

- **Introductory workshop.** At the start of the main evaluation mission, the team held a half-day workshop with management and Programme staff, as well as some other senior personnel in the CO. This fulfilled its purpose of explaining the purpose and nature of the CPE to these key staff, to reassure them that it was meant to be a proactive and constructive exercise rather than an exercise in finding fault, and to start exploring some of the key issues that the evaluation would have to address. Although heavy work pressure at the CO precluded a longer introductory process, this initial workshop was valuable in building a sense of common purpose between the evaluation team and the CO.
- **Field visits.** The evaluation team undertook two field visits. The first was to Kigoma Region, with visits and interviews at orphanages formerly supported under the PRRO host communities initiative; the WFP sub office and the offices of various partner organisations in Kasulu; and the Nyarugusu refugee camp. The second field visit was to north central Tanzania (Arusha, Dodoma, Manyara and Singida Regions). Here, the team split in two. One group visited FFA and P4P activities, while the other focused on nutrition and school feeding work. During both field itineraries, the evaluators met female and male beneficiaries, WFP staff and staff of LGAs and partner NGOs. Interaction involved both formal interviews and focus group modalities.

#### *Evaluation process, feedback and validation*

5. The development of methodology during the inception phase was linked to extensive work on the country context and on initial analysis of the portfolio. Following a briefing mission to WFP HQ from 21 to 23 January, an inception mission, comprising the OEV Evaluation Manager, the Team Leader and the Research Co-ordinator visited Dar es Salaam from 9 to 13 February 2015. During this mission, stakeholder analysis was undertaken, initial contacts and interviews with CO staff and key non-WFP stakeholders took place, and the team planned the main evaluation timetable with the CO.

6. The main evaluation mission took place from 8 to 29 April, with inputs from Anne Bossuyt 8–16 and 20–29 April; and from Chris Leather 15–29 April. Edward Mhina and Stephen Turner worked throughout the main mission period, with Amanyile Mahali joining the second field visit from 20 to 25 April and participating in some subsequent mission work. Annex D presents a list of people consulted during the briefing, inception and main evaluation missions.

7. There have been further contacts with the CO since the evaluation mission as the team validates data and seeks additional information. Following approval of the draft of this report, a feedback workshop is scheduled for 8 July in Dar es Salaam. It is hoped that this event will not only present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation but will also serve as a platform for discussion about the future work of WFP in Tanzania, as the CO begins preparation of the next CS and CP.

## Annex C Evaluation Matrix

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
<b>Key question 1: alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio</b>				
<b>Strategic positioning</b>	<b>EQ1. What is the strategic context of WFP's country strategy and portfolio in Tanzania?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tanzania's humanitarian and developmental needs (gender disaggregated, including different sub groups if possible), priorities and capacities</li> <li>National agenda, policies and co-ordination frameworks</li> <li>Decentralisation context, especially the role of Regions and districts</li> <li>Objectives and activities of strategic partners (see stakeholder analysis)</li> <li>Relevant aspects of WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies</li> <li>UN DAO and UNDAF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard international economic, social and governance data</li> <li>National development plans and relevant sector policies</li> <li>WFP Strategic Plans and relevant sector policies</li> <li>Mapping of actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International and national data sets</li> <li>GOT and partner policy statements (including aid strategy)</li> <li>GOT, WFP, partner and external informants, including UN agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies</li> <li>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among data sets</li> </ul>
<b>EQ2. How relevant have the country strategy and portfolio been to Tanzania's humanitarian and developmental needs?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do the CS and PDs reflect a consistent strategy (and underlying theory of change) over the evaluation period?</li> <li>How specifically do the CS and portfolio address humanitarian needs?</li> <li>How accurately do the CS and portfolio target humanitarian needs?</li> <li>How explicitly do the CS and portfolio address developmental needs, including capacity development?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Statements in CS and PDs</li> <li>Comparison of WFP operational objectives and targets with other analysis (EQ1)</li> <li>Review of treatment of gender in CS and PDs</li> <li>Comparison of WFP operational objectives regarding gender with those of national policy and partner programming</li> <li>Comparison of programme data and needs data</li> <li>Capacity gap analysis</li> <li>Capacity framework</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CS, PDs</li> <li>Analysis generated for EQ1</li> <li>Comparable WFP and partner programme documentation and data</li> <li>GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies</li> <li>Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How accurately do the CS and portfolio target developmental needs, including capacity development and influencing strategy?</li> <li>How gender-disaggregated, balanced and proactive are the CS and portfolio?</li> <li>How well targeted is the gender disaggregation of the CS and portfolio, if any (including in capacity development interventions)?</li> </ul>			
<b>EQ3. How coherent have the objectives of the country strategy and portfolio been with the stated national agenda and policies?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How coherent have the CS and portfolio been with the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and the NSGRP (Mkukuta II)?</li> <li>How coherent have the CS and portfolio been with national policies on refugees, nutrition, school feeding, sustainable livelihoods, food security, agriculture, gender and climate change?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy (PRRO document, CS, CP document) with relevant GOT policy, strategy and plans.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CS, PDs</li> <li>Analysis generated for EQ1</li> <li>GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT (national), partner agencies</li> <li>Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>
<b>EQ4. How coherent and harmonised have the country strategy and portfolio been with those of partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs)?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have there been contradictions or duplication between the country strategy and portfolio of WFP and those of partners?</li> <li>How complementary have the roles of WFP and partners been?</li> <li>Have the country strategy and portfolio been effectively integrated into the UN DAO framework and the UNDAP?</li> <li>How well aligned have the CS and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy (PRRO document, CS, CP document) with relevant partner strategies and plans and co-ordination frameworks, including the UN DAO and UNDAP</li> <li>Degree of active harmonisation and collaboration achieved between WFP and partners</li> <li>Alignment of CS and operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSD, PDs</li> <li>Analysis generated for EQ1</li> <li>GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> <li>Analysis of application of humanitarian principles, Do Not Harm approaches and Sphere standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies</li> <li>Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	portfolio been with international humanitarian principles?	design with international humanitarian principles		
<b>EQ5. How strategic has WFP been in its alignment?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the comparative advantage of WFP in Tanzania and how clearly has WFP defined and recognised it?</li> <li>• How explicit is WFP's strategy about maximising its comparative advantage and making the biggest difference?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of WFP CS and PDs for analysis of comparative advantage and how it should be exploited and maximised</li> <li>• Consideration of WFP potential to add value in the context of other actors' strengths and weaknesses (EQ1 above)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CS, PDs</li> <li>• Analysis generated for EQ1</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>
<b>EQ6. What trade-offs have there been between WFP strategy and national strategies?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How coherent are the WFP mission, Strategic Plan and corporate policies, and WFP-related elements of the UNDAP, with the relevant elements of Tanzanian national planning (see EQ3)?</li> <li>• What deviations from global WFP strategy have there been in WFP Tanzania's country strategy and portfolio?</li> <li>• What deviations from WFP technical standards (e.g. in nutrition and school feeding) have there been in the interests of better alignment with GOT standards?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Check for inconsistencies and/or compromises between WFP mission, SP and corporate policies, and the UNDAP, and strategies of GOT. Are they identified as such in the WFP documentation?</li> <li>• Check for explanation of these inconsistencies and/or compromises, if any</li> <li>• Check for inconsistencies and/or compromises between global WFP strategy and that of WFP Tanzania</li> <li>• Check for explanation of these inconsistencies and/or compromises, if any.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP SP</li> <li>• Relevant WFP policy statements</li> <li>• CS, PDs</li> <li>• Analysis generated for EQ1</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
<b>Key question 2: factors and quality of strategic decision-making</b>				
<b>Strategic decision-making</b>	<b>EQ7. To what extent has WFP analysed hunger challenges, food security, nutrition and gender issues in Tanzania?</b>			
	<p>For each of its interventions and with reference to specific target groups such as refugees, PLW and children under two, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• use of data and analysis gathered by WFP and others (including within the UN DAO framework) for strategy formulation;</li> <li>• analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods, markets and gender context, and how this is used for effective targeting;</li> <li>• information on other national and local social safety net programs and how WFP might influence and coordinate;</li> <li>• use of WFP research and monitoring data to inform strategic decision-making.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of written and oral evidence concerning the analysis WFP undertook in preparing its PDs and CS during the review period</li> <li>• Assessment of clarity and thoroughness with which PDs and CS refer to relevant data and analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CS, PDs</li> <li>• WFP and other UN analysis and data</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
<b>EQ8. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What explicit efforts has WFP made:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• in policy advocacy on hunger, food security, nutrition and gender dimensions of these challenges?</li> <li>• towards developing national and sub-national capacity for monitoring, analysis and decision-making in these fields?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Has WFP:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• influenced GOT and /or other partners on these issues?</li> <li>• strengthened national and sub-national capacity for analysis and decision-making in these fields?</li> <li>• influenced UN DAO strategy and/or the UNDAP on these issues?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of documentary record on WFP advocacy efforts, if any, in these areas</li> <li>• Analysis of documentary record on WFP capacity development efforts in these areas</li> <li>• Analysis of documentary evidence, if any, on the influence that WFP advocacy has had</li> <li>• Analysis of participant perceptions of the extent and effectiveness of WFP advocacy and capacity development in these areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP records, including SPRs, and UN DAO and UNDAP documentation</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: OMJ, CO, GOT (national and provincial), partner agencies</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>
<b>EQ9. What internal and external factors affected WFP's choices in its country strategy and portfolio?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent were the choices in the CS and portfolio (including interim review and revision) influenced by:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• perceived comparative advantage;</li> <li>• corporate strategies and change processes;</li> <li>• UN DAO and UNDAP programming and</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of available documentation on preparation of CS and PDs</li> <li>• Analysis of perceptions of participants in preparation of CS and PDs</li> <li>• Analysis of CO resourcing strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP records including Budget Revisions</li> <li>• UN DAO and UNDAP records</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO (including previous incumbents)</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• priorities;</li> <li>• previous programming;</li> <li>• national policy;</li> <li>• resource availability;</li> <li>• organisational structure and staffing;</li> <li>• analysis of context and need;</li> <li>• monitoring information;</li> <li>• emergencies;</li> <li>• other factors?</li> <li>• How explicitly were these factors ranked and compared in strategic decision-making?</li> <li>• What resourcing strategy did WFP adopt for each operation and type of activity, and how effective was this strategy?</li> </ul>			
<b>EQ10. To what extent has WFP in Tanzania been able to learn from experience and adapt to changing contexts?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What (systematic or ad hoc) efforts has WFP made to learn from experience, including adaptations to the changing context in Tanzania (cf EQ1 above)?</li> <li>• To what extent has WFP benchmarked its plans and performance in Tanzania against those of WFP and other organisations elsewhere?</li> <li>• How has WFP responded to developments in international understanding of food insecurity, nutrition, school feeding etc. (including the developing context of WFP's global strategy and policies)?</li> <li>• How effectively has WFP adapted its programming to fit within UN</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• References in WFP planning to broader WFP experience and to evolving context in Tanzania</li> <li>• References in WFP planning to relevant performance benchmarks and standards and developments in international understanding of paradigms, approaches</li> <li>• References in WFP planning to feedback from beneficiaries, individuals and communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PRRO project documents</li> <li>• Country Strategy Document</li> <li>• Country Programme document</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO (including previous incumbents)</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>



Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	DAO and UNDPAP? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do WFP's (and GOT's) monitoring systems provide feedback loops from beneficiaries, individuals and communities?</li> </ul>			
<b>Key question 3: performance and results of the WFP portfolio</b>				
<b>Performance and results</b>	<b>EQ11. How efficient have the main activities in the WFP portfolio been, and why?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How efficient has WFP been in terms of logistics, systems and delivery?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of selected unit costs: FFA, staff training, beneficiary training, selected logistics indicators, school feeding, nutrition</li> <li>Comparison of cost, quality, timeliness in relation to other organisations and/or WFP in other settings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP records and reports</li> <li>Other agencies' records and reports</li> <li>Beneficiary views</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: OMJ, CO, partner agencies, other agencies active in the relevant sectors</li> <li>FGDs (women and men separately where appropriate)</li> <li>Triangulation by cross-check of available data and analysis, where possible</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
<b>EQ12. How effective have the main activities in the WFP portfolio been, and why?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How well targeted and effective has food assistance to refugees been?</li> <li>• How well aligned has WFP support to refugees been with international humanitarian principles?</li> <li>• How well targeted and effective have nutrition activities been?</li> <li>• How well targeted and effective have school feeding activities been?</li> <li>• How well targeted and effective have FFA activities been in building household and community capacity to resist livelihood shocks and stresses?</li> <li>• How effective has capacity building in VAM and related fields been, and why?</li> <li>• How effective has capacity building been with regard to disaster preparedness and response, and why?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of available WFP and GOT data on changes in indicator variables on relevant aspects of nutrition, livelihood resilience and institutional capacity since baseline</li> <li>• Review of WFP M&amp;E analysis of extent to which positive changes can be attributed to WFP activities</li> <li>• Analysis of perceptions of qualified observers about extent to which positive changes can be attributed to WFP activities, and why</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP M&amp;E data</li> <li>• Analysis of change in relevant variables and sectors</li> <li>• Beneficiary views</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies, other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant sectors</li> <li>• FGDs (women and men separately where appropriate)</li> <li>• Triangulation by cross-check of available data and analysis, where possible</li> </ul>
<b>EQ13. To what extent has WFP assistance enhanced gender equity?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent has WFP assistance contributed to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• access to and control over food and resources;</li> <li>• responsibility for decision-making;</li> <li>• livelihood opportunities?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indicators of gender differentials in the specified livelihood parameters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP M&amp;E data</li> <li>• Analysis of change in relevant variables</li> <li>• Beneficiary views</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• Interviews: beneficiaries, CO, GOT, partner agencies, other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant variables</li> <li>• Separate FGDs with women and men</li> <li>• Triangulation by cross-check of available data and analysis, where possible</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
<b>EQ14. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the main activities in the country portfolio?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have the main activities in the country portfolio complemented each other?</li> <li>What multiplying effects have there been between the main activities in the country portfolio?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of linkages and complementarity between activities in the portfolio</li> <li>Analysis of extent to which activities in the portfolio have facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of other activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP records and reports</li> <li>GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO</li> </ul>
<b>EQ15. What has been the level of synergy and multiplier opportunities with partners at operational level?</b>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have WFP operations complemented those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners, especially through UN DAO and the UNDAP?</li> <li>To what extent have multiplier opportunities developed between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners, especially through UN DAO and the UNDAP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of linkages and complementarity between activities in the CP and activities of partners, especially in the UNDAP and especially at operational level</li> <li>Analysis of extent to which activities in the CP have facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of partners' activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP records and reports</li> <li>GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Document research</li> <li>Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, UN and other partners</li> <li>Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ16. How sustainable are the results of the main activities in the WFP portfolio likely to be, and why?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How sustainable are the results of WFP activities in the field of nutrition likely to be, and why?</li> <li>• How sustainable are the results of WFP activities in the field of school feeding likely to be, and why?</li> <li>• How sustainable are the results of WFP activities in the field of FFA likely to be in building household and community capacity to resist livelihood shocks and stresses, and why?</li> <li>• How sustainable are the results of WFP activities in the field of disaster preparedness and response likely to be, and why?</li> <li>• To what extent has community participation in WFP activities built community ownership that will contribute to sustainability?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of perceptions of qualified observers about how sustainable WFP-influenced change is likely to be, and why</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of change in relevant variables and sectors</li> <li>• Beneficiary views</li> <li>• GOT, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document research</li> <li>• FGDs (women and men separately where appropriate)</li> <li>• Interviews: HQ, OMJ, CO, GOT, partner agencies, other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant sectors</li> <li>• Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

## Annex D People Consulted

Name	Affiliation	Date
<b>Headquarters briefing</b>		
Silvia Biondi	Programme Officer, WFP OMJ Regional Bureau	21 January (by phone)
Maud Biton	Consultant, Private Partnerships	23 January
Sally Burrows	OEV Deputy Head	21 and 23 January
Charlotte Cuny	Policy Officer, School Feeding	22 January
Getachew Diriba	Chief, Country Capacity Strengthening Unit	22 January
Fabrizio Felloni	Senior Evaluation Officer, IFAD	4 February (by phone)
Dominique Frankefort	Policy Officer, Policy Programme and Innovation Division	22 January
Perrine Geniez	Nutrition Policy Officer	23 January
Mar Guinot	OEV Research Assistant	21–23 January
Paul Howe	Chief, Chief Humanitarian Crisis and Transition	23 January
Inka Himanen	Programme Officer, WFP Tanzania CO	21 January (by phone)
Juvenal Kisanga	VAM Officer, WFP Tanzania CO	21, 23 January (by phone)
Chris Kaye	Director, Performance Management and Monitoring	21 January
Alix Loriston	Senior Donor Relations Officer	23 January
Joao Manja	Senior VAM Officer, WFP OMJ Regional Bureau	23 January (by phone)
Chad Martino	Programme Advisor, Performance Management and Monitoring	21 January
Jan Michiels	VAM Officer, WFP OMJ Regional Bureau	23 January (by phone)
Kathryn Milliken	Programme and Policy Advisor, Climate Resilience for Food	23 January
Octavian Mushi	Programme Officer, WFP Tanzania CO	21 January (by phone)
Edouard Nizeyimana	Senior Programme Adviser, P4P (Africa Focal Point)	23 January
Yukimi Ogaki	Programme Policy Officer, School Feeding	22 January
Fumika Ouchi	UNDP Evaluation Specialist (Tanzania UNDP Assessment of Development Results)	22 January
Susanne Quadros	Programme Officer, Country Capacity Strengthening Unit	22 January

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Kairsu Leena Rajala	Climate Risk Management Officer, Climate Resilience for Food	23 January
Scott Ronchini	Programme Officer, Resilience & Prevention Unit	22 January
Sonsoles Ruedas	Chief Gender	22 January
Miranda Sende	OEV Evaluation Officer	21–23 January
Federica Zelada	OEV Research Assistant	21 January
<b>Inception mission</b>		
Ismail Amir	Logistics Officer, CO	9 February
Antonio Baez	Finance Officer, CO	9 February
Jerry Bailey	Deputy Country Director, CO	9 February
Randy Chester	USAID	10 February
Steven Daniel	Ministry of Home Affairs	11 February
Emmanuel Expenous	Statistician, Early Warning Section, Food Security Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	16 February
Helga Gibbons	Planning, M&E Specialist, Office of the UN Resident Co-ordinator	9 February
Inka Himanen	Programme Officer	9 February
Domina Kambarangwe	National Programme Officer	9 February
Julius Kejo	TRCS	12 February
Mutiko Kimo	UNHCR	12 February
Benedict Kisaka	Project Officer, PMO-DMD	11 February
Juvenal Kisanga	National Programme Officer	9 February
Byungchul Lee	Programme Officer	9 February
Evelyn Mkanda	National Food Procurement Officer	9 February
Renatus Mkaruka	Disaster Preparedness Manager, TRCS	12 February
Fizza Molloo	National PI Officer	9 February
Charles Msangi	Economist, PMO-DMD	11 February
Maria Msangi	Senior Research Officer, TFNC	12 February
John Msocha	National IT Officer	9 February
Marjorie Mua	Associate Programme Officer, UNHCR, Dar es Salaam	12 February
Adeline Mumuo	Senior Research Officer, TFNC	12 February
Octavian Mushi	National Programme Officer	9 February
Joel Mwamasangula	Principal Education Officer, MOEVT	11 February

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Jenitha Ndone	Ministry of Home Affairs	11 February
Marina Negroponte	P4P Programme Officer	9 February
Onasimbo Ntikha	Economist, Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Section, Food Security Department, MOAFC	16 February
Elijah Okeyo	Country Director, IRC	12 February
Masaki Okada	Ambassador, Embassy of Japan	10 February
Richard Ragan	Country Director	9 February
Alvaro Rodriguez	Resident Co-ordinator of the UN System	9 February
Johari Said	National Programme Officer, Kasulu	9 February (by phone)
Atsushi Sakamoto	Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan	10 February
Francis Sampa	Programme Officer, DFID	
Edgar Senga	PMO-DMD	11 February
Alexandre Serres	Programme Officer, EU	11 February
Dora Shayo	Senior Programme Assistant	9 February
Neema Sitta	Head of Sub Office, Dodoma	9 February (by phone)
Charles Sokile	Programme Officer, DFID	12 February
Rosemary Tirweshobwa	Senior HR Assistant	9 February
Rogers Wanyama	Programme Officer – Nutrition, CO	19 February (by phone)
Tamaki Yoshida	Researcher/Adviser, Embassy of Japan	10 February
<b>Evaluation mission</b>		
Amina Abadallah	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Octavian Abdallah	Acting Focal Person P4P: Cooperative Officer. Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Abdallah Abdallah	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Saleh Abdullah	Field Monitor Assistant, Dodoma	20 April 2015
Angelique Abilosa	President, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Mdathiru Abubaker	Senior Programme Assistant (VAM), CO	8 April 2015
Massa Abwe	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Zuhura Aefuka	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Issahaka Adamu	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Japhet Alfred	Distribution Clerk, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Asha Ali	Meru District Council; Usa River	24 April 2015
Mwanahamisi Ally	Hamlet/sub-village Chairperson (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Ibrahim Ally	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Aziza Ally	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Hamisi Alute	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Gervas Amata	Acting District Executive Officer: Planning Officer. Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Ismail Amir	Logistics Officer, CO	15 April 2015
Emanuel Amon	Acting FFA Focus Person: Community Development Officer. Kondoa District Council	21 April 2015
Salima Amri	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization: Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Mwanjaa Athumani	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Ashimu Athumani	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Antonio Baez	Finance and Administration Officer, CO	16 April 2015
Safari Baghayo	Gallapo P4P FO; Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Beatrice Bahelanya	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Jerry Bailey	Deputy Country Director, CO	Several meetings
Mwanaidi Bakari	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization: Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Salim Bakari	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Iddi Bakari	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Niels Balzer	Safety Nets and Social Protection Unit, Rome	15 May 2015



<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Mbisha Banga	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Ayubu Banka	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Ester Bary	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization: Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Hashim Beya	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Judith Bihondwa	Nutritionist, UNICEF	8 April 2015
Zaina Bilandeka	Co-ordinator, Matumaini Women and Care of Children, Kigoma	11 April 2015
Michael Bisama	Senior Programme Assistant and Head of Office, Kasulu Sub Office	12–14 April 2015
Stella Bita	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Sospeter Boyo	Camp Commander, MHA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Asmini Burra	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOs P4P Farmers Organization, Kondoa District	21 April 2015
Khadija Bwesa	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Yasoni Chabunila	Farmer (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Tosha Chantal	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Aithan Chaula	Act. District Agriculture, Irrigation & Cooperative Officer (DAICO), Chamwino District Council	20 April 2015
Philipo Chepa	Gallapo P4P FO; Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Raphael Chilimu	Farmer (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Raphael Chisemwa	Hamlet/sub-village Chairperson (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Celline Chiza	Distribution Centre Supervisor, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Beatrice Christopher	Distribution Clerk, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Said Daudi	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization: Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Julius Daudi	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Lekinyiye Daudi	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Halima Deli	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Cosmas Delly	Gallapo P4P FO; Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Fatina Didau	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Fatina Didru	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Mohammed Dudu	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Adam Dudu	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Samwel Dugha	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
William Dulushi	Senior Logistics Assistant Team	20th April
Saidi Duma	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Kemmy Edwini	Clerk, ADRA, Kigoma Transit Centre	11 April 2015
Musa Ezekiel	Hamlet/sub-village Chairperson (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Marcus Falinzungu	Senior IT Assistant, CO	8 April 2015
Lisa Marie Faye	Social Justice Programme Coordinator, Oxfam	27 April 2015
Dominique Frankefort	Policy Officer, Policy Programme and Innovation Division	15 May 2015
Mona Folkesson	Special Assistant to the RC, Coordination Specialist, UN Resident Coordinators Office	27 April 2015
Hamisi Furuji	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Yusuf Furuji	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Helga Gibbons	Planning, M&E Specialist, UN Resident Coordinators Office	27 April 2015
Francis Gityang	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Hadija Gora	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Maneno Gora	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Gerald Guninita	District Commissioner, Kasulu	13 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Elizabeth Gwandu	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Kenneth Hageze	Director, Sanganigwa Children's Home, Kigoma	11 April 2015
Hajara Hamisi	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Mzamiru Hamisi	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Maulidi Hanse	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization; Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Zakia Hasani	Mnesia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Bashiru Hasani	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Kasimu Hasani	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Husna Hassan	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Majidi Hassan	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Zainabu Hassani	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Maulidi Hatha	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Maulidi Hatha	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Inka Himanen	Programme Officer, CO	Several meetings
Issa Hintayi	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Francis Honda	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Yusuf Hoti	Mnesia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Aisha Hussein	Mnesia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Aisha Husseni	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Omary Ibrahim	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Ashura Iddi	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Khalifa Isaka	Mnesia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Yusuph Isangu	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Ayubu Isimbula	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Maulidi Isimbula	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Shabani Issa	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Moshi Issa	Themi ya Simba FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Jacob Jackson	Head of Office, ADRA, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Ekodi Jamba	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Moses Japhet	Distribution Clerk, ADRA, Nyarugusu	13 April 2015
Jesca Jeiros	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Issa Jengu	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Anna Johannes	Agriculture Extension Officer (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Paul Joseph	Gallapo P4P FO; Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Omari Jsimbula	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Fatuma Juma	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Fauza Juma	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Abdi Juma	Gallapo P4P FO; Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Hassan Juma	NFRA Zonal Office – Arusha	24 April 2015
Daudi Kabalika	IT Assistant, CO	15 April 2015
Faniel Kajiru	AAIDRO Office – Arusha	24 April 2015
Kiza Kalembe	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Abdul Kalindi	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Domina Kambarangwe	National Programme Officer, CO	Several meetings

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Willbroad Karugaba	Senior Programme Assistant, P4P, CO	10 April 2015
Husein Kasim	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Fredy Kassale	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Nuuman Kassim	Storekeeper, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Charles Katikiro	Programme Assistant, Kasulu Sub Office	12–14 April
Yusuf Kayi	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Zuhura Kemo	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Ibrahim Kidesu	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Gary Kiloza	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
James Kimambo	Assistant Nutritionist, TRCS, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Veronica Kimambo	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondoa District	21 April 2015
Sabas Kimboka	Head, Community Health and Nutrition, TFNC	9 April 2015
Joan Kimirei	Sr Project Manager-Marketplace for Nutritious Foods, GAIN	
Esther Kirimi	Resettlement Officer, UNHCR, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Juvenal Kisanga	National Programme Officer, CO	Several meetings
Sipora Kisanga	Field Support Specialist, UNICEF Iringa Sub Office	
Juma Kisaya	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Frederick Mathias Kivaria	Assistant to FAO Representative - Programme, FAO	28 April 2015
Hamadi Kivina	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Hamadi Kivinja	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Zainabu Kivuyo	Arusha District Council; Arusha	24 April 2015
Mohamedi Kova	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondoa District	21 April 2015
Juma Kuliko	Themi ya Simba FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Amina Kumbele	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOs P4P Farmers Organization, Kondoa District	21 April 2015
Mutika Kumi	Associate Programme Officer, UNHCR, Dar es Salaam	17 April 2015
Vanda Kvaginidze	Associate Programme Officer, UNHCR, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Dominic Kweka	Executive Director, Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Gabriel Kyenge	Reporter, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Nuru Lacha	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Frank Landatai	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Byungchul Lee	FFA/FFE (SZHC), CO	
Demis Lega	Associate Public Health Officer, UNHCR, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Subira Lendaiga	IRC, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Eliaupendo Lendatai	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Ramadhani Lesso	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization; Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Elizabeth Lestila	Secretary of Irrigation Committee (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Tala Loubieh	Public Information Unit, CO	8 April 2015
Mcimbwa Luoci	Deputy President 1, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Mahamud Mabuyu	National Logistics Officer, CO	15 April 2015
Elizabeth Macha	Nutritionist, UNICEF	8 April 2015
Omary Mafita	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Cyprian Maganga	Storekeeper, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Mwalu Maganga	Logistics Assistant – CTS, Kasulu Sub Office	13–14 April 2015
Issaya Magelanga	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Mohammed Maguo	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Juma Mahmoud	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization: Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Hawa Majala	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Majid Majid	Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Rehema Makalamu	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Masasa Makwassa	Programme Officer, P4P, CO	10 April 2015
Mariam Manande	Mnesia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Prisca Manyaji	Village Chairperson (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Denesi Manyaji	Member of Irrigation Committee (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Lauriani Marcel	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Emanuela Martin	Logistics Officer, ADRA, Kigoma Transit Centre	11 April 2015
Faustini Martin	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Stewart Masaninga	Programme Assistant, M&E, CO	8 April 2015
Jean Mateso	Deputy President 2, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Ernide Mauwa	Secretary, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Eunice Mawowe	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Rosemary Max	National Finance Officer	16 April 2015
Rabison Mbise	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Juve Mbowe	Arusha District Council; Arusha	24 April 2015
Richard Mbwana	Team Leader, TRCS, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Musu Mchoni	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Jane Mgya	Distribution Clerk, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Magreth Mgeni	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Halima Mguso	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondoa District	21 April 2015
Salum Mhitira	Nutritionist, TRCS, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Nambu Mihaya	Programme Assistant, P4P, CO	8 April 2015
Lusiani Mima	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Evelyn Mkanda	National Food Procurement Officer, CO	15 April 2015
Yaesa Mlenda	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Abdul Mlezi	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Edward Mlongwa	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Mariamuh Mohamedi	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Muderis Mohammed	Senior Social Protection Specialist, World Bank	17 April 2015
Sinson Mollel	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Fizza Molloo	National PI Officer, CO	16 April 2015
Renson Morungu	Field Monitor Assistant, Dodoma	20 April 2015
Athumani Msakati	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Liberatus Msasa	Meru District Council; Usa River	24 April 2015
Kiza Mseke	Sub-committee chair, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Yohana Msigwa	Ward Executive Officer (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Shija Msikula	Economic Justice Programme Coordinator, Oxfam	27 April 2015
Musa Msitu	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Marjorie Mua	Associate Programme Officer, UNHCR, Dar es Salaam	17 April 2015
Kigabi Muhubiri	Journalist, Camp Leadership Committee	14 April 2015
Saidi Mujungu	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015



<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Issa Muru	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Sofia Musa	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Juma Musa	NFRA Zonal Office – Arusha	24 April 2015
Jumaine Musabwa	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Octavian Mushi	National Programme Officer, CO	8 April 2015
Enock Musinguzi	Country Representative and SUN Business Network Coordinator, GAIN	
Saada Mwaruka	District Executive Officer, Chamwino District Council, Dodoma	20 April 2015
John Mwasakafyuka	Acting P4P Focus Person: Cooperative Officer. Kondo District Council	21 April 2015
Rashid Mwinyi	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Said Mzaliwa	Zone Leader, Camp Leadership Committee, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
George Namnyata	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Nyanchege Nanai	Assistant Director, Operations and Co-ordinator, Department of Disaster Management, Prime Minister's Office	17 April 2015
Biram Ndiaye	Nutrition Manager, UNICEF	8 April 2015
Kheri Ndumkwa	FFA – Focal Person, Chamwino District Council, Dodoma	20 April 2015
Zaidina Neema	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Marina Negroponte	P4P Programme Officer, CO	20 April 2015
Ally Ng'Ombesazi	Field Monitor Assistant (FFA Focal Point), Dodoma	20 April 2015
Rogers Ngalya	Acting Village Executive Officer (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Joyce Ngeba	REACH coordinator Tanzania	
Semanga Ngosingosi	Senior Programme Assistant (Gender Focal Point), CO	8 April 2015
Fatuma Ngungu	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Neema Nima	Head of sub – Office & Programme Officer, Dodoma	20 April 2015
Mustafa Njoge	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Majidi Njolo	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Huseni Nkera	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Haima Nkoki	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Juma Nkoloma	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Zainabu Ntomola	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Khalifa Ntomola	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Yahaya Ntuko	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Daudi Obote	Themi ya Simba FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Yukimi Ogaki	Safety Nets and Social Protection Unit, Rome	15 May 2015
Agnes OloTu	Procurement Assistant, CO	8 April 2015
Omari Omar	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Hassan Omari	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Amina Omari	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Hawa Omary	Mnenia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Abdallah Omary	Themi ya Simba FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Orondi Orondi	Gallapo P4P FO; Babati District Council	23 April 2015
Endru Patric	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Justin Paul	Acting Head of Office, IRC, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Paulo Peter	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Richard Ragan	Country Director, CO	Several meetings
Ananth Raj	Consultant (PPP), CO	10 April 2015
Rashid Ramadhan	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization; Chemba District Council	21 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Rukia Ramadhani	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Ahmedy Rashidy	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Miir Rehema	Protection Officer, UNHCR, Kasulu	13 April 2015
Enock Rimba	Clerk, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Alvaro Rodriguez	Resident Coordinator of the UN System, UN Resident Coordinators Office	27 April 2015
Stephan Roggers	Senior Programme Assistant, Dodoma	20 April 2015
Siaza Ropian	Bwawani FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015
Patrick Rubalo	Distribution Clerk, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Gertrude Ruhamrya	Distribution Centre Supervisor, ADRA, Nyarugusu	14 April 2015
Jumane Sadala	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Salumu Saidi	Mkombozi Soko Kuu SACCOS P4P Farmers Organization, Kondo District	21 April 2015
Shambani Saidi	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Zawiya Sakala	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Juma Salim	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Maulid Salum	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Amosi Samba	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Emanuel Sekwao	Acting District Executive Officer: DAICO. Kondo District Council	21 April 2015
Sakina Selemani	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Mritwala Selemani	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Ayubu Sereri	Kwamtoro P4P Farmers Organization: Chemba District Council	21 April 2015
Jinja Shamroi	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015
Kudra Shamroi	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>
Siwatu Shamroy	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Rashida Shariff	Gender Justice Programme Coordinator, Oxfam	27 April 2015
Dora Shayo	Senior Programme Assistant, Pipeline, CO	15 April 2015
Khadija Sinoni	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Ibrahim Siraji	Programme Assistant, Data Entry, CO	8 April 2015
Paschal Stephen	Chairperson of Irrigation Committee (Participant of FGD Chalinze Irrigation Scheme FFA Site: Chamwino District Council)	20 April 2015
Mwanga Takayo	Mnemia FFA Site (Tree Planting); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Damiano Tango	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Antene Tesfaye	Acting Officer in Charge, Programme Section, UNHCR, Dar es Salaam	17 April 2015
Aisha Tete	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Maulidi Tete	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Steve Thorne	Country Director, Save the Children	28 April 2015
Rosemary Tirweshobwa	Senior Human Resources Assistant, CO	8 April 2015
Ramadhani Tuji	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
John Tura	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Afrael Urío	Usomama P4P; Kateshi District Council	23 April 2015
Joachim Wangabo	AAIDRO Office – Arusha	24 April 2015
Rogers Wanyama	Programme Officer (JPO) – Nutrition, CO	9 April 2015
Iddi Waziri	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Kaifa Wele	Madege Irrigation Scheme; Kondoa District Council	22 April 2015
Anya White	Peace Corp Volunteer, Dodoma	20 April 2015
Emanuel William	Themi ya Simba FFA Site; Arusha District Council	24 April 2015

Name	Affiliation	Date
Iddi Yusufu	Orolimo FFA Site (Dam); Kondo District Council	22 April 2015

## Annex E Additional Information on the Portfolio

**Table 10 Timeline and funding level of Tanzania Portfolio 2011–14**

Timeline and funding level of Tanzania Portfolio 2011 - 2014					
Operation	Time Frame	2011	2012	2013	2014
PRRO 200603 - Food Assistance for Refugees	Jul 14 - Jun 16 (+ 1 BR)				Req: 36,115,584 Rec: 16,466,352 <b>Funded: 45.6%</b>
PRRO 200325 - Food Assistance for Refugees in the Northwest	Jan 12 - Jun 14		Req: 50,440,696 Rec: 41,511,894 <b>Funded: 82.3%</b>		
CP 200200 - Country Programme	Jul 11 - Jun 15 (+ 6 BR extended to Jun 2016)		Req: 162,794,267 Rec: 67,676,392 <b>Funded: 41.6%</b>		
PRRO 200029 - Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Households Among the Host Populations in North-Western Tanzania	Jan 10 - Dec 11	Req: 43,948,689 Rec: 41,940,751 <b>Funded: 95.4%</b>			
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		37,644,000	38,090,000	32,457,000	12,738,798
% Direct Expenses: Tanzania vs. WFP World		1%	1%	1%	0%
Food Distributed (MT)		48,984	41,752	34,338	19,570
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		1,168,353	926,234	800,986	663,875

Source SPRs 2011-14, Funding levels given up to December 2014  
Requirements (Req.) and Contributions Received (Rec.) are in US\$


**Table 11 Tanzania 2011–2014 – Financing Sources.**

	CP		PRRO 200029		PRRO 200325		PRRO 200603	
	Received	Share of Requirement	Received	Share of Requirement	Received	Share of Requirement	Received	Share of Requirement
USA	7,999,952	12.3%	16,059,115	25%	13,078,388	20.1%	3,999,816	6.1%
UK			6,339,144	10%	15,396,725	23.6%	6,941,123	10.6%
Carryover from previous operations	15,587,506	23.9%	6,004,346	9%	733,131	1.1%	3,020,517	4.6%
European Commission			4,261,791	7%	3,775,078	5.8%	890,733	1.4%
Japan			2,000,000	3%	4,000,000	6.1%	1,400,000	
Spain			3,674,300	6%				
Multilateral	16,030,447	24.6%	2,196,708	3%	749,000	1.1%		
Saudi Arabia			764,940	1%	102,0287	1.6%	125,885	0.2%
UN Common Funds and Agencies	9,892,062	15.2%			1,489,683	2.3%	34,292	0.1%
Russian Federation	1,000,000	1.5%			1,000,000	1.5%		
Miscellaneous income	552,141	0.8%	228,319	0%	269,602	0.4%	53,986	0.1%
France			412,088	1%				
Canada	9,873,809	15.1%						
Korea Rep. of	3,000,000	4.6%						
Belgium	2,002,059	3.1%						
Private Donors	1,733,801	2.7%						
Tanzania	4,615	0.0%						
<b>Total</b>	<b>67,676,392</b>		<b>41,940,751</b>		<b>41,511,894</b>		<b>16,466,352</b>	
<b>Operational Requirements</b>	<b>162,794,267</b>		<b>43,948,689</b>		<b>50,440,696</b>		<b>36,115,584</b>	
<b>Shortfall</b>	<b>95,117,875</b>		<b>2,007,938</b>		<b>8,928,803</b>		<b>21,880,113</b>	
<b>% Shortfall</b>	<b>58.43%</b>		<b>4.57%</b>		<b>17.70%</b>		<b>60.58%</b>	
<b>% Received</b>	<b>41.57%</b>		<b>95.43%</b>		<b>82.30%</b>		<b>45.59%</b>	


Source: WFP Resource Situation Documents (up to December 2014)

**Figure 6 Planned and Actual Beneficiaries 2011–2014**


**Planned v Actual beneficiaries by year**




**Planned v Actual beneficiaries by activity 2011–14**



**% of planned beneficiaries by activities 2011–14**



**% of actual beneficiaries by activities 2011–14**



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14



# Annex F Country Context

## Table 12 Portfolio and Context Timeline

WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation - Tanzania 2011-2014											
	pre 2009	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016		
WFP Operations	Tanzania Country Strategy										
	Tanzania Country Programme 200200 - Extended to June 2016 with budget revision										
	PRRO 200029 - Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Households among Host Population in Northwestern Tanzania (January 2010 - December 2011)			PRRO 200325 - Food Assistance for Refugees in the Northwest (January 2012-June 2014)				PRRO 200603. Food Assistance for Refugees (July 2014-June 2016)			
WFP General	2008-2013 WFP Strategic Plan - with a move from food aid to food assistance										
	February: Gender Policy launched		December: Directive on cash and vouchers published mainstreaming the use of cash and vouchers across all WFP operations		February: Nutrition Policy launched	March: launch of WFP capacity development tool-kit	June: WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 approved, continuing the focus on food assistance	November: Revised School Feeding Policy launched	Gender Policy 2015-2020 launched		
WFP Tanzania	Global Survey by WFP of School Feeding										
							Evaluation of P4P pilot with case study of Tanzania	September: Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis Tanzania published	June: WFP begin looking at feasibility of Cash and Voucher modality in Nyarugusu refugee camp	August: The first Tanzania Joint Multi-sectoral nutrition review is carried out, highlighting progress but the need for continued urgent action in nutrition	
Tanzania	1961: Tanganyika becomes independent from the British										
	1962: Tanzania becomes a Republic			June: SUN Tanzania launched							
	1964: Tanganyika and Zanzibar merge to become Tanzania			July 2011 - 2012: Severe drought affects the entire East Africa region, including Tanzania				July 2011 - June 2014: UN in Tanzania is operating under a single business plan: the UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP)			
				September 2011: National Nutrition Strategy 2011-2016 launched							
	2011 January: Tanzania handed opportunity of being a Delivery as One reform pilot country							Big Results Now initiative launched by Government of Tanzania shaping national priorities for 2013/14-2016/17			

## **Annex G Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping**

### **Introduction**

1. WFP's corporate fact sheet on vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) states that

It is the basis for the design of all operations (emergency operations, protracted relief and recovery operations as well as country programmes). Prior to the design of operations in any country, WFP undertakes an analysis of the food security situation. (WFP, 2013t: 1)

2. The food security analysis function is commonly referred to as VAM (vulnerability analysis and mapping). This was the name of the first WFP service that was created in 1994 to analyse and map food insecurity. The name has remained ever since. Food security analysts in the field are called VAM officers.

3. In this CPE, VAM is considered to include all assessment, monitoring and other analytical activities which aim to develop an understanding of the situation in Tanzania, identify appropriate responses and to monitor and evaluate policies and programmes, as well as efforts to build the capacity of governments and other actors in such activities. It includes WFP's Comprehensive Vulnerability and Vulnerability Assessments and Emergency Needs Assessments.

4. It should be noted that in Tanzania the VAM team, currently consisting of two people, engages in a broader range of activities than covered by this definition of VAM. For example, the team leader participates in external coordination meetings, such as the UN Emergency Coordination Group, and provides technical support to the Prime Minister's Office Disaster Management Department (PMO-DMD). This section of the report focuses on WFP's VAM activities.

### **Strategic context**

5. In Tanzania, responsibility for leading food security monitoring and assessments lies with the Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Section (CMEWS) section of the Food Security Division (FSD) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives (MOAFC).

6. CMEWS undertakes monitoring of 12 crops during the agricultural season and post-harvest assessments. They also undertake food basket analysis, assessing self-sufficiency ratios at LGA level. LGAs with poor crop production and possible need for external support are identified.

7. Following the crop monitoring, biennial Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessments (CFSNAs) are undertaken in the high risk LGAs following both agricultural seasons (long and short rains). The findings of the MUCHALI assessments then inform short- and long-term responses (e.g. by NFRA) coordinated by the PMO-DMD and MOAFC.

8. CFSNAs are coordinated through the Tanzania Food Security and Nutrition Analysis System (MUCHALI) which is co-chaired by the PMO Disaster Management Department and the MOAFC FSD. Partners in MUCHALI include government Ministries and Departments (PMO-DMD, Agriculture, Livestock, Markets, Water, Gender and Children, Local Government, Tanzania Meteorological Agency, National Bureau of Statistics and the TFNC); UN agencies (WFP, FAO, UNICEF) and NGOs (including Care, Oxfam, World Vision International and Save the Children).

MUCHALI is one of the SADC's Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VAC).<sup>43</sup> In Tanzania the IPC approach to food security analysis is integrated into the MUCHALI assessments.<sup>44</sup>

9. MUCHALI is currently undertaking livelihoods mapping and profiling to build up Household Economy Approach (HEA) baselines that can be used for much more detailed outcome analysis and development planning purposes as part of SADC's Climate Smart Initiative. WFP has not been involved due to lack of resources.

10. The MOAFC has plans to decentralize the MUCHALI approach to all LGAs in the country, requiring further capacity building at national and district levels.

### **Planned and actual VAM activities**

11. In its Tanzania Country Strategy (2011–2015), WFP considered that the Government had limited capacity for comprehensive vulnerability, hunger and nutrition analysis with a view to designing appropriate responses.

The government conducts regular rapid vulnerability assessments in relation to drought and floods, but the capacity to carry out periodic national level hunger and nutrition analysis and prepare appropriate response strategies; including monitoring and targeting relief assistance at local level needs strengthening. (WFP, 2010a: 12)

12. The Country Programme document (200200) 2011–2015 considers strengthening food security and nutrition information systems to be a strategic focus:

While the Government demonstrates clear capacity to monitor the food security situation at national level, district capacity for early warning and nutrition monitoring remains weak. Consequently, further capacity development through training, investment in data collection and analysis, and joint assessments<sup>45</sup> are required to ensure that WFP and the Government can respond to localized and structural causes of hunger. (WFP, 2011b: 6–7)

13. The CS stated the following comparative advantages of WFP in relation to vulnerability analysis and mapping:

Hunger knowledge and analysis: Through its vulnerability analysis and mapping, WFP has the capacity to understand the various environmental, social, cultural and political factors that cause hunger in the different regions and sub-regions of the country, and to share this information with stakeholders for appropriate response. (WFP, 2010a: 15)

Capacity building: Vulnerability analysis and food assessments; including smallholder farmer groups/SACCOS training under P4P initiative, are undertaken through local institutions (e.g. National Bureau of Statistics for CFSVA; RUDI for P4P training) and Government (e.g. RVAs, disaster preparedness and response). In order to ensure proper evaluation of the impact of the intervention programmes, WFP has been strengthening the monitoring and evaluation capacities of the government and partners, through training, development of monitoring tools and database. (WFP, 2010a: 16)

14. Increased efforts at capacity building and hand-over of vulnerability analysis and mapping to the government, partners and national institutions are considered a strategic priority (WFP, 2010a: 4).

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<sup>43</sup> <http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-deputy-executive-secretary-regional-integration/food-agriculture-natural-resources/regional-vulnerability-assessment-analysis-programme-rvaa/>

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/ipcinfo-eastern-middle-africa/Tanzania>

<sup>45</sup> Including: developing capacity of food security information teams and rapid vulnerability assessments, strengthening early warning systems, geographical-risk mapping and disaster risk reduction database for flood-prone areas

15. The strategy indicates that technical assistance and capacity building will be provided in relation to its first two objectives of the Country Strategy.

**Table 13 VAM and the WFP Tanzania Country Strategy**

	<b>Emergency Preparedness and Response</b>	<b>Food Security and Nutrition Support</b>
<b>Technical assistance and capacity building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early warning</li> <li>• Emergency Needs Assessments</li> <li>• Risk and Vulnerability Analysis (RVAs)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk &amp; Vulnerability monitoring</li> </ul>

16. Within the CS, VAM activities take place both to inform the interventions of WFP (programme assessments) and to build national and local capacities (capacity development and support to partners).

### ***Programme assessments***

17. WFP used the results of both the 2006 and preliminary results of the 2010 Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Assessments among other key documents such as the 2007 Household Budget Survey and 2005 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS),<sup>46</sup> to guide decisions on the 2011–16 CS.

**Table 14 Assessments in which WFP participated**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• United Republic of Tanzania Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis September 2010 (Data collected in November–January 2009/2010)</li> <li>• Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Report of the 2010/11 Vuli Season, March 2011</li> <li>• Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Report of the 2010/11 Main (Msimu &amp; Masika) Season, October 2011</li> <li>• 2012 – Nyarugusu Camp Nutrition Survey</li> <li>• Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Report of the April, 2012 Main (Masika) Season, April 2012</li> <li>• Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessment, October 2012</li> <li>• Community and Household Surveillance in North Western Tanzania:</li> <li>• Programme Outcome Monitoring in Nyarugusu Refugee Camp (2013)</li> <li>• Comprehensive Food Security &amp; nutrition Assessment, February 2013</li> <li>• Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) Nyarugusu Camp, Tanzania, August 2013</li> <li>• Comprehensive Food Security &amp; Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), Tanzania, 2012. Report published: September 2013</li> <li>• Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessment, November 2013</li> <li>• Nyarugusu Cash &amp; Voucher Feasibility Study June 2014</li> <li>• the First Tanzania Joint Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Review (JMNR), August 2014</li> </ul>
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<sup>46</sup> Data collection for the next DHS is currently in progress.

18. In relation to the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations for refugees and host communities, CFSVAs and CHS studies have been used to analyse changes in refugee and host population vulnerability and coping mechanisms. This information is complemented by informal surveys and reviews of secondary data.

19. For both camp-based activities and host areas programmes, WFP implementing partners report on food distributions and activity results as per agreed standards. All reports should contain gender-disaggregated information. Food basket monitoring is conducted by health organizations in the refugee camps on a fortnightly basis to ascertain adequacy and efficiency of the distribution system. On-site and post-distribution monitoring (PDM) is undertaken by WFP and UNHCR field staff and refugee food committee members during each food distribution cycle.

20. Data collected through annual WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs) provide information on changes in livelihoods and the impact of food assistance. Beneficiary contact monitoring (BCM) is undertaken yearly and is complemented by the community household surveillance system.

21. Additional nutritional data on malnourished children are collected at supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres and trends in the numbers of beneficiaries enrolling for supplementary feeding are monitored. Joint nutrition assessments are conducted annually in the refugee camps.

### ***Capacity development and support to partners***

22. During the evaluation period, a major focus of WFP's VAM capacity development activities has been the support provided to the Ministry of Agriculture's CMEWS for the biennial assessments, continuing support which had been provided in many years previously.

23. WFP has consistently provided human resource, financial and logistical support to the CFSNAs, participated in the analysis of the data and fed into the assessment reports.

24. WFP is a member of the Tanzania IPC technical working group and participated in the integration of the IPC approach in to the CFSNAs.

25. In the 2011–2016 UNDAF, WFP is the lead agency for emergency assessments. During the majority of the evaluation period, there were no major emergencies in Tanzania.

### **VAM capacity in Tanzania**

26. In years prior to the current evaluation period, WFP had significant resources to support VAM activities, from the global WFP Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC) project as well as through programme funding for EMOPs and responses to the global food price and financial crises.

27. However, during the evaluation period VAM activities have been very poorly resourced. This has meant that WFP was unable to engage in as many multi-stakeholder processes as it would have liked to. For example, WFP would be participating in the currently on-going national livelihoods profiling if it had resources available.

## **Note on internal monitoring of VAM activities**

28. Despite VAM being a strategic focus for WFP in Tanzania, particularly in terms of capacity development, there are no VAM-related outcomes or performance indicators included in the CP logical framework. Furthermore, there are no reports on VAM-related activities, outputs and outcomes in the Country Programme or PRRO Standard Project Reports (SPRs). This, combined with the limited time available during the Evaluation Mission to discuss with VAM staff, has limited the comprehensiveness of the evaluation of this component of the portfolio.

## **Findings**

### ***EQ1. Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy & Portfolio***

29. The CPE found that the focus of WFP on strengthening national food security and vulnerability information systems is widely appreciated. In general WFP is highly regarded for its technical competences in VAM and its support to national institutions and processes.

30. Even so, interviews indicate that WFP could better align its own VAM work plan with that of the MOAFC FSD. They think that this should include working closely with the pre-harvest team as well as the early warning unit. It is important for WFP to be engaged in preparedness activities as well as responses to food deficits.

31. It is perceived by some that WFP should have a greater focus on surplus areas to address the significant pockets of food insecurity, in addition to working with better-off, smallholder farmers in the marketing of produce through P4P.

32. WFP's support in the integration of the IPC approach into MUCHALI assessments has been appreciated, whilst recognising that FAO had the donor funding and capacity to lead on this from the UN. Given the recent drop-off in funding to FAO for this work, it would be appreciated if WFP could work with FAO to find additional resources to sustain the efforts and further build capacity particularly at local levels. It is felt that WFP's global level commitment to the IPC approach should be more strongly translated into technical support at country level in Tanzania.

33. WFP's approach of supporting multi-stakeholder, consensus-based assessments and analysis, in addition to conducting its own assessments for its own programming, are highly regarded. However, some government stakeholders consider that WFP could feed in more of its own information on the food security situation and its assistance activities, e.g. school feeding, to inform collective situation analysis and the coordination of activities.

34. WFP's VAM capacity building activities have been very much focused on early warning and emergency assessment to inform disaster management responses. A number of CPE interviewees suggested that WFP could draw upon its institutional VAM and other analysis capacities to support improved government and multi-stakeholder monitoring of chronic food and livelihood insecurity to inform social protection policies and programmes. This was considered by some to be a missed opportunity by WFP.

35. WFP's 2010 CFSVA assessment and the 2011 desk-based update fed into the collective UN situation analysis to inform the development and monitoring of the 2011–2016 UNDAF.

36. The WFP VAM staff in Tanzania appeared to have a strong awareness of relevant corporate guidelines (e.g. guidelines on CFSVAs, EFSAs, market analysis, and the 3-pronged approach to resilience analysis and programming) as well as international standards (e.g. SPHERE, IPC). In general, they have been well used to inform internal assessments and external capacity development activities. However, one informant did suggest that the corporate 3-pronged approach could be used more both to guide WFP's FFA and other programming and to inform national government information and planning systems.

### ***EQ2. Factors and quality of strategic decision-making***

37. WFP's VAM activities have been responsive to the requests for support from government and other partners, within the severe resource constraints experienced during the evaluation period.

38. Due to a lack of funding WFP was unable to undertake many planned activities, e.g. capacity building of LGAs in CFSNA methods; the intended baseline assessments for its own FFA projects in 2014; and participation in the MUCHALI livelihood profiling.

39. WFP has certainly used its comparative advantages in terms of its technical capacities at global, regional and national levels. The experience and knowledge of the VAM Programme Officer were praised by a number of informants within WFP and externally.

40. The lack of documentation on VAM (particularly capacity development) activities, outcomes and impacts not only risks concealing a valuable component of WFP's portfolio but also may hinder strategic thinking about the future direction of VAM and how it might inform the overall strategy of WFP in Tanzania.

41. During the CPE, WFP staff at country and regional levels acknowledged that there was a need to shift VAM work in line with the WFP corporate Strategic Plan. They felt that the VAM work has not been as influential as it might have been in ensuring that the strategic approach outlined in the Country Strategy was operationalized.

### ***EQ3. Performance and results of the WFP portfolio***

42. Despite the limited resources available during the four-year period, VAM activities have clearly had a demonstrable impact in informing WFP's own programming and supporting government-led and multi-stakeholder processes.

43. The technical and logistical support provided by WFP for MOAFC CFSN assessments is highly appreciated. However, there is disappointment that this is limited to the areas where WFP had sub offices and national level coordination.

44. WFP's continued participation in national food security assessment and monitoring activities is valued. Recent support to the MOAFC CMEWS from WFP's Regional Office in approaches to assessment in urban areas was noted as an example of good collaboration.

45. However, the extent and quality of support is perceived to have declined significantly over the last five years. Previously, WFP had provided financial and capacity building support to MUCHALI, but has provided very little recently. The reasons for this decline did not appear to be well understood by government and other partners.

46. The VAM team in the WFP Country Office have effectively promoted the use of the organisation's Community-Based Targeting and Distribution (CBTD) approach both within WFP's own programmes and in government programmes. The PMO DMD adopted this approach, recognising its value in promoting the neutral selection of beneficiaries, and has appreciated the capacity building support provided by WFP.

47. During the evaluation period, VAM capacity building activities have had a sustainable impact on the approaches and capacities of government systems, building upon the more intensive efforts in previous years. As noted, WFP CFSVA and CBTD approaches have, at least in part, been integrated into the work of the MOAFC CMEWS and PMO DMD. However, informants in the CPE suggested that these national systems themselves might not be sustainable if there is not a greater focus on building capacity at local level.

## **Conclusions**

48. Compared to some other components of the WFP portfolio, the VAM team has given a strong focus to capacity development activities, in addition to supporting WFP's own programming.

49. During the evaluation period, WFP's VAM work has been well positioned and effective in supporting national early warning, emergency assessment and disaster response systems, despite experiencing significantly reduced resources compared to the preceding Country Programme. This work has been focused at the national level. There are increasing requests for support from the MOAFC and DMD to scale up its capacity building support at LGA level.

50. The limited funding has not only reduced its capacity development support to external actors but also constrained the operationalisation of the 2011–16 Country Strategy and ongoing strategic thinking about WFP's role and approach in Tanzania.

51. There has not been an adequate shift in the focus of VAM in terms of assessing the feasibility of different food assistance modalities or supporting national systems to monitor chronic food insecurity, risk and vulnerability as a basis for social protection programmes. Such a shift is justified not only by the WFP corporate Strategic Plan but also by the nature of food insecurity in Tanzania and growing national resources and capacities.

52. WFP VAM may have a particular added value in linking social protection and early warning information systems in the country. This is particularly the case if WFP is to play a role in strengthening social protection programmes in order that they can be scaled up to respond to acute crises.

53. Furthermore, WFP's own programming and its national policy influencing strategy may have been constrained by the lack of an overall analysis of the food system in Tanzania. WFP's current portfolio includes activities that aim to increase the production and marketing of food by small-scale food producers as well as activities to meet the short-term food needs of food insecure households. An understanding of the current national food system in Tanzania is critical for the development of appropriate strategies for small-scale food producers with poor consumers.



## Annex H School Feeding

### The strategic context of WFP's School Feeding portfolio in Tanzania

#### *Education sector in Tanzania: 2011–2014*

1. **Tanzania made huge progress in getting children into school, but enrolment rates are showing a downward trend after 2011.** By 2010, the overall net enrolment rate at primary school stood at 95.4 per cent (girls alone 95.6 per cent). Since 2011 there has been a downward trend and by 2013, the national average enrolment in primary schools was 89.7 per cent (GOT, 2012c; GOT, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; GOT/MOEV, 2012). Expansion in access has not been matched by an improvement in quality of education, but efforts are ongoing to improve learning outcomes through the 'Big Results Now in Education programme', which will address a range of causes of low performance (DFID, 2014; GOT, 2013c).

#### *School feeding in Tanzania: 2011–2014*

2. **SF was included in some national strategies, albeit with a heavy focus on community involvement.** The Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP II) anticipates the introduction of community-funded SF schemes (GOT, 2008), while MKUKUTA II articulates how SF with community involvement will promote equitable access to education for all (GOT, 2010). In 2010, approximately 4,800 out of 16,000 government primary schools provided school meals and by 2012, 89 per cent of districts had established some form of school feeding, providing school meals to approximately 2.7 million students in 5,400 primary schools (WFP, 20130). Although SF is part of the national planning process, relevant regional budgets can only finance programme management (staff salaries, training, and M&E), not food. At a more local level, schools should have a budget line for SF, although funds are rarely disbursed. SF thus still depends heavily on external donors (World Bank, 2012b). The MoEV has the mandate of managing, implementing and coordinating the SF programme. In 2013, an inter-ministerial task force was established to examine the various sectoral implications of officially adopting national a SF strategy (WFP, 20130).

3. **Besides WFP, other external agencies** that support SF are the World Bank, some international NGOs such as Plan International, Project Concern International, Feed the Children and various smaller faith-based organizations (WFP, 20130). Within the context of the 2011–2016 UNDAF, the UN helps the government in developing a national primary SF scheme. UNICEF and UNESCO are the lead agencies for education, whereas WFP was assigned to lead on school feeding. WFP worked with UNESCO and the World Bank in support to the Education Sector Management Information System (ESMIS), 2010–2012 (KII; WFP, 20130).

4. **The portfolio was implemented during a transition period of related corporate strategies.** The 2009 SF Policy (WFP, 2009g) established WFP as a provider of time-bound support to governments with the long-term objective of phasing out its assistance, and set eight quality standards for SF. The 2013 updated SF Policy (WFP, 2013f) foresees that WFP will focus increasingly on helping countries to establish and maintain nationally owned programmes linked to local agricultural production, while continuing to advocate the universal adoption of SF. The 2013 policy presents two types of expected results, which are mutually reinforcing and interrelated. One type relates to changes in children's lives brought

about by SF . The other type relates to institutional changes – within and outside WFP – that derive from implementation of this policy. (WFP, 2014e).

### **Alignment of the school feeding portfolio to Tanzania’s humanitarian and developmental needs, the national policies and the corporate policies**

5. The **Country Strategy (CS)** describes how SF under the previous CP was expanded to act as an effective safety-net for the populations affected by the financial crisis, but also how it helped to build national human resource capacity. Under the new CS, the design of SF evolved around improving students’ enrolment and attendance, alongside its potential role as safety net. The CS specifically states that it will simultaneously expand services and build capacity to ensure hand-over to government (WFP, 2010a).

6. In accordance with the CS, the subsequent project documents complement direct support to service delivery with technical advice to the GOT. WFP provided children at 1,167 primary schools with two cooked school meals a day in five regions (Arusha, Dodoma, Manyara, Shinyanga and Singida) as well as in some selected Complementary Basic Education in Tanzania (COBET) centres in host communities in Kigoma. The CO also supported the MOEVT to pilot the use of micronutrient powders to fortify school meals and to develop a national SF strategy, build capacity at central and district level, and support expansion of the ESMIS database.

7. Finally, WFP would provide advisory services to districts of the host community in Kigoma in establishing their own SF programme and identifying alternative financial support for safety net programmes. In the interim, partial rations would be provided to facilitate transition from WFP assistance. WFP’s support to develop a national SF strategy aimed also to phase out WFP assistance and leave behind sustainable, cost-effective national SF. Project documents were however less clear how this phasing out would be achieved and what were the expected milestones (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2011c).

8. There exists little national policy guidance on SF in Tanzania. The CS acknowledges that SF is not a goal in the MKUKUTA II. It states correctly that it features in the education section, but does not indicate that the MKUKUTA II anticipated that SF should be implemented with community involvement (WFP, 2010a; WFP, 2011b). No reference was made in the CS to other possible partners who support the MOEVT with SF, and project documents stated vaguely that WFP will work with NGOs who support schools in other areas such as hygiene, sanitation and school infrastructure (WFP, 2010a; WFP, 2011b). WFP’s support to the MOEVT in developing a national SF strategy and guidelines to support implementation of SF was in line with objectives under DAO and the 2011–2016 UNDAF (UNDAF, 2014).

9. The portfolio’s SF interventions were guided by WFP’s corporate SF Policy of 2009 and by the 2010 guidance note on SF and nutrition (WFP, 2010f). Although the CP was developed prior to the publication of the 2013 corporate update on the SF Policy (WFP, 2013f), the evaluation team has reviewed whether the document was already aligned with it. SF outcomes and related indicators support some of the intended outcomes as described in the 2013 update of SF policy, notably the increased attendance and enrolment rate, leading to improved school achievements (measured by the pass rate). The design of the SF interventions also represents the two types of expected results as indicated in the 2013 revised SF policy. Even without a nutrition-specific outcome of SF, WFP-supported SF still have nutritional benefits in the sense that they provide nutritious, fortified foods, which conform to the 2009

and 2013 policies and the 2010 corporate guidelines on SF and Nutrition (WFP, 2010f).

10. **With a 95 per cent net enrolment rate at primary school, school enrolment had reached its peak shortly after the CS was designed.** In retrospect, it is not clear how SF could have further boosted enrolment with an expected average annual rate of change of 3 per cent, as planned in the CP (WFP, 2011b: 12). To be fair, that information was not available when the CS was designed. The CS was built on rather outdated information, the 2005 TDHS and *Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania 2003–2007* (BEST). One year later, TDHS education data provided more updated information showing a gross attendance ratio of 99 per cent. However, TDHS only provides regional aggregated data, and more updated BEST data were not available.

11. **Geographic targeting of SF was based on food-security indicators combined with enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates.** The CS and project documents do not provide the education-related data underlining the choices of the target regions for SF. Based on 2010 DHS data, the evaluation team concluded that most of these Regions had indeed lower net attendance ratios in 2010 (less than 80 per cent), with the exception of Arusha (DHS, 2010). Details on eligibility of schools selected are provided in ¶29.

### *Conclusions*

12. The SF interventions planned were intended to complement direct support to service delivery with technical advice to the GOT. There was minimal national policy guidance on SF in Tanzania but the CS did not sufficiently highlight the focus of community involvement in the national policy documents. SF interventions were in line with the 2011–2016 UNDAF. In design, guided by the 2009 WFP SF Policy, project documents already included some elements of the 2013 update on the SF Policy.

13. Expected outcomes of SF were clear and relate to increasing access to education and human capital development. Two types of expected results were stated, notably those related to the changes in children's lives and those related to institutional changes. The CO was however less clear how the phasing out would be achieved and what the expected milestones were. With a 95 per cent net enrolment rate at primary school, school enrolment had reached its peak by the time the CP started. In retrospect, it is not clear how SF could have boosted enrolment with an expected average annual rate of change of 3 per cent. At design level, geographic targeting of SF was relatively adequate and was based on food security indicators combined with enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates. The choice of the food basket was strategic: even without a nutrition-specific outcome, SF still has nutritional benefits in the sense that it provides nutritious, fortified foods in a context of high micronutrient deficiencies.

### **Factors and quality of strategic decision-making**

14. **The CO had sufficient funds for SF during the design of the CS.** Under the previous CP, SF was supported in 13 drought-prone food insecure districts in four regions covering 350 schools for a total number of 213,000 pupils. In 2009, USAID granted WFP USD 34.6 million through the Financial Crisis Initiative (FCI). The grant resulted in a significant scale-up of all SF from 350 primary schools in 2009 to 1,167 schools in 2010 with approximately 600,000 school children

benefitting from the programme. This increased caseload was incorporated into the ongoing CP 2011–2015, although little analysis was provided as rationale for the inclusion of SF as part of the 2011–2015 CP (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2013s).

15. **The portfolio was intended to include a pilot on micronutrient powders in schools.** This was in line with the policy and the 2010 guidance note which suggested that SF programmes can address micronutrient deficiencies if designed in contexts where the prevalence of anaemia is above 40 per cent among school-age children or above 50 per cent in children under 5 years old (WFP, 2010f). The choice of this pilot was not underlined with the necessary justification, despite high levels of anaemia among young children under the age of 5 (60 per cent according to DHS 2010). Lessons learned from an earlier WFP pilot introducing micronutrient powder in schools in 2007 were not further analysed in project documents (WFO, 2007b).

16. **The description of the link with the Government’s deworming programme under the CP was weak.** The CP stated that “*The Government will implement a national deworming programme*”, but there is little evidence that this programme was effectively implemented in the intervention zones. The 2009 corporate policy and the 2010 guidance note already indicated that deworming should always be associated with SF programmes where needed (WFP, 2009g; WFP, 2010f).

### *Conclusions*

17. An analysis of the project documents gives the impression that strategic choices made under the SF programming might have been guided more by availability of resources than by a detailed review of the situation and the country’s needs. Although data were available, insufficient analysis was provided to underscore the inclusion of SF, while no milestones were provided for phasing out. Little evidence was provided to justify the planned pilot on micronutrient powders and its possible expansion to all the schools. Considering the importance of deworming for the uptake of food, insufficient evidence was provided on the efficacy of the deworming programme implemented by the Government.

## **Performance and results**

### *Outputs: Number of beneficiaries*

18. At the start of the evaluation period, 626,923 primary school children in five regions (Arusha, Dodoma, Manyara, Shinyanga and Singida) received two meals a day, as well as an additional 2,000 children in COBET schools in Kigoma. Interventions in the host community schools in Kigoma were able to cover 100 per cent of the anticipated target (WFP, 2011a; WFP, 2012b; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2014r; WFP, 2015d), but, implementation of SF in the other five Regions was confronted with important challenges, which resulted in a declining number of SF beneficiaries. Details on beneficiary numbers are provided in Table 15 and Figure 7 below. Differences between actual and planned numbers can be explained as follows. In 2012 the FCI funds were exhausted. Available funds did not allow maintaining the number of schools. WFP and the MOEVT developed a plan anticipating a gradual phasing down of SF. In March 2013 the SF ration was reduced by removing the mid-morning porridge, but continuing the provision of maize, pulses and oil for lunch. In 2013, the number of feeding days was also 18 per cent fewer than planned. In May


2014, additional funding constraints led to another reduction in the number of schools assisted. SF was discontinued in 40 per cent of the schools assisted. Only half of the planned beneficiaries received a meal a day. The number of schools receiving assistance dropped from 1,167 to 640. WFP also explained the reduction of the number of children covered in 2014 by declining school enrolment figures, in accordance with a national trend (WFP, 2013a; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014q; WFP, 2014r).

**Table 15 School feeding: CP: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**

	Beneficiaries		Tonnage	
	Planned	Actual	Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)
2011	650,000	626,923	12,422	8,040
2012	683,000	619,933	25,971	15,966
2013	717,000	533,827	27,264	14,698
2014	753,000	485,406	22,759	9,770
<b>Total</b>	<b>700,750</b>	<b>566,522</b>	<b>88,416</b>	<b>48,474</b>

Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

**Figure 7 School feeding: CP: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

19. By the end of the evaluation period, most SF activities were limited to primary schools in Singida and Dodoma, as well as boarding schools in Arusha and Manyara. Because of severe funding constraints, WFP discontinued traditional food assistance for SF at the end of June 2015 through a sixth budget revision (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b; WFP, 2013s; WFP, 2015c).

20. **SF coverage was also influenced by declining enrolment rates**, which were – according to CO staff – in line with the national downward trend which started in 2011. At the planning stage in 2011, enrolment figures were projected to increase by 3 per cent per year. Considering that enrolment rates had already reached 95% in 2011, it is not clear why these targets were never adapted during the evaluation period (KII; WFP, 2015b).

21. **Some planned activities were not implemented**, such as the launch of a micronutrient powder pilot in schools, which stalled because of funding constraints (WFP, 2013s). The CO also planned to collaborate with UNESCO and the World Bank to roll out the ESMIS database, but this was abandoned after supervision missions highlighted issues with the computerised system – which were beyond WFP’s capacity – and little government buy-in (UNDAO, 2014).

#### *Monitoring the progress*

22. Schools report on a monthly basis to the districts, A special section of the reporting form captures information on SF and is used by WFP for planning purposes. Reports are sent monthly to the District Education Office. WFP analyses the reports and sends a consolidated district level report back to the district authorities for validation. A baseline study was commissioned but the quality of the report was considered inadequate. Output and outcome data are being collected through regular monitoring and district reports, but no special surveys have been carried out. WFP reports key outcome information on SF on an annual basis through the SPR process, using data collected through regular project monitoring. According to interviews, national education data or surveys, such as the BEST data, do not allow for district or facility level information.

23. WFP ensured that adequate monitoring systems were in place and has undertaken regular and frequent monitoring visits to ensure representative coverage. Supervision missions are organised in collaboration with the District education authorities. Irregularities or and problems were reported for immediate action and follow-up. Spot checks are carried out in schools to review the data collected and maintained at the school to verify accuracy and stock management (KII; Hoffman *et al*, 2012).

24. An evaluation commissioned by USAID revealed that SF guaranteed that children receive meals, encouraging attendance and relieving household burdens related to feeding children, helping to mitigate future shocks to the household as well as enhancing the coping capability of children. Interviews with WFP, local government officials and school staff identified several areas for improvement (Hoffman *et al*, 2012).

#### *Effectiveness*

25. Perceived benefits. Focus group discussions with school teachers, parents, school committees, and district and ward authorities during the field visits revealed that perceived benefits of SF included marked educational effects (enrolment, attendance, concentration and performance and drop-out rates). Schools visited reported that, in general, attendance has improved, since the food not only attracts children but also reduces truancy after lunch. Teachers also reported that student focus has improved and enrolment increased – especially for pre-primary age children. Similar results were cited in the 2012 evaluation.

26. Discussions with communities and local authorities indicated that SF eases the burden on families, allows families to save money and assures children of a guaranteed meal. SF also enables families to spend time normally devoted to gathering and preparing food on other economic activities. Parents and teachers also stated that there has been improvement in the health of students. Village authorities acknowledge that the promotion of fuel-efficient stoves has been extended to the community. These stoves are now being used at household level (Hoffman *et al*, 2012).

27. **As shown in Table 16, data provided during subsequent SPRs show a decline in school attendance and enrolment in WFP-assisted schools.** The SPR of 2014 argues that the WFP supported schools follow the same trend as non WFP supported schools. It also explained that for the majority of WFP-assisted schools, the removal of the mid-morning meal in early 2013 had a negative impact on school attendance. Not all outcome indicators were measured annually. Values for dropout rates, pass rate and retention rates are only reported in the 2014 SPR – which does precludes assessment of progress (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

**Table 16 CP – SF – Progress in reaching output and outcome indicators**

	Baseline value	Indicator values : Achievements			
		2011	2012	2013	2014
Output indicators					
Number of feeding days as % of actual school days		100	62	82	
Number of primary schools assisted by WFP		1,167	1,167	74.5	
Number of technical assistance activities Provided (new indicator)					
Outcome indicators					
Attendance rate (boys in WFP assisted schools)	95.87	92.3	92.16	89.1	87.4
Attendance rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	95.53	92.54	92.94	90.2	89.5
Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	-9.3	-2.99	-1.48	-15.9	-2.4
Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	-5.4	-3.57	-0.75	-13.6	-1.7
Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	0.99	0.98	0.99		

Sources: WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b

28. A Cochrane study showed that SF can have small effects on school-age children's anthropometry, particularly in low-income settings (Kristjansson *et al*, 2007) but no research has been done in Tanzania to confirm this.

#### *Factors that influence outcomes*

29. **Targeting of schools was done in collaboration with the MOEVT, based on food security indicators combined with enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates and remoteness of schools.** Little information is available on the eligibility of selected schools, although regional data and earlier evaluations indicate that the selection of schools was appropriate. The supported schools are mainly located in 16 drought-prone, food-insecure districts of central and northern Tanzania<sup>47</sup>, as well as in the host communities in Kigoma. Target schools were already identified in 2009, when WFP had provided guidelines to GOT officials on the selection criteria. In the 16 drought prone and food insecure districts, WFP-supported SF covered all schools. All children in a school were included in order to avoid stigmatism and for practical reasons (Hoffman *et al*, 2012).

30. **The food basket provided under SF responded to the needs, but changed over time.** Children initially received a fortified mid-morning snack (40 gram of Super Cereal) and a school lunch consisting of 120g maize, 30g pulses, and oil. Timings of snack and lunch seemed appropriate to ensure maximum impact for school concentration. The morning snack was provided in view of the fact that children seldom had breakfast. Discussions with communities and parents indicated that school snacks were served systematically at mid-morning and lunches around noon, which was considered the right time of day. In early 2013 the food basket was revised in order to respond to the reduced funding, but also to the Government's vision for a sustainable, community-led SF programme. The use of Super Cereal as mid-morning snack was considered too costly and therefore not replicable by either the Government or local communities. A consultation led by the MOEVT recommended phasing out the Super Cereal starting in March 2013, while continuing to provide cereals, pulses and vegetable oil for the lunch throughout the school year (WFP, 2013s; WFP, 2013m)

31. **WFP contracted private companies to deliver food commodities to the schools on a quarterly basis.** Quantities of quarterly deliveries were based on stock reports and waybills, which were shared by the district education authorities with WFP. Interviews with district authorities and schools authorities indicate that the quality of the food commodities remained high, while delivery of goods was considered satisfactory and timely, notwithstanding some occasional and minor delays. SPR reports and discussions with WFP staff revealed however that the capacity of stock management at the school level needed continuous attention (KII).

32. **The quantity of food distributed was often lower than planned.** Reasons provided were irregular preparation of school meals resulting from lack of water and/or firewood, and the inability of some communities to pay cooks or provide for the necessary wood and water. Inaccurate monthly reporting of stocks also affected the quantity of food dispatched to the schools. To address these issues, WFP continued to work with ward education coordinators and school committees to sensitize communities on the management and monitoring needs of the programme.

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<sup>47</sup> The districts are Bahi, Chamwino, Mpwapwa, Kondoa, Manyoni Singida Rural and Iramba, Manyara, Shinyanga Rural, Meatu, Kiteto, Monduli, Longido, Karatu, Ngorongoro and Simanjiro. WFP did not support all schools in these districts, but did provide full coverage in the wards where it supported schools.



Data available do not allow an assessment of whether there was difference in attendance on days when school meals were served and days when they were not (KII; FGD; WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

33. **WFP also supported complementary activities** such as the construction of basic kitchens and storage facilities, school infrastructure, access to potable water, and access to water to irrigate school gardens. Capacity was built in all the WFP schools related to food safety standards and facilities for safe food storage and preparation in schools. The evaluation team was also able to visit a sample of schools and assessed that the minimum requirements for SF were present in all schools visited, including cooking and storage facilities, accessibility for food deliveries, safe cooking water and the availability of fuel-efficient stoves. Although at some schools it was observed that the task of collecting firewood and water fell to students. Respect for food safety standards was verified by governments and WFP during the supervision visits. As observed during the field visits, food safety standards seemed to be respected in schools visited (KII; FGD; WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

34. The 2009 Policy and 2010 guidelines on Nutrition and SF indicate that “*WFP should ensure that health and nutrition education is provided to school children – be it through the curriculum or through specific activities and campaigns implemented by partners, or by WFP*”. This is confirmed by international evidence (Adelman *et al.*, 2008). Project monitoring reports, interviews and a review of various documents have not provided any indication that WFP proactively established linkages with other partners to ensure that its SF was provided alongside school health and nutrition education.

### *Efficiency*

35. **WFP did not analyse cost efficiency of its support to SF in Tanzania**, but based on CO calculations, the annual cost per child of SF was estimated at USD 30, which reflects the total expenditures associated with SF divided by the number of beneficiaries (including commodity procurement, transportation, storage and handling and personnel). With removal of the Super Cereal in March 2013, the cost went down to USD 23 per child per year (source: KII). The Tanzania SF cost is competitive with other low-income countries, which have costs that vary between USD 10 and USD 117 per child. Global WFP average cost is estimated at USD 40 per child per year over the period 2008–2012 (WFP, 2013n). Costs of community-led SF models in Tanzania were estimated by WFP in 2013 and amounted to USD 22 per child per year, including costs for food (maize, pulses, salt and oil), expenditures for salaries of cooks and guards, the construction of a kitchen and store, as well as contribution to firewood and water (WFP, 2013o)

36. **The unit cost of delivering primary education** in Tanzania on the other hand is estimated at USD 65 (DFID, 2014). The returns to SF are not yet calculated for Tanzania but based on the WFP’s Investment Case Model, the average cost-benefit ratio ranges from 1:3 to 1:8. Thus, for each dollar a government spends on SF, it could potentially receive at least three dollars back in the form of various economic returns (WFP, 2013n).

37. **Cost efficiency also assumes that food commodities provided are consumed in the best possible way.** WFP introduced some cost saving interventions such as the introduction of wood-saving stoves, which reduced the amount of wood being used to prepare school meals. WFP supervision also focused

on improved food management in schools through better reporting for improved planning, training in food management, and increased community involvement. The construction of proper facilities for food storage is important to keep food from spoiling and being consumed by rodents. Some schools have dedicated food store rooms. Schools visited by the evaluation team, however, used classrooms or offices as storage areas.

**38. Deworming can help ensure that SF feeds the child, and not the worms.** Evidence supports the idea deworming can lead to a better absorption of food, to significant reduction in anaemia, and to improved cognition (WFP, 2009g; Sonnino, 2007; Grigorenko *et al.*, 2006; Bundy, 2005). Deworming of helminths and bilharziasis is organised yearly in schools by the MOEVT and MOHSW, although implementation was reported to be variable by national and district stakeholders. SF monitoring documents do not report on associated deworming efforts by the Government in WFP-supported schools, although the CO states that it has been forwarding WHO/GOT annual reports on deworming to RBJ and HQ.

#### *WFP's contribution to influencing the school feeding agenda*

39. WFP provided ongoing support to the MOEVT in developing a national SF strategy and in developing capacity at central and district level to train education officials to manage SF activities. During the first years of the evaluation period, some successes were recorded, but Government's interest declined in late 2013. A snapshot of interventions over the years shows:

- Prior to the evaluation period (in 2010), a task force was established with the objective of establishing modalities for a “National Food for Education Programme”. The Task Force benefited from technical assistance from WFP Rome.
- Early in 2011, WFP facilitated learning missions to Ghana and Rwanda for some national, regional and district representatives. In July 2011, WFP supported the MOEVT in organising a planning meeting with District Education Officers from all the regions in order to assess challenges and options for expanding community-led SF.
- During 2012 and 2013, and WFP supported the MoEVT in assessing the capacity in seven districts to manage a community-led school meals programme. This allowed WFP to introduce the eight SF Quality Standards for Programme Design and Implementation and ratings, which were developed under the 2009 corporate SF policy. The assessments gathered different examples of communities implementing SF with locally available foods (rice, maize, sorghum, cassava). Findings from these assessments were meant to contribute to the drafting of the national strategy and guidelines and allowed WFP to estimate annual costs of community-led SF.
- During 2012, WFP initiated capacity assessments using the World Bank's Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) to benchmark standards of good practices toward sustainable SF programmes. Subsequent efforts (from 2013) to have WFP validate the SABER results were reported by the CO to have been unsuccessful. That same year, WFP facilitated two missions by representatives of line ministries of the Tanzanian government and by President Kikwete to the Brazil Centre of Excellence against Hunger. As a result of this visit a draft action plan for the design and implementation of a national SF programme was

developed using a multisectoral approach, led by the MOEVT, with the support of the Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Water, Ministry of Infrastructure, and Ministry of Children, Gender and Community Development. The draft action plan was leaning heavily towards a national Home Grown SF (HGSF) strategy.

- 2012–2013: WFP, the MoEVT, the World Bank and the Partnership for Child Development (PCD) worked on a joint proposal to pilot some HGSF activities. Sensing little government buy-in, projects were slowed down later in 2013. Because WFP sensed that communities in most food-insecure districts could not bear the food and additional costs to implement a SF programme alone, WFP worked with the LGAs to ensure that SF and some of its associated activities would be integrated into district government work plans and budgets.
- In 2013, representatives of the MOEVT and WFP staff attended the Global Child Nutrition Forum in Brazil, which was organized by the Global Child Nutrition Foundation and the WFP Centre of Excellence against Hunger, and covered sustainable methodologies on SF, as well as field trips to visit smallholder farmers. WFP and the Centre of Excellence carried out various high-level interventions to ensure that the Draft Action Plan would be validated. Efforts were in vain. Discussions stalled in 2014 (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

40. Key stakeholders indicated that there might have been some tension during this policy dialogue between “what WFP considered as the right path” and “what Government considered as the right path”. It was acknowledged that WFP had made many efforts to make SF sustainable, but that it might have focused too much on a central, government-led system, rather than supporting the Government in finding sustainable options or innovative alternatives for community led SF.

41. WFP policy dialogue was less active in other areas. While influencing the SF agenda, nutrition concerns such as the emerging overweight issues were not on the agenda. Although communities and local government consider the SF as a safety net through its value transfer to households, interviews indicate that this was not sufficiently documented and used during safety net policy discussions.

#### *The level of synergy and multiplying effect (WFP)*

42. **The CP projected a district-wide approach, promoting programme linkages between SF, FFA and nutrition in food-insecure districts.** In reality, SF and FFA overlapped in only two or three districts during the evaluation period (WFP, 2015), and, even then, both programmes did not systematically reach out to the same communities. Complementarity between FFA and SF was not documented but interviewees stated that some FFA works had contributed to SF, especially those which increased access to water in schools, and also, during the early years of the evaluation period, the construction of school kitchens and stores. According to interviews, no specific incentives were provided to districts to actually align both interventions better.

43. Investing in nutrition requires focusing on the first 1,000 days of life, but addressing the nutrition needs of school-aged children can help ensure that the early development gains are not jeopardized by later failures. **Catchment areas of WFP-supported health facilities were also covered by SF**, and, although complementarity is likely, there is no specific evidence for the potential of SF as a

continuum of MCHN and SuFP. WFP conditioned SF with the availability of food stores, kitchens, and adequate water and sanitation, and thus contributed to ensuring that complementary activities were carried out to ensure a healthy environment for schoolchildren. Linkages with other WFP programmes under the CP, such as P4P and policy efforts for food fortification, were probably not sufficiently explored (see below).

*The level of synergy and multiplier opportunities with partners*

44. **WFP was one of the few agencies complementing service delivery with policy dialogue.** Some national and international NGOs were involved in small-scale service delivery while strategic support was provided by the World Bank and PCD. WFP had thus the comparative advantage of influencing national policy and creating local level capacity, while delivering services to communities. The high-level visit to the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger had also significantly enhanced WFP's facilitation role in Tanzania in 2012 and supported country policy dialogue that year. Policy discussions were rather focused at national level. According to interviews, WFP dialogue with councils, on the other hand, focused more on operational issues than on policy and strategic issues.

45. **WFP worked very closely with LGAs,** which were responsible for supervising and sustaining all SF activities implemented in the councils. Supervision missions were carried out jointly. Council and regional level authorities organized annual information meetings, which enabled all education partners involved in implemented and planned activities to be informed. Discussions with local stakeholders revealed that this information platform was not used optimally and that there was little coordination among education partners.

46. **The CO explored the option to leverage partnerships with national and international NGOs** such as Feed the Children, Plan International Canada and Project Concern International (PCI), which since 2010 has been implementing an SF programme in 103 public primary and pre-primary education schools. In late 2014, WFP and PCI started exploring options to pilot a HGSF programme at small scale. If discussions are successful, the pilot might start later in 2015 (KII; WFP, 2013c).

47. **The private sector is a potential source of resources** for sustaining SF, and provides technical support, solutions and advocacy. WFP has pursued some ties with the private sector, although rather as a financier than as a technical and advocacy tool. In 2013 WFP obtained a grant from Caterpillar to reduce the shortfall in SF (PCI, 2013; WFP, 2013s; WFP, 2013v).

48. **During the implementation period WFP worked with other partners to explore how school gardens can increase community contribution.** School gardens in Tanzania are intended as learning instruments for children. Sizes of plots vary from school to school. WFP explored the option of collaborating with Helen Keller International in 2012 to support schools in the production and consumption of orange-fleshed sweet potatoes, and also supported some school garden projects with the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and Childreach Tanzania. Experiences confirmed that school gardens can supplement school meals in some cases but cannot sustain them entirely. In 2013, due to funding constraints, WFP was not able to scale up school garden activities beyond the three districts that it was supporting (WFP, 2013s).

## *Sustainability of the results*

49. **WFP's support to SF is embedded in the Government's service delivery for education.** WFP training and supervision involves regional, district, ward and village level officials. Peer-to-peer visits were organized between schools. Operational training was provided by WFP to district and ward administrators, head teachers, school committee members, school administrators, cooks, and storekeepers, centring training on how to implement the programme and how to manage stocks. Most training was provided in 2010 and 2011. Training beyond 2012 did not take into consideration turnover of staff, but focused rather on capacity building of ward education officials (Hoffman *et al*, 2012; WFP, 2010g; WFP, 2011f; WFP, 2011g).

50. WFP was responsible for the delivery of food commodities to the schools, which makes the model less sustainable. WFP did not explore closely whether strengthening the government logistics system would have been worthwhile.

51. WFP involved communities in the management of SF but community participation was not consistent, which jeopardised sustainability. At school level, SF was managed jointly with parent committees, which in turn involved the broader community through the village authorities. Schools often also had a dedicated SF management committee. The main contributions from the community included the construction of kitchens with wood-saving stoves and stores, and provision of water, firewood, and wages for cooks. Other community support can include the construction of communal eating places and pit latrines as well as wages for security guards. WFP particularly encourages the full participation (at least 50 per cent) of women in SF committees. Management and verification of food stocks in schools is done with community participation, involves parents and even students. Discussions with district, ward and village officials and parents indicated that it took some time for parents to acknowledge the benefits of SF. The temporary nature of SF support was initially not clearly understood, while parents did not give much consideration to their own responsibility for feeding children in school. WFP's decision to discontinue the mid-morning snack triggered discussions at community and district level, with recognition of the educational and household benefits of SF, which in turn allowed mobilisation of some communities to contribute more to SF.

52. Focus groups were also asked how they thought households would cope without the SF activity. They responded that communities might be able to contribute sufficiently to take over the snack but that they did not have the resources to contribute for the lunch. WFP withdrawal would result in families eating less and a drop in school attendance, or would require family members to migrate. Similar responses from focus group discussions were obtained during this field visit and the 2012 USAID commissioned evaluation. Not all communities were keeping up with the expected community contributions. WFP staff pointed out that strong local leadership was a critical factor in maintaining the momentum built up from the SF programme (Hoffman *et al*, 2012; WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

53. **Phasing out of WFP's support to SF was done gradually, although not considered optimal by all stakeholders:**

- In early 2013 the provision of a fortified mid-morning snack was discontinued by WFP, partly for funding reasons but also to align its SF support to the Government's vision of sustainable, community-led SF. To enable a smooth

transition and adjustment to the changes, joint stakeholder workshops were held in early November 2012 in Dodoma and Arusha with technical staff from regions, districts, wards, villages/communities and schools.

- WFP worked with LGAs to create action plans to implement communication and dissemination strategies regarding community contributions to the mid-morning meal. Discussions with district authorities during the CPE confirm that phasing out was prepared in a timely manner by WFP, although schools felt that not enough was done to create capacity at local level. In some regions, WFP monitored community contributions to the mid-morning snack. Some districts were more successful than others in collecting community contributions.
- The CO anticipated closely monitoring school enrolment to detect any negative change as a consequence of the phase-out of the morning snack and indicated that annual enrolment data for WFP-supported schools in 2013 and 2014 would be analysed, but this was never taken up following human resource constraints.
- In May 2014, additional funding constraints led to another reduction in the number of school assisted and SF was discontinued in 40 per cent of the schools. WFP worked with regional and district level authorities to prepare communities. Some programme implementers confessed that WFP messaging on closing down the programme in their district was confusing because WFP continued to search for additional funding, which kept hopes up. Closing down was considered quite abrupt. Once the programme was closed down in a district, WFP staff were not able to assure follow-up with communities, nor could they assess how this had influenced school attendance – mainly because of the closure of the Arusha office and reduction of human resources (WFP, 2013s; WFP, 2013m).

54. It was anticipated that WFP would provide advisory services to the host community districts in Kigoma in order to establish SF in their budgets and plans, which would allow **for a gradual phasing out of the direct operations**. Interviews with implementing partners indicated that WFP did indeed start a policy dialogue with district authorities one year before the end of its support, but also felt that not enough was done to create capacities and find alternatives for feeding children in COBET schools. Partner agencies were also under the impression that WFP continued to look for other funding arrangements and that the discontinuation of the support was not as imminent as they were told (source: KII).

55. **The potential linkages between HGSF and P4P for a sustainable SF system were explored.** The draft action plan for a national SF programme leaned heavily towards a national HGSF strategy. Some stakeholders regret that WFP might not have focused enough on documenting this, or on establishing the potential links between SF, agriculture and the local economy. SF programmes can generate a structured and predictable demand for food products that can benefit farmers by building up the market and the enabling systems around it. This is the concept behind HGSF but could also be linked to P4P. P4P already accounts for a high amount of food distributed under various programmes under the CP, but stakeholders felt that this was not taken up as an opportunity to showcase the link between P4P and SF. When local production contributes to SF programmes, informants stated, there are win-win spinoffs for local economies.

56. Finally, the debate around SF was moving rapidly between 2011 and 2014. The CO was not provided with the new skills and new organizational incentives need to react appropriately to the change in ownership by GOT, to ensure that SF

remained on the agenda of the SP national discussions and to address issues and carry out advocacy related to the relationship between HGSF and P4P.

### *Conclusions*

57. With the exception of the SF coverage in Kigoma, there are important differences between actual and planned beneficiary numbers for SF. Attendance and enrolment rates show declining trends. WFP argues that this matches national trends, which would however mean that SF did not reach its intended outcome of attracting and keeping children in schools.

58. Benefits of SF perceived by beneficiary communities and schools were very positive. Marked educational effects were reported, while SF was also considered as a value transfer to the household. Its safety net function was well appreciated by beneficiary communities. SF also had an effect on the health of students, although little was done to ensure the provision of school health and nutrition education in the WFP-supported schools, and to monitor or support the Government's provision of annual deworming services in the schools.

59. WFP's support to SF is embedded in the Government's service delivery for education. Routine monitoring data provided by the MOEVT do not allow for an assessment of progress of SF, which means that WFP had to set up special reporting forms. In addition, the quality of reporting data is low, requiring much monitoring and the close involvement of WFP. WFP staff often take over the analysis and consolidation of reports. Poor quality of reporting also jeopardised predictable delivery of food. It is therefore unfortunate that the support to ESMIS was stalled.

60. Based on WFP calculations, the annual cost per child of SF is estimated at USD 30, which represents 65 per cent of the primary education cost per child per year. Within this context it is unfortunate that WFP has not supported an assessment of the returns of SF in Tanzania and has not prioritized a cost-efficiency survey. WFP introduced some cost-saving interventions such as the wood-saving stoves, while focusing also on improved food management, although little attention was given to deworming, which can help ensure that SF feeds the child and not the worms.

61. Although a district-wide approach was anticipated, few effective linkages were established between SF, FFA and nutrition – therefore missing the opportunity to strengthen programme linkages with local government priorities, plans and budget processes.

62. At the early stages of the programme, the community was totally dependent on WFP for SF and the temporary nature of the support was initially not clearly understood. WFP's decision to discontinue the mid-morning snack triggered discussions at community and district level, with recognition for the first time of the educational and household benefits of SF, which in turn allowed mobilisation of some communities to contribute more to SF.

63. WFP staff pointed out that strong local leadership was a critical factor in maintaining the momentum built up from the SF programme and ensuring community participation. Yet, the CPE also identified that not much training was organized beyond 2011, and not enough consideration might have been given towards building greater capacity for district, ward, and village level leaders. Even if capacities were built up to manage SF, communities in food insecure areas often do not have sufficient resources to finance it. WFP acknowledged this and worked with some LGAs to include SF in their planning and budgeting. Despite these efforts, most

policy dialogue was carried out at the national level. WFP capacity interventions at decentralized level were focused on creating operational capacities and did not really strengthen national and sub-national capacity for analysis and decision-making in SF. The final objectives of strengthening the capacity of districts in data collection and management as well as raising awareness of the cost and impact of SF appear to be minimal.

64. The potential linkages between HGSF and P4P for a sustainable SF system were explored, but could have been developed more intensively. Although P4P already accounts for a high amount of food distributed under various programmes under the CP, this was not taken up as an opportunity to showcase the link between P4P and SF. When local production contributes to SF programmes, there are win-win spinoffs for local economies. Currently P4P does not specifically make the link between local procurement and local consumption of food. A slightly adapted P4P could however have presented an important argument for sustainable SF. Purchasing from farmers' groups close to schools may increase the costs because of lower economies of scale, but could also lower transportation and handling costs and increase community support and participation in SF programmes. In addition, foods that are locally grown and prepared are palatable to children and provide benefits that reach beyond the school and into the local community.

65. The CO faced many set-backs in the process from service delivery to policy support and a nationally owned SF programme. Initially, some successes were registered, which led to the drafting of an action plan. Government's interest declined in late 2013 and discussions stalled in 2014. Overall, WFP's support to SF in Tanzania lacked an exit strategy and clear milestones, whereas the CP design document even indicates that the number of planned SF beneficiaries would increase over time – which is a contradiction to a well-designed phasing out strategy. Some interest was shown in HGSF and school gardens, but it was not taken to a successful conclusion due to limited buy-in by the GOT. Although WFP tried to be balanced, it is still possible that WFP put too much weight on influencing the policy discussions towards a central government programme, rather than using community led initiative as an entry point. Phasing out of the SF was done gradually, although considered rather abrupt by local stakeholders. In retrospect, it also seems that phasing out was driven more by unpredictable funding than by well-designed planning.

### **Issues for the future**

66. Now that WFP has decided to shift from being a service provider to being a policy adviser, this could be an opportunity to strengthen, at policy level, the links between SF, agriculture and community development. Community-led SF in food-insecure communities might be hard to implement and in its role as a policy adviser WFP should continue to assess options for government-supported SF in selected geographical areas, such as linking it with the safety net interventions or testing out new delivery models.

67. Especially in food insecure areas, WFP should continue to work with districts and play a greater role in advising LGAs to promote the planning and budgeting for SF, to support capacities in public procurement, and to indicate how to structure food-based programmes in these districts to benefit the local economy and agricultural development. Pilots can still be used to show the advantages of certain models in food-insecure settings. They should be designed acknowledging GOT's



priorities, and in a holistic way taking full advantage of WFP experience, including a flexible implementation of P4P, the promotion of fortified staple foods and a greater involvement of the private sector. An innovative pilot could also test out decentralised procurement schemes whereby cash is sent to schools or food-insecure districts for local procurement of food. This will allow the GOT to experiment in food insecure areas, while WFP is taking the initial risks and will work with GOT to ensure buy-in and national ownership. All pilots should be accompanied by a handover strategy with clear milestones and should be accompanied by strong and, if possible, external evaluation.

68. Important progress has been made in creating an interest in and capacity for local fortification of flours. These recent developments in the fortification of staple foods will also offer opportunities to deliver micronutrients to schoolchildren as local fortification enables increased nutritional content in foods which are already traditionally consumed by schoolchildren. As the progress is quite recent, further efforts are needed to link this with SF. WFP should work with LGAs and schools to ensure that they use/buy from the local millers who fortify the food.

69. It is important that the CO continue to strengthen staff skills to remain involved and continues to identify and develop the new skills that are required for the new approaches, including SF as social protection or as part of the HGSP.

## Annex I Nutrition and HIV/AIDS

### Strategic positioning

#### The strategic context of WFP's nutrition portfolio in Tanzania

1. To assess the nutrition situation in Tanzania during the evaluation period, two sets of national surveys can be used: the 2010 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (DHS, 2010) and the 2014 National Nutrition Survey (NNS) (TFNC, 2014). WFP nutrition work under the CP is concentrated in two Regions (Dodoma and Singida) and four districts (Bahi, Chamwino, Singida Rural and Ikungi). Table 17 below provides nutrition data at national level and for these two Regions. Nutrition data at district level are not available.

**Table 17 Selected nutrition indicators at national level, in Dodoma and Singida Regions (2010 and 2014)**

Indicators for children	2010 DHS			2014 Nutrition survey		
	National	Dodoma	Singida	National	Dodoma	Singida
<i>Prevalence of Global and Severe Underweight (Weight-for-Age Z-score) – percentage</i>						
Children underweight (-2 SD)	15.8	26.8	18.9	13.4	21.8	17.9
Children severely underweight (-3 SD)	3.8	7.6	5.2	2.8	5.6	2.5
<i>Prevalence of Global, and Severe Chronic Malnutrition (Height-for-Age Z-score) in children 0 to 59 months of age – percentage</i>						
Children stunted (Global; HAZ, -2 SD)	42.0	56.0	39.0	34.7	45.2	34
Children severely stunted (-3 SD)	11.5	28.4	15.2	11.7	15	11.7
<i>Wasting – Prevalence of Global, Moderate and Severe Acute Malnutrition (Weight-for-Height Z-score) in children 0 to 59 months of age (percentage)</i>						
Children GAM (WHZ, -2 SD)	4.8	5.2	9.2	3.8	5.2	4.7
Children MAM (WHZ <-2 and >=-3)	3.6	4.3	6.7	2.9	4.7	4.2
Children SAM (-3SD)	1.2	0.9	2.5	0.9	0.4	0.5
<i>Other indicators (percentage)</i>						
Children overweight or obese (+2SD Weight for height)	5	7	2.2	3.5	1.5	3.4

Indicators for children	2010 DHS			2014 Nutrition survey		
	National	Dodoma	Singida	National	Dodoma	Singida
Children who started breastfeeding within one hour of birth	48.7	42.8	31.2	50.8	59.5	26.2
Children 0–23 month ever breastfed	96.9	-	-	98.4		
Infants under six months of age exclusively breastfed	49.8	-	-	41.1	38.5	54.9
Children 6–23 months who get a Minimum Acceptable Diet	21			20.0		
Indicators for women	2010 DHS			2014 Nutrition survey		
	National	Dodoma	Singida	National	Dodoma	Singida
Total thin (BMI < 18.5)	11.4	24.5	19.2	5.5	8.2	8.4
Overweight or obese (BMI $\geq$ 25)	21.5	9.5	13.3	20.0	17.3	20.9

2. **Micronutrient deficiencies are significant.** In 2010, about one third of children between 6–59 months were iron and vitamin A deficient, and 59 per cent of children were anaemic. Integrated campaigns provide both vitamin A and deworming services to children. The campaign organized in October 2014 allowed for a 72 per cent coverage of children 6–59 months for Vitamin A supplementation and 70.6 per cent coverage for deworming. Vitamin A coverage in 2014 was reported to be higher than in 2010 (61.0 per cent).

3. **Both the 2010 DHS and the 2014 NNS show regional differences in malnutrition.** WFP nutrition programmes were implemented in two ‘central zone Regions’: Dodoma and Singida, where the highest rates of GAM could be found in 2010. In 2010, Dodoma is one of the four Regions where stunting exceeds 50 per cent. The 2014 survey results show a level of GAM considered by WHO as ‘acceptable’ (0–4 per cent) in all Regions of Tanzania Mainland except for Dodoma with 5.2 per cent. Wasting occurs largely in food insecure areas. Stunting on the other hand occurs even in areas that are food secure (such as Iringa). In comparison, Regions with frequent food insecurity (Tabora and Singida) are less affected by chronic malnutrition or stunting (DHS, 2012; TFNC, 2012; TFNC, 2014; WHO, 2014).

4. **Two nutrition surveys were carried in the refugee camp,** assessing the nutrition situation at the start and at the end of the evaluation period. The prevalence of GAM was relatively low in 2012 and 2014 (2.6 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively), remaining under the UNHCR 10 per cent threshold for refugee settings and below the 5 per cent WHO threshold. Stunting remained an area of

concern with levels of 48 per cent in 2010, 46 per cent in 2012 and 40.7 per cent in 2014. Of children under 5 years old, 38 per cent were estimated to have anaemia in 2010 and 33 per cent in 2014. Among non-pregnant women, 31.2 per cent had anaemia in 2010 and 21 per cent in 2014 (UNHCR *et al.*, 2012; WFP, 2015g).

5. **Prevalence of HIV in Tanzania decreased slightly.** In 2012, about 5.1 per cent of people between 15 and 49 were HIV positive, with HIV prevalence higher among women (6.2 per cent) than men (3.8 per cent) (GOT, 2012d). The Tanzania National HIV and AIDS policy dates from 2001 and stresses the importance of a multisectoral response (GOT, 2001).

6. **The Government of Tanzania is committed to addressing these challenges** and has reflected nutrition in the MKUKUTA II. Nutrition is also included as a separate investment priority in the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP). A national policy on food and nutrition was adopted in 1992 and is currently under revision (GOT, 2010). Tanzania joined SUN in 2011, when it elevated nutrition to a national priority in its own right. High-level meetings were hosted by the Prime Minister, which triggered many follow-up interventions. Political commitment was further strengthened by a Presidential Call for Action on Nutrition in May 2013. The National Nutrition Strategy 2013–2017 (NNS 2011–2016) guides nutrition interventions (GOT, 2012a) and a National Food Fortification Programme was adopted early 2014 ((KII; TFNC, 2012).

7. **Various institutions exist to guide or co-ordinate the nutrition stakeholders.** The High-Level Multi-Sectoral Steering Committee on Nutrition is chaired by the Prime Minister's Office and gathers stakeholders from various sectors. The Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC), is mandated to guide, coordinate and catalyse nutrition work in the country. Common UN delivery platforms were created under REACH, One UN and 2011–2016 UNDP initiatives and for civil society under PANITA. The Development Partner Group (DPG) on Nutrition supports the GOT and functions as a platform for SUN, UN, donors and civil society actors (TFNC, 2012; SUN, 2013).

### **Alignment of the nutrition portfolio to Tanzania's humanitarian and developmental needs, national policies and corporate policies**

#### *Nutrition priorities in WFP's portfolio 2011–2014*

8. Nutrition under the Country Strategy was embedded in the humanitarian agenda and integrated as part of the interventions planned for chronically vulnerable districts and in the refugee camps (WFP, 2010a). During programming, WFP prioritized nutrition interventions targeting young children and PLW. The supplementary feeding programme (SuFP) aims to reduce malnutrition among children under 5 and PLW, while gradually shifting to a new approach that addresses stunting. The mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) programme, on the other hand, aims to reduce stunting levels among children under 2 and to contribute to improving mother and child health by encouraging them to use health and nutrition services. To address micronutrient deficiencies, WFP would accelerate food fortification through advocacy and technical support and operational research, introducing the concept of Cash and Voucher as possible transfer modalities. WFP would also provide technical support for strengthening the Nutrition Information Management System (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2013d).

#### *HIV and AIDS in WFP's portfolio 2011–2014*

9. The CS started an intended shift from a targeted HIV and AIDS programme to an integrated approach, recognizing the needs of AIDS-affected households and

addressing HIV-related vulnerabilities. In line with this, and based on a review of WFP's comparative advantage, it was decided that WFP's engagement in HIV and AIDS would focus on policy, nutrition advocacy and integrating support to people affected by HIV and AIDS. Food assistance to anti-retroviral therapy (ART) patients, most-vulnerable children and families would only be continued for six months, while supporting linkages with organizations specializing in HIV and AIDS to provide the necessary follow-up food support. However, the CPE found no evidence that this hand-over was effectively accomplished, nor that WFP played the national advocacy role with regard to HIV and AIDS that the CP envisaged. With an HIV prevalence in Nyarugusu camp of only 1 per cent, support to people living with HIV and AIDS, as well as those living with TB, was discontinued in the refugee camps starting from July 2014.

#### *Alignment with national policies*

10. When the nutrition activities were designed, no updated nutrition policy or strategy existed to guide WFP's nutrition-specific interventions. WFP's nutrition portfolio aligns with the 1992 Food and Nutrition Policy, although according to informants this policy was rather outdated by 2011, following a significant change in the policy environment and in the national nutrition situation.

11. The NNS 2011–2016 was finalized in mid-2011 with inputs (according to informants) from various stakeholders, including WFP and although many activities were designed prior to the NNS 2011–2016, they were already in line with it. WFP's nutrition portfolio supported – directly or indirectly – all the eight priority areas identified in the NNS 2011–2016. The selected beneficiary groups for nutrition interventions in the WFP nutrition portfolio also addressed the priority groups identified in the NNS 2011–2016. Maternal, infant and young child feeding and behaviour change communication was an area of attention under NNS 2011–2016, which was acknowledged by WFP as it anticipated linking distribution of specialised food commodities with counselling interventions delivered at health facilities. Finally, the NNS 2011–2016 indicates that activities to address stunting should be implemented with a geographic focus on areas with high stunting rates, high poverty and high food insecurity. Geographic targeting of WFP's nutrition interventions generally corresponded with these requirements, although project documents did not provide the names of target regions and districts (GOT, 2012a; TFNC, 2012; GOT/MOF, 2014).

12. WFP also acknowledged the decentralisation framework for nutrition as designed in NNS 2011–2016 and set the responsibility for delivery of nutrition services and resource allocation at level of the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) (WFP, 2011b: 3; GOT, 2012a; TFNC, 2012; GOT/MOF, 2014).

13. Besides the fact that the WFP nutrition interventions adhered to the principles on which NNS 2011–2016 is designed, they were also in line with the National Development Vision 2025, as well as with MKUKUTA II and the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2005–2015 (TFNC, 2012; SUN, 2013).

14. The nutrition support for refugees was designed in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, UN and respective NGOs, was harmonized with the government budget cycle and was incorporated in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (July 2011 – June 2015).

#### *Comparative advantage and harmonization with other partners*

15. WFP had some specific comparative advantages as it is the sole agency providing specialized nutritious foods (Super Cereal) through direct feeding

programmes in health centres, and there was thus little risk of overlap with other organizations and agencies.

16. WFP's interventions were complementary to other services provided. All its nutrition interventions were implemented as an integral part of the health services provided by the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) units in the health facilities. Focus was given to developing partnerships by collaborating with NGOs and other UN agencies for community-based approaches to counselling and health education. Interventions for food fortification were intended to build on partnerships with WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank, which, according to informants, were the predominant partners in this area during the writing of the CP.

17. The CP was designed prior to Tanzania's engagement with SUN. None of the project documents refer specifically to the ongoing SUN efforts and how these partnerships could be enhanced under the WFP portfolio. Progress reports did however report on progress related to SUN.

#### *Alignment with corporate policies*

18. The nutrition portfolio was designed prior to the publication of the 2012 WFP corporate strategy on nutrition and relevant guidelines (WFP, 2012f; WFP, 2012e). While it was not possible for the design of these operations to take into account the new nutrition policy and frameworks, some early alignment with these corporate policies could be detected, including the comprehensive approach to prevent stunting. The corporate 2012 Nutrition Policy specified that specialised food supplements could be part of a stunting approach, especially in countries where the prevalence of stunting was at least 30 per cent. This approach was applied in Tanzania, which had a 42 per cent stunting rate in 2010 (DHS, 2010).

19. Geographic focus was also aligned. The corporate policies highlighted that stunting prevention programmes should be targeted to areas with high stunting rates, high poverty and high food insecurity. Under the CP, nutrition interventions would be carried out in areas based on their food security vulnerability status and, among these, on districts with the highest nutrition needs.

20. The applied approach of providing nutrient fortified complementary foods for children and PLW was in line with the 2012 WFP Nutrition policy, which indicated that supplementary feeding could be undertaken as part of a comprehensive package to treat and prevent MAM and to prevent stunting (WFP, 2012e). The CS did not, however, refer to the new evidence related to the importance of food composition for the effectiveness of programmes to prevent and treat malnutrition (Black *et al.*, 2008; De Pee and Bloem, 2008).

#### *Trade-offs between corporate priorities and local needs*

21. With HIV prevalence in Nyarugusu camp at only 1 per cent, support to people living with HIV and AIDS, as well as those co-infected with tuberculosis, was not continued in the refugee camps starting from July 2014. Stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation mission regretted this decision and argued that people on ART and DOTS in the camps are much more vulnerable as no other agency is providing them with supplementary nutritious food (KII; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d).

#### **Factors and quality of strategic decision-making**

22. Design documents show a proper causal analysis for nutrition, although this exercise was hampered by limited availability of recent data, especially for the CS, which was based on the 2004 DHS and 2010 CFSA. For the writing of the CP more

up-to-date nutrition information was available, based on the 2010 DHS. The design of the nutrition interventions for refugees was based on the findings and recommendations made by surveys carried out in the camps, such as the 2010 and 2012 Nutrition Surveys, the 2010 and 2012 Joint Assessment Missions, the 2011 and 2012 CHSs and various post-distribution monitoring surveys. The 2012 cash transfer pilot was developed based on the findings of WFP's Transfer Modality Review (January 2011), on district-level market assessments, and on a Programme Response Identification Study (Mayer & Kambarangwe, 2011; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2012c; Ndaw, 2011).

23. Some small concerns were identified. First of all, the tool for the cost of adequate diet which Save the Children had used for its 'cost of adequate diet' survey in Tanzania published in 2009 was not applied. It shows that most poor households – and especially those in food insecure areas – have insufficient income to purchase nutritious foods for their children (STC, 2009). The CP did specify that there were no disaggregated nutrition data at district level, which would make geographic targeting complicated. It did not explain how targeting would eventually be fine-tuned. Target Regions and districts for nutrition interventions were not actually spelled out. While design documents include an increasing focus on stunting prevention which was clearly in line with the country's needs and policies, no reference was made to global evidence such as the Lancet 2008 and 2013 nutrition series.

24. Interviews with nutrition stakeholders at national level reveal that WFP was proactive in moving some of these strategic agenda points forward, while supporting discussions on others. WFP was a strong promoter of the SUN movement in the country, it supported the 'Presidential Call for Action on Nutrition' and was a strong supporter of the national fortification agenda. But stakeholders interviewed also commented that human resource limitations did not allow WFP to be as proactive as might have been necessary. Key nutrition partners all agreed that WFP was an active member of nutrition working groups and the dedicated task forces which supported the delivery of several reviews and surveys between 2011 and 2014 (KII; WFP, 2014m).

25. Under the 2011–2016 UNDAF, WFP was assigned the responsibility for establishing an integrated Nutrition Surveillance System for regular monitoring of nutrition trends. The CO initiated a review of the surveillance system in 2012 (McKinney, 2012). The review considers how information can be effectively coordinated, shared, analysed, rationalized and brought together to provide strong advocacy messages as well as to provide planning data. Nutrition stakeholders indicated that this survey was the basis for further work in strengthening the surveillance system taken up by REACH in 2012 and 2013. The planned establishment of the sentinel centres for nutrition monitoring in various locations was not carried out. Discussions with key stakeholders indicate some specific nutrition areas where WFP might have influenced the UN DAO strategy and/or the 2011–2016 UNDAF: the prevention and treatment of MAM, food fortification and nutrition surveillance. WFP also hosts REACH and GAIN, which was considered as a strong sign of WFP's involvement in the nutrition agenda (Alnwick, 2012).

26. **WFP also promoted using cash or vouchers** as approaches to increase health-seeking behaviour and reduce micronutrient deficiencies and stunting. After a detailed formulation process, WFP initiated its first conditional cash transfer pilot in Mtwara district 2012, linking transfers to attendance at health and nutrition awareness-raising sessions in order to directly address mother and child undernutrition. The pilot was intended to provide evidence on innovative

approaches to address stunting within the context of the national protection strategy. The findings from this cash pilot were shared with the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). Despite many discussions between WFP and the Government, TASAF decided not to scale this up (WFP, 2013b; WFP, 20120; Ndaw, 2011). Furthermore, in 2014, WFP carried out a Cash & Voucher Feasibility Study in the Nyarugusu camp. The study assessed the potential of using a Cash & Voucher transfer to diversify diet and improve access to nutrient dense foods from the markets given the high prevalence of stunting and micronutrient deficiency in the camp (Murray, 2014).

27. Stakeholders interviewed could not recall whether WFP had supported policy and nutrition advocacy for people living with HIV and AIDS during the review period, although nobody from the Tanzania Commission for AIDS was available during the mission.

**28. Geographic targeting was heavily hampered by the lack of nutrition data at district level – and later also by the lack of funding.** As mentioned earlier, the CP and relevant SPRs never spelled out the names of the target Regions and districts for nutrition. Interviews with WFP staff indicated that the CO had anticipated that nutrition interventions would be rolled out gradually all over the Regions of Dodoma and Singida, where nutrition problems were severe and where WFP already had a sub office with complementary interventions. Restricted funding only allowed for much more modest coverage in only a few districts (Table 18).

29. The ET could not find any written explanations for the choice of Dodoma and Singida, but it was considered by all interviewees as an appropriate choice, based on food insecurity, high stunting and wasting rates. Targeting remained appropriate in 2014. This is also confirmed by a review of the DHS and 2014 NNS.

**Table 18 Geographical expansion of WFP nutrition interventions : Districts covered in Dodoma and Singida Regions per year**

	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Dodoma Region</b>	Chamwino	Chamwino	Chamwino	Chamwino
		Bahi	Bahi	Bahi
<b>Singida Region</b>		Singida Rural	Singida Rural <sup>48</sup>	Singida Rural
			Ikungi	Ikungi

Source: WFP CO data

### Conclusion

30. Where possible, the CO’s nutrition response was based on an understanding of the nutrition situation, although documents did not consider the tool of ‘the cost of an adequate diet’ which had already been applied in Tanzania. The CP project document did not address how targeting would eventually be fine-tuned. Global evidence was not specifically cited, although already applied.

31. Although policy discussions were often driven by other partners, interviews with nutrition stakeholders at national level confirm that WFP was proactive in moving some strategic agenda points forward (the prevention and treatment of MAM, food fortification and nutrition surveillance), while supporting discussions on others. WFP also tried to promote cash or voucher programmes as an approach to increase health-seeking behaviour and reduce micronutrient deficiencies and

<sup>48</sup> In 2013, Singida Rural district was divided into two different districts: Singida Rural and Ikungi.



stunting. Human resource limitations did not allow WFP to be as proactive as may have been necessary. Particularly in the refugee operations, nutrition interventions were adapted gradually as new evidence came in. Despite the fact that geographical targeting was hampered by the lack of nutrition data at district level, such targeting was appropriate.

## **Performance and results**

### *Outputs*

32. During the evaluation period, WFP implemented nutrition activities through its CP for children and pregnant and lactating women attending health facilities in prioritised districts in Dodoma (Chamwino and Bahi) and Singida Regions (Singida Rural and Ikungi). A shorter six month conditional cash transfer pilot was implemented in Mtwara. Nutrition interventions for refugees focused mainly on PLW and young children who accessed health facilities in the camps. PRRO 200029 ran from January 2010 to December 2011 and provided assistance to approximately 100,000 refugees. PRRO 200325 started in January 2012 and provided humanitarian assistance to 70,000 refugees from DRC and Burundi until June 2014. PRRO 200603 started in July 2014 and was planned to provide assistance to 70,000 refugees in one camp for two years.

33. Table 19, Table 20 and Figure 8 below summarise output data for non-refugee nutrition activities in the portfolio.

**Table 19 Nutrition beneficiaries**

	2011			2012			2013			2014		
	Planned	Actual	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached
<b>Nutrition: Treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition</b>												
Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding (treatment for moderate malnutrition)	4,800	714	15%	4,800	845	18%	4,800	2,070	43%	12,000	1,297	18%
Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding (treatment for moderate malnutrition)	7,200	1,784	25%	7,200	1,268	18%	7,200	3,106	43%			
Pregnant and lactating women given food under MCH/supplementary feeding	18,000	7,774	43%	36,000	1,323	4%	36,000	1,017	18,000	36,000	261	1%
<b>Nutrition: Prevention of Stunting</b>												
Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding (treatment for moderate malnutrition)	71,100	0	0%	71,100	635	1%	71,100	53,253	75%	71,100	18,852	27%
Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding (treatment for moderate malnutrition)												

	2011			2012			2013			2014		
	Planned	Actual	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached
malnutrition)												
Pregnant and lactating women given food under MCH/supplementary feeding	33,000	0	0%	33000	902	3%	33,000	26,687	81%	33,000	14,047	43%
Cash and Voucher Beneficiaries	-	-	-	3,200	3,102	97%	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Support to HIV and co-infected TB patients</b>												
Children under five	5,003	4,946	98.9%									
Children 5–18	11,366	10,836	95.3%									
Adults	13,231	13,553	102.4%	600	696	116.0%						


Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

**Table 20 Nutrition: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**

	Beneficiaries		Tonnage	
	Planned	Actual	Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)
2011	133,033	24,033	540	546
2012	175,980	14,625	8,885	399
2013	172,780	94,041	8,885	1,406
2014	181,792	54,647	9,396	1,156
<b>Total</b>	<b>165,896</b>	<b>46,837</b>	<b>27,706</b>	<b>3,507</b>

Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

**Figure 8 Nutrition: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

### Treatment of moderate malnutrition

34. Children under five and PLW with MAM attending health facilities received a monthly ration of Super Cereal and fortified vegetable oil to improve their nutritional status. Overall, the actual number of beneficiaries reached for the treatment of moderate malnutrition was much lower than anticipated (see Table 19 above).

- The Supplementary Feeding programme (SuFP) aimed to supplement about 12,000 children under 5 and PLW. As Table 20 and Figure 8 show, the actual number of beneficiaries was lower than planned, with a very low coverage of PLW (less than 3 per cent in 2012 and 2013). WFP explained this by: i) changes in the admission criteria, with the introduction of weight-for-height and mid-upper arm circumference – previously weight-for-age was used; ii) lack of accurate population estimates at district level; iii) the low number of malnourished PLW; and finally iv) the absence of the planned baseline survey. Planning figures were never revised during the reporting period (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

- The Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) Programme was implemented in the refugee camps until July 2014. The number of refugee beneficiaries who received support in 2011 was high, but remained lower than planned starting from 2012. Reasons provided were: i) initial resource constraints (2012), and ii) a low prevalence of acute malnutrition among the refugee community (2012 and 2013). As a result, TSF was not implemented in the camp after July 2014 (WFP, 2011c; WFP, 2012d; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d; WFP, 2014d; WFP, 2014b; WFP, 2014o).

#### Stunting prevention: MCHN and BSF


35. Table 19 above provides data on the planned and actual beneficiaries under the stunting prevention programmes. A take-home ration of fortified blended food was given to PLW six months before and after delivery, and to children 6–24 months who attended health facilities. Food supplementation was complemented with nutrition education and other health-related services. Overall, interventions rolled out much later than planned, resulting in low coverage of stunting interventions until 2013.

- The MCHN programme faced an initial resource shortfall and did not roll out until late 2012 when, following a small-scale pilot in one district, new modalities were developed with district councils and community health workers (CHW). Roll-out to the remaining districts took place in late October 2012. By 2013, the beneficiary numbers picked up, though remaining lower than anticipated. Planned beneficiary figures based on annual population projections from the catchment areas were found to be overestimated compared to the actual number of children under two and PLW attending the targeted health facilities (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).
- In the refugee camps, stunting prevention started as a Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSF). As observed during the evaluation, food distribution for pregnant women was carried out weekly and was accompanied by nutrition education. Distribution of food supplements for lactating women and children 6–23 months was carried out monthly without nutrition education. The programme rolled out in May 2013, which accounted for low coverage rate in 2012 and 2013. Reasons for low achievements against planned numbers were: i) the shortfall in resources in 2012; and ii) a delay in sensitization of the beneficiaries, which resulted in a late start in 2013 (WFP, 2011c; WFP, 2011d; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d; WFP, 2014b; WFP, 2014o, WFP, 2014p).
- A Conditional Cash Transfer pilot was launched in one district in 2012, when a budget revision made it possible to carry out a six month cash transfer pilot in Mtwara. The pilot started in 2012 and was extended into 2013. The project targeted households with PLW with children under the age of two; beneficiaries were given a monthly cash transfer of USD 10 through a mobile money platform, based on attendance at a health clinic. The number of beneficiaries was slightly less than anticipated: of the planned 3,200 beneficiaries, 3,102 were reached in 2012 and 2,180 of these were reached in 2013 (WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2014m).

**Table 21 HIV/AIDS: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**

	Beneficiaries		Tonnage	
	Planned	Actual	Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)
2011	33,300	31,835	3,061	1,568
2012	3,200	2,772	287	296
2013	2,500	2,500	0	1
2014	2,500	2,500	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>21,350</b>	<b>39,607</b>	<b>3,348</b>	<b>1,865</b>

Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

**Figure 9 HIV/AIDS: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**

Source: WFP SPRs 2011–14

### HIV and AIDS

36. Table 21 and Figure 9 above shows the number of people living with HIV and AIDS who were reached. More beneficiaries were reached than anticipated, but the number remained low because it was expected that food assistance to patients enrolled in ART would only be continued under the CP through cooperating partners for six months. Refugees enrolled in ART, those co-infected with HIV and TB and PMTCT cases continued to receive fortified take-home rations (supplementary to their general family rations) but this was discontinued in July 2014 (WFP, 2011c; WFP, 2012d; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d; WFP, 2014b; WFP, 2014o; WFP, 2014p).

### *Effectiveness*

37. **The nutrition programmes were monitored on a monthly basis.** District health authorities collected health facility data on distribution of health commodities, treatment response, recovery and defaulter rates as well as on stock management, and shared this with the WFP sub office, which further ensured quality control and analysis. The consolidated monthly district report was sent back to the district health authorities for validation. In addition to monthly reporting data, the WFP-supported health facilities also collected anthropometric data, but

these data were not used. In 2015, a study was initiated to review the quality of the anthropometric data and to assess whether and how these data could be used to crudely estimate some impact. In the refugee camps, WFP used Community and Household Surveillance (CHS), nutrition surveys, Joint Assessment Missions (JAM), outcome post-distribution monitoring (PDM) and coverage assessments for programme monitoring. All facilities supported by WFP were regularly visited by joint support supervision missions (WFP, 2011c; WFP, 2012d; WFP, 2013c; WFP, 2013d; WFP, 2014b; WFP, 2014o; WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

**38. It is complicated to assess the progress in performance of the nutrition interventions based on SPRs,** given the regular adjustments in nutrition-related outcome indicators over time in the CP. Stunting prevention interventions only rolled out in 2013, which explains why no specific progress on indicators on MCHN was reported until 2014. The planned MCHN baseline study was not carried out, and no outcome indicators related to infant and young child feeding practices were available until 2014, when data on one – Minimum Acceptable Diet – were collected.

**39. Interviews with health facilities and a review of a sample of related health facility registers show overall satisfaction with the nutrition outcomes,** and more specifically related to the reduction in the supplementary feeding default rate and improved recovery rate among the enrolled beneficiaries, which is also confirmed by WFP monitoring data such as the SPRs. Health facilities visited also repeatedly highlighted the link between the SuFP and the reduction in low birth weight. The incidence of low birth rate was measured in the 2011 and 2012 SPRs (with respectively 17 per cent and 15 per cent of infants < 2,500 grams at birth among live births). In the absence of a baseline and more recent data, it is difficult to assess any change or even impact, but, based on these data, it would be expected that the Tanzania experience follows the trends provided in global evidence which show that a balanced energy protein supplementation can increase birth weight (Imdad & Bhutta, 2012; Kramer & Kakuma, 2003; Bhutta et al., 2013).

**40. Discussions with health care providers supported by WFP programmes indicated that health seeking behaviour by mothers and young children in their catchment area has increased,** and interviewees feel this is attributable to the provision of fortified foods. While it is probably safe to argue that WFP's model for nutrition interventions allowed the increase in contact points between mothers and health service providers during pregnancy and the first two years of life of a child, this statement cannot be underlined with hard evidence because of the absence of a baseline survey. Interviews with health facility staff and mothers indicated however that some mothers have to walk long distances in order to access food supplementation services. In the camps, on the other hand, informants indicate that varied distribution cycles and health service delivery put high demands on mothers' time and caring practices, as young children are left in the care of older siblings, who – in turn – are skipping school as a result.

**41. In line with WFP guidelines, the initial target for SuFP duration was 60 days** (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012e). However, review of a sample of health facility registers revealed that the recovery of children who were malnourished was relatively slow, especially at the start of the evaluation period, with subsequent re-enrolment of patients after six months. WFP was aware of re-enrolment issues and reinforced supervision in 2013, which has resulted in a drastic drop of re-enrolment rates over time. Reasons for re-enrolment provided were the sharing of the specialised food

commodities with other family members, combined with poor nutritional and health care practices of the children within the family. The default rate for SuFP remained under 2 per cent throughout the evaluation period and can be explained by families relocating from their communities (WFP, 2014j; WFP, 2011h).

42. **Nutrition interventions for the refugee population were considered successful by local authorities and health facilities**, which is also confirmed by the 2014 camp nutrition survey and respective SPRs. The age-specific mortality rate for children and the crude mortality rate in the camp remained low, although this cannot be attributed only to WFP-supported interventions. Supplementary feeding recovery rates were high throughout the review period. Although treatment of MAM does not directly affect GAM rates, it is notable that the camp nutrition surveys show a drop in prevalence of GAM from 2.6 per cent in 2010 to 1.4 per cent in 2014, and a reduction in stunting (48 per cent in 2010, 46 per cent in 2012 and 40.7 per cent in 2014). Anaemia among children under 5 dropped from 38 per cent in 2010 to 33 per cent in 2014 (UNHCR *et al.*, 2012; WFP, 2015g).

43. Some targets set for stunting indicators seem rather ambitious, given historical changes in the country or in the camps, especially for the target set for the ‘percentage of children 6–23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet’, which was set at 70 per cent and is currently estimated at 20% for Tanzania and 27.3 per cent for the children in the refugee population. Discussions with CO staff indicated that the end-of-project targets were identified based on corporate guidelines, but that the CO assesses progress towards these targets (KII; WFP, 2015b).

44. In addition, recent targets set for stunting reduction in the refugee camps might be difficult to reach. The 2014 Nutrition Survey Report in Nyarugusu camp reported that the overall prevalence of stunting in the under-five population group in the camp had decreased, from 48 per cent in 2010 to 40.7 per cent in 2014, which reflects a reduction of 7.3 per cent over 4 years. The outcome indicator for stunting prevention under PRRO 200325 was fairly ambitious with an expected reduction of 10 per cent per year in prevalence of stunting among targeted children under 2. The latest PRRO, 200603, included a target of 5 per cent reduction in the prevalence of stunting among targeted children aged 6–23 months over a timeframe of 2 years.

#### *Factors influencing outcomes*

45. The 2014 PDM exercise showed that **diet diversity and meal frequency among children aged 6–23 months is a serious challenge**, linked to limited access to and inappropriate use of available resources.

46. **Sharing of Super Cereal seems quite predominant** and can reduce expected nutrition outcomes.

- Interviews with health care providers and beneficiaries revealed that Super Cereal is often shared with other family members, which can lead to consequent dilution of impact of the SuFP. In refugee camps, selling of Super Cereal was also widespread until mid-2014.
- Initially, the ration of Super Cereal provided included a provision for anticipated sharing at the household level. The ration was cut back in July 2014, following the verification exercise. It was assumed that sharing would be less predominant because beneficiaries were now identified with their exact entitlement, and all families would get their exact rations.
- Through regular monitoring and CHS WFP was well aware of sharing or



selling, and tried to respond to this by reinforcing the Behaviour Change Communication (BCC) component and engaging with the TRCS and the camp authorities to further discourage ration sharing and selling, as well as pre-mixing Super Cereal with oil to prevent diversion of fortified vegetable oil. Despite various efforts, inappropriate use of Super Cereal remained an issue (WFP, 2014p; WFP, 2012e; WFP & UNHCR, 2011; WFP & UNHCR, 2012a; WFP & UNHCR, 2012b; WFP & UNHCR, 2013).

47. **The target area reached by nutrition interventions was smaller than anticipated and only covers four districts in the two Regions, as well as the refugee population.** Through its nutrition portfolio, WFP supported 39 health facilities spread over two Regions as well as all health facilities established in the refugee camps. Given that nutrition data at district level are not available, the facilities were further identified following consultations with the MOHSW. Despite a low geographic coverage, the relevance of the nutrition activities was enhanced by locating them in health centres with the highest needs and limited number of other nutrition partners who operate through the health facilities (sources: KII).

48. **The 2014 PDM enabled the collection of beneficiary participation data:** 94 per cent of children in the 6–23 month age group participated in at least two thirds of the distributions under MCHN in 2014. Coverage data of MCHN for 2014 was still being analysed during the CPE (WFP, 2011b; WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).

49. **The coverage of the nutrition activities remained, however, limited compared to the Regions' needs.** Through its SuFP, WFP reached about 1,300 malnourished children under five in Dodoma and Singida. For the same year, the 2014 NNS estimated that about 40,804 children under five were moderately malnourished in these two Regions combined (TFNC, 2014). Compared to Regional needs, the coverage by the nutrition interventions thus remained limited (SuFP covering 3 per cent of all MAM children in the two Regions). Despite some promising results of the programmes at facility level, the nutrition interventions supported by WFP may not have greatly influenced malnutrition rates at district or Regional level. The 2013 Lancet indicates that out of the ten nutrition-specific packages, the greatest number of lives could be saved by therapeutic feeding for moderate and severe acute malnutrition if scaled up to 90 per cent coverage (Bhutta *et al.*, 2013; WFP, 2015b).

50. **Most nutrition interventions were complemented by nutrition counselling,** carried out by government health workers and Community Health Workers (CHW). Studies of nutrition education in food insecure populations show significant effects on stunting (Bhutta *et al.*, 2013). Field visits revealed that the quality of the BCC provided was variable. WFP staff confirmed that the BCC component of their programmes needs to be reinforced, which is why they look to partnership with other agencies such as Save the Children to fulfil this role in future. Under the refugee operations, nutrition counselling is provided by the TRCS but field observations revealed that the BCC provided as part of the stunting prevention programme was also not optimal.

51. **WFP sought proactively to involve CHWs.** Globally it is proven that CHWs can play a critical role in scaling up coverage of nutrition interventions and have the potential to reach poor populations through demand creation and household service delivery (Bhutta *et al.*, 2013). Field visits in some WFP supported health facilities have shown that the extent of the involvement of CHWs is variable.

A close follow up, and adequate refresher trainings might increase CHW incentives and ensure the quality of services provided.

**52. WFP contracted private companies to deliver monthly the specialised food commodities to the health facilities.** Quantities of monthly deliveries were based on the monthly stock reports, which were shared by the district health authorities with WFP. Interviews with district and facility authorities indicate that delivery of goods was considered satisfactory and timely, notwithstanding some occasional and minor delays.

**53. The activities under the cash transfer pilot programme started off with some logistical challenges related to the distribution and reconciliation of cash transfers,** which caused delays and extended the payments of the pilot into early 2013 (WFP, 2014a). Overall, the pilot was considered successful, although the duration (six months) may have been too short to be convincing. The importance of conditional cash transfers was already highlighted in the 2013 Lancet series which indicated how cash transfers and related safety nets can address the financial barriers and promote access by families to health care and appropriate foods and nutritional commodities (Bhutta *et al.*, 2013).

**54. Changes in the food basket may also have influenced programme outcomes, although no specific survey was done to underline this.** Table 22 below provides information on the changes in the food baskets provided.

- The food supplement of choice for children and PLW was the nutrient-fortified complementary foods. Early programme documents still mentioned “Corn Soy Blend” or CSB but during the review period, the CO shifted to an improved formulation of CSB, which allowed more appropriate response to child- and adult-specific nutritional needs by using CSB Plus, formulated to correspond to WHO guidance (WHO, 2012). The terminology of Super Cereal was slowly introduced in CO reporting formats.<sup>49</sup>
- The inclusion of CSB or Super Cereal in the general food ration for refugees was meant to address the high levels of anaemia and compensate for refugees’ limited access to micronutrients. The BSF for children was delayed by 18 months and only started in May 2013. In July 2014, an additional GFD ration of 50g of Super Cereal with sugar was introduced for children 24–59 months to prevent micronutrient deficiencies and acute malnutrition. As mentioned earlier, rations of fortified Super Cereal (Plus) were reduced in July 2014 following the verification exercise: Super Cereal for PLW from 250 grams/person/day (g/p/d) to 100 g/p/d; and Super Cereal Plus for children 6–23 months from 200 g/p/d to 100 g/p/d (WFP, 2015j: np).
- The daily ration of fortified food commodities could not always be delivered as planned. Under the SuFP, vegetable oil was introduced with a one year delay (in 2012). Because of funding constraints, the MCHN programme only started in late 2012. By that time the new nutrition programming guidelines had been published (WFP, 2012e), advising a more adapted nutrition ration for the prevention of stunting, which was adopted for one year. The ration for children under the MCHN was affected in 2013–2014 following resource shortages. According to informants, the CO was aware that Super Cereal was not appropriate as a specialized nutritious food product for the 6–24 month

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<sup>49</sup> CBS products were renamed “Supercereal”. What was previously called “CSB+” became “Super cereal” and “CSB++” became “Supercereal Plus” (UNICEF, nd).

age group, but the use of Super Cereal Plus required additional funding (WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2013v; WFP, 2014q; WFP, 2014r; WFP, nd(c)).

- The HIV component supported orphans and other vulnerable children (although there was no separate identification of AIDS orphans), clients on anti-retroviral (ART)/TB treatment and women enrolled in prevention of maternal to child transmission programmes (PMTCT) with fortified food and take-home family rations consisting of maize, pulses, fortified blended food (Super Cereal) and fortified vegetable oil.

**Table 22 Daily ration provided under nutrition interventions 2011–2014 (g/person/day): planned and changes in implementation <sup>50</sup>**

Programme focus	Refugee Camp between Jan 2010 and Dec 2011 (Kigoma, Kagera)	Refugee Camp Refugees in NW between Jan 2011 and June 2014 (Kigoma)	Refugee Camp in Nyarugusu camp in Kigoma starting from July 2014	Nutrition interventions implemented in health facilities in Dodoma and Singida (2011–2014)
Treatment of moderate malnutrition SuFP – adults	SuFP: Planned 50 gram cereals; 175 gram CSB, 20 ml oil	TSF PLW: 250 gram Super Cereal  TSF ART: 200 gram Super Cereal and 20 ml oil	-	SuFP Planned: 230 CSB and 20 ml of vegetable oil per day  Implemented: 2011: only CSB, no oil
Treatment of moderate malnutrition SuFP – children 6–56 months	SuFP: Planned 50 gram cereals; 175 gram CSB, 20 ml oil	TSF : Planned 200 gram Super Cereal and 20 ml oil	-	SuFP: Planned: “ 230 CSB and 20 ml of vegetable oil per day  Implemented: 2011: only CSB, no oil
Prevention of stunting PLW (six month before and after delivery)		BSF : Planned: 250 gram Super Cereal  Only implemented starting from May 2013	BSF : Planned: 100 gram Super Cereal with sugar and 20ml vegetable oil	Planned: 250 gram/day Super Cereal  2011: not implemented  2012: 250 gram Super Cereal
Prevention of stunting Children 6–23 months		BSF : Planned: 200 gram Super Cereal plus  Only implemented starting from May 2013	BSF : Planned: 100 gram Super Cereal	Planned: Child 210 gram Super Cereal  2011: not implemented  From Oct 2012 to December 2013: 200 gram Super Cereal Plus  From January 2014

<sup>50</sup> Sources: WFP, 2009d, WFP, 2010b, WFP, 2011a, WFP, 2011b, WFP, 2011c, WFP, 2012b, WFP, 2012c, WFP, 2013a, WFP, 2013b, WFP, 2013c, WFP, 2013d, WFP, 2014a, WFP, 2014b, WFP, 2014p, WFP, 2014o, WFP, 2015b.

Programme focus	Refugee Camp between Jan 2010 and Dec 2011 (Kigoma, Kagera)	Refugee Camp Refugees in NW between Jan 2011 and June 2014 (Kigoma)	Refugee Camp in Nyarugusu camp in Kigoma starting from July 2014	Nutrition interventions implemented in health facilities in Dodoma and Singida (2011–2014)
				onwards: 200 gram Super Cereal

### *Alignment with international humanitarian principles*

55. The ET also examined whether the nutrition interventions in the refugee camps were in adherence with the SPHERE international humanitarian principles and standards for nutrition (Sphere, 2011). SPHERE describes the minimum requirements for nutrition in relationship with nutrition assessment, IYCF, management of acute malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies. The project documents did not specifically refer to SPHERE or other international humanitarian principles but supervision documents considered SPHERE standards. In 2012, results against most of the SPHERE nutrition-related standards were considered to be satisfactory although it was reported that the number of health posts was not sufficient, following which TRCS constructed new health posts (KII; UNHCR *et al.*, 2012; UNHCR *et al.*, 2013). Adherence to SPHERE standards was also assessed during the 2014 camp nutrition survey, which concluded that the health and nutrition indicators met these standards, including those for the performance of SuFP and BSF (WFP, 2015g).

### *Efficiency*

56. **A cost analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis of nutrition programming was not carried out.** While it is relatively easy to identify the costs of specialised food commodities and of the provision of specialised tools (scales, registers, BCC material), it is more complicated to calculate other related programmatic unit costs, such as for nutrition training, supervision and monitoring, transport of commodities and WFP staff support. Cost analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis of the MCHN and SuFP programmes would have been useful in policy discussions, but is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

57. Nonetheless, the evaluation team was able to **review whether available resources were used sensibly**, considering selected programme features which might have influenced costing of the programmes:

- **Transport of specialised food commodities:** WFP contracted private companies to deliver monthly the specialised food commodities to the health facilities. Alternative delivery mechanisms, such as the Medical Storage Department (MSD) were discussed but considered not appropriate. The MSD is a semi-government entity responsible for distributing medical commodities to district-level medical warehouses, and more recently up to facility level. Interviews with various stakeholders indicate that there are often pipeline breaks in medicines delivered through MSD. The use of the MSD distribution system was also deemed not suitable for WFP nutrition programming because it allows only for quarterly deliveries, and its cost for delivering high volume products was perceived to be too expensive. A detailed cost comparison of both delivery systems was not carried out (WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b; WFP field monitoring tools and data).

- **Stock management and losses:** losses were reported to be minimal. Although monthly delivery of food commodities might be considered costly, it does allow for a vigilant management of stocks and limits post-delivery losses in health facilities. Field visits revealed that some health facilities have basic storage capacities, with bags stacked close to the ceiling and limited aeration. Under these circumstances it is expected that during the hot season the storage temperature might exceed 30 degrees Celsius, which calls for frequent deliveries and good stock management. Expiry dates of food were carefully monitored at facility level, and no expired food was found during field visits. Following a slight increase in post-delivery losses of Super Cereal under the MCHN in 2012 (0.4 per cent of losses versus amount handled), WFP intensified collaboration with the district health authorities in monitoring facility level stock management. In addition, the SO continued to work closely with the contracted transport companies to eradicate transit losses. By 2013 the percentage of loss versus amount handled under the MCHN had dropped to 0.2 per cent and by 2014 there were no more losses reported under the nutrition programme. (WFP, 2012c; WFP, 2013b; WFP, 2014a; WFP, 2015b).
- **Long duration of SuFP:** as mentioned earlier, children's recovery under SuFP was relatively slow. The long duration of SuFP and the subsequent re-enrolment of patients in the programme after six months can have a significant impact on the cost of treatment per child (see above).

**58. By the end of the evaluation period, WFP was able to proactively support mass food fortification, which is globally considered as a cost-effective intervention.** Following the 2013 launch of the National Food Fortification Programme, WFP worked in collaboration with World Vision and Royal DSM to train 105 mill owners and foremen and women in food safety and flour fortification in mid-2014. As supported by the Copenhagen consensus and the 2013 Lancet articles, fortification is one the most cost-effective strategies for reaching populations at large (Horton *et al.*, 2008; Bhutta *et al.*, 2013).

**59. The cost efficiency of the approach is sometimes questioned.** As mentioned earlier, only very few children in the target Regions received an adequate diet. Micronutrient deficiency is therefore predominant in Dodoma, Singida and in the refugee camps. Through the provision of nutrient-fortified complementary foods, such as Super Cereal (Plus), WFP provided targeted fortification to children aged 6–24 months. The 2013 Lancet identified this kind of targeted fortification as an effective intervention in resource-poor settings where family foods do not meet nutrient requirements of young children (Bhutta *et al.*, 2013). Despite these global recommendations, some partners expressed concerns about the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of the approach of blanket supplementary feeding to prevent stunting. Nutrition stakeholders acknowledge that WFP's nutrition programmes were implemented in food insecure areas (and camps) which have very high stunting rates, where micronutrient intake is low, and where there is likely to be a gap in energy intake by PLW and children due to limited availability of nutritious local food. It was however suggested that this can hardly be a long-term solution and that WFP could link up with other programmes which increase access to nutritious food in the region.

**60. Cost efficiency of the C&V needs to be assessed but has potential.** When the camp regulations were relaxed in 2014, WFP launched a Cash & Voucher Feasibility Study in order to assess the potential of using of Cash & Voucher transfer to diversify diet and improve access to nutrient-dense foods from the markets. Setting up a C&V pilot will allow WFP to tap into a wider choice of options, which

might be more cost-effective, although cost-effectiveness studies of various strategies (Cash/C&V/food commodities) are scarce. There is however evidence that in contexts in which markets work well, appropriate foods are readily accessible, and rates of undernutrition are not dangerously high, these alternatives to food-based rations might be viable and potentially cost-effective (Bailey *et al*, 2012; Langendorf *et al*, 2012; Bhutta *et al.*, 2013).

*The level of synergy and multiplier effect*

61. **Synergy was established in the day-to-day work in the refugee camp.** Partnerships were effectively established with various NGOS for food distribution, health and nutrition programmes, water and sanitation, rights and protection. WFP contracted the food management out to international NGOs and collaborated with all other partners operational in the camp. Most of the partnerships were established over the years and resulted in an effective synergy. Regular co-ordination meetings allowed for regular updates on any issues and to understand the food needs in the camp. However, WFP did not acknowledge adequately the potential of the promotion of kitchen gardens, supported by a local NGO. WFP staff and other stakeholders agree that only very few efforts had so far been made to take that experience to scale. The promotion of kitchen gardens, if complemented with BCC, has high potential for increasing food diversity (Ruel, 2001; Ruel *et al.*, 2013; Masset *et al*, 2012; Berti, 2004).

62. **Synergies were built with the MOHSW's basic health delivery system.** The delivery of nutrition support was embedded in the government's RCH services provided in the health facilities and enabled them to enhance the results of RCH. Food rations were only handed over to mothers once counselling and the monthly health check for mother or child were finalised. This included – among many other services – an ante-natal check-up including iron/folate supplementation, growth monitoring and promotion, child vaccination and reproductive health services. Zinc supplementation and nutrition education was implemented within the RCH department which was present at all levels from dispensary to hospital (KII; TFNC, 2012; TFNC, 2014).

63. The 2011–2016 UNDAF had a clear division of responsibilities for WFP, UNICEF and WHO, but different geographical intervention areas did not allow UNICEF and WFP to collaborate at an operational level. Health facilities in Dodoma clarified that – although WHO was also supporting RCH departments within their facilities – they have not observed any synergy or common approach by WFP and WHO. Through REACH, WFP worked with other UN agencies to support improved capacities for nutrition surveillance. WFP also supported the GAIN Marketplace project. WFP was also considered by stakeholders to be an active partner in the DPG on nutrition, which it co-chaired in 2014.

64. **At national level, WFP developed synergy or multiplier effects less effectively with the domestic or international NGOs.** It was reported by interviewees that WFP did not specifically establish links with PANITA, a national level civil society network for nutrition. In Dodoma no official collaboration was established with the Mwanzo Bora Nutrition Programme (MBNP) implemented by Africare nor with the Tuboreshe Chakula Food Processing and Consumption Project (TCP). Linking WFP beneficiaries with MBNP would have been beneficial as this programme has a strong focus on scaling up multisectoral community level nutrition interventions, supports social and behaviour communications change activities to deliver nutrition improvement messages, and works with peer support groups to improve nutrition behaviour and practices of care-givers, families and

village leaders. TCP on the other hand aims to increase the supply of and demand for nutritious and fortified foods and conducts a behaviour change campaign to strengthen the demand for fortified foods and micronutrient powders (USAID, n.d.; Africare, 2014).

65. **The CP project document hoped for a district-wide approach of FFE, FFA and nutrition, but in reality few formal linkages were established to link the beneficiaries with various programmes.** According to interviewees, inking nutrition beneficiary households with FFA or other forms of safety net such as TASAF would however have increased the level of household food security, which in turn could have reduced the risk of sharing of fortified food commodities.

66. **The SUN business network**, which is supposed to be convened by WFP and GAIN, was largely stagnant over the past years, and is now being relaunched by GAIN. WFP has provided indirect support by hosting GAIN in its offices.

### *Sustainability*

67. **Nutrition interventions were implemented as part of the RCH services of public health facilities.** WFP delivered various operational trainings which were delivered directly to the district and health facility implementers. Discussions with health care providers indicate that they have now incorporated malnutrition screening and nutrition education as part of the RCH services, but that they will remain dependent on WFP to provide the Super Cereal. Most training was provided at the start of the programme (2011) and prior to the 2012/2013 introduction of MCHN, although one course was held in December 2013. In view of high turnover of health staff and CHW, local stakeholders indicated the need for annual training sessions and regular refresher training.

68. The NNS 2011–2016 calls for an increased use of data for decision-making at all levels, including the district level. Hence, WFP collected nutrition data through the district level authorities, but analysis was rather carried out at WFP level, which seems a missed opportunity to strengthen capacities at decentralized level.

69. As mentioned above, WFP remained responsible for the delivery of specialised food commodities to the health facilities, which makes the nutrition interventions less sustainable. Distributing CSB through the health logistics system (Medical Storage Department) was considered but not retained because of regular pipeline breaks and related costs. WFP did not explore closely whether strengthening the government logistics system would have been feasible and worthwhile.

70. Activities to support capacities at district and Regional levels to improve nutrition planning, budgeting and co-ordination are planned for 2015, but were not carried out during the evaluation period.

### *Conclusion*

71. **The CP nutrition programme was not able to reach the planned beneficiary numbers.** Coverage for SuFP was much lower than anticipated due to some initial estimation errors, and MCHN activities rolling out much later than planned, accounting for low coverage of stunting interventions until 2013. Although WFP was aware that planned figures were overestimated, the figures were never revised during the reporting period.

72. Given the phasing out of direct interventions on HIV and AIDS, the number of beneficiaries reached under the HIV and AIDS programming was low, but did however reach 100 per cent of the planned number.

73. **Annual progress reporting on nutrition indicators was irregular**, which makes it hard to identify the trends in outcomes. Where implemented, SuFP has promising treatment default and recovery rates, although the long duration of SuFP **treatment** as well as regular re-enrolment might compromise the cost of the recovery. The planned nutrition baseline study was not carried out, which does not allow the assessment of outcomes related to infant and young child feeding practices, but the 2014 PDM indicates a need to increase focus on IYCF counselling.

74. **Overall, programme outcomes at health facility level are perceived to be very good.** Reported benefits include SuFP success and low default rates and a marked decrease in the incidence of low birth weight.

75. **Nutrition interventions in refugee camps are considered successful:** age-specific mortality rates for children and crude mortality rates in the camp remained low, although this cannot only be attributed to WFP-supported interventions. Supplementary feeding recovery rates were high throughout the review period.

76. Most nutrition interventions are complemented by nutrition counselling, but **the quality of BCC remained variable.**

77. **WFP support to health facilities is perceived to have resulted in increasing health-seeking behaviour** for mothers and young children, and the fortified food distributions enabled an increase in contact points between mothers and health service providers during pregnancy and the first two years of life of a child. However, time demands on women were increasing.

78. **Some targets set for stunting prevention were very ambitious** and may have been driven rather by corporate policies than by local policies or conditions. This is especially the case for the 70 per cent target set for 'minimal acceptable diet of children', bearing in mind the baseline values, respectively 20% at national level and 27% for the refugee population.

79. **The daily ration of fortified food commodities under the CP could not always be delivered as planned**, which may have influenced nutrition outcomes.

80. **Sharing or selling of Super Cereal was also quite widespread**, which can reduce expected nutrition outcomes and increase the cost of interventions. Concrete evidence on patterns of sharing and diversion is lacking and is still based on anecdotes and assumptions, as well as self-reporting by mothers.

81. WFP used some opportunities to increase contact points with mothers by involving community health workers, but **it missed the opportunity to link up nutrition beneficiaries with the FFA and safety net programmes.** Other programmes are not yet nutrition-sensitive and WFP thus did not take full advantage of its available programmes to increase delivery strategies for nutrition interventions, which would also have allowed it to achieve a higher coverage.

82. Although considered beneficial at health facility level, the low coverage of nutrition activities did **not influence district or Regional level malnutrition rates.** Confronted with financial restrictions, WFP did not take the opportunity to reformulate its nutrition interventions under the CP and transform them to a 'pilot', delivering evidence on possible impact. This would have allowed WFP to provide



policy guidance on whether and how its model for nutrition interventions could be expanded to other areas where malnutrition rates and food insecurity are high and where WFP does not intervene. Finally, there was no clear exit strategy for the nutrition interventions, and it is therefore unclear how the different programme components would continue should WFP withdraw

83. It is difficult to assess the cost of delivery of nutrition interventions, but there are indications that the **delivery of these services has become more efficient** over time.

84. **The Conditional Cash Transfer pilot was probably too short to be convincing.** Assessments of the feasibility of expansion and the effects of such approaches in a national or regional context would have been useful, but the Cash and Voucher pilot in the camps offers WFP another opportunity to influence policies.

85. **Synergy was established in the day-to-day work in the refugee camp, but WFP did not recognise adequately the potential of the promotion of kitchen gardens,** supported by a local NGO. At national level WFP achieved varying levels of collaboration with other partner agencies during the review period, but significantly less synergy or multiplier effects.

86. **At policy level, WFP probably influenced food fortification most,** and supported it by delivering training to small-scale local millers. Although this intervention is not directly oriented to vulnerable children or PWL, this kind of universal fortification has the potential to produce foods and food products that are widely consumed by the general population and is a very cost-effective nutrition intervention.

87. **Nutrition interventions were implemented as part of the RCH services of public health facilities,** and thus have a sustainable element. However, health workers report that sustainability of nutrition counselling/education has higher potential than the supplementation of Super Cereal. Planning and implementation of training did not take into account the turnover of health staff and CHWs.

88. **Capacity building also had a strong operational focus** and did not pay enough attention to strategic issues such as capacity to use data for decision-making or capacities at district and regional levels to improve **nutrition** planning, budgeting and coordination.

89. **Some stakeholders feel that by the provision of fortified food supplements, WFP did not provide a long-term solution** and did not work sufficiently on availability and demand for a diversified diet. In future, it would be useful for WFP to explore alternative options for delivering supplementary feeding, such as those combined with vouchers. Although a food voucher system on its own would not be suitable to replace the SuFP or MCHN programme, food vouchers in combination with food supplements can support a positive behaviour change (Concern, 2013).

90. **The decision to introduce cash or value-based vouchers in the refugee camp might promote nutritional outcomes,** although this will also involve some challenges. Assuming the market around the camp functions, the use of cash and value vouchers may be more cost-efficient than food transfers, but will not automatically increase nutrition outcomes. Although value-based vouchers might be easier to implement than commodity-based vouchers, nutritional outcomes could be lower because there is obviously less restriction on how the

voucher is spent. In the long term, education of beneficiaries could of course enable the right choices to be made, as well as appropriate monitoring, reporting, and control systems (Hidrobo et al, 2012; Bossuyt, 2014). Commodity-based food vouchers could be a cost-effective tool for WFP to promote fortified nutrients or enable more dietary diversity, but only after taking into account both nutritional value scores and the full cost of delivery of the commodities to be supported, as was identified in a recent trial in Mozambique (Ryckembusch, 2013).

## Issues for the future

91. **Improving the proportion of children 6–24 months who receive an adequate diet** is one of the major objectives of the nutrition programme and will require a more intensive focus on BCC and some complementary activities. Within that context, fostering partnerships to promote kitchen gardens in the camps and food-insecure districts, combined with nutrition and health education, could address some barriers related to a proper complementary feeding of children between 6 and 24 months, as well as a diversified diet for children and PLW. Given high stunting rates and micronutrient deficiencies, the focus of kitchen gardens should be on promoting nutritious crops (legumes such as pigeon peas, soybeans; vegetables (dark green leafy vegetables, carrots) and even fruit trees (papaya, mango, which have lots of micronutrients).

92. **WFP will have to strengthen capacity at decentralized levels for nutrition planning and budgeting nutrition coordination.** While WFP has focused on creating operational capacities for the implementation of its programmes, more efforts could be made to create capacities at district level for district nutrition planning and budgeting, as well as Regional co-ordination. Regional co-ordination can only be increased if capacities of all districts are developed (and not only the four intervention districts).

93. **Despite policy guidelines, other WFP programming is not yet nutrition-sensitive, Nutrition education should go beyond MCHN and SuFP contact points.** BCC is a major strategy for the GOT to address stunting. WFP could explore to how to use various programme contact points for disseminating nutrition messages, such as FFA gathering events and P4P mobilization meetings. These combined efforts will allow reaching beyond the traditional target population of mothers and harnessing the power of a broad range of influential groups (including men and leaders) to change overall social norms.

94. **Eliminating the sharing of Super Cereal in camps and food insecure settings might be unrealistic but should not be ignored.** Given the high levels of micronutrient deficiencies in the camps, it would be important to estimate the extent of sharing in order to design adapted BCC, and enable estimates of how much is needed to compensate for sharing and what would be the related costs and effects of these options.

95. **The current programming of nutrition interventions might – in the long run – not pay off.** If WFP wants to make a difference to the stunting and wasting rates of selected Regions, it needs to expand its nutrition interventions within the health centres to the full Regions or consider its nutrition interventions rather as pilots and link them up with international research institutes to evaluate impacts of different approaches, deliver evidence and inform policies. **Some operational research could include:**

- Globally, only limited rigorous evidence exists that compares the impact on nutrition outcomes of food assistance in the form of value or commodity-

based vouchers versus cash or in-kind. Introducing the C&V system in the refugee camps provides WFP with the opportunity to be involved in a more global discussion on the effectiveness of these tools. Impact assessment might be costly, but by associating with international research institutes or universities WFP could cut down the cost of the survey and be assured of getting reliable survey results which could be used later to influence policy discussions

- Conducting a robust nutritional impact and efficacy assessment of the SUFP and MCHN, with all parties and donors involved in the study design to ensure shared objectives and ownership of the results. Ensuring that if impact and efficacy are demonstrated, there are discussions with key stakeholders to determine clear programme targets for the future, including exit criteria.
- In order to demonstrate the impact of SuFP and MCHN, WFP should also carry out some small-scale studies to determine causes of malnutrition and identify why (and how many) beneficiaries may be sharing rations with other family members. If income is the major factor for sharing, this might inform the country's decision-making process on the expansion of TASAF in these areas.

**96. Local procurement through P4P was successfully implemented in the portfolio.** In view of the recent roll-out of the National Food Fortification Programme, the CO can now start looking into the potential of for WFP to procure locally fortified vegetable oil and maize. But given that fortification of staple foods is a new initiative, WFP could also play a role in supporting the Government in monitoring compliance to standards and setting up the public-private partnerships which are essential to ensure a competitive market for fortified products.

**97. Food fortification and local production of nutritious food is a promising path for the future.** It would be useful if WFP continues to support these interventions with technical assistance, in collaboration with other development partners. Areas for WFP's attention could be building capacity for quality control of fortified food; providing technical assistance to local producers and industries in order to increase availability of high quality fortified foods; and support to agricultural organisations to produce locally nutritional products.

## **Annex J Food Assistance for Assets**

### **Introduction**

1. During the evaluation period, food assistance for assets (FFA) activities were planned to take place on a small scale (1,700 beneficiaries) under PRRO 200029 in 2011 but did not do so (see ¶4 below). A much larger FFA programme was planned under the July 2011 – June 2015 Country Programme, targeting 250,000 people per year.
2. The 2011–15 CP document (WFP, 2011b) describes FFA projects as part of a food assistance safety net approach, also involving FFE and nutrition activities on a “district-wide basis in the most food insecure areas”. The intention was to transition to “wholly government-owned safety net programmes”.
3. The intended target of FFA activities was people living in extreme poverty and hunger who struggle to meet their basic food and nutrition needs; and, are chronically hungry and more vulnerable to shocks. The intended outcomes and outputs are described in the CP logical framework, together with the intended performance indicators. Progress against these outcomes, outputs and indicators is evaluated in ¶29 – ¶57 below in relation to EQ3 on performance and results of the FFA programme.

### **Actual WFP activities and approach during the evaluation period**

4. Under PRRO 200029, while some FFA activities were implemented in 2010, implementation was lower than planned, as a resource shortage necessitated temporary suspension of the work (WFP, 2011a). FFA activities did not take place under subsequent PRROs.
5. Under the 2011–15 Country Programme, FFA activities included soil and water conservation measures, construction and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, fish farms and market access roads. Other activities aimed at environmental protection through tree planting and land rehabilitation as well as the provision of water supply for both livestock and domestic use. During the evaluation period WFP implemented a total of 382 FFA projects across eight Regions of Tanzania.
6. The FFA programme was targeted at the most chronically food insecure Regions and districts in Tanzania. Criteria for selecting projects included: level of food insecurity; coverage of needs by other actors; integration of proposed activity in District Development Plans; the expected benefits; and availability and quality of technical support. WFP’s Community Managed Targeting and Distribution (CMTD) approach was used to select beneficiaries and manage food distributions (see WFP, nd(a): 5)
7. Technical assistance to communities was provided by district technical officers. WFP acted as a community mobiliser and provided the food for work and some non-food items, including tools, and operational funds (internal transportation, storage and handling as well as other direct operational costs) for implementation of FFA activities. WFP also mobilised complementary inputs from institutional partners including district government, communities, and NGOs. It conducted regular site monitoring to check on the quality of work and the use of food as well as annual Comprehensive Monitoring Exercises.

8. According to WFP guidelines, food rations for participants (one participant per household) were distributed based on daily work norms. Daily work norms included the definition of a piece of work that could be reasonably accomplished in a six hour work day taking into account the difficulty of the task. Participants were expected to finish their daily task in order to receive the daily ration, or else a new piece of work would not be assigned. Different work norms could be established for the same activity considering factors such as soil conditions when digging. Up to 10% of the rations could be distributed to labour-poor households, such as the elderly, handicapped or orphaned, who do not participate directly in asset-building activities. Food distribution was intended to take place once per week for the work accomplished by participants. The standard daily ration per participant for all activities was: maize: 3kg; pulses: 450g; oil: 225g. However, the actual work norms used and rations received by beneficiaries varied from project to project.

## **Findings**

### ***EQ1. Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy & Portfolio***

#### *Relevance to humanitarian and developmental needs*

9. Many interviewees during the CPE acknowledged that WFP's FFA projects are highly relevant to Tanzania's chronically food-insecure populations. The community assets supported are considered to be appropriate to the environmental and economic context and were identified as priorities by communities and districts (i.e. in District Development Plans).

10. The evidence clearly indicates that the vast majority of people consider the provision of food for work to be more appropriate than cash because of fears that cash spent on non-essential items. WFP's 2014 FFA Comprehensive Monitoring found that:

... cash might cause conflict at household level as men tend to have more control over money and this might result in violence as men might not want to buy items including food that are priority for the family.

11. The CPE fieldwork also suggested that food is widely preferred because of fears of misuse of cash. One district official reported that some beneficiaries opted out of TASAF projects and moved to WFP FFA projects because of a preference for food. Communities, farmers' organisations and district officials expressed significant interest in vouchers as an alternative to in-kind food rations as means of promoting local production and trade, while ensuring that people are able to access essential needs.

12. On the other hand, monitoring reports on the cash pilot project implemented by WFP in 2012-2013 (which also included nutrition education activities) showed that:

...of the amount of cash received, about 81 per cent was used to purchase food items, about three per cent was spent on medical or health care services, six per cent was saved in local Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCOS), and about four per cent was used on non-food items such as clothes...

...improvements were shown in infant and young child feeding practices and household consumption. The shift towards purchasing more fruits and vegetables was observed throughout the six months of the pilot. The transfer modality combined with nutrition education for social behavioural change has shown great

potential for stunting reduction if implemented for a longer period of time with a strong monitoring and evaluation component (WFP, 2014a).

13. During the CPE, concerns were expressed by some district officials and beneficiaries, e.g. in Orolimo, regarding the timing of projects, e.g. de-silting during the rainy season may be inefficient and also take time away from on-farm activities. They recommended that projects should be undertaken before the lean season. This issue was also identified during WFP's own Comprehensive Monitoring (WFP, 2014k). Others felt that there was not a problem in this respect as households could divide their labour with some members working on the family farm whilst another participated in the FFA project.

#### *Coverage of needs*

Table 3 on page 15 above provides data on the coverage of the chronically food insecure population<sup>51</sup> by WFP FFA projects in each Region where they were implemented. It shows that overall 27 per cent of chronically food insecure women and men benefited from FFA activities. There is, however, significant variation between regions. The percentage covered in some Regions (and the overall percentage) is significantly lower than planned due to funding deficits.

#### *Coherence with agenda and policies of the national government and other stakeholders*

14. Portfolio design documents indicated that transition to nationally owned safety net programmes was a top priority of WFP. It was therefore to be expected that there would be close association between WFP's FFA programme and nationally owned programmes, such as TASAF.

15. The WFP FFA activity is very similar in objectives and approach to the national TASAF initiative. While WFP provides food for work and TASAF provides cash, it should be noted that WFP does ensure that the value of the food ration is consistent with TASAF cash payments. During field visits, the evaluation team heard of a number of examples of collaboration between WFP and TASAF in project activities. For example, in the Madege irrigation scheme in Kondoa District, a TASAF public works project cemented the canals that were de-silted and extended through WFP FFA activities.

16. However, the evaluation team found limited evidence of alignment at national level. A number of CPE informants expressed surprise and disappointment that WFP had not been more engaged in the national social protection agenda. The WFP Country Representative has held conversations with TASAF and World Bank representatives regarding the possibility of WFP implementing TASAF public works projects. However, this proposal was not received very enthusiastically.

17. The CPE did not identify any examples of field level collaboration between WFP and other UN agencies in FFA activities. The field level presence of other UN agencies in WFP's area of operation is minimal. However, WFP's FFA programme was considered by other actors to be coherent with the objectives and activities in the 2011–2016 UNDAP.

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<sup>51</sup> The chronically food insecure population is considered to be the people with poor food consumption plus the people with borderline food consumption in the 2010 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (WFP, 2010d). Data are only available at Regional, not at district level due to limitations in sample size during the CFSVA.

18. Efforts to engage with other actors were not reported to have had negative impacts on the quality of WFP's FFA activities. However, WFP senior staff do believe that the time taken up in the UN Delivering as One process takes time away from generally overseeing operations and strategic development. The main trade-off may actually have been in the opposite direction to that which might be expected. WFP has invested significant time and resources to ensure that FFA projects are implemented to good technical standards. This focus on operational coverage and quality may have been at the expense of engagement in national policy dialogue and programme development.

### ***EQ2. Factors and quality of strategic decision-making***

19. The strategic direction of the FFA activity was informed by WFP's own vulnerability analysis and mapping as well as the food security assessments and analysis carried out by the national government with the support of WFP.

20. WFP FFA activities began in Tanzania in the early 2000s as WFP was keen to be addressing the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition, building resilience and having a longer-term impact as well as meeting immediate food needs. Furthermore, WFP strategy and programme documents also highlight the perceived need to move away from the provision of unconditional transfers.

21. From 2007, WFP was no longer needed to provide emergency food aid in Tanzania as the national government was able to cover needs. One informant was of the view that there was a desire to scale up FFA activities after this time, motivated by the desire of WFP to continue playing a role in Tanzania.

22. Some CPE informants expressed the view that WFP's FFA approach is more driven by WFP's food pipeline than by an analysis of the needs of food insecure households and consideration of the most appropriate types of interventions and modalities of assistance.

23. Monitoring and evaluation activities have had an influence on FFA activities and methods of implementation. The CPE found that in general, the M&E of the FFA activities was good. During routine follow-up of FFA projects WFP verified the community-based selection of beneficiaries, reviewed community proposals, and monitored the quality of food storage and distributions, and the quality of the construction / rehabilitation work on community assets.

24. The evaluation of the 2007–10 CP influenced FFA activities in the portfolio under review, e.g. concentration of projects in smaller geographical area. WFP's own Comprehensive Monitoring Exercises have also led to adjustments in implementation approach during the review period. For example, the 2010 FFA monitoring report recommendation that future FFA projects should be integrated into District Development Plans was implemented from 2011 and has contributed to increased local government ownership and follow-up.

25. However, the CPE did find WFP's FFA monitoring reports to be infrequent and variable in quality. A baseline survey was carried out in October – November 2011 (WFP, 2011j). Comprehensive monitoring exercises were carried out in 2012, 2013 and 2014 with data compiled and reports produced for each district. However, an overall summary report was only produced in 2014 (WFP, 2014k). This report was of poor quality with many findings cut and pasted from an FFA monitoring report produced in 2010.

26. The 2011 Baseline Survey collected data to enable the programme to report on food security and productive asset related indicators and assess the impacts of FFA projects. Further data on these indicators were collected in July 2012 and reported on in the 2012 CP SPR (WFP, 2013b). WFP did not carry out a baseline survey for the newly targeted FFA areas in 2013 due to funding constraints. WFP conducted a Community and Household Surveillance baseline for FFA in December 2014. Results were incorporated into the 2014 SPR.

27. The major factor affecting FFA strategy has been the availability of funding. The work was able to proceed on a larger scale during the first two years of the review period due to the availability of funds from donors, channelled through WFP headquarters, with funding from the Financial Crisis Initiative. However, when these funds ran out, WFP was forced to reduce the scale of its FFA activity.

### ***EQ3. Performance and results of the WFP portfolio***

#### *Outputs*

28. Table 23 and Figure 10 below summarise the outputs achieved by FFA and related activities during the review period.

**Table 23 FFA, food for training: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**

	Beneficiaries		Tonnage	
	Planned	Actual	Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)
2011	289,100	190,378	22,500	3,808
2012	250,250	186,290	22,500	5,271
2013	250,250	115,206	22,500	3,030
2014	250,250	68,283	22,500	2,138
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,009,850</b>	<b>560,157</b>	<b>90,000</b>	<b>14,247</b>

*Source: WFP SPRs 2011–2014*


#### *Extent to which activities implemented to high technical standards*

29. During the CPE fieldwork, a wide range of informants, including District Executive Directors, technical officers, village leaders and beneficiaries, expressed strong satisfaction with WFP’s activities and approach.

30. In the CPE Inception Report (Turner *et al.*, 2015), it was stated that the “5 keys to success” in FFA projects identified by WFP during earlier evaluations (WFP, 2013h) would be used to evaluate the process by which FFA projects were implemented. The quality of implementation of FFA activities is reported against these criteria in this section.



**Figure 10 FFA, food for training: planned and actual beneficiaries and tonnage**



Source: SPRs 2011–2014.

*Putting communities and people, particularly women, at the centre of planning.*

31. During the CPE field visits, community leaders reported that significant attention has been paid by WFP staff to ensuring gender balance in the selection of beneficiaries, participation in village committees and taking the needs of women into account in the implementation of projects. For example, it was appreciated that some of the food provided could be distributed to pregnant women and other people who were unable to work. Other vulnerable people were able to undertake light work in exchange for food.

32. WFP endeavoured to ensure that assets were identified by local people as priorities in village, ward and district development plans. Some District officials, e.g. in Kondoa District, reported the use of the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development Approach in which villagers rated their development needs in the process of identifying FFA projects.

33. The methods of implementation promoted by WFP, including CBTD, were widely welcomed by national and by local government interviewees, as well as by beneficiaries. CBTD was reported to be a valuable approach in ensuring accountability to affected populations, enabling community participation and feedback in the selection of beneficiaries and the implementation of projects. The quality of the food, the timing of deliveries, the guidance and training provided by WFP were all highly appreciated.

*An understanding of the local context, landscape and livelihoods.*

34. Formal assessments and the local knowledge of WFP and partner staff enabled the programme to be targeted at some of the most chronically food-insecure districts and communities in the country and ensure that the projects supported the creation of assets appropriate to the local natural and economic environment.

*Making sure quality standards for food distributions and assets created are met.*

35. The responsibility for the technical design and supervision of assets lay with District Councils. WFP played a facilitation and monitoring role to mobilise district technical support to communities. In instances where WFP had concerns about the quality of the work, staff would raise the issue with district technical officers.

36. During field visits, the CPE found that different work norms were used in different projects. For example, in Orolimo, participants received a ration of food for every 1m<sup>2</sup> of work carried out on the Charco dam. This meant that those people who could work more received more food. This raised concerns that the most vulnerable benefited least. On the other hand, in the Madege irrigation scheme project each participant was allocated 10m of canal.

*Strengthening of local and government institutions' capacities.*

37. People consider that WFP played a catalytic role in mobilising districts to support asset creation and rehabilitation. A number of informants reported that assets would not have been made functional without the initiative of WFP.

38. WFP capacity building activities focused on the local level. Apart from technical support provided during implementation of the activities, WFP also engaged the beneficiaries in planning, designing and implementing the project through a process known as LLPA – Local Level Participatory Approach. LLPA (also known corporately as Community-Based Participatory Planning) is a tool that FFA beneficiaries can also use for planning other community-based projects. The aim is for communities and district authorities to own, manage and sustain the projects beyond the activity's timeline.

*Integrating with other activities (partnership) and scaling-up.*

39. Some informants made comparisons between WFP's FFA projects and TASAF's public works activities. It was perceived that WFP was timelier in the provision of assistance. WFP was also praised for ensuring that people who could not work, e.g. elderly, displaced people, pregnant women, could undertake light work or receive free food assistance, whereas TASAF was reported not to do this. As noted above, the majority of people preferred to receive food for work rather than cash.

40. There were calls from many village and district representatives for WFP to continue and scale up the FFA programme, particularly in 2015 when a difficult food security situation is expected in many areas due to the poor rains in the 2014/15 agricultural season.

### *Extent to which intended outputs been achieved*

41. During the evaluation period WFP implemented a total of 382 FFA projects across eight Regions of Tanzania. The number of beneficiaries<sup>52</sup>, the amount of food distributed and the number of assets created were all significantly lower than planned. Under the 2011 – 15 CP, WFP aimed to target 490,000 men and 510,000 women with FFA activities to a value of USD 65,635,858. In reality, WFP reached 289,256 women and 264,360 men (i.e. 55% of the planned number of people). The SPRs attribute this to funding constraints, which led WFP to strategically consolidate its FFA intervention areas in 2013 and again in 2014. Table 6 on page 31 above presents data on the difference between planned and actual outputs.

### *Effectiveness*

42. The effectiveness of FFA activities is evaluated in relation to the three intended outcomes identified in the 2011–14 CP Logical Framework (see above).

*Outcome 3: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households at risk of falling into acute hunger*

43. The provision of food rations in return for work in FFA projects helped beneficiaries cover their immediate food needs during the period of the year when they find it most difficult to do so and when energy requirements are higher due to the need to undertake intensive agricultural work. According to the 2013 SPR:

WFP's food assistance for asset activities continued to improve food consumption among beneficiary households, especially in the lean season. The proportion of households with borderline food consumption increased (from 57.9 per cent to 65.7 per cent) and the number of households with poor food consumption decreased (from 5 per cent to none). (WFP, 2014a)

44. The provision of food rations had benefits beyond helping meet immediate consumption needs, including freeing up scarce funds for other essential items. WFP's Comprehensive Monitoring Exercise (2014) found that:

Food support helped cover immediate food needs; the little money initially used to buy some food from the market was used to cover other non-food needs. Food assistance also enabled households to attend also to their farms (a family member attending to own farm while other(s) attend to a FFA project; without food, they would go to search for casual and/or agriculture labour opportunities which in most cases are located further away from homestead. (WFP, 2014k)

45. The CPE revealed that food provided to FFA communities is sometimes shared among a larger group than intended. However, immediate food needs still appeared to be met. The CPR did not hear complaints that the amount of food provided was inadequate. This suggests that some beneficiary households did still have other sources of food, enabling them to share WFP rations with others. In this sense, the food ration could be seen as more valuable as an income transfer than an essential nutrition intervention.

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<sup>52</sup> The CPE refers to the number of FFA beneficiaries rather than FFA participants to be consistent with the Country Programme SPRs. Furthermore, reference to beneficiaries is more useful when describing the number of people reached by WFP with its food assistance and benefiting from assets created.

46. Some beneficiaries reported that if they had not received food aid they would have had to sell a cow or goat or migrate in search of work in order to earn income to purchase food. Therefore, it appears that at least in the short term, food aid also helped to protect people's livelihoods and maintain some resilience.

*Outcome 4: Hazard risk reduced at community level in targeted communities*

47. For the purposes of the CPE this outcome is understood to mean that the impacts of shocks and stresses on food security and nutrition are reduced. In other words, people's livelihoods and community support networks have become more resilient.

48. The CPE field visits support the findings of WFP's own monitoring exercises (see for example WFP, 2014k). Observations and interviews with District officials, community leaders and beneficiaries did provide a common narrative in which it was claimed that new and rehabilitated assets have resulted in increased food production, incomes and food consumption over a number of years. Other benefits such as reduced time fetching water by women and less male migration, were also reported.

49. However, contrary to claims made in WFP monitoring reports, there is limited evidence to suggest that the improvements in livelihood and food security are adequate to increase resilience to major shocks and stresses in the future. The absolute levels of production and income are still low, alternative livelihood and coping strategies are limited and community support systems remain weak.

*Outcome 5: Broader policy frameworks incorporate hunger solutions*

50. The indicator for Outcome 5 states that WFP hoped that government funding for hunger solution tools in national plans of action would increase by 20 per cent as a consequence of learning and advocacy based upon WFP's FFA activities.

51. It is not clear exactly what was intended to be achieved and how. The outputs suggest that WFP would encourage LGAs to incorporate climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction programmes in their plans and budgets and use evidence from its own activities to inform social protection programmes.

52. No information was received by the CPE on activities that related to such outcomes and outputs or on any progress made. All WFP FFA projects reviewed were incorporated into district development plans. However, this was a precondition for WFP agreeing to support the proposed project rather than an outcome of WFP's activities.

*Impacts on women's participation and gender equity*

53. According to the 2014 SPR (WFP, 2015b):

FFA targeting was gender sensitive and prioritized female-headed food insecure households. However, there were more male FFA beneficiaries due to community demographics. At each project site, the twelve-member Food and Asset Management Committee had equal representation of men and women. WFP provided committees with training on modalities of food allocation and distribution, and on asset management. As a result of increased sensitization and training, both men and women members shared their ideas in public fora and reached joint decisions concerning project activities.

54. Some CPE informants claimed that the focus placed by WFP on gender equity was positively influencing gender roles in communities, with increasing numbers of women participating in management committees.

#### *Synergies and multiplier effects*

55. As noted above, the Country Programme document envisaged that FFA projects would be part of a food assistance safety net approach, also involving FFE and nutrition activities on a district-wide basis in the most food-insecure areas, and that WFP's experience and lessons learned from FFA would support the strengthening of government-owned safety net programmes.

56. However, there was very limited geographical overlap between these different types of activity. Some CPE interviewees stated that some FFA projects have contributed to FFE, especially those that increased access to water in school, and – during the early years of the evaluation period – also construction of school kitchens and stores. There were also reports of FFA projects having an indirect impact on community-based school feeding by increasing the food production and incomes of parents who were then able to better contribute food and cash for school meals. In some CPE field sites, informants also highlighted examples of FFA projects that had enabled households to increase their surplus production to the extent that they could sell some produce to the NFRA through WFP's P4P programme.

57. Such examples of linkages and synergies between WFP's activities are rare. There do not appear to have been systematic efforts to ensure the geographical and operational integration of projects.

#### *Sustainability*

58. The 2014 SPR (WFP, 2015b) reports that:

Under FFA, communities and districts were empowered to manage and maintain the assets created using their own cash, human and in-kind resources. Asset management committees and village leadership continued their role of overseeing asset maintenance, and ensuring all beneficiaries were benefitting. Districts and supported communities have, to date, benefitted from created assets through improved agricultural production, improved access to water, and increased capacity of districts to manage and sustain community projects. WFP will explore means of integrating FFA activities into partner projects, to maximize the impact of the activities in improving food security. WFP will also explore means of integrating future FFA activities into the national Productive Social Safety Net programme targeting the vulnerable poor and food insecure population through both nutrition-sensitive food and cash transfers.

59. FFA activities, if carried out at a larger scale and integrated with other community development activities, can build the resilience of communities to climatic shocks. Complementary inputs from the district authorities (such as funds, supervision, community mobilisation) and commitment to scale up the activity in all food insecure districts will help address the long-term objective of graduating food insecure to stable food secure communities.

60. Most assets appear still to be functioning three or four years after work was done due to emphasis given to community management and district-level support. However, long-term sustainability is questionable without increased decentralisation of public funds and increased technical capacities at local level.

## Conclusions

61. The FFA activities planned and partially implemented with communities hosting refugees at the start of the review period were of potential benefit. However, the effort gives the impression of being rather tokenistic. The intended number of beneficiaries (1,700) was quite small and there does not appear to have been a plan to integrate the activities into local development plans.

62. Subsequent planning documentation clearly envisaged that WFP FFA activities would be integrated with FFE and nutrition activities within districts, as part of a food assistance safety net approach. There are examples of these different types of intervention being implemented in the same districts and even the same communities. However, they are too few and far between to be able to consider WFP's programme as a safety net.

63. WFP also clearly stated the intention of transition to wholly government-owned safety net programmes. Little progress was made in this respect in relation to FFA. Dialogue with TASAF stakeholders was limited. It is not clear why there has been a failure to operationalise the intention to transition to government-owned safety net programmes.

64. The FFA programme, as with other components of the portfolio, appears to have been driven according to a predominantly operational approach, which is no longer (if it ever was) appropriate to the Tanzanian context. Day-to-day management of logistically intensive programmes limited the time available for strategic analysis and operationalisation.

65. WFP's own monitoring of its FFA activities was generally satisfactory as evidenced by the annual district-level monitoring reports, with findings feeding back, in some instances, into programme implementation at project level. However, the lack of overall monitoring reports in 2012 and 2013 and the poor quality of the 2014 synthesis report do lead to concerns about the validity of data, the analysis of the evolving situation and the extent to which lessons from experience were being learned. The 2014 report leaves a strong impression that many challenges in implementation identified in 2010 had not been addressed four years later. Furthermore, the lack of on-going monitoring of the food security and productive asset related indicators limits the evaluation of FFA impacts.

66. FFA projects were generally implemented to high technical standard in terms of targeting approach, food quality, and timing of deliveries. WFP was effective in mobilizing districts to provide technical support and follow-up.

67. Individual projects were effective in the short term in helping people to meet immediate food needs and prevent the use of negative coping strategies (e.g. sale of livestock) and in increasing food consumption and income through community asset creation.

68. However, the target populations are chronically food-insecure and many are subject to frequent stresses, such as poor rainfall, localised flooding and volatile food prices. The community assets certainly do assist some people to improve their food and livelihood security over a sustained period of time (3–4 years to date). Yet, the evidence is limited that their livelihoods become sufficiently resilient to be able to cope with future shocks and stresses as claimed in WFP's own monitoring reports.

69. The FFA activities made some contribution to improved gender equity in beneficiary communities. There is evidence of increased participation in decision-

making by women at community and household levels and examples of where they took leadership roles in community committees.

### **Issues for the future**

70. A number of issues regarding the implementation approach need to be clarified and developed, including the approach to work norms and food rations and the timing of FFA relative to existing livelihood activities.

71. Under its next CS, WFP could shift from being an implementer of FFA activities to a provider of technical assistance to TASAF public works projects (and other national safety net programmes).

72. There will be a need to clarify the comparative advantage of WFP in such roles relative to other actors, such as the World Bank and UNICEF, which are already heavily engaged in support of TASAF.

73. In order to inform its technical support, WFP should better document the approach it has used in its FFA activities and lessons learned from experience. This will require a rigorous analysis of existing monitoring data and the filling of any gaps that might exist.

74. While WFP's own FFA activities continue, there is a need to improve the frequency and quality of monitoring reports which provide a synthesis of the data and analysis produced at district level.

75. In particular, there should be a rigorous analysis of the impacts of FFA projects on community and household resilience to shocks and stresses. The evidence for such impacts and claims is currently very limited.

76. The cash pilot project provided important analysis both for WFP's own programming approach and for national safety net programmes. Initial dialogue with TASAF on this issue should be picked up on and developed.

77. There are opportunities for WFP to promote coherent and integrated national programmes that aim to assist chronically food-insecure and vulnerable people to meet their basic food needs. For example, some TASAF public works interventions support members of AMCOSs to increase their production and sell surplus to NFRA and other possible buyers. WFP could also consider advocating that TASAF provides vouchers to extremely food insecure households, which could be exchanged for food with SACCOSs.

## **Annex K United Nations Delivering as One**

### **Delivering as One pilot countries**

1. The “Delivering as One” approach emerged from intergovernmental decision-making on the operational activities of the United Nations system for development. In resolutions on the triennial comprehensive policy review adopted in 2001, 2004 and 2007, the General Assembly called for strengthening of the system to make it more effective, coherent and relevant. “Delivering as One” involved pilot attempts to respond to those provisions (UN, 2012a).
2. The High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence, which issued its report in November 2006, recommended that the United Nations system should “deliver as one” at country level. That would include the adoption of the “Four Ones”, namely One Leader, One Programme, One Budget and, where appropriate, One Office.
3. At the end of 2006, the Secretary-General formally announced that eight countries had volunteered to pilot the “Delivering as One” approach: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam. The Secretary-General requested the Chair of the UNDG to lead an effort with the Group’s executive heads to move forward with the “One United Nations” initiative on the basis of the interest expressed by programme countries.
4. The purpose of the pilots was to allow the United Nations system, in cooperation with host Governments and in support of national development goals, to develop approaches that would enhance coherence, efficiency and effectiveness at country level; reduce transaction costs for national partners; and test what works best in various country situations.
5. In 2010, seven of the eight pilot countries (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam) conducted extensive country-led evaluations.

### **Delivering as One in Tanzania**

6. In 2007, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (GOT) formally signalled its interest to become one of eight countries to pilot Delivering as One (DAO). UN Tanzania was consequently mandated to innovate and experiment with ways of planning, implementing and reporting as One for enhanced coherence, effectiveness and efficiency across four pillars: One Programme, One Leader, One Budget and One Office (harmonisation of business practices). The One Voice (joint communications) was subsequently added as a component at country level, with formal endorsement at the Fourth High-Level Inter-Governmental Conference on DAO, Montevideo 2011.
7. Between 2008 and 2011, UN Tanzania initiated nine Joint Programmes (JPs) under the auspices of the One Programme and two JPs related to the One Office and the One Voice. The JP modality encouraged the 14 Participating UN agencies (PUNs) to work together, creating a coherent and holistic approach to programming in areas of common interest. It required agencies to collaborate on joint work plans and budgets, and adhere to an agreed division of labour and a common results and accountability framework.



8. The JPs were developed under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2007–2011, which was aligned to the three pillars of Tanzania’s 2005–2010 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) and its equivalent in Zanzibar (MKUZA). The JPs varied in size – in terms of number of Implementing Partners (IPs) and PUNs – as well as management arrangements. Some were thematic while others were geographic in focus. Their design reflected the UN’s mandate to support the GOT to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

9. Notwithstanding their accomplishments, the UN Country Team (UNCT) acknowledged that these JPs essentially formed a parallel structure to agency operations, increasing planning, monitoring and reporting requirements and, by extension, transaction costs. Moreover, the broader UNDAF, into which the JPs were retrofitted, was found to be insufficiently focused and overly ambitious, with monitoring reflecting an emphasis on process rather than results.

10. Based on these experiences, the UNCT established a single, coherent One UN Country Plan for all UN agencies’ activities (resident and non-resident, development and humanitarian, DAO reform agenda) for the subsequent programming period: the UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) 2011–2015 (extended to 2016). This Plan, with a budget of USD 876 million (current at time of writing), was subsequently extended with GOT support by one year to 30 June 2016.

11. The WFP 2011–15 Country Strategy states:

To support the United Republic of Tanzania in the implementation of its second poverty reduction strategy, the United Nations Country Team is preparing the UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP), which outlines the UN strategies, programmes and activities for 2011–2015. The UNDAP aims to address the Government priorities in MKUKUTAI/MKUZAII where the country team has a comparative advantage and where the UN can effectively contribute to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. (WFP, 2010a)

12. The 2011–2016 UNDAP incorporates a Programme Results Matrix and a complementary Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix which includes indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification. UNDAP also incorporates a Delivering as One Matrix which defines the strategic results and actions of the reform process. There is also a database “Results Monitoring System” (RMS) which tracks all activities and progress of the participating agencies under UNDAP.

13. In addition to the above, Tanzania has produced a Common Country Programme Document (CCPD), which incorporates a common narrative with agency-specific components, results frameworks and resource requirements for UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP.

14. The UNCT has already started to lead the development of UNDAP II that should be agreed by September 2015 and implemented from July 2016 onwards.

## **Evaluation of DAO**

15. According to the 2012 independent evaluation of “Delivering as One” (UN, 2012a), stakeholders recognized the positive effects of UN engagement on national ownership and leadership. However, strong national co-ordination mechanisms need to be consolidated and links between individual UN organizations and line ministries strengthened and expanded. The evaluation also concluded that both national and UN system planning and monitoring and evaluation capacities at country level

should be further reinforced. There is also a need for comprehensive harmonization of business practices, particularly in financial management, accounting standards and human resources rules and regulations to ensure further efficiency gains and reduced transaction costs.

16. An evaluation of the 2011–2016 UNDAP took place from December 2014 to April 2015. The analysis and recommendations of the evaluation should inform the formulation of the UNDAP successor, helping to define programme content, governance structure and DAO reform priorities going forward. However, the CPE team heard that there are major concerns amongst UNCT members about the quality of the work. The report was not available to the CPE team in time to inform the WFP CPE report.

### **WFP planned engagement in the Delivering as One process**


17. The WFP 2011–2015 Country Strategy states:

The UNDAP will serve as the basis for a common country programme document and WFP's country strategy is informed by the unfolding UNDAP process to ensure consistency and alignment with it. The UNDAP clearly outlines WFP's role and reflects the agency's comparative advantage in contributing to the MKUKUTA II/MKUZA II outcomes

The UNCT's experience with Delivery as One (DAO) serves as a foundation for improved co-operation and coherence for the future UNDAP. For instance, in the UNDAP process, UN agencies are identifying specific outcomes where joint actions will yield concrete results. In particular, WFP is collaborating with UNICEF and FAO, among others, to achieve results in food security, nutrition, safety nets and emergency response preparedness. The DAO One Fund to which key donors channel their assistance to the UN is also a means to ensure the continued collaboration. (WFP, 2010a)

18. Figure 11 below (from the WFP Country Strategy) illustrates WFP's strategy linkages with national priorities and the 2011–2016 UNDAP. This is intended to provide a general view of linkages and therefore includes only key elements to illustrate synergies.

**Figure 11 WFP’s strategy linkages with national priorities and the 2011–2016 UNDP**



## ***WFP's activities under UNDAP I***

19. In the 2011–16 UNDAP, WFP committed to be the lead agency for 26 actions under 13 out of the 58 outcomes under 8 out of the 10 programme areas in the UNDAP. In addition WFP agreed to lead on 6 actions under 3 outcomes to support the Delivering as One process.

20. Table 24 below shows the amount of funds from different sources, including the One UN Fund, spent by WFP in different UNDAP areas of work from July 2011 to February 2015. It shows that WFP received USD 8.3m from the One UN Fund. The majority of the One UN funds supported WFP's operational activities, FFE, FFA, Nutrition and Refugee programmes.

**Table 24 Funds received / spent by WFP from One UN Fund per UNDAP area of work**

<b>UN Working Group</b>	<b>Agency Core</b>	<b>Agency Non-Core</b>	<b>One Fund</b>
Communications			
DAO Management			
Economic Growth	0	307,823.40	122,302.94
Education	0	29,443,419.89	2,251,143.00
Emergencies	0	473,787.33	76,412.00
Environment	0	12,879,313.82	1,746,020.37
Governance			
HACT/Finance			
Health & Nutrition	0	2,623,820.50	2,075,110.00
HIV/AIDS	0	700,000.00	308,891.70
Human Resources	0	0	2,759.00
Human Rights WG			
IAGG			
ICT	0	0	143,799.71
PME WG			
Refugees	0	61,683,850.29	1,489,682.79
Social Protection	0	79,184.00	141,011.00
TOPT			
WASH			
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>108,191,199</b>	<b>8,357,133</b>

Source: UN RCO

## **Findings**

### ***EQ1. Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy & Portfolio***

21. The WFP Country Strategy is seen by CPE informants as being well aligned with national priorities and plans as outlined in the Second Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA II / MKUZA II 2010/11 – 2014/15) and with sector policies such as the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) 2011/12 – 2020/21. The extent of the coherence of WFP's operational activities with national policies is evaluated section 2.1 of the main report.

22. The UN 2011–2016 UNDAF is structurally coherent with MKUKUTA II and consequently the planned activities of WFP and other UN agencies are aligned with MKUKUTA goals and outcomes.

23. WFP is generally considered to have engaged constructively in the development and implementation of UNDAF I. There is a perception that WFP was more engaged in DAO processes during the first year or two of the UNDAF but its participation waned subsequently. This reflects a general trend amongst the participating agencies.

24. WFP have co-chaired the UN Emergency Co-ordination Group throughout the 2011–2016 UNDAF period but did not continue in the role of Chairing the Emergency Programme Working Group (which focuses on government capacity building in disaster management) following a change in Deputy Director. This is disappointing to some stakeholders, including in government departments, who consider that there is still a need for co-ordinated capacity development support from the UN.

25. In terms of the development of the new UNDAF, on the one hand it is appreciated that WFP is not trying to “impose” itself, but on the other hand some interviewees expressed concern that WFP is not engaging sufficiently. Some informants believe that WFP has important messages to bring to the table, particularly the need for the UN to support the Government to develop local level capacities to implement national policies and programmes and ensure positive impacts on the lives of poor and vulnerable people. However, its voice is being missed by some in this respect.

26. CPE informants considered WFP’s portfolio activities to be relevant to the humanitarian and development situation in the country. Some informants did express concern about the limited policy and technical capacity of WFP to be engaging deeply in efforts to promote agricultural production and marketing.

27. However, the major concern expressed by interviewees was in relation to missed opportunities to work with UN and other partners to support national policy development and implementation, particularly in relation to social protection. Informants believed that WFP does have technical competencies (e.g. in risk and vulnerability analysis, income transfer programmes, public works projects) that could be better used to support the development of national capacities.

28. The intention of WFP to support national policy and capacity development in general, including in the area of social protection, is clearly stated both in the WFP Country Strategy and the 2011–2016 UNDAF. There are good examples of where WFP has engaged effectively with government ministries and departments at the national level, e.g. in supporting the development of the new Disaster Development Act, building capacities in vulnerability and early warning analysis. However, WFP is seen to be disengaged from the development of TASAF initiatives at national level, despite some good examples of effective collaboration at local level through its FFA projects.

29. From the WFP Country Office perspective, alignment with Government policies and with the 2011–2016 UNDAF has not limited the types of programmes implemented by WFP or the technical quality of the work. However, the DAO process is considered by the senior management team to be heavily time-consuming, taking resources away from strategic and operational activities and perversely reducing coordination with ‘natural’ partners such as UNICEF and FAO.

## ***EQ2. Factors and quality of strategic decision-making***

30. It is unclear what influence the 2011–2016 UNDAF has had on WFP's country strategy and activities in Tanzania. CO informants suggest that any benefits of the DAO process are vastly outweighed by the negative impacts and opportunity costs of engaging in UN coordination meetings and processes.

31. Many informants perceive that UN agencies, including WFP, merely categorised their planned activities under common outcomes and goals in the UNDAF. The UNDAF is considered to be inadequately based on the sort of joint analysis and planning that would lead to co-ordinated strategic decision-making.

32. A range of informants, including WFP staff, articulated numerous limitations of the DAO process. DAO is seen as having little added value for operational agencies such as WFP. Strategic effectiveness of the UN is seen by some as being constrained by the inclusive DAO approach.

33. Many informants consider the major problem is that agencies push their own institutional agendas and are not prepared to prioritise. Agency heads remain ultimately accountable to their head offices rather than to the Resident Co-ordinator (RC) and their partners in the UNCT. The provision of earmarked funds by donors further discourages prioritisation. The ability of the RC to play a neutral, facilitation role is seen to be compromised by accountability to one agency, i.e. UNDP.

34. Outside Dar es Salaam, DAO is regarded as having little relevance and impact, apart from in the refugee operation. UN agencies with a field presence are scattered widely throughout the country and their programme areas tend not to overlap.

35. The CPE team heard major differences of opinion about how to make the DAO process more effective. There are those who would like to move back to joint programmes, focusing and integrating the activities of agencies in a few geographical areas. On the other hand, there are those who consider that a looser framework approach is required with the actions of different agencies contributing to common outcomes. The UNCT recently decided that UNDAF should be based on the latter approach.

## ***EQ3. Performance and results of WFP in the context of DAO and the 2011–2016 UNDAF***

36. WFP is generally considered to be sceptical but supportive of the DAO process. WFP was reported to have played a positive role, working together with other agencies, in a number of areas such as supporting the closure of refugee camps in collaboration with UNHCR and government authorities.

37. The government Disaster Management Department expressed strong appreciation for WFP's chairing of the UN Emergency Working Group. They consider the Group to be being well organised and helping to avoid duplication. WFP is seen to bring a lot of good technical and local knowledge to the table as well as strong connections with the PMO Disaster Management Department.

38. WFP's support to the development of the common IT platform was particularly appreciated, even though it appears it will not be widely adopted by UN agencies. WFP is also reported to have played a valuable role in chairing the UN Operations Management Team, providing business processes training to other agencies and also managing the telecommunications contract with Airtel on behalf of all UN agencies.

39. Concerns were expressed that WFP and FAO are not working together as closely as they should be. For example, a greater engagement by WFP, working

together with FAO, in integrating the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) approach into national food security monitoring and early warning systems would be appreciated. It was also considered that WFP's activities in relation to promoting improvements in agricultural production and marketing in its FFA and P4P activities could benefit from closer collaboration with FAO.<sup>53</sup>

40. Likewise, some stakeholders believe that WFP has missed opportunities to do more joined-up work, for example with UNICEF in the education sector.

41. Concerns around the performance of WFP in relation to its commitments under the 2011–2016 UNDAP are mostly around capacity development. The UNDAP clearly states that WFP will support the government to implement SF. However, the SF programme was largely implemented by WFP and is now being phased out because of lack of funds.

42. It was impossible for the CPE to evaluate the contribution WFP activities have made to common outcomes in the UNDAP owing to the limited time available and the difficulties of unpacking WFP impacts from those of other agencies. However, it is not surprising if WFP's biggest contributions have been in the areas where it has a comparative advantage in terms of technical expertise and funding, as well as where it has had a lead agency role, e.g. SF, disaster management, and feeding for refugees.

## Conclusions

43. UN Delivering As One offered a major opportunity – and challenge – for the alignment and strategic positioning of the WFP portfolio in Tanzania during the review period. Although informant evidence indicates that WFP engaged constructively with this process, it also shows that, as for many other stakeholders, DAO fatigue set in as the CO began to conclude that the costs of the process were outweighing the benefits.

44. A significant amount of paper alignment between WFP, other UN agencies and the GOT was achieved in the voluminous documentation of the 2011–2016 UNDAP and of DAO. But there is no evidence that this resulted in significantly more productive alignment and synergy between all these stakeholders, nor in enhancement of WFP's strategic positioning relative to GOT programmes or the contributions of the UN as a whole.

45. The WFP Country Strategy and commitments in the 2011–2016 UNDAP positioned the agency well in terms of transitioning from a predominantly operational role to one of increasing technical support to the national and local government, in collaboration with other UN and non-UN actors. However, this strategic shift largely did not materialise.

46. In the context of the UN system, WFP Tanzania has a number of comparative advantages that it could draw upon to create synergies with other agencies. Its field-level experience working with local communities, district officials and technical agencies such as NFRA in order to develop and implement programmes is critical in a country where a key challenge is to translate national policy commitments into local level action and impacts.

47. UN DAO should have been a prominent opportunity for WFP to achieve synergy and multiplier effects in its portfolio, through collaboration with other UN agencies in a structured interaction with the GOT. Despite the structure of the UNDAP and the major effort committed by senior CO staff to co-ordination

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<sup>53</sup> FAO is a member of the P4P Steering Committee.

processes in Dar es Salaam, there is limited evidence of any such results having been achieved. Institutional silos remain obstinately upright.

48. Informants argued that WFP's collaboration with WHO and FAO was insufficient and that opportunities had been missed with UNICEF. Most significantly, as argued elsewhere in the CPE report, WFP did not adequately grasp the emerging opportunity to build synergy with the GOT, UN agencies, the World Bank and bilateral DPs like DFID in building the national social protection system.

### **Issues for the future**

49. Clearly, the DAO process has major weaknesses that have negative impacts on WFP. However, it is not an option for WFP to disengage. Renewed efforts will need to be made at both country and head office levels to try and ensure that the DAO/UNDAP process is more effective.

50. The CO should work with partner agencies to find fresh ways of minimising the bureaucratic burden of DAO, optimising the synergistic value that it should be able to add, and focusing on what should be the core purpose: joint action by UN agencies that finally starts to break down the silos in which they still too often operate.

51. The CPE findings suggest similar issues regarding the new UNDAP as for WFP's own portfolio in Tanzania, i.e. the need to integrate operational activities in a smaller number of geographical areas, in support of local capacities, to ensure economies of scale, to document learning, and to use it to inform further policy development and roll-out at national level.

52. With this in mind, WFP could play a constructive role in the UNDAP II development process by advocating such a strategy, while avoiding becoming overly immersed in the process. For example, it could be advocating that the UN system focus more on building government capacity to deliver on policy commitments at local level.

53. Given the difficulties in UN agencies agreeing on priorities themselves, it may be worthwhile encouraging the Government to play a more proactive role in providing a steer to UN agencies on the essential roles they can play.



## **Annex L Gender**

### **Gender in Tanzania: 2011–2014**

1. Gender equality and women's empowerment form a major component of the National Poverty Reduction Strategies (MKUKUTA II in Mainland and MKUZA II in Zanzibar) under the goals on governance, education and health. Tanzania has made progress in advancing gender equality, although challenges remain.
2. The country ranks 125th out of 155 countries on the Gender-related Development Index for 2009 (UNDP, 2013), but also ranks 66th out of 136 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report, 2013 (World Economic Forum, 2013: 354).
3. Primary school enrolment ratios for girls and boys are almost equal, though the gender balance deteriorates for secondary school, with 88 per cent girls to boys enrolling in secondary school in 2012. Dropout rates in Tanzania's primary schools averaged 4.5 per cent and in secondary schools were 13.8 per cent (GOT, 2014b: 36). Although truancy is the highest single reason for dropouts in primary (75.7 per cent) and secondary schools (76.1 per cent), early pregnancies (4.4 per cent) and marriage continue to contribute significantly to school dropouts (GOT, 2014b: 36).
4. Women's representation in the Union parliament was 36.5 per cent (102 seats) following the 2010 general elections. Women parliamentarians in Zanzibar hold 30 per cent of the seats.
5. Women face challenges in economic empowerment and continue to be more likely than men to be poor and illiterate. Women are also more likely to be subject to gender-based violence, and they usually have less access than men to medical care, property ownership, credit, training and employment (AEO, 2013).
6. Tanzania has made some commendable progress in advancing gender equality. As mentioned above, primary school enrolment ratios for girls and boys are almost equal (UNCT Tanzania, 2011a), though the gender balance deteriorates with transition to secondary and higher levels. The share of girls enrolled in secondary schools increased from around 30 per cent in the last decade to 46.3 per cent in 2012.
7. However, the challenge remains with regard to retention and performance of girls at all levels of education. In addition, early pregnancies and marriage continue to contribute significantly to school dropouts among girls in both rural and urban areas.
8. Over 23.3 million Tanzanians were active in the labour force at the 2012 population census. However, only 16.6 million were employed. Women's labour force participation is quite high (8.5 million in 2011 against 8 million for men) with a narrow gender gap of about 2.3 per cent, although the gap in skilled labour is larger (22 per cent) (UNCT Tanzania, 2011a). Between 800,000 to 1 million young people graduate into the labour market each year.
9. Domestic violence against women is still prevalent. While Tanzania has undertaken major reforms (including reforms of family and land laws) to protect women's rights, inequalities persist.

### **Gender and WFP**

10. Translating the WFP Gender Policy into practice is sometimes challenging. For instance, WFP HQ provides limited funding for gender mainstreaming work by the Tanzania Country Office. The CO once applied for funding on gender mainstreaming, targeting income-generating activities for women, including fish ponds, training and creation of women's SACCOs, but was not allocated any. It appears that gender

mainstreaming is sometimes regarded as addressing women in isolation rather than in tandem with men. Sensitisation of WFP staff at sub offices has been held on a few occasions. But instead of setting a plan to address gender mainstreaming, more often posters are used to mobilise change in perceptions.

11. Gender mainstreaming measures by WFP have included ensuring that women are not overburdened with additional workloads through WFP-supported activities. Moreover, the main strategy has focused on reducing their workload through shared work. Among specific projects where WFP targets women are FFA activities and income-generating activities through P4P.

#### *Gender priorities in the WFP portfolio: refugees*

12. A **gender disaggregated overview** on the status of women in the SPR for the first year of the review period (WFP, 2012b) acknowledged poor nutrition as a serious problem among women of reproductive age, and that half of pregnant women in Tanzania were often anaemic. The report also mentioned that one in ten women in the country were malnourished.

13. Concerning the **status of women among people with HIV**, the SPR noted that prevalence of HIV among women was at 6.6%, while among men the prevalence was around 4.6%. The report mentions that **support for PLHIV on anti-retroviral therapy** shows a higher proportion of women were accessed compared to men. The reason given was that men tend to be more resistant to declaring their HIV status openly and therefore avoid being reached. Moreover, women who are responsible for managing food at the household level find it essential to fetch food rations.

14. In the **education sector**, the overview showed that the overall rate of enrolment in primary schools in the year 2010 was at 95.4 per cent, with that for girls being slightly higher at 95.6 per cent. There was nearly no gender disparity between the sexes at the primary school level, but girls' enrolment was slightly higher. Disparities were stated as being more common among girls and boys in pastoral communities.

15. **Specific objective 3** for this work with refugees early in the review period, to "improve the nutritional status of targeted pregnant women (PLW) through blanket feeding programme", indicated a focus on improving women's health status (WFP, 2013a).

16. **Sensitisation of leaders** at Nyarugusu refugee camp was applied as a measure to ensure that women were encouraged to participate in Food Distribution Committees, and to control food management at the household levels. Training in gender-related issues and on WFP's Gender Policy was also arranged for WFP staff and for staff from partner organisations.

17. Impacts observed from WFP sponsored gender or women empowerment focused training interventions in 2011 included increased women's participation in food management at the household level, increased involvement of women in leadership roles, and more men allowing women to take a more active role in decision-making on food assistance management.

18. The 2012 **CHS (Community Household Surveillance)** showed that 59 per cent of households sampled stated that decisions on the utilisation or distribution of foodstuffs at the household level were now undertaken by women at the Nyarugusu camp.

19. Moreover, other progress reported included pursuing the **recruitment of women as food monitors** (WFP, 2013a). However, it was reported that the

environment in the camp proved challenging for recruiting women as food monitors, making it harder to attract them to the role.

20. On the **outcome side**, support to refugees early in the period had a **strategic objective number 3**, which pursued and monitored the gender ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools (WFP, 2013a). The base value was given as 0.57 and the latest follow-up ratio was 0.5, which showed a slight decline in disparities.

21. **UNFPA** is one of the UN agencies working in partnership with WFP on addressing sexual and reproductive health and gender-based violence at the refugee camps.

22. The 2014 SPR on food assistance to refugees (WFP, 2015d), stated that women and girls accounted for more than half of all **WFP beneficiaries** with regard to provision of food assistance to the 75,000 refugees and targeted host communities.

23. In 2014, WFP continued to encourage women to becoming part of the **food distribution and management committees (FDC)** through advocacy and sensitisation. This resulted in 12 women (46 per cent) being appointed to the FDC in Nyarugusu camp among the 26 members of the two FDC committees there. Furthermore, inroads made by women into food distribution committees were seen to have increased their involvement in business management and distribution of food.

24. WFP also **collaborated with UNHCR** in issuing ration cards to women as heads of household. This shift was designed to ensure that food provisions were distributed to women, and hence to give them control over resources at the household level. More than 70 per cent of the ration cards were issued in the name of women.

25. According to **the 2014 CHS**, 65 per cent of respondents to a survey at Nyarugusu camp supported the issuing of ration cards in the names of women as a measure that would reduce the sale of food aid and improve decision-making at the household level.

26. However, 35 per cent of respondents were opposed to this shift. Reasons stated for their opposition included the cultural inappropriateness of the change, which could cause a loss of respect for men and result in some men reducing financial support to their households. In addition, it was argued that other results could include domestic violence, and perhaps even separations.

27. Increased **sensitisation and education sessions** during the introduction of the shift in issuing ration cards to women were mentioned as possible interventions that could mitigate the tensions and risks of increased cultural tensions in the camp.

28. WFP's participation in the UN's **IAGG (Inter Agency Task Force on Gender)** was reported as a measure that improved its capacity for dealing with gender issues, as well as for addressing sexual and gender violence.

29. Among **cross-cutting indicators** introduced by the WFP in 2013–2014 were those on monitoring the “proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food or cash vouchers.”

30. The 2014 SPR on food assistance to refugees (WFP, 2015d) noted that surveys in Nyarugusu camp have shown that most **respondents surveyed** (72 per cent) supported empowering women as primary decision-makers on the utilisation of food at the household level. Moreover, 22 per cent of the respondents surveyed were convinced that this obligation was a joint responsibility, while 14% thought men

should remain the sole decision-makers in this case. The SPR stated that there was no marked increase in tension at the household level as a result of this shift.

31. The SPR noted that WFP monitors the **proportion of households where women make decisions** over the use of cash/voucher or food at the Nyarugusu camp. The base value was 72%, and the project target was 50%, while the latest follow-up was at 72%. In short, the data showed that the target had been exceeded with more women making decisions over cash/voucher or food.

32. The proportion of **women beneficiaries in leadership positions** in project management committees was similarly monitored by WFP. For instance at Nyarugusu, the targeted value at the conclusion of the operation was 50%, while the base value was 46% and the follow-up value was 46%. This shows that women still had not reached the 50% mark in leadership positions within management committees.

33. With regard to **protection and accountability of the affected populations**, WFP reports the use of Town Hall type meetings to discuss camp issues around sexual and gender-based violence, as well as girls' school attendance.

34. Other cross-cutting indicators applied by WFP include the "proportion of assisted (women or men) informed about the programme – who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain". The end-of-project target was pegged at 80% for both women and men, while base values were 98% for women and 80% for men, and latest values were 98% for women and 83% for men. This shows that **more women are informed on the programme than men**.

35. There were also indicators on SO1 regarding saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies. In this context, WFP monitored the dietary score in both female- and male-headed households. According to the 2014 data, the end of project value was pegged at a diet diversity score above 4.60 for female-headed households (similar to male-headed households), and a base value dietary diversity score of above 4.60 for both female- and male-headed households. There was no score reading given in the latest 2014 report.

36. UNHCR commissioned the **IRC as the lead agency in gender and protection issues** in the camp. IRC worked with other partners, including WFP, through working meetings to address SGBV, and collaborated through Inter-Agency Meetings to develop coordination guidelines, as well as GBV Standard Operating Procedures. IRC also organised workshops on a GBV Information Sharing Protocol to provide information on pragmatic interventions. IRC dealt with child protection, responsible education, GBV prevention and response, community-based rehabilitation, and youth development.

37. **The International Rescue Committee (IRC)** was the partner organisation dealing with gender-based violence issues at the Kigoma Transit Centre and the Nyarugusu camp. IRC ran education programmes, community awareness, child protection, response, youth and child development. According to field visits, IRC managed GBV prevention relating to domestic incidents between spouses, quarrels, theft cases, GBV counselling of refugees, and prevention of rape.

38. IRC and WFP therefore took measures to resolve food ration related disputes, especially where women faced threats from husbands. In such cases the IRC intervened by arranging allocation of the ration card to women. In the past, ration cards imbued men with remarkable status and power, and this resulted in some men seeing themselves as entitled to dispose of any household resources, including food rations, at will. In a few instances, where food stocks were depleted in households, women were harassed and held accountable for sourcing food.

39. For the most part, refugees felt that they had to protect their culture, and therefore IRC prevented them from indulging in early marriages, forced marriages and child marriages. Resistance persisted among some men to accepting decisions made by women leaders, and some men resisted meetings where heads of household were supposed to attend. IRC also maintained fatherhood groups where men acted as volunteers who were trained to address GBV cases in Nyarugusu camp.

40. More than **60 GBV cases were recorded each month at Nyarugusu Camp**. In some cases GBV incidents were not associated with food-related matters but other domestic issues. Data shared by IRC show that in 2011 there were 967 GBV cases against women and 87 against men; in 2012 a total of 689 cases were reported against women and 22 against men; as of 2013 there were 432 cases against women and 43 against men; and lastly, in 2014 a total of 493 cases were reported against women, and 55 against men. Data on GBV cases (e.g., rape, attempted rape, sexual harassment, denial of resources or opportunity or services, psychological and emotional abuse, forced marriage, early marriage, domestic violence, and other cultural based forms of physical assault, punishment, or force on the individual) were collected at the camp by the IRC Protection Unit and dispatched to the Technical Unit at UNHCR in Dar Es Salaam for analysis and consolidation.

41. ADRA is another WFP partner organisation that addressed women's empowerment. This included implementing affirmative action in the recruitment of women among its staff.

42. The **Women's Legal Aid Centre** is a local organisation dealing with specialised legal services for women and children in Nyarugusu Camp. The organisation provided legal representation for or on behalf of refugee women.

#### *Gender priorities elsewhere in the portfolio*

43. According to a 2012 SPR (WFP, 2013b), FFA activities targeted vulnerable communities that were prone to recurring economic shocks and climate variability. However, **female participation in core FFA activities was stated as a continuing challenge**. Nevertheless, an FFA food line survey in 2012 showed that women's participation in FFA projects was particularly high, especially in assembly meetings where prioritisation or choice of community assets was decided.

44. Gender **participation in food committees** varied between FFA projects, with women's participation being highest in food management committees, and second highest in asset creation committees where 50 to 75 per cent of members were women. Nevertheless, **in decision-making committees, men dominated the leadership roles**. Cultural practices in the respective communities were identified as the main hurdle. As regards women's involvement in Field Monitoring positions, this remained an area where men dominated over women. Very few women sent applications for Field Monitoring jobs.

45. A Health and Nutrition training focused on **women's participation in the cash and transfer pilot** in Mtwara Region focused on advocacy messages directed at men to embrace the importance of their attention to maternal and child health issues. The training events were designed to raise men's responsibility on MCHN within the household and the community. Out of 58 community health workers trained in 2012, 27 were women.

46. Gender equality indicators monitored by WFP on **food monitors** show that out of 25 monitors, only 3 were women. There was only one female food monitor in SF projects, FFA projects, and in HIV/AIDS interventions. No female food monitors existed among the three food monitors in MCHN projects, and all three food monitors in supplementary feeding were male.

47. Concerning the monitoring of **girls and boys enrolled in primary schools within the SF programme**, the average annual rate of change in numbers of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools had a base project value of -5.4 for girls (-9.3 for boys), and a follow-up value of -0.75 for girls (and -1.48 for boys). A previous follow-up reading showed the values at -3.57 for girls and -2.99 for boys. Overall, these data show marginal improvements for girls.
48. On indicators monitored with regard to the **ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools**, the data provided by a 2012 SPR on the Country Programme (WFP, 2013b) showed the base value for girls at 0.99, while the previous value was 0.98, with the latest value returning to the base value of 0.99.
49. The **attendance rate for girls in WFP assisted primary schools** was monitored from a base value of 95.53 (95.87) which dropped to 92.54 (92.3) in the previous reading, before climbing slightly to 92.94 (92.16) in the latest follow-up. The data show that the decline in attendance among boys persisted.
50. In supplementary feeding, a 2012 SPR showed that the percentage of supported lactating women who received a **post natal check-up** in 2012 started at a base value of 92%, with the latest reading increasing to 94% (WFP, 2013b).
51. A 2013 SPR (WFP, 2014a) noted that a **Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis** (CFSVA) carried out in 2010 revealed that households with poor consumption, especially female-headed households, on the whole had lower expenditures, and were frequently more exposed to animal pests and plant diseases. Poor food consumption was associated with ownership of less productive assets and vulnerability to shocks that affect crops and livestock.
52. On progress towards gender equality, the 2013 SPR reveals that gender balance was taken into consideration in the composition of school committees. The target was to maintain equal representation of women and men, but their proportions appeared to be more dependent on the actual number of female and male teachers in each school. The report found that there was a strong correlation between the number of female teachers at a school and the proportion of female representatives in the school committees. Moreover, WFP continued promoting and encouraging schools to nominate a member of the opposite sex as the alternate leader in the school food management committee.
53. In **FFA interventions** priority was directed at targeting female-headed households. Nevertheless, the decision on who was eventually selected was a prerogative of the village assembly.
54. In nutrition programmes, **ration cards were issued to women**, mothers or caregivers. In addition, WFP advocated increased male involvement in commitment to improving infant and young child feeding practices and improving the nutritional health of women. Men were also being encouraged to accompany their children to clinics under the MCHN programme.
55. Observations from the six month **cash transfer pilot exercise** in Mtwara Region showed that distribution of cash entitlements directly to PLW increased women's control over decisions regarding the distribution of financial resources within the household.
56. A forum was organized for UN agencies' GFPs by UN Women, in which GFPs expanded their knowledge and skills in gender mainstreaming. In addition, the UN **Delivering as One (DAO)** encouraged WFP staff to be more sensitive to gender aspects.

57. In the year 2012–2013 training was held for all UN staff on gender mainstreaming, especially for key staff relevant to the DAO initiative. The training helped in strengthening awareness in gender issues, especially in going beyond male/female attributes.

58. In 2010–2011 a gender network system existed, as well as a gender advocacy network. This gender network system was previously at every sub office, and each unit was supposed to have a GFP.

59. In refugee camps, gender mainstreaming activities mainly addressed household surveillance on food sufficiency at the household level, and distribution of ration cards to women. This component had a more gender-targeted focus on addressing inequalities. Refugee camps are a setting where gender mainstreaming is more systematically organized and managed.

60. Women were given ration cards in their name in the refugee camps as a measure to increase their control on food hand-outs for the family, but also to increase their decision-making power and status in the camps. However, sensitisation of household members on the benefits of women empowerment was not adequately addressed.

61. WFP's GFPs were appointed on the basis of interest in working on gender mainstreaming issues. However, some were recruited in relation to the nature of the programme components they were engaged in. Once appointed they were given the opportunity to participate in workshops to update their technical capacity.

62. Previously opportunities for gender training for GFPs were made available through WFP. Later these opportunities ceased; instead GFPs were expected to participate in meetings rather than manage gender-responsive programme interventions. UN Women was the UN agency most targeting and supporting the GFPs.

63. According to the HR Office at the WFP CO, GFP was an additional responsibility to an existing job description and TOR.

64. Capacity building of GFPs was once undertaken through a three-day workshop at the Regional Bureau in South Africa. The workshop reviewed the role of GFPs, shared experiences, and explained what being a GFP entailed. WFP also created access to online training for GFPs. This certificate training through the WFP website focused on gender analysis. But there was little immediate incentive for most staff to undertake the courses.

65. The main gaps as regards GFPs were those pertaining to formal knowledge on **what a GFP was supposed to do**. These gaps involved capabilities required for analysis of gender and mainstreaming. GFP work requires more knowledge than was actually provided. The gap made the GFPs' work hard because they had to navigate on their own. The focus was more often on commitment to working on women's issues.

66. It was observed that GFPs are not aware how the **National Nutrition Policy** in Tanzania addresses gender issues.

67. WFP's P4P activity supported rural women with agro-processing equipment. This was aimed at reducing rural women's work load. However, in other activities GFPs were not adequately prepared to address gender issues in other current issues in existing programmes. They mainly lacked knowledge and skills in using gender markers, gender budgeting, and addressing cultural and human rights issues. On the other hand, some of the experienced GFPs could easily become resource persons to

teach other GFPs and programme staff how to manage gender issues in their respective areas.

68. A 2014 SPR (WFP, 2015b) noted that school Food Management Committees (FMCs) had variable gender balance among male and female membership. The leadership position in an FMC was determined by whether the head teacher was male or female. Overall, the proportion of female leaders in FMCs was below WFP targets. In order to amend this situation, WFP was to continue sensitising community members on the necessity of creating gender balance in decision-making forums.

69. WFP reported that women's leadership increases participation of women, as well as enhancing the handling of gender issues in project activities. WFP has for instance assisted in constructing rainwater harvesting tanks in 24% of WFP-assisted schools, as a measure to reduce girls' time burden in fetching water and giving them time to concentrate on their studies. Another gender-specific measure by FMCs was the exemption of girls from involvement in preparing school meals. Most FMCs influenced their schools to recruit a female and male cook, in order to ensure that gender balance was upheld within the SF job opportunities.

70. In FFA activities, female heads of household were prioritised in selecting food-insecure households. Community demographics also meant that a higher proportion of female heads of household were accessed. Most Food and Asset Management Committees had equal representation between the sexes among their 12 members.

71. WFP and its partners also continued with sensitisation of community members on the benefits of sharing work or domestic chores between women and men at the household level.

72. With regard to cross-cutting indicators, WFP monitored the proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees. The project target value in 2014 was 50%, but the latest follow-up value on the proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions in FFE was 12.5%. On the other hand, as concerns FFA committees, the project target value was at 50% and the base value was at 50%.

73. Moreover the target proportion of assisted people (women/men) informed about FFA activities – e.g., what people will receive, who is included, where people can complain) was 90% for both women and men at the end of intervention. The base value showed that more men (77.50%) than women (68.50%) were informed.

74. Additional indicators from the SF programme monitored the attendance rate of boys and girls in WFP-assisted primary schools. The end-of-project target for boys was pegged at 92.94% and for girls at 92.16%. Meanwhile the latest follow-up shows there was a decline for both sexes, with attendance for boys dipping more significantly from 89.10% to 87.40%, and girls' attendance falling from 90.20% to 89.50%.

75. Pass rates for boys and girls in WFP assisted primary schools dropped from a base value of 54.60% for boys, and 47.80% for girls, to 25.00% and 20.00% respectively.

76. As concerns retention of boys and girls in WFP-assisted primary schools, the project target value was 98.00% for both boys and girls. But follow-up values showed that slightly more boys were staying in school (98.12%), as well as girls (98.52%).

#### *Gender disaggregation, gender balance and proactivity*

77. Disaggregation of data by sex and gender creates opportunities for gender mainstreaming, as does monitoring and assessing gender issues in various interventions.



78. For instance, the P4P project appeared to have relatively strong gender mainstreaming elements, which emerged more as an initiative of the officer in charge. In a way, success in gender mainstreaming in WFP seems to be anchored by the efforts of the respective staff, rather than the support from the GFPs.

79. It is not clear who did the analysis of gender indicators at the country portfolio level. The Strategic Results Framework comprised all indicators at all levels, both output and outcome, as well as cross-cutting indicators. The 2014–2017 Strategic Results Framework Indicator Compendium provided a list of Mandatory Indicators for each programme or project. Follow-up on indicators was based on resources available. The Indicator Compendium explained the methodology to be followed and how to go about collecting data on each respective indicator.

80. The **M&E Unit at the Country Office** tracked gender mainstreaming outputs for men/women, boys/girls at the programme level (e.g., the proportion of assisted women, men, or both women and men who make decisions over the use of cash, vouchers or food within the household, proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees, and the proportion of women Project Management Committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution).

81. At the **outcome level**, WFP distinguished male and female headed households, as well as other types of heads of households such as child and grandparent headed. Previously Food Security Analysis did not distinguish between male-headed households and female-headed households or ownership. Monitoring of sex disaggregated information was also undertaken on proportions of male and female leaders in the SF Committees.

82. Since 2014, the **Corporate Strategic Plan** has made gender indicators mandatory for protection, partnership and accountability. FFA activities also provided analysis on gender relation dynamics within the households represented. This was undertaken through targeting females or female-headed households as food recipients. Most FFW participants were women. Up to 70% of food-insecure households were headed by women.

83. **FFA** project activities were popular among households because the projects were mainly in food deficit areas. Moreover, food payments were preferred because food was perceived as for the household, while cash was considered as the right of men. WFP used the presence and participation of women as criteria for selecting which projects to support. Cases have been mentioned where women were forcefully dispossessed of cash by their partners and this underlined their preference for payment in the form of food rather than cash. WFP has been urged by some of its stakeholders to continue providing food rather than cash as payment for work rendered.

84. FFA interventions seem to have **reduced gender barriers** through encouraging men to accept women's choices in selection of project installations.

85. WFP's interventions in MCHN should be extended to reach adolescent girls, while engagement of men and their commitment should be further sought.

86. Promotion of **men accompanying their spouses** on the first clinic visit conformed with government policy and ongoing campaigns to increase male involvement in family health issues. This is also in line with the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children's policy statement number 42.

87. According to the Children Development Policy's paragraph 63, the **Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children** (MCDGC) is responsible for coordinating children's issues at the national level. The Ministry observed that

WFP failed to consult closely with it about its involvement. It was mentioned that the government policy on children deals with observance of nutritional aspects for children. The MCDGC is the line ministry responsible for advocacy on nutrition at the community level. It could therefore be engaged as a partner to track and monitor the nutritional well-being of children through community development officers at the district council level.

88. The best approach would have been for WFP to engage the Ministry as the main advocacy agent in propagating nutrition issues among children at the community level. MCDGC should have been awarded the task of working on advocacy issues and behaviour change interventions at the community and household levels.

*Gender analysis of hunger challenges, food security, and nutrition*

89. The Comprehensive Household Survey of Refugee Households (CHS) (undertaken in June/July 2014) provided useful information on gender relations pertaining to women's empowerment. For instance the **decision to re-distribute food ration cards at the household in women's names** encountered some resistance, but majority acceptance. In a few households, the empowerment of women as household food ration recipients encountered negative internal gender relation dynamics which affected the distribution of food rations. Promoting women's responsibility for decision-making or membership on Food Committees at the household level has not influenced the way women are involved in decisions around resources.

90. The verification exercise by UNHCR, besides shifting food management and distribution from men to women, also created an opportunity for empowering women and changing their status at the household level. Nevertheless, it is thought by some (e.g., UNHCR staff at Kasulu District Offices) that the distribution of food entitlements to women did not have a huge impact on gender relations at the household level. Irrespective of this, the CHS collected a useful amount of gender-related information on the camp, with significant disaggregation of women and men.

91. It was stated by WFP's GFPs that the nature of any WFP activity enhanced or diminished the gender mainstreaming potential. For instance, proper addressing of gender issues in nutrition depended on dissecting the demographics of male and female community members or beneficiaries.

92. FFA depended on the presence of food-insecure households, and also on the household representative who turned up for the work. But it also depends on the household gender dynamics and relationships. Men appeared to dislike FFA interventions. P4P's agricultural activities were mainly dominated by women, a factor which burdens them with multiple tasks. WFP introduced tools to reduce women's time and work burdens in P4P activities.

93. In SF, WFP partners tracked the progress of girls and boys. For instance at **Sanganigwa Children's Home**, girls were assessed as more vulnerable and slower in achieving self-supervision. Counselling was also held for both girls and boys, either individually or in group format. Girls were seen to generally perform better than boys academically, with two girls taking degree courses at the University of Dar es Salaam. WFP's MoUs with partner organizations had strong elements on the partner's obligation to address gender aspects and on empowering girls.

94. Sex and gender disaggregation of data was upheld by partner organizations in all reproductive health programmes, and in disaggregation of female and male staff.

95. WFP had special CO gender awareness activities on the 25th of each month from 2013. On this particular day staff wore orange coloured T-shirts, and shared advocacy knowledge on a specific GBV topic of the day.

### *Enhanced gender equity and reduction of gender gaps*

96. The problem of men selling household food rations at refugee camps has been partly addressed. Moreover, men largely accepted that women took charge of management of ration cards for food resources at the household level. Packaging was also reduced to fit the carrying capacity of women. Men accompanied women to fetch firewood in order to reduce the risk of rape. Food distribution committees (six of 12 representatives) and work committee (three of six representatives) each had 50% representation of women and men.

97. Gender disaggregation of customs and traditions of various refugees by nationality was accessible. Refugees from Burundi were assessed as more conservative as regards changing their strongly patriarchal gender relations, especially in relation to promoting women to leadership positions. Cultural background was influential in enabling women's participation.

98. WFP staff at the Kasulu sub office said that Food Committee membership and leadership were strong evidence for such sex and gender disaggregation and accountability. For instance out of 26 Food Committee members, 50% were women. Food Distribution Teams also comprised a fair share of male and female membership. This was deemed as a way of enabling women to acquire opportunities for leadership.

99. **Reduction of gender gaps** was experienced with regard to most primary schools experiencing a relatively higher proportion of girls, and in some areas children were pushed by their parents to start school earlier due to the presence of the SF programme. School dropout problems also decreased in primary schools where the feeding programme exists.

100. On the whole, in most primary schools where SF exists, communities were motivated to contribute towards their schools, children were performing better in national examinations, enrolment increased, and parents were saving food, energy and financial resources at the household level. In case where food deficit situations implied choices being made on who to prioritise in feeding first and most, the SF programme meant liberation for some parties, especially girls and women.

101. WFP achieved positive gender relations in most of its activities. Nevertheless, at the household level the cultural norms, values and influences still favour men.

102. On the staff side, gender relations have been changing with time. Women are as a policy always encouraged to apply and given priority under affirmative action if they possess equal qualifications to male candidates. Nevertheless, the WFP Kasulu and Dodoma sub offices were still dominated by male staff at the end of the review period. The now closed WFP Arusha sub office was dominated by female staff. The CO in Dar es Salaam had more male staff. All drivers were men, except for WFP's only female driver, who was retrenched in 2014 – she had worked for more than six years without accidents.

103. Total staff, including volunteers, at WFP numbered 119 (31 women and 88 men) as of 2014. There were also 12 international staff (9 men), of whom 3 were volunteers.

104. WFP's recruitment policy advertised vacant positions with strong encouragement for women to apply. Usually the response from women averaged 20 to 30 per cent of all applicants. Women were usually more attracted to administrative posts, followed by programme positions (up to 40% of applicants were women). Driver jobs attracted very few female applicants.

105. WFP had an **affirmative recruitment policy** which encouraged women to be included in outsourced positions. In nearly all Field Level Agreements (FLAs) and MoUs with partner organisations or institutions, WFP **categorically required the recruitment of women** in several of the outsourced positions or interventions.

106. **Affirmative action** was used to populate positions of monitors with women. Affirmative action on proportional representation of women on all committees was viewed as a direct impact from gender mainstreaming by WFP. In the SF programme, a number of schools opted for recruiting a male and female cook instead of preference for male-only cooks. In fact, quite a few schools decided not to recruit an all-female outfit because they realised cooking is hard work, and women already have a burdensome routine at home.

107. With regard to women's involvement and household decision-making patterns, livelihood opportunities surveys, such as the UNHCR-sponsored CHS and PDM, carried out by WFP or its partners, were the main source of information..

108. Women's involvement in the various Committees was monitored through a range of sex disaggregated indicators. There were two types of indicators: Corporate Indicators, which are given to all WFP projects, and Project Specific Indicators, which can be devised locally or from previous experiences. The latter require clearance from WFP Headquarters.

109. A 2012 evaluation on P4P revealed that the programme was gender blind. However, the Programme drafted a gender mainstreaming proposal and sought funding from USAID. Initially P4P programme was designed as an intervention for developing SACCOSs, unconcerned with upholding gender balance in these societies' membership. It later built a strong capacity building component for female and male farmers on how to grow quality crops, warehousing and other measures. Women farmers are thought to extend their P4P knowledge to their households. FFA had food committees and Asset Management Committees where a 50/50 representation of women and men was upheld.

#### *Gender differentials and livelihood parameters*

110. Prevention and mitigation of SGBV was an area under the mandate of the UNHCR in the camps, and LGAs in host communities. SGBV interventions involved men accompanying their wives or spouses to the clinic when fetching CSB and other foods. Secondly, WFP provided information on the underlying factors of malnutrition to both women and men, as a way to reduce or prevent low birth weight.

111. Education on behaviour change and communications was given to women on how to feed their infants and toddlers, and on how to care for them. Nevertheless, challenges emerged where some women shared their rations with other non-eligible family members, including their husbands. The fact that the targeted food was consumed by other family members reflected a partial failure in convincing men not to infringe on food meant to improve the health of their unborn children and/or their expectant spouses.

112. Moreover, men were still reluctant to accompany their spouses to clinics, unless forced by threats that their spouses would be denied clinical services. In addition CHWs were used to follow up on compliance by both PLW and men. Some of the men who accompany their spouses to clinic were said to be unhappy about the measure, but women were happier when the health facility staff requested their husbands to attend clinics.

113. A hidden success in the WFP supplementary feeding activity for PLW is the fact that where the activity took place up to 98% of pregnant women delivered at a health facility. A second hidden achievement is the fact that WFP-supported

programme areas in SF and MCHN nearly all achieved and surpassed Tanzania's MDG goals numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5.

114. On the FFE side, attention to breaking down gender barriers was monitored less closely because tracking was mainly focused on the output level rather than the gender aspects of the impact of SF on educational performance of girls and boys. At the output level, monitoring was mainly focused on enrolment and retention. The analysis is wanting on the outcome level. There was no terminal evaluation of most WFP activities, including SF.

### **Summary**

115. The aim of addressing gender mainstreaming in this evaluation is multiple. Besides finding out what works in the WFP activities as regards gender mainstreaming, the evaluation also aimed to find out what lessons there are and how these can be applied to strengthen WFP's practice in consolidating gender sensitive practices.

116. Gender sensitivity is undeniably a crucial element for WFP. However it cannot be downloaded in a top-down manner, but rather built through innovative good practice.

117. The evaluation has undoubtedly identified and recognised several achievements, strengths, and challenges on addressing gender equality and equity aspects in WFP programmes and projects. Among some of the more commendable achievements is the increased tracking of gender or cross-cutting indicators across a wider range of WFP supported interventions and communities.

118. Moreover, the evaluation has revealed that WFP has been concerned with reducing negative impacts on women and men in WFP-supported interventions, whether through expanding women's involvement in decision-making forums, improving women's status at the household level, protecting women and preventing domestic violence against women, reducing gender stereotypes, and increasing girls' access to and performance in the education system.

119. WFP supported and encouraged understanding of gender issues, recognised women's leadership qualities, realised women's time and work burden, and recognised the need for systematic monitoring of improvements or impediments to more cordial gender relations.

120. Gender mainstreaming in WFP operations predominated within food distribution in refugee camps, SF, SPRs, beneficiary identification, P4P interventions, and MCHN activities.

121. Key achievements in gender mainstreaming are observed in school performance, retention, enrolment, improved status of women, equal representation of women in decision-making, and increased employment of women.

122. Previously, staff in the CO had training in gender analysis and mainstreaming. But later this practice was not regular. New staff charged with overseeing gender issues were not given necessary capacity building support. GFPs felt that they were not treated as team members by other staff.

123. General accountability in the present setup was based in the GFP position. Moreover, the onus for mainstreaming in programme components rested with the respective programme officer, and was dependent on their capacity to carry out the gender analysis and mainstreaming responsibilities. GFPs were an opportunity yet to be fully developed and exhaustively utilised.

124. Most of WFP's operations managed to address some gender aspects. More so those targeting improving the status of refugee women, or aiming at creating gender balanced education in schools, as well as involvement of women and men on school committees, or other committees created through the WFP activities (e.g. food distribution committees, village based beneficiary selection committees, etc.).

125. The refugee camp setting provided the most lucid gender mainstreaming arrangements (e.g., SGBV prevention and mitigation interventions, improvement of women's status at the household level, empowering women in decision-making bodies, formation of women's support groups, fuel-saving stoves, safety of women and girls in camps). UNHCR dealt with these issues more systematically for a much longer period.

126. WFP managed to instil a regular gender focus and reporting in SF interventions, country programme and standards reports, and in MCHN interventions (e.g. male involvement in supporting spouses and child care).

127. In breaking gender barriers, relapses were detected and complained about by some of the stakeholders, especially as regards men's support and commitment to supporting women in improving the nutritional status of women and children. Secondly, providing women with entitlements as heads of households created a backlash against women in some households.

128. Outstanding challenges in gender mainstreaming include the need to further strengthen capacities to capture various dimensions of women's empowerment through WFP supported interventions. Capacity needed includes enabling WFP staff and communities to deliberate on and discuss how gender norms and values in WFP-supported areas and communities have evolved and been transformed.

129. Moreover, WFP still needs to capture the potential of furthering the existing capacity for consolidating gender mainstreaming and analysis skills among staff at the CO and field level, and among partners and gender experts.

130. In addition, WFP needs to reinforce GFPs' autonomy, authority, resources, time and support in managing gender mainstreaming obligations. Such measures will achieve vast benefits going beyond targeting and counting women, avoiding making stereotype assumptions, grounding gender relations in maximising positive power dynamics, and transforming local contexts.

131. More supportive leadership in gender mainstreaming programmes and projects is another area where crucial priority is required at the WFP CO. This should ideally include additional capacity building on gender analysis and planning for all WFP staff, increasing performance in gender mainstreaming by all managers, and integrating gender equality and equity into the design of programmes and projects.

## **Conclusions**

132. Priority areas for gender mainstreaming in the WFP country programme were largely congruent with the main intervention areas with regard to food assistance (e.g. entitling women as recipients of food aid, introducing women into food distribution committees); access to education (as well as encouraging-gender balanced representation on SF committees, or recruitment of cooks); MCHN (e.g. encouraging men to support health and nutrition wellbeing of their spouses and children); and in FFA (e.g., prioritising women headed households in selection for work opportunities).

133. As regards alignment between WFP's programme priorities and gender mainstreaming priority areas, observations above show that there is largely increased alignment, especially from 2013 onwards. This is also the period when WFP

introduced, adhered to and reported consistently on gender targeted indicators in support of refugees (e.g. empowerment of women at household and camp level), SF (e.g. increasing girls' access to education), FFA (e.g. increasing women's access to food security), and in P4P (e.g. in enabling women to acquire time and labour saving technologies).

134. Key achievements as regards gender equality or equity intervention areas, mainly concerned reducing gender gaps in access and retention and performance in primary school education; improving the status of women in refugee camps, host communities and targeted food deficit districts; improving recruitment opportunities for women in WFP-supported activities; and increased reporting and monitoring of gender equality indicators.

135. WFP-supported interventions where positive gender relations were achieved strongly are mainly in: SF, where a huge proportion of schools observed a sustained gender parity with regard to enrolment, retention and performance between boys and girls; the cash for work pilot exercise which facilitated direct access to financial support for women; in MCHN where PLW as well as their infant children have had direct support for improving their nutrition status; and in FFA interventions through prioritised selection of women as immediate recipients. It should also be underlined that in areas where WFP supported MCHN interventions, maternal and child mortality rates were reduced.

136. On breaking gender barriers at the household level, the immediate and direct evidence is with regard to women being increasingly accepted as food managers at household level in refugee camps, and in introducing male involvement in child care activities.

137. Staff capacity to mainstream gender in WFP remains underdeveloped. Only a limited proportion of WFP's staff are able to undertake a gender analysis or create plans for addressing gender equality or gender equity targeted interventions. However, a relatively higher proportion are able to follow up or monitor sex disaggregated data and information.

138. On the partners' side, there is little proof of systematic efforts to build capacity on addressing gender issues beyond the measures mentioned above.

139. Accountability and responsibility for gender mainstreaming in WFP's activities, interventions, programmes and projects is currently lodged at the GFP level. There was limited evidence at the CO and in sub offices and projects, on who is directly responsible or accountable for gender mainstreaming into MoUs, work plans, strategic results framework, and programmes.

140. Advocacy on gender mainstreaming by WFP was consistently evident in FLAs and MoUs, which stated which gender mainstreaming measures should be adhered to (e.g. mainly in beneficiary proportions, leadership, staffing and capacity development related interventions).

141. All in all, the portfolio showed regularly well performing gender mainstreaming elements across the range of indicators on cross-cutting indicators that were being monitored. Moreover, evidence on gender mainstreaming is more available with regard to gender disaggregated data in a few selected interventions. But the aspect of women's empowerment was not adequately articulated and measured.

## Annex M Recommendations: links to CPE and SER text

Recommendation	See main text paragraph number(s)	See Summary Evaluation Report paragraph number(s)
<p>1. With support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division, Safety Nets and Social Protection Unit), the CO should redefine and restructure any future food assistance contribution in Tanzania (outside its humanitarian food assistance and its P4P agricultural marketing initiative) within the national social protection framework.</p>	<p>92, 104, 158, 176, 187, 203</p>	<p>S.15, S.41</p>
<p>2. The CO, with support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division), should apply as much flexibility as possible in the design, resourcing and management of any further programme of food assistance in Tanzania so that the programme as a whole becomes a tool for creative, proactive support to the GOT - based on profound strategic analysis of WFP's comparative advantage and appropriate roles in Tanzania. To enable this:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP should explore how to maximise delegation of authority for adjustments to budgets and the use of programme funds.</li> <li>• 2016 should be seen as a transition year to be programmed accordingly (e.g. CP extension pending new CS).</li> </ul>	<p>96, 110, 111, 188, 190, 220</p>	<p>S.34, S.36</p>
<p>3. In Tanzania, WFP should shift from operations to advice in its food assistance services. With support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division), the CO should focus on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational services including procurement and logistics to support humanitarian transfers in Tanzania and the region.</li> <li>• Technical assistance, notably on cash and voucher transfers and social protection.</li> <li>• Transfers of food should only be used in refugee emergencies and in any other crises that government cannot handle alone.</li> </ul>	<p>111, 179, 180, 210, 213, 214, 221</p>	<p>S.38, S.39, S.40</p>
<p>4. The CO, with support from RB and HQ (Policy and Programme Division, Emergencies and Transitions Unit) should ensure that any further programme of support to refugees in Tanzania is based on a fundamental reappraisal and justification of WFP's role and comparative advantage in medium- and long-term food assistance to them.</p>	<p>213, 223</p>	<p>S.38, S.42</p>



<p>5. In consultation with HQ (Policy and Programme Division) and the RB, the CO should work constructively and proactively to optimise the value that UN DAO should add to WFP and UN partners' contributions in Tanzania. In order to optimise the synergistic value:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP should undertake a corporate review of WFP's experience with DAO, to clarify its corporate position and responsibilities at different levels.</li> <li>• As the UN prepares for a second generation DAO and an UNDP II in Tanzania, the CO should work with partner agencies to find fresh ways of achieving the recommendations of the 2012 global DAO evaluation, in particular those referring to better UN system support to programme countries and the simplification and harmonisation of business practices.</li> </ul>	<p>70, 102, 147, 156, 161, 198, 202, 224</p>	<p>S.16, S.24, S.27</p>
<p>6. With support from RB and HQ (Gender Office), the CO should ensure that in its future focus on food assistance advisory services in Tanzania, it specifies how the 2015–2020 gender policy will be implemented for each activity/operation. The CO should give priority to the resourcing of this implementation.</p>	<p>59, 68, 87, 109, 141, 150, 151, 152, 200</p>	<p>S.17, S.28</p>

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## Acronyms

AAIDRO	Arusha Archdiocesan Integrated Development and Relief Office
ACF	Action Against Hunger
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AfDF	African Development Fund
AEO	African Economic Outlook
AIDS	Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AMCOS	Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Society
ART	Anti-Retroviral Therapy
ASMR	Age-specific Mortality Rate
BCC	Behaviour Change Communication
BCM	Beneficiary Contact Monitoring
BEST	Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania
BF	Breast Feeding
bn	billion
BMI	Body Mass Index
BRN	Big Results Now
BSF	Blanket Supplementary Feeding
C&V	Cash and voucher
CBTD	Community-based targeting and distribution
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCPD	Common Country Programme Document
CCS	Country Case Study
CD	Country Director
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
CFSNA	Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Assessment
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CHS	Community and Household Surveillance / Comprehensive Household Survey
CHW	Community Health Worker
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIP	Country Investment Plan

CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CMEWS	Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Section
CMTD	Community-managed Targeting and Distribution
CO	Country Office
COBET	Complementary Basic Education in Tanzania
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CP	Country Programme
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CS	Country Strategy
CSB	Corn Soya Blend
CSD	Country Strategy Document
CSEE	Certificate of Secondary Education Examination
DAC	(OECD) Development Assistance Committee
DAO	Delivering as One
DCD	Deputy Country Director
DFATD	Department of Affairs, Trade and Development (Canada)
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DOTS	directly observed treatment, short course (for tuberculosis)
DP	Development Partner
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC	direct support costs
EB	Executive Board of WFP
EC	European Commission
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Analysis
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMG	Evaluation Management Group
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ENS	Emergency Nutrition Surveys
EPWG	Emergency Programme Working Group
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EQ	Evaluation Question
ER	Evaluation Report
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
ESDP	Education Sector Development Plan

ESMIS	Education Sector Management Information System
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCI	Financial Crisis Initiative
FDC	Food Distribution Committee
FEG	Food Economy Group
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFA/W/T/E	Food Assistance for Assets/Work/Training/Education
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FHH	Female-Headed Households
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FO	farmers' organisation
FPF	Forward Purchase Facility
FSD	Food Security Division
FSMS	Food Security Monitoring System
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEEW	gender equality and empowerment of women
GER	General Average Enrolment
GFCS	Global Framework for Climate Services
GFD	General Food Distribution
GFP	Gender Focal Point
GNI	Gross National Income
GOT	Government of Tanzania
g/p/day	grams/person/day
ha	hectare
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer
HAZ	Height-for-age
HEA	Household Economy Approach
HGSF	Home Grown School Feeding
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HLMSCN	High Level Multi-Sectoral Steering Committee on Nutrition

HOSO	Head of Sub office
HQ	Headquarters
HR	human resources
IAGG	Inter-agency Gender Group
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy and Research Institute
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IT	information technology
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JICA	Japan International Co-operation Agency
JP	Joint Programme
KII	Key Informant Interview
LF	Logical Framework
LGA	Local Government Authority
LIPW	labour-intensive public works
LLPIA	Local-Level Participatory Planning and Implementation Approach
LMIC	Lower Middle Income Country
LNS	Lipid-based nutrient supplements
LTA	Long Term Agreement
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
m	million
mt	metric tonne
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MBNP	Mwanzo Bora Nutrition Programme
MCDGC	Ministry of Community Development Gender and Children



MCHN	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MKUKUTA	National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction
MKUZA	Zanzibar strategy for growth and reduction of poverty
MNP	micronutrient powder
MOAFC	Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives
MOEVT	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOHSW	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
MSD	Medical Storage Department
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
mt	metric tonne
MUAC	Mid-upper Arm Circumference
MUCHALI	Tanzania Food Security and Nutrition Analysis System
NACS	Nutrition Assessment, Counselling and Support
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCI	National Capacity Index
nd	no date
NER	National Enrolment Rate
NFRA	National Food Reserve Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNS	National Nutrition Strategy
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NSS	Nutrition Surveillance System
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
ODOC	other direct operational costs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED	Office of Evaluation Director
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OMJ	WFP Regional Bureau Johannesburg
OMN	WFP Regional Bureau Nairobi

P4P	Purchase for Progress
PANITA	Partnership for Nutrition in Tanzania
PCD	Partnership for Child Development
PCI	Project Concern International
PD	Project Document
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PI	Public Information
PLHIV	People Living with HIV
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PME WG	Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation Programme working Group
PMI	President's Malaria Initiative
PMO-DMD	Prime Minister's Office – Disaster Management Department
PMO-RALG	Prime Minister's Office – Regional and Local Government
PMTCT	Prevention of Maternal to Child Transmission
PPP	Patient Procurement Platform
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PSLE	Primary School Leaving Examination
PSSN	Productive Social Safety Net
PUNs	Participating United Nations Agencies
QA	Quality Assurance
QS	Quality Support
RB	Regional Bureau
RBJ	Regional Bureau Johannesburg
RBN	Regional Bureau Nairobi
RCH	Reproductive and Child Health
RD	Regional Director
REACH	Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and undernutrition
RMS	Results Monitoring System
RUSF	Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food
RVA	Risk and Vulnerability Analysis
SABER	Systems Approach for Basic Education
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Co-operative Society
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania

SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SENAC	Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SF	school feeding
SFP	School Feeding Programme
SGA	Small for Gestational Age
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SO	Special Operation
SO	Strategic Objective
SP	Strategic Plan
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
STC	Save the Children
SuFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition [movement]
TACAIDS	Tanzania Commission for AIDS
TAFSIP	Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TB	Tuberculosis
TCP	Tuboreshe Chakula Food Processing and Consumption Project
TDHS	Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey
TFNC	Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre
TL	Team Leader
TOC	Theory of Change
TOPT	Tanzania One Procurement Team
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRCS	Tanzania Red Cross Society
TSF	Targeted Supplementary Feeding
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
TWESA	Tanzania Water and Environmental Sanitation
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistance Plan

UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VHW	Village Health Worker
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WHZ	Weight for Height
WG	Working Group
WVI	World Vision International
ZHC	Zero Hunger Challenge



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