

Strategic Evaluation

How WFP Country Offices adapt to change: A Strategic Evaluation

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Everett M. Ressler, *Team Leader*

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Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

1. This is one of four strategic evaluations that WFP's Office of Evaluation (OE) is conducting in the current biennium and that are related to WFP's strategic shift from food aid to food assistance. This evaluation focuses on assessing country offices' ability and capacity to change, based on how they have responded to changes in the external and internal environments over the past five years. Country offices' adoption of the right changes, at the right time, is expected to enhance the relevance of WFP's contribution and lead to more effective efforts to meet hunger needs. The objectives of this evaluation are threefold:

- determine how country offices have adapted to changing needs in the external and internal environments over the past five years;
- assess the processes that country offices have employed to achieve desired changes, identifying factors that seem to facilitate or impede implementation; and
- determine the wider factors – both internal and external – that have facilitated or hindered country offices' ability to change, including elements of the organizational change process related to the introduction of new organizational priorities and tools.

2. Three premises underpin this work: i) adaptation to shifting realities is a necessary and healthy function for organizations. ii) no matter how legitimate, change poses organizational challenges when objectives, strategies or methods of work are altered; iii) management of the change process is a determinant of WFP's ability to achieve desired changes, maintain/improve performance and remain relevant to stakeholders. Recognizing that change is an ongoing process, the evaluation aims primarily to support organizational learning and adaptation.

3. *Methodology.* Initial steps in the evaluation involved developing the evaluation methodology and drafting an inception report, participating in consultations and interviews with WFP staff in Rome, adjusting the Terms of Reference in consideration of these consultations, and undertaking an extensive literature review of internal and external documentation.

4. The principal data collection method was semi-structured interviews. In total, 156 stakeholders were interviewed in Rome, at two regional bureaux – in Kampala and Bangkok – and in the five countries visited – Burundi, Cambodia, Indonesia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. A staff member from the

Kyrgyzstan office was also interviewed. Interviewees included representatives of WFP staff, government partners, donor missions and agencies, other United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other partners. Country visits took place between 2 May and 3 June 2011.

5. The primary criterion for selecting country offices was the reported extent of programme adaptation since the approval of WFP's Strategic Plan 2008–2013; offices embarking on extensive changes and those undertaking fewer changes were both included in the evaluation. Diversity in programme size and regional representation were considered, along with the country office's availability to participate in the evaluation.

6. WFP's mandate and commitment to addressing hunger cover both emergency and non-emergency situations. Over past decades, WFP country programmes, while typically based on food aid, have been adjusted to local circumstances in emergency, transition, recovery and post-emergency circumstances. For this evaluation, only country offices not engaged in major emergency operations were selected, so the findings do not cover the transition from food aid to food assistance in emergency operations.

7. The topical focus of the evaluation was determined by inviting interviewees in case-study countries to identify what they considered the most important change faced over the past five years. A strategic shift in programme approach and operations proved to be the dominant response and therefore became the focus of the evaluation.

8. Information was gathered on the context, nature and extent of change, and on the internal and external influencing factors, so that these could be understood and learned from, regardless of the success or failure of change efforts. How WFP responded to change was analysed in relation to three core factors – acceptance, ability and authority – in line with the conceptual model of the evaluation.

9. *Organizational change concepts.* In this evaluation, organizational change is understood as the processes by which individuals and structures adapt knowledge and behaviours in response to shifts in the internal and external environments.

10. Growing consensus in the organizational change literature suggests that successful change depends on three sets of factors:¹ *acceptance* – acceptance of the need to change, belief in the specific type of change being proposed and

¹ Andrews, M. 2004. Authority, acceptance, ability and performance-based budgeting reforms. *Intl. Jour. Of Pub. Sector Man.*, 17(4): 332–344; Andrews, M. 2008. The Good Governance Agenda: Beyond Indicators without Theory. *Oxford Dev. Studies*, 36(4): 379–407; Andrews, M., McConnell, J. and Wescott, A. 2010. Development as Leadership-Led Change: Harvard Kennedy School Working paper 10-009. Boston, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government.

commitment to changing; *authorizing* frameworks – both formal and informal – that allow agents to identify the need for change, experiment with change ideas, and adopt and implement necessary measures; and *abilities*, including ideas and information, money and the presence of people dedicated to operating beyond their day-to-day mandate, and time. Change is understood as a dynamic that involves all three sets of factors, played out in the “change space” they create, with leadership – by groups of people, rather than individuals – playing an important role. The evaluation findings also reaffirmed the importance of clarity of purpose, as it relates to relevance.

CONTEXT

11. To gain a perspective on the dynamics that may influence change at the country level, two background reviews were undertaken concerning: i) global trends with potential impacts on WFP’s country offices; and ii) internal literature on past change management efforts in WFP.

12. *Global trends.* Six broad global trends were identified as having the potential to influence change in country offices:

i) Widespread hunger and malnutrition exist and may increase.

ii) Shifting patterns of hunger and malnutrition may necessitate change, particularly in light of demographic changes, climate change and crises, including economic distress.

iii) Changes in funding and resource patterns include a continuing decline in global food aid levels, diminishing support for the use of food aid in development activities, decreasing development funding, and an outdated architecture for global food aid.

iv) Higher priority is given to improving agricultural production, and in nutrition the attention is shifting from acute to chronic malnutrition.

v) In many countries, the financial crisis has stimulated changes, including the development of national safety net systems, the use of cash as an alternative to food aid and greater attention to hunger in urban environments.

vi) In many countries, national capacities are increasing, as is national ownership of the management of humanitarian and development assistance, encouraged and legitimized by the Paris Declaration.

13. Major change initiatives in WFP since 1992. Staff perceive change and adaptation in WFP as being continual. Three major change initiatives in WFP were reviewed: the change process that occurred in 1992–2002; the change management initiative in 2005–2007; and the current Strategic Plan 2008–2013. In general, the first was essentially a structural change related to decentralization, the second focused on refining systems and the last reflects a shift in programme strategies and tools. Each was managed differently.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

Change at the Country Office Level

14. The evaluation confirmed that all the country offices reviewed were making significant changes to their programme approaches. Although the country contexts varied considerably – for example, the contexts of Indonesia and Burundi or of the United Republic of Tanzania and Cambodia were quite different from each other – all countries faced similar programme change issues and organizational implications. The changes being undertaken in all the country offices reviewed were driven principally by multi-dimensional change in the country context. Although the evaluation found that the changes in programme approach were not driven by WFP’s Strategic Plan and shift from food aid to food assistance, these had an authorizing and contributing role.

15. The evaluation found that change at the country office level often occurred under crisis-like conditions, driven by funding reductions or forced in some other way. Typically, change was initiated with limited time for transition and little planning of or support for the process.

16. Staff perceptions that shape the direction of change include an understanding that: i) activities should address hunger issues in some way; ii) the approach should enhance national capacities; iii) government ownership is central; iv) the approach should be truly participatory; and v) activities should be aligned with government priorities, United Nations prioritization and harmonization efforts, and WFP’s Strategic Plan. These broad principles have long been articulated by WFP, but staff indicate that they are being operationalized in new ways.

17. The typical process for change in country offices includes reviewing activities considered unsustainable, concentrating programme efforts, building on specific components of existing programmes for which strong support exists, and identifying new gaps and opportunities; there is little restriction of topic or field as long as hunger is addressed. The main criteria reportedly used for adopting new programme activities are articulated need or gap filling, and potential donor support. Basing staffing and programmes on these criteria alone poses challenges for WFP.

18. *Changes in sectors of engagement.* In response to the change in context, the delinking of programme activities from food aid, and the availability of new tools and processes, programming choices are expanding into a wide range of fields and sectors, but strategic focus and clear boundaries are lacking. While this enhances WFP's opportunities for contributing to national efforts to meet hunger and food security needs, it also carries the risk of WFP programmes becoming scattered and difficult to support.

19. *Agriculture.* Country offices are moving far beyond traditional food aid-related projects to engage in a wider array of food-related concerns, such as access to markets, livelihoods, a wider involvement in agricultural production and marketing – including through the Purchase for Progress programme – and national policy development.

20. *Nutrition.* In every country visited, chronic malnutrition was a principal justification for WFP's engagement. WFP programme approaches for nutrition are shifting to include, for example, development of new and improved food products, prevention of malnutrition and new channels for nutrition programmes.

21. *Health.* Country offices are adapting the food inputs related to health programmes, including by adopting more nutrition-focused activities and linking, for example, household food support components with home care and social welfare mechanisms.

22. *Safety nets.* Increasing engagement in national safety net programmes is affecting WFP programmes and strategies in at least two ways: i) safety net programmes constitute a national mechanism through which WFP can provide assistance such as food or cash/vouchers; and ii) WFP initiatives are increasingly expected to be through or coherent with national safety net systems.

23. *Cash and vouchers.* Country offices are increasingly exploring or using cash/vouchers as alternatives or complements to food transfers. By late 2010, 39 country offices were using these instruments; the 2010 management plan estimated that about 7 percent of all programming would be cash-based.

24. *Capacity development.* For WFP, capacity development means strengthening governments' capacity to improve food security and enabling them to deliver on national food assistance strategies. The Strategic Plan 2008–2013 also links capacity development to an explicit strategy for WFP.

25. *Others.* Country offices are developing tools and supporting programme efforts in a range of other fields, including protection, gender-based violence, transition activities, climate change adaptation, monitoring and emergency preparedness.

26. *Changes in programme planning processes.* Depending on how it is implemented, the new country-based approach to programme planning represents a notable shift, with considerable potential for greater linkage of WFP-supported activities to national needs and opportunities, thus increasing WFP's relevance and effectiveness. Situating WFP strategy and efforts within the framework of country needs and national strategies is increasingly recognized as the necessary starting point for programme planning. By June 2011, planning documents from 21 country offices had been approved internally, and three were pending.

27. *Changes in partnerships and positioning.* The move from food aid to food assistance is leading to substantive shifts in partnerships and organizational positioning. WFP has fewer operational partners – NGOs – for emergency-related services, and more partnership arrangements with national authorities. New partnerships are also being formed to support new programmes.

28. WFP country offices work with a growing number and wider array of government counterparts, such as ministries of education, health, agriculture and social affairs. The nature of national partnerships with WFP is changing as governments assume greater responsibility for programme implementation and costs.

29. Country office staff are repositioning WFP in the development architecture at the national and – to some extent – the regional levels, including by assuming new supportive roles at senior policy levels in national systems in a variety of fields. WFP staff are more active in United Nations inter-agency planning and harmonization processes, and increasingly taking leadership roles in inter-agency efforts.

30. *Changes in funding.* As programming based on non-food aid increases, country offices have moved from a comparatively predictable funding environment to a more competitive and less secure situation. The precipitous elimination of the option of extending protracted relief and recovery operations contributed to the change in programming, but also accentuated country offices' financial difficulties. All country offices have taken assertive steps to raise funds locally. Some have secured bridge funding to support a strong transition programme, but this is not the norm. Some country offices have faced such severe financial constraints that commitments to government, NGO partners and communities have had to be broken suddenly and country offices down-sized, with the loss of valuable staff. Few country offices reported a reassuring view of future funding support, unless there are adjustments to funding arrangements.

31. *Changes in staffing: "right-sizing" and re-profiling of offices.* All the offices visited have undergone recent right-sizing and re-profiling exercises, several with

considerable reductions in staff. Rather than being part of an orderly change process, re-profiling has generally been driven by acute funding shortfalls. For example, donor support had enabled the Uganda country office to embark on a significant programme shift without undue loss of staff initially, but a lack of sustained funding then forced the office to down-scale. For all offices, building a new staff profile and capacities has proved more challenging than reducing staff numbers.

Drivers of Change

32. A review of the external and internal factors driving changes in WFP country offices suggests that change has been imposed, with country offices having little or no choice. Local external drivers were found to be stronger motivations for change than internal WFP drivers. In large part, these external factors mirrored global trends:

- *Changes in context.* The resolution of large-scale emergencies has substantially reduced beneficiary levels and made programme change unavoidable.
- *National governments being increasingly directive (“ownership”)* is increasingly shaping programmes and implementation modalities.
- *Growing national financial resources and support* for development concerns are changing the type of assistance needed from WFP.
- *Stronger national policy frameworks* define systems and programme directions. For example, WFP is expected to work within national poverty reduction frameworks, agriculture policies, nutrition frameworks and safety net systems.
- *Approaches to addressing food and hunger concerns* have shifted, with projects that support sustainability – for example, by increasing agricultural production rather than relief – and nutrition gradually becoming higher national priorities. There is weak support for the use of food aid in development activities; there was particular criticism for the use of imported grains when local foods are available and/or national authorities are exporting grains.
- *A funding shift in support of national implementation.* Major donors recognize that international actors have a role, but are emphasizing nationally implemented programmes. Governments are seeking – and donors are supporting – larger programme grants, rather than project funding.
- *Inter-agency coordination.* Inter-agency coordination approaches enhance adaptation and responsiveness in some ways, but limit them in others.

33. Major internal drivers of change include office leadership, fund reductions and the threat of programme down-sizing or closure, and staff’s commitment to relevancy and effective action. The Strategic Plan (2008–2013) was not found to

be a driver of change, but it constructively supports the changes being made by country offices, primarily by providing institutional endorsement.

Factors Facilitating or Limiting Change

34. The evaluation analysed three sets of factors – acceptance, authority and abilities – to assess which factors facilitated or limited the changes being implemented by country offices. It found numerous limitations to the change process.

⇒ Acceptance

35. Stakeholders acknowledged the need for, and unavoidability of, change at WFP country offices, but feedback suggests that acceptance of WFP's shift is weak overall, both internally and externally. Levels of belief in and commitment to the changes were decidedly varied, with some people expressing adamant agreement, while many conveyed uncertainty or strong reservations regarding elements of the change.

36. Internally, staff expressed differing opinions concerning new programme approaches, uncertainty about sustainability and concern about longer-term organizational implications. Headquarters is perceived as advocating for the change but not demonstrating the follow-through that would reflect real commitment to supporting it.

37. Externally, WFP's changes in programme and strategy were applauded, but partners reflected weak acceptance in their questions about role and mandate, uncertainties about capacity gaps and lack of clarity regarding what the changes were about. Acceptance was stronger where results were demonstrated with practical achievements.

⇒ Authority

38. Country offices' actions to enhance the authority for change included bringing WFP programme agendas into harmony with government strategies, integrating proposed changes into government sectorial reform strategies, establishing Memoranda of Understanding to clarify WFP's new ways of engaging, creating strategic partnerships with other development agencies, and establishing inter-agency agreements to clarify WFP's roles and responsibilities.

39. Factors that limit authority frameworks relate to ambiguous goals and the need to address potential role conflicts:

- The conceptual framework of how the new approaches and strategies address longer-term trends and underlying causes of hunger and food insecurity appears weaker and less developed than is the understanding of short-term needs.
- Some stakeholders do not perceive a demarcated role for WFP in the non-emergency context; many are uncertain of WFP's mandate and are concerned about potential overlap with other organizations.
- Lack of clarity about what WFP is committed to leads stakeholders to question whether WFP's programme focus relates to food security, household food security, hunger, poverty reduction, nutrition, safety nets or filling whatever gap exists.
- The absence of core organizational objectives to guide programme choice is perceived as potentially leading to a very diverse and weakly-focused programme, creating complications for the development of specialized organizational competencies.
- Tensions in WFP's inter-agency role and coordination, particularly where functions may overlap, potentially threaten performance and the achievement of objectives.

⇒ *Abilities*

40. Overall, country offices' current abilities to achieve the new programme changes are widely regarded as weak. The need to address weaknesses is recognized, but systems development has not kept pace with the rapid changes in programming. Many of the limiting factors arise from systemic issues.

41. The need to re-profile and enhance skills in all sectors of the new work is widely recognized; in large part, resolution depends on strategic decisions by WFP and developments in the human resource system. For example, the technical fields in which WFP and country offices will maintain dedicated staff are not yet clear, nor are their numbers and level of expertise.

42. The organizational, technical and political support of change efforts provided to country offices by Headquarters and regional bureaux was consistently reported as weak and uneven, and the change management approach was described as largely undirected and organic. At the country office level, change management is observed to be predominantly opportunistic, with short-term goals and limited support.

43. It is widely recognized that financial constraints remain one of the most dominant limitations to change efforts; a funding mechanism to ensure stable support of non-food programming does not yet exist. The need to adapt financial

reporting systems, particularly those based on tonnage, is widely recognized but has not yet been institutionalized.

CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Conclusions

44. The programme changes being made by the country offices reviewed in this evaluation reflect a strategic change for WFP, and are more than merely the adoption of new tools or incremental programme adjustments. The changes have impacts on – and may require adaptation of – all aspects of WFP’s operations: focus, services, basis of engagement with governments, partnerships with United Nations agencies and others, staffing, working modalities, and funding. The new programme approach, falling under the rubric of the shift from food aid to food assistance, constitutes one of the most significant internal changes since WFP was founded. This significance is related to the changing environment in which hunger occurs, the changing context in which WFP must work, and the adaptations WFP is required to make.

45. Although many new tools and approaches are being applied in emergency contexts, this evaluation focused on programme adaptations in post-emergency or development contexts.

46. In every country office included in the evaluation, experienced and dedicated staff were actively working to make the changes succeed. In spite of the current circumstances in which change is understood to be necessary rather than optional, change efforts were not observed to be limited by staff recalcitrance, although many staff expressed uncertainties and doubts.

47. However, review of the change experience raises questions about how country offices and WFP as a whole respond to change. In WFP, change is determined by how each unit adapts and how the overall system works together. Country offices’ adaptation to change is closely linked to the synergies within the larger system. Without diminishing the many achievements to date, the evaluation found the foundational elements of this change to be weak – weak “change space”, meaning weak agreement, authority and abilities.

48. Questions that might be asked include: Why are strategic adaptations at the country level occurring now, when many of the realities have existed for a long time? Why has this shift been initiated only in crisis-like circumstances, under the threat of radical down-scaling or office closure? Why has change been driven by external rather than internal forces? Why do many perceive the support for this fundamental

change as weak? The issues behind these questions are linked to how WFP manages change.

49. In the evaluation, the importance of clarifying and agreeing on the basis for and aims of change emerged as a critical organizational issue. Clarification of the primary hunger/food security-related concerns to which WFP is committed, particularly in non-emergency contexts, and of the related organizational goals, objectives and programme priorities is key to enhancing the legitimacy of the change.

50. Change requires a common vision of WFP's mission in the non-emergency context. Establishing such a vision includes considering options, issues and needs, and understanding what is expected and allowable; and identifying evidence that supports the need for change. This shared process must involve country offices, regional bureaux and Headquarters.

51. WFP's processes and practices for supporting development of a common vision are weak. The Strategic Plan (2008–2013) endorses the use of new operational tools but offers little additional guidance; offices are weak in analysing the causes of hunger and potential remedial efforts, beyond the information generated by vulnerability analysis and mapping; and weak practices were found in the new programme planning approach with governments.

52. Management of change processes at the country and systems levels emerged as an important factor in the success of change efforts. Feedback from stakeholders reflected the perception that such management at Headquarters and in regional bureaux was weak.

53. Leadership also emerged as a major facilitator of change. The evaluation findings support the emerging concept that leadership is best understood as a team rather than an individual effort, and this warrants thorough consideration for strengthening WFP's change dynamics.

54. The weak and reactive planning of change efforts suggests the need for a dedicated organizational strategy to support current changes. Between unplanned change and an over-rigid process of change there is a middle ground where change processes are structured to empower, monitor, guide, solve problems and support.

55. The importance of addressing authority issues is illustrated by role conflicts resulting from inadequate collaboration agreements with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in the present change effort. UNICEF acknowledged the need to avoid role conflict, while WFP's changes to support agriculture and food security activities

are perceived hostilely by FAO staff, as widely noted by stakeholders. Failure to resolve this authority issue will weaken the change effort.

56. The absence of a stable funding basis for WFP's efforts to address hunger and food security issues in non-emergency situations is a very significant gap for change efforts. Extraordinary endeavours to put new funding arrangements in place are clearly required.

57. In institutionalizing and operationalizing the new programme approach, the change process is at a very early and formative stage. Full transition will require considerably more effort, further development, and concerted action with a long-term perspective. Many current efforts appear to be based on short-term planning horizons.

58. With nearly 1 billion people recognized as hungry, exploration of how WFP can improve its contribution to this problem seems fully justified. Enhancing country offices' ability to make the right changes at the right time, with the full support and engagement of the larger organization, will enhance the relevance of WFP's contribution and lead to more effective efforts to meet hunger needs.

Overall Assessment

59. On the basis of this review, country offices' adaptation to change may be characterized as demonstrating an overall tendency to resist adaptation beyond transactional improvements, unless forced to change; changes have generally been more reactive than proactive; and the decision to adapt has usually been practical and opportunistic.

60. The shift from a food aid to a food assistance approach has opened a wide range of possibilities for change. The weakness of WFP's change management culture and systems limits a dynamic change process, but this is correctable.

61. The changes in programme approach that WFP offices are striving to undertake constitute a fundamental change for the organization. However, the success of this initiative is uncertain because of weak support and insufficient efforts to address the "change space" related to agreement, authority and abilities. Adopting a more dynamic problem-solving culture for organizational change will facilitate resolution of challenges.

RECOMMENDATIONS

62. Recommendation 1: Clarify the basis on which WFP change efforts are considered and implemented, including clarification of core commitments, programme priorities and authority frameworks, and

interpretation of how activities in the new environment are linked to WFP's mandate. A clear basis for change is critical to ensuring that adaptations support organizational objectives and enhance legitimacy and agreement, authority and abilities. Clarify the fundamental needs and issues to which WFP is committed, and the compelling goals to which its efforts are dedicated. Clarify the core programme activities that WFP will commit to and develop competencies for. Address the ambiguities that stakeholders may have in the interpretation of WFP's mandate in the new environment; the mandate may be clear at the central level but is not clear for partners in the field.

63. Recommendation 2: Strengthen internal change management processes. Clarify a corporate approach to managing change. This should include actions to improve visioning capabilities; clarify organizational aims and commitments; continue developing the dynamic analysis of hunger issues as evidence for the need to change; strengthen assertive problem-solving mechanisms; and improve the synergies among country offices, regional bureaux and Headquarters in support of change management. Specific attention should be given to strengthening leadership approaches and structural changes that will enhance the achievement of results-based goals.

64. Recommendation 3: Enhance efforts to mobilize support and build consensus for change. Review ways of strengthening structures and functions for overall organizational efforts to support change. These efforts should aim to enhance agreement with all stakeholders, ensure that sufficient authority frameworks are in place, and give concerted attention to addressing the need for new abilities. Agreement for change is more likely to be effective if there is strong organizational support.

65. Recommendation 4: Address the gap in the financial base for non-emergency activities. Mobilize an exceptional effort with the Board, donors and other governments, to establish mechanisms for more stable funding for enhancing WFP's capacities to address, particularly, hunger-related concerns in non-emergency and transition periods.

66. Recommendation 5: Mount a special initiative to address critical challenges and limitations affecting the current change initiative:

- i) Enhance current efforts to address the limitations in staff capacity.
- ii) Review and enhance the structure and systems for guiding and supporting country offices' change efforts; this applies to Headquarters functions and under-resourced regional bureaux.

iii) Mount a time-limited process for forging new partnership arrangements with major partners that are relevant to the non-emergency context. In particular, this effort should seek to establish positive partnership arrangements with UNICEF and FAO, the two United Nations partners with which collaboration is most likely to enhance effectiveness and avoid conflicts over roles.

1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Features

1. Change is not new to WFP, but exploration of the management of “change” in WFP is largely undeveloped. Because of this, and by the nature of the topic, this evaluation is more likely to be the beginning rather than final understanding of this issue. For purposes of this evaluation, organizational change is understood as the processes by which individuals and structures adapt knowledge and behaviors in response to shifts in the internal and external environment. Improvement in the effectiveness of WFP efforts to support hunger solutions is the accepted high level objective of organizational change.

2. **Aim.** The aim of this evaluation is to provide an understanding of how WFP adapts to change. More specifically, the evaluation focuses on change at the country office (CO) level. The focus on change at the country office level was an agreed adjustment to the Terms of Reference (TOR) (**Annex 1**). The evaluation purposes to:

- Determine how country offices have adapted to respond to changes in the external and internal environment in the past five years.
- Assess the processes employed by country offices to achieve desired changes, identifying factors which seem to be facilitating or impeding implementation.
- Determine the wider factors (both internal and external) which have facilitated or hindered the ability of country offices to change, including elements of organisational change process related to the introduction of new organisational priorities and tools.

3. **Rationale.** WFP as an organisation is recognized as always changing – “innovating,” “shifting,” “undergoing reforms,” and “transforming” – as it strives to meet hunger needs in a continually changing global and local context. WFP country offices are on the front line in translating organizational goals into action and are constantly called upon to redefine their roles and adapt their strategies, programmes and partnerships. These changes are in response both to its external environment (changing contexts, etc.) and its internal environment (evolving corporate priorities and tools).

4. Change in WFP is more complex than the staff simplistically adapting to new organization directives for country offices are innovators as well as implementors of evolving organizational strategies and programmes. Changes in WFP are commonly built on innovations from staff who pioneer adaptations in working with partners to understand hunger related needs and to identify and implement the most appropriate strategies and programmes to meet these needs.

5. The expectation is that the right changes adopted by country offices at the right time will enhance the relevance of WFP's contribution and lead to more effective efforts to meet hunger needs. Understanding how country offices adapt is therefore pivotal in understanding how WFP is endowing itself to achieve desired results in the dynamic environment within which it operates. As WFP charts its way forward, a more complete picture of country offices' ability and capacity to adapt as well as an understanding of the facilitating/limiting factors will help to provide a shared understanding of the challenges of change and support strategies across the organization.

6. **Premises.** Three premises underpin this evaluation: i) Adaptation to shifting realities is a necessary and healthy function for organizations. ii) No matter how legitimate the change, altering objectives, strategies or methods of work poses organizational challenges; iii) How the change process is managed is a key determinant of the ability of the organization to achieve desired changes and maintain/improve performance against intended objectives.

7. **Methodology.** Initial steps in the implementation of the evaluation involved, assembling an evaluation team, defining the evaluation methodology, drafting an inception report, participating in consultations and interviews with WFP staff in Rome, adjusting the Terms of Reference in consideration of those consultations, and undertaking an extensive literature review of both internal and external documentation. (See **Annex 2.**)

8. The principal data collection method was semi-structured interviews with 156 key stakeholders in WFP Rome, two regional bureaux (Kampala and Bangkok), and five WFP country programmes (Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Indonesia, Cambodia). A WFP staff person in Kyrgyzstan was also interviewed. Persons interviewed included WFP staff, government partners, donor missions and agencies, other UN agencies, NGOs and other partners. (See **Annex 3.**)

9. The selection of country offices to be included in the field work was based on the criteria of reported degrees of programme change – “extensive” and “less extensive” – since the approval of WFP's Strategic Plan 2008-2013. Diversity in programme size and in regional representation were also considered. The interviews were conducted by members of the evaluation team during field missions undertaken between 02-May and 03-June 2011. The intention to gather further data through a survey was dropped.

10. It is recognized that WFP's mandate and commitment to address hunger concerns covers both emergency and non-emergency situations. Over past decades WFP country programmes, while typically based on food-aid, have adjusted to local circumstances in emergency, transition, recovery and post-emergency circumstances. For the purposes of this evaluation, only country offices not engaged in major emergency operations were selected; its findings do not cover the dynamics of change in emergency operations.

11. The topical focus of the evaluation was determined by inviting interviewees in case study countries to name what they considered the most important change faced over the past 5 years. A strategic shift in programme approach and operations proved to be the dominate response and was therefore accepted as the focus of the evaluation.

12. Information was gathered on the context, nature, and extent of change and the internal and external influencing factors. How the organization responded to that change was analysed in relation to three core factors - acceptance, ability and authority, within the broader concepts of change management in line with the conceptual model described in **Section 1.2**.

13. The evaluation was carried out by an independent evaluation team with no conflicts of interest that would jeopardize the objectivity of the work. The Office of Evaluation (OE) provided support throughout, including guidance and feedback to ensure compliance with WFP's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS).

14. **Limitations.** Four limitations to the evaluation are noted: (i) Time and language constraints prevented field work in some WFP regions. (ii) The selection of the country offices purposed to include both country offices which underwent extensive change and those who reportedly changed little. The field work gave indication that different selection criteria may have resulted in a selection of country offices with even wider spread of change experience. (iii) The use of semi-structured interviews aided in uncovering issues and experience and was considered appropriate for the task but limited quantitative data analysis. (iv) As the focus was on recent change, the understanding of its long-term implications was obviously limited.

1.2 Context

Organizational change concepts

15. In many organizations, change initiatives disappoint in terms of actual results. Organizational change frequently fails in the private sector as well. Gilley (2005,4) cites various studies showing that one half to two thirds of major corporate change initiatives (and 50-80 percent of reengineering efforts) are failures; fewer than 40 percent of these produce positive change, and one third actually make the situation worse. Other studies find "initiative decay" in change processes, where gains from change are either never realized or are lost because new practices or approaches are abandoned.

16. Basically, then, effective change is difficult everywhere, and answers about how to implement change successfully cannot be assumed as intuitive or well known – especially when the goal is for substantive change where "[n]ot only have the process and outcome changed, but the thinking and attitudes behind them are fundamentally

altered and the systems surrounding them are transformed in support” (NHS Modernization Agency (2002, 12)).²

17. Change is inherent in all organizations, and includes both episodic interruptions and continuous adaptation. Literature characterizes organizations as adopting change for one of two reasons – either to improve performance or improve organizational legitimacy. Motivations to change arise from either external threats, opportunities to improve performance, or to ensure that processes are respected.

18. Change is seldom linear; it is a journey of twists, turns and loops as people strive to find ways to find solutions to problems that necessitate change. Change at its best is problem-solving.

19. The literature on organizational change is extensive, studied and written about from many perspectives and disciplines.³ Kotter, for example, approached it functionally and suggested eight steps to organizational change;⁴ Keagan and Lahey explore psychological and social factors influencing change;⁵ Argyris and Senge approach it from an organizational learning perspective.

20. Many authors emphasize the importance of problem clarification and argue that the failure to frame change as the result of and response to an emerging problem significantly limits the potential to effect change.

21. Problems come in different types and demand different change space to address. Burke and Litwin (1982) categorize problems dealt with in organizational change as either transformational or transactional. Transformational problems require change to the core values and behaviors of organizations and individuals, whereas transactional problems involve adjusting structural parameters that determine an organization’s incentives, motivation and control infrastructure. Others have categorized problems as technical or adaptive (Heifetz, 1994, and Linsky and Heifetz, 2002), noting that many change initiatives fail because adaptive problems are misdiagnosed and/or treated as technical problems.

22. Effective organizational change is observed to include five processes (Andrews, 2008, building on Lewin, 1947) which will take differing forms, depending on the context. While not necessarily linear, each contributes uniquely and together they form an analytic through which to assess change actions:

- *Pre-conceptualization* involves establishing readiness and acceptance of change.

² Andrews, McConnell, and Wescott, *Development as Leadership-Led Change: Harvard Kennedy School Working paper 10-009*.

³ See Andrews, McConnell and Wescott (2010), Ashworth, Boynew and Delbridge (2008), Fernandez and Rainey (2006), Kotter (1995), Pettigrew (2000), Scott (2001), Waclawski (2002), and Walker, Armenakis and Bernerth (2007).

⁴ Kotter’s eight steps to change – i. Establish a sense of urgency; ii. Create a guiding coalition; iii. Develop a change vision; iv. Communicate the vision for buy-in; v. Empower broad-based action; vi. Generate short term wins; vii. Never let up; viii. Incorporate the change into the culture.

⁵ Robert Keagan and Lisa Lashow Lahey, *Immunity to Change: How to Overcome it and Unlock the Potential in Yourself and Your Organization*.

- *Conceptualization* involves establishing a change vision and plan.
- *Initiation* sees change agendas instigating change through early adoption mechanisms.
- *Transition* involves the spread of change as it starts to replace old ideas and processes.
- *Institutionalization* is where change becomes widespread *de facto* reality.

23. Many writers and scholars have focused on leadership as a key consideration of organizational change. Yuki (2002, 273) argues that “[Change] is the essence of leadership and everything else is secondary.” But leadership theory and literature are fragmented with names like “trait theory,” the “leadership behavior” school, “power and influence approach,” “connective leadership,” and so forth. It is suggested that within these models, leadership can be categorized as transformational (aspirational and motivational), transactional (enabling of goal achievement), and relational (team building, facilitating communication, coordination). Research in development settings by Andrews and colleagues substantiates that all three types of leadership are essential in organizational change, each offering a unique and necessary contribution.

24. Organizations adopt change for various reasons; the kind of motivation driving change affects the depth of change. At one extreme of a continuum, organizations adopt change because of pressures from external players on whom they depend for survival; a failure to adopt change leads to compromised legitimacy and loss of support. At the other extreme, one finds organizations adopting change to improve results, either because there are threats to maintaining performance or because of opportunities to do better.


25. The literature commonly finds that organizations motivated predominantly by external change pressures have common characteristics. They are highly dependent on others, for instance, and have ambiguous or uncertain goals and measures of ‘results.’ When motivated by external survival, they typically adopt the prescribed change only peripherally. They comply with change scripts to ensure that external parties can ‘see’ change but do not necessarily implement deeper adjustments. This limited version of change is seen in deficiencies in key factors required for effective change.

26. Those implementing externally motivated change are commonly found to lack belief in the change and have limited commitment to its success. Internal authorizing mechanisms often do not support change that is adopted because of external motivators. Change ideas are often not supported by extant abilities and are thus poorly implemented. Lack of coherence between the change factors is practically manifested in change that is not implemented in any deep or functional manner.

27. Organizational change literature suggests that successful change depends upon three sets of factors:⁶ “**acceptance**,” the degree of acceptance of the need to change, belief in the specific type of change being proposed, and the commitment to change; “**authorizing**” factors—both formal and informal—that allow agents to identify the need for change, experiment with change ideas, and adopt and implement necessary measures; and “**abilities**” to change, including ideas and information, money and people dedicated to operate beyond their day-to-day mandate, and time.

28. In this understanding, change is understood as a dynamic involving all three sets of factors, played out in the ‘change space’ they create, with leadership as groups of people, rather than individuals, playing a key role. Theory speaks of the potential of enhancing these factors and the creation of ‘change space.’ See **Figure 1**.

Figure 1. The Dynamic of Change



29. In this model, organizational capacity to change depends on the “space” available to identify change, shift focus to change demands, and embrace new forms and functions that aid progress and development. Change happens when there is sufficient “change space,” i.e. where acceptance, abilities and authorization to act are enabled.

30. In considerations of organizational change, the role of leadership is commonly recognized. With the concept of change space, it is posited that leadership action should center on unearthing and addressing problems: “Leadership contributes to change when it builds change space [acceptance, authority, ability] where leaders foster acceptance for change, grant authority to change (with accountability), and introduce or free the abilities necessary to achieve change. Change space is especially enhanced where leadership facilitates open access societies and learning

⁶ See Andrews (2004, 2008) and Andrews, McConnell and Wescott (2010).

organizations in which members are empowered – in groups – to pursue change through problem solving.”

31. Importantly, recent research reaffirms that “leadership” may be more critical to change than “leaders,” leadership being more about empowerment of groups than individuals.⁷ It is observed that multiple people are likely to exercise leadership in any successful change event. Further, research confirms that “leaders” are identified more because of their functional contribution to change than their personal traits or authority, and that leadership contributes to change when it builds change space which fosters acceptance of change, grants authority to change (with accountability), and introduces or frees the abilities necessary to achieve change.

Past change initiatives in WFP

32. Change and adaptation are perceived by staff to be continual in WFP, with most adaptations coming from innovations by staff themselves. But beyond these ongoing developments, several major change initiatives have been launched where large systems alterations were needed. Previous to the current change initiative related to the roll out of WFP’s strategic plan 2008-2013, two previous change initiatives in WFP are instructive – one in the period 1992-2002 and the second in 2005-2007.

33. **The 1992-2002 change initiative.** By 1992 WFP was recognized as a permanent and distinct humanitarian institution whose operational breadth had quickly outgrown its structural capacity. The principal global concern was shifting from development issues to complex emergencies, encouraged by declines in development funding. The development-oriented architecture of WFP was considered ill equipped for the emergency challenges faced. Issues of concern then included the need to shift the staff skill base, change outdated and cumbersome resource management systems, improve poor reporting and accountability procedures, and improve the “cultural gap” between headquarters and the field.

34. A period of intense introspection, re-evaluation and open dialogue between staff and member states led to a set of seven key initiatives introduced in September 1993, to direct WFP’s movements towards structural improvement. Key changes included adoption of a mission statement, closure of 23 offices in “graduating” middle-income countries, and decentralization of authority to managers at the field level.

35. In mid-1995, the Executive Director instigated a review of progress through informal consultations with staff. The review culminated in the Executive Director’s announcement of a ‘new vision’ for WFP which built on the initiatives laid out in 1994. This expanded change program was announced in a July 1996 circular “Preparing WFP for the Future – An Organization to Meet our Mandate.”

⁷ Andrews, McConnell, Wescott. *Development as Leadership-Led Change* – A Report for the Global Leadership Initiative and the World Bank Institute (WBI); Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 2010.

36. The vision acknowledged the inevitability of roughness in the change process, while reaffirming that WFP operations could not lose momentum as a result. Employees were exhorted to “embody” new behaviors in order to secure as seamless a transition as possible. The process of translating the new WFP vision into a structural, operational, and policy reality opened in late 1997.

37. By 2002, WFP stood an almost entirely decentralized institution with structural features much different from those seen in 1992. The general consensus thereafter has been that if WFP had not engaged in such an extensive process of change, its original structural capacity would have collapsed under pressure of its ever-evolving and expanding obligations to food aid and development. Among many other changes, a Financial Management Improvement Programme (FMIP), the WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS) and the Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency and Support Team (FITTEST) programs were instituted. A three year training initiative was instituted, to standardize all guidelines and manuals.

38. The management of the change process was given high priority. An Organizational Change Team was established in August 1996, comprised of five sub-teams: the Field/Headquarters Team, the Streamlining of Procedures Team, the Staffing and Training Team, the Communications Team and the Advocacy and Resource Mobilization Team. Each worked to advance change in its respective areas, but as a coordinated effort under the orchestration of an executive Change Manager. Interested staff members were invited to join.

39. **The 2005 – 2007 change initiative.** 2005 saw the onset of a further round of major WFP change initiatives that had been prefaced by a 2004-2007 Strategic Plan aimed at strengthening change governance within the organization. The aim was to clarify, streamline and systematize managing roles in a new working structure.

40. This initiative occurred against the background of internal concern expressed by Country Directors about many proposed changes, the need to prioritize, and a changing external context. Projections in 2002 indicated a reversion to 1997 funding levels with decreases in development funding and large increases in emergency funding. In addition, WFP was facing criticism from some European member states over its approach to development and a lack of results-based assessment, among other issues. The shifting emphasis toward emergencies led staff to question whether the organization was predominately humanitarian or developmental, a situation described then as an “identity crisis.”

41. Among the changes undertaken, a joint OED-OD Operations Review team began guided interviews with WFP field staff in September 2004 in order to gauge progress made towards decentralization. Following the publishing of the resultant Operations Review, the review team presented WFP’s Executive Board with an option to tailor regional bureau support structure to the needs of the country offices of each region. Country offices would hence be directly involved in determining the

type of technical and administrative support they needed. This proposal was well and widely received.

42. Adjusting WFP's financial working structure was another major concern tackled in 2005-2006. To address a growing administrative cost issue, a 4% charge on Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) and Emergency Operations (EMOPs) had been introduced in 1992 and increased in 1993 to 5%. In 2004, however, the Executive Board looked at possibilities for longer term funding and in 2005 introduced "full cost recovery" rather than the 4/5% charge.

43. To manage the change process in this period, a Director of Change Management was appointed in June 2005, and the process was clarified in a "Circular on Management of Change Initiatives at WFP," released in August 2006. A Steering Committee for Change Management was established to review and monitor on-going change initiatives. A "change manager" guided the work. The approach started with an inventory of the change initiatives being undertaken, which were then prioritized based on a 3 dimensional rating system. Of over 25 initiatives identified, 12 were developed and mainstreamed in 2006 and 7 in 2007, including such systems developments as upgrading the WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS) and the International Public Sector Accounting System (IPSAS).

44. However, an internal review in 2009 concluded that this change management effort had not met expectations, that tools and training had not been developed to oversee change initiatives, and that reviews had not been undertaken to assess the initiatives and further support required. Despite perceived shortcomings, the principal recommendations included that consideration should be given to incorporate corporate change management functions and that relevant staff be trained in change management.

Global Trends

45. Changes at the country office level seldom occur in a void; contextual forces exist which enhance or limit action and outcomes. To situate potential forces shaping action by WFP offices at the country level, the current discourse on matters related to food security was reviewed and the emergence of the following issues identified:

46. *Hunger.* As many as a sixth of the world's population, nearly a billion people, are estimated to suffer hunger and malnutrition.⁸ While situations are to be found in which hunger and malnutrition have been reduced, overall the goal of reducing the actual number of hungry people has not been achieved and may further increase. This reality is likely to remain the compelling consideration by WFP country office in considering changes possibly required. (See **Annex 5, Chart 1.**)

47. *Commitments and action.* To "eradicate extreme poverty and hunger" remains first on the list of the Millennium Development Goals set in 2000, and follows commitments made in 1996 in World Food Summit to reduce world hunger by half

⁸ FAO

by 2015. Similar commitments have been made in other fora. Such commitments continue to provide a foundation for global and national action. Clearly national and local agreement, authority, and ability remain central to achieving these goals, a still unfinished effort. The feasibility of achieving the gamut of global goals is coming under increasing scrutiny. The need to disaggregate, strategize, and prioritize at country level may well surface in the next global aid effectiveness meetings taking place in Busan, for example.

48. *Demographic changes.* Increasing urbanization, poverty and population growth remain country level trends in most countries. During the ten year period from mid-2001 to mid-2011, the world's population increased by more than three quarters of a billion (from 6.20 to 6.97 billion). During the next ten years another 700 million persons will be added, reaching 7.73 billion by the middle of 2021.⁹ Whether or not increasing population growth translates to an increase in hunger depends on whether supporting systems – environmental, economic, political, food security – keep pace at the country level in particular.

49. *Climate change.* The latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) concluded that under-nutrition linked to extreme climatic events may be one of the most important consequences of climate change. Growing evidence indicates that climate change will significantly increase the risk of food insecurity – by up to 20% within the next forty years. In parallel, climate change is multiplying existing vulnerabilities, threatening to undermine achievements in eradicating hunger and poverty. On a positive note, in some situations the need for corrective action is resulting in the availability of resources, which provides opportunity for constructive action to address hunger related issues.

50. *Emergencies.* The need to assist victims in emergency situations to meet basic food requirements will continue. Considering demographic, environmental, and urbanization trends, the frequency, severity and impact of emergencies are projected to continue increasing. (See **Annex 5, Chart 2.**)

51. *Acute economic distress.* Acute economic distress remains a growing threat in many countries and can be expected to further accentuate concerns about food security and hunger. Risks to the disadvantaged and poorest are accentuated by a vulnerable global food security system, including a highly volatile world food market. Some projections suggest that food prices will continue to increase.¹⁰ Although many countries over the past decade have seen strong, even exceptional, economic growth, the benefits have not been shared by all. “Feast and famine,” sufficiency and inadequacy, exist in the same situation. For example, even as gains against hunger

⁹ “GeoHive - World Population 1950-2050.” Source UN, Depart of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011), World Populations Prospects: The 2010 Revision. 2001 figure is an estimate. 2011 and 2021 figures are projections based on a medium fertility variant.

¹⁰ Bailey, Robert. *Growing a Better Future: Food Justice in a Resource-Constrained World*. Rep no. 170611. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.: Oxfam GB for Oxfam International, 2011. Print.

are in evidence in middle income countries who have benefitted from steady growth, a growing gap is occurring between rich and poor.

52. The financial-food-fuel crisis in 2007-2009 that impacted many countries served as a global “wake-up call” and continues to have a profound impact on food aid practice and politics at both global and national levels.¹¹ This crisis brought renewed attention to hunger and food issues, the volatility of the global food market, and the weaknesses of the global food aid architecture in effectively responding. It has engendered an ongoing debate on how future occurrences of rapid price increases should be dealt with, the place of food aid in global food security, and the roles of respective agencies. It elevated agriculture as a national priority and as a concern deserving international support. It raised awareness of the need for improving ways to understand and monitor household welfare and has stimulated many countries to endorse rapid development of national safety net systems.

53. *Changing views on remedial approaches.* Overall, a long term falling trend continues with regard to in-kind food aid contributions provided by donor countries. In 2009 in-kind food aid levels were at their lowest point since 1961, linked to less food surpluses being available and the use of food aid to support development programmes less often considered the approach of choice. Correspondingly, a dramatic reversal continues to emerge with regard to the proportion of WFP food aid available for development goals *vs.* the proportion available for relief. (See **Annex 5, Charts 3 and 4**) Food aid is likely to remain a tool of choice in specific circumstances, but selectively.

54. Increasingly, enhanced *agriculture, nutrition, and safety net* programmes are being regarded as alternatives to food aid driven strategies for helping those in need. WFP has endorsed the use of cash as an alternative to food aid, strongly advocated for local and regional purchase of foods in place of imported foods, called for untied financial donations, and acknowledged that the hungry may be the urban poor. All these elements have been endorsed in the new Strategic Plan 2008-2013.

55. *Agricultural productivity.* National governments, regional institutions, and international donors in the last few years have shifted their priorities to give agricultural production more attention. For example, governments in Africa participating in a continental initiative called the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) are encouraged to allocate 10% of national budgets for agriculture.¹² Increasing the level of pledges to fund agriculture have been made by the G-8 and G-20 groups of countries; the World Bank has also established a funding mechanism. The importance of participating in and adding value to multisector analysis of hunger problems, policies, and operational solutions is one of the major challenges facing WFP country offices.

¹¹ Jennifer Clap, “The Food Crisis and the Global Governance of Food Aid,” unpublished, 2011.

¹² The Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) is an Africa owned and Africa led initiative working to boost agriculture. Its work falls under four pillars: land and water management; market access; food supply and hunger; agriculture research.

56. *Nutrition.* In non-emergency situations, nutrition rather than food availability is increasingly recognized as the more urgent hunger-related need. Within the field of nutrition the focus has shifted from “acute malnutrition” to greater concern for “long term malnutrition,” nutritional deficiencies, and stunting. Food aid, in whatever form or use, is increasingly critiqued for its nutritional contribution. Also an influencing factor on local action, increasing consensus exists within the nutrition field as to how malnutrition is best addressed.¹³

57. *Funding.* As illustrated in **Annex 5, Chart 5**, the overall level of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has continued to increase over time in real terms, reaching its highest level to date in 2010. But within this global picture, funding patterns, donors, and donor priorities continue to shift. Some traditional donors to WFP and national systems are currently scaling back their international assistance levels, while new donors are increasing their engagement. For example, many of the 28 countries that supported WFP response to the food and financial crisis in 2008 were in fact first-time contributors. While the picture is mixed, the efforts of WFP country offices may be impacted by the increasing competition for scarce development resources, and considering the current global economic situation, a retracting rather than expanding aid environment is foreseen.

58. *Food aid architecture.* Global food security and food aid issues are substantively influenced through the governance mechanisms and agreements that make up the international food aid architecture. The present global food aid architecture is widely considered outdated and inadequate, and no consensus yet exists as to what an optimal new system might be. This uncertainty filters down to country level coordination and governance structures for aid with which governments must interact. Issues being debated include definitional issues related to what would be agreed as food assistance, more sustainable approaches, new ways to enhance coherence between actors, improvements in assessment and monitoring, and initiatives to enhance preparedness and modify funding mechanisms.

59. *National ownership.* National management of humanitarian and development efforts is a growing determinant in development assistance, including with regard to food security and hunger issues. National planning continues to coalesce around Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS's) and national “ownership” of the development agenda; some 66 countries are now working within a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) framework. Correspondingly, many international community members are

¹³ Wide recognition now exists that priority should be given to children under two years of age and adolescent girls, with a strong emphasis on the importance of nutrition at critical points of the life cycle. With respect to both general health and cognitive ability, critical points include: (i) the 1000 day ‘window’ from conception to 2 years, and (ii) maternal health and nutrition, not only during the period of pregnancy but also in the years prior to conception. Poor nutrition during a girl’s childhood and adolescence is likely to have a negative effect on the health and cognitive ability of children she later bears, creating an intergenerational cycle. On average, better nourished mothers have higher birthweight babies with better health and productivity prospects. A girl’s number of years of schooling is also positively correlated with healthier children.

giving priority to development assistance strategies which have strong national ownership, a strongly influencing trend for WFP country offices.

60. Similarly, in many countries national emergency systems are being strengthened with the aim to be more self reliant, particularly in response to small and medium scale emergencies, and for large emergencies as well.¹⁴ Disaster risk reduction is increasingly embraced as a pro-active alternative to an after-the-fact, relief-response orientation. The emergence of national safety net systems and use of new strategies such as cash and vouchers are examples of other changes in national systems which are enhancing capacities to respond to emergency needs. The changes too potentially impact WFP programme support at the country level.

61. *Aid effectiveness.* Aid effectiveness considerations have now a strong influence on development assistance, including supporting efforts for food security and hunger concerns. The global aid effectiveness initiative, often referred to as the Paris Declaration, which began around 2000, now has the endorsement of over 100 countries. Clarity continues to emerge around key principles agreed with regard to aid effectiveness, and donor and recipient countries are holding each other accountable for commitments. (See **Annex 4, Chart 6**). A key result is that wide agreement exists that aid should be used to help build local governance systems to better manage their own development and eventually reduce dependency on aid. These changes are manifested at the country level.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Drivers of change

62. Over the review period, the WFP country offices have embarked on substantive efforts to transform programme and strategies, mostly as a result of external stimuli and with the Strategic Plan 2008-2013 serving as the authorizing instrument for change.

63. Amongst the key external factors, the following were recorded in the countries visited:

a. Changes in context such as the resolution of large scale emergencies in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, where conflicts receded and refugees and displaced persons started returning homes; or in Indonesia, where the 2004 tsunami response had come to an end in 2009. In Cambodia too, the long running transition period was considered by national authorities to have come to a conclusion.

b. *National directiveness of development assistance*, or “ownership” has increased, implying a stronger role of national authorities in determining the types of programmes required and in calling on agencies to end emergency/transition operations and adopt developmental approaches. In Indonesia, for example, the

¹⁴ Harvey and alia, *Food Aid and Food Assistance in Emergency and Transitional Contexts: A review of current thinking*.

national government reportedly insisted that the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) would be acceptable only if it were reconceptualized as a “partnership framework” rather than “assistance framework.” The principles of the Paris/Accra Declaration and the on-going international processes around them were found to have a strong influence on aid management at the country level, WFP programming included. In Indonesia, the principles of the Paris Declaration were further adapted and expressed as the Jakarta Declaration.

c. *National resource commitments* have also grown in parallel, positively from the perspective of sustainability. In Uganda, Tanzania, Cambodia and Indonesia, increasing resources allowed the authorities to commit to cover the costs of priority programmes, in full or in part. For example, Tanzania assumed the full cost and implementation of food security assessment systems introduced by WFP and FAO over a decade ago and has established national strategic food reserves to address food shortage emergencies without international assistance. School feeding programmes are also increasingly integrated into national programmes.

d. National poverty reduction frameworks, agriculture policies, nutrition frameworks, and safety net systems and related implementation capacities continue to emerge in most countries, empowered by growing economic strength over the past decade and enhancements of national public sector management – e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

e. Approaches to hunger concerns in the non-emergency environment are evolving and “sustainability” appears to be a strongly sought after criterion. Increasing agricultural production to help address food security concerns has become a higher national priority in many countries, supported by regional initiatives and international donors. While nutrition is still not recognized to be a strong national priority in most countries, it is reportedly being given more national attention than previously. Examples include the recent establishment of a nutrition unit in the Ministry of Health in Burundi and the establishment of a global task force on nutrition in Tanzania. National safety net systems have been strengthened in the last several years. The development of a national safety net system in Cambodia, after the 2008 financial-food-fuel crisis, for example, was cited by interviewees as a major policy achievement for the country; WFP staff coordinated UN support.


f. With respect to donor funding, shifts are reported towards giving funding through national mechanisms and to efforts executed nationally, and to giving larger grants for programme funding rather than project funding. At the same time, the use of food aid to support development activities has weak support, being commonly described as palliative only, unsustainable, contributing little to long term solutions, and in the worst case potentially counter-productive. Few donors support its use. Food aid using imported grains in situations when local foods are available and when national authorities are exporting grains drew particular criticism.

64. Key internal drivers of change included office leadership, fund reductions threatening programme down-sizing or closure, and the commitment of staff to

relevancy and effective action. The 2008 – 2013 Strategic Plan supported the change, primarily by providing institutional endorsement of the changes being made by the country offices.

65. The chart below (**Figure 2**) illustrates the perspective of interviewed stakeholders on drivers of change and highlights that external pressures were perceived as stronger motivations to change than internal factors.

Figure 2. Perspectives on what motivates change in WFP drivers of change



- The largest bloc of responses— 29% in all—noted that WFP change was motivated by changes in organizations with whom WFP works. Half of these references noted that changes in host-country governments necessitated changes in WFP country offices. They cited examples like decentralization, changes in ministry responsibilities, and even adjustments to government planning, budgeting and operational systems. The other half noted that WFP changes were motivated by changes in partner UN agencies, other development organizations, and NGOs.
- The second largest bloc of responses—25% of the total—identified external survival pressure as the main motivator of change. Interviewees here spoke particularly of the change required to maintain legitimacy (and maintain financial support) and change demanded by external funders.
- A smaller bloc—12% of comments—noted a third external pressure in the form of changes in the nature of the problems faced by WFP. Interviewees identified shifts in the food security problem in specific countries and in the way food security is conceptualized globally.
- About a third of the comments reflected on change drivers or motivators that are internal to WFP
- About 17% of the comments noted that change in WFP was driven by HQ. This came either as encouragement for country offices to adopt new processes and tools or through staffing changes emanating in HQ—where the appointment of new country director or other senior staff member led to change in the country office.
- A similar proportion of answers (about 17%) pointed to local country office drivers of change. More than half of these referenced an influential country director as the change motivator, and a number spoke of a results and innovation focus in the country office fostering ideas for change and prompting initiatives to implement change.

2.2 Changes at country office level

66. The evaluation confirmed that all country offices reviewed were actively engaged in making significant changes to their programme approach. While the country context varied considerably (the contexts of Indonesia and Burundi or Tanzania and Cambodia being quite different, for example) issues related to programme change and the organizational implications are common. The changes being undertaken in all country offices reviewed were driven principally by multi-dimensional context based factors. While the evaluation found that the changes in programme approach were not driven by WFP's strategic plan and shift from "food aid" to "food assistance", it had an authorizing and contributing role.

67. As the need and support for emergency food aid plummeted and country offices cut back on emergency programmes, governments tended to take a functionalist approach with regard to WFP's support. Governments continued to welcome WFP assistance with explicit provision that WFP shift programming approaches associated with emergency and transition, to approaches perceived as more relevant to non-emergency contexts, including closer alignment other national priorities and support of national capacity building efforts.

68. Country offices had to decide what contribution, if any, they would make in a more developmental context and how programmes would be adapted to be relevant in the new context. The timely issuance of the 2008 – 2013 Strategic Plan was instrumental in allowing country offices to make changes as the Strategic Plan endorsed a substantive repositioning of WFP as a "food assistance" rather than a "food aid" focused agency and offered country offices the opportunity to initiate programmes without a link to food aid and to expand the array of programming tools available. While many of the newly promoted tools were developed years before as piloted efforts, the "new" approach is described by staff in such terms as "the most important change in 40 years".

69. Generally, the perception is that the new range of programme options for WFP is almost unfettered as long as it is somehow linked to addressing hunger and that action is guided by the following principles: (i) activities should enhance national capacities; (ii) government ownership is central; (iii) the approach should be truly participatory; and (iv) activities should be aligned with government priorities, UN prioritization and harmonization, and WFP's strategic plan¹⁵.

¹⁵ Informal papers reflected staff understanding of the overall transition as: a) encouraging an expanded array of programming tools beyond direct food aid, including provision of technical support to help a government devise its own hunger solutions; b) reaffirming host governments as the party responsible for meeting food needs; c) encouraging a shift from a project approach to a more comprehensive approach; d) supporting a shift from implementing partnerships to strategic partnerships; e) increasing design of interventions based on consideration of local context; f) recognizing a shift from imported foods to local purchases and other forms of support; g) encouraging a move to provide food assistance within a social protection system; and h) encouraging enhanced linkages between food assistance and nutrition strategies.

70. Country offices were encouraged to concentrate efforts and review activities considered unsustainable and, in collaboration with national governments and partners, to recognize gaps and opportunities, identify niches where WFP can meaningfully contribute, and innovate. In doing so, country offices have taken a practical approach to making adaptations and have been pragmatic in building on organisational strengths while striving to introduce new programme planning processes and projects. The primary justification in the identification and selection of new programme activities was cited by interviewees as “identified need” or “gap filling” and having potential for receiving donor support.

71. Approaching programme choice this way, however, carries the risk that WFP’s programmes may be scattered and be perceived as lacking focus, and poses difficulties in building organizational capacities. Also, the evaluation noted that change at the country office level often happened under crisis-like conditions – with insufficient time for transition and action being taken only when the money ran out, when forced otherwise to change.

72. However, the strong commitment of WFP staff to help meet the needs of the most vulnerable, to address hunger related problems effectively, and to be relevant in the local context was ever-present. Staff continue to describe themselves and the organization as action-oriented and problem-solving, and they continue to innovate and seek solutions.

73. While adaptation is perceived by staff to be a constant reality in WFP, a “sea change” of purposeful adaptations in programming began to occur in country offices after 2008, many of the new efforts beginning only recently.¹⁶ Some of the new programmes are in the planning stage; others are being piloted or are in the very early stage of implementation so it is still too early to know the impact and full implications of the changes being made.

74. The new programmes included a mix of new activities, a continuation of activities (e.g. the well established food security vulnerability mapping on which WFP and the government have long collaborated) and adaptations to or termination of some long-standing projects.

Changes in sectors of engagement

75. In response to changes in context the delinking of programme activities from food-aid and the option to utilize new tools and processes, programming choices are expanding WFP’s engagement in a wide range of fields and sectors including agriculture, nutrition, social protection, education, health, poverty reduction, livelihoods, disaster risk reduction and preparedness, among others. Broadly

¹⁶ In Tanzania, a new team was put in place in 2007/8; their new country programme (2011-2015) therefore is just beginning. The change in programme strategy in Uganda began in 2008 with 2008-9 being a reorientation period. A new senior management team was brought into Indonesia country office in 2009. 2010 - 2011 served as an assessment and adjustment period; a new country programme was approved in 2011. In Cambodia, a new team of senior staff began in 2009; in 2010 the office prepared the new country programme which was approved and begins in July 2011.

speaking, the most common fields of programme development appear to be in nutrition, household food security, and disaster preparedness, but programs are being fluidly generated at the country level in response to local opportunities and contexts. However, neither a strategic focus nor clear boundaries are evident.

76. *Agriculture.* Country offices are moving well beyond traditional food aid related projects to engage in a wider array of food related concerns – e.g. access to markets, livelihoods, a widening range of agriculture production and marketing (including contributions through the P4P programme), national agriculture policy development. Notably, through the Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative launched in September 2008, twenty-one WFP COs, including Tanzania and Uganda, have been involved in efforts to facilitate increased agricultural production and sustained market engagement to increase incomes and livelihoods of low-income smallholders.

77. Generally, governments expressed appreciation for WFP contributions in the agriculture field to help fill gaps and support national efforts, citing WFP's role in strengthening food security systems, enhancing the economic standing of the poorest producers, helping to market national food surpluses, and helping to find innovative ways to address such problems as improving grain quality through drying, for instance. Nonetheless, WFP's role in agriculture remains unclear to many of those interviewed; while appreciative and positive about WFP's possible contribution, they often inquired as to the potential overlap with FAO and raised question about mandates.

78. *Nutrition.* The evaluation also observed the adoption of a new approach to nutrition, focusing on: 1) using new and improved food products; 2) preventing malnutrition; and 3) exploring alternative channels for nutrition programmes. In every country visited, a principal justification for WFP interventions was a concern about chronic malnutrition, particularly stunting and micro-nutrient deficiencies. Stunting levels in Burundi, for example, are as high as 59%. In Tanzania, the new country programme will pilot a different approach to nutrition interventions; support to MCHN programmes will shift to nutrition; and the programme will focus on improving fortified nutrition products.

79. For WFP country offices, the shift in focus to chronic malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies in non-emergency settings (from a predominant focus in emergency contexts on food availability and on acute malnutrition) was noted by interviewees as a shift requiring quite different skills, strategies and interventions.

80. *Health.* COs are making adaptations to health programme related food inputs, The approach to food assistance for HIV/AIDS care and treatment is evolving. For example, corporate policy now encourages the organisation to integrate nutrition and food assistance into treatment and is starting to distinguish individual supplements provided as part of comprehensive treatment – such as Food By Prescription (FBP) – from household food support components delivered through home care and social welfare mechanisms. The evaluation observed that food support to tuberculosis

patients and to persons with HIV & AIDS who had been supported for 10-15 years was generally terminated.

81. *Safety nets.* Increasingly, WFP is taking part in nationally-owned safety net schemes. National safety net systems impact WFP programme and strategies in at least two ways: (i) they constitute a national mechanism through which WFP can provide assistance, e.g. food or cash/voucher; and (ii) WFP initiatives are increasingly expected to be through or coherent with national safety net systems, rather than independent relief projects. For example, in Cambodia the food-for-work approach is being adapted to be part of the national safety protection programme to better reach the most vulnerable. Also, WFP Cambodia serves as the UN's focal point with the government on safety net programming.

82. *Capacity development.* WFP understands capacity development as strengthening the capacity of governments to improve food security and enabling them to deliver on national food assistance strategies. The new Strategic Plan now clearly links capacity development to an explicit strategy for WFP to exit from direct food support and foster government ownership, capacity, and accountability while ensuring that hunger, food security, and nutrition feature prominently on national agendas.

83. Efforts in this respect have been observed such as in Tanzania where WFP support is shifting to capacity enhancement in light of increased government capacities in preparedness and response and where the CO is increasingly supporting a national school feeding programme. In one situation, national authorities are reported to have given WFP the option either to shift programme focus from food aid to national capacity building, or close operations.

84. *Cash and vouchers.* New tools are endorsed under the current Strategic Plan and WFP staff reported either introducing or piloting alternative modalities to make the food aid more supportive of national priorities and more developmental in approach. In particular, cash and vouchers, are increasingly provided as alternatives or complements to food transfers. As of late 2010, 39 country offices were using such instruments and the 2010 management plan estimated that about 7 percent of all programming would be cash-based. In Cambodia, for example, WFP is testing a cash scholarship as an alternative to school feeding.

85. *Others.* In addition to the above examples, WFP country offices are developing tools and supporting programme efforts in a range of fields including protection, gender based violence, support of transition activities, climate change adaptation, monitoring and emergency preparedness, and, more generally, national capacity building.

Programme planning processes

86. Situating WFP strategy and efforts within the framework of country needs and national strategies is recognized as the necessary starting point for programme planning. National ownership of programmes has been a long standing principle of

WFP. Efforts to develop country planning tools were initiated as long ago as the early 1990s (e.g. Country Strategy Outlines) but the practice was not continued. While not without precedent, the presently reinstated country programme planning processes represent for many offices a new and substantively different planning approach.

87. Country Strategies and related Country Strategy Documents (CSDs) were launched in 2008 to help country offices define the role and rationale for WFP's presence in light of its comparative advantages and hand-over strategies.¹⁷ CSDs are understood as tools to allow the implementation of the Strategic Plan at country level on the basis of hunger analyses linked with government priorities. To support this process, the Executive Director issued a Memo in July 2009¹⁸, a Strategic Review Committee for CSDs was established¹⁹ and guidance was provided.²⁰

88. Country strategy and country programme planning are expected to result in a concise country action plan and as such are principal agents of change at country office level. The first Country Strategies – for Sudan and Uganda – were completed in 2008 and by June 2011 another 19 had been approved and three were pending approval.²¹

89. The importance of situating WFP strategy and efforts within the framework of country needs and national strategies was recognized as the starting point for programme planning. WFP staff cited the importance of understanding the national developmental policies and implementation frameworks as a prerequisite to making shifts in programme and strategy. This is especially relevant as staff in one WFP country programme admitted that in the previous emergency oriented programming, they had been completely unaware of national policy and implementation frameworks with regard to development oriented activities. For them, beginning with an inventory of government policies substantively influenced subsequent change efforts.

90. While WFP staff acknowledge that the main value lies in the process of preparing the strategy rather than in the resulting plan per se, the degree of participation by government and partners in needs assessments, gap analysis and development of strategies and programmes has not always been significant. In several countries reviewed in the evaluation, the collaborative work normally expected to span 6 to 12 months was squeezed into a much shorter timeframe, with the result that strategies were developed with minimum consultation.

91. It remains unclear whether the abbreviation of the participatory planning was due to the recent introduction of the country strategy planning process or whether it reflects a weak commitment to participatory needs assessment and planning.

¹⁷ WFP, *Annual Performance Report for 2008 (WFP/EB.A/2009/4)*.

¹⁸ WFP, "Decision Memo on Executive Policy Council on Country Strategy."

¹⁹ WFP, "Establishment of the Strategic Review Committee for Country Strategies: A joint directive of Operations Department and Resource Management and Accountability Department."

²⁰ WFP, *Strategic Plan Implementation Guide. Country Strategy*.

²¹ WFP, *Country Strategy Roll-out Matrix: Classification by Executive Board Session*.

Feedback from country offices reflects a desire for HQ and regional bureaux to invest more heavily in helping them do the planning more effectively.

92. Country offices did seek ideas and support from HQ, regional bureaux (RB) and other country offices in the process of planning but did not use external change management consultants. Overall planning of the larger processes of change was not evidenced. For comparison, during the evaluation the WFP change process in one country was compared with the process of another UN agency also undertaking a change management process. Some of the key differences included that the other agency's process was planned to be undertaken over several years, a budget was allocated to support it, and a change management consultant was hired to support the effort.

Partnerships and repositioning

93. The shift in programme focus brought about a shift in WFP partnership arrangements. Overall, country offices have reduced the group of operational partners upon which they depended for emergency related services, notably NGOs, and increased partnerships with governments, in line with the objective of support to national priorities.

94. *National partnerships.* New working relationships are being forged with an increasing number of government counterparts ranging from the Ministry of Education, to the Ministry of Health, Agriculture or Social Affairs. As governments assume greater responsibility for programme costs, sometimes contracting WFP to provide a service, the nature of the partnership has changed, as illustrated in programmes for school feeding in which governments have adopted national expansion of school feeding but rejected the operant WFP models.

95. In Cambodia, for example, when national authorities assumed more financial responsibility for school feeding, they insisted on a modification of the approach to rely more on local food inputs²². In such a situation, the need for WFP was not just a "handover" operation but contributing to piloting new, more sustainable ways of providing the services.

96. As part of the changes occurring at the country level, the evaluation noted attempts to reposition WFP in the development architecture at national (and to some extent, regional) levels, away from roles linked to food aid in the humanitarian sector. To make a contribution, particularly in policy, "being at the table" is facilitative and in this regard, WFP staff are establishing new working relationships and assuming contributing roles at senior policy levels in national systems in a variety of fields linked to WFP's strategic shift, e.g. with the ministries of foreign affairs, ministries of agriculture, ministries of social affairs, ministries of education, and so forth.

²² In Cambodia it was calculated that the per child cost for a full year of primary education is \$ 27, while the cost of the school meal programme is \$ 20 per child as previously operated.

97. For example, for many years WFP's principal governmental counterpart in Uganda was the Ministry of Disasters. Since its programme shift, WFP has joined the National Agricultural Sector Working Group, an inter-party coordination and national decision-making body; assumed active participation in a stakeholder group working on malnutrition; and participates in national development planning fora. In Burundi, WFP now participates in a government-led dialogue on agriculture policy and has stimulated development of a high-level forum to map out nutrition and food security concerns. In Tanzania, WFP is an active participant in national coordination structures and co-chairs with the government the newly formed early warning/preparedness working group as part of the government's disaster risk reduction efforts.

98. *Interagency collaboration.* WFP's ability to respond to needs, adapt, represent the organization and raise funds is impacted in some countries by the emerging UN coordinating structures and processes; staff speak of the need to preserve the space to act effectively, while doing so in coherence with others.

99. WFP's operational orientation and "can do" spirit is regarded as a particularly important contribution in collaborative efforts within the UN country teams. WFP's active participation in the UNDAF process was seen to enhance collaborative planning, common understanding, role clarity and coordination. WFP staff are more actively participating in UN inter-agency planning and harmonization processes than in the past and WFP is increasingly leading inter-agency working groups. However, the evaluation found that partnerships with other UN agencies still falls short of optimal collaboration despite repeated affirmation by WFP staff of the desire to collaborate with other UN agencies.

100. The collaboration with UNICEF and FAO was perceived as particularly critical as many of the activities newly prioritized by WFP are generally considered to be in fields where these two agencies already have recognized expertise and roles. While local UNICEF staff were consistently positive about WFP's shift in programming, as the needs justified enhanced WFP efforts, and talked about a good working relationship with WFP as a natural partner, they stressed the importance of role clarification and remained quietly skeptical as to whether the shift would lead to real collaboration or merely result in posturing.

101. WFP's moves to support activities in the field of food security is perceived more hostilely by FAO staff. At the individual level WFP and FAO staff are reportedly collegial, but an underlying clash over roles, activities and collaboration was widely perceived and cited by government officials, donors and other agencies. Examples were mentioned of one agency's proposals to government being countered by the other, clashes over funding, and lack of consultation and collaboration.

102. Interviews with government, UN, and other partners, provided examples in which WFP was clearly perceived to be more open and collaborative than previously, in line with the stated intent to work more in "partnership" rather than through a contractual relationship. However, other examples still illustrated unilateral

planning and actions considered insufficiently collaborative, putting into question the extent to which this new partnership aspiration is being actualized in WFP culture and working modalities. Some examples of selling a WFP-determined “solution” rather than engaging in finding mutually agreeable solutions were still reported.

103. Even if partial, this change in the partnership dynamic has organizational implications which are still unfolding, and country offices are grappling with finding the most appropriate partners, meeting the expectations of each new relationship, and setting up new MOUs.

104. These new roles and partnerships are seen as enhancing the opportunity for WFP to contribute to national efforts in new ways, but it also has implications for the organization, such as creating expectations and necessitating requisite staff capacities. In the course of the evaluation, partners questioned the contribution and credibility of WFP staff who without specific expertise in a field were expected to represent WFP at technical working groups in that field. Even having enough staff to attend essential planning and coordination meetings was reported by some offices as a daunting challenge.

Changes in funding

105. In the shift to more non-food aid based programming, country offices have moved from a comparatively predictable funding environment to a more competitive and less secure funding situation.

106. When funding for emergency programmes ended, some offices were able to secure alternative funding for a transition of the programme, such as the Uganda country office. This, however, was not the norm and even in the Uganda case, the benefit proved to be short term and the country programme subsequently faced the same constraints as others. More commonly, offices faced acute financial constraints so severe that commitments to government, NGO partners, and communities had to be broken suddenly and offices down-sized rapidly, with the loss of key staff. Some interviewers linked this to lack of planning for change.

107. In respect to the acute financial distress found in country offices, the corporate decision to limit the duration of PRROs played a role. While the rationale for doing so is widely understood – some countries having been considered in “transition” for more than a decade – the PRRO existed because of donor willingness to support transition activities and weak support for development activities. PRROs had grown to be such a central funding mechanism for country offices that ending these operations precipitously had a detrimental effect, particularly as no alternative funding mechanism was available.²³

²³ As a peer reviewer to this evaluation noted, as reflected in the World Development Report, even countries fast tracked from conflict to recovery took 14 years and the average time to return to recovery was considerably longer; this may reflect a PRRO cycle that is 3 or 4 programmes long.

108. All WFP offices visited took assertive steps to raise funds for development type activities and new funding opportunities or arrangements were reported, including receiving funding from new donors or host governments. Country offices are also establishing new relationships with private sector groups as funders and implementers, and partnering in new ways with such institutions as the World Bank.

109. Donors commented positively on the effectiveness of local fund raising efforts (e.g. presenting needs, taking partners and donors to demonstration projects) but the evaluation team considers that country offices are generally poorly resourced to raise the sustained support required for programming in non-emergency contexts. Consequently, country offices shifting to development activities are attempting to achieve organizational objectives on a highly limited and uncertain financial base that is unable to support even minimal staff costs, a programme that is reliable beyond the vicissitudes of short-term funding, or transition processes.

Changes in staffing: Right-sizing” and re-profiling offices.

110. In the countries visited, staffing adjustments were made but these focussed more on re-sizing staff numbers rather than adapting skills profiles, even if both were recognised as important.

111. Where the resizing and re-profiling of staff were deemed necessary, a Staff Review Exercise (SRE) was undertaken with the support of the regional bureau, as was done in the last three years in all country offices visited. While recognizing the process as difficult and painful, interviewed staff consistently mentioned the SRE as an open, transparent and constructive process.

112. In 2010 the Burundi CO had to reduce its staffing by 41 persons, Cambodia reduced by 30, and Indonesia cut its staff by half. Many remaining staff work on 3 month contracts. The re-profiling in these offices was driven less by orderly change than by acute funding shortfalls of their country programmes. By contrast, the Uganda CO embarked on a significant programme shift without undue loss of staff. Enabled by the exceptional financial support received from donors to support the transition, substantial funds were made available to retrain and enhance national staff capacities, an initiative that empowered the change efforts of the office.



113. Downsizing was recognized as an opportunity to make necessary adjustments, but all offices reported that the loss of key staff had weakened organizational capacities – while in the midst of changes that were demanding greater capacities. Building staff capacities has also proven more difficult than reducing staff numbers and no consensus yet exists in relation to core skills required by the changing nature of programme activities. Many questions remain on how to balance implementation skills with the skills required for national policy development work, the technical fields in which WFP should have dedicated staff, the level of expertise required in any particular field, and so forth.

2.3 Factors facilitating or limiting the change

114. Referring back to **Section 1.2** on the three factors of acceptance, authority and abilities, which are considered crucial to create the necessary change space, the evaluation assessed the extent to which elements related to these have facilitated or hindered the change happening at CO level to provide an understanding of the areas in which more work needs to be undertaken to ensure success.

115. The evaluation found that, despite significant efforts to enable change, there are still numerous limits in relation to acceptance, authority and most notably to abilities for the change at CO level as illustrated by **Figure 3**, below. The table in **Annex 5** summarises the responses from stakeholders as these related to elements enabling or limiting the three factors required to create the space change.

Figure 3. Extent of Enablers and Limits of Change



116. **ACCEPTANCE.** The blend of belief in the need for change and in the specific type of change adopted – was perceived to be weak both internally and externally, despite some efforts related to increasing external acceptance notably.

117. If the WFP shift is to be understood and supported, stakeholders must come to understand WFP in a new way – seeing beyond its role as a humanitarian and food aid agency to its potential to contribute substantively in the development context. A central question is how well the country offices and WFP more generally communicates and engenders support for changes.

118. Country directors and senior managers at country office level were perceived by the evaluation as generally playing a crucial enabling role with respect to both internal and external acceptance and more generally, change facilitation. Many of them were strong and visionary ambassadors to WFP and contributed to building

belief in WFP's new role and in building acceptance for change by assuring staff that there are gains and even protecting staff during the transition period (where uncertainty about change is rife).

119. While all senior managers may have the similar objectives, approaches seem to differ with some tending more toward an "informing" style while others gave more emphasis to "empowerment." Most importantly, if "leadership" is understood to include team efforts rather than efforts by individual leaders alone, the evaluation interviews reflected a wider range of office strategies to mobilize staff teams to find solutions and implement change.

120. In this respect, the feedback from the staff in the Uganda office was particularly notable. Virtually all staff interviewed cited the intensive efforts that had been made to actively and continuously engage the full staff, including sub-office staff, both in considering options and proposing solutions, making them an active part of change process. In this case, the staff tended to see themselves more strongly as change agents.²⁴ However, interviewees across country offices reflected a weaker picture. In some cases, the evaluation noted that country office staff came to know about changes in the organization, such as changes related to the new Strategic Plan through an email from HQ, learning about the changes in meetings, or hearing from their supervisors (who heard from their supervisors, cascade-style).

121. However, generally, the evaluation found that WFP country office staff have reservations or are uncertain about the likely success of the changes introduced, which are largely considered as externally imposed. Some spoke of limited 'belief' in the change and a number of them spoke of change as creating anxiety and weak morale – indicators of acceptance problems.

122. In most cases, internal acceptance was hindered because of the perceptions that change ideas were introduced without appropriate discussion and engagement. Many of the interviewees considered communications systems/patterns within WFP, particularly from HQ, a limiting factor with respect to effective change and commented on the need to create an open culture in which staff feel empowered to talk about change and show dissent in the face of change. Also, it was felt that while HQ advocates for change, it is not showing real commitment to supporting it (discussed under abilities).

123. In every country office visited, the evaluation team noted a dedicated effort to inform partners and key stakeholders of the changes to programme and strategy, which was verified in interviews with stakeholders. Efforts included repeated, ongoing dialogue with senior government partners, holding consultations at provincial or local level, briefing parliamentarians, initiating discussions with


²⁴ As one example, arguing the benefits of being able to innovate, the Logistics Unit in the Uganda office cited what they considered their change achievements including – changed logistics systems to support p4p; established a construction office; developed a new tracking system for NFIs; established an emergency regional transportation hub; strengthened inter-agency logistics services; established a quality control service related to the purchase of local grains, among others.

ambassadors and aid missions, having discussions with NGO partners and making presentations at UN and inter-agency meetings. In a few examples, meetings with beneficiaries were reported. In some cases, sub-office staff had the responsibility for communicating changes with partners. In Tanzania, one of the most effective advocacy efforts was to take stakeholders to see actual projects being implemented.

124. Nonetheless, there are signs of a limited external acceptance at local level by partners and/or governments of WFP's recent changes, with some of them questioning the role WFP could play in development, mostly because WFP lacked the capacities required or because WFP had not developed a consistent message to support its change in mission. The seriousness of this issue is demonstrated by the fact that across the spectrum – government partners, donors, other agencies – interviewees consistently raised the questions of how WFP's new approach and activities in the non-emergency ("development") context relate to similar efforts by other agencies and whether they fit within WFP's mandate.

125. Interviews with stakeholders revealed in some cases an impression of WFP advocacy efforts that differed from WFP's description. Rather than a "dialogue," as construed by WFP staff, in some cases the stakeholder spoke of a "presentation;" rather than "consultation," the stakeholder saw the session as "informing;" and some key stakeholders indicated that while others within their organization may have been consulted, he/she was not. Such differences highlighted the importance and complexity of communications efforts in the pursuit of change and the need to reconsider how to improve engagement and communications, as part of change management.

126. Generally, greater attention to demonstrating results as part of the change process was found to enhance acceptance. The more WFP country offices were able to show actual efforts and results, the greater the acceptance, understanding and support of WFP's programme shift and contributions were. Demonstrating practical results, solid outcomes and lessons learned, even of pilot programmes, is a powerful contribution to engendering support. This reality was reaffirmed by partners and donors in places where this was made an important element of the change process (e.g. Tanzania).



127. **AUTHORITY** is important in the change process, as agents engaged in change must have the formal and informal authority to find and implement new ideas.

128. The WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013 has been a clear authorising factor to change at CO level and its release coincided in a timely way with changes in country contexts forcing an evolution of WFP programmes. As indicated in an interview in Indonesia, "We did not change because of the Strategic Plan, but we would have closed the office if it had not existed".

129. With its focus on new tools and local planning process, the Strategic Plan did not clarify goals, explain the implications of the changes endorsed or provide a blueprint for change. Staff overwhelmingly describe the changes in programme approach, falling under the rubric of the shift from ‘food aid’ to ‘food assistance, as a radical departure from past approaches. implying evolutions in purpose, ways of working, and activities.

130. While a strong consensus exists that WFP’s concerns relate to hunger, uncertainty and dissonance exist among staff and partners on what WFP’s overall purpose, role and contributions are in addressing hunger concerns in non-emergency situations. There appears to be no commonly shared perception of where the changes endorsed by the Strategic Plan will lead in the longer term, and the wide variation of conceptions reported calls into question of the degree of common understanding of what WFP is committed to. To name but a few queries heard in the evaluation, is WFP’s over-arching purpose “food security,” “household food security,” “hunger,” “poverty reduction,” “nutrition,” “safety nets,” or “filling whatever gap exists”?

131. The lack of clarity as to WFP’s over-arching objective, what fundamental aims it is working toward, in non-emergency situations contribute to perceptions of the organization having an “identity crisis.” While ambiguities may also exist in emergency situations, in general, the fundamental aims are often less ambiguous particularly where the issue is provision of needed food.

132. Similarly, ambiguity of core programme objectives impacts the change process. Currently, a wide variety of organizational commitments are being made along with programme activities initiated in multiple fields as a consequence of a more flexible approach to meeting needs, responding to requests, and filling gaps. While this flexibility has many positive attributes, including responsiveness to national priorities and needs, and helps to ensure relevance, the high degree of diversity in programmes brings with it possible perception of a lack of focus, and uncertainty about which core competencies to build to support new activities.


133. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF for example have adopted a core commitment approach, implying that a minimum core of fields/activities were agreed corporately even if country offices were not limited to these selected activities. While providing flexibility, this also allowed building and maintaining competencies for key priority programme concerns.

134. A number of efforts were noted to enhance external authority, with positive effects on the ability to enable change. These included ensuring that WFP programme agendas are in harmony with government strategies by integrating WFP ideas into government sectoral reform strategies and having MOUs clarify the way in which WFP engaged with government in specific areas. Strategic partnerships with other development agencies also strengthened WFP’s authority to implement its change agenda, and inter-agency agreements clarifying WFP roles and responsibilities were seen as empowering WFP to assume new roles and responsibilities. Other efforts included using international agreements to support

WFP's change agenda, since it fits harmoniously with current development trends, and tapping into local and international development agendas – global initiatives, UN frameworks, and so forth – to give authority to WFP's change agendas.

135. However, the following limitations were considered key:


- *A lack of understanding of how WFP's mandate to address hunger issues is applicable in non-emergency situations , which led to perceptions of WFP having no clearly demarcated role in the development business. With responsibilities vague, WFP country offices are left to define their own conditions for engagement.*
- *Ambiguity about formal agreements and coordination challenges with development parties, particularly where potential overlap of functions exist. Weak formal coordination meant that informal agreements dictated who does what, when and how. While participating in government and UN coordinating processes enhanced coordination, it proved insufficient without resolution at senior levels of organizations.*



136. **ABILITIES** - including having additional financing to facilitate finding and implementing new ideas as well as people with different skills, information and processes to accommodate change - are a critical element in successful change. However, the evaluation noted a number of limitations with respect to internal abilities. WFP processes, policies and systems – e.g. procurement systems designed for other purposes, budgeting and reporting systems based on tonnage and legacy human resource systems – were noted as complicating and limiting change.

137. The chart below (**Figure 4**) details the most commonly cited internal limitations with respect to acceptance, authority, and abilities.

Figure 4. The Most commonly cited internal limitations (acceptance, authority, and abilities)



Capacity gaps

138. WFP's exceptional abilities to implement food-aid type programmes is recognized globally, but its abilities to carry out new functions related to the shift to "assistance" are extremely weak. Weak abilities impact perceptions of legitimacy, programme quality, partnerships and funding.

139. The evaluation found that the capacities required to allow WFP to provide assistance in new fields and add value to national efforts in analysis, design, policy and programme on long term hunger concerns were insufficient. This finding was reaffirmed by both WFP staff as well as by questions raised by governments, donors and NGO partners about WFP capacities.

140. The programme shift requires new skills (e.g. for activities in nutrition, agriculture and market support, cash and vouchers, safety net, policy formulation, etc) and the lack of those skills has hampered implementation and scale up of change initiatives. More worrying still, there is not yet clarity on the profile of staff required or on the fields the organization should/will build staff competencies in to facilitate effective programme changes.

141. WFP staff have also pointed to human resource systems which prevented the "right" persons being put in the right post, thus preventing offices from securing the staff with the qualifications believed needed.

142. Finally, while some guidance has been issued and some trainings have been conducted to build staff capacity, these have been found to be old-style and largely ineffective. As staff are expected to contribute in new ways, often at senior policy level, a robust, proactive, staff capacity building programme is needed.

Weak planning and support systems

143. While HQ set up an authorizing environment for change, notably by issuing the Strategic Plan, it was widely felt that processes were not in harmony with its change agenda, and change efforts by country offices have been made more difficult by weak organisational planning and support.

144. The change management approach, as described by staff, rested on strongly endorsed belief in the changes by senior level managers, but from a systems approach was largely undirected and organic. Staff spoke of the uneven ways by which programmes associated with the Strategic Plan were established and resourced by headquarters as a reflection on planning. As the need arose, select tools-centered units were strengthened in HQ, and mid-level staff initiated efforts to respond to demands for guidance and support.

145. Interviewees described the organizational structure of HQ as confusing, with multiple units working on the same problem, no clear focal points for dealing with critical programmatic changes, multiple independent trust funds for capacity building, and the lack of a unit to specifically monitor country office transition progress.

146. The organizational, technical and political support provided to country offices by HQ and regional bureaux has been insufficient with regard to the myriad functions required to shift programme focus and activities. HQ support is perceived as unstructured, contradictory and obstructionist, and RB support as weak.

Financial constraints

147. Financial constraints have limited an orderly change, as insufficient resources have been provided to COs to facilitate the transition. Funds were not forthcoming or were not available in flexible enough forms.

148. Also, recognizing that WFP's funding modalities have been a continuing challenge for many years, a stable funding mechanism for support of development-oriented activities (non-food aid tied funding) does not yet exist. The tonnage-based financial and reporting systems, notably the standard project reports, while relevant for food aid projects, are inadequate for programmes that are not food aid based. For example, some finance staff are maintaining a manual financial reporting system for non-food projects, parallel to the formal WFP systems.

149. The modus operandi for raising funds has changed, particularly as WFP moves away from direct implementation. Country offices also perceived that the recent shift of fund-raising responsibility from HQ to country offices has not been accompanied by adequate support from HQ or the RB, while the new direction in which WFP was going could have uncertain resource streams. Indeed, a mixed picture with regard to donor trends for funding development-oriented activities emerged. Generally, most interviewees were skeptical about the funding streams, reporting that funding in non-emergency ("development") contexts is must more difficult to secure, that donors are focusing and reducing their efforts, and that further decreases in development funding are likely due to global economic trends. For example, some traditional donors, such as DFID, were withdrawing from countries no longer considered in transition from crisis, and in Burundi, few traditional donors are reportedly maintaining their funding commitments.

3. Conclusions and Overall Assessment

Conclusions

150. The expectation is that the right changes adopted by country offices at the right time will enhance the relevance of WFP's contribution and lead to more effective efforts to meet hunger needs. Understanding how country offices adapt is therefore pivotal in understanding how WFP is endowing itself to achieve desired results in the dynamic environment within which it operates. As WFP charts its way forward, a more complete picture of country offices' ability and capacity to adapt as well as an understanding of the facilitating/limiting factors will help to provide a shared understanding of the challenges of change and support strategies across the organization.

151. The programme changes being made by country offices reviewed in this evaluation reflect strategic change for the organization, not mere adoption of new tools or incremental programme adjustments. The changes being taken impact and potentially require adaptation by the organization in all aspects - focus, services, basis of engagement with government, partnerships with UN agencies and others, staffing, working modalities, funding. The new programme approaches, falling under the rubric of the shift from 'food aid' to 'food assistance', constitute one of the most significant internal changes since the organization was founded. The significance is related to the changing environment in which hunger is occurring, the changing context within which WFP must work, and the adaptations required by the organization.

152. While many of the new tools and approaches are being applied in emergency contexts, this evaluation focuses specifically on programme change in post-emergency or more developmental contexts.

153. The shift in programme approach is an illustration of adaptation by country offices to changing local realities. It reinforces the observation that country offices spearhead change in WFP. In every country office reviewed the evaluation found concerted efforts to address change by experienced and dedicated staff. Challenges to the change effort were not observed to be recalcitrance.

154. But review of this change experience raises questions about how country offices and the larger organization respond to change. Without diminishing the many achievements to date, the evaluation found the foundational elements of this change to be weak – weak “change space,” meaning weak “agreement,” “authority,” and abilities.”

155. Many other questions might be asked: Why are the “new tools” being institutionalized at this time, after being innovated years before? Why was this shift only initiated under the threat of radical down-scaling or office closure? Why was change driven by external rather than internal forces? Why did change only take place in crisis-like circumstances in some offices? Why in the face of such fundamental change is inadequate support so persistently reported? Why are recognized “limiting factors” not resolved, or more quickly addressed?

156. These issues are linked to how change is managed in WFP.

157. In WFP country offices, as in the larger WFP system and other organizations, a continuing tension exists between the desire to preserve the status quo and the need to change. Transactional change is continuous in WFP as adjustments are made within well established systems and approaches, but the organization has remained tenaciously resistant to changes to its long standing approaches. In the change considered in this evaluation, external drivers gave some offices little choice. It may be argued that a more proactive change management response could have initiated the changes as internally driven processes to greater effect.

158. Change in WFP is determined by how each unit of the organization adapts as well as how the system works together overall. Change is complex in an organization such as WFP as authorities and responsibilities are shared across many levels and contexts. Interviews reflected considerable collaboration but dissonance was also found within the system. How country offices adapt to change is very much linked to the synergies within the larger system.

159. The evaluation signaled the importance of establishing clarity and agreement on the basis and aims of change. Lack of clarity leads to the possibility that changes may not contribute to fundamental organizational aims, and may be perceived as disparate and unfocused, even though making a contribution. In the current shift from “aid” to “assistance”, ambiguity of aims and purposes is a key contributing factor to weak “change space”. Enhancing clarity as to the primary hunger/food security related concerns to which WFP is committed, particularly in non-emergency contexts, and clarifying related organizational goals, objectives and programme priorities, is key to enhancing the legitimacy of the change.

160. Change requires a common vision with regard to WFP’s mission. The evaluation found wide acceptance of WFP’s mission and role in emergency situations, but not with regard to its mission and role in what others consider non-emergency contexts. Establishing a common vision includes: visioning, considering options and needs, understanding of what is expected and allowable, what the options and issues are, and the evidence suggesting the need for change. This shared process must involve country offices, regional bureaux and Headquarters to be helpful. The lack of common vision found in the evaluation reflected a weak change process.

161. The processes and practices in WFP to support development of a common vision are weak. Current visioning appears often to rely on individuals. The Strategic Plan 2008-2013 endorses the use of new operational tools but offers little guidance beyond that. WFP generally is weak in rigorous analysis of the causes of hunger and potential remedial efforts beyond the information generated by VAM. The contribution of the new participatory programming planning approach with governments will only be as effective as the efforts put into it to ensure its full potential.

162. Effective management of the change processes at country and systems levels emerged as a key factor in the success of change efforts. Feedback from stakeholders reflected the perception that the management of the change processes at HQ and RB has been weak and the support systems have many discontinuities.

163. Leadership of change also emerged as a key driver, with strongly praised leadership examples in several offices, and a perception of weak leadership in others. The evaluation findings support the emerging concept that leadership is best understood as a team rather than an individual effort, deserving strong consideration in strengthening WFP change dynamics.

164. Weak and reactive planning related to change efforts suggests the need for a dedicated organizational strategy to support current change efforts. A senior staff member defended an organic process to change with the observation that “we don’t count the pot holes before beginning a voyage; we navigate them on the way”. Between unplanned change and a rigid processes of change is a middle ground in which change processes are structured to empower, monitor, guide, problem-solve and actively support.

165. The importance of addressing “authority” issues is illustrated by role conflicts resulting from the lack of sufficient collaboration agreements with UNICEF and FAO in the present change effort. Many of the activities newly prioritized by WFP are in fields in which these two agencies already have recognized expertise and roles. The need to avoid role conflict was recognized by UNICEF. WFP’s changes to support activities in the field of agriculture and food security are perceived hostilely by FAO staff, a conflict widely noted by stakeholders. Lack of resolution of this authority issue will weaken the change effort.

166. Absence of a stable funding basis to enable WFP to address hunger and food security issues, particularly in non-emergency situations, is a gap of fundamental significance to change efforts. Extraordinary efforts by country offices, the larger system and the Board may be required to resolve it; a lack of resolution of this issue as part of change management threatens the change initiative and the mission of WFP.²⁵

167. The process of change within WFP has been initiated but is very much at an early and still formative stage. Many of the planned changes are still aspirational. It is too early in the effort to ascertain the extent to which the new role and activities will prove substantive and sustainable. However, full institutionalization and operationalization of the changes being initiated will require considerably more effort, further development, and concerted action with a long term perspective. Many of the current efforts appear to be based on short term planning horizons.

168. With nearly a billion people recognized as hungry, exploration of how WFP can improve its contribution to this problem seems fully justified, in emergency and other contexts.

Overall Assessment

169. On the basis of this review, the general characteristics of country office adaptation to change may be characterized as: overall, country offices have tended to resist adaptation beyond transactional improvements, unless forced to change; changes have tended to be more reactive rather than proactive; the choice of adaption has tended to be practical and opportunistic. The new “food aid” to “assistance” approach has opened a wide range of possibilities for change, but the

²⁵ Raising the overhead rate from 7% to 10% was a suggestion received by the Evaluation Team as one way to considerably enhance WFP’s minimum essential funding base.

weakness of the change management culture and systems in WFP limits a dynamic change process.

170. The changes in programme approach which WFP offices are striving to undertake constitute a fundamental change for the organization. However, the success of the effort is uncertain because of weak support to the initiative, and insufficient efforts to address “change space” related to “agreement,” “authority,” and “abilities”. Adopting a more dynamic problem-solving culture related to organizational change will facilitate resolution of such challenges.

4. Recommendations

171. In consideration of the findings of this evaluation, the following recommendations are offered:

Recommendation 1: Clarify the basis on which WFP change efforts are to be considered and implemented - including clarification of core commitments, programme priorities, and authority frameworks, and interpretation of how activities in the new environment are linked to WFP’s mandate

172. Clarification of the basis for change is critical to ensuring that adaptations support organizational objectives and enhance legitimacy and “agreement”, “authority” and “abilities”. Clarify the fundamental needs and problems to which WFP is committed and the compelling goals to which WFP efforts are dedicated., Clarify the “core” programme activities that WFP is committed to and is building competencies for. Address ambiguities that stakeholders may have in the interpretation of WFP’s mandate in the new environment, for the mandate may be understood clearly at the central level but not by partners in the field.

Recommendation 2: Strengthen internal change management processes.

173. Clarify a corporate approach to managing change. This should include actions to: improve visioning capabilities; clarify organizational aims and commitments; further develop dynamic analysis of hunger issues as evidence for the need to change; strengthen assertive problem-solving mechanisms; improve the synergies between country offices, regional bureaux and headquarters in support of change management. Specific attention should be given to strengthening leadership approaches and structural changes that will enhance results-based goal achievement.

Recommendation 3: Enhance efforts to mobilize support and build consensus for change.

174. Undertake a review of ways to strengthen structures and functions of the full organization efforts supporting change. The effort should aim to enhance “agreement” with all stakeholders, ensure that sufficient authority frameworks are in

place and that concerted attention is given to addressing the new abilities challenges. Building agreement for change will be more effective if organizational rather primarily country offices.

Recommendation 4: Address the gap in the financial base for non-emergency activities.

175. Mobilize an exceptional effort, with the Executive Board, donors and other governments, to establish mechanisms for more stable funding of non-emergency hunger related activities and transition periods. Acknowledging the difficulty of the issue, finding a new financial basis for supporting change related activities deserves highest priority as the key threat to change efforts by country offices.

Recommendation 5: Mount a special initiative to address critical challenges and limitations impacting the current change initiative.

176. a) Enhance current efforts to address staff capacity limitations. Need to enhance staff capacities is well recognized and concerted efforts are being taken; still the issue is so central to achievement of current change efforts that enhancement of current efforts is encouraged.

177. b) Review and enhance the structure and systems to guide and support change efforts of country offices; this relates to HQ functions, and under-resourced regional bureaux.

178. c) Mount a time limited process to forge new partnership arrangements with key partners relevant to the non-emergency context. In particular, the effort should seek to establish positive partnership arrangements with UNICEF and FAO, the two UN partners for which collaboration is likely to enhance effectiveness and avoid conflicts over roles. The central issues are likely to be role definition and the establishment of active processes through which successes and problems can be appraised and resolved as needed. Two reportedly successful models deserve special consideration – the WFP-UNICEF partnership arrangement in Bangladesh, and the WFP-UNHCR partnership globally.

Annexes

Annex 1: Summary Terms of Reference

This evaluation is one of four strategic evaluations conducted in the 2010-2011 biennium under the umbrella theme of “Choosing the Right Response to Hunger Needs”. The other three evaluations focus on WFP’s social protection and safety net strategies; WFP’s role in ending long-term hunger and WFP’s engagement in partnerships.

Subject of the evaluation

As the global context, food security architecture as well as policies and practice of major actors evolve, so should the WFP responses to allow the organisation to stay relevant and effective in addressing current and future hunger challenges. It is widely accepted that WFP as an organisation is always changing – “innovating,” “shifting,” “undergoing reforms,” and “transforming” - to strive to meet hunger needs in a continually changing global and local context.

In recent years WFP has shown an ability to learn, adapt and innovate in designing and testing programmes that deliver results for the food insecure. A 2010 WFP publication “Revolution: from food aid to food assistance” describes the reforms and transformations the organisation went through lately and recognises the strong and enduring imperative to change and innovate within the organisation’s daily routine to accommodate the vicissitudes of a volatile world (WFP, 2010). In the words of WFP’s Executive Director “taking proven solutions to the field, scaling up what works and constantly innovating to improve is essential if we are to reverse the backslide in the fight against hunger. (...) By capturing best practices, we can sustain innovation and improvement” (WFP, 2010).

WFP country offices are at the front line of translating organizational goals into action and are constantly called upon to redefine their roles and adapt their strategies, programmes and partnerships to changes in the external environment (changing contexts, etc) and in the internal environment (evolving corporate priorities and tools).

Working with partners to understand hunger related needs and to identify and implement the most appropriate strategies and programmes to meet these needs, COs are both innovators as well as implementors of evolving organizational strategies and programmes.

The expectation is that the right changes adopted by country offices at the right time will enhance the relevance of WFP’s contribution and lead to more effective efforts to meet hunger needs. Understanding how country offices adapt is therefore pivotal in understanding how WFP is endowing itself to achieve desired results in the dynamic environment within which it operates.

As WFP charts its way forward, a more complete picture of COs' ability and capacity to adapt as well as an understanding of the facilitating/limiting factors will help to provide a shared understanding of the challenges of change and support strategies across the organization.

Objectives and users of the evaluation

The evaluation aims to establish the nature and extent of the change that the organisation went through in the last five years (**accountability**) and to determine the factors which facilitated or limited the observed change to draw lessons and highlight best practices (**learning**).

The main **users** of the evaluation include the WFP country offices, management and governance body. They are expected to feed findings into the development of strategies and guidance as the organisation scales-up and/or mainstreams recent initiatives or develops new ones in response to evolutions in the context and in hunger challenges.

Key Questions

The evaluation will address the following three key questions:

Q1: Extent of changes in WFP country offices' strategies and programmes: the evaluation will analyse the nature, drivers and extent of changes in COUNTRY OFFICE strategies and programmes at country office in the past five years to determine how effectively country offices have adapted to changes in the external and internal environment and which factors have influenced their ability to do so.

In order to draw lessons for the future, the evaluation will build an understanding of the factors which facilitated or limited the change process at country office level, how, when and why. It will notably look into:

Q2: Factors in the external operating environment facilitating or limiting the ability and capacity of country offices to adapt to external and internal changes including, e.g. developments in crisis environments; partnerships; recipient countries and donors' policies and programmes, etc.

Q3: Internal factors facilitating or limiting the ability and capacity of country offices to adapt to external and internal changes. This will include amongst others factors related to WFP's organisational change process.

Evaluation roles and responsibilities

The evaluation is managed and funded by the **WFP Office of Evaluation** (total estimated cost USD 250,000). It will be conducted by a team of **independent consultants** composed of experts including specialists in organisational change processes and change management. A **reference group** composed of a cross-

section of key WFP stakeholders from various business areas will contribute to the evaluation quality assurance by providing informed peer feedback on the evaluation process and products.

Timing and consultations with Stakeholders

The evaluation will start in February 2011 with the inception phase. Consultations will take place at headquarters, regional bureaux and country office levels between February and May 2011 to elicit feedback from key internal and external stakeholders. A public debriefing on the findings of the evaluation will be held at the end of the fieldwork. The draft evaluation report will be shared for comments in June-July 2011.

Opportunities to actively disseminate findings will be sought and the summary evaluation report will be presented to the **WFP Executive Board in November 2011**. The report will be publicly available on the WFP website.

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Annex 3: Persons Met/Interviewed

HQ and External, Inception Phase

Organization	Name	Position/Unit	Location
WFP	1. Martin Bloem	Chief, Nutrition & HIVAIDS Unit	Rome
	2. Trudy Bower	Chief, Grants Management Unit	Rome
	3. Lynn Brown	Senior Policy Officer, Policy & Strategy Unit, Security & Safety Nets Service	Phone
	4. Claire Conan	Evaluation Manager, Office of Evaluation	Rome
	5. Manuel Da Silva	Acting Director, Policy, Planning & Strategy Division	Rome
	6. Ilatira Dettori	Chief, School Feeding	Rome
	7. Torben Due	Director of Operations	Rome
	8. Joan Fleuren	Director, Capacity Development/Partnership Branch	Rome
	9. Ruth Grove	Head, Policy & Career Management	Rome
	10. Caroline Heider	Director, Office of Evaluation	Rome
	11. Chris Kaye	Director, Performance Management	Rome
	12. Al Kehler	Head of Program Design, ODXP	Rome
	13. Sarah Longford	Senior Program Advisor, Purchase for Progress	Rome
	14. Martin Ohlsen	Director, Logistics	Rome
	15. John Prout	Programming, Cash & Vouchers	Rome
	16. Naila Sabra	Advisor to the Director of Operations	Rome
	17. Domenico Scalpelli	Director, Government Donor Relations Division	Rome
	18. Carlo Scaramella	Chief, Climate Change & Disaster Risk Reduction Unit	Rome
	19. Paul Turbull	Deputy Director, Performance Management	Rome
	20. Marian Ward	Chief, Operational Reporting & Analysis Branch	Rome
	21. Nancy Walters	Chief, School Feeding Policy	Rome
Consultant	22. Bruce Crawshaw	Independent consultant on food security issues	Email
IDEA International	23. Chloe Domergue	Lead Specialist, Leadership & Change Management	Phone

Country Office Uganda, 2-5 May 2011

Organization	Name	Position
Government	1. Paul Laboke	Min Agr, Animal Ind & Fisheries Senior Agriculture Officer, Food Crops
	2. Henry Opolot	Min Agr, Animal Ind & Fisheries - Principal Agriculture Officer
	3. Okaasai S. Opolot	Min Agr, Animal Ind & Fisheries - Director, Crop Resources
	4. Acer Godfrey Okot	National Planning Authority - Board Member
	5. Abel J.J. Rwendeire	National Planning Authority - Deputy Chairperson
	6. John B. Ssebuliba	National Planning Authority - Manager, Population, Health & Social Development
Samaritan's Purse Uganda	7. Chris Blackham	
	8. Alex Rwego	
Commodities Exchange		
World Vision	9. Walter Chengo	
USAID	10. David Eckerson	Mission Director
	11. Theresa Tuano	Director, Economic Growth Team
DfiD	12. Gerald Owachi	
FAO	13. Charles Owach	Assistant FAO Representative (Programme)
	14. Tewolde Baraki	Logistics Officer
WFP COUNTRY OFFICE	15. Mario Binasoy	Head Finance Officer
	16. Arben Casslli	Head, Procurement Officer
	17. Marco Cavalcante	Special Assistant to the Country Director
	18. Geoffrey Ebong	Policy Advisor/Office of Country Director
	19. Gerald Kakooza	Senior HR Assistant
	20. Sarah Laughton	Head of Programme
	21. Mulumba Livingstone	Senior Logistics Assistant, Funds Management
	22. Solomon Maravanyika	Security Officer
	23. Robinah Mirembe Kahaga	Senior HR Assistant
	24. Simplex Muhereza	Senior Security Assistant
	25. Martin Muwaga	Head, Monitoring & Evaluation
	26. Victoria Nabyonga-Kabuye	HR Officer
	27. Collins Nyeko	Support/P4P
	28. Elvis Gonza Odeke	Coordinator, Agriculture & Markets
29. Jimi Richardson	Program Offr, Food & Nutrition Security Coordinator	
30. Stanlake Samkange	Country Director	

Organization	Name	Position
	31. Steven Samba	HR Officer/Agriculture Head of Admin
	32. Hakan Tongul	Deputy Country Director
	33. John Baptiste Wamara	National Logistics Officer (Transport Ops & Contracting)

Regional Bureau Kampala, 6 May 2011

Organization	Name	Position/Unit
WFP REGIONAL BUREAU	1. Sory Ouane	Deputy Regional Director
	2. Genevieve Chicoine	Regional Advisor, VAM Senior Regional Advisor, New Initiatives
	3. Mads Lotvall	Regional Advisor, Nutrition
	4. Cecilia Gorion	Senior Regional Programme Advisor
	5. Abdiraham Meygay	

Country Office Tanzania, 9-12 May 2011

Organization	Name	Position
Government	1. F.M. Kagoro	Primary Ed. Ministry Ed. Senior Education Off.
	2. John Kambona	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AG Multi Dir
Embassy of Sweden	3. Lennarth Hjelmaker	Ambassador
Embassy of Japan	4. Hirosih Nakajawa	Ambassador
Canada	5. Robert J. Orr	High Commissioner
Irish Aid	6. Sizya Lugeye	Chief Advisor
USAID	7. Tanya Trevors	Senior Nutrition Advisor
Office of UN Coordinator	8. Alberic Kacou	Resident Coordinator
	9. Helge Gibbonse	M&E
IFAD	10. John Gicharu	Country Director
UNICEF	11. Dorothy Rozga	Representative
	12. Harriet Torlesse	Nutrition Manager
	13. Brenda Muwanga	Nutrition Specialist
	14. Munir Safieldin	Deputy Rep
WFP COUNTRY OFFICE	15. Ronald Sibanda	Country Director
	16. Shiela Gruden	Deputy Country Director
	17. Vera Mayer	Program Officer, C/V
	18. Juvenal Kisanga	Program Officer, VAM
	19. Dominique Leclercq	Program Coordinator, P4P
	- Saidi	
	- Dora	
	- Evelyn	

Country Office Burundi, 12-18 May 2011

Organization	Name	Position/Unit
Government	1. Adolphe Nahayo	Min of External Relations & Int'l Coop, Ambassador & D.G.
	2. Liboire Bigirimana	Min of Elementary Educ, Chef de Cabinet
	3. Gilbert Nduwayo	Min de la Sante et Lutte contre le SIDA:SP/CNLS, Directeur
	4. Frederic Kanzungu	MinSol
	5. Fabien Yamuremye	MinSol
ECHO	6. Isabelle Dhautd	
ECHO	7. Alex Mangona	
USAID	8. Melissa Joy	
UNDP	9. Souleymane Beye	Resident Coordinator
World Bank	10. Aurelien Beko	
UNICEF	11. Hedy IP	Specialist in Nutrition
UNHCR	12. Chrispus Tebid	Administrateur charge du Programme
FAO	13. Hubert Chauvet	
World Vision	14. Thomas Tuttob	
World Vision	15. Tamrat Haile	Strategy & Ministry of Quality Director
NRC	16. Georges Swinimer	Coordinator de Project/Camp Management
ome CARITAS	17. Jean Chrysostome Ndizeye	S Directeur des Programmes
WFP	18. Adama Diop-Faye	Deputy Country Director
	19. Marc Neilson	Public Info and Reporting
	20. Christian Nzeyimana	
	21. Lillian Bigayimpuzi	Programme Officer Health and Nutrition
	22. Emmanuel Twagiramukiza	Programme Officer Relief, Refugees
	23. Seth Niyongabo	Programme Development
	24. Renovat Goragoza	Programme Development
	25. Jean Mahwane	Programme Officer VAM & M&E
	26. Josephine Twagirayezu	Programme Officer VAM & M&E
	27. Deo Batungwanayo	Admin and Finance

Country Office Indonesia, 24-27 May 2011

Organization	Name	Position
Government	1. Susanto Sutoya	Ambassador/Special Advisor to the Coordinating Minister for Peoples's Welfare (on Foreign Aid and International Relations)
	2. Wahyuningsih Darajati	Director for Environmental Affairs
	3. Pak Tjuk Eko	Ministry of Agriculture
OCHA	4. Iganancio Leon-Garcia	Head of Ocha Indonesia
UNICEF	5. Marcoluigi Corso	Deputy Director
Australia	6. Helen McFarlane	Counsellor Health, Gender & Disaster Management
WFP COUNTRY OFFICE	7. Coco Ushiyama	Country Director WFP
	8. Supanon Chobchai	Head of Finance and Administration
	9. Guilia Baldi	Head of Programme
	10. Peter Guest	Deputy Director
	11. Charles Kumar	Logistics Officer
	12. Betty Ka	Head of Supply Chain and Logistics
	13. Melania Gondomartojo	External Liaison Officer

Country Office Cambodia, 29May-01Jun

Organization	Name	Position
Government	1. Chan Sophea	Director, Primary Education Dept
	2. H.E. Srun Darith	Deputy Secretary General, Office of Council of Ministers, Council for Agriculture & Rural Development
	3. H.E. Try Meng	Secretary of State, Ministry of Rural Development
Asia Development Bank	4. Chanthou Hem	Senior Project officer
	5. Nao Ikemoto	Natural Resources Management Specialist
Australia Aid Programme	6. Sin Sovith	Senior Programme Manager, Agriculture & Rural Development
Canadian Cooperation Office	7. Linda Wishart	Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation (CIDA)
	8 Srey Chanthy	Senior Analyst
CARE	9. Bill Pennington	Assistant Country Director
	10. Arif Mehmood	
CENAT (National Centre for TB and Leprosy Control)	11. Dr. Mao Tan Eang	Director
Church World Service	12. Agnetta Dau Valler	Deputy Director Cambodia COUNTRY OFFICE
FAO	13. Paris Chuop	Assistant Representative
UN	14. Douglas Broderick	Resident Coordinator
	15. Ann Lund	Senior Coordination Specialist
WFP COUNTRY OFFICE	16. Richard Bridle	Country Representative
	17. Isabelle Austin	Deputy Country Director
	18. Joachim Groder	Head of Programme
	19. Jean-Pierre de Margerie	Country Representative
	20. Kannith Kong	Education and School Feeding
	21. Kurt Burja	Head of VAM
	22. Ly Eng	Head of Logistics
	23. Meng Chanthoeum	Program Officer, Food Security/FFW
	24. Nora Poghosyan	Head of Admin and Finance
	25. Sokhom Chay	Admin and Finance
World Vision	26. Chhoun Wathan	Senior Programme Manager
	27. Hak Piset	PMCTC, Care & Support Programme Manager

Regional Bureau Bangkok, 02Jun 2011

Organization	Name	Position
WFP REGIONAL BUREAU	1. Alex Marianelli	Regional Logistics Officer
	2. Gerald Daly	Senior Regional Programme Advisor,
	3. John Aylieff	Deputy Regional Director
	4. Naoko Fukunaga	Finance and Administration Officer
	5. Rita Batia	Senior Regional Programme Advisor
	6. Tony Craig	Regional Emergency Advisor

Annex 4: Expressions of the implications of WFP's shift from "Aid" to "Assistance"

Statements reflecting understanding of "purpose"

- purpose remains the same – hunger; it is the strategy that is different
- help government achieve their goals
- move from transition to development
- shift from short term needs to long term perspective
- align with gov priorities, UNDAF, WFP strategic plan
- shift from "food" to "food security"
- shift from food access to food production, accessibility and utilization
- shift to "gap filling and innovation"
- from "doing" to "capacity building"
- contribute to poverty reduction

Statements reflecting new "ways of working"

- from service delivery to helping gov develop sustainable solutions
- reflects an open strategy but no "blue print"
- shift from selling food aid solution to listening and finding solutions
- opportunity to innovate, be creative, use new tools (e.g. cash for education)
- from working "independently" to "participatory"
- changes how WFP engages with governments
- from "WFP project" to "project by others with WFP support"
- enhances focus on targeting
- from implementing large scale operations to piloting and prototypes
- from "short term" to "longer term" concerns
- requires adjustments in partners and partnership
- changes way of working at local levels
- work through gov systems rather than create parallel ones
- greater link to private sector
- phasing out of one-off activities


Statements of implications for activities

- a shift from "feeding" to "facilitating"
- a shift from "doing" to technical assistance and national policy development
- less tonnage
- from "food" to "cash"
- greater attention on nutrition/MCHN
- move to engagement in "safety nets"
- concern for food fortification products
- from WFP school feeding" to "gov school feeding"
- improve food production
- increase incomes of the poorest
- from "importing" to "local purchase"
- buying from small producers rather than big traders
- move of focus from "quantity" to "quality" of food provided
- more attention to "price stabilization"
- shift in M&E from "outputs" to "results"

Annex 5: Charts Illustrating Global Trends

Hunger and malnutrition remain a global scourge, afflicting as many as a sixth of the world's population, or a billion people. A widely used depiction of the hunger trend is reflected in **Figure 5** below.


Figure 5. FAO chart on hunger trends



The graph above is indicative, depicting in very general terms an overall reflection of the problem, based only on the status of persons whose food intake regularly provides less than 1800 K/cal per day of minimum energy requirements. It may be helpful to remember some of the critical considerations associated with hunger which are not reflected in the chart – for example, disaggregation of hunger by men, women and children; considerations by age, body size, activity level and physiological conditions such as illness, infection, pregnancy and lactation of people who are undernourished.

Emergencies. Based on statistics from the Red Cross, some 500 emergencies occur each year of a scale or nature to be noted internationally, with the majority being small in scale and dealt with locally. **Figure 6** illustrates the recorded trends from 1981 to 2009.

Figure 6. Emergencies (by type) in countries requiring assistance



Food aid. Over the course of several decades, a dramatic reversal has occurred in the proportion of WFP food aid devoted to development goals *vs.* the proportion devoted to relief (see **Figures 7 and 8** below). Spikes have occurred several times but overall a falling trend continues; global food aid deliveries in 2009 were at their lowest point since 1961. While support for food aid use in development activities has declined markedly, support for use of food aid in emergency situations has remained constant, suggesting that food aid is increasingly considered a humanitarian intervention.

Figure 7. WFP FAIS graph on global food aid trends





Figure 8. Global food aid flows (1988-2009)²⁶




Funding. As illustrated in **Figure 9**, the overall level of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has continued to increase over time in real terms – reaching its highest level to date in 2010. However, ODA has decreased as a percentage of donor countries’ combined gross national income (GNI), which constitutes the base for funding targets. Within this aggregate, funding continues to shift, with some traditional donors currently scaling back their assistance levels, while new donors are

²⁶ Webb, *Food as Aid: Trends, Needs and Challenges in the 21st Century*. (Occasional Paper no. 14).

increasing their engagement. Many of the 28 countries who responded to the food and financial crisis in 2008, for example, were in fact first-time contributors. Considering the global economic situation, a retracting rather than expanding aid environment is foreseen.

Figure 9. Official Development Assistance



Aid effectiveness. Aid effectiveness initiatives have an expanding influence on development assistance. To counter often cited deficiencies, a sustained global initiative, commonly known as the Paris Declaration initiative, has been underway since around 2000, with endorsement by over 100 countries. Through revisions in the Declarations of Rome, Paris, and most recently Accra, key principles have emerged, and donor and recipient countries are holding each other accountable for commitments (see **Box 1**). A key result is enhanced consensus that aid should be used to help developing countries build local governance systems to better manage their own development and eventually reduce the dependency on aid.

Box 1. High level fora on aid effectiveness, summarized from OECD website

1st: Rome , 2002. Principles for aid effectiveness first outlined. Priority actions included:

- Delivery of aid based on priorities of recipient countries
- Increased cooperation and flexibility by donors on country programmes and projects
- Focus on good practice, monitoring, and development of national capacity

2nd: Paris, 2005. Donors and recipients made commitments around 5 fundamental principles for aid effectiveness:

- **Ownership:** Poverty reduction strategies developed, institutions strengthened, and corruption addressed by recipient countries.
- **Alignment:** Donors support recipient-country priorities and use local systems.
- **Harmonization:** Donors coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information.
- **Results:** The focus is on results, which are measured and tracked.
- **Mutual accountability:** Donors and partners are both accountable.

3rd: Accra, 2008. Stakeholder group widened to include civil society participants. Progress evaluated and stronger efforts proposed towards ownership, partnership, and delivery of results, with capacity building seen as central.

4th: Planned for Busan, 2011. Projected agenda is expected to consider aid effectiveness in view of global challenges to development (e.g. crises in financial, food, security, and climate sectors), progress evaluated, and areas for new or increased focus identified.

Acronyms

CO	Country Office
CP	Country Programme
CS/CSD	Country Strategy/Country Strategy Document
EB	Executive Board
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EU	European Union
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FBP	Food by Prescription
FFW/A	Food for Work/Assets
FITTEST	Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency and Support Team
FMIP	Financial Management Improvement Programme
GNI	Gross National Income
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCHN	Maternal and Child Health Nutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RBM	Results-Based Management
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
OE	Office of Evaluation
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme (Ethiopia)
RB	Regional Bureau
SRE	Staff Review Exercise
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System
WFP	UN World Food Programme

Office of Evaluation
www.wfp.org/evaluation



World Food Programme