




World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation



*Full Report of the Evaluation of EMOP
10339.0/1: Assistance to populations
affected by conflict in greater Darfur, West
Sudan.*

Rome, December 2006

Ref. OEDE/2007/002



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The evaluation team visited Sudan for three weeks in August 2006. This document was prepared by the mission team leader, John Cosgrave, on the basis of the mission's work in the field, and on the preparatory research prepared for by the Office of Evaluation and the Feinstein International Center of TUFTS University

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in Darfur, in Khartoum and in Headquarters. A list of persons met can be found in Annex 2. The team would also like to acknowledge the input of the external Good Practice Review Groups in the development of the evaluation questions.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The team would particularly like to thank the Review Group members for their helpful comments: (listed in alphabetical order)

- Dr. Adam Elhag Ahmed
- Professor Ali Mohayad Bannaga
- Maurice Herson
- Tania Kelly
- Ted Kliest
- Larry Minear

Mission Composition

- John Cosgrave, team leader, Channel Research.
- Allison Oman, public health specialist and nutritionist, Channel Research.
- Adul Jabar Abdullah Fadel, national expert, Channel Research.
- Saad Ali Babiker, national expert, Channel Research.

The evaluation was managed by Jeffrey Marzilli of the Office of Evaluation, WFP.



Acronyms

<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
<i><5 MR</i>	Mortality Rate for children under five
<i>2004 EMOP</i>	EMOP 10339.0
<i>2005 EMOP</i>	EMOP 10339.1
<i>CDC</i>	Centers for Disease Control
<i>CMR</i>	Crude Mortality Rate
<i>CP</i>	Cooperating Partner
<i>CSB</i>	Corn Soya Blend
<i>EMOP</i>	Emergency Operation
<i>ESFNA</i>	Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment
<i>ESFP</i>	Emergency School Feeding Programme
<i>FAO</i>	Food and Agricultural Organisation (of the United Nations)
<i>FFR</i>	Food for Recovery
<i>FFW</i>	Food for Work
<i>FLA</i>	Field Level Agreement (signed by a CP with WFP)
<i>GAM</i>	Global Acute Malnutrition
<i>GFD</i>	General Food Distribution
<i>ICRC</i>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<i>INGO</i>	International Non Governmental Organisation
<i>ISO</i>	International Organization for Standardization
<i>kcal</i>	Kilocalories
<i>mn</i>	Million
<i>mt</i>	Metric tonne
<i>NGO</i>	Non Governmental Organisation
<i>SAM</i>	Severe Acute Malnutrition
<i>SFP</i>	Supplementary Feeding Programme
<i>SO</i>	Special Operation
<i>TFP</i>	Therapeutic Feeding Programme
<i>USD</i>	United States Dollar
<i>VAM</i>	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
<i>WFP</i>	World Food Programme



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1. Introduction

This independent evaluation examined the work of the World Food Programme Emergency Operation (EMOP) in Darfur in Western Sudan from April 2004 to December 2005. The purposes of this evaluation were threefold:

- *Accountability* not just to WFP's Executive Board and donors, but to the extent possible and practical, to beneficiaries and cooperating partners. In the discussions in Rome prior to the start of the fieldwork WFP's Office of Evaluation stressed that accountability should be the primary focus of this evaluation.
- *Guidance* for the operation. The complexity of the problem in Darfur, the size of the programme, and the wealth of lessons from previous operations all imply that external evaluation may be able to provide useful guidance.
- *Learning* from WFP's programme in Darfur, one of the largest WFP operations in its 40 year history. The evaluation should contribute to the knowledge base on food aid interventions in complex emergencies

This report does not present an analysis of the complex root causes of the conflict in Darfur, which may include:

- the increasing political marginalisation of Darfur within Sudan
- environmental stress with increasing population
- the effect of the changes to pastoral migration pattern and routes caused by the long running conflict in the south
- existing tensions between farming and herding communities

Neither does the report present any analysis of the motives for the actions of the international community in Darfur. These issues are not only well covered in other reports (Bairiak, 2004; Buchanan-Smith et al., 2006; House of Commons: International Development Committee, 2005; Young & Osman, 2006; Young et al., 2005) but are also very contentious. Accusations of "genocide" on one side are ranged against accusations of "neocolonialism" and a "crusader agenda" on the other. Deng (2005, p. 15) notes that for Southern Sudan, the very lack of consensus about the root causes made that conflict all the more intractable.


However, one issue for WFP is that, at the most simplistic level of analysis, the conflict left two broad groups in Darfur:

- The farming community, many of whom had been displaced by the violence, or denied access to their lands or other livelihood options by the threat of violence
- The nomadic herding community, who, while still able to move throughout much of Darfur, suffered indirectly through the loss of the mutually beneficial trading relationship they had previously had with the settled community

Before the outbreak of armed conflict in Darfur, WFP had a small operation there dealing with residual IDP caseloads from the conflict in Southern Sudan and support for some development programmes including food for education. WFP had also supported drought affected populations in North Darfur. The conflict in Darfur began in early 2003, leading to large-scale displacement in the second half of the year. The volume of documents posted on Relief Web referring to Darfur is an indicator of the changing level of interest of humanitarian agencies in the crisis there.



Figure 1: Number of documents about Darfur on the Relief-Web website.



WFP proposed the first large-scale emergency food response in a budget revision to EMOP 10048.2 (for Southern Sudan) that was approved in November 2003. This evaluation did not examine this EMOP as this had already been evaluated in the evaluation of EMOP 10048 carried out in 2004 (Broughton et al., 2004).

Table 1: Details of EMOP 10048.2 budget revisions with elements for Darfur

<i>EMOP</i>	<i>Main theme</i>	<i>\$mn</i>	<i>MT</i>	<i>\$/MT</i>
10048.2 BR2 Nov03-Mar04	Added 600,000 beneficiaries in Darfur to original South Sudan caseload	39.0	52,650	741
10048.2 BR3 Apr04-Dec04	Included 660 mt high energy biscuits for beneficiaries in Darfur	2.2	660	3,333
Planned Expenditure and Tonnage		41.2	53,310	773

As per the terms of reference (Annex 1) this evaluation concentrated on EMOP 10339.0 (2004) and EMOP 10339.1 (2005). Throughout this document the term “2004 EMOP” will be used to refer to EMOP 10339.0 and the term “2005 EMOP” will be used to refer to EMOP 10339.1. The 2004 EMOP was launched in April 2004, many months after the populations movements began, but prior to this access to Darfur was severely limited and it would not have been possible for WFP to mount a large scale operation¹.

¹ One reviewer suggested that as access only came about due to strong pressure from Donors and the United Nations, earlier pressure from WFP could have achieved earlier access. However this view overstates WFP’ influence as it is the Donors (through their resourcing) that determine where WFP acts rather than vice versa.



Table 2: Main details of the 2004 EMOP (10339.0) and its two budget revisions

<i>EMOP</i>	<i>Main theme</i>	<i>\$mn</i>	<i>MT</i>	<i>\$/MT</i>
<i>10339 Apr to Dec</i>	1.18 M beneficiaries exclusively in Darfur (part ration planned for post harvest)	99.4	107,959	921
<i>10339.0 BR1 Oct to Dec</i>	Provided full ration; increased beneficiaries from 1.18 M to 2.0 M due to poor harvest; augmented capacity	95.9	109,630	875
<i>10339.0 BR 2 Aug to Dec</i>	Provided blanket supplementary ration all for children under five years of age	8.5	7,104	1,197
Planned Expenditure and Tonnage		203.6	224,693	906
<i>Confirmed Contributions</i>		162.2	80%	
Actual Expenditure and distribution		126.8	126,583	1,002
<i>Actual as % of planned</i>		62%	56%	111%

The situation worsened significantly during 2004. Insecurity², the resulting increased displacement, and a poor harvest locally, all led to an increase in the number of beneficiaries. The EMOP for 2005 saw the number of beneficiaries rise to an eventual total of three and a quarter million.

Table 3: Main details of the 2005 EMOP (10339.1) and its two budget revisions

<i>EMOP</i>	<i>Main theme</i>	<i>\$mn</i>	<i>MT</i>	<i>\$/MT</i>
<i>10339.1 Jan to Dec</i>	Increased beneficiaries from 2.0 to 2.3 mn; ration now has 25gm sugar and 10gm salt.	438.2	453,216	967
<i>10339.1 BR1 Apr to Dec</i>	Increased cereal ration from 13.5 to 15 kg to compensate for milling losses and support markets; augment capacity.	28.9	31,608	914
<i>10339.1 BR2 Jun to Dec</i>	Increased beneficiaries from 2.3 mn to 3.25 mn and extended relief to remote areas	94.4	84,379	1,119
Planned Expenditure and Tonnage		561.5	569,203	986
<i>Confirmed Contributions</i>		481.5	86%	
Actual Expenditure and distribution		472.9	438,804	1,078
<i>Actual as % of planned</i>		84%	77%	109%

Both EMOPS concentrated on General Food Distribution (over 90% of volume), but also included Food for Recovery, Emergency School Feeding as well as Supplementary Feeding. However, almost all of the food was distributed via General Food Distribution.

The EMOPS were supported by a series of Special Operations (SOs) that ranged from augmented logistics capacity to running the humanitarian air service.

² Insecurity may increase the need for food assistance even where there is no displacement due to the restriction of livelihood. For example, people may not be able to cultivate their land at a distance from their village, or exchange their goods or labour.




Table 4: Special Operations in support of the 2004 and 2005 EMOPs (10339.0/1)

<i>Main theme of the Special Operation</i>	<i>Total Budget \$mn</i>	<i>Estimated Darfur Share \$mn</i>
<i>UNJLC 2004</i>	1.6	0.8
<i>Provision of Inter-Agency Security Telecommunication Network</i>	3.2	1.6
<i>Logistics Augmentation in Support of EMOP 10339.0</i>	35.4	35.4
<i>WFP Humanitarian Air Services - all Sudan, 2004</i>	11.5	5.8
<i>Logistics Augmentation in Support of EMOP 10339.1</i>	27.8	27.8
<i>WFP Humanitarian Air Services, all Sudan, 2005</i>	24.0	12.0
<i>UNJLC 2005</i>	2.8	1.4
<i>Augmentation of Libya logistics corridor, in support of Sudan EMOP 10339.1 and Chad EMOP 10327.1</i>	4.6	1.8
<i>Emergency Repairs and Upgrading of Rail and River Transport Infrastructure in support of EMOP 10339.1 and 10048.3.</i>	23.5	2.4
<i>Expansion of VAM capacity in support of WFP food aid operations in Sudan</i>	4.1	2.0
Total	138.4	91

Of the special operations, it appears that Darfur’s share was approximately \$91mn over the two years as a whole. It should not be forgotten that Darfur was not the only WFP area of operation in Sudan. There were ongoing operations in the South, in the East and in the transition zone in the centre of the country. Although the Darfur operation dwarfed these in 2005, operations in the South of Sudan especially also offered very significant logistics challenges.

Figure 2: Darfur and other WFP operations in Sudan



The scale of the WFP response in Darfur was exceptional. In terms of donations, logistics and tonnage it surpassed any WFP operation to date with approximately one sixth of all WFP expenditure in 2005 going on the 2005 EMOP. This evaluation concentrates only on the two EMOPs for Darfur, and does not deal, except peripherally, with the special operations supporting the Darfur EMOPs.

One important factor to bear in mind is that Sudan is an exceptionally difficult environment to work in. Not only do the geographical position of Darfur and the lack of infrastructure pose significant logistics challenges, but the continuing security concerns and the




government's distrust of the broader international community, as demonstrated by its unwillingness to see a United Nations force deployed in Darfur, also constrained operations.

1.1. The logistics constraints for the emergency operation

Darfur lies in the West of Sudan. The main port of entry is Port Sudan on the Red Sea, more than 1,500km from Darfur as the crow flies and it is over 2,000km by road from Port Sudan to WFP's field office in Geneina, the logistics node for Western Darfur.



Figure 3: Map showing the position of Darfur within Sudan.



The logistics constraint is not just the distances, but also the lack of infrastructure. There are no paved roads between Darfur and the rest of Sudan. The paved road ends 100km West of El Obeid. There is a rail link to Nyala, but this has suffered from years of underinvestment and consignments sent by rail were very slow. During the rains, access to many areas is impossible for trucks for as long as three months. The lack of transport infrastructure and the nature of the soils make logistics in Sudan very challenging. Only two of the three area offices have all-weather runways. The third, Geneina, only has a dirt strip which has to be closed even to helicopter flights in heavy rains.

A further constraint was the competition with the private sector for whatever logistics resources are available. Some parts of the Sudanese economy are growing quickly³ and WFP faced competition for trucking from the Merowe dam project and the oil industry.

The lack of fuel for all modes of transport and spare parts for local truckers also contributed to the logistics difficulties. WFP had to import its own supplies of aviation fuel to keep the air-lift operation running.

1.2. The security constraint


From the start security has been a constant concern for humanitarian agencies working in Darfur. While security improved between 2004 and 2005, Figure 4 shows that security

³ Sudan's GDP grew by 5.2% in 2004 and by 8.0% in 2005 (World Bank, 2006)



remained a significant concern during 2005 and the operational environment was challenging during EMOP 2005 as well as during EMOP 2004. Security concerns ranged from simple banditry to organised violence by groups wishing to control food aid.

Figure 4: Security incidents in the first 46 weeks of 2005 (remainder of year excluded due to lack of data).



These incidents include only those that came to the attention of WFP and UNDSS security officers, and probably only represent a small proportion of the total number of security incidents. Armed attacks or fighting were the most common security incident recorded representing over 30% of the incidents recorded. Many of these security incidents pose particular threats to WFP staff and the staff of Cooperating Partners and contractors, due to their having control of WFP assets, or needing to travel within Darfur.



Table 5: Types of security incidents logged by WFP security officers in Darfur in 2005

<i>Type of security incident</i>	<i>Number</i>
<i>Armed Attack/Fighting</i>	325
<i>Banditry</i>	99
<i>Looting</i>	87
<i>Abduction/Arrest/Detention</i>	75
<i>Rape and Harassment</i>	68
<i>Robbery</i>	58
<i>Killing</i>	44
<i>Ambush</i>	40
<i>Threats</i>	20
<i>Riot - Crowd Disorder</i>	17
<i>Corruption</i>	6
<i>Checkpoint</i>	4
<i>Other (including arson, extortion and actions by combatants)</i>	221
<i>Grand Total</i>	1,064

2006 has been even worse in terms of security for the humanitarian sector in Darfur, with much of Darfur inaccessible to humanitarian agencies by August. 2006 has also been marked by the deaths of a large number of humanitarian workers from both national and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

1.3. Government bureaucratic constraints

The Sudanese Government, like all governments, places a high value on its sovereignty and is very suspicious of the involvement of international agencies in what it regards as an internal matter. It is also a party to the conflict in Darfur and has a clear interest in controlling the international presence there.

In situations of internal conflict like Darfur, where the government is a party to the conflict and some areas are under the control of anti-government elements, national staff is at particular risk of being accused of supporting one side or the other, and staff from particular backgrounds may face conflict with beneficiaries or officials. International staff is therefore essential to maintain the appearance of neutrality of humanitarian action.

Until late March 2004 it was extremely difficult for international staff to get access to Darfur. Visas for Sudan were also an issue for NGOs. While these restrictions were partially lifted for the United Nations, NGOs still need travel permits to travel to Darfur, and visas are a continuing issue and greatly impacts on the capacity of NGOs. Importation of vehicles and communications equipment was also difficult for NGOs.

1.4. Limited number of cooperating partners

WFP normally works through cooperating partners, which are typically NGOs. There was a relatively low presence of NGOs in Darfur, except for a small number of agencies with



long-term development programmes in Darfur. This means that when WFP was expanding operation in Darfur, many cooperating partners were only setting up operations there for the first time.

The lack of an existing well-developed NGO infrastructure not only constrained WFP's actions, but it also placed large demands on WFP. WFP had to assist cooperating partners to overcome travel, visa, logistics, and customs problems, consuming valuable staff time. These administrative issues also slowed NGO deployment and limited WFP's choice of cooperating partners. The extent of the scaling up is illustrated by the changes in the numbers of staff working for international aid organisations in Darfur. This increased from 228 staff⁴ in April 2004 to 13,500 staff by August 2005 (United Nations, 2006, p. 5).

⁴ This figure includes both international and national staff and also includes support staff such as drivers, guards, and cleaners.





2. Methodology

The methodology used by the evaluation team consisted of four main methods:

- Research, largely centred about a collection of documents gathered by the preparatory study undertaken for WFP by Tufts University.
- Interviews with key informants in Rome and in Sudan including staff from WFP, cooperating partners, other United Nations Agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross in both Khartoum and Darfur, and a limited number of Government staff.
- Focus group meetings with beneficiaries in Darfur.
- Direct observation.

The team was very fortunate to have the benefit of the extensive preparatory work undertaken by Tufts University, including a field visit to Khartoum and Darfur by the Tufts team and WFP evaluation manager in late 2004. The report prepared by Tufts as a result of this work included a summary background and conflict analysis, a meta-evaluation of other recent Darfur evaluations, a stakeholder assessment as well as a summary of key issues for consideration based on field interviews with stakeholders from WFP Khartoum and El Fisher offices, the Government of Sudan, donors, WFP cooperating partners and beneficiaries, and Sudanese academic and civil society.

Interviews with key informants were a very important source of information for the evaluation. A list of persons met can be found in Annex 2. All interviews with key informants from outside WFP and meetings with beneficiaries were conducted without any WFP staff members being present. Interviewees were told that their comments would not be attributed to them by name, or in such a form as would render them identifiable.

Given the time lapse between the end of the 2005 EMOP and this evaluation, direct observation played a limited role in the evaluation. However, many of the circumstances of the EMOP remained the same and this allowed the team to identify some issues with logistics and with distribution practice.

2.1. The evaluation questions

The terms of reference offered a priority list of issues and a huge range of potential evaluation questions deriving from the Tufts preparatory work. The evaluation team reduced these to a series of 20 hypotheses about the WFP programme to be tested. The questions were developed on the basis of the terms of reference with input both from team members and from an external reference panel. The final version of the 20 hypotheses to be tested is presented below, and reflects the primary focus of the evaluation as a summative⁵ one with some formative elements.

⁵ Evaluations that are primarily meant to contribute to learning are often called *formative* evaluations, whereas evaluations for accountability are described as *summative* evaluations (Molund, Schill, & Sida, 2004, p. 13).



Table 6: Hypotheses tested by the evaluation

No.	Hypothesis
1:	The design, scale, timing, and scope of the EMOP and changes in it were proportionate to the changing levels of needs.
2:	The way in which the EMOP was implemented was appropriate for the needs of the affected population.
3:	The addition of sugar and additional cereal acted as an income transfer, met milling costs, and supported private markets in remote areas.
4:	WFP's food distribution complemented the interventions of other actors, including affected households, and was sufficiently coordinated with them.
5:	WFP interventions reached those who needed them and minimised leakage to those who did not.
6:	WFP's food basket met the food needs of those affected by the crisis including the principal vulnerable groups.
7:	The provision of food by WFP had a positive impact on the protection of the affected population.
8:	The various measures adopted by WFP reduced the food-aid pull factor.
9:	WFP took effective steps in its programme to take account of gender and of the risks of gender-based violence or exploitation.
10:	WFP took innovative approaches to maximise coverage in the face of severe constraints.
11:	The logistics system established by WFP, and the approach taken (airlift and own fleet) met the needs of the programme in a timely manner.
12:	The FLAs and distribution strategies adopted by WFP and its Cooperating Partners were appropriate and maximised the impact of food aid.
13:	The distribution of food items as an additional income transfer was more efficient than a mixture of food and cash would have been.
14:	Donor's funding policies were coherent with WFP mission.
15:	WFP's food operations were coherent with agreements with other UN agencies, with standards, and with WFP policy.
16:	WFP was able to monitor the effectiveness of its programme and inform managers in good time when changes were needed.
17:	WFP demonstrated learning in its Darfur operations.
18:	WFP structured the management of the Darfur emergency response to enable a rapid scale up and adequate support.
19:	WFP food prevented widespread nutritional distress and mortality in Darfur.
20:	Beneficiaries were reasonably satisfied with the assistance that they got from WFP.

2.2. Evaluation team constraints

The team encountered a number of significant constraints in undertaking the evaluation. The first of these was the same constraint that grips the whole of WFP's operations in Darfur – security. Security concerns meant that it was not possible for the team to visit as many sites as originally hoped, and prevented any visits to non-camp rural distribution sites, or to areas under SLM control.

The second constraint was simply that of timing. The field work took place in August, more than seven months after the end of the period under review. This meant that in some



cases, persons interviewed could not comment on 2004 and 2005 but only on their direct experience in 2006.

A third constraint was that the evaluation had a primary focus on accountability. Given that the activity evaluated had ended seven months previously, this limited the amount of evaluative guidance that the evaluation team could provide to the country office⁶.

The final constraint was that the evaluation dealt primarily with the two Darfur EMOPs and specifically excluded a full evaluation of the related special operations, despite their centrality to the Darfur operation.

⁶ Immediately before the field work, the Country Office requested that the evaluation be extended to cover the first six months of 2006, but this request was denied by the Evaluation Office as the evaluation contract had already been issued.






3. Hypothesis 1: The design, scale, timing, and scope of the EMOP and changes in it were proportionate to the changing levels of needs.

EMOP 10339 was a response to a rapidly changing complex humanitarian. EMOP 10339 took over from the Operation Lifeline Sudan EMOP (10048.2) which had two budget revisions covering needs in Darfur. Borrowing food from EMOP 10048.2 also allowed work to start on EMOP 10339.

The difficulties of planning work in Darfur can be highlighted by the fact that there is no generally accepted estimate for the overall population of Darfur. Although initial assessments were limited there were some (Anon, 2004; Bairiak, 2004; Brady et al., 2004; FAO/WFP, 2004; Osman, Suleiman, Bukhari, & Nour, 2003; WFP, 2004) carried out at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 which helped to guide the beneficiary number and general targeting of relief. WFP had the advantage of having the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment to draw on in preparing the 2005 EMOP (CDC & WFP, 2004).

Figure 5: WFP planning figures compared with the numbers of affected people reported by OCHA



WFP’s planning figures in the EMOPs and the budget revisions closely match (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.96) the estimates of total need made by OCHA as shown in Figure 5. Initially the focus was on displaced in IDP camps, but later both the host population and IDPs outside camps were also assisted. It should be noted that this is only an approximate figure as:



- The ICRC was also distributing food⁷ (to different populations⁸ and in close coordination with WFP).
- The number of beneficiaries accessible for assistance in any month varied with security conditions and, during the rainy season, with road conditions.

Nevertheless Figure 5 does show that WFP's planning was in line with the best estimates of the level of humanitarian need and sometimes anticipated increasing numbers. WFP changed its plans in response to the changing pattern of needs, and the budget revisions were largely appropriate.

During the period under review WFP had five strategic priorities:

1. Save lives in crisis situations.
2. Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks.
3. Support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people.
4. Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training.
5. Help governments establish and manage national food-assistance programmes.

Four of these were reflected in the 2004 EMOP and three in the 2005 EMOP as shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Objectives for the 2004 and 2005 EMOPs

<i>EMOP</i>	<i>WFP Strategic Priority</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Modality</i>
2004	1,3	Saving lives of conflict affected populations in the Greater Darfur region; through contributing to improving and maintaining the nutritional status of target populations with specific emphasis on women and children.	GFD, SFP, TFP
2004	2	Increased access to physical assets, knowledge and skills. Within the target communities in Greater Darfur region.	FFR
2004	4	Support continued access to education among IDP children and alleviate short-term hunger by providing meals under the Emergency School Feeding Program.	ESFP
2005	1,3	Saving lives of conflict affected populations in the Greater Darfur region; through contributing to improving and maintaining the nutritional status of target populations with specific emphasis on women and children.	GFD, SFP, TFP
2005	4	Support continued access to education among IDP children and alleviate short-term hunger.	ESFP

⁷ ICRC distributed 8,500 tonne of food in 2004 and 32,000 tonne of food in 2005 (ICRC, 2005, 2006). The ICRC tonnages were 6.7% (2004) and 7.3% (2005) of WFP's distributed tonnages.

⁸ ICRC focused on assistance to populations in rural areas. At the time of the field-work, ICRC was considering ending its food assistance project by the end of 2006, as its beneficiaries were either now served by WFP (IDPs) or no longer in need of assistance (settled populations). ICRC reported very close cooperation with WFP.



The 2004 EMOP document identified conflict affected persons as the primary target for the food assistance. The plan proposed that 91% of the total assistance be provided via general food distribution (GFD), with 4% for food for recovery (FFR) 4% for supplementary, institutional and therapeutic feeding programmes (SFP, IF, TFP) and the final 1% for an emergency school feeding programme (ESFP).

The 2004 EMOP also stated that 60 to 65% of the displaced were women, but no further breakdown was given by gender. WFP monitors did collect some data on gender at distributions, but in many cases families sent male members or hired male neighbours to collect food, even when the registered ration card-holder was female.

The 2004 EMOP documents present the objective of school feeding as to: *“Support continued access to education among IDP children and alleviate short-term hunger by providing meals under the Emergency School Feeding Program.”* In the 2005 EMOP the desired outcome is to *“Support continued access to education among IDP children and alleviate short-term hunger.”*

The logic in both cases was flawed. Firstly, IDP children should already be receiving a full ration and should hardly be suffering from *“short-term hunger”*. Providing them with a school feeding ration would have been a partial double-distribution. Secondly, providing school feeding to children would not have supported continued access to education among IDP children. The beneficiary focus group discussions showed that while education is a priority for the IDPs, children had no schools to go to. The main issue is the lack of access to education, not the lack of encouragement to attend. School feeding would not have been effective as an educational incentive.

A final issue is the needless complexity of the 2004 EMOP. It presented no less than six different rations scales (Table 12), three of which were identical. The 2005 EMOP (Table 13) sensibly reduced this to four ration scales.

3.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 1

The scale, timing, and scope of EMOP 10339.0 and 10339.1, including their various budget revisions, were largely proportionate and timely to the changing needs in Darfur. The number of planned beneficiaries reflected the best estimates of the scale of population in need, and WFP’s system responded quickly and effectively as those estimates changed.

While the design of the EMOPs was broadly appropriate they were overly complex, and did not fully reflect the situation on the ground in Darfur. The inclusion of Food for Recovery in the 2004 Darfur EMOP was understandable given the hope that IDPs might begin returning to their home in 2004. However the continuing crisis and the increasing numbers of IDPs made FFR inappropriate and it was appropriate to drop it in 2005.

Emergency School Feeding was included in 2005 as well as in 2004, but the logic of doing so was flawed. The experiences in 2004 clearly showed that ESFP was not relevant for the context in Darfur and it should not have been included at such a high level in the 2005 plan.



3.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 1

In future large scale humanitarian emergencies where there is a need for large amounts of food and limited partner capacity, WFP should focus its efforts (at least in the initial phases of EMOPs) on general food distribution and food for supplementary and therapeutic feeding.

WFP should state clearly what the objective of school feeding in any programme is, i.e. whether it is to encourage enrolment by girls, support child nutrition, promote the quick re-establishment of schools, or help pay for teachers.



4. Hypothesis 2: The way in which the EMOP was implemented was appropriate for the needs of the affected population.

There is a clear difference to the way in which any EMOP is planned and the way in which it is implemented. Any plan for such a volatile situation as Darfur may need to be revised, and this hypothesis looks at the appropriateness of the *implementation* of the plans rather than the appropriateness of those plans themselves as in Hypothesis 1. While the plans called for a range of food-aid distribution mechanisms, general food distribution was used to distribute almost all the food programmed in both 2004 and 2005.

Table 8 presents the planned and actual levels for both the 2004 and 2005 EMOPs. In 2004, close to 100% of the food went for general food distribution. Only 17% of the planned numbers of SFP beneficiaries were reached in 2005 suggesting that this accounted for less than 1% of the total tonnage distributed.

Table 8: Distribution Modality for WFP by percentage of tonnage planned or distributed.

<i>EMOP 10339 Food distribution modalities</i>	<i>2004</i>		<i>2005</i>	
	Planned	Actual ⁹	Planned	Actual
<i>Emergency school feeding programme (ESFP)</i>	1%		3%	0.1%
<i>General food distribution (GFD)</i>	91%	98.7%	92%	97.2%
<i>Supplementary Feeding programme/Institutional Feeding (SFP/IF)</i>	2.8%	0.5%	4%	2.7%
<i>Therapeutic Feeding (TFP)</i>	1.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0.04%
<i>Food for Recovery (FFR)</i>	4%			
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

FFR was effectively dropped between 2004 and 2005. This was sensible given that displacement increased rather than decreased over the period and that no FFR programmes had been implemented in 2004. The affected population was in no way ready to engage in recovery, nor even think about returning on any significant scale.

The Standard Project Report (SPR) for the 2004 EMOP explained that insecurity prevented FFR projects and that the priority given to general food distribution prevented paying attention to other ways of distributing food. This explanation is somewhat disingenuous. The reality is that GFD is a more efficient mechanism for distributing large quantities of food, in terms of cost, staff support, and partner capacity, than any other mechanism. In the early period of the emergency intervention the need to deliver general rations stretched WFP to the limit. Large-scale FFR or ESFP would have placed further stress on limited staff and non-food resources and the resulted in reduced numbers receiving basic life-saving support via a general food distribution.

While school feeding represented 700,000 children beneficiaries in the two EMOPs, it was not actually implemented in 2004 and only reached 3% of planned beneficiaries in 2005. While the inclusion of ESFP was understandable in the initial 2004 EMOP, it is difficult to

⁹ Note that these figures are approximate as they are back calculated from WFP reporting of beneficiaries rather than of metric tonnes.



see why it was planned for over one third of a million beneficiaries in 2005. School feeding was not an appropriate response in the context where children were not in schools because there were no schools available.

WFP provides food for therapeutic feeding programmes and goods and support for supplementary feeding programmes. In the case of therapeutic feeding, WFP just provides a logistics service to UNICEF and others. For supplementary feeding, WFP is completely dependent on having partners willing and interested in carrying this out. The increase in NGO capacity in Darfur is indicated by the rise of food for supplementary feeding from 0.5% of WFP's tonnage in 2004 to 2.7% of WFP's tonnage in 2005.

WFP concentrated on general food distribution. Throughout 2004 and 2005 WFP was effectively running uphill against a background of ever increasing numbers (Figure 5). Of the other potential modalities, supplementary and therapeutic feeding are only effective against the background of an adequate general ration, food for recovery was a non-starter, and ESFP was inappropriate for the reasons already explained.

While the biggest increase in numbers in 2005 was for non-displaced populations. WFP still gave first priority to providing a full ration in the IDP camps. This population has the least access to alternative livelihood, and depended more on food-aid than others did. However, WFP did not distinguish between the different IDP populations, some of which were far more reliant on food aid as a livelihood strategy than others.

WFP's operations in Darfur were constrained by staff numbers. In particular there was (and is) continuing difficulty in recruiting particular types of staff such as food monitors and national female field staff. Table 9 shows that WFP in Sudan had about half the number of staff per unit of resource compared to WFP field programmes in the rest of the world¹⁰. The ratio for Darfur specifically is probably even lower as only 28% of WFP Sudan staff worked in Darfur. Some of the remaining staff supported the WFP operation in Darfur, but others were supporting operations in Southern Sudan, including some WFP Sudan staff physically based in Kenya.

Table 9: Resources handled per staff member for Sudan compared with the rest of the World.

<i>Item</i>	<i>Sudan</i>	<i>Rest of the World</i>	<i>Unit</i>
<i>WFP expenditure in 2005</i>	684,970	2,207,431	'000 USD
<i>WFP staff in 2005 (excluding HQ)</i>	1,370	8,206	Persons
<i>Resources handled per head</i>	500	269	'000 USD
<i>Staff to resource ratio</i>	2.00	3.72	Persons per million US\$ of resources

WFP Sudan took the decision to prioritise maximising the flow of food into Darfur in order to assist the largest possible proportion of the affected population. The focus on maximising the numbers had a cost. It meant that WFP paid less attention to other aspects of the EMOP. WFP did measure overall nutritional impact through the annual Emergency Food Security Assessment, the implementation of the EMOPs – from a nutrition

¹⁰ Staff numbers for Sudan from (WFP, 2005b); Staff numbers for WFP globally from (WFP, 2006).



perspective – focused almost exclusively on maximising numbers reached through general food distribution (GFD). WFP Sudan placed very little emphasis on non-food causes of poor nutritional outcome (access to water, sanitation, and health care; hygiene practices, food use; and infant care practices).

Relatively few resources flowed through TFP or SFP. Both of these however depend on having partners who are willing to do such programmes. WFP only provides food alone for TFP, and food with some support for SFP. While WFP did employ nutritionists to work in Darfur, the supervision of the supplementary feeding programmes by partners was weak.

Giving greater attention to one aspect of the EMOP meant that there were fewer resources to attend to other aspects. This means that some of the laudable intentions expressed in the EMOPs were overlooked or implemented to only a limited extent. The corollary is also true, that had WFP given greater emphasis to the other aspects of the EMOP, this would have reduced the resources to attend to General Food Distribution.

4.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 2

The way in which the EMOP was implemented was largely appropriate for the needs of the affected population, and more closely matched the needs than the planned activity in the EMOP. The evaluation team concluded that WFP Sudan took a conscious decision to focus on general food distribution on the basis of the overall humanitarian needs. The team also concluded that general food distribution was clearly the most appropriate food distribution modality, and that the emphasis on giving first priority to the displaced in camps was correct.

The implementation of the EMOPs focused on some issues (such as the numbers reached) and placed less emphasis on others (such as HIV/AIDS, gender issues, nutritional impact, or monitoring). This meant that the prioritisation of maximising the proportion of the affected population served had real costs in terms of the quality of the operation. This is a complex issue and the evaluation team will present their conclusion on this below after the other hypotheses have been discussed.





5. Hypothesis 3: The addition of sugar and additional cereal acted as an income transfer, met milling costs, and supported private markets in remote areas.

The 2005 EMOP included an extra 25gm per person per day of Sugar. The first budget revision in 2005 implemented a recommendation made by the joint USAID/FFP/EU/WFP/FAO mission in February that the cereal ration be increased by 1.5kg per month to support the local market in cereals. The hypothesis discusses the impact of the sugar ration and then of the increased cereal ration.

Sugar has a special social role in Sudan, where people use large amounts in their tea. Because of its cultural importance, with people of every social class drinking tea, beneficiaries were selling cereal to buy sugar at very unfavourable terms of trade. Sugar is not a nutritionally interesting commodity, being effectively “empty” calories, but distributing sugar served to protect the nutritional value of the cereals which beneficiaries would otherwise have exchanged to buy sugar.

Table 10 shows the relative terms of trade for sugar to food-aid sorghum¹¹ in April and September 2005. It is interesting to note that in 2006, ICRC followed WFP’s example and introduced sugar into its general ration. In 2006 also WFP increased the sugar ration to 30gm.

Table 10: Amount of sorghum that can be bought by selling 25gm of sugar

	<i>Food aid Sorghum</i>		<i>Market price of sugar</i>		<i>Amount of Sorghum that can be bought for 25gm sugar (gm)</i>	
	<i>US\$/100kg</i>	<i>US\$/100kg</i>	<i>US\$/100kg</i>	<i>US\$/100kg</i>	<i>Apr-05</i>	<i>Sep-05</i>
	<i>Apr-05</i>	<i>Sep-05</i>	<i>Apr-05</i>	<i>Sep-05</i>	<i>Apr-05</i>	<i>Sep-05</i>
<i>North Darfur</i>	25.07	25.14	138.00	124.12	138	123
<i>South Darfur</i>	35.16	23.61	152.85	115.07	109	122
<i>West Darfur</i>	16.53	12.57	159.54	130.63	241	260
<i>Average for Darfur</i>	24.67	18.53	149.74	124.08	152	167

The 2005 EMOP offered the rationale that the sugar was a compensation for the energy loss due to milling of the cereal grains. Most of the cereal grain provided by WFP in Darfur was wheat or sorghum. Milling losses for most cereals are generally estimated at 5-10%. Sorghum normally has a higher milling loss of between 10 and 20%. The 2005 EMOP used a figure of 7% for milling losses.

Sugar calories did not completely compensate for the calories lost through milling¹², but the economic value of the sugar was more than the economic impact of milling

¹¹ Sorghum is used here for comparison as the EFSNA data is only for sorghum. In 2005 wheat formed the bulk of the food aid cereal distributed (82%).

¹² 25gm of sugar contains about 100 calories, calories lost in milling would have been in the range from 106 to 152 for a 7% to 10% milling loss.



Photo 1: Mixture of WFP wheat and local millet awaiting milling at ZamZam IDP camp

losses. However, there was no evidence that WFP Sudan ever made such a calculation. The fact that the sugar was worth more to the beneficiaries than the scale of their milling losses was a fortunate happenstance rather than a deliberate policy based on an analysis of the terms of trade.

The EFSNA survey found that sugar was consumed at the household level and was not sold. The sugar ration meant that people no longer had to sell their cereal ration to buy this culturally vital commodity.

However, milling losses are only a part of the story. Households also have to pay for the milling. The EFSNA showed that payment in-kind for milling was very rare and that two thirds of households sold food aid to pay for milling¹³. The quantities of cereal sold to pay for milling were very much more than the cereal losses.

Part of the reason why payment in kind for milling is rare may be that people normally mill a mixture of grains rather than a single grain (Photo 1). Beneficiaries explained that they used a mixture of grains as flour made without any millet would be too glutinous for the preferred traditional dishes, and used the other grains as they were cheaper. This also explains why food-aid recipients exchange food-aid to buy millet. However, it should be stressed that Darfur demonstrates a very wide range of food use practices and preferences, even within single regions, and what is true for one location may be false 20km away.

Prior to the crisis small-scale commercial millers were well established in Darfur. Households used the commercial millers rather than milling manually except for those in very poor or remote rural areas. Household milling was rare in the IPDs sites visited by the evaluation team. This may have been partly due to IDPs leaving their household milling equipment behind them when they fled. Household milling seems to be more common among those who are not displaced and in sites away from the main urban centres. Even near the urban centres, IDPs sometimes carried out some food preparation at home such as decorticating sorghum, or partially fermenting grain before milling.

Some traditional dishes require unmilled whole grains, and the need for milling depends on the grain. There are more traditional Darfur dishes that use unmilled wheat than unmilled sorghum. The very poorest households were reported to use unmilled grains exclusively, and beneficiaries regarded this as being an example of the direst poverty. Milling is the cultural norm and the majority of the aid cereal used by IDPs is milled commercially.

The 2005 EFSNA collected data on grain and milling costs in September 2005. Table 11 indicates that this cost ranged from 19% to 28% of the ration in September 2005. Beneficiary groups interviewed by the evaluation team suggested that the percentage of the cereal ration used to meet milling costs ranged from 20 to 40%, with 25% being the value most commonly quoted.

¹³ Other households presumably had other income to pay milling costs.



Table 11: Milling costs in Darfur in September 2005: Source EFSNA 2005 price data

Cost in US\$/100kg September 2005				
<i>Location</i>	<i>Grain</i>	<i>Milling</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	<i>% cereal ration which has to be sold to pay for milling the remainder</i>
<i>North Darfur</i>	25.14	5.82	4.3	19%
<i>South Darfur</i>	23.61	5.82	4.1	20%
<i>West Darfur</i>	12.57	4.86	2.6	28%
<i>Overall Darfur</i>	18.53	5.53	3.4	23% ¹⁴

Interviewees reported that there was a significant trade in food aid and food aid cereals were seen in the markets visited. The trade in food aid is confirmed by the ratio of the price of sorghum (which was provided as food aid) to millet (which was not provided as food aid). The ratio of sorghum to millet prices dropped from 0.85:1.00 before the conflict to 0.50:1.00 by February 2005. This change in price ratios occurred before the additional 1.5kg appeared in the general rations. Beneficiaries reported they used the additional cereal ration to meet additional household needs (i.e. to eat for more days in the month.) rather than for trading as originally envisaged.

The EFSNA in 2005 found that there had been a reduction both in travelling and permanent markets, and a reduction in cereal availability in such markets. However, this reduction was probably due to the poor 2004 harvest and the general security situation. While the markets contracted, this contraction may have been made less severe by the additional tonnage supplied in Darfur via the increased cereal ration.

5.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 3

The addition of sugar and extra cereal were positive and served as a useful income transfer, especially for IDP populations with very limited access to alternative livelihoods. However the calories in the 25gm of sugar did not replace the calories lost through milling, nor did the 50gm of cereal cover the cost of milling. Even so, the introduction of sugar into the ration was particularly useful as it enjoyed very favourable terms of trade against cereals.

The cost of milling is a major issue for beneficiaries, especially IDPs. The majority of grain is milled at small-scale commercial mills. Milling costs and losses consumed a good proportion of the WFP food ration and significantly reduced its nutritional value to the beneficiaries.

While food aid in general supported markets, the additional quantities provided under budget revision one to EMOP 2005 supported household food intake in general rather than markets in particular.

5.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 3

WFP Sudan should seek donor resources to support a subsidised milling programme to reduce the cost of milling to food aid recipient households in IDP camps.

¹⁴ This ratio changed throughout the year depending on the local price for cereals – it may have been less than 20% in April 2005 for example.



WFP should maintain sugar as a component of the ration, and increase the cereal ration to 15kg per person per month for IDPs with limited access to other livelihoods¹⁵.

¹⁵ The evaluation team note that the sugar ration for 2006 has been increased to 30gm per person per day, although a lack of resources means that in effect, sugar rations are far lower than in 2005.



6. Hypothesis 4: WFP’s food distribution complemented the interventions of other actors, including affected households, and was sufficiently coordinated with them.

WFP played such a large role in the Darfur response that it to some extent set the agenda. WFP was faster to set up than other UN agencies or even some large NGOs. This does not necessarily mean that the WFP response was fast enough in Darfur. Some sources have criticised the slow speed of response of the humanitarian system as a whole in Darfur (Miner, 2005, p. 77; Stevenson, 2005, p. 7). WFP was constrained by some of the same human resources constraints that affected other humanitarian actors (Loquercio, Hammersley, & Emmens, 2006, p. 6). These included the difficulty of finding appropriately qualified staff keen to go to Darfur, competition for suitable national staff, a lack of appropriate housing and working conditions.

WFP’s relationship with ICRC was particularly important as they were also distributing food. Although WFP was distributing food in (less than 10% of the amount that WFP was distributing). ICRC began operations in Darfur in October 2003. All those interviewed reported that there was a good working relationship between WFP

WFP’s cooperating partners were relatively slow to establish an effective operating presence (Broughton, ETC UK Ltd, & PDM Pty Ltd, 2005, p. 19). This issues will be dealt with below under Hypothesis 12. The slow start by cooperating partners and other UN agencies gave limited scope for complementary activities. Development of capacity by cooperating partners lagged behind WFP capacity for much of 2004, and reinforced WFP’s decision to concentrate on GFD

WFP did not broadly support complementary programming that could have enhanced the effectiveness of its food aid programs. These include projects in water point rehabilitation and creation, sanitation facilities, local milling initiatives, and enhanced support to fuel-saving stoves. Other agencies and UN organizations reported they would have welcomed WFP food support in the form of Food for Work and Food for Training to implement these programs.

WFP’s ability to coordinate its programming with others was limited by the overall low partner capacity and presence in the area. For instance, WFP sought partner projects that were outside the IDP camps in order to balance the services in between camp and non-camp populations. Unfortunately, there were very few actors developing such programmes, particularly among the non-camp populations.

WFP was also limited by the tools at its disposal. The bulk of interventions in water and sanitation during the period under review were in IDP camps, where the whole population was already receiving a full ration from WFP, limiting any potential role for WFP in supporting such activities.

Some donors complained that WFP did not always sufficiently coordinate activities with other United Nations agencies (such as FAO and UNICEF), and expressed an interest in better United Nations coordination that could maximize funding impact. However, it was not clear what level of coordination these donors expected or that any lack of coordination was solely the responsibility of WFP. WFP did provide food resources to “protect” the seeds distributed by FAO, it did invest in the annual multi-agency Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment, it did support registration, it did work with UNICEF to



promote iodisation of salt, and it did provide resources for UNICEF's therapeutic feeding programme.

A more serious issue is that of complementarity with the livelihood strategies of the affected households. There were five very broad categories of household. The first were displaced households in camps with very circumscribed access to their original livelihoods and the greatest need for food aid. The second were the displaced living the host community. The third group was those households who needed some food to replace their initial assistance to the displaced, and assistance to compensate for the loss of livelihood opportunities due to conflict. The last two groups were the settled and nomadic communities who had not been displaced, but whose livelihoods had been affected by the conflict. This analysis is very simplistic, as the circumstances of each group, and hence their access to different livelihood strategies varied from site to site.

The variability in livelihoods means that assistance should be varied to reflect the difference in access to different livelihoods. WFP did go part of the way in sponsoring research on livelihoods, but there was little research on what beneficiaries actually did with the food they received. More detailed knowledge of the priorities and strategies of the beneficiaries would have further allowed WFP to modify the GFD rations for different groups to better complement their livelihood strategies.

Even without detailed knowledge of the livelihood strategies adopted by each household, the way in which households use aid food indicates something about its relative importance compared with other livelihood strategies. In general, WFP food aid could have been more efficient and had a greater impact if WFP had known more about the household utilisation of food¹⁶. Such knowledge would have prompted better targeting and in some cases, adjustment of the rations for particular groups.

The sheer variability across Darfur of livelihood strategies, household food preferences and practices made it difficult to plan complementary household livelihood strategies. However, there were issues which were common across Darfur, including the high priority given to sugar and the high cost of milling. WFP did address the last two issues partially through the extra sugar and cereal, and through piloting the distribution of a small number of hand mills.

Two areas of WFP's activity that greatly complemented and even facilitated the work of other actors were the operations of the Humanitarian Air Service and the activities of the WFP security teams. Both of these activities allowed other agencies to work in areas which would have otherwise been inaccessible to them.

6.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 4

WFP was ahead of most other actors in deployment in Darfur. WFP played a key role in coordination and facilitation through the Humanitarian Air Service and the provision of security advice. WFP cooperated closely with ICRC and their food distributions were complementary.

¹⁶ Although the EFSNA in 2004 and 2005 did conduct some rudimentary research on food utilisation, and the post distribution monitoring also did some data collection there is no comprehensive picture of the utilisation of food aid at the household level.



However, the interventions of other actors that could have been assisted by WFP were relatively limited. Apart from seed protection and the registration, WFP has played a relatively small role in joint interventions. Lack of partners was, and the lack of partner capacity was partly to blame. However, WFP's policy of maximising the proportion of beneficiaries reached through GFD food flows to meet the needs of an ever-expanding caseload did not allow it to put more effort into promoting complementary activities.

WFP did not know enough about household food usage to intervene effectively to complement household strategies.






7. Hypothesis 5: WFP interventions reached those who needed them and minimised leakage to those who did not.

There are two aspects here, the extent to which WFP reached those who needed food, and the extent to which WFP avoided distributing to those who did not need it. In terms of overall tonnage WFP delivered about 56% of the planned tonnage in 2004 EMOP and 77% of the planned tonnage in the 2005 EMOP. At first glance this may not appear like a very good performance, but this does not taken into account the following factors:

- The necessary time lag between receiving funds or a pledge of food and the distribution of that food, or food purchased with those funds in Darfur (discussed under hypothesis 14 below).
- The constraints imposed by security.
- The slow start-up and limited capacity of potential cooperating partners.
- The very challenging lack of logistics infrastructure in Sudan and especially Darfur.
- The fact that the budget was not fully funded.
- The fact that WFP was trying to meet a constantly increasing target.

When all of these factors are considered, WFP's performance is really very impressive (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Actual distributions compared with the level planned in the EMOP



The November rise presumably reflects some double month distributions due to the approach of the holy month of Ramadan, and this probably resulted in the reduction in December. The fact that WFP was able to distribute nearly 60,000 tonne of food in 2005 shows how far capacity had been developed since 2004. In terms of beneficiaries reached the pattern is slightly different Figure 7.



Figure 7: Actual beneficiaries reached compared with the number planned in the EMOP






Figure 6 and Figure 7 both ignore the impact of the timing of contributions to the EMOP. This has a very important impact as contributions made in the second half of the year are unlikely to result in food being distributed in that year – this will be discussed further below in Hypothesis 14. Ignoring timing had the impact of overstating the potential volume and number of beneficiaries in these two figures.

Broughton (2005) notes that while WFP planned to conduct a “rigorous registration and verification exercise” from the outset of the 2004 EMOP it became preoccupied with delivering food. Essentially WFP Sudan faced a choice between concentrating resources on a rigorous registration exercise and beginning immediate food distribution in a situation with a very real and very obvious need for food¹⁷. This meant that WFP initially opted to risk inclusion errors¹⁸ in food distribution rather than suffer any delay. WFP Sudan put the humanitarian imperative ahead of other considerations.

One result was that rolls became inflated in some sites, leading to a determined effort, after much negotiation, to register the beneficiaries in 2005. Unfortunately the registration model chosen was quite complex with a great deal of data being collected (including village of origin, livestock losses etc.) The complexity of the registration data, and the involvement of the International Organisation for Migration, allowed those with a vested interest in the existing inflated figures to represent the registration as being a prelude to forcible return¹⁹.

Registration at camps near urban centres (which had the greatest number of “ghost” recipients) proved very difficult with registration exercises being disrupted in organised violence. Registration posed very real risks for staff (Box 1).

The end result of registration and head-counting exercises was very large reductions in the numbers of beneficiaries, helping to reduce inclusion errors in food distribution. However, continuing violence in Darfur has led to new displacement and the effort to avoid new inclusion errors has sometimes led to new arrivals being kept off the food rolls.

WFP has not been able to leverage the information gathered from the 2005 registration exercise into a comprehensive on-going registration and verification process that can

Box 1: Registration can be hazardous for your health

On July 8th 2005 an attempt to re-register El Geneina's 8 IDP camps was disrupted by violent groups armed with sticks, stones, axes and knives. The group appeared to be coordinated, appeared suddenly in most cases. They were thought to be connected to the group of sheikhs with excess ration cards.

Re-registration teams from various UN agencies and NGOs were forced to relocate from 7 of the 8 camps when violence with sticks and knives etc was directed at humanitarian workers. 12 humanitarian staff (including 8 women) were injured and two women were hospitalised.

The police supporting the registration but were unable to curb the violence. The African Union troops provide armed escorts through crowded areas to allow staff to leave the IDP camps.

One UN vehicle was badly damaged; another 6 UN and 2 NGO vehicles had windows smashed or body panels dented by the mob.

¹⁷ On 21 May 2004 MSF warned that in Darfur “There are already high levels of excess death and malnutrition and the whole population is teetering on the verge of mass starvation” (MSF Holland, 2004).

¹⁸ Inclusion errors are where those who don't need food are included in the distribution rolls. Exclusion errors occur where those who need food are excluded.

¹⁹ Those opposed to registration pointed to the IOM's name as proof that forced migration was planned.



inform policy on new arrivals. The evaluation team found large differences in the way that new arrivals were handled by different partners. In some cases genuine new arrivals have not got the assistance they needed, in others they have not (Box 2). In practice the treatment of new arrivals is very dependent on the quality of both the agency managing the camp and of the cooperating partner managing the distribution. When both work well, new arrivals have the least problems.

WFP has extensive experience of serving IDP in emergencies, but the problems with registration in Darfur suggest that this experience has not been turned into institutional knowledge. Registration is obviously a broader issue for WFP as it is a problem in more places than Darfur. An extra 4,000 ration cards (with five beneficiaries each) in Darfur can cost a \$1mn to service, so registration is clearly a critical area for ensuring the effectiveness of WFP operations. Prior to the re-registration and head-counting exercises in 2005, inclusion errors in some of the camps near urban centres were over 40%.

Another aspect of implementation is the ability to appropriately target the food aid to vulnerable groups. While extensive assessments were carried out in late 2003 and early 2004, VAM was less able to influence distribution sites and policies in 2005.

Like many aspects of the program, continual recruitment problems meant that the VAM units differ from area to area in terms of competency, targeting and effectiveness. They were often constrained by security and access issues.

In North Darfur, VAM unit works with OCHA and other agencies in interagency assessments as high security risks prevent independent operation. Coverage in 2004 was fairly good for assessments, very few areas that couldn't be reached. North Darfur VAM unit was ahead of the other Darfurs in these types of assessments, and began doing rapid assessments for food relief with partners in mid-2005. The North Darfur VAM unit was able to assess both IDP and resident areas and would determine level of need and make recommendations back to Khartoum on whether an area needed no support, 50% ration support or full ration support.

In South Darfur, the VAM unit works closely with FAO and WFP security and is able to do assessments as needed, though there are areas of South where comprehensive assessments have not yet been done to security, access and human resources. In West Darfur the VAM unit has undergone staffing changes and now has an extremely strong unit, but that was not always the case and of all three areas, West Darfur is the most inaccessible with only in/out helicopter missions available in many areas.

Box 2 Waiting for Registration

In Durti Camp, West Darfur there is a caseload of fifty families who have waited for over three months to enter the distribution list. For the last 120 days they have lived by begging food from other in the camps to share their food aid.

Unhappy to burden the others any longer, a group of them decided in August to return home in order to cultivate their own land. The other IDPs told them not to go because of the danger, but they preferred the risk to begging for food from the other families.

On the way they were attacked and badly beaten by the *janjaweed*. They have now returned to the camp and await a decision on their IDP status. This group is not unique, in other camps also, beneficiaries raised the issue of unregistered families who lived by begging from the registered.

However, the situation varies from camp to camp. Those arriving from other locations with ration cards have the least problems. Those arriving without ration cards from areas that were being served take the longest to check, as their data is compared with the original distribution lists.

Not all claimants are genuine and some are just people from outside the camp or IDPs trying to get a second ration. While one can understand the reluctance of WFP to allow a return to the over registration of early 2005, there does appear to be a lack of a clear policy on dealing with new arrivals from areas which did not previously have assistance.



However, the lack of comprehensive and timely assessments hampered the programs ability to undertake informed and ongoing targeting. Lack of targeting risks both high inclusion and exclusion rates that can decrease the impact of the food aid on the beneficiaries and lead to program ineffectiveness.

7.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 5

WFP opted for a policy to risk high inclusion rates to minimise exclusion. WFP's interventions largely reached those who needed them. Leakage was minimised in 2005 after the start of registration and head-counts.

Registration for camps near urban centres has been very difficult and there are outstanding issues about the registration of new arrivals. WFP has a fundamental responsibility to ensure that beneficiaries are correctly registered both to ensure that inclusion, and especially exclusion errors are minimised. In Darfur, WFP concentrated on minimising exclusion errors, but the high level of inclusion errors in the initial response.

The targeting of assistance through vulnerability analysis and mapping have varied across the Darfurs.

7.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 5

WFP should develop a registration system (be it simple or complex) suitable for use in emergencies like Darfur. Such a system should include a full set of guidelines, protocols forms, software tools etc.

WFP Sudan should develop a clear policy on new arrival verification and emergency ration distribution to ensure that new arrivals at camps in Darfur promptly receive the food assistance they need.





8. Hypothesis 6: WFP's food basket met the food needs of those affected by the crisis including the principal vulnerable groups.

The food basket developed for the Darfur crisis was generally appropriate in 2004 and improved in 2005 with the addition of sugar and (in March) increased cereal. As noted above, the 2004 EMOP contained six different rations. Nearly 99% of food was distributed via the general food distribution modality in 2004.

Table 12: Ration scales from the 2004 EMOP

<i>Ration element</i>	<i>General Distribution</i>	<i>Therapeutic Feeding</i>	<i>Supplementary Feeding</i>	<i>Food for Recovery</i>	<i>School Feeding</i>	<i>Institutional Feeding</i>
<i>Cereals (gm)</i>	450	-	-	450	150	450
<i>Pulses (gm)</i>	50	-	-	50	30	50
<i>Vegetable Oil (gm)</i>	30	15	20	30	20	30
<i>Salt (gm)</i>	5	5	-	5	5	5
<i>Corn Soya Blend (gm)</i>	50	150	200	50	-	50
<i>Sugar (gm)</i>	-	-	20	-	-	-
<i>DSM (gm)</i>	-	80	-	-	-	-
<i>Total (gm)</i>	585	250	240	585	205	585
Nutrition Value:						
<i>Kcal (gross)</i>	2,130	991	937	2,130	803	2,130
<i>Proteins (gm)</i>	69	56	36	69	23	69
<i>Fat (gm)</i>	47	25	32	47	23	47

In 2005 (Table 13) DSM was dropped from therapeutic feeding. Salt was increased to 10gm per person per day, because of concerns about Iodine Deficiency Disease²⁰. Sugar was added to compensate for some milling losses and to increase ration kilocalories. By March, the additional 50gm per person per day of cereal was added to the general ration.

The inclusion of Corn Soya Blend or a fortified blend in the general ration was particularly important because of the impact this has on the nutritional quality of the ration, and the fact that it is a particularly appropriate food for young children.

²⁰ Iodised salt is the best prophylaxis for iodine deficiency on a population level.



Table 13: Ration scales for the 2005 EMOP

<i>Ration element</i>	<i>General Food Distribution</i>	<i>Therapeutic Feeding</i>	<i>Supplementary Feeding</i>	<i>Food for Recovery</i>	<i>Revised General ration from March</i>
<i>Cereals (gm)</i>	450	-	-	150	500
<i>Pulses (gm)</i>	50	-	-	30	50
<i>Vegetable Oil (gm)</i>	30	15	20	20	30
<i>Salt (gm)</i>	10	-	-	-	10
<i>Fortified Blend (gm)</i>	50	100	200	-	50
<i>Sugar (gm)</i>	25	10	20	-	25
<i>Total (gm)</i>	615	125	240	200	665
<i>Nutrition Value:</i>					
<i>Kcal (gross)</i>	2,226	553	1,017	731	2,400
<i>Proteins (gm)</i>	70	18	36	23	81
<i>Fat (gm)</i>	47	21	32	21	41

Nutritionally the 2005 ration was superior to the 2004 rations because it contained a higher level of essential micronutrients (Table 14). The rations scales do not reflect the full range of rations, as WFP also used variants such as half rations and double half rations.

Table 14: Nutritional analysis of the EMOP 2004 and EMOP 2005 food baskets

<i>2004 EMOP ration</i>			<i>2005 EMOP (Budget Revision 1) ration</i>		
<i>Nutritional Analysis</i>			<i>Nutritional Analysis</i>		
<i>Micronutrients</i>	<i>(% of recommended level)</i>		<i>Micronutrients</i>	<i>(% of recommended level)</i>	
<i>Calcium</i>	53%		<i>Calcium</i>	56%	
<i>Riboflavin</i>	72%		<i>Riboflavin</i>	77%	
<i>Vitamin C</i>	86%		<i>Vitamin C</i>	86%	
<i>Energy</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Recommended</i>	<i>Energy sources</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Recommended</i>
<i>Total kilocalories (gross)</i>	2,123	2,100	<i>Total kilocalories</i>	2,390	2,100
<i>Energy from Protein</i>	12.9%	10-12%	<i>Energy from Protein</i>	12.3%	10-12%
<i>Energy from Fat</i>	19.9%	17%	<i>Energy from Fat</i>	18.2%	17%

On the surface, the 2005 ration was very generous, however, when one considers the impact of milling costs and losses the rations are far less attractive (Table 15).




Table 15: The impact of milling costs and losses on the 2004 and 2005 rations

2004 EMOP ration					2005 EMOP (Budget Revision 1) ration				
Commodity	Notional values		Milling cost and loss ²¹		Commodity	Notional values		Milling cost and loss	
	Gm per day	kcal	Less Cost	Less Loss		Gm per day	kcal	Less Cost	Less Loss
Oil	30	255	255	255	30	255	255	255	
Cereal	450	1,485	1,143	1,063	500	1,650	1,271	1,182	
CSB	50	190	190	190	50	190	190	190	
Sugar	0	0	0	0	25	100	100	100	
Salt	5	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	
Pulses	50	170	170	170	50	170	170	170	
Totals	585	2,123	1,758	1,678	665	2,390	2,089	1,992	
Sphere minimum		2,100							

The combination of milling losses and costs consume over one-quarter of the cereal ration. We discovered that in some camps food-aid recipients have to pay 7 to 15% of their cereal ration to the Sheiks to cover the “costs” of transport from the delivery point to the distribution site, guarding the food overnight, and the service of the sheiks.

Figure 8 shows two scenarios: the first where the beneficiaries receive their full ration and the second where they have to pay part of their ration to cover the “costs” of distribution.

Figure 8: Impact of milling cost and losses on the cereal ration



²¹ Milling costs taken as 23%, with milling losses at 7% of the milled amount.




Where people had to pay for “porterage” this reduce that the notional 2,123kcal²² ration for the 2004 EMOP really to only 1,468kcal²³ per person per day at the household level. Even the generous 2,390kcal ration under the first revision of the 2005 EMOP falls to 1,663kcal per person per day if beneficiaries have to pay 15% of the cereal ration for “porterage”.

The team considered that the charges for porterage etc. fell into the responsibility of WFP’s cooperating partners as the management of the distribution was their responsibility. However, it was clear that WFP monitoring had not been effective in highlighting this issue early enough. The impact of milling costs and losses is a critical issue for populations in camps as they have very little access to any income other than the general food distribution.

A further negative impact on nutrition was the lack of a complete ration basket. During 2004 EFSNA, it was found more than 50% of households were missing oil, pulses and CSB from the distributions they received in September 2004. Figure 9 shows the level of kilocalories distributed per beneficiary served.

Figure 9: Kilocalories per beneficiary assisted in Darfur (based on distribution returns)




²² The EMOP quotes a kcal figure of 2123kcal which is the energy value with sorghum as the cereal. Using wheat reduced the energy value of the ration to 2100kcal.

²³ In the report we have followed the usual WFP practice in taking a month as a standard 30 days and ignored the reduction of 1.44% in ration values due to the real average month length (30.44 days).



Figure 10: Shortfalls in different commodities in 2004 to 2005 (based on distribution data)



Gaps in the food basket sometimes arise through pipeline breaks. When there are gaps in the food basket, WFP has guidelines for temporarily substituting foods missing in the general ration with other commodities in order to preserve the energy and protein content of the ration (Table 16). These guidelines were often not applied in 2004 because WFP was struggling to reach the overall targets and had shortfalls sometimes across five out of six items in some months as for August 2004 (Figure 10). In 2004, the missing commodities were an unfilled gap in the food basket.

Table 16: Guidelines for substituting missing commodities

<i>Commodity Substitution Guidelines</i>	<i>Replacement Ratio</i>
<i>Blended Food for Beans</i>	1:1
<i>Sugar for Oil</i>	2:1
<i>Cereal for Beans</i>	2:1
<i>Cereal for Oil (but not oil for cereal)</i>	3:1

The 2005 EFSNA noted that WFP had greatly improved the food basket delivery and most beneficiaries received most commodities most of the time. This was supported by the distribution data for 2004 for 2005 (Figure 10), although sugar was a problem for the first five months. In 2005 also WFP also substituted commodities when necessary. In 2005 WFP even experimented with airdropping oil, a very difficult process, in order to ensure the beneficiaries received the full caloric value of the ration.

Despite these efforts, poor distribution practice often led to beneficiaries receiving less than their due even before the cost of milling is taken into account. However good a ration is on paper, it must still be delivered and distributed to meet household food needs. WFP succeeded impressively on the first two points, but were less able to accomplish the third



key aspect of food delivery due to poor distribution practice by cooperating partners. The lack of effective monitoring both of partner performance and the nutritional impact of the rations meant that problems around the cost of milling and poor distribution practices were not being flagged up for management action.

One further factor reducing the ration consumed at the household was the failure to quickly register new arrivals in some camps. Beneficiaries at different sites repeatedly confirmed that such new arrivals supported themselves by begging food from those receiving rations, especially during distribution days. Some beneficiaries complained of the impact that the social obligation to support the new arrivals with food had on their own rations.

Vulnerability to gaps in the food basket is obviously higher for those who are almost completely reliant on food-aid as is the case with some encamped populations who are unable to move outside the camp for security reasons. WFP made no distinction between groups on this basis, other than a general priority for meeting the needs of IDPs first. However, some IDP populations have more access to other livelihood strategies and were less dependent on food aid as a result.

Beneficiaries seemed satisfied with the individual commodities that make up the ration basket. While millet is the preferred cereal, wheat, sorghum or a sorghum/wheat mix is very welcome. The pulses provided are palatable and accepted. The salt and sugar are both highly valued items and the only complaint is that the amount is small. In terms of oil, most beneficiaries strongly preferred the variety that was predominant to the current one. Across the board beneficiaries preferred the oil in the plastic jerry cans both due to taste as well as the added usefulness of the plastic jug. The corn-soya blend (CSB) was discussed at length with both donors and beneficiaries and is worth discussing in some detail.

CSB, nutritionally, is an essential part of the emergency ration. CSB offers half of the vitamin A and all of the vitamin C available in the ration basket. It also represents approximately 20% of the calcium and 16% of the protein in an average basket. CSB is the most appropriate food in the basket to feed to young children and makes a suitable weaning and first food for children who have begun to introduce solids into their diets.

CSB is a very cost-effective method of bringing in key micronutrients and relatively cheaper than, for example, offering fresh orange juice to provide vitamin C as was done in one recent crisis. In micronutrient deficient populations, it is essential that something is provided to make up for the micronutrient gaps, and there are not a large variety of options. While iodisation of salt is feasible and was supported by WFP, direct fortification of flour at the milling point is currently unrealistic for Darfur. Mass supplementation is not feasible given the access and security issues.

The current micronutrient powder sachets being piloted in South Darfur are a possibility in the future, but this was not an available option in 2004 when the crisis response began. Mass movement of fresh fruits and vegetables is a highly unrealistic and costly option. Therefore, given the population has suspected micronutrient deficiencies, given the need for an acceptable food to feed young children, CSB is without doubt the best option.

Beneficiary ranking and use of CSB was directly related to the level of information they had received about the product. The evaluation team found that where CSB education and information campaigns have been conducted the household interest in and value placed on CSB was very high. In two beneficiary group interviews, CSB was ranked above oil and pulses in terms of use and priority, and no beneficiary group placed CSB as the lowest



ranked commodity. CSB has now become the breakfast food for most beneficiary households. CSB is also considered to be a children's food, which reduces its market value compared to "adult" foods and encourages its consumption at the household level.

The evaluation team encountered some anti-CSB claims by cooperating partner staff, but in no case were these supported by evidence or by the beneficiaries interviews conducted. One problem that was highlighted by beneficiaries is that there have been times where CSB was distributed with a very sharp and unpleasant taste, presumably due to the CSB being old or rancid. In at least one case this was due to a cooperating partner failing to observe the first-in first-out rule with distribution commodities. CBS is a milled food and is more susceptible to insect and pest attack than the other items in the food basket. However the nutrition advantages it brings justify careful management so that beneficiaries receive a nutritionally better diet.

8.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 6

The food basket as notionally designed was reasonable and would have met the food need of the affected populations, especially in 2005. However, WFP did not make adequate allowances for milling charges or provide an alternative. This significantly reduced the calorific and nutritional value of the ration.

The food basket as designed also suffered from the "portage" and other costs being levied at some sites. While WFP did a very good job at getting food to Darfur and sending it out to the distribution sites, the distributions have been less well managed. This issue will be addressed further in Hypothesis 13 below.

No particular priority was given to those who were almost wholly dependent on food aid. An effective monitoring system could have highlighted which beneficiary groups were more vulnerable to gaps in the food baskets.

WFP were not able to implement an effective monitoring system that could systematically call their attention to problems with distribution such problems where they existed. The end result was that, the caloric value of the ration that the household actually 'consumed' ration was significantly less than WFP appreciated or reported. This was a particular issue for those almost wholly dependent on food aid.

WFP's performance in terms of substitution of missing commodities improved from 2004 to 2005, but was still not comprehensive.

8.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 6

WFP should adopt a more comprehensive and objective measurement, monitoring and reporting regimen for 'rations'. This should reflect (a) what is notionally intended, what is delivered to the FDP, and what is actually available for consumption by the beneficiary. In other words, WFP needs to monitor the net nutritional value of what beneficiary households receive, not just the tonnage of food distributed.

WFP needs to monitor all aspects of the food operation, including the performance of partners. WFP especially needs to monitor the net nutritional value of the food that households receive and not just the tonnage of food distributed, or the notional ration levels.



WFP should introduce a formal requirement to report on ration-basket shortfalls, and especially the reasons why commodities are not substituted in accordance with WFP's guidelines.

When dealing with shortfalls or limited resources, WFP should give priority to groups that are more dependent on food aid. Monitoring systems need to be sufficiently sensitive to identify which populations are most dependent on food aid.

WFP Sudan should carry out a sensitisation campaign on the nutritional usefulness of CSB so that beneficiaries get the greatest advantage from this product.



9. Hypothesis 7: The provision of food by WFP had a positive impact on the protection of the affected population.

Protection in this instance refers to protecting populations from human rights abuses. There are two other broader senses of the term protection, related to the protection of the right to life through humanitarian assistance, and to protecting the safety, dignity and integrity of populations that humanitarian agencies are working with. WFP does not specifically recognise any of these three definitions (human rights, right to live, or safety with dignity) in either policy or guidance.

The team compared the pattern of security incidents (Figure 4) with WFP distributions for the first six months of 2005 (1,444 distributions and 166 security incidents). However, no clear pattern linking distributions with security incidents could be seen. It was clear that the logged security incidents did not represent the whole picture and the need to have someone present who could log and report the incident confounded whatever underlying patterns there might have been.

It was very clear from conversations with beneficiaries that beatings, rapes, and other forms of harassment are continuing throughout Darfur, and the team interview some recent victims. Protection from such abuse is not an abstract academic idea but a real issue in Darfur.

There are four issues here:

- Did the distribution of food aid make beneficiaries targets and have a negative impact on their protection?
- Did the increased international presence implicit in WFP's operation have an impact on the protection of the affected population?
- Did the resources provided by WFP limit the needs of beneficiaries to undertake risky livelihood strategies?
- Did WFP's operation help to ensure the most basic human right of all, the right to life? This is discussed below under Hypothesis 19, and won't be addressed further here.

Beneficiaries interviewed reported that receiving food aid did not make them targets for attack, and felt that this was generally unlikely. Beneficiaries pointed out that livestock rather than food stocks were the main target for looting in attacks on villages.

Some non-WFP interviewees suggested that focus on providing assistance to the settled community (based on need) played a role in increased banditry and unrest. This is true in South and West Darfur where nomadic groups have felt specifically excluded from the WFP ration distribution. Interviewees accepted that food needs among the nomadic groups were far less. Some agencies reported dealing with the problem of the ill feeling created by providing food to settled communities alone through simultaneously providing the nomadic community with non-food assistance such as animal-health services, or water sources.

There was general agreement among all the people interviewed that the greater international presence associated in part with WFP's programme had contributed to their protection, through the ability of external actors to report what they has witnessed. WFP also supported protection through providing training in protection for humanitarian staff and through pressing for firewood patrols by the African Union troops.



It was also clear that without WFP food, people in camps especially would have been forced to undertake activities such as collecting firewood or grass for sale more often. Such livelihood activities put people at risk, and there was general agreement among those interviewed that WFP's assistance has helped to protect the population by providing an alternative source of income.

While providing a good general ration has a protective impact through limiting the need for IDPs to undertake risky livelihood strategies, the converse is also true – reducing rations due to pipeline gaps or food basket changes has a negative impact on the protection of populations.

The food basket at a notional 2,100kcal per person after milling losses is not enough to support a family. Families have other costs such as firewood, education, clothing, medicine, and social obligations. The 2,100kcal ration is particularly inadequate when one considers the impact of both milling costs and of occasional gaps in the food basket. People support their families by engaging in petty trading, sale of labour, firewood collection and other activities to fill in the gaps, but may face particular risks when doing so.

Unfortunately the protective impact of food-aid is not formalised within WFP as a whole, and there are no special ration guidelines for protection. WFP's targeting of food aid in Darfur made little distinction between the levels of risk faced by different populations, other than the general policy of giving priority to IDP camps.

9.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 7

WFP's programme has a very clear positive impact on protection, both through the associated broader international presence in the areas of WFP operation and through reducing the necessity for people to undertake risk-laden foraging outside of the camps by providing food-aid. Having food-aid made populations safer by limiting their exposure to risk livelihood strategies.

The corollary is also true, that when WFP failed to deliver a full ration due to pipeline gaps or when rations were reduced, populations were placed at risk. However, these risks are not equal for all the camps. Particular camp populations face different levels of risk when engaged in livelihood activities. However, there was no linkage of this differential risk to ration policies.

9.2. Recommendation on Hypothesis 7

WFP should formalise what the concept of protection means to WFP within its policy guidelines.

WFP should consider introducing the general principle that groups whose potential livelihood strategies are constrained by the risk of abuse get augmented rations to minimise their need to employ risky livelihood strategies.

WFP in Sudan should give priority to the provision of full rations to communities for whom other livelihood strategies pose very high risks. When rations have to be cut because of pipeline breaks those most at risk in terms of protection should get priority. In the Darfur context, this normally applies to IDP camps where movement from the camp is severely restricted, and where there are no or only very limited livelihood opportunities in adjoining urban centres.



10. Hypothesis 8: The various measures adopted by WFP reduced the food-aid pull factor.

It is sometimes suggested that providing aid at urban centres had the effect of “pulling” beneficiaries in from rural areas. WFP was conscious of the risk that food-aid could act as a pull factor, especially after the poor harvest in Darfur in 2004. In West Darfur WFP systematically worked with surrounding villages to ensure that people did not enter the camps for food rations. During registration in camps WFP undertook simultaneous satellite village registration while the camp registration was ongoing to reduce the pull.

The whole increase of WFP beneficiary numbers throughout 2005 was for people outside of camps, with the IDP camp population remaining virtually static. This was a harder group for WFP to reach as they are more dispersed and more expensive to get to as they were further from the main centres. All of this meant that any pull factor from the food was minimised.


The group outside camps (Figure 11) included communities who had never been displaced, communities hosting IDPs, IDPs scattered in communities and nomadic communities. There was concern that the poor harvest in some parts of Darfur in 2004, coupled with the continuing impact of insecurity on livelihoods, would force even more people into the camps.

WFP conducted assessments to decide which communities should be targeted for assistance, but sometimes decisions were taken without detailed assessments. One complicating factor in Darfur is that hunger is a recurring part of the natural cycle, and that many populations will appear to be in nutritional distress when measured by the standard criteria. Life is hard in Darfur at the best of times and the influx of the urban poor into IDP camps was one of the reasons for the inflation of ration rolls in the IDP camps near urban centres.

ICRC also helped to prevent movement to camps through its distributions in rural areas. It is interesting to note here the difference between WFP and ICRC policy. In Darfur ICRC only supplied food during the hungry season, arguing that communities could support themselves for the rest of the year with their harvests. WFP instead went for a year round ration. However, the population that ICRC assisted was in rebel-held areas and livelihoods were not as constrained here as in the areas assisted by WFP. ICRC rations were very strongly linked to need, and ICRC monitoring included nutritional assessments to determine if ration changes had had a nutritional impact.



Figure 11: Number of non-camp population needing assistance



Even with the increased numbers outside the camps, WFP gave priority to providing a full ration for IDPs in camps. This was the correct emphasis.

However, there were some instances where WFP did not give IDPs priority. This was the case in Kebkabiya where rations for the IDPs were halved at the same time as the ration for the host population. Also, there was no difference between the general rations for those in camps (who were generally far more dependent on food aid), and those outside camps, or between IDPs and the host population. Those outside camps and the host population normally had more access to different livelihood opportunities. Populations who are not displaced usually have more livelihood opportunities than IDPs. This means that having higher rations for populations in camps that those who are not displaced will not act as a draw, due to the opportunity costs involved in becoming an IDP.

10.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 8

WFP worked effectively to reduce the food-aid pull factor through the distribution of food to populations outside the camps. Initially the biggest draw of the camps was not food aid, but the security that they potentially offered. Drought made food aid a pull factor in early 2005. Both the rural distributions and the distributions in the areas around the camps helped to reduce the food aid pull factor.

However, while extensive food aid for the population outside the camps helped to prevent any general move to the camps it was not always well founded on need. Populations outside of the camps had greater access to other livelihoods than populations inside the camps.

10.2. Recommendation on Hypothesis 8

WFP should make more effective use of vulnerability analysis (VAM) and post distribution monitoring to distinguish what role food-aid plays in the overall livelihood strategy of any particular component of the affected population. Using this knowledge, WFP should allocate ration levels to different groups based on what alternative livelihood activities are open to them.



11. Hypothesis 9: WFP took effective steps in its programme to take account of gender and of the risks of gender-based violence or exploitation.

The WFP Darfur Operation could have done more to support the WFP Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW) and the commitments made to gender-focussed programming in both the 2004 and 2005 EMOPs. The situation in Darfur is challenging in terms of gender issues and women's rights. Nevertheless the evaluation team considered that compared to the effort to maximise the flow of food to Darfur, gender issues were a relatively low priority for WFP Sudan. The evaluation team reached this conclusion based on interviews with WFP staff and beneficiaries, direct observations, and the general lack of gender analysis in the different WFP documents reviewed.

Rather than mainstreaming gender from the beginning of the Darfur response, WFP Sudan viewed gender programming as an extra programming load that could be introduced once food was flowing in satisfactory quantities. At the time of this evaluation, two and a half years after the start of the response, gender issues were only just beginning to receive proper attention and priority. This delay was surprising given that the situation in Darfur is wrought with complex protection issues that call for gender-sensitive programming.

Both the 2004 and 2005 EFSNA highlighted specific gender issues that needed to be addressed. These recommendations were mostly not followed. There are still many camps that don't have women on distribution committees or in parallel women's committees that can act as participatory advisers. In some cases it is the cooperating partners that must be brought into line with WFP policy about women's participation and presence in all aspects of food handling and distribution. Sometimes the food distribution committees exist in name but have no real role or involvement in the distribution.

One area where commitments to women were given adequate attention and priority was in terms of the registration process. A long process of community sensitisation, discussions and dialogue resulted in women being registered as ration card-holders. This was particularly sensitive for polygamous households where a single woman could lose her rights to direct food distribution if she was not registered on her own card.

The issue of firewood collection and women's protection issues has long been highlighted in Darfur. Women need to collect fuel wood in order to cook the food aid, but put themselves at risk of attack and rape when they leave the relative safety of the IDP camp. There is currently no adequate solution and the small-scale AU accompanying activities (where AU soldiers would take a group of women to collect firewood under their protection) have basically ended.



Fuel-saving stoves have been piloted on a small scale, but their numbers are not significant enough to have much impact on the problem, and in many cases women collect firewood as an income generating activity rather than just for their own use. The pilot programme ended due to the lack of resources and capacity to continue with it.

Women are victims of attack and abuse on an almost daily basis across Darfur, yet there has been no real institutional reaction to this problem. Firewood is an issue for WFP because of the need to cook the food supplied by WFP, and because ration levels determine whether people can exchange food for fuel, or need to do out and collect it.

It is important to recognize that gender issues are not just limited to women, but imply the distinct needs of men as well. In Darfur this issue is particularly relevant because the men living in the IDP camps are at high risk for violence and many are unable to leave the camps because of fear of attack or death. Given this scenario it is essential that specific programming be put in place that recognize the needs of the men for income-generating activities, educational opportunities and other training possibilities.

Both male and female beneficiaries complained that there is undue pressure on the household given the current security situation. The firewood issue complicates this because the men know if they attempt to leave the camp they will be killed, and so the household has had to decide that the risk of rape and attack to the women is a preferable risk than the risk of death for the husband. Cooperating partners working in camps feel that the strong control and dominance men are exerting over the food commodities is based on their lack of control over other aspects of their survival. In the camp, food represents income and therefore power.

Traditionally in Darfur women controlled the means and products of their own production. This was used to feed the family and women made their own decisions regarding selling and consuming the produce. Women rarely asked men for food assistance except in times of celebration or stress. This system has now been replaced by the food aid system, with very different roles and responsibilities. All of this must be taken into account in developing programs that support both men and women and in determining the most effective method for incorporating gender issues into the food aid system.

11.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 9

Some steps were taken to meet the ECW, but real gender concerns, rather than tokenism, appear not to have been a priority for the Darfur operation. Women were represented on the Food Distribution Committees, but some committees were found to have no real role in food distribution or monitoring.

Box 2: Collecting firewood

In Sereif Camp in Southern Darfur the security situation around the camp is so poor that women will pool together to hire a policeman or security guard with a gun to protect them while gathering fuel wood.

Unfortunately the *janjaweed* have gotten so dangerous that even the police now refuse to go. The women still need fuel wood so only the very oldest women are sent out into the bush and need to collect sufficient wood for the entire household.

These older women are less likely to be raped but are often attacked with whips and beaten badly and the fuel wood collected is stolen.



Apart from one small improved stove project, WFP has taken no direct action on firewood – one of the key risks facing women. Specific areas of gender focus in need of improvement can be summarized as the following:

1. Only one in eight monitors are women. More women monitors are needed to liaise with the beneficiaries and communities and assist in to gather gender-sensitive data. However we do recognise that WFP has faced particular problems in recruiting women for such positions in Darfur and that female candidates offered such posting often refuse them.
2. Poor monitoring and follow-up on Extremely Vulnerable Groups (the elderly and infirm, disabled, widows, pregnant and lactating women, female-headed household, child-headed households) within the beneficiary caseload.
3. Limited access and communication between the Gender Advisor and the focal points for gender in the field. In 2005 there was little to no information flow which hampered WFP's role as a lead agency in the Gender-Based Sexual Violence working group in Khartoum.
4. Insufficient commitment by senior managers to gender mainstreaming and to encouraging and supporting staff to include gender-programming into their work plans.
5. Cooperating partners did not seem to be aware of WFP's expectations in terms of gender-aware distribution modalities, gender-disaggregated data collection and gender-sensitive programming.
6. Post distribution monitoring did not focus sufficiently on questions that highlight gender-specific issues including use of commodities, household decision-making, control of assets and resources, gender-stratified workloads and childcare practices.
7. Not enough emphasis on the need to discourage unsafe wood and grass foraging but offer income incentive such as brick making, small-scale vendors and cell-phone operators.

There are other aspects of gender programming that also need attention, such as the problem of female genital mutilation, HIV/Aids training etc, but these probably fall outside WFP's remit. However, it must also be recognised that many of these areas in need of improvement depend on WFP having partners with the capacity to implement gender-sensitive programmes.

11.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 9

WFP Sudan should lead a high-level United Nations effort to deal with the firewood foraging issue and the related protection risks.

WFP must set up better channels for monitoring and enforcement of its ECW policy, both internally and for the actions of its cooperating partners. WFP should redouble efforts to recruit female monitors, and should experiment with other approaches, such as recruiting married couples for monitoring.

WFP also needs to ask more gender specific questions in the post-distribution monitoring, and pay particular attention to monitoring assistance for extremely vulnerable groups.



WFP should make cooperating partners aware of WFP's expectations of them in terms of gender focus, and should monitor the performance of partners against this.

WFP senior managers in Sudan should encourage staff to integrate the ECW more fully into all aspects of programming, including increased beneficiary participation in all aspects of food delivery and distribution.

WFP Sudan should provide Food Distribution Committees with real rather than nominal roles. WFP could do this by providing distribution committees with calculation tables and scales for verifying ration distributions; by encouraging committees to serve as a complaint mechanism to monitor any abuses around ration distribution.



12. Hypothesis 10: WFP took innovative approaches to maximise coverage in the face of severe constraints.

WFP took a range of different approaches to maximise the reach of its operations in Darfur. The innovative approaches included:

1. Making extensive use of internal borrowing mechanisms to keep the pipeline filled.
2. Establishing a large field security team with the ability to conduct security assessments.
3. Providing what were effectively loans to transport contractors to allow them to expand their fleet.
4. Investing in original research on livelihoods in Darfur.
5. Bringing food in through Libya to increase the pipeline to Darfur. This helped to ensure
6. Placing helicopters in Darfur to allow rapid assessments and to guarantee access when road travel was difficult.
7. Experimenting with community distribution to permit food distribution in the absence of cooperating partners.
8. Establishing a large network of warehouses to permit pre-positioning before the rains.
9. Investing in registration.

The first of these has been the subject of a separate evaluation, but it will be discussed here as it, together with the security team probably had the largest impact on the performance of WFP on the ground. Sudan was one of the trial sites for the Business Process Review, which included a number of loan mechanisms including the working capital finance scheme. These added to existing smaller internal borrowing mechanisms.

Essentially WFP cannot order food, or sign contracts for transport unless it already has the funds in hand to pay them. However, it may be many months before full payment has to be made against these contracts, so the consequence is that WFP may have large cash reserves that are committed for future payments. Programmes may also have received funds for one area of expenditure which are not expected to be disbursed for some considerable time.

In 2005, encouraged by Rome, the Sudan programme made extensive borrowings from these various mechanisms. Essentially all of these mechanisms draw money from the same pot – funds received by WFP which are not due to be disbursed for some time, and although the funds have different names. WFP Rome appears not to have taken the totality of borrowings into account when assessing the risk of loaning funds to WFP Sudan.

WFP Sudan borrowed a total of US\$101mn through these mechanisms, 21% of the total expenditure for 2005. The Sudan programme used this money largely to purchase food to avert pipeline breaks. WFP Sudan estimated that using these internal mechanisms permitted the programme to reach an additional 600,000 beneficiaries.



However, at the end of 2005, some 73,000mt of food with a full cost recovery²⁴ value of US\$77mn was in stock but could not be moved. This was because WFP Sudan bought the food by borrowing from grants received for transport. However, no suitable untied contribution had been received that could be used to repay the money borrowed from the transport fund, and allow the transport of the food.

This meant that at the start of 2006, WFP appeared to have a healthy pipeline because of this stock of food (for which there were no funds for onward transport), and some suggested that this slowed contributions at the start of the year. While the amount was cleared in the first quarter of 2006, the whole saga may have led to the Sudan programme having difficulty in getting approval for their desired level of internal borrowing in 2006.

The internal borrowing system is really just a work-around to address the problem of the lack of timeliness of donor contributions to WFP programmes. Donor conditionalities make it significantly more difficult for WFP to operate the internal borrowing mechanisms.

WFP's investment in security, and especially in the setting up of a team specifically to do security assessments was a major innovation that allowed WFP to reach into areas that would otherwise have been inaccessible. One of the criticisms made of the UNDSS is that their priority is to keep staff safe rather than to allow them to do their work safely. Having a security team who worked closely with WFP programme and logistics staff meant that the security team understood the operational priorities and were able to balance security concerns with operational concerns.

Having a dedicated security assessment team meant that new routes and sites were security cleared for UN use, or re-cleared after incidents, far faster than would otherwise have been the case. This had a major impact not only on the geographical range of WFP's operations, but also on the range of NGOs and other UN organisations. For example, it would have been very difficult to conduct the fieldwork for the EFSNA without such a dedicated security.

WFP paid advances against future deliveries to retained contractors. This 'earnest money' allowed transporters to get commercial loans from the bank to purchase trucks. This policy increased the commercial transport fleet available to WFP, especially for all-terrain vehicles. However, the decision of the Sudanese government to permit the duty free import of trucks in 2005 probably had a bigger impact on the overall fleet in Sudan.

WFP's investment in original research around livelihoods was impressive {Buchanan-Smith, 2006 #48}. It has added to the body of knowledge about what is happening in Darfur and has helped to inform opinion within the broader humanitarian community. Similarly WFP's investment in work by Tufts and in the annual EFSNA has been positive. All of this research has contributed to WFP's policies in Darfur.

WFP opened a second logistics pipeline into Darfur by airlifting food from Libya. This helped to ease the pressure on the main overland routes within Sudan. However, the overall tonnage moved by this route was small compared to the tonnage delivered overland.

²⁴ Full cost recovery is the cost of the food itself, plus the cost of the other EMOP elements needed to distribute the food. The problem was that WFP Sudan had used the borrowings to buy the food, but did not maintain a reserve for the transport costs, as funding from other pledges was expected to cover this.



Nevertheless, the additional tonnage helped WFP to achieve very impressive distribution volumes in 2005.

WFP operated the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flights that allowed humanitarian workers to reach sites all over Darfur. The presence of UNHAS, as especially the decision to increase the number of helicopters in Darfur was positive. It not only allowed rapid assessments but it also guarantees access when road travel was difficult. The presence of the UNHAS helicopters have permitted cooperating partners to continue working in isolated locations in the knowledge that they could be evacuated by air if necessary. Together with WFP's security system this encouraged cooperating partners to operate in areas which they would otherwise have avoided or where they would have otherwise been much slower to establish a presence in, or faster to abandon when security conditions worsened.

WFP experimented with community distribution. This was intended to permit food distribution in sites where there were no CPs. This was partly a contingency preparation in the event that security conditions forced CPs to withdraw. In the event, this approach was little used.

WFP reacted to the fact that the many sites are inaccessible during the rains by establishing a large network of warehouses. This permitted food to be pre-positioning before the rains. This allowed the delivery of full rations to isolated locations during the wet season.

Finally WFP invested in a registration system and head counting exercises. The problems associated with this system are discussed elsewhere, but it did establish planning figures for many of the sites served. These planning figures were used by other agencies for their own programming.

12.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 10

Very clearly the innovative and courageous approaches by WFP Sudan in terms of internal borrowing, security arrangement, support for transporters and other measures have enabled WFP, its partners, and other UN agencies to maximise coverage and reach.

However, this innovation applied almost exclusively to the quantity of coverage (logistics) and not the quality of coverage (programming). Innovation in moving food was encouraged and given the highest priority for human, material and financial resources, whereas innovation in programming (VAM, programme diversification, partner capacity development, monitoring) got little attention.

The WFP Sudan management took calculated risks that proved correct in the end. However these achievements were not sufficiently appreciated nor supported by the rest of the organisation. Were it not for the unusual and non-bureaucratic willingness of the WFP Sudan management to place the humanitarian imperative ahead of bureaucratic safety, WFP's successes in Darfur would certainly not have been as strong as they were.

12.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 10

WFP should formally examine and document the specific innovations used in Darfur. The same study should also examine the general attitude and approach toward innovation followed by WFP Sudan management, and the response by HQ to these innovations. All of



these elements could provide valuable practical insight to inform an improved risk management approach toward similar programmes in the future.

WFP should consolidate or at least rationalise all the internal borrowing channels as they all borrow from what is essentially the same pot.




13. Hypothesis 11: The logistics system established by WFP, and the approach taken (airlift and own fleet) met the needs of the programme in a timely manner.

The Darfur operation was a logistics triumph. A huge amount of food was moved in a very difficult logistics environment. It is instructive to compare the logistics for the 2004/05 operation with the Darfur famine relief operation in 1984-1985. At the time that response was considered a major logistics achievement.

However, in that response less than 100,000 tonne of food was moved into Darfur, compared with over 565,000 tonne for 2004-2005. The context was clearly different in 1984 and people were able to use alternative livelihood strategies to survive (de Waal, 1989).

Figure 12: Two Darfur emergency food operations compared



In 1984/85 a great use was made of the railway, but by 2004 decades of under-investment meant that railway capacity was far more limited than 20 years earlier²⁵. WFP relied on trucking operations and on airlift. Over the two years WFP made a major effort to improve stockpiling prior to the rains to prevent the need for airlift, and as a result there has been no need for airlift to Darfur in 2006.

One key element of the WFP policy was to increase storage at field offices and for cooperating partners. WFP erected a series of storage tents at different locations. None of the storage tents inspected had been erected properly in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. This issue is discussed in detail in Annex 5.



Photo 2: Plastic pallets in El Fasher

²⁵ ICRC used the railway to deliver all their food aid to Darfur in 2004/05, their planning figure for 2005 was 30,000 tonne, or about 7% of WFP's flows.



The team noted several issues about general warehouse practice. The first of these was stacking practice. This issue is described in detail in Annex 6. Essentially current stacking practice increase the risk of stack collapses at the end of stacks. A number of simple remedies are discussed in Annex 6.

The second warehouse practice issue is the use of pallets. Many tented storage warehouses had no pallets. Pallets are useful not only in preventing water damage to goods at the base of the stack, but also in making it easier to detect rodent problems, and preventing some forms of pest attacks. Pallets were in short supply in Darfur and some locations had been supplied with wooden pallets which quickly became prey to termites. Plastic pallets are the ideal in these circumstances, but only a limited number were available.

A third issue noted that was some storage sites have been set up without adequate drainage, rather an obvious oversight. One final issue was that warehouses in West Darfur were not as clean as they should have been²⁶.

During interviews in Rome after the fieldwork it became clear that there had been an issue with commodity tracking in Darfur. It emerged that, for a number of reasons, there was a significant tonnage which paperwork showed as being dispatched, but which had not been recorded as being received. This was the case with air-drops – the food was issued on a waybill from the warehouse, but no receipt documentation was ever generated. The country office and the internal auditors were in dispute about the scale of the discrepancies, but this was apparently resolved in October 2006.

It was clear that there was no suggestion that this discrepancy represented diverted food, but rather that the paperwork had not been properly completed. It was also clear that at the start of the operation, and even into 2005 the Darfur programme, despite the presence of very experienced logisticians, had difficulty in using the COMPAS system, and set up a parallel system to provide management information. Interviewees confirmed that this is not unusual in WFP emergency operations.

13.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 11

The delivery of such large amounts of food (and the move away from airlift) to such a disperse population in such difficult conditions represents a huge triumph for WFP and for the responsible staff. The WFP Sudan logistics team clearly scores high marks for the way they were able to mobilise capacity and bring to bare lessons and expertise acquired in past operations, both within an outside of Sudan, to address the challenges that confronted them in Darfur

There are some issues around the erection of storage tents (improperly anchored tents blew away), warehouse practice (stacking practices leading to dangerous collapses and food spoiling due to a lack of pallets), and commodity tracking. These represent room for improvement and are relatively minor points compared with the achievements made.

The experience from Darfur suggests that COMPAS, WFP's official commodity tracking system, is not sufficiently nimble to serve the initial stages of an emergency operation. Apparently, it is not unusual for WFP logistics to maintain parallel systems in emergencies,

²⁶ "Clean, tidy stores help in the control of pests" (Tropical Stored Products Centre, 1979, p. 30).



with all of the disadvantages that this brings. This means that those logistics officer who prioritise getting the food to the needy lay themselves open to negative assessments from audit and oversight authorities.

13.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 11

WFP should ensure that contractors for the erection of Wiik Halls are properly trained, and that their work is checked. This is particularly important with the new generation of Wiik Hall tents, which while much easier to erect, are also less tolerant of erection errors than the tents found in Darfur.

WFP should consider discussing with the manufacturer the preparation of a single or double-sided sheet listing the most common erection faults that logistics staff can check after erection (e.g presence of all anchors, connection of braces, fixing of walls etc).

WFP should introduce plastic pallets into stock at Brindisi. The pallets should be available as a set sufficient for equipping the standard sizes of Wiik Hall storage tents kept in stock there.

WFP Sudan should change stacking practice in Darfur to a two and a half bag module from the present one and a half bag module.

WFP should consider re-issuing an update version of the “Handbook on Good Storage Practice” (Tropical Stored Products Centre, 1979) as a guide for storekeepers.

WFP should hold a review of the use of the COMPAS system to determine what features of the system, or of current practice, which make it difficult to use in a rapidly developing emergency.





14. Hypothesis 12: The FLAs and distribution strategies adopted by WFP and its Cooperating Partners were appropriate and maximised the impact of food aid.

There was a good deal of variation in Darfur in terms of partner ability and programming. Some partners work in a very professional way and do work of a high quality. Others do a very poor job of even basic food distribution²⁷. The current Field Level Agreement (FLA) standard format did not necessarily enhance the effectiveness of individual partners because the FLA assumes a certain standardisation of operations between the different partners that does not exist.

The issue of Cooperating Partner (CP) effectiveness and performance was of particular significance in this evaluation. While it is quite easy to cast blame and point fingers at individual cooperating partners, there was also a structural incoherence that characterized WFP dealings with the CPs. There was a lack of oversight and accountability that allowed certain CPs to develop poor practices. Poor CP performance reduced the effectiveness of WFP's food operation. The cost per tonne to be paid to CPs for their work became the main area of WFP negotiation and interaction with CPs, particularly at the Khartoum level.

WFP did only limited training for CPs. As a result CP performance was based mainly on each individual agency's existing ability and integrity. Since WFP monitoring of CP activities was also sparse, partners were essentially left to manage WFP food according to whatever internal regulations and guidelines they might have. Some partners were not aware of WFP's requirements around distribution or around WFP's Enhanced Commitment to Women²⁸. If the CP was good and capable, then this had a positive impact on their handling of WFP food, but if a CP was less able and disorganized, then their dealing with WFP food would be characterized by these shortcomings.

Due to the difficult working conditions in Darfur, partners were plagued with staff turnover, understaffing and poorly qualified staff (Minear, 2005, p. 111). While WFP is not directly responsible for this issue, it should have recognised from its own experience that this was likely to be an issue and should have conducted more CP training and capacity building to allow them to meet the minimum standards expected by WFP.

There needed to be more investment in partner capacity as well as more pressure applied to CPs to fulfil their contractual obligations in terms of field staff and monitors. It should be noted that this level of pressure is now being applied by the WFP Area Offices, over two years after the start of the operation. WFP in Sudan is now introducing a new FLA package that includes key performance indicators.

WFP is committed to finding NGOs and INGOs willing to work in Darfur, and this has not been an easy prospect with INGO staff turnover. In many cases the local NGOs working with WFP were able to respond more effectively, but this is partially due to the work in terms of capacity building and training WFP offered.

²⁷ In the interest of fairness, this report will not identify those cooperating partners whose work the team believes to have been of low quality. This justification for not identifying the worst performing partners is that the evaluation team were evaluating WFP rather than its cooperating partners, the short time in Darfur did not allow for a comprehensive review of each partner.

²⁸ These expectations are fairly clearly set out in WFP's guide for NGO partners "How to Work with WFP" (WFP, 2005a).



However, again, it was notable that most of this capacity building and training centered around logistics and hardware. Partners were trained in warehouse management, record keeping, and the WFP documentation system.

Local NGOs were able to offer a level of community understanding and support that can be lacking in the international agencies. In 2005, as more and more international agencies arrived in Darfur, WFP increasingly reduced the beneficiary caseload of the local NGOs in favour of international NGOs. However, the Sudanese Red Crescent is still WFP's largest partner for general food distribution in Darfur (Table 17).

Table 17: WFP's GFD cooperating partners in Darfur.

WFP Cooperating Partner	% of 2005 caseload
<i>Sudanese Red Crescent</i>	16.3%
<i>CARE</i>	15.5%
<i>German Agro Action</i>	14.4%
<i>Save the Children US</i>	10.2%
<i>World Vision International</i>	10.1%
<i>Solidarities</i>	5.7%
<i>Danish Refugee Council</i>	4.8%
<i>Samaritans Purse</i>	4.1%
<i>CRS</i>	4.0%
<i>African Humanitarian Action</i>	3.3%
<i>ACF</i>	3.2%
<i>Sudan Popular Committee for Relief</i>	2.5%
<i>ALISIE</i>	2.1%
<i>Norwegian Refugee Council</i>	1.5%
<i>Relief International</i>	1.4%
<i>United Methodist Committee for Relief</i>	0.5%
<i>International Islamic Relief Organisation</i>	0.4%
Total	100.0%

WFP was keen to bring large international NGO partners on board that already had considerable food distribution experience and an existing relationship with WFP in other countries. WFP shifted responsibility from some overstretched local partners to the INGOs to take advantage of their presumed skills. INGOs were always more expensive, but in some cases they were also less competent than their local counterparts. WFP needs to monitor and evaluate partner performance in order to improve their handling of WFP food distributions. Because this monitoring was not consistently undertaken, CPs in some cases hampered rather than enhanced the WFP food program. Had WFP offered *all* CPs the level of guidance and support offered to local NGOs, many of these problems could have been minimized.

In signing the FLAs, WFP was not proactive in offering very clear directives and expectations to the CPs, particularly in terms of the food distribution mechanism. As of this writing, there are CPs distributing WFP without following even the most basic



distribution policies and guidelines. This evaluation found multiple examples of distribution sites where:

1. The beneficiaries do not know their entitlements.
2. There are no standardized scooping materials.
3. Cooperating partners did not actively monitor the distribution site.
4. There are no shade or water facilities despite waiting times of over four hours.
5. No women are involved in distribution/relief committees.
6. There was no mechanism to check the received ration or to complain if something is amiss.
7. There is no priority or special assistance given to vulnerable individuals.

In case of poor CP performance, it is essential that WFP have some mechanism for censure. WFP should have the means to take over the distribution process from a persistently poorly performing CP. In this way WFP can ensure CP compliance to basic WFP distribution policy and improve the level of support to beneficiaries. However, it must be recognised that INGOs may have funding and relationships with the same donors that WFP relies upon, and that this can make disciplining INGO CPs difficult,

The performance indicators attached to the FLAs now being introduced by WFP Sudan, and the Arabic translation of “Working with WFP” now being distributed should both help to improve this. However, the key issue is not around guidelines and indicators, but about how WFP manages its relationships with CPs. Without good monitoring, WFP may not even be aware of partner performance, and the dialogue with partners tends to centre around the aspects of partner performance that are obvious to WFP, such as logistics performance.

Poor partner performance can directly impact the health and nutritional status of the beneficiary population. Negligence in terms of registration manifests, food management, or distribution can have a direct negative impact on populations that are highly food dependent. If the vulnerable groups are not being appropriately assisted, then they could have their food intake severely compromised by unfair or inequitable treatment. WFP must monitor partner performance to support the nutritional impact of the food aid.

14.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 12

While WFP has some excellent partners in Darfur, WFP’s intervention has also been severely limited by the performance of some of the available partners. Darfur is a very harsh environment and some partners have had difficulty recruiting suitably qualified staff. This has meant that the performance of some partners in Darfur is simply not good enough, despite their strong reputation for performance as WFP partners in other countries.

The sometimes poor performance by some partners has not been helped by WFP’s primary focus on the numbers of beneficiaries reached rather than on the quality of partners’ work. The lack of monitoring by WFP has also contributed to poor partner performance.

The difficult conditions in Darfur had a large impact on CPs, making it difficult for them to recruit adequately qualified staff for their operations. WFP should have recognised this earlier and undertaken capacity building to compensate.



WFP in Sudan has already begun to work on improving the quality of cooperating partners. Recent innovations include the introduction of monitoring indicators as part of FLA, and the translation of the “How to work with WFP” handbook into Arabic.

14.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 12

WFP should invest in developing a set of guidelines and standards for cooperating partners to make clear what minimum standard of performance is expected of them. The guidelines should be simple and basic and should cover the basics of distributions with data on how many people can be processed per hour with different distribution arrangements. This could be a simple pamphlet based on excerpts from the “How to work with WFP” NGO Handbook.

WFP country programmes should introduce an annual training plan. This training plan should concentrate on those topics where CP performance has been found to be less than ideal.

WFP should establish a formal procedure for censuring CPs not meeting their commitments. Such a procedure should be transparent and just, as only through such a fair process can WFP hope to get Donor backing for such censure.

Even though WFP contracts out some responsibility to CPs, it is still WFP that is ultimately responsible for the effective delivery and distribution of its food aid. Any weaknesses on the parts of its cooperating partners reflect directly on its own effectiveness. WFP must accurately assess the capacities of its partners and invest sufficient resources (financial, human and material) to ensure that they can meet minimal agreed levels of operating capacity. WFP needs to invest more resources in building Cooperating Partners capacity, especially where programmes are being expanded in difficult operating condition, or where existing capacity is very limited.

WFP has an obligation to regularly and systematically monitor the activities of its partners to ensure that they are following agreed procedures and to recognise when minimum standards are not being met and the wellbeing of beneficiary populations is being compromised as a result.



15. Hypothesis 13: The distribution of food items as an additional income transfer was more efficient than a mixture of food and cash would have been.

The provision of food items by WFP represented a transfer of income to the food aid recipients as food has a cash value. This hypothesis considers whether it would have cost less to WFP (for the same benefit to the recipients) to have given the food aid recipients a mixture of cash and food instead of food alone.

The problem with food aid in Darfur is that Darfur is not only a long way from the main seaport of Port Sudan, but also has very poor infrastructure. Links with the rest of the country are so poorly developed that Darfur is effectively not in the same market as the rest of Sudan, but operates as a distinct regional market.

When the costs of the Special Operations are added, the cost of the distributed commodities only represents 20% (2004) to 25% (2005) of the overall cost of the operation (Table 18).

Table 18: WFP expenditure for the Darfur Operation and the resulting calculated costs per tonne

	2004			2005			Notes
	US\$ mn	as %	\$/mt	US\$ mn	as %	\$/mt	
Tonnage Distributed	126,583 mt			438,804 mt			Expenditure data based on WFP financial reporting.
Expenditure²⁹							
<i>EMOP Commodities</i>	33	20%	259	126	25%	286	Sugar added in 2005
<i>Other EMOP Costs³⁰</i>	94	58%	742	347	68%	792	Wider distribution in '05
<i>Total EMOP</i>	127	78%	1,002	473	93%	1,078	
<i>SO Expenditure</i>	35	22%	275	38	7%	86	Estimated (80% of budget)
<i>All non-commodity costs</i>	129	80%	1,017	385	75%	878	
<i>EMOP and SO</i>	162	100%	1,277	511	100%	1,164	

Generally food aid is less efficient than cash transfers. The recent OECD study (Clay, Riley, Urey, & OECD, 2006, p. 60), which despite its title also looked at relief food, found

²⁹ One reviewer has commented that this table overstates the cost to WFP as it assumes that capital investments are not amortised (spread over the period in which the asset is used) but simply written off in the first year. However:

- 1) This is the very policy the WFP itself follows, charging the full cost of capital assets to projects in the year of purchase rather than internally amortising them
- 2) Only a small part of the costs are represented by capital purchases with any resale value - most of the non-commodity costs are for transport, salaries, other running costs. Many of the capital assets, such as warehouse tents, have no realistic recoverable value at the end of the operation.
- 3) A full analysis of the amortised costs would have to include whatever benefit the Darfur operation had gained from capital investments in previous years

³⁰ WFP typically divides these into various direct and indirect operational costs, but that is of peripheral interest here.



that food aid generally cost 30% more than similar commercial imports would have done. For all development aid, repeated studies have found that tied aid is 25% less efficient than cash transfers (World Bank, 1998, p. 6).

In the case of Darfur, distributing cash instead of food aid was not an alternative as there simply was not enough food on the Darfur market to meet the needs. However, food recipients had to sell part of their food to pay for milling and buy other commodities. This was one of the factors behind the ration change in 2005 when first 25gm of sugar and then 50gm of cereal was added to the ration. The terms of trade that food aid recipients receive for their commodities vary by commodity and time of year (Table 19).

Table 19: Relative cost and value of three food commodities in Darfur

<i>All costs in US\$/kg Commodity</i>	<i>WFP Budget figures</i>	<i>Non Commodity costs</i>	<i>Total WFP cost</i>	<i>Apr '05 Local price</i>	<i>Ration value/ration cost</i>	<i>Sep '05 Local price</i>	<i>Ration value/ration cost</i>
<i>Aid Sorghum</i>	0.19	0.88	1.06	0.19	17%	0.25	23%
<i>Vegetable Oil</i>	0.86	0.88	1.73	0.97	56%	1.25	72%
<i>Sugar</i>	0.28	0.88	1.16	1.24	107%	1.50	129%

When considering these ratios between cost of food aid and the value to the recipient the following should be borne in mind:

- The value of food aid on the local market is dependent on the availability of other food, of food aid, and of consumer preference³¹. If WFP had delivered less food the price of food would have been far higher.
- Cereals were the part of the ration most often sold to pay for other costs.
- Low prices for cereals, while giving poor terms of trade to food-aid recipients, do make more cereals available for those not receiving food-aid.

For example, beneficiaries typically needed to sell 23% of their cereal ration to pay for milling costs. If we conservatively assume that only 20% of the whole ration was commercialised by recipients to meet milling and other costs we find that WFP paid nearly US\$72 mn to deliver food that people sold for US\$17 mn (Table 20).

Table 20: Monetary implication of differences between food cost to WFP and value on local market

<i>Costs of commercialisation</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Unit</i>
<i>Total Cereal distributed in 2005</i>	338,067	mt
<i>Assumed commercialisation (20%)</i>	67,613	mt
<i>Total cost to distribute commercialised food</i>	71.9	US\$ mn
<i>Benefit to recipients of commercialised food</i>	16.7	US\$ mn
<i>Cost less benefit</i>	55.2	US\$ mn
<i>Ratio of cost to value on the local market</i>	4.3	

³¹ For example, by September 2006, the type of vegetable oil had changed to a variety which was not liked by most of those interviewed, as a result the oil was selling for less than \$0.30/kg while the preferred local oil was \$1.78/kg.



Now, it is not suggested that WFP could have saved 11% of the budget in 2005 by distribution 400gm of cereal plus 2.5 US cents per person per day. In reality there are distribution costs for cash as there are for food, but these are probably significantly smaller than for food. Reducing the food quantity would have increased the price of food in Darfur, and caused hardship to those not receiving a full ration from WFP. One of the reasons behind the extra 1.5kg per person per month in the first budget revision of 2005, was that such food would enter the market and eventually end up on the tables of people who could not be reached directly by WFP. This implies that WFP was pursuing a “cheap food” policy. Reducing the food quantity would have increased food prices in Darfur and made food less accessible to those not directly assisted by WFP.

Cash distribution would require one of WFP’s key skills, the ability to make tough contracts with local contractors, as cash distribution might well be done through local cash transfer mechanisms. The most common concerns about cash transfers, that they might be used less responsibly than other transfers, or might be appropriated by men, or are more subject to diversion, are not supported by the latest research (Harvey, 2006; Harvey & Overseas Development Institute. Humanitarian Policy, 2005). However, the body of evidence on cash transfers in developing countries is still relatively limited.

In reality, WFP’s programme in Darfur was struggling to move the food tonnage required, and would probably not have been able to handle the added complexity of a cash transfer programme. However, there were a number of options that could have been pursued to improve the situation.

1. Supporting milling costs, as this consumed a significant portion of the ration. This could have been done by providing milling machines to be operated by women’s groups in the camp as has been done in other countries. Beneficiaries interviewed were not in favour of receiving milled cereals due to their shorter shelf life and the fact that it rules out the use of traditional preparation practise such as fermenting or part-germinating grain before milling or of mixed grain milling.

Box 4 Arbitrage in practice

A chance observation by a WFP staff member uncovered a fraud by transporters. Transporters were taking the WFP food they loaded in Port Sudan or elsewhere to Khartoum. The empty bags and the paperwork (and sometimes the truck licence plates) were then flown to Darfur where the transporter bought WFP or other food on the local market, placed it in the WFP bags, and delivered it to WFP.

Due to the volume of WFP food flowing into Darfur, food there was sometimes cheaper than in Khartoum so the transporters made a profit on the food exchange as well as saving on the transport price.

WFP alerted the police and then took steps to prevent the reoccurrence of this fraud by transporters, which in some cases led to the substitution of low quality commodities for the WFP food.

The transporters were practicing arbitrage – taking advantage of the fact that food prices in Darfur did not reflect the cost of transporting it there.

2. Taking advantage of the low price of food in Darfur by buying back some WFP commodities on sale at low prices as some transporters were doing (Box 4). This would have increasing the price of the commodities and reducing the cost to WFP. Increasing the price of the commodities on the market would have reduced the amount that families needed to sell to pay for milling. However, it would have had the negative consequence of making food more expensive for those not targeted directly by WFP distributions.
3. Providing a greater amount of commodities whose price was higher in Darfur than the cost of supplying them. Sugar was one clear example of this. In September 2005



sugar in Darfur was selling for 29% more than it cost WFP to provide it. While nutritionally not very useful, sugar was an effective income transfer.

Of these three options, one and three would have been the easiest to implement.

15.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 13

The needs of the affected population include both nutritional needs that can be met by food aid and non-nutritional needs that can only be met by cash or the exchange of food aid. The poor terms of trade available for cereals supplied by WFP meant that WFP was paying over six times as much to distribute cereals than the recipients could get by selling them on the local market to pay for milling and other family costs.

The large volume of food aid delivered by WFP did help to keep food prices low in Darfur. This assisted those in the population who were not directly targeted by WFP food, but at the cost of increasing the amount of food that targeted beneficiaries needed to sell to pay for other costs.

Cash distributions would probably not have been a realistic option for WFP in the Darfur context (due to the overwhelming food deficit and the market isolation). However, WFP could have reduced the need for cash by supporting milling or reduced the need for sales by providing more commodities with high values in the local market.

Sugar was a very effective means of income transfer as its value in Darfur was sometimes greater than the cost of providing it to WFP. While the provision of cereals was not an efficient means of income transfer the provision of sugar was.

15.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 13

WFP planning and monitoring should consider not only the nutritional content of the food basket supplied, but also the household economy impact, in terms of the local value of the commodity supplied. In particular WFP should always track the ratio between costs of supply of commodities and their resale value on the local market.

WFP should experiment with food-aid resale price support through buy-back of food aid. This could be organised through merchants as a way to raise food aid to at least market equivalence with locally produced food commodities.

WFP Sudan should support the establishment of milling programmes to reduce the milling cost for food aid recipients.

WFP Sudan should consider increasing the sugar ration for encamped populations to improve their household food security³².

³² The Evaluation team note that sugar has been increased to 30gm per head in 2006.




16. Hypothesis 14: Donor’s funding policies were coherent with WFP mission.

Donors responded very generously to the WFP appeals for funds for the Darfur response. WFP received \$162mn in 2004 and \$482mn in 2005 for the Darfur EMOPs. Expenditure was 68% of the confirmed contributions in 2004 (discussed below) and an incredible (for an emergency operation) 98% in 2005.


Funding for the rest of Sudan was increasing at the same time, rising from US\$100 million in 2002 to nearly \$700 million in 2005. Overall expenditure in Sudan was nearly a quarter (24%) of all WFP expenditure in 2005. The 2005 EMOP along accounted for one in six of every dollar spent by WFP in 2005. Expenditure for Sudan outside the Darfur EMOP doubled from 2003 to 2004.

Figure 13: WFP expenditure for Sudan 2002 to 2005



The Darfur EMOPs received support from a wide range of donors. The largest support proportion of support came from the United States as show in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Funding support for the Darfur EMOPs



As noted above, only 68% of the confirmed contributions were spend in 2004, the reason for this is simply that funding was not available early enough to be of use. There is quite a



long time-lag between a donor making a confirmed commitment and WFP being able to distribute food in Darfur. Table 21 shows the timeline from donation to distribution. Sometimes a few weeks can be shaved off overall, but there is still a six month lead time for an isolated location like Darfur.

Table 21: Timeline for donation to distribution in Darfur

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Duration in weeks</i>	<i>Total weeks</i>
<i>Donor make a confirmed commitment</i>	0	0
<i>Funding registers the commitment, and clarifies if necessary</i>	1	1
<i>Information is passed to the programming service who then contacts the country programme to ask what their requirement is, after advising them of the impact of any donor conditions.</i>	1	2
<i>The programme service then try to combine this requirement with other requirements before passing the procurement request to procurement</i>	1	3
<i>Procurement prepare the tender documents and publish the call for tenders</i>	2	5
<i>Four weeks allowed for tendering</i>	4	9
<i>Technical appraisal of the tenders</i>	1	10
<i>Financial appraisal of the tenders</i>	1	11
<i>Placing of order</i>	1	12
<i>Supplier prepares, and packages items and delivers them to port</i>	4	16
<i>Delay for suitable sea vessel</i>	2	18
<i>On the high seas</i>	3	21
<i>Unloading and dispatch</i>	1	22
<i>In country transit</i>	3	25
<i>Stock held at area warehouse</i>	4	29
<i>Delivery to CP and distribution</i>	1	30

This time-lag is the reason for the relatively low tonnage distributed against the planned tonnage in 2004. Contributions from donors later in the second half of the year normally cannot be used for food to be distributed in that year, especially when the impact of the rainy season is considered. WFP's performance in 2004 is actually quite impressive when one considers that the EMOP really only started in April 2004.

One of the ways in which WFP dealt with the time problems is through the internal borrowings system which allow country programme to borrow for one purpose from advances received for another purpose. This was discussed above under Hypothesis 10.

Internal borrowing is one area which is strongly affected by donor conditionality as can be seen from Table 22.



Table 22: The operational impact of common donor conditionalities

<i>Donor Condition</i>	<i>Operational impact</i>
<i>Bag Marking</i>	Bag markings not only cost money but also limits loans between programmes and internal borrowing. If money from donor A is used to temporarily pay for goods that donor B will eventually pay for; neither A nor B will be happy if the bags are marked as being from the other. Bag marking requirements make funds much less flexible.
<i>TOD/TDD</i>	TOD (Terminal Operation Date) and TDD (Terminal Disbursement Date) impose limits on when the money can be used for operations, and how long after operation ends disbursements can still be made. Operations often lag slightly and it is useful if funds can be expended later than planned. Many contractors and partners may submit invoices after the end of an operation, so a terminal disbursement date that coincide with or falls shortly after the terminal operation date is very restrictive.
<i>Purchasing</i>	Donors may supply goods in kind or require purchasing in their own country or in affected country or in less developed countries ³³ . Donors may veto purchases of food that may contain GM materials. All of these restrictions increase the cost of food to WFP and may increase lead times for delivery to beneficiaries.
<i>Funding Proposal</i>	Some donors require a funding proposal in a particular format, or reporting to boot. This means that highly skilled staff spends time producing such documents (that may be immediately filed rather than read) instead of focusing on the operational priorities.
<i>Resource transfer and the reprogramming of Unspent Balances</i>	Given the lead times inevitable in supplying food aid, there are always going to be unspent balances and undistributed commodities at the end of the operation. Donor inflexibility on transfers consumes staff time as they search for solutions that will be acceptable to the donor.
<i>Internal Response Account (IRA)</i>	The internal response account is one of the internal loan mechanisms used by WFP. If donors agree to allow their funds to be used for IRA loans, or to reimburse expenditures made with IRA loans, it means that WFP can plug holes in the pipeline and ensure the beneficiaries have a more complete food basket.
<i>Working Capital Financing (WCF)</i>	Working capital financing is another internal loan mechanism that permits programmes to prevent gaps in food deliveries to beneficiaries. Donor flexibility on this helps to prevent pipeline breaks and can speed up the response.

The bottom line is that donor conditionality, especially when combined with the timing of donations, makes it even harder for WFP to juggle the different contributions to deliver a consistent pipeline to beneficiaries. Putting the different contributions together is a bit like building a 3-D jigsaw when you only have some of the pieces and other pieces arrive at random intervals while you are making the jigsaw. Donor conditions make WFP programmes both more expensive and less effective than they might otherwise be.

16.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 14

Donors provided generous amounts of funding for WFP and it is partly this generosity that has enabled WFP to perform so well in Darfur.

However, the timing of contributions and the conditions set by donors imposed significant costs on WFP and promoted pipeline breaks in some cases. Donors who have agreed to allow their funds to be used as, or to repay, internal loans have helped WFP to get around some of the delays. These internal financing mechanisms played a very large role in WFP's performance in Sudan.

³³ Food aid that is tied in this way can be expected to be 30% more expensive than food purchased on a straight commercial basis (Clay, Riley, Urey, & OECD, 2006).



16.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 14

In line with the general principles of good humanitarian donorship, and where their domestic legislation permits, donors should remove negative conditionalities from their contributions to WFP. Such conditionalities not only increase the costs for WFP, leading to a reduction in the numbers served, but may also promote breaks in the pipeline which can increase the suffering of the affected population.



17. Hypothesis 15: WFP's food operations were coherent with agreements with other UN agencies, with standards, and with WFP policy.

WFP has a number of standing agreements in the form of Memoranda of Understanding with other UN organisations. The most important of these is probably the WFP MOU with UNHCR. However, this applied to the operation in Chad rather than in Darfur. In Darfur the most important MOU were probably the agreements with UNICEF³⁴ and ICRC³⁵. WFP also has technical agreements with WHO on logistics cooperation, with UNICEF for field telecommunications as well as with FAO.

WFP has a global MoU with UNICEF through which UNICEF is expected to take the lead in assessing the prevalence of malnutrition, the special needs of young children and women as well as needs for water, sanitation, health care, education and other social services. WFP and UNICEF also have an agreement dating from 2005 on Food for Education.

The MOU with UNICEF about nutrition was one of the most important MOU's in terms of nutritional impact and assisting extremely vulnerable groups. However, as already noted in the evaluation of EMOP 10048 for Operation Lifeline Sudan (Broughton et al., 2004), the terms of the MOU on nutrition are only being partially implemented by UNICEF due to capacity constraints.

In terms of standards, WFP requires NGO partners to adhere to the Code of the Conduct of the Red Cross and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response & ICRC, 1994). The Code of Conduct is a useful summary of general principles for humanitarian action.

The first principle of the IFRC Code of Conduct (Box5) is that the humanitarian imperative comes first. WFP did observe this principle and took administrative risks to ensure that food was delivered to Darfur.

As noted earlier, WFP enjoyed a very good collaborative relationship with ICRC, and ICRC staff very positive about their relations with WFP. This is hardly surprising, given the way in which WFP put the humanitarian imperative first in its response, a position that fits very closely to that of ICRC.

However, WFP's performance against some other principles is less impressive. Beneficiary involvement could have been better, as could accountability to the affected population.

The harshest criticisms of WFP came from other United Nations agencies who accused WFP of being not responsive to changes on the ground quickly enough. Some blamed the centralised structure adopted by WFP which meant that many issues had to be referred to Khartoum for decision.

³⁴ 1998 UNICEF/WFP Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Emergency and Rehabilitation Interventions.

³⁵ Aide Mémoire for Field Agreements between ICRC and WFP, 23 December 1999.



Box 5: Principles of the Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct

However, the team found no evidence that WFP was in breach of any agreements or memoranda of understanding with other United Nations agencies. From comments made by interviewees, it was clear that WFP needed to communicate better, not only with other United Nations agencies, but also with line ministries such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Education.

There were a number of departures from WFP policies on food distributions and the policies laid out in WFP's Enhanced Commitment to Women. These departures from policy were most often seen in the work practices of cooperating partners. These departures included a lack of shade at distribution points, payments for distribution, insufficient women's participation on food distribution committees, and the lack of beneficiary information about the ration.

An additional departure from WFP policy included a sustained weakness in monitoring throughout the life of the emergency operations under review. The evaluation team was happy to note that WFP Sudan was paying a great deal more attention to monitoring in 2006.

17.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 15

Where WFP undertook operations with other UN agencies these were in conformance with agreements. However, WFP could have had better communication with some agencies.

WFP's clearly put the humanitarian imperative first and took administrative risks to meet the food needs in Darfur.

Some aspects of distributions were not in conformance with WFP policy (again raising the issue of CP performance, which has already been discussed).

WFP's efforts at monitoring did not meet standards outlined in policy guidance (see detailed discussion below).

17.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 15

WFP Sudan should improve communication with other UN agencies and with the Government Departments most closely associated with its work.

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not objects of pity.



WFP should consider testing the use of the Code of Conduct as a framework for the evaluation of WFP humanitarian operations.





18. Hypothesis 16: WFP was able to monitor the effectiveness of its programme and inform managers in good time when changes were needed.

There was little or no monitoring in 2004 due to the overwhelming focus on getting tonnage out to the field and reaching the maximum number of beneficiaries. In 2005, WFP Sudan gave a higher priority to monitoring and evaluation. Khartoum requested help from Rome and a database was set-up with the assistance of a consultant from Rome.

After the database was set-up, South Darfur was then the office to implement the monitoring and evaluation package and to train WFP and cooperating partner staff in food aid monitoring. Training in North and West Darfur followed and a standardised monitoring system was put into place. This includes a quota of four food basket monitoring reports, four food distribution monitoring reports and two post-distribution monitoring reports of fifteen households for each field office per month.

WFP food monitors submit their reports to the area office for compiling and a report drafted. While the system is clear, the actual analysis and subsequent use of the monitoring reports to inform managers is less obvious. In some offices this is more effective than in others, but overall the monitoring system developed is more of a database activity rather than a dynamic tool that offers managers valuable and timely information on the program.

The single biggest problem in the implementation of the monitoring plan is insufficient human resources. Field Monitors are a relatively junior post, but are quite demanding in terms of the skills required. The types of candidates with the requisite language and social survey skills tend to move on fairly quickly once they have some WFP experience. Very few field offices have the three to five field monitors needed and for most of 2005 field offices had only one field monitor despite the size of the Darfur caseload. Field monitors also tended to be given other tasks to do apart from the monitoring.

Standardized reporting only really began in July 2005 for South Darfur and in September 2005 for North and West Darfur. It was nearly 18 months before the regular monitoring foreseen in the 2004 EMOP was in place. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that WFP monitoring that is carried out concentrates mostly on food flows and less on the impact of food. ICRC monitoring includes anthropometric measurement. This allows ICRC managers to decide whether to continue with half rations in some location or to reinstate full rations depending on the nutritional trends that the monitoring reveals.

In many WFP programmes issues are first raised by cooperating partners and then confirmed by WFP monitoring. In Darfur, many of the cooperating partners only began monitoring in mid-2006 (over two years into the Darfur program). This delay means that cooperating partners' did not understand the impact of the food distribution modality they were using and the use of the food aid at the household level.

One issue for cooperating partner monitoring is very low staffing rates. Most cooperating partners do not have the manpower to monitor the distribution or post-distribution effectively. This is particularly true in West and South Darfur, where one of the major cooperating partners is only now (September 2006) setting up field offices which will allow for more consistent field presence and monitoring activities.

A key monitoring issue is WFP's ability to monitor the performance of its cooperating partners. WFP did try to introduce mutually agreed performance criteria for cooperating



partners in 2005, but these were not very successful, partly because of partner capacity. Normally, a monitoring and evaluation system would include a comprehensive system to ensure the performance of the cooperating partners in terms of food handling and distribution. This level of monitoring is only now being put into place and is potentially a central factor in underperformance by certain cooperating partners.

Monitoring is particularly necessary in such a dynamic situation as Darfur, and especially where cooperating partners had in some cases shown themselves to be weak. While monitoring was perhaps another issue that got sidelined in the rush to reach over three million affected, it is perhaps the omission to be most regretted because of the importance of monitoring in informing management of what the impact of their work is, and how they need to change programmes to be more effective and efficient.

To some extent, management policies were influenced by the annual EFSNA, but this is not a substitute for regular monitoring, not least because it provides a global picture, rather than the detailed one needed by managers to address shortcomings in their own or in partners' performance.

Good management requires not only good information, but also that decisions are based on information and analysis rather than on group-think. The issue of CSB has been discussed elsewhere. However, the team noted that the reasons offered for the proposed removal of CSB from the general ration were based on anecdotes about beneficiary use of CSB. The proposal also seemed to be based on an ill-informed consensus among some CPs, rather than on an objective analysis founded on real evidence.

18.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 16

Monitoring was very weak on aspects other than logistics and denied managers the information to take steps to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the programme. The annual EFSNA is not a substitute for regular monitoring. However, monitoring by WFP did improve noticeably towards the end of the period under review.

Monitoring did not inform managers sufficiently, and there seems to have been very little internal reflection on the operational strengths and weaknesses of the Darfur response.

18.2. Recommendation on Hypothesis 16

WFP Sudan needs to take further steps to improve the quality of monitoring of food distribution and use so that managers have the information they need to take evidence-based decisions about the targeting of food.

WFP Sudan needs to base its decisions on food-aid on the analysis of objective data from monitoring.



19. Hypothesis 17: WFP demonstrated learning in its Darfur operations.


Institutional learning occurs when an institution changes what it does through changing its internal decision rules in response to the knowledge that staff gains from the institutions interactions with the surrounding environment. This definition encompasses three elements:

- Change in the observed behaviour of the institution.
- Changes in what the agency does prompted by changes in internal policies
- Changes in internal policies in response to knowledge gained by the institutions staff.

WFP clearly demonstrated learning in its Darfur operation. In the absence of effective monitoring, WFP took advantage of the annual EFSNA to learn lessons and recommendations from the 2004 and 2005 EFSNAs were incorporated in the EMOPs for 2005 and 2006.

WFP's performance implementing the Darfur EMOPs increased significantly between 2004 and 2005 across a range of indicators (Figure 15). This was a very significant achievement against a background of a larger number of more disperse beneficiaries. Such improvements in performance are only possible when an organisation is learning from what has happened before, and this is the best evidence that WFP was learning from its experience.

Figure 15: Changes in key performance indicators between 2004 and 2005



The improvements in performance were only possible because WFP continually changed the way it implemented the EMOPS so as to improve performance. However, it should be noted that most of the indicators show in Figure 15 are logistic or administrative ones. Even so, the improvements shown reflect a significant achievement against a background of an increased number of beneficiaries spread over a wider geographical range. Such



improvements in performance are only possible when an organisation is learning from what has happened before, and this is the best evidence that WFP was learning from its experience.

WFP changed internal policies in an effort to promote better performance. Not all of these policy changes were completely successful, for example the efforts by WFP to improve monitoring by agreeing performance targets with partners.

In interviews with WFP staff, it was clear that changes in policies, on such issues as warehousing for cooperating partners had come about as a result of knowledge gained by WFP staff. The biggest challenge for WFP was that, without good overall monitoring, learning was largely restricted to logistics, an area where WFP had good internal monitoring.

19.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 17

WFP clearly demonstrated learning in its Darfur operation, making changes in rations and practices in response to lessons learned. The improvement in several key performance indicators demonstrate the WFP was learning during the operation.

However, WFP's learning was constrained by the lack of effective monitoring over the whole programme, and learning was most evident in areas like logistics where WFP monitoring was concentrated. In the absence of good post distribution and food use monitoring, WFP made extensive use of the annual EFSNA to inform policy decisions.



20. Hypothesis 18: WFP structured the management of the Darfur emergency response to enable a rapid scale up and adequate support.

One of the benefits of modern technology is that email and satellite telephones have made everyone more accessible, including those working in the deep field. However, this universal communication brings real problems for managing a response in an isolated area like Darfur as it is so easy for staff in the field to get distracted with competing demands for information.

In Darfur, WFP Sudan changed the traditional matrix structure, where staff report simultaneously to the line and technical managers, to a hierarchical one. In the hierarchical scheme all communication was channelled through the area coordinator to the Darfur Operations Unit and the Emergency Coordinator for Darfur.

Most of the field level staff interviewed was very positive about the decision to move to a hierarchical structure. They reported that it gave them a single point of contact for all their queries and issues, and that any issues raised got dealt with one way or another. One of the key concerns for the Emergency Coordinator was to ensure that field level staff were not overloaded or confused by conflicting instructions or demands for information.

In a world with universal instant communication, this type of structure is probably essential to keep everyone focused on the task in hand and to prevent the sort of chaos that can happen when staff is overwhelmed by competing demands. Maintaining a central control ensures that everyone remains focused on the priority established by the centre.

However, some technical staff at Khartoum level felt that they were marginalised by this arrangement, as they no longer had direct contact with the field, but had to work through the chain formed by the Darfur Unit and the Area Coordinators. However, other support units had no problem with this arrangement. It is not clear if the issues arose from personality issues or from different visions about the role of technical units. Are they there to control the quality of the work that is done, or are they there to support the field?

The centralisation meant that while the communication between the field and Khartoum was more focused, it was also narrower and less rich than it would have been in a matrix structure. The quality of communication lost out to the narrow focus. This can lessen the ability of technical specialists to react and impact on specific technical issues that occur. Finally it can act a disincentive for technical support and program creativity/flexibility that is essential during a complex emergency. Several examples were given in interviews of instances where Darfur issues were marginalized in some technical units due to the working environment produced by the hierarchical structure.

The hierarchical structure also frustrated certain partners in Sudan who worked under decentralised models and resented having to communicate with WFP only through its 'official' representative in Khartoum.

20.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 18

The replacement of a matrix structure with a hierarchical model with a single node for all communications was a key change which facilitated both scaling up and the focus on the number of beneficiaries. This change meant that all communication flowed through a single node.



The evaluation team concluded, from comparison of the WFP operation in Darfur, with other emergency operations by other agencies that they have evaluated, that the move to a hierarchical structure was a necessary condition for what WFP achieved in terms of the huge tonnages distributed in Darfur.

However this approach also had costs, particularly on the programme/technical aspects of the operation. It also placed a large load on the area coordinators. It also frustrated certain partners who resented the limitations of the centralised structure.

20.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 18

WFP Sudan should consider reinforcing the Area Coordination Offices as the hierarchical model places a great deal of stress on the Area Coordinator. The area coordinators act like Country Directors in a way, but don't have the administrative support that a Country Director would have.

WFP Sudan needs to ensure that the hierarchical model does not impact too heavily on the quality of the information flow between technical units in Khartoum and their assistants at field level. This may require providing pre-agreed procedures for such communication and a further effort by the Darfur unit to engage with all the technical units in Khartoum.



21. Hypothesis 19: WFP food prevented widespread nutritional distress and mortality in Darfur.

There can be no doubt that WFP food aid interventions prevented widespread nutritional distress and mortality in Darfur. Darfur was threatened by a catastrophe in early 2004 (MSF Holland, 2004). Food aid was a major factor in 2004-05 in preventing distress as insecurity denied people access to their normal coping strategies. In contrast, the role of food aid was far more questionable in the 1984-85 famine as the population has access to their normal coping strategies then.

In interviews with all of the major stakeholders, including beneficiaries, cooperating partners, and United Nations agencies there was general agreement that WFP food flows into Darfur averted a serious humanitarian catastrophe. Beneficiaries in particular supported this idea very strongly and felt the food aid supplied averted an almost certain disaster.

While pockets of malnutrition continued throughout 2004 and 2005 in areas of Darfur, the yearly EFSNA statistics reflect the overall trend in Darfur, which shows a substantial reduction in the global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates, the severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates, the crude³⁶ mortality rates (CMR) and the under five mortality rates (<5 MR) (Table 23).

Table 23: Change in nutritional indicators from 2004 to 2005

<i>Year</i>	<i>GAM Z score³⁷ basis</i>	<i>SAM Z score basis</i>	<i>CMR deaths/ 10,000/day</i>	<i><5 MR deaths/10,000/day</i>	<i>SFP³⁸ coverage</i>	<i>TFP Coverage</i>
T2004 EFSNA	21.8% 95% CI ³⁹ (18.2% -25.3%)	3.9% 95% CI (2.3% - 5.6%)	0.72	1.03	18%	0%
2005 EFSNA	11.9% 95% CI (10.3% -13.6%)	1.4% 95% CI (0.9%- 2.0%)	0.46	0.79	20.2%	28.3%
Benchmark k values	15%	2-3%	1.00	2.00	>50% rural >70% urban >90% camp	

While there was an overall reduction in the malnutrition rates, it is important to note that the malnutrition situation did not stabilize between 2004 and 2005 and there continued to

³⁶ Crude refers to the fact that the mortality rates are not adjusted for the age composition of the population.

³⁷ Z-score basis means that the children measured have been compared with the distribution curve of weights that for children of the same height in the reference population. This is more rigorous than the using a fixed percentage of the mean weight to classify children as malnourished.

³⁸ Supplemental feeding programme (SFP) address the food needs of moderately malnourished children, while therapeutic feeding programmes (TFP) address the food (and possibly the medical needs) of severely malnourished children.

³⁹ The first figure gives the prevalence of the condition (GAM or SAM) in the sample population. The 95% confidence interval gives the range that the prevalence likely to have (with only a 5% chance of it falling outside the range) in the whole population from which the sample is drawn.



be localised areas with very high rates of GAM and SAM in all parts of Darfur. Even the 2005 EFSNA found that while the rate of GAM had decreased dramatically in West Darfur to 6.2%, North Darfur was still above the emergency threshold with a 15.6% GAM rate.

Further, even as the EFSNA sample found the average GAM to be 6.2% in Western Darfur, intensive surveys done by other organizations found rates at single locations as high as 16.9% GAM just two months earlier. Overall, the range of malnutrition in IDP camps in 2004 was from 10.7-33.9% GAM and in 2005 was from 9.9-26.5% GAM. The occurrence of levels as high as 26.5% GAM in 2005 is disappointing given the levels of food aid.

One area that did show marked improvement between 2004 and 2005 was the change in household food consumption for IDP households living in camps. In 2004 only 14% of IDPs in camps had acceptable food consumption. This rose to 51% in 2005. Over all of Darfur (IDP and host communities included), 31% of households had acceptable food consumption in 2004, which rose to 58% in 2005. The higher percentage of host community households (compared with IDP households) with acceptable food consumption reflected their access to livelihood strategies other than food aid.

The reason for continuing high levels of GAM in camps against a background of improving levels of food consumption is complex. Food is necessary to prevent malnutrition but is not sufficient on its own. Poor access to clean water, poor access to health care services, inappropriate infant and child feeding practices, insecurity, lack of access to supplementary and therapeutic feeding and livelihood insecurity can lead to malnutrition.

The rate of diarrhoeal cases in children under five increased between 2004 (41%) and 2005 (45.3%), implying that appropriate water supplies, effective sanitation or hygiene education were inadequate. The 2005 EFSNA points out “The variation in malnutrition prevalence by state correlates well with the availability of other health and nutrition related services - access to improved water sources, SFP and treatment rates for childhood illnesses were highest in West Darfur (GAM 6.2%) and lowest in North Darfur (GAM 15.6%)”. The available of health and nutrition related services were strongly correlated with the proportion of the population that was displaced, and the international community delivered these services in IDP camps.

Supplemental and therapeutic supplemental feeding programs are intended to offer nutritional support to the nutritionally vulnerable population, primarily children under five and pregnant/lactating women. In Darfur, the coverage for these programs was very low and the yearly EFSNA found that only about one in five of children identified as being moderately malnourished was receiving supplementary feeding. The coverage for the therapeutic feeding programmes was even lower going from zero in 2004 to 28.3% in 2005.

The second budget revision in 2004 proposed that 400,000 children under five in Darfur received a blanket supplementary ration for 120 days from August to November 2004, the worst of the “hungry season” in Darfur. Although this budget revision was approved, this blanket supplementary feeding never took place. WFP interviewees said that it was not implemented as it was not practical. WFP did not manage to deliver the planned tonnage even for GFD in this period, and the number of people in need identified by OCHA continued to grow from August to December 2005.



The evaluation team found that in general there is a misconception of moderate malnutrition among households. This leads to households failing to recognize the importance of SFP. This is often the case when programmes staff are not aware of beneficiary needs and priorities around such issues as the timing, placement, and commodities given in the SFP, the need for personal interaction and information giving, encouragement of active participation among mothers etc.

However, it should be clear here that WFP has a limited capacity to influence the level of SFP and TFP coverage. SFP and especially TFP are very demanding in terms of technical capacity, and only some cooperating partners have this capacity and an interest in this area. Even so, WFP could have done more in conjunction with UNICEF and other partners to increase the availability of SFP and TFP and to increase coverage through supporting public education.

One issue raised by a partner was about the value of the supplemental feeding basket. Originally it was agreed between nutrition partners, UNICEF and WFP that the SFP basket would offer approximately 1300 kcal/day. The amount was then reduced to 1017 kcal/day by WFP without consulting the nutrition group further. Many do not feel that the SFP amount is sufficient while other are more concerned about the unilateral way WFP altered the basket without consultation. Generally, the standard SFP should offer approximately 1,000-1,200 kcal and have 35-45 grams of protein 30% of the energy in the form of fats. The current SFP ration meets these standards.

21.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 19

Very clearly, without the food brought by WFP there would have been very significant nutritional distress, morbidity, and death in Darfur. The food was clearly needed especially as security prevented access to many traditional coping strategies.

WFP could have even greater impact if more attention were paid to assisting partners to improve their nutritional programmes and to work on non-food causes of malnutrition (including water, sanitation, and access to health services).

WFP could have devoted more attention to SFP and TFP, but given the limited resources both in terms of its own capacity and the capacity of cooperating partners; this would have reduced the level of GFD. SFP and TFP are not very effective in the absence of a reasonable level of general food availability.

21.2. Recommendations on Hypothesis 19

WFP needs to work more closely with partners to improve both the extent and coverage of SFP and TFP. There is also a very high rate of defaulting and low rate of recovery in the centres, which needs immediate attention if the programs are going to fulfil their intention and have positive nutritional impact.

WFP needs to improve its communication with partners on the standards for and WFP policy on supplementary rations.





22. Hypothesis 20: Beneficiaries were reasonably satisfied with the assistance that they got from WFP.

Beneficiary satisfaction with assistance is the key accountability for all humanitarian work, because beneficiaries are in the best position to determine if assistance has been effective or not⁴⁰.

The monthly monitoring and evaluation reports note that WFP still has low visibility in many areas. However, this was not the experience of the evaluation team as the beneficiaries we were able to access (almost all of whom were in camps) were familiar with WFP.

Beneficiaries were unstinting in their praise of WFP, particularly in 2005, and recognise the key role that WFP has played in ensuring their survival. They did however regret that rations had been reduced from their 2005 values, although the beneficiaries we talked were aware of the issue of resource constraints.

22.1. Conclusions on Hypothesis 20

Beneficiaries were very satisfied with the assistance that they got from WFP, particularly for 2005 when rations were better than in either 2004 or 2006.

⁴⁰ Beneficiaries are less well able to judge efficiency, as they don't have access to the cost basis for the operation.





23. General Conclusion

23.1. Quantity or quality?

One major question throughout this report has been about the balance between the quantity of food delivered and the quality of the operation in terms of its nutritional impact. Given the limited capacity both of WFP and especially of its cooperating partners, paying more attention to the quality of the programme would have reduced the total flow of food into Darfur.

The real issue is whether the population of Darfur was best served by WFP maximising the food flow into Darfur, or would have been better served by an approach less focused on GFD and more focused on the other aspects of the EMOP.

Effectiveness in working towards the strategic objectives of the operation is determined not only by the amount of food delivered to cooperating partners, but also by the ways in which cooperating partners distribute food and households use it. This would suggest that WFP should have paid more attention to the quality of this final part of the food delivery chain.

WFP did very well all along the logistics chain up to delivery to cooperating partners, but the final parts of the chain were far from ideal. This was due partly to variable performance by cooperating partners and partly to WFP's inability to appropriately monitor the food aid.

While supplying food is necessary to achieve a nutritional impact in a situation like Darfur it is not sufficient in itself to do so. Would the increased benefits from higher quality targeting and distribution have offset the losses from reducing the overall flow of food? This is a question which it is impossible to answer as it contains so many uncertain elements, for example around the likely scale of costs and losses.

One major problem is that even if WFP had focused more on the quality of the operations, the limited partner capacity might have led to only minimal gains. The best guess that the evaluation team can make is that a higher quality approach might possibly have saved even more lives, especially once logistics issues were more or less under control in 2005. WFP was probably too slow to change gear from a logistics emphasis to a programme quality one.

23.2. The internal constraint – corporate culture

“Corporate culture” comprises the attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values of an organisation. Deal and Kennedy (1982) referred to organisational culture as “the way things get done around here”. The culture of any organisation constrains what that organisation can do. At times this can be as great a constraint as all the external constraints put together.

Several interviewees pointed to WFP's culture as the underlying reason for some aspects of the operation in Darfur. In particular, interviewees often noted that WFP has a bias towards logistics. Logistics positions were filled quickly while even senior programme positions sometimes languished under temporary arrangements for months at a time. This bias was used by some interviewees to explain the emphasis on the number of beneficiaries assisted rather than the quality of the assistance that they were getting.



“What gets measured, get done” is one of the best known management aphorisms, and in WFP’s case it is quite clearly the tonnage of food that gets measured. WFP has a system for closely monitoring the flow of food through the logistics system, but no formal agency wide system for monitoring the impact of food interventions.

Peters and Waterman (1982) argue in “In Search of Excellence” that “strong” cultures are more effective than weak ones. However, they provide no means of measuring the “strength” of a particular corporate culture. However, Hofstede (1991, p. 189) suggested that the measure of the strength of a culture was the homogeneity of the views offered to test questionnaires. Hofstede (1991, p. 190) also found that such homogeneity was strongly linked to a results orientation.

WFP Darfur has a strong results orientation, and this focus helped it to achieve what it did. However, the result being kept in focus was the proportion of beneficiaries who were assisted, rather than the nutritional impact of that assistance. Nutritional impact depends not only on the quantity of food supplied, but also the quantity and quality available to the most vulnerable, access to water, sanitation, and health and a host of other factors.

The problem was that, with the poor quality monitoring, WFP staff in Darfur had very little information on the nutritional impact, other than the annual EFSNA. This lack of monitoring meant that it was not possible for WFP Sudan to use nutritional impact as the goal to drive the programme. This meant that success was measured by tonnage, a good fit with WFP’s overall corporate culture, but a far poorer fit with achieving a nutritional impact.

23.3. Summary conclusion

WFP’s staff in Sudan worked hard to fill the food gap in Darfur. They filled that gap in a very difficult logistics environment. Distributing over 560,000mt of food in Darfur between April 2004 and December 2005 was a triumph. There was a clear need for food and the staving-off of large-scale morbidity and mortality was an achievement that justifies the existence of WFP.

This achievement was only possible because the WFP management in Sudan took risks. They ignored the rule in any bureaucracy that “who does nothing, does nothing wrong”. They did things, they took calculated risks, they sailed close to the wind at times, they found innovative solutions, and they did not always comply with every WFP policy⁴¹. However, the result was that WFP Sudan achieved a great deal though their focus on meeting humanitarian needs.

The evaluation found that WFP achieved the results it did at the cost of less attention being paid to some key issues. These included:

- the lack of effective monitoring and evaluation of both the distribution process and the work quality of cooperating partners;
- an inadequate response to the firewood and milling issues affecting beneficiaries;
- poor commitment to gender mainstreaming and complex gender issues;

⁴¹ One senior interviewee in Rome frankly stated that the Darfur operation would not have been able to reach so many beneficiaries if they had stopped to dot every “i” and cross every “t”.



- Inadequate support in terms of human resources to assist the area offices in fulfilling their operational obligations.

While it is not the role of the evaluation team to second guess the priority strategies of the Darfur operation, issues of monitoring protection, gender, and nutritional impact are not sideline issues that can be addressed after an emergency. They are an integral part of the response itself and must be granted the attention and funding support from the inception of the humanitarian response. Priorities are an essential aspect of good management, but programming priorities cannot be discounted for the sake of logistical priorities. These are two sides of the same coin, and both parts must be present to ensure an effective response to a complex humanitarian emergency.

The lack of effective distribution and post-distribution monitoring was the biggest problem in the Darfur operation. The resulting lack of information meant that managers could only measure progress by monitoring food deliveries, rather than by monitoring food use and nutrition impact. Good monitoring would have flagged up a whole lot of issues for management to act on, from the milling cost to non-compliance with the Enhanced Commitment to Women.

Nevertheless, while greater attention to programme issues might have increase the quality and effectiveness of the WFP operations, and might have saved even more lives, there is no denying that WFP food-aid saved lives and prevented suffering in Darfur. Overall, and without hesitation, the evaluation team respects what WFP was able to do in its response to Darfur, and is impressed by what was achieved against a very difficult background.





Annexes





Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Sudan EMOP 10339: “Assistance to populations affected by conflict in greater Darfur, West Sudan”

1. Introduction

It is widely agreed that the 3-year old emergency in Darfur (and neighboring Chad) is far from winding down, and very possibly worsening. For WFP, both the challenges of the operating environment and the scope of its own engagement have steadily grown since 2003. By the end of 2005, WFP was running in Darfur one of the largest emergency programs in its history.

WFP operations in response to the Darfur crisis are likely to remain substantial for the foreseeable future. Taken together with a new generation of Southern Sudan interventions related to recovery and reconstruction (peace building), WFP’s activities in Sudan could represent one fifth or more of the agency’s worldwide operations.

In accordance with the WFP Evaluation Policy, **WFP will undertake a comprehensive evaluation of its emergency operations in Darfur in 2004-2005 under EMOP 10339 “Food Assistance to Populations Affected by War in Greater Darfur”.**

This evaluation of WFP’s emergency intervention in Darfur comes at a critical time. It has the potential to positively impact all WFP operations in Sudan, and to influence the response of the larger international humanitarian community.

2. Background

For a chronology of the conflict in Darfur, the international humanitarian response, and WFP’s role within it, please refer to Annexes 1-2.

Copies of official documents covering WFP’s emergency operations in Darfur over the period 2004-2005 will be sent on a CD-ROM to the successful bidder.

For detailed information on WFP’s ongoing humanitarian activities in Darfur, please refer to WFP’s public web site www.wfp.org.

3. Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will cover WFP emergency assistance to Darfur over the period 2004-2005. While WFP’s initial activities in Darfur occurred under Budget Revisions 2-3 of EMOP 10048.2, this evaluation will focus primarily on Sudan EMOPs 10339.0 and 10339.1: “Food assistance to populations affected by conflict in greater Darfur. Sudan EMOPs 10339.0/1 were supported by three Special Operations (SOs) in Sudan and one SO in Libya⁴². These will be considered in the evaluation only in so far as they support and complement EMOPs 10339.0/1. They will not be evaluated in their own right.

⁴² SO 10371 Logistics Augmentation; SO 10181 UN Humanitarian Air Services; SO 10342 UN Joint Logistics Centre; SO 10417.0 WFP Libya – Special Operation)



The evaluation will also take into account, though will not evaluate in detail, the impact on EMOPs 10339.0/1 of the related Chad EMOP 10327.0/1: Assistance to Sudanese refugees and host communities in eastern Chad.

Table 1. Principal WFP Emergency Operations in Darfur 2004-2005

EMOP No.	Start	End	Note
10048.2 Budget Rev 2	Nov 2003	Mar 2004	Added 600,000 beneficiaries in Darfur to original South Sudan caseload
10048.2 Budget Rev 3			Included 660 mt high energy biscuits for beneficiaries in Darfur
10339.0	Apr 2004	Dec 2004	1.18 M beneficiaries exclusively in Darfur
10339.0 Budget Rev 1	Oct 2004	Dec 2004	Provided full ration; increased beneficiaries from 1.18 M to 2.0 M due to poor harvest; augmented capacity
10339.0 Budget Rev 2	Aug 2004	Nov 2004	Provided blanket feeding for children under 5 years
10339.1	Jan 2005	Dec 2005	Increased beneficiaries from 2.0 M to 2.3 M;
10339.1 Budget Rev 1	Mar 2005	Dec 2005	Increased ration from 13.5 to 15 kg to compensate for milling losses and support markets; augment capacity;
10339.1 Budget Rev 2			Increased beneficiaries from 2.3 M to 3.25 M and extended relief to remote areas

4. Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is three-fold: accountability, guidance and learning.

Accountability: Under the WFP evaluation policy, the size of the Darfur programme requires that it be evaluated, and that the evaluation be managed by the Office of Evaluation (OEDE). The evaluation will examine if work has been conducted in appliance with agreed rules and standards, and report objectively on performance results. ‘Accountability’ in the context of this evaluation will include not just accountability to WFP’s Executive Board and donors, but to the



extent possible and practical, it should also include WFP's accountability to its beneficiaries and cooperating partners.

Guidance: WFP and its Executive Board increasingly recognise the importance of evaluative guidance during an operation and not just at the mid and end points. Periodic and comprehensive evaluation is clearly indicated in the case of Darfur due to the complexity of the problem, the size of the programme, and the wealth of relevant lessons from prior WFP interventions under similar circumstances in Sudan.

Learning: It is the expressed interest of the Executive Board that WFP's Office of Evaluation spend more time on evaluation of large EMOPS, as these are increasingly becoming the 'standard profile' of WFP interventions. Darfur is presently WFP's largest humanitarian operation, and one of the largest in its 40 year history. The evaluation will both draw upon and contribute to a rich and growing knowledge base of food aid interventions in complex emergencies

5. Guiding principals of the evaluation

In accordance with WFP evaluation policy and practice, the evaluation will respect the following principles:

- *Be **comprehensive***, by applying the standard OECD DAC criteria for evaluation of humanitarian interventions);
- *Take **account of lessons learned*** in recent and historic evaluations in Darfur and Sudan (see Annex 4), and also the WFP thematic review of recurring problems in humanitarian emergencies (WFP/EB.3/99/4/3);
- *Directly address **management needs***, by reviewing evaluation findings and lessons learned in relation to the main programme and management functions of WFP;
- *Identify and actively engage **local partners in the evaluation***, i.e. identify appropriate roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders, including donors, national partners, cooperating partners and beneficiary groups;
- *Actively **support local capacity building processes***, which includes the dissemination of lessons learned, one to one debriefings, and where appropriate having national partners participate in a national Reference group and evaluation activities.
- *Apply **accepted, rigorous and objective methodological approaches*** to evaluation, in accordance with ethical codes of conduct.
- *Take account of relevant **evaluation policies and good practice guidelines***, including those of WFP, donor, and implementing partner policies.
- *Include a **strategy for dissemination*** of findings, lessons and recommendations among key stakeholders in Sudan and beyond. These processes should be supported by the appointment of both international and national peer review groups.

6. Modalities of the evaluation

The evaluation will be conducted by a team of external evaluators contracted through (and responsible to) one lead evaluation agency with proven capacity in evaluation and demonstrable knowledge of humanitarian operations, preferably in Sudan. The contract will be managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEDE) and advised by technical reference groups nominated by



same. The TORs and expected outputs for the evaluation will be decided by OEDE. Responsibility for all deliverables will be that of the contractor.

WFP has invested substantial time and effort in background data collection and analysis to inform both the design and the eventual implementation of this evaluation. This research will be made available in full to the contractor and includes the following:

- Narrative summary of the Darfur crisis, the international response, and WFP's role within it;
- Meta-analysis of recent evaluations of humanitarian activities in Darfur and their relevance for WFP operations in Darfur;
- Stakeholder analysis;
- In-depth analysis of the key issues of concern to WFP stakeholders in this evaluation.

These materials, along with a comprehensive set of project documents and weekly, monthly and annual progress reports, will serve as the starting point for this evaluation.

Good practice argues for the strong inclusion of stakeholders' perspectives, not just as objects of the evaluation but equally as subjects of the evaluation. Participation of stakeholders is particularly important in providing an objective view of the relevance and appropriateness of WFP's strategic approach. In addition, WFP recognises that capacity building should be an objective of all its efforts, evaluation included. As a result, this evaluation will strive to incorporate both international and local stakeholder participation in a relevant and appropriate manner. Principal stakeholder participants could include members from:

- key UN cooperating partner (eg. UNICEF, UNHCR)
- key NGO partners, including established INGOs, INGOS arriving in Darfur only after 2003, local NGOs, Sudan Red Cross / Red Crescent, etc.
- UN coordinating partners (eg. OCHA, SG, HC)
- evaluation quality assurance partners (ALNAP)
- key donor(s)
- government and extra-government authorities, private sector and civil society

7. Approach and methodology

Basic methodological components

The evaluation should apply a range of standard evaluative techniques, including:

- desk reviews and studies of monitoring and assessment reports and data (qualitative and quantitative analysis),
- selected key informant interviews from WFP Cooperating Partners (CPs) and other selected stakeholder groups (e.g. government, donors, other UN agencies, ICRC, civil society), and
- focus group interviews applying a range of PRA techniques as appropriate with relief committees, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, civil society groups and tribal leaders during field visits to a range of selected locations in Darfur.

Reference Groups



The WFP evaluation manager will form and chair two ad hoc evaluation reference groups, one international in nature and composed primarily of WFP, donor, NGO, and other UN evaluation experts, the other local in nature and comprised of members of Sudanese government, NGOs, and civil society. The international reference group will advise the evaluation team on technical issues related to evaluation and evaluation best practice. The local reference group will advise the evaluation team on key issues for consideration in the evaluation, opportunities for effective participation, and a strategy for dissemination of the results.

Evaluation questions and judgement criteria

The evaluation should be based on a list of *evaluation questions* to be agreed between the evaluation team and WFP with the advice of the reference groups. The evaluation team will be responsible for the first proposal of the evaluation questions. The evaluation questions should draw heavily on the insight and analysis contained in the evaluation's preliminary design phase research.

For each agreed evaluation question, quantitative and /or qualitative judgement criteria will be identified, around which data collection methods will be decided and built. The evaluation team will provide a brief outline of key evaluation questions, judgement criteria, and proposed data collection and analysis methods to the Evaluation Manager and reference group members for their comment at least ten days prior to the start of field work.

Data collection

Security permitting, field visits should be made in all three Darfur regions. Field sites should be selected to include a range of intervention contexts, e.g. IDPs in camps (established & newly formed; those experiencing problems with registration); where IDPs are integrated with the urban population; distributions in more remote SLM areas; distributions to rural non IDPs; distributions to urban host/residents and pilot areas for Food For Education (if different from above).

The proposed evaluation methodology should be in accordance with WFP policies, programme guidance on evaluation (as elaborated in the Programme Guidance Manual and its supporting documents) and the principles and guidelines for humanitarian evaluation published by the OECD/DAC).

8. Focus of the evaluation

The evaluation will apply the standard OECD DAC criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian interventions:

- Relevance / appropriateness
- Connectedness
- Coherence
- Coverage
- Efficiency
- Effectiveness
- Impact

As mentioned above, key evaluation questions will be prepared by the evaluation team and approved by Office of Evaluation with the advice of the relevant reference group. Based on



preliminary desk study and interviews with key WFP stakeholders in Rome, London, Khartoum and North Darfur over the period December 2005 to February 2006, WFP has identified the following priority issues for investigation in the evaluation. In general, the evaluation questions will focus on these priority areas of concern:

Relevance: Was the design of WFP's intervention appropriate to the magnitude and nature of the problem? Did the objectives remain relevant throughout the intervention, and/or did they appropriately evolve in the face of rapidly changing circumstances on the ground in Darfur? Was the intervention design in line with WFP corporate strategies, policies and protocols, and was it relevant vis à vis the policies and capacities of WFP's donors and cooperating partners?

Special issues for consideration:

- *Management of food aid 'pull factor':* How well did WFP manage the strategic challenge of addressing the emergency needs of IDPs concentrated in and around urban areas, while minimising the 'pull factor' of food aid distribution? What were the positive and negative effects of the strategies employed? What are the implications for future WFP interventions?
- *Protection:* Did WFP's intervention modalities adequately account for the protection issues and needs of beneficiaries in the Darfur context? What was the overall effect of WFP's approach to protection in Darfur, and what are the implications of this experience for future interventions in Sudan or elsewhere?
- *Experimental design:* WFP tested several innovative approaches in Darfur intended to leverage existing resources: (1) increased rations of sugar in the food basket as a direct income transfer, and (2) the use of an expanded cereal ration to offset milling costs and support the functioning of private markets in remote areas with a view toward reducing in-migration to settlements. What were the results of these efforts? The costs? What are the lessons and implications for future WFP interventions?

Effectiveness/impact: Did the WFP intervention effectively meet the basic food needs of conflict-affected persons in Greater Darfur? Did it successfully contribute to improving and maintaining the nutritional status of target populations? Did these actions indeed save lives as intended? Did WFP accomplish these objectives with appropriate consideration for age, gender, material and non-material needs? Was the EMOP effective in providing IDP children with continued, consistent education in spite of their displacement?

Efficiency/coverage: Did WFP combine human, material and financial inputs most economically and in a timely manner to achieve its desired results? What constraints did WFP face in Darfur with respect to organisational structure, partner capacity, resourcing, physical access, humanitarian access, and security, and what strategies did they employ to mitigate or overcome them? Were these efforts successful, cost-effective and sufficient? What were the key lessons learned from these actions and what implications do they hold for future WFP interventions?

Special issues for consideration:

- *Logistical challenges and responses:* Darfur presented WFP with unusually serious and diverse logistic challenges, including limited physical infrastructure (ports, roads, storage), pervasive insecurity, and strong competition from the commercial sector for available operational inputs (port access, transport, storage, fuel); Creative responses allowed WFP to set agency records for logistical deliveries in a complex emergency, consistently increasing deliveries through the rainy season; what were the results in terms of vulnerable individuals reached who would otherwise have been neglected?



What were the costs? What are the specific implications for future logistics operations in Sudan and elsewhere?

- *Use of mobile distribution teams and 'unsupervised' community-based targeted distribution (CBTD) in a conflict situation:* WFP used security escorts and mobile distribution teams in Darfur to extend food aid coverage to insecure areas; this required the use of unsupervised community based targeting and distribution mechanisms; What were the results of this strategy vis à vis the level of coverage that otherwise would have been possible under the given security constraints? What were the costs? What were the approximate levels of targeting error under unsupervised CBTD vis. WFP Sudan's experience with partner-supervised CBTD? In the end, how did communities evaluate the experience of unsupervised CBTD?
- *Beneficiary registration:* Was beneficiary registration handled according to WFP policy and usual practices? Was registration timely and effective? What constraints did WFP and its partners face in registration, and how did they attempt to mitigate them? What were the impacts of registration inefficiencies on targeting outcomes? What are the implications for future registration practice?

Connectedness: Did WFP's humanitarian intervention in Darfur sufficiently consider, and address where possible, the long term needs of Sudan? Did the design of the emergency intervention reflect a sufficient understanding of the medium and long term development aims of WFP in Sudan as expressed in the Country Programme, co-existing PRRO, and nascent post-peace programming? Were institution- and capacity-building opportunities sufficiently considered and captured in the intervention planning and implementation?

Coherence: Did WFP's emergency activities in Darfur appropriately and sufficiently complement and/or supplement the activities and objectives of other actors, including effected households (coping activities), state, non-state, UN, NGO and bi-lateral entities?

9. Evaluation team composition and experience

The evaluation team should have proven knowledge and experience of humanitarian programming in camp and non-camp environments, food aid modalities for IDP and non-IDP populations, emergency nutrition, and emergency logistics. Such knowledge and experience should include operating in complex emergencies (ie. insecure environments), preferably in Sudan. The team should also have proven knowledge and expertise in evaluation planning, evaluative methods and techniques, and evaluation management. Familiarity with WFP structure, operations and policies is desirable.

The evaluation team should include local technical assistance from independent consultants and/or partner institutions in Sudan with experience, expertise, and language skills relevant to the evaluation.

The exact team composition will be proposed by the contractor and is subject to the approval of WFP. For illustrative purposes WFP has proposed an evaluation team comprised of a team leader, a programme specialist, and an economic analyst/ logistics specialist. However, a different team composition may be proposed based on the judgement of the contractor. Once a bid is awarded, the team composition may change only if so indicated in the process of refinement of the evaluation design or methods, and only if agreed by WFP.

At least one of the team members should have proven knowledge and practical experience in the field of emergency nutrition.





Annex 2: Persons met

Please note that the following table has not yet been checked – so please let us know if you are missing – or if your name is spelled wrong, or we have assigned you the wrong job title (or gender).

Most of the beneficiary interviews (146 women and 178 men) were in the form of group interviews. The details of these appear at the end of the list of individual interviews.

Summary of Interviewee Category (“Ct” in the table below)				of which	
Category of person interviewed	Ct	No	as %	♀	♀ as %
<i>World Food Programme</i>	W	76	44%	25	33%
<i>Cooperating Partners</i>	C	55	32%	12	22%
<i>Other UN</i>	O	17	10%	6	35%
<i>Red Cross and International NGO</i>	N	9	5%	5	56%
<i>Donor</i>	D	7	4%	1	14%
<i>Beneficiary (Individual interviews only)</i>	B	5	3%	1	20%
<i>Government</i>	G	2	1%	0	
Total		171	100%	50	29%

No one from the rebels was interviewed as security concerns prevented the evaluation team traveling to rebel controlled areas. Only a few government employees were interviewed in Khartoum. The team’s visit to Darfur coincided with a very sensitive time with reports of preparation for renewed fighting. During this time, the relevant government staff was already fully committed in dealing with the implications of the “Organisation of Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Act”, as well as dealing with high level delegations from donors and UN delegations. Given the sensitivities involved, the difficulty of getting appropriate appointments at short notice, and the risk of damaging WFP’s relations with the government by asking the wrong questions, the team opted to concentrate instead on interviewing beneficiaries.

Summary of Interview Method (“Meth” in the table below)				of which	
Type of interview method	Type	No	as %	♀	♀ as %
<i>Semi-structured Interview (Individual)</i>	ssi	107	63%	34	32%
<i>Semi-structured Interview (Group)</i>	ssg	41	24%	10	24%
<i>Brief Discussion (on a single topic)</i>	bd	14	8%	2	14%
<i>Detailed discussion</i>	dd	1	1%	1	100%
<i>General meeting</i>	gm	13	8%	5	38%
Total		171	100%	50	29%

In the following table the following are the initials for the interviewers:

- jc - John Cosgrave
- ao - Allison Oman
- afaf - Adul Jabar Abdullah Fadel
- sab - Saad Ali Babiker
- wt – Whole team, all of the above.
- jm – Jeffrey Marzilli



<i>Surname, Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	♂♀	<i>Meth</i>	<i>Ct</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>by</i>
<i>Abd Rachman, Khalid</i>	MSF Holland, Assistant to the Head of Mission	♂	bd	C	Khartoum	26/08/2006	ja ao
<i>Abdalla, Bader El Din</i>	HAC, Director Humanitarian Affairs	♂	ssg	G	Khartoum	07/08/2006	jc sab
<i>Abuala, Omar Abaked</i>	Mat Weaver, Duma Village	♂	ssi	B	Duma	13/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Abudrahman, Mohammedein</i>	IDP Sheik, Duma	♂	bd	B	Duma	13/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Aden, Abdi Dr.</i>	WHO, Head of West Darfur Programme	♂	ssi	O	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Ahimana, Cyridion</i>	UNICEF, Nutrition Officer	♂	ssg	O	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Akol, Ayii Bol</i>	WFP, Programme Officer	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	22/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Al Bushari, AlFateh Najm</i>	SRC, Executive Director West Darfur	♂	ssg	C	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Ali, Abulgasim Ahmed</i>	SRC, Programme Assistant	♂	ssg	C	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Alsherif, Omar</i>	SPCR, Food Aid Officer	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Amstad, Barbara</i>	ICRC Nyala, Head of sub-Delegation	♀	ssi	N	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Anbrey, Patrick</i>	ACF, Programme Coordinator	♂	ssg	C	El Fasher	16/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Avella, Antonio</i>	WFP, Head of Programme Nyala and acting Area Coordinator	♂	ssi	W	Nyala	10/08/2006	wt
<i>Badaoui, Annisa</i>	TDH, Camp Coordinator-Durti	♀	bd	C	Geneina	22/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Badri, Barakat Faris</i>	Sudanese Red Crescent El Fasher, Executive Director	♂	ssi	C	El Fasher	19/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Barclay, Bill</i>	Team Leader, Common Monitoring and Evaluation Approach, Office of Performance Measurement and Reporting	♂	ssi	W	Rome	08/09/2006	jc ao jm
<i>Barrett, Gary</i>	USAID, Team Leader Darfur	♂	ssg	D	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Barretto, Carolina</i>	WFP, Programme Officer (International)	♀	ssg	W	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Baruto, Rose</i>	WFP Rome, Resources Mobilization Officer, Resources and External Relations Division	♀	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Bastos, Paulo</i>	ICRC Nyala, Senior Logistics Delegate for Nyala	♂	bd	N	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Beckem</i>	WFP Rome, Logistics Officer, freight Analysis and Support Service, Transport, Preparedness and Response Division	♂	bd	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc
<i>Bizzarri, Mariangela</i>	WFP Rome, Programme Officer, Gender Unit	♀	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Bloem, Martin</i>	WFP Rome, Chief, Nutrition Unit	♂	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Bones, Alan</i>	Chargé d' Affaires, Canadian Embassy, Khartoum	♂	ssi	D	Khartoum	08/08/2006	jc
<i>Brian</i>	WFP, Programme Officer	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	21/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Brieme, Atat Mohamed Mohamoud</i>	UNICEF, Assistant Project Officer (Nutrition)	♀	ssg	O	El Fasher	16/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Buffard, Paul</i>	WFP Rome - Operations Department	♂	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc
<i>Buratto, Francois</i>	WFP Rome, Head of Procurement service	♂	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Chagali, Sammy</i>	Oxfam, Programme Manager, Oxfam Kebkabiya	♂	bd	C	Kebkabiya	21/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Clarival, Caroline</i>	ICRC Khartoum, Food and Essential Household Implements Programme	♀	ssi	N	Khartoum	24/08/2006	jc ajaf



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	Manager						
<i>Cunga, Abraõ Filipe</i>	ICRC El Fasher, Economic Security Delegate	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	17/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Curry, Denis</i>	Goal North Darfur, Field Coordinator	♂	ssi	C	Kutum	20/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Czerwinski, Christopher</i>	Area Coordinator, El Fasher	♂	ssg	W	El Fasher	15/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Da Silva, Romero Lopes</i>	WFP, Director ODT	♂	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	jc
<i>de Velasco, Antonio</i>	ECHO, Head of Office, Khartoum	♂	ssi	D	Khartoum	24/08/2006	jc
<i>Deng Manok, Mawut</i>	Senior Food Monitor	♂	ssi	W	Kebkabiya	21/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Dessimoz, Yasemine Praz</i>	ICRC Khartoum, Head of Operations – Darfur – ICRC	♀	ssi	N	Khartoum	24/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Detori, Illaria</i>	WFP Sudan, Darfur Unit, Programme Officer	♀	ssg	W	Khartoum	06/08/2006	wt jm
<i>DiPasquale, John</i>	Samaritans Purse, Khartoum, Deputy Country Director	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Doetsch, Walter</i>	USAID, Programme Officer Darfur	♂	ssg	D	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Driba, Getachew</i>	WFP Rome. Former Head of Programme, WFP Khartoum 2002 to 2005	♂	ssi	W	Rome	08/09/2006	jc ao jm
<i>Eerdeken, Kristal</i>	MSF Belgium, El Fasher, Head of Mission	♀	ssi	N	El Fasher	22/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>El Abbas, Hanan</i>	WFP, Gender Officer (National)	♀	ssi	W	Khartoum	09/09/2006	ao
<i>El Hag Bello, Farrah Omer</i>	UNOCHA, Field Coordinator Geneina	♂	ssi	O	Geneina	22/08/2006	ao sab
<i>El Noor, Salha</i>	GAA	♀	gm	C	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Elgony, Hamid Ibrahlim</i>	Care Nyala, Former Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Elsimari, Mohamed Alamadin</i>	UNICEF, Project Assistant	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	16/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Farah, Khalid M</i>	HAC, Director General Emergency Unit	♂	ssg	G	Khartoum	07/08/2006	jc sab
<i>Gettacheu, Eob</i>	WV Zone Manager	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Gordon, Renato</i>	World Vision Northern Sudan, Country Director	♂	ssi	C	Khartoum	27/08/2006	jc ao
<i>Grudum, Shiela</i>	WFP Rome, Emergency and Transiiont	♀	ssi	W	Rome	08/09/2006	ao jc
<i>Gurung, Naresh</i>	UNICEF, Resident Programme Officer (International)	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	16/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Hamid, Arahman</i>	USAID Khartoum, Food Security Advisor	♂	ssg	D	Khartoum	09/08/2006	jc ao sab
<i>Hashan, Salah</i>	WFP	♂	gm	W	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Hassan, Addelkareem Idrees</i>	Sudan Red Crescent, Executive Manager, Nyala	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc, ajaf
<i>Hassan, Jehad Abu</i>	Solidarités, Country Program Manager	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Heinrich, Jorg</i>	GAA Country Director, Sudan	♂	ssi	C	Khartoum	26/08/2006	jc ao
<i>Herbinger, Wolfgang</i>	Head, Emergency Needs Assessment Unit	♂	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc
<i>Hines, Deborah</i>	World Food Programme Rome, Chief, Performance and Reports, Policy Strategy and Programme Support	♀	ssg	W	Rome	08/09/2006	jc ao jm
<i>Hokan</i>	WFP, Head of Field Office, Habila	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Holsen, Martin</i>	WFP Rome, Chief, freight Analysis and Support Service, Transport, Preparedness and Response Division	♂	ssi	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc



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<i>Horton, Amy</i>	WFP, Head of Area Geneina	♀	ssi	W	Geneina	17/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Hudson, Catherine</i>	WFP El Fasher – Head of Programme	♀	ssi	W	El Fasher	23/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Hugh</i>	Tearfund, Area Coordinator	♂	ssi	C	Geneina	21/08/2006	ao
<i>Hunter, Sebit</i>	NRC Nyala, Distribution Coordination	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	12/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Husain, Arif</i>	Head of the VAM unit in Khartoum until Feb 2006	♂	ssi	W	Rome	08/09/2006	jc jm
<i>Ibrahim, Malak</i>	WV Nyala, Nutrition Supervisor	♀	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Idris, Adil</i>	WFP	♂	gm	W	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Ikumi</i>	WFP, Programme Officer	♀	ssi	W	Geneina	21/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Ippe, Josephine</i>	UNICEF, Senior Nutritionist (International)	♀	ssi	O	Khartoum	09/09/2006	ao
<i>Isaacs, Coy</i>	Samaritans Purse Nyala, Programme Coordinator	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Issac, Ali</i>	NRC Nyala, Project Assistant, Distribution	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	12/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Janssens, Karel</i>	MSF Belgium, Field Coordinator, Kebkabiya	♂	ssi	N	Kebkabiya	21/08/2006	jc
<i>Kamara, Mohammed</i>	WFP, Head of Field Office, Mourni	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Kandal, Rao</i>	Danish Refugee Council, Programme Officer (International)	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	10/08/2006	ao
<i>Kanova, Lucie</i>	WFP, Head of Field Office, Geneina	♀	ssi	W	Geneina	18/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Karimova, Jamila Dr.</i>	Relief International, Medical/Reproductive Health Coordinator	♀	ssi	C	El Fasher	16/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Karlsson, Lizette</i>	WFP, Programme Officer (International)	♀	ssg	W	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Kelley, Mark</i>	WFP, Deputy head of Security	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	07/08/2006	jc
<i>Kibiro, Ndoho</i>	WFP, Head of Field Office, Kebkabiya	♂	ssi	W	Kebkabiya	21/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Kiernan, Dierdre</i>	UNICEF, Head of Office Geneina	♀	ssg	O	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Kumar, Sasi</i>	Concern, Assistant Country Director	♂	ssi	C	Geneina	21/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Kusemererwa, Gloria</i>	WFP, Darfur Nutrition Coordinator	♀	ssi	W	El Fasher	15/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Laughton, Sarah</i>	WFP Rome, Programme Adviser, Emergency and Transition Unit	♀	ssi	W	Rome	08/09/2006	ao jc
<i>Lefevre, Julian</i>	WFP Rome, Senior Evaluation Officer, OEDE.	♂	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Lewis, Jane</i>	IRC	♀	gm	N	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Lewis, Jeffrey</i>	WFP Rome, Operations Department for Transport and Logistics, Logistics Officer and Deputy Head of Advance Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies	♂	ssi	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc
<i>Lyman, Andrew Thorne</i>	WFP, (International) (Check)	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	09/09/2006	ao sab
<i>Mammar, Ahmed Fadel</i>	Solidarités, Distribution Coordinator	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Manditsch, Maxine</i>	WFP Rome, Oversight Services Department of Inspections and Investigation, Senior Inspections and Investigations Officer	♀	ssi	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc
<i>Marianelli, Alex</i>	Logistics Officer for Darfur (OIC Logistics pro tem)	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	06/08/2006	jc sab
<i>Maritia, Lino Arcangelo</i>	Storekeeper	♂	ssi	W	Kebkabiya	21/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Martin, Fabrice</i>	Solidarités, Country Director	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab



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<i>McDonagh, Mike</i>	OCHA Manager, North Sudan	♂	ssi	O	Khartoum	26/08/2006	js sab
<i>McLoughlin, Elizabeth</i>	Deputy Director, CARE	♀	ssi	C	Khartoum	09/08/2006	jc
<i>Meeysa</i>	WFP, Registration	♀	ssi	W	Khartoum	09/09/2006	ao sab
<i>Mehghestab, Haile</i>	WFP Rome, Vulnerabilty Analysis and Mapping Unit. Based in Sudan from 1999 to 2002	♂	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Menage, Nicole</i>	WFP Rome, Chief Food Procurement Service	♀	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Messenger, Claire</i>	MSF Holland, Deputy Head of Mission	♀	bd	C	Khartoum	26/08/2006	jc ao
<i>Meznan</i>	WFP, Health and Nutrition Officer	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	19/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Mohamed, Abdirahman</i>	CRS, Head of Office Geneina	♂	ssg	C	Geneina	23/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Mohammed, Faisal</i>	WFP Nyala Field Office, Programme Assistant	♂	bd	W	Al Serif	12/08/2006	jc
<i>Molla, Daniel</i>	WFP Khartoum, VAM Officer	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	06/08/2006	jc
<i>Mounier, Beatrice</i>	ACF, Nutrition Coordinator	♀	ssg	C	El Fasher	16/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Mtendere, Mphatso</i>	FAO, Area Emergency Coordinator- West Darfur	♂	ssi	O	Geneina	23/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Muwanga, Alice</i>	IOM	♀	gm	O	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Negesse, Belihu</i>	CRS, Food Security Program Manager, West Darfur	♂	ssg	C	Geneina	23/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Nelms, Rashad</i>	WFP Rome, Protection Unit	♀	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	rome
<i>Neysmith, Daniel</i>	IOM, Head of Sub-Office Nyala	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Nikodimos, Tito</i>	WFP Rome, Logistics Officer, freight Analysis and Support Service, Transport, Preparedness and Response Division	♂	ssi	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc
<i>Nordby, Craig</i>	WFP, Internal Auditor, Rome	♂	ssi	W	Rome	30/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Norein, Abdoul Rahim</i>	WFP, VAM Assistant (National)	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	17/08/2006	ao
<i>Nur, Mohammed</i>	IOM, Registration Program Officer	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Nur, Mohammed</i>	SCF(USA), Food Programme Manager	♂	ssg	C	Geneina	19/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Nyandega, Jim</i>	Samaritans Purse Nyala, Food Commodities Manager	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Nyuguen</i>	WFP, Logistics Officer	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	17/08/2006	ao
<i>O'Keefe, Ivana</i>	OCHA El Fasher – Head of Office	♀	ssi	O	El Fasher	16/08/2006	jc
<i>Ogwaro, Rose</i>	Nutrition Coordinator, Goal	♀	ssi	C	Kutum	20/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Oshidari, Kenro</i>	WFP Representative, Sudan	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	08/08/2006	jc ao sb
<i>Osman, Bakri</i>	WFP, VAM Assistant (National)	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Osman, Ibris</i>	International Islamic Relief Organisation, Nyala, Deputy Director.	♂	gm	C	Nyala	12/08/2006	jc, ajaf
<i>Pal, Rohit</i>	WFP Logistics Officer, Nyala	♂	ssi	W	Nyala	12/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Palakrishnan, Rathi</i>	WFP Sudan, Darfur Unit, Programme Officer	♀	ssg	W	Khartoum	06/08/2006	wt jm
<i>Pattugalan, Gina</i>	WFP Rome, Consultant, Protection Unit	♀	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	jc
<i>Piytoo</i>	WFP, Warehouse Manager	♀	ssi	W	Geneina	19/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Pritchard, Shane</i>	WFP Darfur, Security Assessment Team Leader	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	07/08/2006	jc
<i>Ptassek, Annetta</i>	GAA HR Manager, Bonn	♀	ssi	C	Khartoum	26/08/2006	jc ao
<i>Rahiem, Montasier Abdul</i>	GAA Sudan, Financial Director	♂	ssi	C	Khartoum	26/08/2006	jc ao



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<i>Rahman, Abdu</i>	Shopkeeper, Duma	♂	bd	B	Duma	13/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Rahman, Abdu Ali</i>	Miller, Duma	♂	bd	B	Duma	13/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Rahman, Umda</i>	WV Nyala, Assistant Area Coordinator	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Rashid, Salma</i>	USAID Khartoum, Food Monitor	♀	ssg	D	Khartoum	09/08/2006	jc ao sab
<i>Redai, Haile</i>	WFP, Programme Officer and M&E Focal Point	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	15/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Rico, Susana</i>	WFP FDD, Deputy Director	♀	ssi	W	Rome	04/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Riebe, Ken</i>	UNHCR, Community Service Officer	♂	ssg	O	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Rushman, Mohammed Abdullah</i>	Rushman, Mohammed Abdullah	♂	bd	N	ZamZam	19/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Saleh, Abvakar Idris</i>	CHF Mill Manager, ZamZam	♂	bd	N	ZamZam	19/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Saleh, Asha</i>	Host Community Beneficiary	♀	ssi	B	Duma	13/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Salih, Mohammed</i>	WFP, VAM Assistant (National)	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	15/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Sanchez, Gina</i>	Spanish Red Cross, El Fasher, Programme Manager	♀	ssi	C	El Fasher	17/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Sanders, Nigel</i>	WFP Sudan, Head of Air Operations	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	07/08/2006	jc sab
<i>Schmidt, Eric</i>	Manager agricultural and Natural Resource Management, World Vision	♂	ssi	C	Khartoum	27/08/2006	jc ao
<i>Schmidt-Whitley, Jan</i>	ACF, Programme Coordinator South and East Sudan	♂	bd	C	Khartoum	24/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Sherif, Yahia</i>	Care Nyala, Commodity Accountant Food Section	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Shorley, Tom</i>	Head of Programme, WFP Sudan	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	08/08/2006	jc
<i>Smith, Sarah</i>	Goal Kutum, Medical Supervision	♀	ssi	C	Kutum	20/08/2006	jc
<i>Solomon</i>	WFP, Security Officer	♂	ssi	W	Geneina	17/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Suliman, Adam</i>	SD-RC	♂	gm	C	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Thomas, Glynn</i>	DFID, Humanitarian Adviser	♂	ssi	D	Khartoum	24/08/2006	jc
<i>Thorne-Lyman, Andrew</i>	WFP Rome, Nutritionist	♂	ssi	W	Rome	03/08/2006	jc jm
<i>Tijane, Ahmed Muhammed</i>	World Vision, SFP Nutritionist	♂	bd	C	Duma	13/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Tong, Malony</i>	WFP, VAM Assistant (National)	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Toyota, Terri</i>	WFP, Chief Programme Management Division	♀	ssi	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc
<i>Trolle-Lindgren, Anna</i>	WFP, Programme Officer, Programme Management Division	♀	ssi	W	Rome	29/08/2006	jc
<i>Tucker, Prince</i>	WV Nyala, Senior Commodities Officer	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Van der Kamp, Johan</i>	GAA Regional Director	♂	ssi	C	Khartoum	26/08/2006	jc ao
<i>Veloso, Carlos</i>	Emergency Coordinator, Darfur	♂	ssg	W	Khartoum	06/08/2006	jc sb
<i>Wahome, Lawrence</i>	WFP El Fasher Assistant Logistics Officer	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	16/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Waqar, Khattak,</i>	WFP El Fasher Logistics Officer	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	16/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Watif, Abdul</i>	Goal El Fasher	♂	ssi	C	Kutum	20/08/2006	jc
<i>Weinstein, Susan</i>	UNHCR, Gender Officer Geneina	♀	ssg	O	Geneina	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Wiahl, Jonas</i>	GAA, Head of Office, El Fasher	♂	gm	C	El Fasher	16/08/2006	wt
<i>Wiahl, Jonas</i>	GAA, North Darfur, Head of Project	♂	ssi	C	Nyala	16/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Wole, James</i>	Care Nyala, Team Leader	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Wright, David</i>	SCF(USA), Darfur Director	♂	ssg	C	Geneina	19/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Yacoubé, Rukia</i>	WFP, Nutrition Coordinator	♀	ssi	W	Khartoum	09/08/2006	ao



<i>Surname, Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	♂♀	<i>Meth</i>	<i>Ct</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>by</i>
<i>Yagoub, Sami</i>	WFP, Programme Officer (National)	♂	ssi	W	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Yahaya, Adam</i>	UNHCR, Field Assistant Programme	♂	ssg	O	Geneneia	20/08/2006	ao sab
<i>Yankuba, Patrick</i>	WFP, Head of Field Office, Kutum	♂	ssi	W	Kutum	20/08/2006	jc ajaf
<i>Young, Helen</i>	Member of the Evaluation Reference Group	♀	dd	C	London	24/07/2006	jc ao
<i>Zakaria, Hashim Mohamed</i>	SPCR, Executive Director	♂	ssg	C	Nyala	14/08/2006	ao sab

Group Interviews

The chief topic for all group interviews was the food basket, distribution, protection, livelihoods, and household food security.

<i>Group Description</i>	<i>Place</i>	♀	♂	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>By</i>
<i>Beneficiaries, Distribution Committee Members</i>	Al Serif camp	9		10:30	01:30	12-Aug	ao sa
<i>Sheiks, youth group, women's group, and IDPs from the general population</i>	Al Serif camp	9	21	10:30	10:45	12-Aug	ajaf, jc, sab, ao
<i>Sheiks, youth and IDPs from the general population</i>	Al Serif camp	0	22	10:45	13:05	12-Aug	jc ajaf
<i>Beneficiaries</i>	Duma IDP Camp	23		10:00	01:00	13-Aug	ao sa
<i>Host Beneficiary</i>	Duma IDP Camp	1		01:30	02:30	13-Aug	ao sa
<i>Sheiks and IDPs from the general population</i>	Duma IDP Camp		45	11:30	13:15	13-Aug	jc ajaf
<i>Red Crescent Volunteers, Sheiks, and IDPs</i>	ZamZam IDP Camp		44	09:50	10:45	19-Aug	jc ajaf
<i>Women IDPs</i>	ZamZam IDP Camp	80		10:55	12:00	19-Aug	jc ajaf
<i>Male IDPs</i>	Kassab Camp		7	11:35	13:05	20-Aug	jc ajaf
<i>Kebkabiya IDPs and FDC members</i>	Kebkabiya WFP Office	5	5	12:45	13:50	21-Aug	jc ajaf
<i>Sheikhs</i>	Krindng IDP Camp		29	11:30	01:30	22-Aug	ao sa
<i>Beneficiaries</i>	Krindng IDP Camp	11		01:30	03:30	22-Aug	ao sa
<i>Sheikhs</i>	Durti IDP Camp		5	11:00	12:30	23-Aug	ao sa
<i>Beneficiaries/Sheikhas</i>	Durti IDP Camp	8		12:30	02:00	23-Aug	ao sa





Annex 3: Consultants' itineraries

<i>Date</i>	<i>John Cosgrave</i>	<i>Abdu Jabar Ab. Fadul</i>	<i>Allison Oman</i>	<i>Saad Ali Babiker</i>
<i>Mon 24 Jul 06</i>	Travel to London for briefing by Helen Young		Travel to London for briefing by Helen Young	
<i>Wed 02 Aug 06</i>	Travel to Rome			
<i>Thu 03 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with WFP in Rome			
<i>Fri 04 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with WFP in Rome			
<i>Sat 05 Aug 06</i>	Travel to Khartoum			
<i>Sun 06 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with WFP in Khartoum			
<i>Mon 07 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with HAC, Air Ops, Logs, Security		Travel to Khartoum	
<i>Tue 08 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with WFP Rep, Canadian Embassy Etc	Travel from El Fasher	Interview with WFP-Khartoum, Team Meeting	
<i>Wed 09 Aug 06</i>	Interview with USAID, and Care. Developing final version of hypotheses	WFP Security training	Interview with WFP-Khartoum, UNICEF, USAID, and WFP-HQ nutritionist	
<i>Thu 10 Aug 06</i>	Travel to Nyala - CP meeting briefing by AC	Travel to Nyala - CP meeting briefing by AC	Travel to Nyala - CP meeting briefing by AC. Meeting with DRC. OCHA Security briefing.	Travel to El Fasher - CP meeting briefing by AC
<i>Fri 11 Aug 06</i>	Interview Head of Programme/OIC Nyala	Interview Head of Programme/OIC Nyala	Interview Head of Programme/OIC Nyala	Interview Head of Programme/OIC Nyala
<i>Sat 12 Aug 06</i>	Detailed interview with acting Area Coordinator. Site visit to Al Serif camp and group interviews there.	Detailed interview with acting Area Coordinator. Site visit to Al Serif camp and group interviews there.	Site visit/group meeting. Interviews WFP-Nyala. Interview NRC	Site visit/group meeting. Interviews WFP-Nyala. Interview NRC
<i>Sun 13 Aug 06</i>	Visit to Duma Camp. Group interviews and interviews with local traders etc	Visit to Duma Camp. Group interviews and interviews with local traders etc	Site visit/group meeting. Household Beneficiary Interview	Site visit/group meeting. Household Beneficiary Interview
<i>Mon 14 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with ICRC, Samaritans Purse, WV, and CARE	Interviews with ICRC, Samaritans Purse, WV, and CARE	Interview IOM, SPCR, Solidarités, WFP-Nyala	Interview IOM, SPCR, Solidarités, WFP-Nyala
<i>Tue 15 Aug 06</i>	Travel to El Fasher - CP meeting briefing by AC	Travel to El Fasher - CP meeting briefing by AC	Travel to El Fasher. Interviews with WFP-El Fasher	Travel to El Fasher. Interviews with WFP-El Fasher
<i>Wed 16 Aug 06</i>	CP meeting: Interview with GAA, IRC, and OCHA	CP meeting: Interview with GAA and IRC	Interviews UNICEF, RI, ACF. CP Distribution Meeting.	Interviews UNICEF, RI, ACF. CP Distribution Meeting.
<i>Thu 17 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with ICRC and ES RC	Interviews with ICRC and ES RC	Travel to Geneina. Meeting Head of Area. WFP-Geneina interviews.	Travel to Geneina. Meeting Head of Area. WFP-Geneina interviews.



<i>Date</i>	<i>John Cosgrave</i>	<i>Abdu Jabar Ab. Fadul</i>	<i>Allison Oman</i>	<i>Saad Ali Babiker</i>
<i>Fri 18 Aug 06</i>	Writing up	Writing up	WFP-Geneina interviews	WFP-Geneina interviews
<i>Sat 19 Aug 06</i>	Site visit to ZamZam. Group interviews. Interview with SD RC	Site visit to Zam Zam. Group interviews. Interview with SD RC	Interview SCF(USA). WFP/CP workplan meeting. Warehouse visit.	Interview SCF(USA). WFP/CP workplan meeting. Warehouse visit.
<i>Sun 20 Aug 06</i>	Visit to Kutum. Interviews with WFP Staff, and ICRC and Goal. Visit to Kassab Camp. Group interviews	Visit to Kutum. Interviews with WFP Staff, and ICRC and Goal. Visit to Kassab Camp. Group interviews	Interviews SRC, WFP, USAID, WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF	Interviews SRC, WFP, USAID, WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF
<i>Mon 21 Aug 06</i>	Visit to Kebkabiya. Interviews with WFP staff, MSF Belgium, Oxfam, and beneficiary group.	Visit to Kebkabiya. Interviews with WFP staff, MSF Belgium, Oxfam, and beneficiary group.	Interviews WFP, Concern, TearFund	Interviews WFP, Concern, TearFund
<i>Tue 22 Aug 06</i>	Writing up. Interviews with MSF Belgium Head of Mission	Writing up. Interviews with MSF Belgium Head of Mission	Interview WFP. Travel to Krinding IDP Camp, Beneficiary interviews.	Interview WFP. Travel to Krinding IDP Camp, Beneficiary interviews.
<i>Wed 23 Aug 06</i>	Interview with Head of Programme for Darfur North. Travel to Khartoum	Interview with Head of Programme for Darfur North. Travel to Khartoum	Interview OCHA. Durti IDP camp, TDH, Beneficiaries. Interview WFP	Interview OCHA. Durti IDP camp, TDH, Beneficiaries. Interview WFP
<i>Thu 24 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with DFID, ICRC, ACF and ECHO	Interviews with ACF and ECHO	Meetings FAO, CRS, WFP. Travel to Khartoum	Meetings FAO, CRS, WFP. Travel to Khartoum
<i>Fri 25 Aug 06</i>	Team meetings and discussion	Team meetings and discussion	Team meetings and discussion	Team meetings and discussion
<i>Sat 26 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with MSF, GAA, OCHA, and WFP staff	Interviews with GAA and WFP staff	Team meetings and additional interviews	Team meetings and additional interviews
<i>Sun 27 Aug 06</i>	Meeting with World Vision, briefing, team meetings	Briefing, Team meetings	Team meetings and additional interviews	Team meetings and additional interviews
<i>Mon 28 Aug 06</i>	Travel to Rome	Travel to El Fasher	Report writing and secondary data review	
<i>Tue 29 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with WFP Rome	Interviews with WFP Rome	Report writing and secondary data review	
<i>Wed 30 Aug 06</i>	Interviews with WFP Rome. Travel to Ireland		Travel to France	
<i>Wed 06 Sep 06</i>	Travel to Rome		Travel to Rome	
<i>Thu 07 Sep 06</i>	Briefings in Rome		Briefings in Rome	
<i>Fri 08 Sep 06</i>	Further meetings in Rome. Travel to Ireland.		Further meetings in Rome. Travel to France.	



Annex 4: Chronology of WFP Darfur emergency operations

This chronology of EMOP 10339 has been taken directly from the supporting documents prepared by Tufts University for the Evaluation.

January 2004

Serious insecurity in Darfur leads to a temporary suspension of WFP activities. At other times it impedes the regular and timely delivery of food to people in need in all three of the Darfur states. Fighting continues to take place between the GoS and SLM/A forces, hundreds of civilians are killed and thousands flee to Chad. Humanitarian access remains limited.

February 2004

WFP starts airlifting commodities into Darfur due to insecurity on the roads. The security situation in most of Darfur continues to worsen throughout the month.

WFP draws up plans to scale up the field office in West Darfur to an area office similar to the two established area offices in South and North Darfur.

March 2004

Insecurity negatively affects WFP's logistical operations. Direct roads from El Obeid leading to Darfur were not safe and only a few transporters are willing to risk driving on these roads. As a result, the cost of moving food to Darfur increased significantly.

April 2004

A high-level UN mission, led by the WFP Executive Director visits Darfur from 28 to 30 April to assess humanitarian needs of the affected populations. The team confirms that there was a humanitarian crisis in Darfur and raises serious concerns about the protection of the affected population.

WFP launches its new Darfur-specific EMOP 10339.0 – 'Food Assistance to Populations Affected by War in Greater Darfur' – which targets 1.18 million beneficiaries between April 1 and December 31 at a total cost of US\$99.3 million. Confirmed contributions received in April against the Darfur EMOP amounted to US\$26,965,537 representing 27% of total operational requirements.

May 2004

WFP's initial response to the Darfur crisis was hindered by severe restrictions imposed by the GoS on access to Darfur. Following the ceasefire agreement and intense international pressure, the GoS lifted some of the restrictive travel regulations and announced a series of measures to facilitate humanitarian access.

A Budget Revision is approved for the Darfur EMOP, which had foreseen a reduced ration for the beneficiaries between October and December. This is based on the assumption that the security situation would improve during the farming season and allow farmers to plant. Since it was evident that this will not happen, a Budget Revision increasing the beneficiary caseload from 1.2 million to 2 million during the period October to December is prepared.

Confirmed contributions received by the end of May against the Darfur EMOP 10339.0 amount to US\$58,681,232 representing 30% of the total operational requirements.

June 2004

The onset of the rainy season poses a significant challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. As rains continue, access to Darfur deteriorates along with the health status of the affected population as Darfur becomes a breeding ground for infectious diseases.

At a high-level donor meeting in Geneva, WFP agrees to meet six key targets in Darfur within the next 90 days (the 90-Day Plan). The plan includes feeding up to 1.2 million people.

July 2004

WFP reaches almost one million beneficiaries despite heavy rains and insecurity. In addition, the operation has not yet reached full capacity. Extra staff, trucks and other equipment are arriving in the region every week to help WFP meet its enormous task. Air operations are also being scaled up dramatically, including the decision to airdrop food into areas rendered inaccessible by the rains.

Despite Darfur's increased profile within the international community, WFP's operation remain substantially



under-funded as of July, with just one third of the necessary financial resources for 2004 committed by donors. This was all the more concerning as it was certain that the humanitarian crisis will continue well into 2005.

August 2004

The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate as ongoing violence and the rainy season leaves more people in need of assistance. According to estimates, around 1.4 million people have fled their homes – 1.2 million are displaced within Darfur, while another 200,000 cross the border into Chad.

WFP dramatically scales up its air operations, particularly in West Darfur, which was worst affected by the rains. Airdrops into inaccessible areas reach more than 100,000 people.

Following a meeting with a UN mission in Asmara, WFP is granted unimpeded access by the SLM/A and JEM to rebel-controlled areas. The two rebel groups also assured WFP that they would not impede or delay food aid convoys. Following this agreement, WFP was involved in joint assessments in six SLM/A-areas and carried out a first food distribution in three SLM/A-controlled areas.

Major delays in food distribution and registration occur in South Darfur when CARE International, WFP's main partner in South Darfur, suspend activities for one week due to a security incident.

The first two batches of 120 all-terrain trucks arrived in Sudan to increase WFP's logistical capacity.

September 2004

Access limitations, insecurity, low cooperating partner capacity, and weak local transportation networks significantly impede the delivery of food aid. However, despite these constraints, WFP feeds more than the targeted 1.2 million beneficiaries and more than 1 million people for the first time since the start of the operation in April.

The September regionwide Food Security and Nutrition Survey among IDPs and residents in Darfur, lead by WFP, makes several key findings. Among the most critical were that 21.8 percent of children under five were malnourished (acute malnutrition) and that almost half the families did not have enough food for their daily requirements.

October 2004

In light of increasing number of beneficiaries and in view of double registrations especially in camps close to urban centers, IOM, together with WFP and OCHA, are requested by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator to develop a standard registration form and central database.

WFP brings in 120 all terrain trucks for secondary distribution in Darfur by October and secured extra contracts for dedicated fleets.

November 2004

Despite heightened insecurity, WFP increases its coverage in West and South Darfur due to the rapid dispatch of food to a number of areas once security conditions stabilize for short periods of time. Beneficiaries receive a more balanced food basket in November compared to previous months. However, food rations remain just below the 2,108Kcal level – the minimum daily nutritional standard.

In an effort to standardize registration processes, WFP holds a meeting with all CPs. The meeting included a briefing by IOM on the registration form agreed upon by the working group, which included IOM, WFP, OCHA and selected NGOs.

As of 30 November, WFP receives US\$ US\$181,201,841 out of the US\$203,632,985 required this year for the emergency operation, representing a shortfall of 11 percent.

December 2004

WFP suspends food convoys in En Nahud, West Kordofan following a large scale SLM/A attack on the town of Ghubaysh and consequent retaliation by the GoS. The attack effectively blocks overland access from central Sudan to Darfur and severely affected WFP road deliveries. WFP enters into discussions with transport companies to use alternative routes to continue deliveries to the Darfur States.

Insecurity in South Darfur cuts off assistance to some 273,000 people in ten locations in South Darfur and three locations in West Darfur. Western Jabel Mara remains a concern as beneficiaries have not received food assistance since October due to persistent insecurity.

January 2005

Trucks start moving to the Darfur States again following WFP's temporary suspension of food convoys in Kordofan due to heavy fighting between rebel forces and Government of Sudan in Ghubaysh, West Kordofan in



the last week of December 2004. Transport companies used an alternative route, adding two days to their turn-around time.

Eleven commercial 6x6 trucks leased to WFP and stolen by the SLM/A on 8 and 17 December in South Darfur remained missing. All trucks were loaded with WFP commodities destined for the warehouse in Nyala, South Darfur.

273,000 beneficiaries in South Darfur and parts of West Darfur remain cut off from assistance because of insecurity.

A dispute between the WFP, the Sudanese Railway Corporation and the Sheikhu Transport Company prevented dispatches via rail in January. In December 2004 only 4% of the planned dispatches were done via rail due to the dispute. The dispute is solved when the rail corporation dedicated 60 wagons for use by WFP.

IOM, in collaboration with WFP, starts a three-day registration training workshop in each of the three state capitals for Cooperating Partners on 5 January. In an effort to standardize and streamline the registration process, a common registration process and format for the distribution of food and non-food items will be implemented. The revised methodology will provide more comprehensive and reliable data on displaced population size, household and individual profiles. A centralized database of IDP information for common information needs for the humanitarian community will be established and managed by IOM.

In a location north of El Geneina, Arab nomads who are not registered loot 0.5MT of food during a WFP food distribution conducted by Cooperating Partner (CP) Catholic Relief Services.

WFP participates in an inter-agency livelihoods assessment mission led by FAO between 26 January and 5 February 2005. The goal is to undertake a rapid assessment of the current status of major markets for main crops, food and livestock systems and prepare a preliminary forecast of cereal shortages in the local markets. It assesses the region's overall macroeconomic situation, its capacity to import food from other states and to effectively deal with the crisis. It is not possible to visit some sites due to insecurity.

According to the WFP/FAO market price analysis for 2004, national average sorghum prices are lower in 2004 compared to 2003 because of the good harvest of 2003/2004. However, the price of sorghum starts to gradually increase from September to December 2004 due to expectations of a poor harvest in 2004/2005 in the main sorghum producing State of Gedaref. The situation was markedly different in Darfur where prices decreased in September 2004, due to a combination of factors that include injection of increased international and national food assistance. In November 2004, a bag of sorghum costs 12% less in Darfur (deficit area) than in Gedaref (surplus area), while in 2003 prices in Darfur are 13 % higher than in Gedaref. In Darfur, little cereal from this year's harvest can be found on the market and the majority of the current stock is either from previous year's production or Chad. Small quantities of relief assistance can also be found on market days in many rural and town markets.

February 2005

Initial findings of the in-depth analysis on rainfall and vegetation index carried out to identify the regions worst affected by erratic rainfall commissioned by WFP are presented to donors and the Humanitarian Coordinator. This analysis is to be followed by field assessments to determine the magnitude of the factors impacting food security in Sudan.

In west Darfur a recent nutrition coverage survey conducted by Concern Worldwide reports that the coverage of therapeutic feeding in camps was 40% and the coverage of supplementary feeding centers as 64%.

In West Darfur WFP/CRS/IOM registered more than 5,000 individuals in Abu Souroge (1,678 households). An interagency rapid assessment mission of WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF verifies that approximately 200 families had returned from December to January 2005 in Habila locality.

A nutritional survey in Mornie, West Darfur, by Concern indicates a GAM rate of 4 % and another survey in Furu Buranga done by Save the Children reported a GAM rate of 6.6%.

WFP staff and food aid monitors participate in an M&E workshop in Nyala in South Darfur. Key workshop recommendations include increased frequency and coverage of monitoring (distribution, post-distribution and food basket).

Preliminary results from an MSF-H nutrition survey in Kalma camp report that the GAM rate had declined significantly from 23.6% in September 2004 to 10 % in January 2005. WFP plans to continue with blanket supplementary feeding for at least 3 months to maintain this rate. MSF reports that cases of malnutrition had decreased in Mukjar area, whilst increasing in Um Dokhon. Um Dokhon recently receives an influx of IDPs from Rahed El Bird and has fewer water and sanitation facilities



FAO presents the results of the livelihood situational analysis carried out together with WFP and Ministry of Agriculture. The analysis covers seven administrative units in North Darfur. Overall it was reported that the resident populations are now beginning to feel the impact of the poor rains from last year coupled with the security situation affecting their normal coping mechanisms.

The Sudanese Red Crescent estimates a caseload of 89,000 people as new arrivals continued to enter a new camp (Abushouk II). The international community is requested to organize the new camp and provide shelter, water and health services.

Food distributions in Birka Saira were disrupted when some residents from surrounding villages demanded food assistance. The residents allowed February's distribution to proceed after WFP confirmed that a food security assessment would be conducted in their areas.

March 2005

WFP's Cooperating Partners (CPs) undertook a Darfur-wide registration 1-31 March of all IDPs and conflict-affected persons entitled to food assistance. As of 31 March, headcounts are completed in 37 percent of the total camps/locations, representing 26% of the total previously registered population in all three Darfur States. An overall decrease of 10% in the caseload was noted compared to the old caseload in the headcount.

In Ed Daein, obstructions from state authorities significantly delay the movement of 200 trucks carrying WFP food commodities to the Darfur States during first week of March.

Preliminary results of a nutrition survey conducted by Tear Fund in Ed Daein report that the GAM rate increases to 25.2% from 11.9% in October 2004.

In South Darfur WFP, IOM and OCHA carry out a joint assessment in Assalaya, west of Ed Daein. CARE reports an influx of 12,000 returnees in Um Dohkon from neighboring Chad, MSF centers, for therapeutic and supplementary feeding in Kass indicate a decrease in new admissions of severely/moderately malnourished children and Local authorities assure WFP they will review possibilities to expand current storage facilities in Kass.

In North Darfur, ACF and MSF-E report that admissions into SFP programs continue to rise in Abou Shouk and TFC numbers doubled in El Fasher town.

Results from a PDM in Kebkabiyah area on a sample population of 14,284 beneficiaries, indicates that 96% of the food received was consumed at home. In addition, results also show that almost 50% of school children did not attend school. Some 67% adult females, 27% adult male and 6% girls collect the monthly food aid.

WFP plans to cut non-cereal rations by half from May onwards in order to guarantee at least half portions of non-cereals in August and September distributions.

April 2005

Delivering food to South Darfur continues to be difficult due to the mandatory GoS imposition for escorts.

Commercial transporters become increasingly reluctant to deliver food to Malha and northwest Kutum in North Darfur following incidences of convoys being stopped at various checkpoints.

Insecurity in North and West Darfur significantly delay the registration exercises. As of 3 April 2005, headcounts have been completed in 37% of the total camps/locations, representing 26% of the total previously registered population in all three Darfur states. As of 24 April, headcounts are completed in 62% of the total camps/locations, representing 43% of the total previously registered beneficiaries. As of 30 April, headcounts have been completed in 67% of the total camps/locations, representing 47% of the total previously registered beneficiaries.

WFP starts preparing to provide emergency food assistance for more than 3 million people at the peak of the hunger period from July to October 2005.

General insecurity along main access roads into Nyala continues to hamper WFP food deliveries. Theft and increasing attacks on WFP contracted trucks in Darfur reach a crisis point in March.

World Vision conducts a nutrition survey in Nyala town area. The preliminary results show high rates of global acute malnutrition (23%). WHO made plans to undertake a second mortality survey to cover both IDPs and affected host communities in 60 locations in Darfur between May and June 2005. Preliminary results from the UNICEF-MOH nutrition assessment conducted in El Fasher town show a global malnutrition rate (GAM) of 17.4%.

In West Darfur WFP, IOM and Save the Children US (SC-US) mobilize a total of 449 humanitarian workers from 15 UN agencies and NGOs to conduct simultaneous registration exercises in eight camps (Abuzar,



Ardamata, Krinding I, Krinding II, Dorti, Hujag, Jama and Riyad). Registration is postponed after the sheiks from 4 of the 8 camps rejected the headcount methodology in favor of exchanging old rations cards with new ration cards.

In North Darfur according to ACF and MSF-E, admissions into SFP continued to rise in Abou Shouk and TFC numbers doubled in El Fasher town WHO and MOH made plans to conduct a meningitis vaccination in the greater El Fasher town area. Results from a recent PDM in Kebkabiyah area, on a sample population of 14,284 beneficiaries, indicated that 96% of the food received has been consumed at home by beneficiaries. In addition, results also showed that almost 50% of school children do not attend school. Some 67% adult females, 27% adult male and 6% girls collected the monthly food aid.

Preliminary results Interagency assessment of Um Kedada indicate a need for food assistance in Al Lait (SLM/A controlled area) and Um Kedada (GoS area) where it is noted that grains are scarce and market prices are higher than other parts of North Darfur. It is estimated that some 45,000 in Al Lait and 55,000 in Um Kedada require food assistance.

In South Darfur CARE reports an influx of 12,000 returnees in Um Dohkon from Chad and MSF centers report decreasing admissions in therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers. In Kass there is an indication of a decrease in new admissions of severely/moderately malnourished children. WFP receives a request from the Benevolent Organization of Nomads to assist approximately 6,000 nomad families throughout South Darfur.

Preliminary results of a nutrition survey in Nyala town area done by World Vision reports high rates of GAM at 23%.

May 2005

Preliminary results of ACF's nutrition survey in Sania Afandu, east of Nyala town in South Darfur, indicate a Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate of 23.6%

GOAL releases preliminary results of a recent nutritional survey conducted in Kutum town, Kasab and Fata Barno camps as a follow-up to their previous nutritional survey conducted six months earlier. Findings indicate GAM at 17.7 % and SAM at 0.8%. The findings showed an overall improvement from six month ago, particularly in the prevalence of moderate malnutrition, which GOAL attributes to regular general food distributions as well as selective feeding activities.

Increased incidents of ambushes along the Ed-Daein and Nyala road escalate to a point where transporters are reluctant to transport food without AU/military escorts. Limitations in AU capacity continue to seriously affect the timely delivery of WFP food assistance into Nyala.

Large groups of new IDPs are reportedly moving from Buram and Abuajora in South Darfur into Firdos Camp located south of Ed Daein. WFP participates in a joint assessment mission of Firdos.

June 2005

In June WFP reaches more than 2.1 million people in Darfur distributing 37, 255 MT of food.

South Darfur becomes a "No GO" area due to banditry.

Preliminary findings of WHO mortality survey conclude deaths in Darfur are below emergency threshold and health situation in Darfur has dramatically improved since 2004. Over 70 epidemiologists interviewing 3,100 households (about 26,000 people) and find a crude mortality rate of .8 deaths per 10,000 people per day in Darfur. In 2004 the CMR is 1.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in North Darfur and 2.9 in West Darfur.

GOAL Ireland releases the finding of their nutritional survey conducted over 6 months in Kutum, Kasab and Fata Barno camps. GAM rate was 17.7% and SAM was .08%.

MSF also releases findings from an assessment carried out in Galaab camp (near El Fasher town) that finds GAM 33.1% and SAM 3.1%.

Save the Children released finding of their June nutritional survey in Sirba. Results showed a GAM of 16.3 % and CMR of .067/10,000 per day and under five-mortality rate of .97/10.000 per day.

A second budget revision for the Darfur EMOP 10339.1 is approved to take into account a higher caseload of 3.25 million people in the hunger season (August – October).

July 2005

In the first week of July widespread and large amounts of rainfall are forecasted especially in West Darfur. Even accounting for some overestimation, suitable rainfall for planting and early crop development is predicted. Jebel Marra is forecasted to receive intense rainfall.



WFP estimates the number of people in need will rise to peak at 3.25 million from August to October as the hunger season advances.

MSF release the final report of a Health Assessment Survey of Serif Umra, North Darfur conducted in April 2005. GAM was reported as 13.5 % and SAM at 2.5 %. The under-5 mortality rate, at 1.2/10,000/day was reported below the emergency level while the crude mortality rate was only just below the emergency threshold at 0.8/10,000/day.

A planned food distribution organized by WFP and Save the Children US is disrupted on Saturday morning, 16 July in Mornei camp, West Darfur, resulting in a number of injuries and two fatalities.

In West Darfur increasing admission rates to selective feeding Programmes are reported by CPs, majority of children are being admitted for diarrhea, linked to increased water contamination during the rainy season.

In South Darfur a rapid needs assessments done by WFP and IIRO in three locations south of Nyala indicates that targeted populations in these areas are in need of humanitarian assistance. Half-rations are recommended for targeted residents and returnees in Yawyaw, Aba-Ragel and Gosbaden.

Preliminary findings from a mortality survey conducted by the MOH, UN agencies and NGOs under the technical guidance of WHO shows that mortality had decreased significantly in Darfur. Over 70 epidemiologists interview 3,100 families (app. 26,000 people) finding a CMR of .8 deaths per 10,000 per day in Darfur (compared to CMR of 1.5 deaths per 10,000 in N. Darfur and 2.9 in West Darfur last year).

Save releases findings of their June nutritional survey in Sirba: GAM = 16.3%, CMR = .67/10,000 per day and U-5 mortality rate = .97/10,000 per day.

WFP, IOM and SAVE complete registration in Masteri camp, West Darfur, registering 12,122 people, representing 59% of the previous caseload of 20,574 people. On July 4, WFP, IOM and Save conducted registration in Mornie where 50,000 people participate. AU and GoS provide security.

Widespread and heavy rainfall is forecasted in Darfur in the first week of July, with indications of heavy rainfall over/near Jebel Marra. In the second week rainfall forecasts are lower but average.

Average sorghum prices in the main markets of Darfur region slightly decline in June but remain above the long-term average.

In El Fasher, sorghum prices decline from 7,500 Sudanese Dinar (SD)/90 kg (equivalent to US\$30) to SD7,000/90 kg (equivalent to US\$28). This slight drop, despite the onset of the rainy season when price normally increase, is indicative of reduced demand for market purchases probably due to a substantial increase in food assistance for North Darfur.

In Geneina and Nyala, prices for local varieties of sorghum remained at about SD 6,000/90kg (equivalent to US\$24) and SD 7,000/90kg (equivalent to US\$28) respectively. Most of this supply originates from southern localities of South and West Darfur or/and from Chad through border towns such as Tisi, Um Durkhan, Masteri and Tandalti.

Admissions in selective feeding programs continue to rise. Discussions are ongoing with UNICEF to expand nutrition outreach activities to allow for early detection of undernourished populations. It is reported that an estimated 1,000 IDPs are currently being relocated following heavy rains in Mornie camp.

In South Darfur WFP provides 25,000 rations of mixed commodities to Cooperating Partner, ACF, in an effort to assist families of malnourished children in Nyala and other centers. This proves to be an important form of intervention targeting food assistance to incorporate vulnerable groups in Nyala who could not be reached through general food distributions.

In North Darfur WFP and CPs continue to distribute food in the Damrats. Three out of the four Damrats locations receive July food rations, together with locations close to Kutum, namely Sheik Abdul Bagi, Bor Saeed, Masri, Um Shidig, El Dur, Areida and Abdul Shekour

August, 2005

WFP and partners assist 2.45 million beneficiaries in August, achieved despite limited primary transport from port Sudan, general insecurity, low stocks in logistical hubs and a shortage of jet fuel.

Heavy rains affect WFP's ability to dispatch required amounts of food in a timely manner. Roads become impassable and some reports of very strong winds and flooding in some places. WFP uses pre-positioned stocks in some places like Foro Burunga and Habilah. In other areas flooded wadis become impassable, which render access to Geneina, Um Jokoti, Gumgar and Ras al Feel impossible. In North Darfur commercial transporters decline to deliver food to Korma due to bad roads and WFP used its own fleet. Deliveries from El Obeid to Nyala



are routed via El Fasher to avoid impassable roads.

Insecurity in Darfur increases in August with increased in targeted attacks on humanitarian vehicles. Commercial trucks and humanitarian aid vehicles continue being targets of banditry.

CPs complete registration in Geneina and Kass, which were two of three difficult camps where resistance from community leaders pose challenges. Preliminary findings show an estimated 95,000 people were registered in the 8 IDP camps in Geneina, Geneina town and surrounding satellite villages. In Kass the registration is completed in 12 of the 15 sites due to disruptions in the remaining 3 sites. Plans to complete registration in the remaining 3 camps were set for first week of September.

A scheduled registration in Kalma camp is postponed due to insufficient security provided by the GoS on the material day. As of 31st August, WFP and partners had registered more than 300 locations. Of the remaining 15 camps, only one camp in Kalma presents a significant challenge due to its size and proximity to Nyala.

July increases in admissions to feeding centers stabilized in August. In N. Darfur malnutrition rates in TFCs in Abu Shouk decreased. In W. Darfur admissions to nutrition programs outside Geneina were stable, with the exception of Mornie which report increases in diarrhea cases. WV conducted blanket supplementary feeding for 25,000 women and children under five as a preventative measure.

In North Darfur the SLM/A grant WFP's CP – the Sudanese Red Crescent – access to ZamZam following the SLM/A's threats in July that national NGOs and agencies linked to the government were not welcome in their areas of influence.

In South Darfur 2,600 people are evacuated from Bendisi due to flooding and MSF was forced to close its health facility serving about 13,000 people. IDPs in Mazroub, Jab El Sid and Abu Krenka in Adilla location are able to receive food distributions after being inaccessible for three months due to insecurity.

In West Darfur a Joint WFP / SC – US and HAC mission assessed 21 of 24 villages reported to be possibly food insecure. Six of the 21 villages were added to Geneina registration exercise.

The rainfall and crop development index for Darfur is positive. There are positive indicators for a relatively good harvest due to substantial rainfall in August particularly in North Darfur. Conditions for crop development are firmly established and residents are observed to be working in the fields across the region.

September 2005

Continued shortage of jet fuel from August and mid September lead to low stock in all WFP hubs. The transport corridor from Khartoum to El Geneina start to improve with the end of the rainy season; commercial trucks resumed activities. The fieldwork on the Darfur-wide food security and nutritional assessment is completed.

Preliminary results of a food security and nutritional assessment indicate an overwhelming improvement in nutritional status in Darfur. GAM is reported at 11.9% (compared to 21.8% in 2004) and SAM is reported at 1.4% (compared to 3.9% the year before). Crop production in Darfur is reported to be below a five-year average.

In September registration is completed at Yahia Hager camp and Humira in Kass, South Darfur, which records increases in caseloads. In West Darfur registrations are completed in Dorti and Sisi camps. The headcount of Kalma camp is also completed in September.

WFP with CPs Concern, SC-US, Tear Fund and World Relief support over 52,000 vulnerable people in West Darfur under blanket supplementary feeding to prevent SAM. In South Darfur WVI's blanket feeding program in Kalma camp designed to prevent children under five from severe malnutrition feed over 27,000 children.

In North Darfur there is a general reduction in both TFC and SFC admissions. ACF reports that TFP admissions are static compared to September while SFP observes 45% readmissions. GOAL in Kutum reports an increase in readmissions in SFPs and falling TFP admissions. MSF also reports a reduction in admissions compared to August.

In South Darfur insecurity prevents access and distributions in Nyala, Shearia and Jebel Marra and Adilla while roads to Edd El Fursan and Rahed El Birdi remain inaccessible. In West Darfur no distributions take place in Kongo, Haraza, Beida and Masteri due to Insecurity. In North Darfur, locations like Kabkabiya town and Malha where stocks could allow WFP does two-month distributions to lessen the burden to beneficiaries during Ramadhan.

Shortages of diesel and jet oil continue to restricted deliveries. WFP continues to face difficulties with primary transport from Port Sudan with increasing competition from the private sector. As buffer stock in major logistical hubs depleted, WFP diverts trucks from leased secondary transport fleet to assist with dispatches from Port Sudan.



In September rainfall is mostly average and was coming to an end. Crops had adequate water supply and good yields are expected in South and West Darfur. In North Darfur, conditions in the southern part are good to average. Pasture conditions are expected to be good.

October 2005

This month marks the first AU fatalities in the Darfur conflict. The security situation in North Darfur remains unstable and the AU continues to reinforce security in IDP camps in the Kutum locality. An AU patrol is ambushed between Khor Abeche and Nyala near Menawashi, three AU soldiers die. In a separate incidence an AU patrol returning to Nyala is detained by rebels for several hours at El Salaam camp, 17 km S. of Nyala. Another 18 AU troops are taken hostage by rebels in W. Darfur during the same period and released unharmed. WFP begins an administrative staff reduction from west Darfur due to increasing insecurity.

In West Darfur on 6th October the road running north of Geneina is closed thus making all roads out of the city “no go” to UN traffic. For the rest of the month WFP relies heavily on the services of WFP-HAS’s four helicopters.

WFP starts to deliver to West Darfur using the Abeche (Chad)-El Geneina corridor on 3rd October after closure during the rainy season.

MSF-H releases results of a nutritional survey done in Shearia on 8-13 September that assess the nutrition and food security of conflict affected children and Households. Despite having no baseline, the survey reveals a GAM rate of 11.4% and a very low SAM attributed to the SF program and general food distribution.

WVI reports a decrease in cases of Malnutrition in its selective feeding centers in Nyala town. Admissions in October are 35% fewer than those of September totaling 1, 244. MSF-H also reports a further reduction in admissions to its TFCs and SFCs.

In W. Darfur MSF-H informs WFP that they intend to downsize operations in view of the improving food security in the state. Preliminary results of the food security and nutrition assessment indicate that west Darfur had the lowest rates of malnutrition in the 3 Darfur states with GAM at 6.2%.

In N. Darfur, admissions to SFC and TFCs see a general decrease during October. ACF in Abu Shouk report stable admissions in both centers although they are concerned with the prevalence of malaria and watery diarrhea in the camp. ACF also reports a concern in the rise of the proportion of admissions from El Fasher town where WFP, UNICEF and MOH (GoS) finalized preparations to open a new SFC in November. In North Darfur WFP provides food to new arrivals in Dali and ZamZam and Tobayi camps that had fled from the violence. Three additional locations are added to the distribution plan of Dar Zaghawa cluster; these are El Hush, Wakahem and Majour.

In South Darfur WFP includes 11,890 more people to its caseload in October in the vicinity of El Salaam camp. The residents are given food to avoid further migration to the camps from the villages.

By the end of October about 95% of locations in Darfur have been registered.

Prices of sorghum and millet in the Darfur region continue a downward trend. On average prices of sorghum in El Geneina and Nyala markets decrease 22% AND 27% respectively from September. Prices of Millet in El Fasher and Nyala decrease by 21% and 5 % respectively. The drop in prices is due to an expected good harvest, though concerns about people not harvesting their crops due to insecurity remain. Farmers express anxiety over the possibility of nomadic tribes grazing their animals on crops before harvesting.

WFP conducts monitoring and evaluation in each of the 3 Darfur states to gauge the impact of distributions and future interventions. Post distribution monitoring and food basket monitoring is carried out in Menawashi and Mershing in N. Darfur which are previously inaccessible due to insecurity.

Access improves at the end of the rainy season and WFP is able to increase road deliveries, this is also assisted by the improvements in jet and diesel fuel supplies in September.

In October the WFP fleet includes 165 trucks across the 3 states which transport 5, 640 MT of food while 7, 047 Mt are delivered by airdrops and airlifts. A 4th Helicopter arrived on October 7th in Geneina.

As of 31 October the EMOP has received US\$ 427 million, with a deficit of US\$ 30 million. The special operation valued at US\$24 million in 2005 faces a shortfall of 6.4 USD.

An alert about WFP pipeline is issued: Without further contributions the WFP cereal pipeline will break in January 2006 and the non-cereals pipeline by April 2006. In-kind or cash donations needed to avoid the break and allow WFP to feed 2.5 million people in 2006.

November 2005



November is characterized by the harvest and increased availability of food. Cereal prices in markets start falling and WFP partners reported decreased admissions to feeding centers. The prices of staple foods in greater Darfur continue a downward trend in November. The monthly average price of sorghum in El Geneina market decrease by 5.4% while the price of millet in El Fasher and Nyala decrease by 19.4% and 11.9 %. Insecurity in some regions disrupts the flow of sorghum to the Nyala market causing a slight increase in sorghum price (5.9%).

In West Darfur security is tense with frequent reports of banditry. All roads out of El Geneina remained “no go” areas to the UN. WFP continues its precautionary reduction of administrative staff.

In S. Darfur, WVI phases out blanket supplemental feeding in Kalma camp which was feeding 27,000 children U-5.

A nutrition survey in Kabkabiya, N. Darfur by ACF indicates stable rates of malnutrition. GAM is reported as 18% and SAM as .7%. New cases of admissions to TFC are largely due to malaria, diarrhea and ARI.

Between October 31st and 1st November a registration and verification exercise is carried out by WFP and SC-US in W. Darfur. 10,000 people who had missed previous registrations are added to caseloads.

In N. Darfur a further fall in the cereal prices is recorded in the first week of November. In Kabkabiya the price of a 90 kg sack of sorghum dropped 10% to 4500 SDD. In El Fasher the price dropped by 9% to 6500 SD.

In N. Darfur a number of locations are added to November’s distribution plan following a needs assessment carried out in the last week of October. The areas include Um Barro, Orchi and Kurbia in the um Barro cluster that had been classified as “no go”. As recommended by the WFP/GAA joint needs assessment, half rations are to be distributed once GAA completed a verification process. Nomadic groups in Majour, Donkey Hush and Wakaim though not included in previous headcounts will be included in the November distribution plan.

WVI releases results of a nutritional survey conducted in Otash and Mershing camps in September. GAM is reported at 12.6% and 13.3% and SAM at 3.4 and 1.7% respectively.

ACF releases results of a nutrition survey done in August and September 2005 in Kalma camp and Nyala town. In Kalma GAM and SAM are reported at 9.9% and .3% respectively compared to 9.9% and 2.6% in February 2005. In Nyala GAM and SAM are reported at 19.1 and 3.4% respectively compared to 10.6% and .6% in February 2005.

In Kabkabiya town, N. Darfur an ACF survey indicates GAM and SAM of 18% and .7%

In Kerenik, West Darfur a head count registration is completed on 14 November by SRC with support from WFP and IOM. About 26,000 people received tokens for food distributions. Also in W. Darfur concerns over insecurity delay registrations in Riyadh by SC and WFP.

Headcounts at Otash camp, S. Darfur are completed and reveal a significant increase in the caseload. WFP and WVI plan a follow-up exercise to verify the caseload.

In Nyala Market, South Darfur, Cereal prices remain stable for part of November with slight decreases in Kass and Ed Daein.

December 2005

Results from a nutrition survey done by RI in Tawilla, N. Darfur are released. GAM is reported as 19.4 and SAM as 4.3%. This is the first survey of its kind in the area and would serve as a baseline.

WFP and Save-US continue training relief committees in West Darfur following a successful pilot in Abuzar camp. The objective is to train the new committees on procedures of food distribution, awareness of food aid management, ration entitlements, care of vulnerable groups and the need for women participation.

Cereal prices in El Geneina market, West Darfur, continue to fall during the last week of December despite insecurity in the state. The price of a sack of both sorghum and millet falls by SDD 2,000 from the start of the month to 4,000 and 6,000 SDD respectively.

In S. Darfur, cereal prices remain stable with the exception of millet in Nyala where the price per sack reduces by 500 SDD to 7, 500 SDD. A similar fall in the price of millet is seen in El Fasher market where the price of a sack reduces by 750 SDD to 6,750 SDD.

A post-harvest assessment done by the Ministry of agriculture and partners including WFP show that the planted area under millet and sorghum in North Darfur increases by 14% over the previous year, while only 37% of the total planted areas of sorghum are expected to be harvested during the season.

A shipment of cereals is discharged in Port Sudan with more shipments of cereals expected in January 2006. Current stocks of non-cereals are expected to cover requirements up to April 2006.






Annex 5: Erection of Wiik Wiiking II storage structures

The evaluation team noted that many of the Wiik tented storage structures (typically called Rubb Halls in WFP) had not been properly erected. These structures consist of a plastic waterproof membrane stretched over a steel or aluminium frame (O'Dowd, 1987). Such structures can fail through:

- Failure of the tent fabric, letting water into the structure. Such failures are extremely rare and are normally only associated with some prior damage to the structure – such as cutting of the material to gain access to the food stored inside.
- Failure of the structure through wind loading (O'Dowd, 1989). This is rare if the structure is properly erected.
- Failure of the structure through being blown away as a unit. A properly anchored structure should fail by collapse rather than blowing away.

281.1. The diagram on the right shows the manufacturer's recommended bracing for the end bays of the O B Wiik Viiking II storage tent (OB Wiik, Undated). The manufacturers confirm that this has been the standard arrangement for many years.



This bracing in both end bays should consist of:

- One additional purlin on each side of the roof.
- One diagonal brace in the side walls.
- Two diagonal braces on each side of the roof.

281.2. None of the structures seen had the complete set of bracing as shown in the manufacturer's erection manual.

The Wiik Hall in Kutum shows diagonal bracing in the roof but is missing the extra purlins and the diagonal bracing in the walls.

This particular tent has been relocated from its former position.





281.3. This newly erected example from Kutum has the wall bracing but is lacking the additional purlins in the end bay and half the roof bracing.

This was probably the most common arrangement of bracing found in the Wiik Hall's inspected: wall bracing with partial roof bracing.

In no case did any of the Wiik Hall's inspected have a full set of bracing.



281.4. The braces for the Wiik Hall should be fitted to the inside of the frame.

In this case in Kebkabiya the diagonal brace has been fitted to the outside of the structure. This can lead to excessive wear on the tent fabric as well as other problems.

The damage to the overlapping fabric seen in this photograph is discussed below.



281.5. One consequence of fitting the brace to the outside of the structure is that there are no holes for bolts in the right position. In this case, the erectors seem to have pulled the end of leg of the second frame out of the vertical to make the brace fit.

The deviation of the frame from the vertical (represented by the darkened band where the tent fabric overlaps) and clearly be seen.

All the Wiik Halls erected in Kebkabiya had the same fault. As the ground plates were covered by earth, and the team had a very short time in Kebkabiya, it was not possible to investigate what had happened there to allow the bottom of the Leg to be so much out of position.

These were the worst-erected Wiik Halls seen, and they creaked with the (very light) wind, something which is very unusual for this type of structure.





281.6. The wind appears to have damaged the fabric at the knee between the wall pane and the roof pane.

This type of damage is unusual if the tent is properly erected as there should be a rope through the leading edge of the overlapping fabric which can be tightened by pulling the rope through an eyelet into the tent.

Even without the rope, the fabric is normally quite tight, but the rope ensures that the overlap will not lift in almost any wind conditions.



281.7. Good anchoring to the ground is essential tented structures are not to be blown away.

However, in Kutum, only half the total number of ground anchors pins had been fitted, and as can be seen here, were not driven home.

Apparently the sandy soil is underlain by rock, preventing the anchors from being driven home, but the retaining collar on the anchor was not in contact with the base plate. In the event of a windstorm, the tent might then lift to the level of the anchor and in that lifting would have gained enough momentum to pull the anchor out of the ground.



281.8. It should be emphasized that all of the above is not an academic concern. Storage tent failures can lead to death and injuries, as well as the loss of commodities.

Rain damaged some commodities on the right of August 30, 2005 when one Wiik Hall blew away and damaged others causing some of them also to blow away.

It should be noted that in these photographs taken by WFP staff in Geneina on the following day, that where ever a base plate can be seen, there is only one anchor inserted rather than the required two





(circled on the last two photographs).

In addition, if the tent is not properly braced, it is easier for the wind to lift one part of the structure to begin with before lifting the whole structure.

It may be that the supplied anchors are not sufficient in the sandy soils in parts of Darfur, but this can hardly be tested given that only half the recommended number of anchor pins seems to have been fitted in some cases. A more likely explanation is that the anchor pins were diverted for use securing the shade shelters used throughout Darfur for weddings and funerals



WFP has now changed the steel-framed storage tent used in Darfur to the aluminium framed version. While much easier to erect than the steel framed models seen in Darfur (OB Wiik, 2006), they do need to be erected with greater care than the steel framed models. WFP will need to ensure that contractors are properly trained in the erection of the aluminium framed model.



Annex 6: Stacking Practice

Good stacking practice is established in several manuals including several prepared specifically for WFP (Tropical Research and Development Institute et al., 1983; Tropical Stored Products Centre, 1979; Walker, 1992, Walker, 2003 #34).


283.1. The basic bag stacking pattern used in many of the warehouses visited inspected was one and a half bag English bond. With this arrangement you have alternate rows of headers and stretchers (bags laid with their ends or their sides facing towards the end of the stack).

The overall stack consists of stack elements one and a half bags wide. This one and a half bag stack is one of the three basic bag stack pattern shown in WFP Handbooks (Tropical Research and Development Institute et al., 1983, p. 75; Tropical Stored Products Centre, 1979, p. 24; Walker, 1992, p. 6; Walker & Farrell, 2003, p. 7).




283.2. This stacking arrangement allows quick counting of the bags as each stack element has (in this case) 19 bags and a 20 layer stack has 380 bags (19MT). This is particularly useful for verifying tallies for dispatch and receipts.

Images show a strip across a larger stack that is 12 bag widths wide.



Odd numbered layers



Even Numbered Layers

283.3. The problem with this stacking arrangement is that there is a vertical line in the stack ever one and half bag lengths.

Normally the bags abut together on this line, but sometimes poor stack building or slight movements in the stack can cause the gap to open up as can be seen in this example from El Fasher.





283.4. A 20 layer stack height was commonly used in the stores seen. This gives a height to width ration of just over two, although sometimes this could be as high as two and a half as in this example from Kutum.



283.5. The problem with height to width ratios of two or more is that the higher the ratio of stack height to the base, the greater the risk of stack collapse.

The image on the right shows a two Flospan Uniport stores in El Fasher. The end wall of the building on the right was forced out by a stack collapse within the building.

Stack collapses are dangerous – the top half of a one and half bag stack can contain nearly ten tonne of food and collapses can kill those unlucky enough to get in the way.






283.6. There are two basic ways of preventing such stack collapses:


- Reducing the base to height ratio.
- Providing tension reinforcement through the stack.
- Tapering the stack ends.

Of these changing to a two and a half bag stack element width is the easiest. This will give a stack height to base ratio of 1.5 to 1.6, a far more stable arrangement.

Images show a strip along a larger stack 12 bags widths wide.



Odd numbered layers



Even numbered layers

283.7. Another option for reinforcing stacks is to add tension reinforcement at one third and two thirds of the stack height as shown by the dotted lines in this photograph.

The tension reinforcement should be porous (to avoid trapping condensation in the stack) and should have a reasonable friction performance.

Hessian or other coarsely woven natural materials make good tension reinforcement.

Tapering the stack ends prevents stack collapses, but reduces the storage capacity of the warehouse. It also requires more supervision of the labourers and prevents easy counting, as the tapered section has a different bag count from the other sections.







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Annex 8: Note to the File

To: WFP- Darfur, Sudan

From: Allison Oman, WFP Evaluator Consultant

Date: 23 August 2006

Re: Ration Scale and Distribution in an IDP Camp

The evaluation team (Allison Oman and Saad Ali Babiker) visited an IDP camp to conduct beneficiary meetings as part of the EMOP 10339 Darfur Emergency Response Evaluation that is currently being undertaken at the direction of the Executive Director Office in Rome. While real time program input is not strictly within the broad TOR for the mission, the evaluation team feels that the ration/distribution issues reported on by the beneficiary groups are serious enough to merit comment. Further, the evaluation TOR has nutrition issues as well as beneficiary support as two main areas of concern, and so this Note to the File is an additional treatment of the issues that will be included in the main evaluation report.

Before arriving at the camp, the evaluation team has had numerous discussions with WFP staff that highlighted an ongoing problem in the food distribution modalities (including food ration entitlement posting, standardized scooping materials, equitable group sharing and effective food relief committees) in certain camps that has the food distribution managed by an implementing partner. It is our understanding that these issues have been addressed with the cooperating partner with varying levels of success. The site visit to the camp reaffirmed that the distribution system is not up to basic humanitarian standards and that immediate and concerted efforts need to be taken to improve the current situation.

During two separate beneficiary group interviews, the first with 25 sheikh representatives and the second with 11 women from the IDP community, the following issues were raised:

There is widespread ration card inaccuracy. Amongst the women interviewed, all 11 women had ration cards that did not reflect their actual family size, nor more importantly, the family size presented on the day of registration. The mistakes in ration card numbers seemed almost systemic with each family size off by one (if there were no additional births since registration) or off by two if a birth had occurred since registration.

The women were not aware of their official ration entitlement. They were in agreement about the amount they received and about the change in ration that has occurred since May 2006, but they were unaware of what they were entitled to at each distribution. Some of them have seen a sheet that has the commodities and amounts listed (4 of 11 women), but said that the sheet did not reflect what they received.

The distribution is a shared distribution where families are grouped into and the cereal and other goods are divided. The sheikhs complain that as they receive the food from the IP, only the initial sectors receive the full amount they need, while the later sectors receive less food.

The group sharing method clumps families of different sizes together to form a unit of 67 individuals. This is fairly unusual and adds to a certain level of confusion over the amount a family should receive. Traditionally, group sharing is most effective when like family sizes are grouped, allowing for equal and equitable dividing of commodities as well as self-monitoring since each family should receive an identical amount in the group.



If there is a complaint that a beneficiary did not receive his/her fair amount after the division, he/she has very little recourse and they are told the food is finished. The sheikhs complain that up to 75% of beneficiaries don't get their full ration, and that the food shortfall is due to the amount of food released to the sheikhs by the IP.

There are no standardized official scooping materials used. The sub-division of food is done using a jerry can lid for salt, a cut off small water bottle base for sugar, the other part of the bottle for oil and lentils and a small bowl for csb.

In terms of cereal, the official ration compared to what the IDPs reported they are receiving is the following:

	Official	Receiving
Family size 1=	13.5kg	12.5kg
Family size 2=	27.0kg	20.0kg
Family size 3=	40.5kg	25.0kg
Family size 4=	54.0kg	37.5kg
Family size 5=	67.5kg	50.0kg
Family size 6=	81.0kg	62.5kg
Family size 7=	94.5kg	75.0kg

In terms of the other commodities, it is difficult to ascertain the exact amounts, but based on the scooping implements, the following scale is used:

Commodity	Official (based on current reduction)	Receiving
Pulses	375g	108g
Sugar	225g	175g
Salt	70g	50g
Oil	675g	153g
CSB	1.12kg	525g

Based on the above calculations (6 and 7), the IDPs are each receiving approximately 1033 kcal per day, compared to a recommended 2100 kcal for a largely dependent IDP population. The 1033 kcal figure does not even reflect the milling losses for sorghum (approximately 10%) or the milling costs that must be absorbed.

An effective solution to many of these problems would be to return to individual scooping to each household, rather than the group sharing method. While there is some community resistance to scooping (based on fear of long waiting time and corrupt scoopers), individual scooping remains a very efficient and effective way to assure households are receiving their full



entitlements. If the group method is used, a standardized grouping procedure based on family size needs to be implemented. Whichever distribution method is decided, the procurement of standardized scooping materials, the posting of the food basket ration scale at the distribution points, the establishment of food relief committees that include the active participation of women and enhanced dialogue and trust between the IP and the camp community are essential issues to improving distribution. A review of the ration card registration manifest could also improve the correlation between actual family size and current family token/distribution card.

It is well known that there is a link between food availability and protection issues. If a household does not have sufficient food, they will seek whatever economic activity is available to enable the household to purchase sufficient food. In the camp women are forced to leave the relative safety of the camp to find firewood and grass to sell in order to meet their food gap. Most women say that the current scale of grain and other commodities given last them approximately half the month (with the cereal lasting approximately 15-20 days while pulses, oil, sugar, salt and CSB last about one week). The women must then find ways to procure food for the remaining days and as landless IDPs, grass and wood collection are the main strategies. The women complain of being robbed, beaten, or raped during the wood and grass foraging, yet despite the risk, they continue to do this because they feel they have no choice. While firewood and grass foraging occurs in most IDP camps (firewood is needed to cook the relief ration and is not provided), the women in the camp forage both for cooking fuel and as an income activity to purchase food. This greatly increases the amount of wood needed, the number of foraging trips taken per week and distance that must be travelled from the relative safety of the camp boundaries. The reduced ration that beneficiaries receive due to a corrupt and faulty distribution system is inadequate and in turn directly subjects them to attack and abuse when they attempt to make up the food gap. In this way, the current food distribution management system is a serious protection issue and must be addressed without delay.