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# A Report from the Office of Evaluation



*Full Report of the Evaluation of the Liberia  
PRRO 10454.0 (July 2007-June 2009)*

*Rome, March 2009*

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## Acknowledgement

The evaluation team visited Liberia from 02 to 19 November 2008. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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## Fact Sheet

Name of Operation:	Food Assistance for Relief and Recovery in Post-Conflict Liberia
Duration:	01 July 2007 – 30 June 2009
Original Approved Budget:	USD 50.6 million
Original Approved Tonnage:	53,632 mt
Budget Revisions	3 Approved Budget Revisions as of November 2008
Revised Approved Budget:	USD 75.4 million
Other ongoing WFP operations:	Development Project Liberia 10733.0 (2008-2011): Support for Education
Main Activities :	Food For Education Nutrition Interventions Food Support to Local Initiatives General Food Distribution Capacity Building (government)
Main Partners:	Government of Liberia Norwegian Refugee Council Visions in Action Adventist Development and Relief Agency Liberian Islamic Union for Relief and Development Action Contre la Faim Catholic Relief Services UNICEF United Nations Mission in Liberia



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## Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
ANDP	Aid for the Needy Programme
BMI	Body Mass Index
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CFSNS	Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey
CO	Country Office
CPO	Country Programme Outcome
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn-Soya Blend
DSC	Direct Support Cost
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFE	Food for Education
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FSLI	Food Support for Local Initiatives
GFD	General Food Distribution
GTHR	Girls take Home Ration
GoL	Government of Liberia
Ha	Hectares
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPRS	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
LCL	Lutheran Church in Liberia
LIURD	Liberian Islamic Union for Relief and Development
LTSH	Land-side Transport, Storage and Handling
MCH	Mother Child Health
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPEA	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
MSF/B	Medecines sans Frontieres – Belgium
MT	Metric Tons
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODOC	Other Direct Operational Costs
OECD- DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee



PLHIV	People Living with HIV/AIDS
PMTCT	Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission
PRC	Programme Review Committee
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RRR	Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery unit of UNMIL
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SO	Special Operation
TB	Tuberculosis
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WCF	Working Capital Facility
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation



## **Executive Summary**

By the end of 2008 Liberia had enjoyed relative peace and stability for more than 5 years. However despite continued stability and a strengthening economy, Liberia remained desperately poor, with high levels of unemployment and under-employment. Food insecure was widespread (11 percent of all Liberian rural/semi-urban households were completely food insecure in 2006 and 40 percent of rural households were considered 'highly vulnerable' to food insecurity). The country was heavily reliant on imported food to meet local needs.

Between 2001 and 2007 WFP provided assistance to the victims of the conflict in Liberia through a series of regional West Africa Coastal PRROs (including Guinea and Sierra Leone), enabling WFP to respond more quickly to sudden shifts of populations across international borders, which had become a feature of the spreading conflict. As the situation stabilized after 2003 WFP shifted the focus of its humanitarian assistance from relief to recovery, and introduced a dual approach of supporting the reestablishment of basic social infrastructure in rural areas, with an emphasis on education and primary health care, to attract returnees and support the re-establishment of rural livelihoods, particularly agricultural rehabilitation. In July 2007 WFP shifted to single country intervention, PRRO 10454.0.

In November 2008 WFP undertook an evaluation of the PRRO, with two main objectives:

- To determine the degree to which stated project objectives had been achieved, and to assess the manner in which these have been achieved, in order to be accountable for aid expenditures to stakeholders;
- To draw lessons from the current operation in order to contribute to improved performance in the next phase of the Liberia PRRO, the new Dev Project 10733.0 and similar operations in the country.

The evaluation covered the last six months of the regional PRRO 16004.3 and the first 17 months of the single country PRRO 10454.0 (i.e. the evaluation covered the period January 2007 to November 2008).

School feeding and agricultural rehabilitation were intended to continue as the cornerstones of WFP's recovery approach in Liberia, particularly as the process of resettlement and reintegration had been hindered by the lack of basic social services and livelihood opportunities in rural areas.

The PRRO would have been more relevant if it had been more focused. In short, it tried to do too much in a situation where capacity was extremely weak at all levels to manage and implement interventions. The PRRO included too many activities.





Many of the output and outcome measures were inappropriate and the linkage between the project aims and output to actual project interventions was weak. Indicators to measure output and outcome were too numerous, too complex, too difficult to obtain and often inappropriate to the objectives. As a result, many of the indicators proposed in the Log Frame were not collected, and it was not possible to monitor progress in reaching the stated objectives.

Nor was the PRRO well targeted on the most food insecure and vulnerable individuals or communities, which had been clearly identified by the 2006 CFSNS as recent returnees and the communities that had the largest number of returnee households. The main activities of the PRRO failed to directly address the main causes of food insecurity and vulnerability in the country.

The PRRO document contained no indications of transitions expected during the period covered by the operation. Nor did the PRRO explore how to phase out of activities in a way that would ensure that beneficiaries did not suffer with the cessation of WFP assistance.

While overall service delivery was good, considerable staff time was devoted to trying to rectify the major problems of poor rural transport infrastructure and the high level of diversions that plagued WFP operations for many years. There were major achievements in improving efficiency through a series of management initiatives that resulted in better accountability at all levels, and this resulted in lower operational costs. A Fleet Management System, introduced in 2007, helped contain transport costs. Cost per ton per kilometer generally declined during 2008 and fuel consumption improved by 10 and 20 percent for light and heavy vehicles respectively.

The Country Office devoted considerable effort to reduce corruption and diversions. A number of WFP staff were dismissed for corruption, and others disciplined. Working closely with Government to ensure that any irregularities identified through monitoring were rapidly addressed and perpetrators publicly punished, diversions in the school feeding activity were significantly reduced.

Overall the operation was well resourced, although it was heavily reliant on WFP multilateral funding. However the operation suffered from inception with inadequate funding of Direct Support Costs (DSC), brought about by the resource transfer from the previous PRRO of commodities but no accompanying DSC. To balance DSC costs the Country Office took a number of major steps, including reducing the number of country office staff by one third, increasing the DSC rate by one quarter between 2007 and 2008, closing two sub-offices, moving into UN joint offices, and closely monitoring spending in particular high risk items (e.g fuel management). Despite these initiatives, the DSC budget remained in deficit and it was unclear whether the Country Office would be able to cover the DSC costs to the end of the operation.

It was difficult to assess the effectiveness of the operation because the complex design of the operation, and the inclusion of a number of inappropriate indicators, necessitated a substantial M&E system to collect the required data, and this was not put in place. As a result there were very few data available to help assess effectiveness.



The poor rural road infrastructure, combined with the severe damage caused during the rainy season (particularly heavy during 2008) meant that in many months less than 60 percent of the planned delivery target was achieved.

Beneficiary numbers in most activities were also less than planned, as were project outputs.

The impact of the PRRO was generally positive and significant. In particular PRRO 10064.3 and PRRO 10454.0 made a significant contribution to encouraging return and resettlement in rural areas, and thus to help consolidate the peace process.

There was widespread agreement that the school feeding activity had been an important factor in revitalizing the education system in rural areas and encouraging return and resettlement. It was generally felt that WFP has also made a major contribution to the rebuilding of education capacity through the establishment of a daily monitoring and recording programme at individual school level (initially for the purposes of food management) that was largely transparent and trustworthy. The school feeding activity had also channelled substantial quantities of food into food deficit rural communities. However children from poorer families still faced significant economic barriers to attending school, and the impact of school feeding would remain limited until these were reduced or removed. Provision of the Girls Take Home Ration had helped to bring to the fore the issue of how to ensure that older rural girls remained in the education system.

Many participants in food for work activities invested a portion of their wages in income generation ventures such as farming and petty trading, which had led to an increase in household income even after the projects were completed. Skills transfer through practical on-the-job training was also important. Furthermore, there was strong evidence that the provision of short term jobs had helped to promote community peace and reconciliation.

Beneficiary numbers in the nutrition interventions were too small to have a national level impact. But a significant number of malnourished children and pregnant women did benefit from the activity. Provision of food to people living with HIV (PLHIV) encouraged them to access treatment, despite the stigmatization they often faced.

WFP's capacity building activities helped to bring issues of food security to the forefront in Liberia. Within the school feeding and nutrition activities, capacity building at the local and county level significantly increased accountability and food management.

The design of the PRRO gave little explicit consideration of transition to exit strategies. However there was evidence that the benefits of many elements of the operation were sustainable. The PRRO helped lay the basis for a return to normality, even though it was not specifically intended. Refugees assisted in the PRRO appeared to be in a situation where they could be self-supporting. There was evidence that farmers who benefited from the rehabilitation of rice fields and vegetable gardens would continue to maintain and benefit from these, especially where they had some form of individual ownership or rights.



While the lack of maintenance capacity meant that much of the rural infrastructure repaired was likely to deteriorate again during the next rainy season, those participants who were able to invest some of their earnings in other productive assets were likely to continue to reap benefits from their employment. The school feeding programme was highly appreciated at all levels. The benefits of education were well understood in Liberia, and incentives such as school meals may not be required in the future.

One of the major issues for the future is to ensure that the WFP intervention better addresses the causes of food insecurity and vulnerability, and to ensure that WFP assistance is better targeted on the most food insecure and vulnerable. This implies significant change to the design of the WFP project, in particular to:

- To address under-five malnutrition
- To ensure that food is available during the hungry season
- To address short term hunger among school children
- To access the more remote areas, where food insecurity and vulnerability may be expected to be highest.

The WFP intervention should also be more focussed. It should have clearer objectives, fewer activities, and indicators that are both relevant and can be relatively easily collected.

The school feeding programme would be more effective if the economic barriers, that currently prevent children from the poorest families attending school, were reduced or removed. WFP could advocate with Government to try to achieve that.

If WFP assistance is to have a longer term impact, greater attention is required to the transition process, and how WFP may phase out of activities. Transition must take care that the needs of beneficiaries are properly considered.

The main recommendations for WFP Headquarters are:

- Review current PRRO guidance to more clearly identify different types of transitions and appropriate indicators to guide the timing of the transition process
- Revise WFP financial procedures to ensure that commodities are not transferred from completed operations without appropriate levels of funding for ODOC, LTSH and DSC
- Review WFP school feeding guidelines to better distinguish between the objectives and indicators of school feeding in emergency situations, in post-conflict countries and countries in transition, and school feeding in the development context. In particular the Guidelines should address the issue of how to implement a transitional school feeding programme, which is the typical situation in PRROs



- Develop practical guidance, in the context of the new Strategic Plan, on more appropriate M&E approaches that go beyond headquarters reporting requirements, and help Country Offices in terms of improved management decisions regarding WFP interventions. Such guidance should focus on issues such as the appropriateness of indicators to measure performance, the range of possible data collection and sampling approaches, and the utilization of data bases to inform management decisions.

The main recommendations for the WFP Country Office are:

- Redesign WFP operations in Liberia so they are more focused and less complex, and more in line with prevailing capacities to manage and implement food assistance. This includes clear and obtainable objectives, fewer activities, and more appropriate indicators that are easier to collect and collate to monitor progress in achieving the operation's objectives
- Significantly strengthen programme monitoring to ensure that progress towards achieving the operation's objectives are measured and that WFP assistance is effective. The feasibility of monitoring based on sampling systems should be considered.
- Investigate the feasibility of developing appropriate local storage facilities that might be used to pre-position commodities closer to project sites prior to the rainy season
- Investigate possible alternative activities with partners that could compliment the Girls Take Home Ration to better address the social and economic causes of high school drop out rates for older girls.
- Investigate the feasibility of an expanded MCH activity to provide blended food to all pregnant women and young children (6 to 24 months) within a defined area. Available data on malnutrition rates should be the prime targeting criteria. Care would be required to ensure that the quality of health service provided would not suffer as a result of including food aid along with other responsibilities.



## **I. Background**

### **1.A. Context**

1. By the end of 2008 Liberia had enjoyed relative peace and stability for more than 5 years, following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of August 2003, largely because of United Nations Security Council Resolution SCR 1509, that enabled the deployment of over 20,000 peace keepers. The nearly two decades of conflict devastated the infrastructure and economy, with massive loss of life and property, huge population displacements to both surrounding countries and to Monrovia (it is estimated that almost every Liberian was displaced at least once during the conflict, and many were displaced numerous times), and the collapse of basic social services. A characteristic of the conflict was periods of intense violence and destruction, followed by periods of relative stability, during which people tried to rebuild their lives and property, only to see them destroyed in the next wave of violence. Consequently many people have remained cautious in terms of investing in rebuilding property or businesses.
2. Following the 2005 election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as the first female president of an African country, the new government gave priority to addressing governance issues as part of the post-conflict recovery process. Despite considerable progress, a number challenges still posed a threat to continued stability, including:
  - The incomplete reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants
  - High levels of youth unemployment
  - On-going concerns about human rights and protection
  - Pervasive poverty and food insecurity
  - Poor health and nutrition
  - Weak educational systems
  - Severely damaged rural infrastructure, especially roads and bridges
  - Weak governance and corruption
  - Continuing political volatility in the region, particularly in neighbouring Ivory Coast and Guinea, which could threaten Liberia's progress.
3. The first phase of the recovery process consisted of the return of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees. The 2006 Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS 2006) found that 86 percent of households in rural areas had been displaced at least once since fighting began in 1989. This return phase officially ended in April 2006, by which time more than 314,000 IDPs had returned to their areas of origin and a total of 35 IDP and refugee camps were closed. The resettlement process was hindered by the lack of basic social services and livelihood opportunities in most rural areas, and many formerly displaced people chose to remain in Monrovia or Greater Monrovia, with the result that in 2008 Monrovia accounted for some 40 percent of the total population. Small numbers of displaced persons and refugees continued to return to their areas of origin after 2006, particularly to counties in the north-west which were among the most highly affected during the last years of the civil strife and where households often had to start from scratch to rebuild their livelihoods.



4. In 2008 pervasive poverty affected all segments of the Liberian population, and at least half of the Liberian population lived on less than half a dollar per day<sup>1</sup>. The 2006 CFSNS noted that 11 percent of all Liberian rural/semi-urban households were completely food insecure; in Lofa this percentage reached 28 percent. Forty percent of rural households were considered 'highly vulnerable' to food insecurity, with the largest proportions concentrated in Lofa, Grand Kru, River Gee, Bomi, Gbarpolu, Nimba and Sinoe counties (see Annex 7).
5. The 2006 CFSNS identified recent returnees as being the most food insecure or vulnerable group. It also noted several underlying structural causes of food insecurity, including:
  - Low agricultural production capacities due to lack of seeds and tools, and knowledge on adequate pest control, storage and processing techniques
  - Low purchasing power due to limited income-generation opportunities in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector
  - Limited biological absorption capacities due to lack of safe drinking water and sanitation, high prevalence of disease, inadequate food preparation, and poor child feeding practices.<sup>2</sup>
6. More recent community participatory assessments of living conditions and challenges, undertaken by UNHCR in 2007 and 2008 among returnee populations in Maryland County, suggested that female-headed households had since become one of the most food insecure and vulnerable groups.
7. Gender discrimination and inequality remained high in all parts of Liberia. Women had less access to education, employment, training, health and other basic services than men. Gender-based violence against women remained a common occurrence. The majority of abuse and violence occurred in the rural areas, where women and girls generally had limited knowledge of their rights and where there were few support mechanisms. Incidents were most often dealt with at the village level through local means of dispute resolution that did not take into account the rights of the survivor, but catered more to appeasement of the affected families and avoiding inter-communal conflicts.
8. The 2006 CFSNS found malnutrition and under-nutrition was pervasive:
  - 39 percent of all under-5 children were stunted
  - 27 percent of all under-5 children were underweight
  - 7 percent of all under-5 children were wasted (acute malnutrition)
  - Chronic malnutrition (stunting) was critical (above 40 percent) in nine of the fifteen counties; the remaining six counties had chronic malnutrition levels of between 30 and 40 percent.
9. Acute malnutrition was significantly associated with high prevalence of illness, mainly diarrhea, malaria and acute respiratory infections, and poor infant and child feeding practices (particularly associated with teenage motherhood).

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<sup>1</sup> All references to dollars (\$) are to US dollars, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>2</sup> The 2006 CFSNS was being updated at the end of 2008, with publication of new data expected early in 2009.



Most households had very limited access to basic services, including water and sanitary facilities and health care. Only one in ten households could access health care services within their proximity. The health system remained largely dependent on NGOs for delivery of many critical services.

10. Micronutrient deficiency was widespread:

- An estimated 86 percent of Liberian children aged 6 – 23 months were anaemic and 53 percent were vitamin A deficient
- 62 percent of pregnant women had iron deficiency anaemia and 12 percent were vitamin A deficient
- 14 percent of non-pregnant women in the reproductive ages had a low Body Mass Index (BMI).

11. The civil conflict had a devastating impact on the education system in Liberia: nearly half of all adults had not received any formal education; nearly two thirds of women were illiterate. The 2006 CFSNS found nearly 30 percent of boys and 37 percent of girls in the age group 6 – 18 were not enrolled in any education institution. There was no evidence that this situation had significantly improved since in rural areas. The main reasons for non-enrolment were the inability of parents to meet the associated costs of education and the prevailing poor education infrastructure, including the lack of suitably qualified teachers. In 2008 the Government abolished school fees for primary level, but other costs such as for uniforms and “voluntary” contributions to volunteer teachers remained.

12. The net primary enrolment rate was estimated at 46 percent (male 62 percent; female 34 percent), while the net secondary enrolment rate stood at 34 percent. Net enrolment was kept low by the late entry of students, with many schools containing teenagers enrolled in all primary level classes. The Government introduced the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), a parallel primary education intervention, to address the basic education needs of young adults who missed out on a primary education because of the conflict. School drop-out rates continued to be high, especially for older girls. Many students had no breakfast before going to school. The school terms typically ran from September to July; schools closed for most of the rainy season.

13. In 2008 the agricultural sector contributed about 50 percent to the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Liberia. Agriculture, mainly smallholder subsistence agriculture or fisheries, remained the main source of livelihood for approximately 36 percent of the population. Agricultural production suffered severely during the years of civil war, as people fled their farms, markets collapsed and the supporting infrastructure was destroyed. Production of rice, the main staple food commodity, grown by nearly three quarters of farming households, fell 76 percent between 1987 and 2005. The recovery process since 2004 placed great emphasis on the agricultural sector, and rice production increased by 70 percent between the 2005 and 2007 agricultural seasons.<sup>3</sup> However production levels were well below world standards and Liberia remained a food-deficit country. As a result the country was particularly vulnerable to price shocks, such as the food price rises of 2008.

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<sup>3</sup> From 85,000 to 144,000 metric tons (MT).



14. Liberian agriculture was characterized by traditional production techniques – mainly slash and burn. Average farm size per household was about 1.3 hectares (ha), with most households accessing land through traditional customary land tenure. In 2008 only 33 percent of farmers had access to improved rice seeds and less than 2 percent had access to fertilizer. There was a clear division of labour: men concentrated on brushing, felling and clearing of forest. Women, who constituted the majority of smallholder producers and of the agricultural labour force in general, were involved in planting, weeding, harvesting and processing. They also played a vital role in linking rural and urban markets through their informal petty trade networks. The hungry season in rural areas coincided with the rainy season (typically July – September) – health clinic records showed admission rates for malnutrition often doubled and trebled during this period.

### **1.B. Description of the Operation**

15. Despite continued stability, a strengthening economy and improvements in agriculture, Liberia remained severely food insecure in 2008, and heavily reliant on imported food to meet local needs. Thus there continued to be a clear role for food aid. Between 2001 and 2007 WFP provided assistance to the victims of the conflict in Liberia through the framework of a series of regional West Africa Coastal PRROs (PRRO 10064.0, PRRO 10064.1, PRRO 10064.2 and PRRO 10064.3), which included Guinea and Sierra Leone. The use of a regional approach enabled WFP to respond more quickly to sudden shifts of populations across international borders, which had become a feature of the spreading conflict in coastal West Africa.
16. As the situation stabilised after 2003, and refugees returned home, WFP shifted the focus of its humanitarian assistance from relief to recovery. General food distributions, which had become an entitlement for many people during the long years of conflict, were phased out during the course of PRRO 10064.3, and resettlement packages provided for refugees and IDPs returning to their areas of origin. PRRO 10064.3 also introduced a dual approach of supporting the reestablishment of basic social infrastructure in rural areas, with an emphasis on education and primary health care, to attract returnees and support the re-establishment of rural livelihoods, particularly agricultural rehabilitation.
17. In July 2007 WFP shifted to a single country intervention, PRRO 10454.0. School feeding and agricultural rehabilitation were intended to continue as the cornerstones of WFP's recovery approach in Liberia, particularly as the process of resettlement and reintegration had been hindered by the lack of basic social services and livelihood opportunities in rural areas. Thus PRRO 10454.0 was designed to contribute to the efforts of the Government to attain Universal Primary Education and to achieve sustainable food security, while also supporting institutional capacity building and infrastructure development.





18. PRRO 10454.0 included all five WFP Strategic Objectives<sup>4</sup>:

- Provide life-saving assistance through general food distributions (GFD) to refugees in camps (Strategic Objective 1)
- Provide food through Food for Work (FFW) and Food for Training (FFT) to rebuild and protect productive assets (Strategic Objective 2)
- Provide food to improve the nutrition and health status of children and mothers and vulnerable groups (Strategic Objective 3)
- Provide food to support access to basic education, with particular emphasis on girl's education (Strategic Objective 4)
- Contribute to building the capacity of national institutions to ensure timely and efficient response to food security challenges (Strategic Objective 5).

19. The logical framework summary for PRRO 10454.0 (see Annex 3) gave the overall objective as: "Contribute to the peace consolidation process through prevention of hunger, creation of conditions for vulnerable populations to restore sustainable livelihoods, foster access to education and increase government capacity in terms of food assistance management". The logic model included a range of outcomes, outputs and performance indicators largely derived from the WFP Indicator Compendium (2006-2007). Means of verification relied heavily on partners providing appropriate and timely monitoring and food distribution reports.

20. Within the five Strategic Objectives, the PRRO included 15 different activities, all of which had been included in PRRO 10064.3; there was little substantive difference between the two PRROs in terms of their design. The main change was that the number of beneficiaries in Food for Education was to be reduced from 600,000 at the end of PRRO 10064.3 (June 2007) to 450,000 for the 2007/2008 scholastic year, and then to 400,000 for the 2008/2009 scholastic year, with the phase out of school feeding in Greater Monrovia. The PRRO included the following specific programme components:

21. **Food-for-Education (FFE):** Food assistance was to help increase enrolment and attendance rates, enhance retention, and narrow the attendance gap between boys and girls. WFP food rations were to be complemented by products from school gardens. School eligibility for food assistance was based on Ministry of Education (MoE)/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)/WFP minimum standards including sanitation, water, cooking and storage facilities, a conducive learning environment, the existence of a functional Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) and year round accessibility by road. Cooks were to be hired by school authorities. FFE included five activities:

- Provision of hot meals during the recess period (typically 10.30 – 11.30), comprised of cereals, pulses, vegetable oil and salt (see Annex 6 for composition of rations). WFP also undertook to provide any necessary non-food items.

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<sup>4</sup> The strategic objectives of PRRO 10454.0 related to the WFP Strategic Plan of 2006-2009. All reference to Strategic Objectives in this evaluation also relate to that Strategic Plan. The WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011, approved in 2008, introduced a new set of Strategic Objectives for WFP, but these have not been referred to in this document, to avoid confusion.



- Girls Take Home Ration (GTHR) consisting of cereals and vegetable oil distributed to girls in Grades 4-6 who achieved an attendance record of 80 percent of a calendar month, as an incentive to boost girls' enrolment and retention rates in schools where the gender gap was 15 percent or more.
- Provision of basic health education, in collaboration with the MoE Division of School Health, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoH), UNICEF and WHO, with particular emphasis on raising HIV/AIDS awareness, and de-worming activities, targeting students in areas of high nutritional concern.
- Initiation of a pilot school garden activity, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), UNICEF, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and cooperating partners, in counties with acute food insecurity and high vulnerability to food insecurity. Schools were to receive seeds and technical assistance from agricultural technicians hired by partner organizations.
- Capacity building for PTAs through sensitization and training to increase awareness, participation and ownership of the school feeding programme.

22. **Food Support to Local Initiatives (FSLI):** FSLI was to be implemented through FFW and FFT in counties with the highest return rates of both IDPs and refugees. The local daily value of the FFW rations was approximately \$3, equivalent to the daily wage paid by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in its labour-intensive employment programme. FSLI included three distinct activities:

- **Food for Agriculture:** In collaboration with MOA, FAO and non-government organizations (NGOs) seeds, tools and food were to be provided to community-based organizations (CBOs) that promoted agriculture rehabilitation and development (irrigation, dams, dykes, swamp rice or vegetable cultivation, fish ponds etc).
- **Rehabilitation of Damaged Infrastructure.** Food support was to be provided to communities for the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure such as schools, clinics, roads, bridges and community wells. (Much of the infrastructure work consisted of "brushing" – clearing vegetation from roadsides.) Projects were to be implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA), other UN Agencies and NGOs.
- **Life Skills and Vocational/Literacy Training:** WFP was to support training projects in vocational and social skills (e.g. carpentry, masonry, tailoring, tie-dying and baking) with the aim of enhancing income-earning capacity.

23. **Nutrition Interventions (NI):** In conjunction with UNICEF and WHO, WFP was to support supplementary feeding programmes in areas with high malnutrition rates in order to improve the nutritional status of acutely malnourished children under five years of age and malnourished pregnant and lactating women, with the following components:

- **Therapeutic Feeding<sup>5</sup>:** WFP was to provide fortified blended foods to severely malnourished children during their second phase of recuperation in recognized

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<sup>5</sup> In PRRO 10454.0 the term "Therapeutic Feeding" was used to cover the provision of blended food to severely malnourished children during their second phase of recuperation in recognized health institutions. This is the way the term has been used in this evaluation.



- health institutions. Mothers or caretakers accompanying the children were to receive a daily ration.
  - Supplementary Feeding: Malnourished children were to receive supplementary feeding for six months
  - Mother-Child Health (MCH): Malnourished pregnant and lactating women were to receive fortified blended foods in the form of take-home rations for a period of six months.
  - Support to PLHIV: WFP was to provide rations for PLHIV and their families for 6 months .
  - Support to tuberculosis (TB) patients: WFP was to provide rations for TB patients to support nutritional recovery and provide an incentive to adhere to medical treatment.
  - Institutional Feeding: WFP was to provide food assistance for highly vulnerable war affected groups, particularly orphans, who had no means of livelihood and were taken care off in inpatient specialized institutions.
24. Apart from the institutional feeding component, these nutritional interventions were essentially curative: therapeutic and supplementary feeding addressed existing malnutrition; the food provided to PLHIV and TB patients helped meet their additional nutritional needs as well as serving as an incentive for treatment adherence.
25. **General Food Distribution: (GFD)** In co-ordination with UNHCR, WFP was to provide food assistance to 1,100 Ivorian refugees living in two settlement areas (Barrakan, Maryland County and Saclepea, Nimba County). Although the number of refugees fell below the cutoff detailed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and WFP, where responsibility for provision of food for refugee camps of less than 5,000 passes to UNHCR, WFP retained responsibility for refugee feeding as it had the food transport infrastructure already in place. WFP arranged delivery of the food and managed the distribution.
26. **Capacity Building (CB)** had the overall objective of contributing to the capacity of national institutions to ensure timely and efficient response to food security challenges. Specific activities included:
- Strengthening the school feeding monitoring unit in the MoE
  - Providing technical support to the Ministries of Planning and Agriculture to develop a national food security strategy and establish a food security monitoring unit
  - Coordinate with UNICEF/WHO to strengthen the nutritional surveillance system in the Ministry of Health
27. National and international NGOs were to play an integral role in implementing the PRRO. Selection of partners was to be guided by the desire to contribute their own funds and to take and share risks. Preference for partnership was to be determined by past performance, expertise and the capacity to add value to the project.
28. PRRO 10454.0 was originally planned to provide 53,632 MT of food at a cost of \$50.6 million. The Operation had three budget revisions (to December 2008):



- In November 2007 the budget was revised to include an additional \$2.3 million, reflecting an update of Land-side Transport, Storage and Handling (LTSH) requirements, based on the latest cost estimates, and additional Direct Support Costs (DSC) arising from the transfer of costs that previously were not considered project specific.
  - In June 2008 the budget was further revised to include an additional \$8.7 million to reflect the prevailing high market prices and exchange rate fluctuations. The budget revision also included a reduction in food requirements as a result of the introduction of a development project in the second half of 2008 targeting 62,000 school children in five counties in southeastern Liberia, which were previously included in the PRRO.
  - In August 2008 a third budget revision for an additional \$16.6 million was approved to provide food assistance to a further 220,000 people, mainly in urban or peri-urban areas, adversely affected by high food prices as follows:
    - School meals to 155,000 school children in Greater Monrovia (this included schools that had been phased out from the school feeding programme in June 2008). This activity commenced in September 2008.
    - Take home rations for an additional 4,300 girls in rural primary schools. This activity also commenced in September 2008.
    - An urban canteen programme for 26,000 children. This had not commenced by November 2008.
    - An expanded MCH activity for 17,000 malnourished women.
    - A food/cash-for-work component for 5,000 urban youth employed in various assets creation and rehabilitation work. This activity had not commenced by November 2008.
29. In June 2008 the Executive Board approved a \$15 million development project (Dev 10733.0) to begin in September 2008, targeting 62,000 school children in five chronically food insecure counties in southeastern Liberia, formerly included within the PRRO, where the need for a longer term intervention was identified.

### **1.C. Evaluation Features**

30. The terms of reference for this evaluation are given in Annex 1. The evaluation had two main objectives:
- To determine the degree to which stated project objectives had been achieved, and to assess the manner in which these have been achieved, in order to be accountable for aid expenditures to stakeholders
  - To draw lessons from the current operation in order to contribute to improved performance in the next phase of the Liberia PRRO, the new Dev Project 10733.0 and similar operations in the country.
31. The evaluation took a mixed method approach that was both:
- Objective-oriented, assessing the extent to which the project goals and objectives (as stated in the project documents) had been achieved to date;



- Participant-oriented, recognizing that project participants and stakeholders are key sources of the information required to determine this.
32. The evaluation focused on the period January 2007 to November 2008, covering the final six months of the previous regional PRRO 10064.3 (January to June 2007) and the first 17 months of the Liberia PRRO (July 2007 to November 2008).
33. In terms of document review and collation of data, the evaluation considered all counties of the country and all activities supported by WFP. However, given the relative size of the different activities, the evaluation gave special emphasis to the FFE component. WFP project documents, including Standard Project Reports, Annual Work Plans and Mid-Year Reviews, COMPAS reports and WFP monitoring reports, provided the major source of data on project implementation, including information on targeting, commodity distribution, numbers of beneficiaries, outputs and outcomes.
34. The evaluation team spent the period 2-19 November 2008 in Liberia. Visits to project sites and meetings with beneficiaries were undertaken during the period 7-15 November. The field trip itinerary gave priority to the counties with the highest levels of food insecurity, the highest levels of child malnutrition and the lowest rates of school enrolment, as identified by the 2006 CFSNS (see Annex 7). In order to extend coverage, the evaluation broke into two teams for the field trip programme. Examples of all the different activities included in the PRRO were visited during the field trips. To the extent feasible, project sites were visited while participants were engaged in activities (i.e. during school hours for FFE activities, during clinic hours for nutrition activities, and during working hours for FFW activities). Field trips also gave priority to visiting more remote project sites, on the assumption overall level of need was likely to be greatest and challenges to sound implementation more likely in the more remote areas.
35. The short time available for site visits and the extremely poor condition of many rural roads had a number of implications for the scope of the evaluation, including:
- The evaluation mission had neither the time nor the ability to undertake extensive primary data collection. Instead the evaluation focused on the extent that current monitoring, reporting and evaluation systems provided accurate data on project implementation.
  - Some counties (Gbarpolu and much of Grand Kru) were not accessible because roads were impassable; other counties (Grand Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, Sinoe) were not visited because of time limitations (see map in Annex 1 for location of the different counties).
  - For the counties not visited, the evaluation relied on secondary information, particularly Government reports and the monitoring reports from implementing partners and WFP field monitors. These were not always complete, accurate or relevant.
36. Informal interviews with project participants (on-site wherever possible) helped to identify additional issues regarding the implementation of the project and the effectiveness of WFP activities in meeting the needs of beneficiaries. In some cases these interviews, particularly those with rural women, were constrained by language difficulties.



37. Interviews with selected stakeholders, including the main donors and cooperating partners, provided qualitative data to complement available quantitative data. In some cases such qualitative data helped to cover gaps in the quantitative data to help assess relevance, effectiveness and impact.
38. WFP had developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and OECD-DAC). It set out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also included checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the Terms of Reference. EQAS was systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents were provided to the evaluation team.

## **II. Main Findings**

### **2.A. Operation Design: relevance and appropriateness**

#### *Needs Assessment*

39. The 2006 CFSNS identified both the counties that had the highest levels of food insecurity and vulnerability, and also identified the population groups who were most vulnerable (the recent returnees). Thus the 2006 CFSNS provided clear guidance which would have enabled WFP to target interventions on those counties where food insecurity and vulnerability were greatest. However from the outset the PRRO was to be implemented in all 15 counties of the country.<sup>6</sup> There was little obvious attempt to target recent returnees as a specific vulnerable group in specific activities (such as FFW, where it would have been most feasible). Certainly the counties with the highest proportions of returnees were included in the PRRO, but the largest number of beneficiaries was highest in the most populated counties, and these were not those with the highest proportion of returnees. The activities of the PRRO did not adequately address the causes of food insecurity in the country.

#### *Internal Coherence*

40. The PRRO was generally in line with the WFP PRRO guidance material. The PRRO did not give sufficient attention to issues of transition, which should be central to a PRRO. However current WFP corporate guidance also is weak in identifying different types of transition that may be applicable (the phase out from recovery to development should not be the only model). Nor does current corporate guidance suggest appropriate indicators to help guide the transition process, and indicate when phase out would be appropriate.

#### *External Coherence*

41. The different activities of the PRRO fitted with and contributed to the actions of the different line ministries as they evolved. The PRRO was designed within both an evolving Government policy framework and a changing United Nations approach that stressed the shift

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<sup>6</sup> No convincing explanation was available as to why the PRRO was implemented in all 15 counties.



towards development. The incoming government quickly made substantial progress with the formulation of an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS), which followed an initial 150-day action plan that particularly sought to address governance issues. Following the IPRS, line ministries commenced the preparation of different sector plans. The Ministry of Education focused on the provision of Universal Primary Education, rehabilitation of infrastructure, teacher training, and strengthening PTAs. The Ministry of Agriculture planned for a national food security programme including the establishment of baseline data on food security. The Ministry of Health had a programme to expand rural health clinics. The main activities of the PRRO supported these Government initiatives.

42. The PRRO was in close accord with and supported the main UNDAF priorities, and nestled within the UNDAF approach, which in turn responded to a government-led development process, based on the Millennium Development Goals. The UNDAF for Liberia was completed in 2007 (for the period 2008-2012), but the PRRO was designed within the context of the then on-going UNDAF discussions. WFP was a strong participant in the CCA and UNDAF discussions, and it was largely through WFP's efforts that both the CCA and UNDAF recognized the importance of food security issues.

43. WFP also played a major role in bringing food security and nutrition issues to the forefront of Government and UN policy discussions, including:

- The development of the National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy, followed by an Action Plan and Government/UN Joint Programme for Food Security and Nutrition, launched in mid-2008
- Training for WFP, Government and partner staff in basic nutrition
- Food Security and Nutrition issues highlighted in the Poverty Reduction Strategies
- The drafting of a National Nutrition Policy
- Establishment of an institutional framework for national food security monitoring (including the setting-up of a household surveillance system and market price data collection system).

#### *Project Design*

44. The eventual design of PRRO 10454.0 was weak in a number of respects. In particular, the design of the PRRO did not take into account the significant management and implementation constraints to undertaking a recovery operation in Liberia. Yet these were concisely detailed in both the project document and in the introduction the Country Director made to the Programme Review Committee (PRC) in 2007, particularly the overall weak management and implementation capacity at all levels of government and potential implementing partners, the high levels of corruption, and the difficulties in accessing rural areas, particularly during and immediately after the rainy season, because of the destruction of much of the rural infrastructure during the conflict.

45. As a result, the PRRO set itself targets and performance criteria that it would not be possible to either measure or meet without substantial efforts devoted to monitoring and evaluation. In short, the final project design included too many activities under too many strategic objectives that required too high a level of monitoring in an extremely difficult physical environment and with extremely weak national management and implementation capacity.



The final logical framework for PRRO 10454.0, which broadly followed that of the preceding regional PRRO 10064.3 and did not seem to be specifically tailored to the changed situation prevailing in Liberia in 2006/2007 (when the PRRO was prepared).

46. Many of the output and outcome measures were inappropriate and the linkage between the project aims and output to actual project interventions was weak. As a result, many of the indicators proposed in the logical framework were not collected:
- Strategic Objective 1 required nutrition screening to be carried out by WFP in collaboration with UNHCR, focusing particularly on acute malnutrition of children under 5 years of age - this was never attempted<sup>7</sup>.
  - Strategic Objective 2 required end of project reports by implementing partners - these largely proved to be untraceable.
  - Strategic Objective 3 required matching recovery rates to medical intervention and food assistance - the medical records were never matched to the food distribution records to trace levels of outcome.
  - Strategic Objective 4 required measures of improved enrolments and attendance - there were no follow-up surveys to the original 2007 Standardised School Feeding Survey to measure this.
47. The PRRO document contained no indications of transitions expected during the period covered by the operation, even for activities that were clearly more suited to relief interventions (such as therapeutic feeding or institutional feeding). Clear exit strategies were only described for school feeding activities (admittedly, which accounted for some three quarters of WFP assistance), with the phase out from Greater Monrovia by July 2008. (The third budget revision reintroduced school feeding to Greater Monrovia for 155,000 children from September 2008 as a justified temporary measure to cope with prevailing high food prices and the risk of attendant civil unrest; unfortunately the MoE interpreted this as a sign that WFP was not serious about phasing out of Greater Monrovia).
48. In the initial project design, the school feeding activity did not make a strong distinction between emergency school feeding and development school feeding. This is also a weakness of current WFP corporate guidance on school feeding – there is insufficient differentiation between emergency school feeding and school feeding undertaken in a development context, in terms of objectives, outputs, outcomes and indicators. Nor is there specific guidance on how to approach school feeding in countries in transition; in such situations one would expect the emergency components (using schools to channel food into communities, trying to rehabilitate the education system) would be gradually replaced by more educational objectives (increased enrolment and attendance, improved educational outcome), but there is no guidance on how to design and implement such a phase-over. In the case of Liberia, the PRRO design used objectives and indicators that were more relevant to development school feeding (and these same objectives and indicators were repeated in development project 10733.0). Objectives and indicators more aligned with recovery interventions would have

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<sup>7</sup> The actual wording of the Logical Framework summary is: “Nutrition screening carried out by WFP in collaboration with partner organizations.” WFP would not normally undertake nutrition screening, as this is not part of the WFP mandate, but would rely on partners. During WFP training in Food security Assessment in 2008, anthropometric measures of under-five children in the refugee settlement were taken.





been of greater relevance. Possible objectives could have included: the reestablishment of basic social infrastructure in rural areas; or encouraging and maintaining the flow of returnees to their home areas - it was in this area that WFP achieved notable success. But these were not included as an explicit objective in the logical framework.

### *Appropriateness*

49. Given the lack of other appropriate mechanisms whereby the distribution of large levels of commodities could be properly managed and accounted for, there was probably no other viable option than to base the PRRO on school feeding in order to channel large quantities of food aid to more remote rural areas. School feeding accounted for three quarters of the total tonnage of commodities. The 2006 CFSNS showed a link between the level of food security and the rate of school attendance, so there was justification for the approach. However in terms of addressing the causes of food insecurity, and of reaching the most vulnerable, the school feeding activity was not necessarily the most appropriate activity, and did not adequately address some of the main food security issues in Liberia, including:

- While it was practical and understandable to include in the selection criteria “schools should be accessible by road for food delivery during the whole school year”, WFP effectively excluded schools serving the more remote areas of the country where vulnerability and food insecurity might have been expected to be the highest.
- Schools were not necessarily the most appropriate way of reaching the most vulnerable or food insecure. An estimated 20-30 percent of primary-aged rural children were not enrolled in school; these mainly came from the poorer, more vulnerable segments of the population.
- The school feeding activity did not address the serious nutrition needs of the under-5 population.
- The school meal, provided at mid- to late-morning did not help to address the issue of short term hunger.
- The schools were closed during the height of the hungry season, July-September.

50. Bulgur wheat was the major commodity, and was acceptable to Liberians (who had been receiving it as food aid for almost 20 years), although the preferred cereal was rice. The price of bulgur was not necessarily less than rice (in fact international prices were higher than prices for rice in early 2007), but being a less preferred commodity, there was a reduced risk of diversion (although losses were a significant problem in the country). Bulgur is not produced in the country, and thus there was little danger of displacing local commodities or of distorting markets.



## 2.B. Outputs and Implementation Processes: elements of efficiency

### Levels of Outputs

51. The poor rural road infrastructure, combined with the severe damage caused during the rainy season (particularly heavy during 2008) posed significant challenges in achieving delivery targets. As a result, project outputs were largely below expectations
52. For the period July 2007 to August 2008, actual deliveries on a pro rata basis only reached 87 percent of planned deliveries. The Country Office revised the planned deliveries each month on the basis of foreseen needs and prevailing conditions. Thus planned deliveries were typically reduced during the July-August rainy season, when schools were closed. In terms of actual deliveries against the deliveries planned for each month, performance for the period July 2007 – June 2008 (the latest month for which full data were available) varied, but overall averaged only 64 percent.<sup>8</sup> As shown in Table 1, there was a generally improving trend up to March 2008, after which time performance fell away again.

Table 1: Monthly Planned and Actual Deliveries, July 2007 – June 2008 (mt)

	July 2007	Aug. 2007	Sept. 2007	Oct. 2007	Nov. 2007	Dec. 2007	Jan. 2008	Feb. 2008	Mar. 2008	Apr. 2008	May 2008	June 2008
Planned Delivery MT	2,947	758	2,794	2,144	2,794	3,482	3,482	3,867	2,571	2,608	3,309	3,326
Actual Delivery MT	1,769	398	1,144	1,545	1,666	2,117	3,052	3,332	946	1,721	1,642	2,414
% Planned	60	53	41	72	60	61	88	86	37	66	50	73

Source: Monthly Executive Briefs (for the period July 2007 – August 2008)

53. Similarly the actual number of beneficiaries reached each month also fluctuated considerably. As Table 2 shows, performance steadily improved from September 2007 to February 2008, before falling away markedly in March 2008, but later improving again.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The increase in planned tonnage over the twelve months of the operation, especially following the third Budget Revision, explains the variance with the pro rata analysis.

<sup>9</sup> Tables 1 and 2 are not directly comparable. Deliveries in one month may be for distribution in that same month, or carried over to the following month or months. Furthermore, in many cases beneficiaries did not receive their full rations each month, but as long as they received some of their rations, they were still included in the beneficiary numbers.



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Table 2: Monthly Planned and Actual Beneficiaries, July 2007 – June 2008

	July 2007	Aug. 2007	Sept. 2007	Oct. 2007	Nov. 2007	Dec. 2007	Jan. 2008	Feb. 2008	Mar. 2008	Apr. 2008	May 2008	June 2008
Planned	459,852	42,023	492,023	429,750	407,073	453,034	453,034	554,409	574,210	556,062	492,931	511,010
Actual	320,623	25,885	120,712	235,306	258,095	278,366	411,797	467,724	118,899	265,562	221,397	511,784
% Planned	70	62	25	55	63	61	91	84	21	48	45	101

Source: Monthly Executive Briefs (for the period July 2007 – August 2008)

54. The 2008 rainy season caused major damage to roads and bridges, and WFP was unable to deliver commodities to whole counties for a period of months (as Table 3 shows, Grand Kru in particular was cut off). Schools in the more remote rural areas were particularly affected. Pre-positioning commodities in schools prior to the rainy season was constrained by a number of factors, including:

- Few schools had sufficient storage capacity to accept several months of commodities
- Most school storage arrangements were not sufficiently secure to keep commodities for a period of months, particularly as most staff were absent during the holiday period
- School storage arrangements were not sufficiently robust to protect commodities over the hot and humid months.

Table 3: Deliveries by County, July 2007 – October 2008 (mt)

County	July 2007	Aug 2007	Sep 2007	Oct 2007	Nov 2007	Dec 2007	Jan 2008	Feb 2008	Mar 2008	Apr 2008	May 2008	June 2008	July 2008	Aug 2008	Sep 2008	Oct 2008
Grand Bassa	136	2	193	120	149	220	223	226	60	16	177	319	18	9	237	374
Bo237mi	66	12	84	164	199	105	153	166	20	132	22	127	11	17	82	148
Bong	225	40	374	297	179	281	343	204	204	238	369	11	20	32	224	466
Cape Mount	56	4	143	166	267	240	440	104	39	165	75	65	0.5	2	28	118
Gbapolu	25	3		3	41	30	42	157	18	20	40	9	0.5	2	16	50
Grand Gedeh	114	26	108	99	95	126	83	111	54	113	119	23	19	7	153	
Grand Kru				4												
Lofa	172	54	324	345	159	342	899	822	198	341	193	418	61	12	437	
Margibi	196	72	241	225	199	232	173	384	170	119	89	183	19	68	175	255
Maryland	53	17	76	61	60	55	67	34	23	70	42	4	4	4	10	
Montserrado	560	34	233	301	368	308	322	491	179	203	205	287	184	219	691	746
Nimba	297	137	332	384	613	625	899	817	249	465	548	188	84	34	556	337
River Gee	49	9	63	61	53	26	43	75	50	65	45	31	6	5	4	
River Cess					17	33	23	2	23	57	22	53	3	3	23	24
Sinoe		2	22			3	49	90	62	106	62	9	14	9	30	1
<b>Total</b>	1948	414	2194	2229	2397	2627	3758	3683	1347	2109	2009	1726	446	422	2668	2521

Source: WFP COMPAS (totals may not add up due to rounding)

55. Within counties, more remote areas were less likely to receive regular deliveries. This particularly affected the school feeding activity, as schools tended to be in the more remote parts of the country. Nutrition interventions were largely based in hospitals and clinics, and these tended to be in capitals or larger towns.



### General Food Distribution

56. The number of beneficiaries of General Food Distribution far exceeded targets in 2007 because of an unforeseen influx of 10,000 returnees, who received a WFP settlement package. The actual number of refugees receiving WFP rations was slightly above the target, but overall the numbers remained small (1,300).

### Food Support for Local Initiatives

57. Under FSLI, the actual number of beneficiaries of **agricultural** activities was well above targets – 150 percent in 2007 and 125 percent in the first half of 2008. However the overall numbers were always quite small, at around 23,000 in 2007 and 13,000 in 2008. In both 2007 and the first half of 2008, 48 percent of beneficiaries were women or adolescent girls, close to the 50 percent target. However the actual tonnage of food distributed was well below targets – 58 percent in 2007 and 64 percent for the first half of 2008. This suggests that either:

- The number of beneficiaries was exaggerated (very likely, as FSLI activities experienced significant monitoring problems)
- Beneficiaries received significantly less than they should have. The Programme Internal Audit unit (PIA) reports suggest that in 2007 and early 2008 many FSLI beneficiaries did not receive the correct ration level, although no FSLI participants interviewed during the evaluation mission reported receiving short rations, and all seemed to know what the ration planned ration level should have been.

58. The hectares of agricultural land rehabilitated and planted was not included as an indicator in the Log Frame, but this was regularly monitored. As Table 4 shows, outputs were well below targets.

Table 4: Area Planted Under Agricultural Activities 2007 and 2008 (planned and actual)

Activity	Target 2007	Actual 2007	Percentage of Target	Target 2008	Actual Jan-Jun 2008	Percentage of Target
Hectares rice fields planted	2750	1718	62	2750	1765	64
Hectares vegetable plots Created	1500	312	21	1500	1076	72

Source: WFP Annual Work Plans and Mid-Year Reviews, 2007 and 2008

59. Distribution of seeds to agricultural activities also fell well short of targets. No vegetable seeds were distributed in either 2007 or 2008 (the target for 2007 was 12 bags; no target was given for 2008). Rice seeds were only distributed in 2007, when only 60 percent of the target (41 mt of a targeted 70 mt) was achieved. No rice seed was available in 2008. A small proportion of agricultural activities supported MoA in the establishment of county seed banks. Successful seed banks have the potential of making higher yielding seeds available to more farmers, and so helping increase agricultural productivity and incomes.

60. The actual number of beneficiaries of infrastructure activities under FSLI was also well above targets – 160 percent in 2007 and 150 percent in the first half of 2008. But again, the numbers involved was comparatively small: 10,000 in 2007 and 6,500 in 2008. In 2007 only 28 percent of beneficiaries were women or adolescent girls, against a target of 50 percent target, but in the first half of 2008 this had risen to 40 percent.



61. The actual tonnage of food distributed for infrastructure activities was again well below targets – 49 percent in 2007 and only 28 percent for the first half of 2008. Again this suggests that either the number of beneficiaries was exaggerated, or beneficiaries received significantly less than they should have. In terms of the kilometers of roads rehabilitated (again this indicator was not included in the Log Frame, but was regularly monitored), outputs were also well below targets: 79 percent in 2007 and only 46 percent for the first half of 2008.
62. Training in income generating and skills under FSLI performed particularly weakly. The actual number of beneficiaries remained very small and well below targets – 1,400 (15 percent of target) in 2007 and 1,000 (11 percent of target) in the first half of 2008. In 2007 22 percent of beneficiaries were women or adolescent girls, which was the target. For the first half of 2008 40 percent of beneficiaries were women or adolescent girls, against an increased target of 50 percent. The actual tonnage of food distributed was also been well below target in 2007, at 28 percent. But WFP data show that 95 percent of the target tonnage for the first half of 2008 was achieved. Given the number of beneficiaries reported, this suggests serious monitoring errors.

#### Nutrition Interventions

63. For the nutrition activity as a whole, the total number of beneficiaries exceeded targets by 177 percent in 2007 (from an annual target of 20,000), and by 216 percent (of a reduced target of 17,200) in the first half of 2008. Actual tonnage distributed in 2007 was 118 percent above target, but only 58 percent of target for the first half of 2008. This suggests that rations were reduced to cover the increased number of beneficiaries (although none of the beneficiaries interviewed complained of shortage of rations). WFP met the target of 50 percent of micronutrient-fortified food delivered through WFP-supported nutritional interventions.
64. **MCH activities** showed a significant increase. From the original planned annual level of 3,700, the number of beneficiaries had expanded to more than 8,300 beneficiaries in 2007 and more than 16,200 in 2008.
65. The annual planned number of children in **therapeutic feeding** was 2,000 for both 2007 and 2008. The actual number was 1,770 in 2007 (88 percent) and 648 (32 percent) in 2008. The annual planned number of children in **supplementary feeding** was also 2,000. The actual number was 5,155 in 2007 (258 percent) and 4,000 (200 percent) in 2008.
66. The annual planned number of beneficiaries of the **HIV/AIDS** programme (PLHIV receiving a family ration) was 3,500; the actual number assisted was 3,200 in 2007 and 2350 in 2008.
67. The annual planned number of **TB** patients receiving WFP rations was 2,000; the actual number assisted was 1,980 in 2007 and 3,160 in 2008. For TB patients, the food also helped meet their nutritional needs, as well as acting as an incentive to encourage regular attendance for treatment. There was no data on overall treatment adherence rates or recovery rates (although cooperating partners implementing TB treatments should have been able to provide WFP with this information).



68. The number of participants in WFP **institutional feeding** activities was planned at 6,000 for 2007-2008 and 5,600 for 2008-2009. The actual number in 2008 was 2,300, of whom 45 percent were prisoners (in River Cess, River Gee and Sinoe Counties the institutional feeding activity only included prisoners). No data was collected on nutritional status of participants in institutional feeding.
69. The activity also included a target of 20 training sessions per year on **AIDS awareness** and Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) undertaken by WFP and partner organizations for targeted beneficiaries. Only four were held in 2007, and none in the first half of 2008.

#### Food for Education

70. In terms of absolute numbers, the **school feeding** activity is both the largest activity (accounting for nearly three quarters of WFP commodities) and among the most successful. The target for both 2007 and the first half of 2008 was 450,000 children. In 2007, 434,500 children received school meals, increasing to 454,900 up to June 2008.<sup>10</sup> However these figures are somewhat misleading. WFP experienced significant problems in delivering food on time to all schools. Grand Kru received almost no deliveries for the period July - December 2007; Sinoe and River Cess received little or no deliveries over the same period; Gbarpolu, Sinoe, Maryland, River Gee and River Cess all received much reduced deliveries (often less than 10 percent of the pre-rainy season level) from August 2008. Hence, not all children would have received a full school meal every school day, as was intended, but they would still have been counted as beneficiaries so long as they received some commodities. This raises an important question: If children were still attending schools, even when provision of the school meal was erratic, was the school meal still needed as an incentive?<sup>11</sup>
71. The **Girls Take Home Ration** activity far exceeded targets. Against an annual target of 15,500, actual numbers of girls receiving take home rations was 25,100 in 2007 and 18,400 in the first half of 2008.
72. WFP data show that 100 **school gardens** were established in 2007 (against a target of 300), and 300 established in the first half of 2008 (against a target of 100). The school gardens seen by the evaluation mission during the field trip suggested that most gardens were in a very poor state, and that these figures may be misleading in indicating the value of the school garden programme.
73. **Deworming** activities, which were intended to form part of the school meal programme, were sporadic at best. UNICEF was unable to meet its obligations to provide the required treatments.

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<sup>10</sup> Originally the targeted number of school children should have fallen to 400,000 for July 2008 – July 2009. However the targets changed in September 2008, when 62,000 school children were transferred from the PRRO to the new development project (10733.0), and an additional 155,000 children in Monrovia were included in the PRRO caseload as part of the short-term response to the high food prices.

<sup>11</sup> From discussions with children and school staff in rural schools it appeared that children were reasonably well informed about the likelihood of a school meal being prepared. There were indications that many children only attended when they were sure that a school meal would be available.



74. WFP made major efforts to **improve government capacity**, both at the national level and at county level. A number of workshops were conducted in 2007 and 2008, including:

- Understanding Nutrition Concepts (November 2007)
- Liberia: Investing in Nutrition to Reduce Poverty; Nutrition Policy Analysis and Advocacy Workshop (December 2007)
- Food Security Assessment Training and Practical Application of Data Collection Techniques (January/February 2008)
- Market price data collection for MOA and FAO staff for pilot-testing price monitoring system (April 2008)
- Price impact analysis workshop (July 2008)

In addition, one MoA staff member was seconded to the WFP VAM unit.

#### *Channels of Delivery*

75. The proportion of WFP commodities provided through the school feeding activity (school meals and take home rations) increased from 69 percent in 2007 to 74 percent in 2008. The proportion of food deliveries for FSLI activities also increased. The cessation of resettlement activities after July 2007 was the main reason for this change. Most other activities remained stable.

Table 5: Deliveries by Project Activity, 2007 and 2008 (mt)

Project Activity	2007 Total (MT)	2007 percent of total	2008 (Jan – Oct) Total (MT)	2008 percent of total
Refugees	126	0.4	177	0.9
Resettlement	3,636	10.6	12	0.1
FSLI	2,908	8.5	2,384	11.5
FFT	4	0	13	0.1
MCH	866	2.5	671	3.2
Therapeutic Feeding	102	0.3	85	0.4
Supplementary feeding	30	0.1	32	0.2
Institutional feeding	2,616	7.6	1,461	7.1
TB	7	0	21	0.1
HIV/AIDS	480	1.4	501	2.4
School feeding	23,521	68.6	15,332	74.1
TOTAL	34,296		20,689	

Source: WFP COMPAS

#### *Targeting*

76. Targeting remained a challenge for the PRRO from inception. As noted, the design of the PRRO paid little attention to the conclusions of the 2006 CFSNS.

77. **FSLI** activities were originally targeted on the eight most food insecure and vulnerable counties, but by November 2008 were being implemented in all counties (although well below planned levels).



In theory FSLI activities would normally have been a better mechanism to deliver food to the most vulnerable – adherence to strict work norms for food for work activities would have helped ensure that beneficiaries came from households that were most food insecure, as only the most needy would be prepared to work for food if there

were other options available.<sup>12</sup> The Country Office prepared specific guidelines and work norms for FFW activities, but these were not systematically applied. FSLI also failed to address food needs during the hungry season, as FFW was not feasible during the rainy season.

78. In terms of project performance, FSLI received a boost when WFP was able to piggy-back on the activities of the UNMIL local employment scheme. However this meant that the FSLI activities did not necessarily meet WFP targeting criteria; UNMIL's mandate meant that it gave priority to major roads, giving access to UNMIL bases, whereas WFP would have given preference to tertiary or farm to market roads in highly food insecure or vulnerable areas.
79. For the **school feeding** activity, food consumption reports examined by the evaluation mission at different schools showed daily fluctuations in the provision of food to the cooks in line with attendance records. But the actual food distribution to each child depended on the cook's ability to ensure equal measures; those served later seemed to receive smaller quantities (in all schools visited by the evaluation mission, younger children were served first). Both cooks and school staff also generally consumed some of the cooked food.
80. The **Girls Take Home Ration** targeted by Grade (4-6). Although age would have been a more relevant criteria, it would not have been appropriate to select only some girls from within a class (which usually included pupils of a range of ages). The inclusion of Grade 4 (normally ages 12-13) in the Girls Take Home Ration component was a practical recognition of the late school enrolment, and the presence of older girls in lower primary classes.
81. A general **MCH** intervention, targeting all pregnant women and young children within an area, would have been the preferred mechanism to both reach the groups most at risk of chronic malnutrition, and to provide food during the hungry season. However the distribution of health clinics throughout the country was limited. Current MCH activities were almost exclusively located in county capitals and larger towns (and so were difficult to access by those living in more remote areas, where evidence suggests chronic malnutrition is a greater concern) and targeted acute malnutrition. It is doubtful whether most clinics would have had the capacity to properly manage a substantially increased MCH programme in the short term, and also maintain an acceptable quality of service delivery. Although MCH activities did increase significantly above the planned level, overall numbers of beneficiaries remained small and existing acute malnutrition remained the main targeting criteria.
82. The 2006 CFSNS noted that acute malnutrition was highest (above 10 percent) in River Cess, Grand Bassa, River Gee, Grand Gedeh and Sinoe counties. In 2008 there were no **therapeutic or supplementary feeding** beneficiaries in any of these counties.

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<sup>12</sup> FSLI beneficiaries interviewed by the mission who had participated in UNMIL's cash-for-work and also in WFP-supported food-for-work all said they preferred cash to food.





### *Service Delivery*

83. Given the constraints faced, service delivery has been good. The major problems were the many bridges and roads destroyed during the conflict and still unrepaired, made worse by the yearly disruptions caused by the rainy season, and the high level of diversions that have plagued WFP operations in the country for many years. WFP reacted creatively to overcome these problems.
84. All commodities for PRRO 10454.0 were obtained through international purchase (apart from a small regional purchase of salt). The operation received no in-kind contributions. By purchasing internationally, the operation was able to get the best prevailing international prices.
85. Partners played an important role in supporting WFP's food deliveries. UNMIL provided the use of spare capacity in MV Caterina (which was chartered to transport supplies to UNMIL bases in Maryland County) to transport commodities to Harper. As Maryland and Grand Kru Counties were inaccessible by road for a long period, WFP would have faced major difficulties in supplying food to these counties without the use of MV Caterina. Also in Maryland, UNHCR transported the commodities for the joint UNHCR/WFP FSLI activities, again free of charge.
86. Monthly food distribution plans, based on analysis by each sub-office of needs and accessibility, were prepared by the Programme Unit, in discussion with the Logistics Unit. The Logistics Unit then coordinated directly with each sub-office to arrange delivery. There were cases when coordination was weak and deliveries made to project sites during the weekend, when there was nobody available to arrange storage.
87. In situations where commodity shortages or pipeline problems required changes to ration levels or composition, full decision was made by the Country Office; cooperating partners were informed of such changes by official letter from the Country Director. There were sometimes delays in partners at county level being informed of ration changes.
88. For a considerable period WFP suffered from high levels of food diversions in Liberia, as well as misappropriation of funds.<sup>13</sup> For example, interviews conducted as part of the report into strengthening PTAs (Norman, 2007) suggested that in many cases pupils were only receiving school meals one or two days per week. Considerable staff time was devoted to trying to rectify these issues, often at the expense of day-to-day project management and implementation. The Country Office dismissed a number of staff for corruption, and insisted that the Government also take a hard line whenever diversions were identified, including through the courts. The security officer spent approximately 80 percent of his time on diversion cases. In July 2007 the Country Office established the PIA section of three programme staff to strengthen monitoring and reduce diversions. As result of these efforts, by June 2008 diversions and losses seem to have declined substantially.

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<sup>13</sup> As did all other UN agencies and NGOs. For a description of the problems faced by NGOs in Liberia, see William Powers (2005): *Blue Clay People*.



89. Improved cargo handling and control helped control losses during transport, although generally losses during transport have been extremely low. The exception was the large loss in February 2008; legal proceedings were underway with regard to these losses. Total losses during transport obviously vary according to the amounts of food transported; generally these are considerably lower during the rainy season, when schools are closed and also many roads are impassable. As shown in Table 6, month-on-month analysis shows a variable situation; the later months of both 2007 and 2008 showed an improved performance over earlier months. The earlier months of 2008 show a general decline in performance over the same months in 2007, but performance in the later months generally shows improvement over the same months in 2007.

Table 6: Total Losses During Transport (mt and percent of total transported)

2007	Jan 2007	Feb 2007	Mar 2007	Apr 2007	May 2007	June 2007	July 2007	Aug 2007	Sep 2007	Oct 2007	Nov 2007	Dec 2007
MT	0.24	0.42	0.62	0.02	2.24	0.44	0	0.53	7.44	0.08	0	0.02
% of total	0.01	0.02	0.18	0	0.32	0.02	0	0.13	0.34	0	0	0
2008	Jan 2008	Feb 2008	Mar 2008	Apr 2008	May 2008	June 2008	July 2008	Aug 2008	Sep 2008			
MT	1.64	117.72	0	0.56	0.06	1.33	0.08	0.02	0.05	-	-	-
% of Total	0.04	3.2	0	0.3	0	0.08	0.02	0	0	-	-	-

Source: WFP COMPAS

90. Losses from project sites were substantially greater, and more difficult to control. The PIA unit, combined with strong action by the Country Office and support from Government ministries, helped to reduce such diversions.

91. The most widespread problems were found among FSLI activities. Nearly one third of the 49 projects (representing 16 percent of all FSLI activities) visited by the PIA section in early 2008 had problems associated with food diversion. In all the cases either less food was delivered as per waybills or none reached the beneficiaries at all. The problem of food diversion was worse in the counties closest to Monrovia, where more than two thirds of the projects visited had food diversion problems. Only 16 percent of FSLI projects were performing well. More than half could not provide proper accounts for:

- List of beneficiaries disaggregated by gender
- When and how much food was distributed to which beneficiary.

92. As a result of the work of the PIA, the implementation of FSLI was substantially curtailed and restructured. By 2008 FFW activities in most counties were only implemented through UNMIL, although in Maryland some FFW activities were also implemented by UNHCR. Other partners helped implement FFT activities, but only for a very limited number of beneficiaries and institutions.

93. For schools, WFP and MoE agreed a code of conduct that specified a system of increasing punitive measures for not observing parts of the agreed guidelines:



- Subject to thorough investigation of the circumstances, a warning letter served to the school with copies filed for future reference.
- Suspension from the feeding list for one month
- Suspension from the feeding list for two months<sup>14</sup>
- Demand for the removal of the school authority
- Deletion of school from the school feeding roster.

94. The main reason for suspensions (or more severe penalties) was improper food management and diversion. As shown in Table 7, the frequency in which penalties were applied gives an indication of performance, and shows a significant improvement.

Table 7: Performance of Schools Visited by PIA, July 2007 – November 2008

	July - December 2007		January – June 2008		July – November 2008	
	No Schools	Percent	No Schools	Percent	No Schools	Percent
Suspension	14	10	38	13	2	1
Warning	53	37	96	33	37	21
Acceptable	75	53	156	54	136	78
Total	142		290		175	

Source: WFP PIA reports

*Monitoring and Evaluation*

95. The focus of most monitoring undertaken by WFP staff (both regular programme staff and PIA staff) emphasized the proper management and accountability of the commodities WFP provided, rather than on overall performance and the achievement of targets and the operation’s objectives. Neither the PIA unit nor WFP monitoring staff regularly collected or collated data on outputs or outcomes. Most such programme monitoring was undertaken by WFP cooperating partners (in school feeding they were specifically contracted for this purpose) with support from WFP programme staff in the WFP sub-offices. Because of the significant problems associated with the mis-use and diversion of commodities, the WFP monitoring programme aimed to ensure that cooperating partners or WFP staff visited each school at least every two months (visits to other activities were less frequent). Sub-office staff were required to follow up with County officials on any irregularities highlighted by cooperating partners, to ensure that appropriate action, including legal action, was taken. WFP sub-office staff also conducted their own monitoring visits.

96. Both cooperating partners and WFP programme staff collected significant amounts of data on individual sites during their monitoring visits. But these data were not collated and reviewed for trends as part of a management system to monitor overall performance and whether targets were being met. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the largest co-operating partner in the school feeding activity, proposed that the programme of monitoring visits should be conducted in such a way that the same schools could be regularly sampled, to monitor overall performance in meeting project objectives. However WFP preferred to focus on improving food management and accountability, which implied regular visits to all sites.

<sup>14</sup> This was later changed to one month warning, so that schools were not suspended for more than one month, with consequences for the children, from February 2008.



97. The Country Office prepared an annual work plan, including indicators and targets for the coming year. These were reviewed mid-year. While these work plans recorded overall trends in performance and achievement of targets, it is unclear to what extent they influenced management decisions.
98. Internal evaluations were undertaken for each of the three main activities (although prior to the time frame of the current evaluation). The findings of these evaluations did lead to management and implementation changes. The evaluation of the school feeding activity highlighted the contradiction in having partners both deliver commodities and monitor their use (the earlier system). As a result, WFP assumed responsibility for all commodity delivery, and partners were charged with monitoring commodity management and use.

#### *Adaptation to Changing Needs*

99. The PRRO was responsive to changing circumstance, both external and internal. One of the most significant external changes was the increase in food prices during 2008. These posed potentially serious consequences particularly for the urban poor, and the danger of severe political destabilization. The Country Office undertook an assessment of the impact of high prices on food security in Liberia in July 2008, and proceeded with a budget revision to obtain additional funds both to maintain resource levels and to expand activities to provide assistance to those most at risk from increased prices in urban areas (in particular by re-introducing school feeding for 155,000 children in Greater Monrovia from September 2008).
100. The PRRO also responded rapidly to the unforeseen return of 10,000 people soon after commencement of the operation in 2007. These were provided with a resettlement package without delay, in line with previous agreements with UNHCR for returnees.
101. The introduction of the development project in September 2008 helped to ease potential problems the PRRO faced in resource levels, by tapping into an additional source of funds. In terms of activities supported and methods of implementation however, there was little significant difference between the PRRO and the development project.

#### *External Institutional Arrangements*

102. WFP played an important role in the transition process, but the lack of strong partners resulted in WFP continuing to maintain a leading role in terms of project delivery, and this may not have been appropriate. As this was a transition project from relief to recovery, changes in the main stakeholders would have been expected. Normally in transition situations, WFP exit strategies would include increasingly handing over leadership to other actors – the Government, other UN agencies or other NGOs. However neither the other UN agencies nor NGOs were in a position to replace WFP assistance with other, perhaps more appropriate, assistance, such as technical support or financial funding. Government capacity was also weak, although by end-2008 the Government had started to assume greater responsibilities (though still with substantial WFP support) in school feeding and in MCH activities.



103. Thus WFP was placed in a situation where it continued supporting relief activities (such as addressing acute malnutrition through therapeutic feeding - the provision of blended food to severely malnourished children during their second phase of recuperation in recognized health institutions), even though the relief phase of the PRRO should have terminated (and indeed actual number of beneficiaries declined by two thirds between 2007 and 2008) and other partners should have been able to replace WFP. WFP was also forced provide food in situations that did not sit comfortably with WFP's mandate, and where exit became increasingly difficult. The most obvious example was the institutional feeding activity, where prisoners (properly the responsibility of the Government or of UNMIL) received WFP food because no other agency was in a position to provide assistance.
104. Within the UN family, WFP had made assumptions about the relative strengths of other UN agencies with whom WFP expected to work, and the resources they were likely to have available. In most cases these proved to be unrealistic. Partnership with UNICEF was strong in the area of water and sanitation in schools, and UNICEF also provided drugs and equipment through MoH for the clinics with WFP nutrition activities. However the deworming activity in the school feeding programme did not succeed when UNICEF was unable to ensure the provision of appropriate medicines. UNHCR provided substantial assistance in 2004 – 2006 in resettling returnees, including constructing many rural schools. By 2008 the UNHCR programme in Liberia was very small, and unlikely to continue. FAO was an intended partner in the provision of seeds and tools to both the FSLI agricultural rehabilitation activities and in the provision of school gardens, but was unable to provide seeds and tools.
105. In 2008 UNMIL became a significant partner in FSLI activities, with WFP being able to piggy-back on UNMIL's own employment-creation programme. This resulted in better managed interventions, with full technical support. But it also meant that the activities undertaken met UNMIL's criteria for project and beneficiary selection, rather than WFP's.
106. The relationship with many NGOs also shifted, from one of close partnership, where both WFP and the NGO provided resources for a mutual activity, to a relationship where NGOs functioned largely as contractors, undertaking specific activities on behalf of WFP.
107. In the initial design of the PRRO community-based project proposals were to be the norm for agricultural rehabilitation; infrastructure projects were to be implemented with the MPEA. In the event it soon became apparent that these organizations lacked suitable implementation capacity and accountability was extremely weak. As a result, FSLI activities contracted significantly. By November 2008 infrastructure activities were mainly implemented as part of projects supported by the Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery (RRR) Section of UNMIL. Only in Maryland did WFP support significant agriculture projects, and only where these were UNHCR-managed projects among returnee populations. Most remaining FSLI activities were Food For Training, and by November 2008 these were very small.
108. Regular review of the performance of cooperating partners resulted in a significant contraction in the number of NGO partners. In 2007 WFP worked with 7 different NGOs in school feeding and 24 in nutrition interventions. In November 2008 WFP worked with 5 NGOs in school feeding, and 10 in nutrition interventions.



109. The review process also resulted in the exclusion of NGO partners from FSLI activities. The relationship with partners in school feeding also changed - partners in this activity effectively worked as contractors for WFP, rather than as partners where both parties brought resources and skills to the activity. Only in the nutrition interventions did the partnership with NGOs retain a true partnership, where both actors provided mutually supportive resources and skills.
110. A new management system to track partner performance linked the payment of partners to timeliness in submitting monthly monitoring reports. This helped to ensure that monitoring reports were more timely.

#### *Cost and Funding of the Operation*

111. By September 2008, two thirds of the way through the operational period (July 2007 - October 2008) PRRO 10454.0 had received 82 percent of planned commodities. Commitments were expected to decline somewhat as the operation neared its conclusion in July 2009, but in gross terms the PRRO appeared well resourced.
112. However this gross level of commodity resourcing hid a significant ongoing problem. PRRO 10454.0 started with a resource transfer of some 7,0000 mt (approximately 15 percent of the total commodities programmed to November 2008) from the preceding PRRO 10064.3. These commodities were accompanied by some Other Direct Operating Cost (ODOC) funds, and LTSH funding, but no DSC funds. This resulted in an initial DSC deficit that the operation was not able to rectify.<sup>15</sup> In order to utilize the commodities from PRRO 10064.3, and prevent delayed deliveries, the Country Office obtained an IRA loan of nearly \$7 million (cash and commodities) and a Working Capital Facility (WCF) loan of \$2 million. The WCF loan was quickly repaid new from contributions to the PRRO, but the IRA loan was still outstanding by November 2008.
113. The Country Office took a number of actions to reduce DSC costs. The most significant of was a series of staff reduction exercises, affecting both international and national staff. The total staff number fell from 303 full time staff (of whom 23 were international staff) in June 2007 to 206 full time staff (of whom 16 were international staff) in August 2008 – a one third reduction. As shown in Table 8, programme staff were disproportionately affected in these downsizing exercises.

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<sup>15</sup> It could be argued that PRRO 10454.0 would have been better off without the transfer of commodities from PRRO 10064.3. A prompt IRA loan to kick start deliveries in July 2007, when the new PRRO commenced, could have helped bridge the delay until new commodities had been received in-country, and would have avoided the DSC deficit which has plagued the operation.



Table 8: Impact of Cuts in Levels of National Staff by Country Office Unit

	No. Staff June 2007	No. Staff July 2007	Percent Change	No. Staff Dec 2007	No. Staff Jan. 2008	Percent Change	No. Staff June 2008	No. Staff July 2008	Percent Change
Programme Unit	49	33	33	32	32	0	31	26	16
Administration Unit	55	43	22	43	40	8	40	35	13
HR Unit	3	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0
Finance Unit	7	7	0	7	7	0	5	5	0
ICT Unit	21	18	14	18	16	11	15	14	7
Security Unit	4	3	25	3	3	0	3	3	0
Logistics Unit	133	122	8	133	115	14	111	97	13
Airops Unit	5	5	0	4	4	0	4	4	0
Total National Staff	279	236		245	222		214	189	

Source: WFP Monrovia

114. Other actions taken by the Country Office to reduce DSC expenditure included the closure of two sub-offices, moving into UN joint offices, and close monitoring of spending in particular high risk items (e.g fuel management). The DSC rate was also increased from \$156 per ton in the original PRRO budget to \$198 in the third Budget Revision, in the hope that the extra DSC raised on new contributions would help to offset the deficit.<sup>16</sup> But despite these initiatives, the DSC budget remained in deficit and it was unclear whether the Country Office would be able to cover the DSC costs to the end of the operation.<sup>17</sup> The Country Office was hoping that the initial IRA loan would be converted into a grant, which would have helped to stabilize the DSC budget.

115. When the PRRO was first prepared, there were strong indications that the US would continue to be a strong supporter, as it had in the past (and Liberia was one of the top ten recipients of US aid). In the event new US policy, which came into force after the PRRO had been approved, prevented funding of school feeding activities from USAID relief budgets, which were the source of US funding to PRROs (the US viewed school feeding as a recovery/development activity, and not suitable for relief funding). As a result, the PRRO relied on WFP multilateral funds (including IRA funds) for more than 40 percent of its resources.

116. Despite these funding issues, the operation suffered no significant pipeline gaps to November 2008, although there had been some specific commodity shortfalls. In August 2008 an international supplier defaulted on a Corn-Soya Blend (CSB) order, with the result that CSB in the MCH ration was replaced with pulses, and the available CSB was restricted

<sup>16</sup> This only applied to new contributions, but the third budget revision did include additional commodities, which would be accompanied by the higher DSC rate.

<sup>17</sup> It is easy for a Country Office to find that DSC expenditure out of kilter with the availability of commodities. Many DSC costs are fixed and are incurred from the beginning of an operation. If there are delays in the arrival of commodities, DSC costs such as office rental, utilities, and basic staffing will be incurred even though there are no commodities to be distributed. In such situations, an operation is likely to approach its closure with commodities still available for distributin, but no DSC costs to enable this.



for use in therapeutic and supplementary feeding. Other shortfalls were covered through borrowings. In 2008 shortfalls in bulgur wheat were covered through borrowings from Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which had its own pipeline. Shortfalls in sugar were covered by borrowing from Ivory Coast (in fact the commodities were diverted at sea).

117. The increase in prices throughout most of 2008 could have had serious consequences for the funding of the operation. Without the additional funds obtained as part of the third budget revision in August 2008 to cover the increase in food prices, the operation would have faced a potential significant shortfall.

Cost Efficiency

118. The Country Office has taken a number of steps to reduce transport costs. The serious lack of commercial truck capacity in the country led to WFP retaining its own fleet to augment commercial capacity. The WFP fleet did not have enough larger capacity trucks, which would have been more cost-effective for larger bulk transport to Extended Delivery Points (EDPs). The WFP fleet was also aging, and was severely tested by the bad roads. Breakdowns were frequent, and most common during the rainy season. Down time was also higher during the rainy season when many roads and bridges were cut. Nevertheless, as shown by Table 9, utilization of the fleet showed an overall improving trend, especially when compared month on month<sup>18</sup>.

Table 9: WFP Fleet Utilization (average percent of total capacity utilized) Jan 2007 – Sept 2008

Jan 2007	Feb 2007	Mar 2007	Apr 2007	May 2007	June 2007	July 2007	Aug 2007	Sep 2007	Oct 2007	Nov 2007	Dec 2007
94.29	81.7	83.4	83.9	84	88	77	71	73	76.8	79	77
Jan 2008	Feb 2008	Mar 2008	Apr 2008	May 2008	June 2008	July 2008	Aug 2008	Sep 2008			
78.8	107.4	83.6	90.2	87.4	81	76.6	76.6	86.8			

Source: WFP Fleet Management System

119. A Fleet Management System was introduced in 2007, and this helped contain transport costs. As shown in Table 10, cost per ton per kilometer generally declined during 2008 (although a number of factors might affect this indicator).

Table 10: Average cost per ton kilometer (US\$), January – September 2008

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept
0.53	0.37	0.29	0.43	0.39	0.30	0.15	0.11	0.32

Source: WFP Fleet Management System

<sup>18</sup> While fleet utilization is a useful indicator, it is not ideal. Drivers can load their vehicles beyond the official capacity. This results in figures suggesting a higher level of fleet utilization (and so that it may even exceed 100 percent), but at the cost of increased wear and tear, and eventually reduced efficiency.





120. Fuel consumption also improved, as shown in Table 11. For light vehicles, average fuel consumption was 6.99 kilometers/litre in 2007, increasing to an average of 7.69 kilometers/litre in 2008. For heavy duty vehicles, fuel consumption also improved over the same period, from an average of 2.33 kilometers/litre in 2007 to 2.88 kilometers/litre in 2008. Month on month comparisons showed improvements for most months.

Table 11: Average Fuel Consumption per Month, 2007 and 2008 (kilometers/litre)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average for the period
Light vehicles 2007	6.40	6.73	6.83	6.89	6.53	8.69	6.86	7.24	7.26	8.15	6.52	5.78	6.99
Light vehicles 2008	6.56	6.78	7.74	8.18	7.78	7.78	8.43	9.68	6.97	6.97	-	-	7.69
Heavy vehicles 2007	2.85	2.61	2.28	2.15	3.32	2.47	2.39	2.35	1.19	1.57	2.36	2.40	2.33
Heavy vehicles 2008	2.88	2.74	2.57	2.94	2.81	2.86	3.49	3.01	2.59	2.88	-	-	2.88

Source: WFP Fleet Management System

## 2.C. Results

### Effectiveness

121. In terms of achieving what was originally intended, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the operation. The complex design of the operation, and the inclusion of a number of inappropriate indicators, necessitated a substantial monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to collect the required data, and this was not put in place. Nor were more appropriate, less complex M&E systems (such as sample surveys, sentinel monitoring) initiated.<sup>19</sup> As a result there were very few data available to help assess effectiveness.

### General Food Distribution

122. The key indicator given in the Log Frame for this activity was “Prevalence of acute malnutrition among refugee children under five years of age”. No nutritional assessments had been conducted by UNHCR (which had prime responsibility) or WFP, so it was not possible to comment on this.<sup>20</sup> However distribution records indicate that the refugee

<sup>19</sup> In 2006 a sampling strategy was developed, but the Country Office was uncomfortable with the fact that not all schools would be visited. A compromise proposal was to visit 25 percent of schools each month, so that all schools would have been visited after each four month period. It was also recommended to conduct baseline and follow-up surveys to monitor trends and outcomes over time, but this does not seem to have been implemented.

<sup>20</sup> During training in Food Security Assessment in Gbargna/Saclepea (January/February 2008), participants were trained in anthropometric measurements, and all under-five children present in the refugee settlement were measured. It was agreed with UNHCR that as this was a training exercise, the results would not be officially released, but no indications of nutritional problems were identified.



population regularly received the intended food ration, and the refugees interviewed had no complaints about the timeliness or quantity of the ration provided (although they did request that WFP supply rice instead of bulgur wheat). Nor were there any reports of significant nutritional problems among refugee communities, although as the refugees were living in villages and well integrated within the local community, this is not surprising.

#### *Food Support for Local Initiatives*

123. The indicator in the Log Frame for this activity was “Percentage of food insecure households in targeted areas (Target: 5%)”, but no data had been collected on this indicator. Nor was there any baseline against which to measure progress. The other objective for this activity was the increased participation and empowerment of women at community level in decision-making bodies. The indicator given for this was “Percentage of women in food-management committees of community projects (Target: 50%)”. No data was available on this objective or indicator.

#### *Nutritional Interventions*

124. The first objective of this activity was given in the Log Frame as “Reduced prevalence of acute malnutrition among beneficiary children and women”. The indicators were given as “Prevalence of acute malnutrition among under 5s (assessed using height, weight, age and sex; Target: < 5%)” and “Recovery rate among under-5 beneficiaries (Target: recovery rate > 70%)”. Given the scale of the project (with only 3,700 planned annual beneficiaries), the first indicator was inappropriate; the intervention would have made little difference to prevailing nutrition rates, and no attempts were made to collect relevant data.<sup>21</sup> The second indicator would have been relevant, and could have been collated – the cooperating partners managing the health clinics supported by WFP collected this data for each patient. But no attempts appear to have been made to collate the individual data to provide input into monitoring or management.

125. The second objective of this activity was given in the Log Frame as “Improved nutritional and health status of PLWHA on treatment”. The indicators proposed were “Percentage of beneficiaries in HIV/AIDS programme maintaining or increasing their body weight (Target: 70%)” and “Treatment adherence rate among beneficiaries of HIV/AIDS programme (Target: >70%)”. Both these indicators were relevant, and the data could have been collated from the reports of cooperating partners, but unfortunately this did not happen.

126. There was no data on overall nutritional improvement of children in therapeutic or supplementary feeding, and whether this was sustained (although cooperating partners implementing both interventions should have been able to provide WFP with this information). Nor were there data on whether mother and child health and nutrition improved as a result of the MCH intervention – individual clinic records should have been able to show this, but these were not collated.

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<sup>21</sup> The 2008/2009 VAM exercise may well help to show changes in the national and county nutritional status. But the WFP activities are too small to be able to draw conclusions about the effect of the food aid provided by WFP to nutrition interventions.



From interviews with participants, the provision of food at the clinics was an important factor in their attendance. Furthermore, the food did seem to be mainly consumed by the mothers and children, in line with WFP guidelines. But it seems likely that the provision of functioning health facilities was a more important factor in encouraging mothers to attend the clinics in the first place.

127. Food support for PLHIV helped them to meet their nutritional requirements and encouraged them to seek treatment, despite the stigmatization they often faced.
128. For TB patients, the food also helped meet their additional nutritional requirements, as well as acting as an incentive to encourage regular attendance for treatment. There was no data on overall treatment adherence rates or recovery rates (although cooperating partners implementing TB treatments should have been able to provide WFP with this information).
129. No data were collected on nutritional status of participants in institutional feeding. However there were no reports of malnutrition cases amongst institutions receiving WFP assistance.

#### *Food For Education*

130. The Log Frame gave the following objectives for the Food for Education activity:
  - Improved enrolment and attendance rate of boys and girls in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools
  - Improved capacity to concentrate and learn among boys and girls in pre-primary, primary and secondary WFP-assisted schools
  - Reduced gender disparity between boys and girls enrolled in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools.
131. The 2006 CFSNS provided data showing that **school meals** had increased school enrolment in the country in the past. Of households reporting to be benefiting from school feeding, 83 percent of children aged 6 – 18 were enrolled in school; in households not reporting to be benefiting from school feeding, only 58 percent of children aged 6-18 were enrolled in school. Certainly there was general and widespread support for WFP school feeding in Liberia. However it was not possible to show that WFP school feeding had a significant effect on school enrolment based on available data for the 2007-2008 period. In part this was because WFP did not establish a baseline against which to measure effect (the schools sampled in the Standardized School Feeding Survey could have provided a representative sample of schools against which to measure effect, but this was not done). In theory data from the annual MoE school census could have helped monitor the effects of school feeding, but there was widespread scepticism about the accuracy of the data collected, and there were major delays in the data being released (the March 2008 survey was still not available by late November 2008).
132. WFP adjusted food delivery figures twice a year, to reflect changes in school enrolments. This was for the purposes of food management and delivery, and was not used to monitor the effects of school feeding, but the data might have given some indication of the effect of the school meal intervention (see Table 12).



Overall, there was no clear pattern in these figures – in a number of cases school enrolment even declined. Where school enrolment increased, much of the increase could be attributed to the inclusion of additional schools. For those counties where the number of schools remained constant (or close to constant - Lofa, River Gee, Sinoe, Margibi and Gbapolu), school enrolment figures showed little change. Thus the evaluation could find no unambiguous evidence that the school feeding activity had increased enrolment.

Table 12: Number of WFP-Assisted Schools and Students, September 2007 – July 2008

County	September 2007		July 2008		% Change Students
	No. Students	No. Schools	No. Students	No. Schools	
Lofa	60,975	227	61,693	227	1
Bong	51,004	219	52,757	223	3
Nimba	81,720	261	104,684	518	28
Grand Gedeh	15,960	92	15,739	123	-1
River Gee	9,633	59	9,633	58	0
Maryland	18,236	74	19,000	79	4
Sinoe	7,550	40	5,686	39	-25
Grand Kru	4,019	25	7,184	39	79
River Cess	10,179	56	10,066	56	-1
Grand Bassa	44,968	182	46,367	185	3
Margibi	28,032	103	25,175	103	-10
Bomi	19,402	153	19,092	155	-2
Gbapolu	6,118	67	6,467	68	6
Grand Cape Mount	25,908	196	26,474	198	2

Source: WFP Monrovia

133. The 2007 Standardized School Feeding Survey found overall attendance rates in WFP-assisted schools to be above 90 percent for both boys and girls (although the survey did suggest that the data may not have been reliable). However the Country Office had no reliable collated data on school attendance for the 2007 – 2008 period. Some monthly reports submitted by cooperating partners responsible for monitoring the school feeding activity provided data on attendance, but this was not collated. It should have been relatively straight forward to collect such data from the food consumption reports completed by each school (the reports seen by the evaluation mission suggested that these reports were reasonably accurate), at least on a sample basis, but was not done either. Thus it was not possible to judge the effect of school feeding on maintaining attendance (although the individual school records seen during the evaluation suggest that school attendance was generally high, although with quite wide variation between schools).

134. Data was collected on the gender ratios of school enrolment (but not attendance). This suggested that the school meal programme positive, although uneven, progress (see Table 13).



Table 13: Proportion of Girls to Boys in WFP-Assisted Schools, Jan 2007-July 2008

	Percent Girls	Percent Boys
Jan. – July 2007	44	56
July – Dec. 2007	46	54
Jan – July 2008	45	55

Source: WFP Annual Workplans and Mid-Year Reviews, 2007 and 2008

135. The 2007 Standardized School Feeding Survey also noted in over 95 percent of WFP-assisted schools, teachers observed positive changes in children’s classroom behaviour, and increased pupil attentiveness and learning abilities, as a result of school feeding.<sup>22</sup> Some monthly reports submitted by cooperating partners responsible for monitoring the school feeding activity also reported on teachers’ perceptions. These data were not collated, but where there were reports, they were generally very positive. Teachers also reported similar positive observations during interviews with the evaluation mission. However the teacher’s observations may apply to children’s behaviour after they had consumed the school meal; a number of school staff informed the mission that prior to the school meal, children’s attention was largely focused on anticipation of the meal. As the school meal was typically provided between 10.30 – 11.30, it had little effect on short term hunger, which seemed to be widespread in rural Liberia.

136. WFP had no data showing that the Girl’s Take Home Ration had been effective in retaining older girls in school. The 2007 Standardized School Feeding Survey identified the barriers to retaining older girls in school as (in order):

- Marriage/pregnancy
- Household/economic commitments
- Cost of schooling.

137. Given these barriers, which the provision of a food ration did little to address, it is not clear whether the intervention had a significant effect. Indeed interviews with girls receiving take home rations indicated that they valued the education they were receiving (and it can be assumed that they came from families with a similar approach) and would probably have remained in school without the ration.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, there was no other generally available form of assistance for older girls. The only other initiative seen by the evaluation mission to assist older girls was a crèche established by Save the Children in two schools in Bong County, at which teenage mothers could leave their babies while they attended school.

138. Girls qualifying for the **take home ration** received 25 kg of cereals and 2 kg of oil per month, in a single distribution. As some lived 5 to 10 kilometers from their school, and public transport was not available, they had to carry this significant load, usually on their heads. A more frequent distribution of smaller quantities may have been preferable.

<sup>22</sup> “Teachers’ perceptions” has been dropped as a corporate indicator of educational attainment.

<sup>23</sup> This was a conditional question, and not a particularly reliable indicator of what would have happened if the GTHR was stopped. But it does at least give an indication of intent.



139. There was no evidence that **school gardens** had contributed significantly to the school meal programme in terms of providing additional ingredients for the school meals. The school gardens seen by the evaluation mission during the field trip suggested that most gardens were in a very poor state. There was very limited support for the idea of school gardens among teachers interviewed. Neither FAO nor MoA had met their obligations in providing seeds, tools and technical support for the school garden activity.
140. One of the requirements for inclusion in the school feeding activity was the existence (or establishment) of a **PTA** to help implement and monitor the school meals. Most schools visited by the evaluation mission did have a PTA, but most PTAs seemed to take little part in the school meal activity. In some cases the PTA took some responsibility for providing fuel wood, but more often children were required to bring fuel wood to school. A 2007 WFP review of PTAs suggested that significant strengthening of PTAs was required - only 43% of PTAs were found to fully meet their stated responsibilities.
141. Although PTAs did not seem to be working well from the point of view of supporting the school feeding activity, they did provide a very obvious and appreciated form of local democracy in rural areas. Rural areas often felt powerless against urban interests (as noted by Hill, Taylor and Temin, 2008, this was one of the root causes of the conflict). The PTAs did seem to be playing a role in increasing people's sense of empowerment and social responsibility, albeit on a relatively minor issue, and so helping to establish the start of grass-roots support for democratic systems - a potentially beneficial effect in terms of increasing the accountability of government.
142. **Deworming** activities, intended to help address one of the main causes of rural malnutrition as part of a joint MoE, MoH, UNICEF and WHO health education campaign, were sporadic at best. UNICEF, which had responsibility to provide the required treatments, had not been in a position to regularly provide sufficient tablets.

### *Capacity Building*

143. There had been considerable effort to ensure that food security concerns were reflected in the broader national policy agenda, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the development of a national Food Security and Nutrition Strategy. WFP was also extremely active in strengthening line ministries (in particular MoE, but also MoA and MoH) at county level to improve food management and accountability, and increase Government responsibility for and ownership of the intervention. Certainly school record-keeping seemed to be well maintained in the schools visited by the mission, and the relevant school authorities understood the purpose and the mechanics of the system to track commodity receipt, storage and utilisation .

### *Impact*

144. The evaluation was able to identify a number of areas where the PRRO had achieved notable impacts. In particular there was widespread agreement that the school feeding activity had been an important factor in revitalizing the education system in rural areas and encouraging



return and resettlement.<sup>24</sup> It was generally felt that WFP has also made a major contribution to the rebuilding of education capacity through the establishment of a daily monitoring and recording programme at individual school level (initially for the purposes of food management) that was largely transparent and trustworthy. While the education sector still faced many challenges, the benefits of education were widely appreciated. The school feeding activity had also channelled substantial quantities of food into food deficit rural communities.

145. It was unclear whether the Girls Take Home Ration helped retain older girls in schools. But provision of the Girls Take Home Ration had certainly helped to bring the issue of how to ensure that older rural girls remain in the education system more to the fore. It now formed part of the general debate about the future of education in Liberia.
146. Children from poorer families still faced significant economic barriers to attending school, and the impact of school feeding remained limited until these were reduced or removed. The abolition of fees for primary education helped improve the situation, but children were still required to purchase uniforms<sup>25</sup>, and fees were still charged in many schools to pay “voluntary” teachers.
147. Beneficiary numbers in FSLI were too small to have national level impacts on poverty or food security. However for many of the individual participants, there was evidence that the FSLI had achieved significant impacts. In a survey of more than 1200 participants in the UNMIL-supported FSLI infrastructure projects (the survey did not distinguish between those who received cash-for-work and those who received food for work; in fact some participants may have been included in both types of programmes), 74 percent of males and 71 of females said that their living condition was better after the project. Most participants said they invested a portion of their wages in income generation ventures such as farming and petty trading, which had led to an increase in household income even after the projects were completed. Skills transfer through practical on-the-job training was also important, with 35 percent of males and 29 percent of females reporting that they learned new skills – 12 percent of males and 6 percent of females reported that they now practiced carpentry and 11 percent of males and 6 percent of females reported they now worked as masons because of the skills learned. Respondents generally felt that the projects had had a positive impact on the local economy; business and trading activities had increased, farmers could more easily transport their produce to market, and more traders were coming to buy than previously.
148. Furthermore, more than 90 percent of respondents were of the opinion that the short term jobs had helped to promote community peace and reconciliation. Community peace and reconciliation were enhanced because people were now working together and more people were able to take care of their families. Some of the respondents associated peace and reconciliation with better income and personal pride. There was also the perception that domestic violence in communities had reduced - increased income seemingly provided people with the means to acquire productive assets and consequently improved standards of living and with it increased cohesion within families as they managed the newly acquired assets.

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<sup>24</sup> The mission was told of a community of Liberian refugees who remained in Guinea, waiting for the school in their home area to be reconstructed before they would return to Liberia.

<sup>25</sup> In some counties, NGOs had provided uniforms to primary school children.



149. UNHCR claimed that the activity to establish communal farms in Maryland, for communities that had received a high number of returnees, normally became self-sustaining after the first harvest. WFP food aid was only required to support workers up until the first harvest had been achieved. UNHCR found the most successful farms were those where the communal land was divided into individual plots, giving each farmer responsibility for their own land. UNHCR also claimed a reduction in domestic violence among communities participating in their agricultural rehabilitation projects.
150. The number of participants in the nutrition interventions was too small to have an impact on national levels of acute malnutrition. But a significant number of individuals did receive nutritional assistance through the activity, and for them the impact was significant.
151. WFP's capacity building activities have helped to bring issues of food security to the forefront in Liberia – information and data from the 2006 CFSNS has been widely quoted in almost every Government and UN report written. Within the school feeding and nutrition activities, capacity building at the local and county level significantly increased accountability and food management. (Unfortunately there had been delays in ensuring that all schools had proper food consumption ledgers by the commencement of the 2008-2009 academic year – many schools were using odd pieces of paper to record commodity utilisation.) These capacity building efforts improved the way data was recorded. Much of the data collected for purposes of project monitoring could have had additional uses. For example school attendance recorded to account for changes in food consumption could also be relevant to MoE efforts to track school rolls and changes in them – at the moment much of this data is collected by MoE annually through a country-wide education census, which is both expensive and disruptive to school sessions (schools typically close for a period during the census period). This could have ensured that the school feeding programme had additional impacts. Unfortunately there were no systems in place to ensure that such data could be transferred and used for other purposes.

#### Sustainability

152. The design of PRRO 10454.0 gave little explicit consideration of transition to exit strategies (apart from reducing school feeding in Greater Monrovia) or the need for sustainability. However there was evidence that the benefits of many elements of the operation were sustainable.
- The introduction of the development project in September 2008 imply in a situation where there is no further need for food aid (although food assistance may still be required)
  - Whether other types of assistance (financial or technical) would be more appropriate, given the changes that have occurred
  - Whether the current range of activities may be expected to continue and will be funded from other sources (Government or donors).
153. Liberia has tremendous agricultural potential, and there have been steady improvements in agricultural production. Thus the continued requirement for food aid should not be automatically assumed.





154. In the case of the refugee caseload, UNHCR was developing approaches to resolve their situation. The refugees were well integrated amongst the local population, with their children attending local schools, where they benefited from the WFP school feeding programme. A number of the refugees participated in local development initiatives, including WFP-supported FFW. Thus the refugees did seem to be in a situation where they were largely self-supporting.
155. In the case of FSLI, it is likely that those farmers who benefited from the rehabilitation of rice fields and vegetable gardens would continue to maintain and benefit from these, especially where they had some form of individual ownership or rights. Support to rice seed multiplication efforts and similar seed farms has the potential to increase the impact of the FSLI activity, by making more productive seeds more widely available. It would also be more sustainable, in that the Ministry budget is likely to eventually be able to fund the activity without recourse to food aid.
156. The road infrastructure repaired through FFW, was likely to deteriorate again during the next rainy season; roadside vegetation rapidly grew again. Only long term maintenance, and upgrading to all-weather surfaces, would resolve the problem, and this was unlikely given the Government's Limited resources. However those participants who were able to invest some of their earnings in other productive assets were likely to continue to reap benefits from their employment.
157. In the case of the nutrition interventions, data was not available to confirm whether the therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding activities resulted in sustained nutritional improvements in the children covered, or whether the nutritional status of the children declined again upon return to their homes. Certainly neither of these activities was directly linked with efforts to address the underlying causes of chronic child malnutrition. MCH interventions potentially were more sustainable, in that they supported existing Government programmes, and so may eventually be absorbed within the MoH budget. MCH programmes also had the potential to shift from a curative intervention to a preventative one by expanding to include all pregnant and nursing women and young children in an area with high chronic malnutrition. This shift had not yet occurred, and would require a considerable level of increased resources if it did. Care would be required to ensure that the quality of service provided by the health clinics was maintained during any scaling up.
158. The school feeding programme was highly appreciated by the Government, and the Government may be willing to support this activity in the future from its own funds. The PRS included a school feeding component for 600,000 children (although it is likely that this merely reflected the current WFP commitment, but based on the caseload under PRRO 1064.3). On the other hand, there may not be continued need for school feeding to act as incentive to increase enrolment and attendance. There was widespread and strong appreciation of the benefits of education in Liberia. The strengthening of the education system, so that students received a quality education, along with removal of the current economic barriers that prevented poor children from attending school, could mean that additional incentives would not be required.
159. WFP's capacity building efforts were instrumental in ensuring that the issue of food security and nutrition was brought to the forefront of the Government's and UN policy and planning effort. However strengthened policy had not yet been reflected in improved Government data



collection and reporting. Recent experiences in trying to transfer responsibility for market data collection and analysis suggested that the Government was not yet in a position to maintain the required quality of data if full responsibility for food security analysis and data collection was transferred. But this may well change in the near future.

## **2.D. Cross-Cutting Issues**

### *Gender*

160. WFP had made strenuous efforts to address gender issues both as part of the implementation of the PRRO activities, and in the way it conducts business. Expected female participation rates were highlighted in the Log Frame, and some activities, such as girls take home rations and MCH, were designed exclusively for females. The PRRO made considerable progress in increasing female participation; if targets were not always achieved, this reflected more the situation of women and girls in Liberia, rather than a lack of effort by WFP.
161. Gender-based violence remained a major problem in Liberia, particularly for adolescent girls. The PRS suggested that gender-based violence was deeply embedded in a combination of cultural beliefs and behaviour acquired during the years of conflict. By its nature, the PRRO had been able to do little to directly reduce gender-based violence, although there was evidence that improvements in the economic situation of households through participation in FSLI activities may have helped to reduce domestic violence.
162. WFP has taken a strong position in addressing issues of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), which was a common feature of food aid programmes in West Africa in earlier years. Training on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse was mandatory for all staff members and service providers, and SEA guidelines were distributed to all WFP staff, staff from co-operating partners and commercial drivers. Special SEA workshops were organised for transporters. Posters and stickers were printed and distributed to raise SEA awareness. WFP and co-operating partner staff were strongly encouraged to report cases sexual exploitation or abuse that they experienced or witnessed. Anonymous complaints boxes, through which such reports could be posted, were located at a number of strategic points through WFP offices. WFP also took a lead within the UN system in addressing sexual exploitation and abuse: in 2006 it contributed \$ 30,000 to joint UN efforts; in 2008 it made a further contribution of \$10,000.

### *HIV/AIDS*

163. WFP provided assistance to PLHIV through its nutrition intervention activities. WFP also took a strong position to promote HIV/AIDS awareness among both beneficiaries and WFP staff and contractors. WFP regularly organized workshops to raise awareness about HIV/AIDS among food aid beneficiaries with various partners. For WFP staff and contractors (such as truck drivers), prevention activities focused both on awareness raising through workshops and training sessions and the provision of male and female condoms in staff washroom facilities (although the availability of condoms within the country was irregular).



### III. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 3.A. Overall Assessment

##### *Relevance and Appropriateness*

164. The PRRO would have been more relevant if it had been more focused. In short, it tried to do too much in a situation where capacity was extremely weak at all levels to manage and implement interventions (as the PRRO document itself recognised). The PRRO included too many activities. Many of the output and outcome measures were inappropriate and the linkage between the project aims and output to actual project interventions was weak. Indicators to measure output and outcome were too numerous, too complex, too difficult to obtain and often inappropriate to the objectives. The scarce capacity in Government, among partners and within WFP became diffused. As a result, many of the indicators proposed in the Log Frame were not collected, and it was not possible to monitor progress in reaching the stated objectives. A more focused approach would have been easier to manage, and likely to have been more effective.
165. The PRRO was not well targeted on the most food insecure and vulnerable individuals or communities (recent returnees and the communities that had the largest number of returnee households). These had been clearly identified by the 2006 CFSNS. Nor did the main activities of the PRRO directly address the main causes of food insecurity and vulnerability in the country
166. The PRRO document contained no indications of transitions expected during the period covered by the operation, even for activities that were clearly more suited to relief interventions (such as therapeutic feeding or institutional feeding) when the country was clearly heading into a recovery and rehabilitation phase. Nor did the PRRO explore how to phase out of activities in a way that would ensure that beneficiaries did not suffer with the cessation of WFP assistance.

##### *Efficiency*

167. Overall service delivery was good. However the poor rural road infrastructure, combined with the severe damage caused during the rainy season (particularly heavy during 2008) meant that in many months less than 60 percent of the planned delivery target was achieved. Beneficiary numbers in most activities were also less than planned. Project outputs were largely below expectations
168. The serious lack of commercial truck capacity in the country, led to WFP retain its own truck fleet to augment commercial capacity. The WFP fleet did not have enough larger capacity trucks, which would have been more cost-effective for larger bulk transport, and was also aging and severely tested by the bad roads. Nevertheless fleet utilization improved when compared month on month. A Fleet Management System, introduced in 2007, also helped contain transport costs. Cost per ton per kilometer generally declined during 2008 and fuel consumption improved by 10 and 20 percent for light and heavy vehicles respectively.



169. The Country Office devoted considerable effort to reduce corruption and diversions. A number of WFP staff were dismissed for corruption, and others disciplined. The newly established PIA strengthened monitoring of the use of WFP commodities. As a result of the work of the PIA, the implementation of FSLI, where diversions were particularly high, was substantially curtailed and restructured. Working closely with Government to ensure that any irregularities identified through monitoring were rapidly addressed and perpetrators publicly punished, available evidence suggests diversions in the FFE activity have also been significantly reduced.
170. Overall the operation was well resourced, although it was heavily reliant on WFP multilateral funding. There were few pipeline issues, and those that did occur were well managed. However the operation suffered from inception with inadequate DSC funding, brought about by the resource transfer from the previous PRRO of commodities but no accompanying DSC. In order to utilize these commodities and avoid delayed deliveries, the Country Office obtained loans from the IRA and the Working Capital Facility, but the IRA loan was still outstanding by November 2008.
171. In order to reduce DSC costs the number of country office staff was reduced by one third and the DSC rate increased by one quarter between 2007 and 2008. Despite these initiatives, the DSC budget remained in deficit and it was unclear whether the Country Office would be able to cover the DSC costs to the end of the operation.

#### *Effectiveness*

172. It was difficult to assess the effectiveness of the operation because the complex design of the operation, and the inclusion of a number of inappropriate indicators, necessitated a substantial M&E system to collect the required data, and this was not put in place. As a result there were very few data available to help assess effectiveness.
173. For **General Food Distribution**, distribution records indicate that the refugee population regularly received the intended food ration, and there were no reports of significant nutritional problems among refugee communities. However nutritional assessments had not been conducted by either UNHCR (which had prime responsibility) or WFP.
174. For **Food Support for Local Initiatives**, there was no baseline against which to measure progress to achieving the stated objectives of improved food security or the increased participation and empowerment of women at community level.
175. For the **Nutritional Intervention** data could have been collated on the nutritional improvements of beneficiaries in the programme from the cooperating partners, who maintained clinical records. However there was no evidence that this was attempted.



176. For **Food for Education**, it was not possible to show that WFP school feeding had a significant effect on school enrolment available data for the 2007-2008 period. In part this was because WFP did not establish a baseline against which to measure effect (the schools sampled in the Standardized School Feeding Survey could have provided a representative sample of schools against which to measure effect, but this was not done). Some monthly reports submitted by cooperating partners responsible for monitoring the school feeding activity provided data on attendance, but this was not collated, and thus it was not possible to judge the effect of school feeding on maintaining attendance. Data was collected on the gender ratios of school enrolment, and this suggested that the school meal programme had made positive, although uneven, progress. WFP had no data showing that the Girl's Take Home Ration had been effective in retaining older girls in school. Given the social and economic barriers to older girls remaining in school, it is not clear whether the intervention had a significant effect. On the other hand, there was no other generally available form of assistance for older girls.

### *Impact*

177. The impact of the PRRO was generally positive and significant. In particular PRRO 10064.3 and PRRO 10454.0 made a significant contribution to encouraging return and resettlement in rural areas, and thus helping to consolidate the peace process.

178. There was widespread agreement that the school feeding activity had been an important factor in revitalizing the education system in rural areas and encouraging return and resettlement. It was generally felt that WFP has also made a major contribution to the rebuilding of education capacity through the establishment of a daily monitoring and recording programme at individual school level (initially for the purposes of food management) that was largely transparent and trustworthy. While the education sector still faced many challenges, the benefits of education were widely appreciated. The school feeding activity had also channelled substantial quantities of food into food deficit rural communities. However children from poorer families still faced significant economic barriers to attending school, and the impact of school feeding would remain limited until these were reduced or removed.

179. Provision of the Girls Take Home Ration had helped to bring to the fore the issue of how to ensure that older rural girls remained in the education system. It now formed part of the general debate about the future of education in Liberia.

180. Beneficiary numbers in FSLI were too small to have national level impacts on poverty or food security; however there was evidence that for many of the individual participants the FSLI had achieved significant impacts. Many participants invested a portion of their wages in income generation ventures such as farming and petty trading, which had led to an increase in household income even after the projects were completed. Skills transfer through practical on-the-job training was also important. Furthermore, there was strong evidence that the provision of short term jobs had helped to promote community peace and reconciliation.



181. Beneficiary numbers in the nutrition interventions were similarly too small to have a national level impact. But a significant number of acutely malnourished children and pregnant women did benefit from the activity. Provision of food to PLHIV and TB patients encouraged treatment adherence.
182. WFP's capacity building activities helped to bring issues of food security to the forefront in Liberia – information and data from the 2006 CFSNS was quoted in almost every Government and UN report written since. Within the school feeding and nutrition activities, capacity building at the local and county level significantly increased accountability and food management. Much of the data collected for purposes of project monitoring could have had additional management uses and ensured that the school feeding programme had additional impacts, but no systems were in place to ensure that such data was transferred between agencies and used for other purposes.

### *Sustainability*

183. The design of the PRRO gave little explicit consideration of transition to exit strategies. However there was evidence that the benefits of many elements of the operation were sustainable.
184. In the case of the refugee caseload, the refugees were well integrated amongst the local population, their children attended local schools, and a number of refugees participated in local development initiatives, including those supported by WFP. Thus the refugees appeared to be in a situation where they could be self-supporting.
185. In the case of FSLI, it is likely that those farmers who benefited from the rehabilitation of rice fields and vegetable gardens would continue to maintain and benefit from these, especially where they had some form of individual ownership or rights. While the lack of maintenance capacity meant that much of the rural infrastructure repaired through FFW was likely to deteriorate again during the next rainy season, those participants who were able to invest some of their earnings in other productive assets were likely to continue to reap benefits from their employment.
186. The school feeding programme was highly appreciated by the Government, and the Government may be willing to support this activity in the future from its own funds. On the other hand, there was strong appreciation of the benefits of education in Liberia, and incentives such as school meals may not be required in the future.
187. WFP's capacity building efforts have helped to ensure that the issue of food security has been well considered in much of the Government's and UN policy and planning effort. Recent experiences in trying to transfer responsibility for market data collection and analysis suggested that the Government was not yet in a position to maintain the required quality of data if full responsibility for food security analysis and data collection was transferred. But this may well change in the near future.



### **3.B. Key Issues for the Future**

188. One of the major issues for the future is to ensure that the WFP intervention better addresses the causes of food insecurity and vulnerability, and to ensure that WFP assistance is better targeted on the most food insecure and vulnerable. This implies significant change to the design of the WFP project, in particular:

- To address the causes of chronic under-five malnutrition
- To ensure that food is available during the hungry season
- To address short term hunger among school children
- To access the more remote areas, where food insecurity and vulnerability may be expected to be highest.

189. Tackling these issues is likely to increase commodity and LTSH costs, as well as requiring new approaches. Chronic under-five malnutrition should be addressed through a package of interventions that address water and sanitation, health and child-caring practices as well as food – such an approach would be heavily reliant on partners to provide the required additional inputs. MCH is one of the few activities that can be implemented during the hungry season, when malnutrition rates typically increase. Short-term hunger would be best addressed through provision of a school snack early in the school day, followed by the hot school meal later in the day. Reaching more remote areas is likely to remain challenging, given the state of much of the rural infrastructure. Investment in secure small-scale rural storage facilities could help pre-position commodities prior to the rainy season. Consideration could also be given to cross-border deliveries through Guinea or Ivory Coast if access from the Liberia side is locked; utilising large cargo canoes and small boats to reach coastal communities; even in exceptional circumstances utilising UNMIL helicopters to reach particularly isolated communities.

190. The WFP intervention should be more focussed. It should have clearer objectives, fewer activities, and indicators that are both relevant and can be relatively easily collected.

191. The school feeding programme would be more effective if the economic barriers, that currently prevent children from the poorest families attending school, were reduced or removed. WFP could advocate with Government to try to achieve that.

192. If WFP assistance is to have a longer term impact, greater attention is required to the transition process, and how WFP may phase out of activities. In some instances this will require stronger cooperation with potential partners, who may be better suited to take over the activity. In other cases it will require more explicit consideration of the goals of WFP assistance, and the implication of their achievement for future WFP interventions in the country. But transition must take care that the needs of beneficiaries are properly considered.

193. WFP has been particularly successful in strengthening the capacity of line ministries at county level (particularly MoE) to monitor and manage commodity use. Capacity building efforts should continue to give emphasis on strengthening line ministry staff at county level,



but with less strict focus on commodity management. A challenge for future capacity building efforts will be to ensure that Government staff are able to apply the skills they have learnt for the purposes of food management to other areas of project management and decision-making, including better management of Government resources and implementation of Government programmes. Much of the infrastructure (such as reporting frameworks) is already in place and there is potential to further develop basic staff skills, and so make a significant practical contribution to local government management.

### **3.C. Recommendations**

#### *For WFP Headquarters:*

194. In order to address the current weaknesses in the PRRO guidance in terms of identifying different types of transitions, and appropriate indicators to guide the timing of the transition process and indicate when phase out would be appropriate, the Programme Design Service should review of the PRRO guidance material.
195. The Programme Design Service should revise the WFP school feeding guidelines to better distinguish between the objectives and indicators of school feeding in emergency situations, in post-conflict countries and countries in transition, and school feeding in the development context. In particular the Guidelines should address the issue of how to implement a transitional school feeding programme, which is the typical situation in PRROs.
196. In order to ensure that commodities are not transferred from completed operations without funds, WFP financial procedures should be reviewed to ensure that transferred commodities are accompanied by appropriate levels of funding for ODOC, LTSH and DSC. In selected cases it might be necessary to modify the current arrangement whereby cash is always linked to commodities.
197. To help improve WFP monitoring of activities as a guide to better project management, the Performance and Accountability Management Division should develop practical guidance, in the context of the new Strategic Plan, on more appropriate M&E approaches that go beyond headquarters reporting requirements, and help Country Offices in terms of improved management decisions regarding WFP interventions. Such guidance should focus on issues such as the appropriateness of indicators to measure performance, the range of possible data collection and sampling approaches, and the utilization of data bases to inform management decisions.

#### *For the WFP Country Office:*

198. Future operations in Liberia should be more focused and less complex, and more in line with prevailing capacities to manage and implement food assistance. This includes clear and obtainable objectives, fewer activities, and more appropriate indicators that are easier to collect and collate to monitor progress in achieving the operation's objectives.





199. In order to ensure that WFP assistance is achieving the desired effects, significant strengthening of programme monitoring is required, to measure progress towards achieving the operation's objectives. The feasibility of monitoring based on sampling systems should be considered.
200. To help avert the serious disruptions that are caused by poor road connections immediately after each rainy season, it is suggested that the country office investigate the feasibility of developing appropriate local storage facilities that might be used to pre-position commodities closer to project sites prior to the rainy season.
201. In order to improve the effectiveness of WFP assistance to retain older girls in the education system, the Country Office should investigate possible alternative activities with partners that would better address the social and economic causes of the current high drop out rates and complement the Girls Take Home Ration. One option might be to work with partners to establish school-based crèches for teenage mothers, with supervisors drawn from older female-headed households and possibly paid through food for work. Consideration should also be given to distributing the Girls Take Home Ration fortnightly instead of monthly, to lessen the real burden of transporting commodities to the girls' homes.
202. To better address the serious problem of child malnutrition, the country office should investigate the feasibility of an expanded MCH activity to provide blended food to all pregnant women and young children (6 to 24 months) within a defined area. Available data on malnutrition rates should be the prime targeting criteria. An assessment of the prevailing capacity to provide health services would also be required, as well as assurance that the quality of health service provided would not suffer as a result of including food aid along with other responsibilities.
203. In order to make broader use of data collected for the purposes of monitoring food management and distribution, and encourage its use for other management purposes, future capacity building efforts at county level should aim to encourage linkages between different Government departments and agencies to take advantage of the significantly strengthened monitoring and accountability structures that have been developed in the school feeding activity



# Annexes



## **Annex 1: Terms of Reference**

### **I. Background**

#### **A. Context of the evaluation**

1. Liberia is in the midst of a difficult post-conflict transition following a period of protracted civil conflict that ended with the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. The conflict displaced millions of Liberians, caused widespread destruction of life and property, devastated social and economic infrastructure and disrupted the fragile livelihoods of both rural and urban populations (WFP, 2007). By April 2006, the vast majority of the three million internally displaced Liberians had returned to their homes and the country is currently experiencing a period of relative peace. Neighbouring Ivory Coast and Guinea, however, are still volatile and continue to pose ongoing threats to overall regional stability. In Liberia itself, incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants, unemployment estimated at 80-85% (World Bank, 2008), environmental degradation, pervasive poverty, an estimated 51% of food insecure and highly vulnerable households (WFP, 2006), an estimated 2-5% HIV prevalence among the adult population (UNAIDS/WHO, 2006) and weak governance, also pose grave threats to long-term peace and stability.
2. The Liberia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10454.0 is a single-country operation that was designed and implemented following a series of regional PRROs that provided a framework of assistance for Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea during the period 2001-mid 2007. The Country Office is planning a second, two-year PRRO to begin mid-2009 and will begin preparing the new project document in October 2008; the document is expected to be ready for approval before the end of March 2009. This evaluation, therefore, will provide timely inputs into the design phase of the new operation.
3. The PRRO is being implemented in the context of i) the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster Approach in Liberia that was adopted as a pilot study in November 2005; ii) the overall humanitarian coordination being subsumed under the United Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and iii) high food prices that are threatening the food security of hundreds of thousands poor and vulnerable Liberians. As a result of these high food prices, the World Bank approved a grant of USD 10 million to finance its Liberia Emergency Food Crisis Response Program; one component of this program, involving support to school feeding, take-home rations for school girls and food support for pregnant and lactating women, is to be implemented by WFP (World Bank, 2008).
4. PRRO 10454.0 originally planned to assist a total of 767,000 vulnerable Liberians during the period July 2007 to June 2009 through the provision of 53,632mt of food at a total cost to WFP of USD 50.6 million. As per the project document, the detailed breakdown of planned beneficiaries and tonnage, respectively, was as follows: general distribution: 1,148 and 459 MT; food-for-work (agriculture): 15,750 and 4,772 MT; food-for-work (infrastructure): 6,750 and 2,045 MT; food-for-training: 15,113 and 905 MT; curative feeding: 13,700 and 1,455 MT; institutional feeding: 6,000 and 2,088 MT; HIV/AIDS: 3,500 and 4,095 MT; food-for-education hot meals: 530,000 and 32,321 MT; and food-for-education girls take-home ration: 17,640 and 5,492 MT.



5. A budget revision is currently underway to address both the de-linking of some school feeding activities from the PRRO and also the high food price situation in Liberia. In addition, there were two previous budget revisions for this project that will have to be taken into account by the evaluation team.
6. The stated objectives of this operation are as follows:
  - Provide life-saving assistance (SO1) through general food distributions to targeted beneficiaries (Ivorian refugees in camps)
  - Provide food for recovery (SO2) as an investment to rebuild and protect human productive assets in order to encourage a social and economic rebound
  - Provide support to maternal and child health programmes (SO3) in order to improve the nutrition and health status of children and mothers and vulnerable groups such as people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) and their families
  - Provide emergency school feeding (SO4) and support access to basic education with particular attention to girls
  - Contribute to capacity-building of national institutions (SO5) to ensure timely and efficient response to food security challenges
7. This PRRO comprises multiple types of activities including a small relief component that provides a general food distribution for Ivorian refugees that remain in camps (*Strategic Objective 1*); a recovery component that provides food-for-work and food-for-training activities for communities with high return rates of IDPs and refugees (*Strategic Objective 2*); a nutritional feeding component that supports malnourished children and vulnerable women and other vulnerable groups through supplementary and therapeutic feeding, institutional feeding and family rations (*Strategic Objective 3*) and a very substantial food-for-education component that provides in-school hot meal rations and take-home rations for girls in WFP-assisted schools (*Strategic Objective 4*).
8. The logical framework summary or logic model presented as an annex to the project document summarized the various outcomes and outputs expected together with the associated performance indicators, means of verification and assumptions and risks. It also indicates a number of targets that depend on the availability of baseline data from school feeding and refugee nutritional baseline surveys scheduled for May 2007 and June 2007. For the purposes of this evaluation, a simplified and streamlined logic model will be used to guide the evaluation (see para. 17).



9. As per discussions with the Country Office, some of the main discussions revolving around the operation include the following:
- the de-linking of a portion of the school feeding activities from the PRRO (and the related budget revision) in order to transfer these to the new DEV Project Liberia 10733.0 that begins in September 2008;
  - longstanding difficulties related to the diversion of food commodities for some activities;
  - the alignment of the new phase of the PRRO with the new Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (iPRSP) 2008-2011.



B. Stakeholders

10. Key internal and external stakeholders for this evaluation are detailed in table 1 below.

Stakeholder Matrix

Key stakeholder group	Interest in the subject of the evaluation	Interest in the evaluation	Implications for the evaluation
WFP Liberia CO staff	*Responsible for management and coordination of WFP assistance and resources	*Evaluation may identify strengths and weaknesses of the operation *Evaluation findings may inform design and implementation of subsequent operations *Involved in the management response to the evaluation	*Main source of data *Main contact for the evaluation
WFP Regional Bureau staff	*Responsible for operations in the region	*Evaluation will assess the contribution of WFP OMD to the Country Office *Evaluation findings may inform design and implementation of subsequent operations, both in Liberia and other operations in the region *Involved in the management response to the evaluation	*Source of information on support provided to the Country Office
WFP HQ staff (OMXD)	*No specific role in the operation	*Evaluation may identify design issues that will inform future operations *Involved in management response to the evaluation	*Will be kept informed on the results of the evaluation
Government of Liberia	*Involved as recipient of WFP assistance *Involved as a cooperating partner of WFP	*Evaluation may affect the design and implementation of future relief and recovery operations in Liberia	*Key informant for the evaluation *Will be consulted through formal meetings at national and sub-national levels
Ministry of Education, GOL	*Involved as a cooperating partner of WFP	*Specific interest school feeding activities	*Key informant for the evaluation
Ministry of Agriculture, GOL	*Involved as a cooperating partner of WFP	*Specific interest in FFW activities	*Key informant for the evaluation
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, GOL	*Involved as a cooperating partner of WFP	*Specific interest in maternal and child health activities of WFP	*Key informant for the evaluation
Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, GOL	*Involved as a cooperating partner of WFP	*Specific interest in the various WFP activities in Liberia	*Key informant for the evaluation
NGO Partners	*Play a key role in the overall implementation of the operation	* Evaluation may affect the design and implementation of future relief and recovery operations in Liberia	*Key informant for the evaluation
UN Partners (FAO, UNICEF, WHO)	*Involved in various aspects of WFP programme strategy and implementation	*Evaluation may affect the design and implementation of future relief and recovery operations in Liberia	*Key informants for the evaluation
Communities/Beneficiaries	*Direct interest in the success of the operation as vulnerable beneficiaries	*Evaluation findings may influence future operations & improve service to beneficiaries	*Key informants on issues regarding relevance and effectiveness
Donors	*Provide substantial financial and in-kind resources to the operation	*Evaluation findings may influence donor attitudes regarding funding of WFP operations in Liberia	*Source of information *Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level
WFP Executive Board	*No specific role in the operation	*Interested in the evaluation as part of WFP's commitment to learning and accountability	*Will be kept informed on the results of the evaluation



## II. Reasons for the Evaluation

### A. Rationale

- This mid-term evaluation was foreseen as part of the OEDE biennium work plan for 2008-2009 and it was also foreseen in the PRRO project document to take place in 2008. It is intended that the lessons learned from this evaluation will inform the next phase of the PRRO operation and possibly the implementation of the new DEV Project 10733.0. The intended users of this evaluation will therefore include regional, country office and HQ staff involved in programme design and implementation.

### B. Objective

11. The objective of this evaluation is two-fold. The first objective is to determine the degree to which stated project objectives have been achieved, and to assess the manner in which these have been achieved, in order to be accountable for aid expenditures to stakeholders. The second objective is to draw lessons from the current operation in order to contribute to improved performance in the next phase of the Liberia PRRO, the new Dev Project 10733.0 and similar operations in the region.

## III. Scope of the Evaluation

### A. Scope

12. In order to understand better any issues related to transition from the regional PRRO 10064.3 to the single country Liberia PRRO, this evaluation will consider, only to the extent necessary, specific programme and logistics arrangements that may have been in place during the last six months of the regional PRRO and that may have changed with the transition to the Liberia PRRO. In other words, the evaluation will not evaluate the regional PRRO but only examine specific approaches and arrangements that might have been in place to support the operation in Liberia before the transition to the single-country PRRO. In order to do this, it will be sufficient to review the final six months of the regional PRRO as it pertains specifically to the Liberia operation.
13. This evaluation will therefore focus on the overall arrangements in place in Liberia during the final six months of regional PRRO 10064.3, the transition to the single country Liberia PRRO 10454.0 in July 2007 and the extent to which the design and implementation of the various components that comprise this PRRO contribute to the achievement of the stated project objectives, with a special emphasis on the emergency school feeding operation under the PRRO.
14. The evaluation will focus on the period January 2007 to June 2007, covering the final six months of the previous regional PRRO 10064.0, and July 2007 to November 2008, covering the first 17 months of the Liberia PRRO 10454.0, as illustrated in Diagramme 1 below.

Diagram 1: Evaluation Scope

**Evaluation Scope**

<Jan-07	Jul-07	Nov-08	31 Mar-09>
Regional PRRO 10064.3	>	PRRO 10454.0	

- The geographical scope of the evaluation will be those areas in greater Monrovia and rural Liberia where WFP has ongoing operations under the current PRRO. *In the pre-mission report, the evaluation team will map out the various WFP activities in each of the 15 counties in the country and then define selection criteria in order to determine a representative sampling of areas and activities to visit during the evaluation team field work.*

Map 1: Reference map of Liberia



**B. Evaluability assessment**

- The logical framework summary annexed to the project document is deemed less than ideal to guide the evaluation, for the following reasons: i) ambiguous or inconsistent wording for some of the stated outcomes; ii) unsuitable outcome indicators given for some outcomes; iii) unsuitable means of verification given for some outcomes; iv) a number of activities expressed as outputs rather than activities; and v) some activities are better located under a different strategic objective to be in line with corporate guidance.





17. A revised and simplified logic model has therefore been proposed by the evaluation manager after consultation with the Country Office (**see Annex 1**). The new logic model clearly identifies the various activities that contribute to each strategic objective and focuses on the corporate output and outcome indicators established in the WFP Indicator Compendium (Biennium 2006-2007), even if some of these indicators were pilot indicators, rather than additional indicators generated by the Country Office. *This proposed logic model will be reviewed by the evaluation team during the pre-mission phase and adjusted, if necessary, in consultation with the Country Office.*
18. It is important to note that the WFP Indicator Compendium does not specify corporate indicators to measure impact at the goal level and the core WFP programme goal is given as follows: “to continue to meet the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) through food-assisted interventions targeted to poor and hungry people.” This goal is therefore adopted as the over-arching goal of the Liberia operation for the purposes of the evaluation and this is consistent with the project document that explicitly recognizes that the PRRO contributes to Government of Liberia efforts to attain universal primary education (MDG 2) and to achieve sustainable food security (consistent with MDG 1).
19. Given that this is a mid-term evaluation of an operation with ongoing activities, it is unlikely that the evaluation will be able to assess fully the impact of the Liberia PRRO and its contribution to the MDG, in particular the achievement of universal primary education and sustainable food security, which are highlighted in the project document. The evaluation team, however, will consider the scale and geographic scope of WFP activities in different sectors, especially the food security, health and education sectors, and the extent to which WFP is working with relevant Government of Liberia entities in each of these sectors to leverage the overall impact of its various activities, in order to determine the likely magnitude of the PRRO contribution toward the achievement of the MDG in Liberia.
20. The Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) of Oct 2006, together with the Crop and Food Security Assessment for Liberia (CFSA) of Feb 2006, are expected to provide at least some relevant baseline information related to nutrition, livelihoods and education. In addition, a WFP standardized school feeding survey (Jun 2007) and a WFP assessment of WFP support to education in Liberia (WFP, 2004) is expected to provide useful information for evaluating progress in the school feeding activities. *During the pre-mission phase, the evaluation team will examine closely these survey and assessment reports to confirm their usefulness and appropriateness to the evaluation of the PRRO.*
21. The database-supported M&E system referred to in the PRRO project document is not yet fully functional; to supplement information available from this system the CO has created a programme internal audit unit to report regularly on programme compliance issues. The focus and reports of this unit may not address fully the need for programme data at the output and outcome level. *This issue will be explored further during the pre-mission phase by the evaluation team in consultation with the CO.*

#### IV. Key Issues & Evaluation Questions

22. The evaluation will assess WFP performance against stated project objectives in terms of the standard evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, as per the EQAS evaluation report template. The evaluation will pay particular attention to



cross-cutting issues such as gender and protection, especially insofar as there are design and implementation strategies that may minimize potential diversion of WFP resources and/or minimize the risk of abuse of WFP beneficiaries; *the evaluation, however, will not investigate alleged cases of diversion and/or beneficiary abuse and if such cases arise, they will be referred to the Inspector General & General Oversight Services Division (OSD) for follow-up.*

23. The following key issues will also be considered:

- Transition from the Regional PRRO 10064.0 to the single country Liberia PRRO. The transition to a single country operation after multiple regional PRROs may pose specific challenges. The evaluation will examine issues related to LTSH costs, resource mobilization, pipeline management and the level of technical support provided by the regional bureau to support the transition.
- Shift from relief to recovery. The lack of clear criteria to signal a shift from relief to recovery was highlighted in the 2004 evaluation of the West Africa Coastal Regional PRROs. The evaluation will consider the extent to which this issue has been addressed in the Liberia PRRO.
- Utilization of relevant VAM studies in the formulation of recovery activities. The 2004 evaluation of the West Africa Coastal Regional PRROs noted that major constraints facing the target populations were generally not taken into account in the formulation of recovery activities. The evaluation will review the various issues, including the limited technical and operational capacity of cooperating partners, that may affect the design and implementation of recovery activities.
- Partial de-linking of school feeding activities from the PRRO to DEV Project 10733.0. The evaluation will study the rationale for this decision, particularly in light of the ongoing WFP emergency school feeding under the PRRO, as well as some of the potential pitfalls and potential advantages of initiating development-oriented school feeding in five south-eastern counties.

## V. Evaluation Design

### A. Methodology

24. The overall approach for the evaluation will be a mixed method approach that is both objectives-oriented and participant-oriented meaning that the focus will be on i) making clear the project goals and objectives and assessing the success of the operation in achieving them and ii) recognizing that project participants and stakeholders are key sources of both questions and the information to answer these questions.

25. The evaluation will use a range of data collection methods such as structured document review, key informant interviews and focus group discussions and a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, as appropriate. During the pre-mission phase, the evaluation team will consider how to ensure appropriate and, to the extent possible, representative sampling in terms of the selection of sites to be visited and stakeholders to be visited during the field work.



26. The main sources of information include i) internal and external documents such as project documents, needs assessment reports, monitoring reports, evaluation reports, Government of Liberia poverty reduction strategy papers and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia and ii) key stakeholders (see Table 1) who will be consulted widely to ensure that the findings and recommendations of the evaluation are based on a full and comprehensive understanding of diverse perspectives.

B. Evaluation Quality Assurance System

27. WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the TOR. All these tools are available with OEDE. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. Concerning the quality of data and information, the evaluation team will ensure a systematic check on the accuracy, consistency and validity of collected data and information.

C. Phases and deliverables

28. The evaluation phases and corresponding outputs are detailed in Diagram 2 below.

Diagram 2: Evaluation phases and outputs

Description	Output	TL (days)	TM 1 (days)	Sep-08			Oct-08			Nov-08			Dec-08			Jan-09			Feb-09			Mar-09								
				1	8	15	22	29	6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26	2	9	16	23	2
<b>Evaluation phase</b>																														
<b>1 Pre-mission report</b>																														
Briefing	Briefing report	4	4																											
Prepare draft Pre-mission report	Draft pre-mission report	10	5																											
Revise pre-mission report	Revised pre-mission report	2	0																											
Final pre-mission report	Final pre-mission report	1	0																											
<b>2 Evaluation Mission</b>																														
Prepare field mission		1	1																											
Field mission	Aide memoire	19	19																											
Field mission de-briefing	De-briefing	1	1																											
<b>3 Evaluation report</b>																														
Prepare evaluation report	Draft evaluation report	15	10																											
Revise evaluation report	Revised evaluation report (1)	2	1																											
Respond to stakeholder comments	Completed comments matrix	2	1																											
Revise evaluation report	Revised evaluation report (2)	2	0																											
<b>4 Evaluation summary report</b>																														
Prepare evaluation summary report	Draft summary report	4	0																											
Revise summary report	Final draft summary report	1	0																											

29. The preparatory mission, which is optional, is not planned to be carried out for this evaluation for the following reasons: i) ability and willingness of the CO to provide necessary data to the evaluation manager and evaluation team in advance of the evaluation field work; ii) limited budgetary resources; and iii) the familiarity of one evaluation team member with WFP operations, including his previous evaluation experience of WFP operations in Liberia in 2004.

30. **Pre-mission report.** The purpose of the pre-mission report (PMR) is two fold: (i) to review and clarify the TOR and present the methodology to be used to undertake the evaluation; and (ii) to present the preliminary findings of the desk review and identify information gaps to be filled with data collected during the evaluation mission. The pre-mission report is prepared by



the evaluation team under the responsibility of the team leader, on the basis of a desk review of all available documents and as per the EQAS report template. It assures the evaluation manager that the team has a good grasp of what is expected from the evaluation and goes on mission fully prepared.

31. The evaluation team will determine the visit itinerary during the pre-mission phase based on agreed selection criteria; the visit itinerary will detail planned meetings with key stakeholders in the capital and during field visits and identify the operational areas are to be visited. The country office will advise the evaluation team on any issues related to security and accessibility. The evaluation team will submit the planned visit itinerary to the country office so that they can prepare logistics and meeting arrangements.
32. **Evaluation mission.** Fieldwork will be undertaken in Monrovia and areas of WFP operations in other parts of Liberia. Fieldwork will be carried out as follows:
  - initial briefing with stakeholders in the capital to explain the purpose of the evaluation;
  - interviews and field visits with internal and external stakeholders in order to collect primary data and
  - de-briefing with key stakeholders in the capital to present the preliminary findings of the evaluation team (WFP HQ stakeholders will have the opportunity to participate in the de-briefing via teleconference).
33. **Evaluation report.** The evaluation report will bring together the findings of the evaluation team in a concise and analytical report as per the EQAS report template. The draft report will be shared with stakeholders and the response of the evaluation team to these comments will be documented in the evaluation report.

## VI. Organization of the Evaluation

### A. Expertise of the evaluation team

34. Based on a preliminary review of background documents, it is determined that the evaluation will need to have experience and/or expertise in the following areas: evaluation of humanitarian action, including programmes related to food security and nutrition; education and logistics. The evaluation manager will ensure that the experience and expertise of the evaluation team encompasses the following areas:
  - Evaluation & food security and nutrition. The evaluation team will have significant evaluation experience, combined with sound knowledge of food security and nutrition issues and recovery program options in a post-conflict transition context.



- Education. Given the fact that the food for education component of the operation accounts for some 71% of project resources and encompasses several different activities and initiatives, expertise and relevant experience is required to understand school feeding activities and the contribution of FFE toward recovery in a post-conflict context.
  - Logistics. Pipeline management and timely delivery of commodities are essential to the overall success of the operation. Solid understanding of WFP logistics issues and constraints will ensure that adequate attention is given to the logistics support of programme activities.
35. The team leader identified for this evaluation is an evaluation expert with very significant evaluation experience in a wide variety of humanitarian action programs. The team member identified has evaluation experience and is familiar with all aspects of WFP operations in a multiple contexts, due to a significant number of consultancies, including evaluation and appraisal work, with WFP over an extended period. Although there is a potential conflict of interest with the team member, given his longstanding work relationship with WFP, the evaluation manager believes that this issue can be managed successfully given the balanced team composition and the fact that the team leader has not had a previous work relationship with WFP.
36. The evaluation team will be made aware of the code of conduct for evaluators in the UN system and provided with relevant documents related to the UNEG norms and standards of evaluation.

#### B. WFP Stakeholders' roles and responsibilities

37. This evaluation is led by the WFP Office of Evaluation and the evaluation manager is responsible to
- Prepare the terms of reference of the evaluation;
  - Select and recruit the evaluation team;
  - Prepare and manage the evaluation budget; organize an initial evaluation team briefing;
  - Organize the field mission in coordination with the Liberia Country Office; provide a first level of quality feedback and assurance for the evaluation products;
  - Disseminate reports to the various stakeholders and
  - Act as the principal interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP.



38. The WFP Liberia Country Office, which will host the evaluation mission for the field work, is responsible to

- Provide data and information requested by the evaluation team
- Provide logistics support for the evaluation team in terms of lodging and transport to and from the airport and to and from project areas
- Arrange meetings with cooperating partners and government officials, as requested by the evaluation team and detailed in the visit itinerary
- Participate as key informants by allocating sufficient time for meetings
- Accompany the evaluation team to various meetings with cooperating partners and government officials, if requested by the team leader
- Provide management responses to evaluation recommendations, as appropriate

39. The main responsibility of the WFP Regional Bureau and WFP HQ staff is to

- Provide management responses to evaluation recommendations, as appropriate.

C. Communication

40. The dissemination strategy for the evaluation includes the following: an in-country debriefing and presentation of preliminary findings, presentation to the WFP Executive Board in June 2009 and the posting of the final evaluation report and summary evaluation report on the WFP external website. All reports will be prepared and presented in English.

D. Budget

41. The overall budget for the evaluation is USD 90,000. Funds will be provided solely from Liberia PRRO 10454.0, specifically the budget line for direct support costs (DSC). Given the size of the DSC budget relative to the total PRRO budget, there is no provision of untied funding for this evaluation.



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**Annex 3: Logical Framework**

Results-Hierarchy	Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumption and Risks
<b>IMPACT</b>			
Contribute to the peace consolidation process through prevention of hunger, creation of conditions for vulnerable populations to restore sustainable livelihoods, foster access to education and increase government capacity in terms of food assistance management	Human development index Gender development index Household food security levels Chronic malnutrition levels of children under 5	National Human Development Report (UNDP) WFP VAM surveys and other food security studies Food Security Monitoring System Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Compliance with Protection/IASC obligations	
<b>OUTCOMES</b>			
<b>SO 1: Save lives of war-affected populations who are critically food insecure</b>			
Nutrition level/health status among refugee beneficiaries is maintained	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among refugee children under five years of age*	Nutrition screening carried out by WFP in collaboration with partner organizations	Socio-economic recovery Government, other UN Agencies and partner organizations respect their commitments and achieve planned results
<b>SO 2: Protect livelihoods, support rehabilitation of productive assets and enhance resilience to shocks</b>			
Increased level of self-reliance and food security and improved ability to manage shocks and meet food needs	Percentage of food insecure households in targeted areas (Target: 5%)	End of project reports provided by implementing partners Food Security Monitoring System reports	
Increased participation and empowerment of women at community level in decision making bodies	Percentage of women in food-management committees of community projects (Target: 50%)		
<b>SO 3: Support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers, PLWHA and other vulnerable people</b>			



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Results-Hierarchy	Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumption and Risks
<p>Reduced prevalence of acute malnutrition among beneficiary children and women</p> <p>Improved nutritional and health status of PLWHA on treatment</p>	<p>Prevalence of acute malnutrition among under 5s (assessed using height, weight, age and sex) (Target: &lt; 0 = 5%)</p> <p>Recovery rate among under-5 beneficiaries (Target: recovery rate &gt; 70%)</p> <p>Percentage of beneficiaries in HIV/AIDS programme maintaining or increasing their body weight (Target: 70%)</p> <p>Treatment adherence rate among beneficiaries of HIV/AIDS programme (Target: &gt;70%)</p>	<p>Nutritional surveys undertaken by WFP and partner organizations</p> <p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p>	
<p><b>SO 4: Support access to primary education in rural areas of the country and reduce gender disparity in access to education</b></p>			
<p>4.1 Improved enrolment and attendance rate of boys and girls in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools</p> <p>4.2 Improved capacity to concentrate and learn among boys and girls in pre-primary, primary and secondary WFP-assisted schools</p> <p>4.3 Reduced gender disparity between boys and girls enrolled in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools</p> <p>4.4 Increased coordination of assistance to the education system among UNICEF, WFP and other partner organizations under the leadership of the national government</p> <p>4.5 Increased participation of parents in managing school feeding activities</p>	<p>Absolute enrolment: number of boys and girls enrolled in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools*</p> <p>Attendance rate of boys and girls in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools*</p> <p>Completion rates/retention rates of boys and girls in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools*</p> <p>Gender ratio in pre-primary, primary and secondary targeted schools*</p> <p>Number of targeted schools assisted in joint programmes*</p> <p>Number of PTAs actively participating in the management of school feeding activities (Target: 100%)</p>	<p>Reports on reference studies and/or thematic evaluations by WFP</p> <p>Baseline and follow-up surveys</p> <p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p>	
<p><b>SO 5: Help Government establish and manage national food-assistance programmes</b></p>			



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Results-Hierarchy	Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumption and Risks
<p>Enhanced Government capacity to monitor and respond to food crisis and malnutrition</p> <p>Strengthened collaboration with governmental line Ministries to monitor food and nutrition programmes</p>	<p>National food security and nutrition monitoring unit established (Target: 1)</p> <p>Number of periodic reports produced by the national food security and nutrition monitoring unit (Target: 4 quarterly reports per year)</p> <p>Percentage of food assistance programmes monitored with active participation of Government counterparts (Target: 100%)</p>	<p>Agreements signed between WFP and line Ministries and other governmental institutions</p> <p>Government reports</p> <p>Food security and nutrition monitoring reports</p> <p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p>	
<b>OUTPUTS</b>			
<b>SO 1: Save lives of war-affected populations who are critically food insecure</b>			
<p>Timely provision of food in sufficient quantity for targeted beneficiaries in conflict and disaster affected areas</p>	<p>Number of actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance through each activity as a percentage of planned beneficiaries, by feeding category, age group and gender (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Actual tonnage of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distribution, by feeding category, age group and gender (Target: 100%)</p>	<p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p> <p>Monthly WFP Food Distribution Reports</p>	<p>Other basic needs of refugees are met by other partner organizations</p> <p>Other partner organizations provide complementary agricultural inputs and qualified trainers</p>
<p><b>SO 2: Protect livelihoods, support rehabilitation of productive assets and enhance resilience to shocks</b></p> <p>Complementary assistance is provided by</p>			



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Results-Hierarchy	Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumption and Risks
<p>2.1.1 Food support provided to beneficiaries of asset creation and income-generation activities with a focus on war-affected and food insecure communities</p> <p>2.1.2 Seed protection provided in collaboration with other agencies distributing agricultural inputs to recently resettled households</p> <p>2.1.3 Food provided to women and men registered in supported skills-training courses</p> <p>2.2.1 Increased awareness on protection issues by female and male beneficiaries</p>	<p>Number of beneficiaries participating in asset-building and income-generation activities as a percentage of planned beneficiaries disaggregated by gender and project category (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Actual tonnage of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distribution by project category (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Number of awareness/training sessions organized on protection-related issues by WFP and its partner organizations (Target: 20 per year)</p>	<p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p> <p>Monthly WFP Food Distribution Reports</p>	<p>other organizations (Government, United Nations and other partners) to fight other underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition</p>
<p><b>SO 3: Support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers, PLWHA and other vulnerable people</b></p>			
<p>Timely provision of nutritious food in sufficient quantity to targeted beneficiaries vulnerable to nutrition and health risks</p> <p>Increased awareness on HIV/AIDS prevention and PMTCT among targeted beneficiaries</p>	<p>Number of actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance as a percentage of planned beneficiaries, by feeding/activity category, age group and gender (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Actual metric tons of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distribution by activity category (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Percentage of micronutrient-fortified food delivered through WFP-supported nutritional interventions (Target: 100% of food commodities that can be fortified)</p> <p>Number of training sessions in HIV/AIDS prevention and PMTCT undertaken by WFP and partner organizations for targeted beneficiaries (Target: 20 per year)</p>	<p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p> <p>Monthly WFP Food Distribution Reports</p>	<p>Government or other agencies provide qualified teachers, school materials, facilities, etc to targeted schools</p> <p>Other agencies agree to implement joint programmes and target the same schools</p> <p>Parents are interested to participate in PTAs</p> <p>Other stakeholders (United Nations and bilateral co-operations) are addressing the basic and fundamental needs of the ministries</p> <p>Government is committed to establish and sustain the food security monitoring system</p>
<p><b>SO 4: Support access to primary education in rural areas of the country and reduce gender disparity in access to education</b></p>			



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Results-Hierarchy	Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumption and Risks
<p>Timely provision of food in sufficient quantity for targeted children, adolescent girls and adults to improve access to education in schools and non-formal education centres</p> <p>Enhanced school capacity to provide food items complementary to WFP food support in areas with acute food insecurity and high vulnerability to food insecurity</p> <p>Reduction of worm infection among targeted beneficiaries in areas of the country with high micronutrient deficiency</p> <p>4.3.1 Enhanced programme management capacity of PTAs in school feeding activities</p>	<p>Actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance through each activity as a percentage of planned beneficiaries, by project category, age group, sex (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Actual metric tons of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distributions, by project category and commodity (Target: 100%)</p> <p>Number of WFP-assisted schools receiving support for establishment of school gardens in select areas (Target: 250)</p> <p>Number of targeted beneficiaries benefiting from de-worming activities in select areas (Target: 75,000)</p> <p>Number of PTA trainings per year as percentage of planned trainings (Target: 30%)</p>	<p>Monthly food distribution reports prepared by staff of WFP and implementing partners</p> <p>Monthly WFP Food Distribution Reports</p>	
<p><b>SO 5: Help Government establish and manage national food-assistance programmes</b></p>			
<p>5.1.1 Improved capacity of Government staff in food security and nutrition analysis</p> <p>5.2.1 Improved knowledge, management and monitoring capacity of Government staff in programs currently implemented by WFP</p>	<p>Number of government staff trained in food security and nutrition data collection and analysis (Target: 30)</p> <p>Number of government staff seconded to WFP and trained in VAM related activities (Target: 2)</p> <p>Number of government staff seconded to WFP and trained in M&amp;E related activities (Target: 1)</p> <p>Number of assessment, monitoring and evaluation reports generated in collaboration with line Ministries as percentage of total (Target: 40%)</p>	<p>WFP situation reports</p> <p>Monthly Monitoring Reports prepared by WFP and its implementing partners</p>	



### **BASIC ASSUMPTIONS**

- Security conditions allow staff members of WFP and implementing partners as well as beneficiaries to have access and work freely in the targeted areas.
  - Other required non-food resources are available to assisted institutions and projects.
  - Timely contribution of funds and commodities are secured.
- 
- The targets for these indicators will be set following the results of baseline surveys scheduled for March-May 2007 (school feeding) and June 2007 (assistance to camp refugees).



## **Annex 4: List of Persons Met and Itinerary**

### **List of People Met**

#### **Monrovia**

Government of Liberia

Ministry of Agriculture

Dr J. Chris Toe, Minister

Mr James B. Logan, Deputy Minister

Ministry of Education

Dr Joseph D.Z. Korto, Minister

Mr Matthew G. Zarzar, Deputy Minister for Administration – designate

Mr James F. Andrewes, Assistant Minister

Ms Felicia Sackey Due-Sumah, Assistant Minister/Instruction, Bureau of Secondary Education

Mr Alfred S. Suna, Director, Division of School Feeding

Mr Christian G Tabla, Sr., Director of Agriculture and Environmental Education

Ministry of Health and Social Welfare

Dr Walter T. Gwenigale, Minister

Dr Barniga Dahn, Deputy Minister

Dr Saye D. Baawo, Director, Family Health Division

Ms Stellah C. Subah, Nutrition Unit, Family health Division

Ministry of Public Works

Mr Loseni Dunzo, Minister

### **Embassies and Missions**

European Commission

Mr Koen Henckaerts, ECHO Field Expert

Mr William K.C. Kawalawu, Sr., Senior Programme Officer, ECHO

Germany

Ms Ilse Lindemann-Macha, Ambassador

Switzerland

Mr Thomas Frey, Senior Advisor, West Africa and Sahel, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

Mr Fritz Steinemann, Country Director, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation





Ms Susan Summer, SOS, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
USA

USAID

Ms Pamela White, Mission Director, USAID, Liberia  
Ms Zema Semunegus, Regional Food for Peace Officer, USAID, Dakar  
Ms Dromone Masiko, Food Aid Development Specialist, Food for Peace, USAID, Dakar  
Ms Sharon Pauling, Programme Officer, USAID,  
Liberia  
Mr Joe-Hoover Gbadyu, Economic Growth Office, USAID

**United Nations Agencies**

FAO

Dr Winfred N.O. Hammond, FAO Representative in Liberia  
Mr James W. Perlum, Assistant Representative/Administration

Office of the UN Resident Coordinator

Mr Jordan Ryan, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General  
Ms Malin Herwig, Special Assistant to the UN Resident Coordinator

UNDP

Mr Bakonam Sam, Deputy Regional Representative, Operations

UNHCR

Ms Monika Brulhart, Deputy Representative  
Ms Kate Makanga, Programme Officer

UNICEF

Ms Susan N. Ngongi, Deputy Representative

United Nations Mission in Liberia

Mr Andrea Tamagnini, Director, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Unit

WFP

Mr Louis Imbleau, Country Director  
Mr Taban Lokonga, Deputy Country Director  
Ms Rosio Godomar, Senior Programme Officer  
Mr Mohamed A. Gadir Musa, Senior Logistics Office  
Ms Claudia Ahpoe, VAM Officer  
Mr Brian Ahpoe, Finance Officer  
Mr Peter Van Orden, Field Security Advisor  
Mr Amos Ballayan, M&E Officer/ Reports Officer  
Mr Aaron Sleh, Pipeline Officer  
Ms Rita Johnson, Gender/Protection/SEA



Mr Sallieu Bah, Logistics Officer  
Mr Prince Roberts, COMPAS

Mr Solomon Lloyd, Logistics Assistant

**Non-Governmental Organisations/Cooperating Partners**

Action Contre la Faim

Ms Berengere de Penanster, Head of Mission  
Ms Alexandra Rutishauser, Nutrition and Care Practices Coordinator

ADRA

Mr Paul Lutke, Country Director  
Mr Jerry N. Doe, Programme Manager

ANDP

Mr Abraham G. Zhara, Programme Manager  
Mr Boima K. Johnson, Programme Officer

CRS

Mr Sean Gallagher, Country Director  
Mr Larry A. Doe, Programme Manager  
Mr Jasper Vande Reep, Programme Manager

ELWA Hospital

Ms Pate K. Chon, Programme Manager  
Mr Anthony Wallace, Programme Officer

Firestone Hospital

Ms Frances Morgan, Programme Officer  
Mr James S. Momo Sr., Programme Officer

LCL

Mr Mitchell E. Togbah, Programme Manager

LIURD

Mr Yusufu Kaba, Executive Director

LOAF  
Ms Cleopatra Watkins-Johnson, Programme Manager

MSF/B

Ms Marthe J. Dennis, Programme Manager

Norwegian Refugee Council



Mr Carsten Hansen, Country Director

Mr Zeljiko Todorovic, Project Manager  
Mr Mustapha Koroma, Programme Officer

Samaritan's Purse

Mr Kendell Kauffeldt, Country Representative  
Mr Edward T. Swaray, Programme Manager  
Mr Eleation T. Topor, Programme Officer

Save the Children (UK)

Mr Anteneh G. Michael, Programme Manager  
Ms Hilary Flumo, Programme Officer

Visions in Action

Mr Stephen Miller, Country Director  
Mr Nat Barnard, Deputy Country Director  
Ms Jamila White, Programme Manager, Lofa

## **Bomi County**

### **Government of Liberia**

Liberia Government Hospital, Tubmanburg

Mr Fatu H. Sheriff, Medical Supervisor  
Mr Davidson O. Rogers, Hospital Administrator  
Mr Muhammad M. Dukuly, Clinical Supervisor/Focal Point for HIV/AIDS, Bomi County  
Ms Jemit O. Paye, HIV Coordinator  
Mr Lysia M. Gray, Supervisor (SMU)  
Mr George B. Gooper, C.H.O.-TB

Eric Z. Zinnah Community Elementary School

Mr Ambulai Ambrose Corneh, Principal  
Mr Samuel D. Jallah, School Feeding Supervisor

Samuel D. Hills Elementary School

Mr Dabah Johnson, Principal  
Mr James D. Mambu, Teacher and Food Supervisor

Tubmanburg Accelerated Learning Programme

Mr Boalkai Zinnah, Principal

Beh Town Youth Education Training Centre

Mr Anthony S. Kamara, Head



## **Non-Governmental Organisations/Cooperating Partners**

(ANDP)

Mr Moses B. Fomba, Medical Supervisor  
Ms Evonne F. Jackson, Therapeutic Feeding Centre  
Elizabeth Doe, Nurse

### **WFP**

Mr Moses Ojota, Head Central Sub-Office

### **Bong County**

#### **Government of Liberia**

County Education Office

Mr. Joseph Kapu, County Education Officer

County Health Team

Dr. Jefferson Sibley, Chief of Medical Staff

J F. Clarke Kindergarten School

Ms. Nowai Kapu, School Principal  
Ms. Theresa Quannah, School Feeding Manager

N. V. Massaquoi Public School

Mr. Stephen Fredrick, School Principal  
Mr. Solomon Joe, School Feeding Manager

Phebe Hospital

Mr. Kerson Saykor, Hospital Administrator  
Mr. Victor Padmoore, Chaplain & Commodity storekeeper  
Ms. Marie Padmoore, Coordinator, PMTCT  
Mr. Anderson M. K. Flomo Sr., HIV/AIDS Counselor  
Ms. Belekula D. Jagbor, HIV/AIDS Counselor  
Ms. Dolo Lablah, HIV/AIDS Counselor  
Mr. Alphonso Koffa, Screener  
Ms. Esther Dymacole, Head Nurse  
Mr. Daniel M. Karbah, Nurse  
Mr. Wallace Tolon, Nurse



## **Non-Governmental Organisations/Cooperating Partners**

### Bong Youth for Development Agriculture Project

Mr. Mark Dowee – Project Chairman  
Mr. Arthur Bondo – CO Chairman  
Mr. Togbah Varpilah – Advisor  
Ms. Oretha Juwle – UNMIL/RRR Project Supervisor  
Mr. Allen Kromah – Reintegration Officer (LRRRC)

### Samaritan's Purse

Ms. Eleatian T. Topor – Programme Coordinator (Bong)  
Ms. Nessie Massaquoi – Field Supervisor  
Mr. Daniel F. Swaray – Reporting Officer

## **Grand Gedeh County**

### **Government of Liberia**

#### Residence of the County Superintendent

Mr. Christopher Bailey, County Superintendent

#### Office of the County Superintendent

Mr. Nyanbio Seoh, County Development Superintendent

#### County Education Office

Mr. Washington Gbeyon, Acting County Education Officer  
Mr. James Dweh, School Feeding Focal Person  
Mr. Samuel Seon, Statistician

#### County Health Team

Dr. Fred Amagashe, County Health Officer  
Ms. Martha Desuah, Nursing Director  
Mr. Nackey Kohn, Nutrition Supervisor  
Mr. Amos Duolo, Clinical Supervisor

#### G. Alphonso Gaye Foundation School

Mr. Nathaniel Nyanway, Vice-Principal

#### Myers Elementary School

Mr. P. Gaye Sarwuo, Principal  
Mr. James Dweh, MOE (School Feeding Focal Person)

#### MOA Seed Rice and Plantain Sucker Multiplication Centre



Mr. Lawrence Yarhe, District Agriculture Officer

Pokor Elementary School

Mr. Sampson Saydee, Principal

R. B. Richardson Community School

Mr. Shelton J. Seidi, Principal

Suah Memorial School

Ms. Annie Suah-Dennis, Principal

Toe Memorial Institute

Mr. Edward P. Nimley, Principal

Mr. William D. Monroe, Vice-Principal

Mr. Richard Cheyee, PTA Chairman

Toe Town Clinic

Ms. Agnes Sohn, MCH Supervisor

Zai Town Clinic

Mr. Patrick Dwayee, Registrar

Ms. Elizabeth Blawuo, Nurse Aid

### **Non-Governmental Organisations/Cooperating Partners**

Zuayah Swamp Project

Mr. John N. Goyee, Chairman

Mr. Alex Whyee, Assistant Secretary

Mr. Peter Cheyee, Secretary

### **WFP**

Mr. George Osoo, Head of Sub-Office

### **Grand Kru County**

#### **Government of Liberia**

Behwan Clinic

Mr Samuel J. Lee, Physician Assistant

Newakan Clinic

Mr Alfred Saydee, Dispenser



## **FSLI Participants**

Mr Isaac G. Nyeman, Sr.

### **Lofa County**

#### **Government of Liberia**

##### **County Education Office**

Mr B. Smallwood Davis, Assistant County Education Officer  
Bazigizia Public School

Mr John Sumo, Acting Principal  
Mr Watta Zayzay, Teacher  
Mr Massayan Jalah, ex-Principal  
Mr John Mawato, parent

Gorlu Elementary and General High School

Mr Sam T. Gleh, Principal  
Mr Buster K. Livingstone, Vice-Principal  
Mr Albert Kerkula, School Feeding Manager

Kolahun Central High School

Mr Michael L. Senesie, Principal  
Mr Dominic H. Malay, Vice-Principal

Kolahun Hospital

Dr Gafar Alawode, Project Coordinator  
Mr Michael H. Kesselley, Nutrition Coordinator

Mama Dukuly Public School

Mr Wilfred M. Sirleaf, Principal

### **Non-Governmental Organisations/Cooperating Partners**

Pentecostal Mission

Mr Peter Kolubal, OIC, Zenalormai Clinic

## **FSLI Participants**

Mr David Bliton  
Mr Morris Dukuly  
Mr Zayee Dukuly  
Mr Jerry Johnson  
Mr Mohammed Kommeb  
Ms Sando Laulah  
Mr Thomas Wulbah



**WFP**

Ms Josephine Foley-Koiwu, Programme Assistant

**Maryland County**

**Government of Liberia**

County Education Office

Mr Jacob H. Brown, Acting County Education Officer

Mr Abraham K. Dennis, District Education Officer, Harper District # 2

Mr Paul H. Dio Appleton, Sr., Logistic Officer

Cavallo Public School

Mr Sampson Woast, Principal

Ms Elizabeth Vithon, Teacher

Ms Beniton Collins, Teacher

Mr Nyema James, PTA Chairman

Pullah Public School

Mr S. Jefferson Howe, Principal

Mr M.L.C. Clark, Vice-Principal

Mr Benedict S. Stemn, Teacher

**United Nations Agencies**

**UNHCR**

Mr David Karp, Head of Field Office, Harper

Barraken 2 FSLI

Mr N'guesson Konan

Mr Marcellin Konan

Barraken 2 FSLI

Ms Roseline Appleton

Barraken Refugee Village

Mr Gmend Toh, Chef du Village

**WFP**

Ms Theresa Nyeka, Programme Assistant

**Nimba County**





## **Government of Liberia**

### County Health Office

Mr. Ernest S. Kennedy, Hospital Administrator  
Mr. Isaac B. Cole, County Surveillance Officer  
Mr. C. Paul Nyanzee, Community Health Supervisor  
Mr. John Momo, Nutritionist  
Mr. Elijah S. Beglac, Store Keeper  
Mr. James Nehmah, Assistant Store Keeper

### Gbanquoi Public School

Mr. Wonokay Yarkpah, Principal  
Mr. George S. Gondoe, Vice Principal  
Mr. Marvin Yeabo, Registrar  
Mr. Garziawon Willie, Teacher  
Mr. Pastor Paye G. Leelah, Teacher  
Mr. Jackson Kermue, Teacher  
Ms. Martina in Martina Suowah, Teacher  
Mr. Samuel M. Gaye, Teacher

## **Non-Governmental Organisations/Cooperating Partners**

### Karnwee Clinic

Mr. Rudeen Sandolo, Registered Nurse  
Ms. Esther Y. Barkpei, Midwife /MCH Supervisor  
Mr. Kelvin Gboe, Vaccinator

### MSF/Switzerland Clinic

Ms. Helena Weh-Johnson, MCH Supervisor  
Ms. Roseline Sahnduo, Assistant MCH Supervisor  
Mr. Joseph Yelemay, EPI Supervisor  
Mr. Brice Fleurang, Log/Administrator  
Mr. Joseph F. Wolobah, Store Keeper

### Saclepea Refugee Camp

Ms. Pandora King, Protection Assistant, UNHCR  
Ms. Karen Domah, Social Worker, Liberian National Red Cross  
Mr. Thomas Holder, Field Monitor, LRRRC  
Mr. James Deah, Field Monitor, LRRRC

## **WFP**

Ms. Bhawana Pradhan, Head of Sub-Office



## **River Gee County**

### **Government of Liberia**

Fish Town Demonstration School

Mr. Gabriel Jarsor, Vice-Principal  
Mr. Kennedy Geegbea, Teacher

Fish Town Health Center

Ms. Doris Saylee, Certified Midwife

Flewroken Public School

Mr. Joseph D. Bohlen, County Education Officer  
Mr. Aloysius S. Doe, Principal  
Hon. Jacob Q. Chea, Paramount Chief/PTA member  
Mr. Peter Doe, Town Elder/PTA member  
Mr. Sammie Tweh, PTA member

Pronoken Elementary and Junior High School

Mr. Alexander T. Tweh, Principal  
Mr. Andrew W. Tweh, Registrar  
Mr. S. Weah The, School Food Manager  
Ms. Janet Kocker, Cook  
Ms. Gbalee Tweh, Cook  
Ms. Cecelia Wesseh, Cook

Tweh Jaiklay Elementary & Jr. High School

Mr Joseph Bohlen, County Education Officer  
Mr. Anthony Chea, Administrative Assistant, Office of the County Education Officer  
Mr Napoleon McCarey, Ministry of Education  
Mr Joseph A. Chede, District Education Officer  
Mr Alfred T. Sackor, District Education Officer  
Mr James Jallah Toe, District Education Officer  
Mr Theodore T. Walker, District Education Officer  
Mr Edwina Massaquoi, Medical Mundal  
Mr James Manneh, Officer in Charge (NAFAPD)  
Mr Torpo T. The, School Principal  
Mr John Jarh, Teacher  
Mr Toe S. Keh, Teacher  
Mr Jericho Nyan, Teacher  
Mr Victor Ireland, Project Officer (CARITAS)  
Mr Eric Folee, Field Officer (Cede)



**Annex 5: Evaluation Mission Itinerary**

Sunday 2 November	Evaluation team arrives Monrovia	
Monday 3 November	Meeting with Country Director Briefing from Country Office Meeting with Ms Claudia Ahpoe, VAM Officer, WFP Meeting with SDC	
Tuesday 4 November	Meeting with Ms Rosio Godomar, Senior Programme Officer, WFP Meeting with ECHO Meeting with MOA Meeting with German Ambassador Meeting with USAID	
Wednesday 5 November	Meeting with MPW Meeting with MOH Meeting with UNHCR Meeting with FAO	
Thursday 6 November	Meeting with Mr Amos Ballayan, M&E Officer, WFP Meeting with UNICEF Meeting with Ms Claudia Ahpoe, VAM Officer, WFP Meeting with Ms Rosio Godomar, Senior Programme Officer, WFP	
Friday 7 November	<b>Bomi County:</b> Liberia Government Hospital, Tubmanburg Eric Z. Zinnah Community Elementary School Samual D. Hills Elementary Public School Tubmanburg ALP School Beh Town Youth Education Training Centre Return Monrovia	
Saturday 8 November	Meeting with Cooperating Partners: School Feeding Meeting with Cooperating Partners, Nutrition Meeting with LRRC	
Sunday 9 November	<b>Travel to Bong County</b>	<b>Travel to Lofa County</b>
Monday 10 November	<b>Bong County:</b>  N. V. Massaquoi Public School, Gbarnga City J F. Clarke Kindergarten School, Gbarnga City Bong Youth for Development Agriculture Project, Gbarnga City Samaritan's Purse, Gbarnga City Phebe Hospital, Suakoko County Health Team, Suakoko County Education Office, Gbarnga City	<b>Lofa County:</b>  Zenalormai Clinic Mama Dukuly Public School, Zenalormai Bazigizia Public School Kolahun Hospital Kolahun Central High School County Education Office, Voinjama
Tuesday 11 November	<b>Nimba County:</b> Saclepea Refugee Camp, Saclepea MSF/Switzerland Clinic, Saclepea Karnwee Clinic, Karnwee Town County Health Office, Sanniquellie City Johnny Voker Elementary School, Saclepea	Lofa County: FSLI Participants, Mementa Village Gorlu Elementary and General High School Gorlu FSLI Participants  Return to Monrovia



Full Report of the Evaluation of Liberia PRRO 10454.0

Wednesday 12 November	<b>Nimba County:</b> <b>Gbanquoi Public School</b> <b>Myers Elementary School, B'hai Bah Town</b> <b>Pokor Elementary School, Banna Town</b> <b>Toe Memorial Institute, Toe Town</b> <b>Toe Town Clinic</b> <b>Zuayah Swamp Project</b>	<b>Grand Kru County:</b> <b>Behwan Clinic</b> <b>Newakan Women Cassava Project</b> <b>Newakan Clinic</b>
Thursday 13 November	<b>Grand Gedeh County:</b> <b>R. B. Richardson Community School, Zwedru City</b> <b>G. Alphonso Gaye Foundation School, Zwedru City</b> <b>Suah Memorial School, Zwedru City</b> <b>MOA Seed Rice and Plantain Sucker Multiplication, Zwedru City</b> <b>Zai Town Clinic</b> <b>County Education Office, Zwedru City</b> <b>County Health Team, Zwedru City</b> <b>Office of the County Superintendent, Zwedru City</b> <b>Residence of the County Superintendent, Zwedru City</b>	<b>Maryland County:</b> <b>Wartaken Help Yourself (FSLI)</b> <b>Cavallo Public School</b> <b>Pullah Public School</b> <b>Barraken 2 (FSLI)</b> <b>Barraken 1 (FSLI)</b> <b>Barraken Refugee Village</b> <b>UNHCR, Harper</b>
Friday 14 November	<b>River Gee County:</b> <b>Flewroken Public School</b> <b>Pronoken Elementary and Junior High School</b> <b>Fish Town Demonstration School</b> <b>Fish Town Health Centre</b> <b>Tweh Jaiklay Elementary and Junior High School, Fish Town</b>	<b>Maryland County:</b> <b>County Education Office</b>  <b>Return Monrovia</b>  <b>Meeting with Mr Aaron Sleh, Pipeline Officer, WFP</b>
Saturday 15 November	<b>Return Monrovia</b>	<b>Meeting with WFP Logistics Unit</b> <b>Meeting with Mr Brian Ahpoe, Finance Officer, WFP</b>
Sunday 16 November	<b>Draft Aide Memoire</b>	
Monday 17 November	<b>Draft Aide Memoire</b> <b>Meeting with DSRSG</b>	
Tuesday 18 November	<b>Debriefing WFP</b>	
Wednesday 19 November	<b>Debriefing Donors</b> <b>Debriefing Cooperating Partners</b> <b>Debriefing United Nations Partners</b> <b>Debriefing Government</b> <b>Evaluation team departs Monrovia</b>	



**Annex 6: Ration composition for each activity of PRRO 10454.0**

Ration scale and commodities (grams/beneficiary/day)								
	Cereals (bulgur wheat)	CSB	Pulses	Vegetable Oil	Sugar	Salt	Total	No. Feeding Days/Month
Refugees	420	50	50	30		5	555	30
School meals	150		30	10		5	195	22
Girls Take Home Ration	833 (25 kg/month)			61 (2 kg/month)			894	30
FFW	2,000		400	125			2,525	25
FFT	200		60	25			285	30
TB patients	370	50	40	25	10	5	500	30
HIV/AIDS	700	300	375	150	100		1,625	30
Institutional Feeding	370		40	25	10	5	500	30
Therapeutic Feeding - children		100		30	20		150	30
Therapeutic Feeding - caretakers	420	50	50	30	20		570	30
Supplementary Feeding		250		25	20		295	30
MCH		250		25	20		295	30



**Annex 7: Food Insecurity, Child Malnutrition and School Enrolment by County**

Food Insecurity by County	Malnutrition rates among Children under 5		Total Proportion of Children 6 – 18 years Enrolled in School
	Greater than 60%	More than 10% wasted	
			Less than 60%
Bomi		Grand Kru	Grand Bassa
Lofa	Grand Gedeh	River Gee	Bomi
River Gee	Grand Bassa	Nimba	Gbarpolu
Grand Kru			
<b>Between 50 – 59%</b>	<b>8 – 10% wasted</b>	<b>40 – 45% stunted</b>	<b>60 – 70%</b>
Gbarpolu	Sinoe	Bomi	Margibi
Bong	River Gee	Grand Bassa	Cape Mount
Nimba		Bong	Nimba
Sinoe		Sinoe	
		Maryland	
		River Cess	
<b>Between 40 – 49%</b>	<b>6 – 8% wasted</b>	<b>35- 40% stunted</b>	<b>70 – 80%</b>
Montserrado	Margibi	Grand Gedeh	Montserrado
River Cess	Montserrado	Margibi	Bong
Grand Gedeh	Nimba		Lofa
Maryland			River Gee
			Sinoe
<b>Less than 40%</b>	<b>Less than 6% wasted</b>	<b>Less than 35% stunted</b>	<b>More than 80%</b>
Cape Mount	Maryland	Cape Mount	River Cess
Margibi	Bomi	Montserrado	Maryland
Grand Bassa	Lofa	Lofa	Grand Kru
	Gbarpolu	Gbarpolu	Grand Gedeh
	Cape Mount		
Source: CFSNS (2006)			





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