

# **COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION**

Sudan: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio 2010–2012

## **Vol I - Evaluation Report**

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Prepared by; Herma Majoor, Team Leader, Martin Fisher, Humanitarian Response Specialist, Abdul Hamid Rhametalla, Food Security Specialist

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## **Evaluation Management**

Evaluation Manager:	Ross Smith
Evaluation Assistant:	Federica Zelada
Director, Office of Evaluation:	Helen Wedgwood

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## Fact Sheet the Sudan (2010–2012)

### Timeline and funding level of the Sudan portfolio operations

Operation	Title	Time Frame	2010	2011	2012	
SO 200470	Logistics Augmentation and Coordination in Support of Humanitarian Operations in South Kordofan	Aug 12 - Dec 12			Req: \$ 249,972 Contrib: \$250,000	
SO 200354	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sudan	Jan 12 - Dec 12			Req: \$ 34,533,260 Contrib: \$ 28,497,219	
EMOP 200312	Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations Affected by Conflict and Natural Disasters	Jan 12 - Dec 12			Req: \$ 412,476,013 Contrib: \$ 308,283,930	
EMOP 200151	Food Assistance to Vulnerable Populations Affected by Conflict and Natural Disasters	Jan 11 - Dec 11		Req: \$ 571,935,941 Contrib: \$ 530,629,860		
SO 200073	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sudan	Jan 10 - Dec 11	Req: \$ 109,654,231 Contrib: \$ 94,757,183			
EMOP 200027*	Food Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict	Jan 10 - Dec 10	Req: \$849,456,701 Contrib: \$ 693,472,160			
SO 108450	Operational Augmentation for WFP and NGO Partners in Darfur in Support of EMOP 10760.0	May 09 - Nov 10	Req: \$ 27,322,864 Contrib: \$ 5,893,862			
SO 10342.2	UNJLC-United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, Common Logistics Services, Logistics Planning and Facilitation, and Support to Non-Food Items and Emergency Shelter Sector	Apr 08 - Dec 11	Req: \$ 28,545,860 Contrib: \$ 20,498,315			
SO 10368.0	Emergency Road Repair and Mine Clearance of Key Transport Routes in Sudan in Support of EMOP 10048.2	Aug 04 - Aug 11	Req: \$ 260,241,888 Contrib: \$256,584,721			
DEV 101050*	Country Programme Sudan	Apr 03 - Aug 10	Req: \$46,762,529 Contrib: \$ 40,523,550			
Food Distributed (MT)*			579,703	392,894	232,334	
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)			619,684,000	434,000,000	299,193,000	
% Direct Expenses: Sudan vs. World			15%	12%	7%	
Beneficiaries (actual)*			M	F	M	F
			4,434,151	4,799,923	3,432,479	4,116,747
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)*			9,234,074	7,549,226	3,636,374	

Source: SPR's 2010-12, latest Resource Situations, APR 2010 - 12

\*reported figures for 2010 and 2011 include both Sudan and South Sudan

LEGEND Funding Level
> 75 %
Between 50 and 75 %
Less than 50 %

### Distribution of portfolio activities by beneficiaries


Operation	Type of activity	HIV/AIDS & TB*	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/FA	Cash/Milling vouchers
EMOP 200312			X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200151			X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200027		X	X	X	X	X	X
DEV 10105.0			X			X	
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>		0%	17%	12%	65%	1%	5%
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>		0%	20%	7%	67%	3%	3%

Source: Decota, PD's, SPR's 2010-2012

\*HIV/AIDS 0% due to a low absolute figure not captured by the %

Note: Planned and actual figures reported reflect both Sudan and South Sudan with the exception of EMOP 200312 reporting figures for Sudan only

### % of actual beneficiaries by activity



**Top 5 Donors:** USA, European Commission, Japan, Canada, Switzerland

**Partners:** Government of Sudan, Humanitarian Aid Commission, 50 International NGO's and 10 UN Agencies

## **Executive Summary**

### **Preface**

In July 2011, the former country of the Sudan officially separated into two states: the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. This evaluation focuses on the current Republic of the Sudan, and all references to “the Sudan”, unless otherwise specified, refer to the Republic of the Sudan.

Prior to the separation, WFP operations were managed from the WFP Regional Bureau in Khartoum, with a network of area and sub-offices across the country. Since July 2011, WFP has been running independent operations from two separate country offices in Khartoum and Juba.

The evaluation reference period was 2010–2012, but the evaluation team did not consider any work undertaken in the areas now located in South Sudan. To the extent possible, the figures, statistical information or other data presented for the initial 18 months of the evaluation period use disaggregated data from WFP Khartoum, unless specifically indicated. Information may therefore differ from the data and figures presented in WFP’s Standard Project Reports (SPRs) for 2010 and 2011, which used consolidated information.

### **Introduction**

#### **Evaluation Features**

1. The Sudan country portfolio evaluation (CPE) conducted between January and June 2013, covered the 2010–2012 period and assessed: i) strategic alignment and positioning; ii) factors driving decision-making; and iii) performance and results. The evaluation serves accountability and learning objectives, and was timed to correspond with the 2009–2012 WFP country strategy and associated United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and to provide recommendations for design of the operation to begin in 2014.
2. The evaluation team required government approval and permits for travel, so could not reach non-government-held areas. As this was a non-essential mission, it was agreed that the team would not travel to some newly accessible border areas. In addition, local unrest and insecurity in North and South Darfur curtailed some planned fieldwork. To mitigate these limitations, the evaluation team collected information and secondary data from a wide range of external stakeholders, including United Nations, government, non-governmental and research organizations, to provide multiple perspectives on core points of analysis. This information was triangulated with the WFP country office, corporate systems information and the primary data collected.

## Context

3. The Sudan has suffered conflicts and humanitarian crises for more than five decades. Classified as a middle-lower-income country,<sup>1</sup> wealth distribution is heavily skewed between the capital and rural areas. With the separation of South Sudan in 2011 and closure of the oil transit pipeline in January 2012, the overall economic situation deteriorated over the evaluation period. Outstanding issues under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and continuing border disputes have negative impacts on populations in Abyei Administrative Area and Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. Insecurity is a major constraint to the well-being of the population and the humanitarian work of WFP staff.

4. Food security, poverty and nutrition indicators are poor: the poverty index stood at 46.5 percent<sup>2</sup> in 2009; the Sudan ranked 61<sup>th</sup> of 79 countries on the Global Hunger Index in 2011;<sup>3</sup> and its situation was classified as “alarming”, with 31.7 percent of children under five being underweight.<sup>4</sup> In April 2012, of an estimated total population of 30.9 million, approximately 4.7 million people were food-insecure.<sup>5</sup>

5. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur have not ended the conflict in Darfur, where much of the population has been displaced. In 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 4.2 million people in Darfur were affected by conflict.

6. More than 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) from North, West and South Darfur live in ten camps in North Darfur, where they represent 1.5 percent of the state’s population; 18 camps in South and East Darfur, as 6.5 percent of the population; and 28 camps in West and Central Darfur, as 10 percent.<sup>6</sup> Under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, these IDP camps are to be closed, but the security situation remains compromised. In Greater Darfur,<sup>7</sup> most rural areas are under government control, but many still host factions and militias. IDPs in rural areas live mainly in informal clusters near villages, rather than in camps with access to water and other resources. Most large IDP camps are in peri-urban areas, occasionally with checkpoints on the roads, but allowing free movement.

7. In West Darfur, improved relations between the Sudan and Chad, and the establishment of joint border patrols have improved the security environment,

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank. 2013. *Global Monitoring Report 2013. Rural-Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Development Goals*. Washington, DC.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Development Programme. 2012. *Status of MDGs in the Sudan in 2012*. New York. [http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg\\_fact.htm](http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg_fact.htm)

<sup>3</sup> International Food Policy Research Institute. 2012 *Global Hunger Index*. Washington, DC. This multidimensional index is based on indicators of child mortality, child underweight and undernourishment.

<sup>4</sup> World Health Organization. 2011. *World Health Statistics 2011*. Geneva.

<sup>5</sup> United States Agency for International Development. FEWSNET. Sudan Food Security Outlook, April–September 2012.

<sup>6</sup> WFP. 2011. *Comprehensive Food Security Assessment 2011*.

<sup>7</sup> In January 2012, Greater Darfur was divided into five states and the two new states of East and Central Darfur were announced.


enabling approximately 46,000 IDPs and 15,000 refugees<sup>8</sup> to return to their areas of origin.

8. Eastern Sudan has been less affected by conflict, but food security and nutrition indicators have been poor for decades, and less international support has been received than in Darfur. Two thousand refugees arrive from Eritrea every month; in 2012, there were 93,500 registered refugees in 12 camps.

9. Humanitarian access to the Three Areas – Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei – is obstructed by conflict. By mid-2012, 275,000 people had been displaced or affected by conflict in government-controlled areas, and 420,000 in areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N). More than 110,000 people were displaced by conflict in Abyei in 2011; few have returned.<sup>8</sup> In 2011, only government and other national organizations had access to government-controlled areas, and movement of United Nations international staff was restricted. Tripartite efforts by the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations to obtain approval for access from the Government and SPLM-N had little success. International agencies and staff obtained access to government-controlled areas in South Kordofan from 2012, and in Blue Nile from 2013.

10. The international aid environment changed significantly over the evaluation period. From 2009, humanitarian funding through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) dropped by approximately 50 percent (Figure 1), largely because CAP funds were directed to South Sudan. Figure 2 indicates the significant decline in official development assistance (ODA) since 2010, and shows that both ODA and humanitarian funding levels started dropping in 2009, well before the separation of South Sudan in mid-2011.

**Figure 1: CAP Funding 2009–2012<sup>9</sup>**




Source: OCHA, 2012. Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012 Mid Year Review.

<sup>8</sup> OCHA, 2012. United Nations and Partners Work Plan Sudan 2012.

<sup>9</sup> Figures prior to 2011 include both the Sudan and South Sudan; 2011 and 2012 figures are for the Sudan only.


**Figure 2: Aid Flows to the Sudan, 1996–2012<sup>9</sup>**



Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Framework, OCHA Financial Tracking Service.

11. The decrease in aid flow had several causes: donor fatigue with the protracted crisis in Darfur; further restrictions on international actors operating in Darfur and a push to close IDP camps in the area; lack of access to humanitarian agencies in the three southern border states; the Government’s policy of channelling aid through national institutions; and the fiscal constraints facing most donor countries. Longer-term funding has increased, with a gradual reduction in funding requests for emergency interventions such as food assistance (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Funding Under the Humanitarian Work Plan (HWP)**



Source: revised CAPs 2007–2013; OCHA Sudan Financial Tracking Service

12. The Government of the Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission was the main contact through which WFP and other humanitarian actors engaged with the authorities to plan and implement operations. WFP also worked with government ministries, including those of agriculture, social welfare, health and education at the national and state levels, and with the Zakat Chamber, the Strategic Reserve Authority, the Agricultural Bank, the Central Bank of the Sudan Micro Finance Unit

and the Forest National Corporation. In Darfur, the recently renewed Darfur Development Authority was a core government liaison.

13. Major donors to the WFP portfolio were the Office of Food for Peace of the United States Agency for International Development, the Governments of Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, and the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. WFP is one of 22 organizations in the Sudan United Nations Country Team. Its principal United Nations partners in food and nutrition interventions and disaster mitigation operations were the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, OCHA and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

14. WFP operates through many partners in the Sudan, including international and Sudanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). The number of international NGO partners decreased after the Government started to channel funds through national institutions, but several important field-based international NGOs remained important stakeholders in this evaluation.<sup>10</sup> WFP also worked with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, the International Committee of the Red Cross and a large number of CBOs. The private sector was another major stakeholder in WFP operations over the evaluation period, particularly in logistics, supply and transport work.

### **WFP’s Portfolio in the Sudan**

15. The Sudan portfolio is one of WFP’s largest and most complex portfolios, with high security risks, limited access to affected populations, a restricted operating environment, and logistics challenges caused by long distances and poor infrastructure. The WFP 2009–2012 country strategy objectives were to move from food aid to food assistance through a gradual shift to recovery activities. The subsequent annual emergency operations (EMOPs) delivered emergency, early recovery and safety net activities. The internal WFP Sudan Vision 2011–2015 document updated the country strategy goals and clarified the relationships among special operations (SOs) and EMOPs, adapting to the continuing need for emergency food assistance.

16. WFP is the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan with more than 40 percent of the total CAP request every year from 2010 to 2012 (Table 1). With support from the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), WFP was able to reach 467 of its 500 planned distribution points in 2012, but it rarely worked in non-government-held areas. The expulsions of NGOs in 2009 and 2012 complicated implementation.

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<sup>10</sup> Including CARE, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision International and German Agro Action.

**Table 1: WFP's shares of total CAP requests, 2013 - 2012**

Year	Total Sudan CAP request (US\$, updated)	WFP request for the Sudan (US\$, updated)	WFP's share of total CAP request (%)
2010	1 843 386 608	894 651 879	48.5
2011	1 132 952 016	456 871 616	40.3
2012	1 051 018 271	447 664 857	42.6

Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (<http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=home>)

17. Table 2 outlines the EMOPs, SOs and part of the country programme (CP) that made up the 2010–2012 portfolio,<sup>11</sup> confirming the dominance of emergency programming. Table 3 outlines the budget and expenditure.

18. Portfolio activities provided humanitarian food assistance through; i) general food distribution (GFD); ii) food-based nutrition programmes for children and pregnant and lactating women; iii) food for assets (FFA), including food for work/recovery (FFW/FFR) and food for training (FFT); and iv) school feeding. GFD was the largest activity, mainly in Darfur. The three EMOPs accounted for approximately 89 percent of funds. The SOs provided support to UNHAS and logistics support to humanitarian partners.

**Table 2: Timeline of the Sudan Country Portfolio, 2010 - 2012**

2010	2011	2012
<b>EMOP 200027</b>		
	<b>EMOP 200151</b>	
		<b>EMOP 200312</b>
		<b>SO 200470</b>
		<b>SO 200354 (UNHAS)</b>
<b>SO 200073 (UNHAS)</b>		
<b>SO 108450</b>		
<b>SO 10342.2 (United Nations Joint Logistics Centre support)</b>		
<b>SO 10368.0 (emergency road repair)</b>		
<b>CP (development project [DEV] 10105.0)</b>		

<sup>11</sup> EMOPs 200027 and 200151 included activities in what is now South Sudan; the evaluation used disaggregated data to isolate activities implemented in the Sudan.

**Table 3: WFP portfolio budget and expenditure by programme category, 2010 - 2012**

	No. of operations	Requirements (US\$ million)	% breakdown	Actual received (US\$ million)	Received as share of requirement (%)	Direct expenditure (US\$ million)
EMOPs	3	1 833.9	89.35	1 528.2	83	1 189.9
SOS*	5	171.8	8.37	129.4	75	132.4
CP/DEV**	1	46.7	2.28	40.5	87	1.1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>2 052.4</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1 698.1</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>1 323.4</b>

Source: SPR 2010–2012, Resource Situation.

\* Not including SO 103680 for road and mine clearance in South Sudan.

\*\* CP/DEV requirements and actual received April 2003–August 2010; expenditure only 2010.

## Findings

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

19. The evaluation found the WFP portfolio in the Sudan to be broadly aligned with the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, despite the complications arising from the Government’s dual role as host government to the United Nations agencies and party to the conflicts in WFP’s operating areas. WFP based its food assistance on food security assessments, and targeted all accessible food-insecure areas, taking into account the differing needs of the population and avoiding taking sides in the conflict. The evaluation also noted that WFP continually negotiated access to insecure areas to conduct food security assessments and deliver food assistance.

20. However, the evaluation found that WFP’s restricted access, including very limited access to non-government-held areas, excluded some food-insecure populations. This points to an inherent dissonance within the humanitarian principles themselves: state sovereignty must be respected, coordination involves the consent of the host country and participation requires collaboration with local and national authorities, even when this may make WFP appear non-neutral from the perspective of some stakeholders.

21. Accountability to donors and affected populations was mixed. Donors reported that WFP’s accountability was relatively good, with detailed reporting and facilitation of donor monitoring visits; however, the evaluation noted funding declines as donor priorities shifted from emergency modalities. Beneficiary groups indicated that they were not always sufficiently consulted about their priorities and needs, partly because communication was often controlled by the Government and camp sheiks, with direct beneficiary consultation often the result of months of negotiation and preparation.

22. The evaluation found WFP to be well aligned with several of the principles for engagement in fragile and conflict states, particularly adaptability to changing

contexts and capacity development of government partners. The different approaches taken by WFP area offices aimed to address the different contexts, and remained flexible as conditions and needs changed. WFP developed capacities in some state-level ministries and engaged in cooperative activities, despite the limited commitment at the federal level.

23. The evaluation concluded that further alignment would require greater engagement in the development-focused approach outlined in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and collaboration to address the links between political security and development. Better interagency coordination is needed, and a more detailed understanding of household- and community-level dynamics would inform programming.

24. The country portfolio was coherent with the Government's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Five-Year Strategic Plan 2008–2011 and Agricultural Revival Programme 2008–2012. However, the WFP planning cycle of annual EMOPs did not align with the two- to five-year cycles of government instruments; some stakeholders saw this as potentially limiting WFP's ability to contribute to longer-term improvements.

25. The evaluation found that WFP had contributed to and was well aligned with national HIV and nutrition strategies. However, although there was evidence of technical support and advocacy for nutrition policies and programming, these appeared informal and often relied on specific WFP staff members for momentum. WFP had no agreement formalizing its relationship with the Ministry of Health at the federal level – unlike the World Health Organization and UNICEF – possibly because of the limitations created by its one-year EMOP framework. Capacity development of the Ministry of Agriculture in the WFP food security monitoring system (FSMS) and comprehensive food security assessments (CFSAs) was more systematic.

26. Major stakeholders reported that WFP's programme activities were insufficiently coordinated with those of other members of the Humanitarian Country Team. There was consensus that coordination in the food security and livelihood sector was poor at the national level and only slightly better at the field level. Engagement improved from mid-2012.

27. WFP's positive relationship with its main government liaison, the Humanitarian Aid Commission, was questioned by United Nations counterparts concerned about the perception of alignment with the Government's position on humanitarian access. United Nations counterparts would like WFP to negotiate access on their behalf, but WFP reported that involving all stakeholders in consultations with the Government could jeopardize WFP's own access to affected areas and populations. The evaluation concluded that negotiation of access to affected populations is a fundamental part of WFP's mandate in the Sudan, and the country office's position is in line with WFP's corporate policies and principles.

Discussions with United Nations partners should be continued in the spirit of cooperation.

28. The number of international NGOs decreased significantly following their expulsion from Darfur in 2009, with another seven leaving Eastern Sudan in May 2012. This forced WFP initially into direct implementation and then into identifying a wider range of national and community organizations, many of which were small with limited experience in food assistance; the evaluation found that WFP responded well in identifying, training and supporting new implementing partners.

29. Portfolio activities were broadly aligned with needs in Darfur and the Central and Eastern Regions and Three Areas (CETA), but the geographic balance of activities depended more on previous activity than assessed food insecurity. For example, the high levels of malnutrition in CETA warranted greater attention compared with Darfur than was observed over the evaluation period.

30. The needs of the most vulnerable populations both in and outside camps in Darfur are largely chronic, requiring targeted food assistance and recovery programmes. FFA and FFT activities, such as Farmers to Market (F2M) and Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy (SAFE) enabled WFP to connect food assistance to recovery activities, but their share of the overall portfolio was small, accounting for approximately 2 percent of actual beneficiaries.<sup>12</sup> The shift from emergency response to recovery programmes was hampered by funding shortages and new emergencies. There is considerable scope for stronger connections between short-term general food assistance and longer-term recovery activities.

### **Factors Driving Strategic Decision-Making**

31. The evaluation found that funding was a significant factor in determining the direction and flexibility of WFP's portfolio. The high percentage of in-kind contributions limited the options for shifting food assistance away from GFD.<sup>13</sup> The evaluation found that some donors perceived WFP to be less technically proficient in recovery/resilience activities and that WFP's comparative advantage was in emergency food assistance; this further challenged the shift to longer-term activities.

32. Table 4 indicates that from 2010 to 2012 the annual EMOPs were relatively well funded, with shortfalls of 6 to 32 percent. Planned budgets decreased each year, dropping 49 percent between 2010 and 2012, with a 61 percent reduction in planned beneficiaries. These decreases reflect several factors: the separation of South Sudan, which reduced the Sudan beneficiary caseload in late 2011 and 2012; the improved food security situation in 2010, which led to a reduction in planned food assistance in 2011; and rationalization, re-targeting and verification of IDP beneficiary lists.

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<sup>12</sup> See Fact Sheet on page i.

<sup>13</sup> The United States of America provided at least 50 percent of the required funds each year; more than 60 percent of these contributions were in kind.

**Table 4: Funding and beneficiaries: 2010 - 2012**

	Beneficiary needs (US\$)*	Total available (US\$)	Funding shortfall (%)	Planned beneficiaries	Actual beneficiaries**	
					South Sudan and the Sudan	The Sudan
2010	951 480 882	772 984 555	19	11 032 000	9 234 074	6 069 938
2011	640 997 532	600 278 937	6	7 296 609	7 549 226	5 497 820
2012	489 583 679	333 987 656	32	4 213 185	3 560 883	

Data for 2010 and 2011 are for the Sudan and South Sudan combined, as disaggregated data were not available. Those for 2012 relates to the Sudan only.

\* Based on the objectives of approved projects.

\*\* Combined data for South Sudan and the Sudan are from SPRs. Disaggregated data for the Sudan were obtained from the WFP Programme Unit in the country office.

Source: WFP Factory, SPRs 2010–2011, Programme Division in the country office, Khartoum.

33. Although the evaluation could not precisely attribute the trends in funding and beneficiary coverage to the various contributing factors, it noted that the number of individual donors declined from 22 to 14 over the period, and that overall donor funding trends began shifting toward recovery activities as early as 2007/2008 (Figure 3), with decreasing net ODA/humanitarian funding since 2009 (Figure 2).

34. The initial improvements in security in 2010, prior to the border conflicts of 2011/2012, contributed to improved food security in the early part of the evaluation period. However, the needs of returnees, primarily in West Darfur, newly displaced households in North Darfur and the poor rains of 2011 meant that humanitarian assistance requirements did not diminish in Darfur in the latter part of the period.<sup>8</sup>

35. WFP conducted needs assessments through vulnerability analysis and mapping, CFSAs, the FSMS framework and emergency food security assessments. FSMS data were used in decision-making by WFP and others, but data collection was limited to WFP intervention areas. For example, under EMOP 200151, FSMS assessments showing improved food security provided the justification for a budget reduction, cutting the size and duration of the GFD ration in 2011. The country office has not systematically measured the impact of such changes, thus missing opportunities for comparative assessment and lesson learning.

36. The evaluation found that WFP had well-recognized technical expertise in monitoring and assessing food security, but limited expertise in other sectors. WFP made efforts to acquire technical expertise through partnerships, but apart from those with the Ministry of Agriculture and UNICEF, these were often small-scale and of short duration. Stakeholders observed that the narrow range of technical expertise may constrain WFP's effectiveness, particularly in policy dialogue on the transition from emergency to development.

37. In the absence of a robust corporate monitoring framework, the Sudan office had to develop its own systems, which were found to be weak, given the scale of the portfolio. Output monitoring was regular, but clear targets were absent. Local problems were remedied, but higher-level support or follow-up was seldom provided.


38. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data were primarily used for corporate and external reporting rather than to inform programme decision-making. M&E systems faced resource constraints that limited innovation. There is considerable scope to improve the use of M&E data in programme planning and decision-making, and for one-off assessments in specific areas, in addition to enhanced collaboration with partners on outcome-level data collection.

### Portfolio performance and results

39. The number of actual beneficiaries decreased by 41 percent over the portfolio period, from more than 6 million in 2010 to 3.5 million in 2012 (Figure 4). The tonnage of food distributed declined by a similar 42 percent (Figure 5).


40. In 2010, 69 percent of beneficiaries resided in Darfur, increasing to 82 percent in 2012, although food security and nutrition indicators had not worsened in Darfur compared with Eastern Sudan.

**Figure 4: Actual Beneficiaries, by Geographic Area**



Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data

**Figure 5: Food and Vouchers Distributed, by Geographic Area\***




Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data.

\* Vouchers are shown in tonnage counter-value.


41. The percentages of beneficiaries under each activity were broadly similar throughout the evaluation period, although the shift from GFD to FFA was reversed in the latter part of the period (Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Actual Beneficiaries per Activity (% of total)**



Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data

**Figure 7: Actual Food Distribution per Activity (% of total)**



Sources: SPRs 2010–2012; country office programme data

42. Figure 7 indicates the decreasing percentages of total food distributed as in-kind GFD over the period, mainly in favour of vouchers, which rose from 1 percent of total food distribution in 2010, to 5 percent in 2011 and 13 percent in 2012. Internal (2011, 2012) reviews and external (2012) assessments of the effectiveness of vouchers demonstrated mixed results: positive effects included greater contact with mobile markets and greater beneficiary control; but beneficiaries had little knowledge of their entitlements, and limited effects on dietary diversity were reported, because beneficiaries prioritized quantity and cheaper items in their food purchase choices. While vouchers appeared to be the preferred option, more rigorous comparisons with in-kind and other modalities are needed.

43. WFP’s logistics capacity in the Sudan, including in pre-positioning, fleet management and support of voucher scale-up, was critical in ensuring the effectiveness of GFD. The evaluation also noted that GFD’s flexibility was essential to WFP’s quick response to needs in newly accessible areas or new humanitarian crises.

44. FFW/FFR interventions were a minor portion of the portfolio, often considered pilots. Implementing partners and beneficiary communities acknowledged that the assets created helped communities to rebuild their asset base and start regenerating livelihoods. However, several CBOs questioned their longer-term effectiveness, and the evaluation did not find an overall strategy guiding activity and asset selection in each area, risk assessment, technical support, partnerships or maintenance and repair plans.

45. Confirming the findings of earlier evaluations, FFT was found to be effective in SAFE projects,<sup>14</sup> with direct benefits to women participants including increased savings, reduced fuelwood wastage and better protection. Very limited results for agribusiness centres and tree nurseries were recorded. The F2M programme reached

<sup>14</sup> SAFE centres support the production of fuel-efficient stoves and briquettes, the establishment of plant and community tree nurseries, livelihood and community capacity development and training, and activities focusing on care practices, health and nutrition, particularly for women.

most of its planned beneficiaries, but as part of a larger government-managed microfinance scheme, much of this programme is beyond WFP's control. It was not clear how WFP would assess the effectiveness of its inputs, nor whether the beneficiaries of F2M will ultimately be food-insecure small farmers.

46. WFP's nutrition activities included supplementary feeding, blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) and an integrated BSF programme (IBSFP). Moderately malnourished children were referred to targeted SF programmes, and severely malnourished children received SF through UNICEF's out-patient therapeutic programme. Children and pregnant and lactating women in Darfur received BSF during lean seasons, as a preventive approach. The IBSFP aimed to address multiple causes of malnutrition through improved feeding, food hygiene and safety practices for young children. Between 2010 and 2013, the planned numbers of BSF child beneficiaries declined by 33 percent and of SF beneficiaries by 67 percent, mainly because of funding shortages.

47. An external analysis<sup>15</sup> of WFP's BSF data for North and South Darfur in 2011 showed very little improvement in the nutrition status of participant children, consistent with other evaluations indicating that BSF has little effect on global and moderate acute malnutrition (GAM and MAM) rates. The IBSFP, piloted in Kassala in 2009/2010, showed a significant decrease in GAM prevalence and appeared to be an effective,<sup>16</sup> if resource-intensive intervention, costing US\$34 per child, compared with US\$12–15 for supplementary feeding.<sup>17</sup> Supplementary feeding to address MAM through both community- and facility-based approaches, was reported to generate recovery rates of 71-95 percent, but the evaluation noted the existence of unofficial and unreleased nutrition survey datasets, reducing further the availability of comparable nutrition data. Collection and analysis of more nutrition data will be essential for improving measurement of the effectiveness of these interventions.

48. School feeding, designed primarily as an emergency intervention targeting food-insecure areas, provided school meals to about 1 million primary school children a year, decreasing after 2011 under a hand-over strategy agreed with the Government, although the Ministry of Education was unable to assume responsibility for the first 10 percent of the schools to be handed over, so the programme ended in these schools. Effectiveness was mitigated by inconsistency between the design of school feeding as an emergency intervention and the long-term expectations and inputs of partners. Available data indicate relatively stable retention rates in WFP-assisted schools over the evaluation period, a stable gender ratio for enrolment in CETA, and a slight increase in girls' enrolment in Darfur. These data are of limited use in determining programme effectiveness as they are not

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<sup>15</sup> Woodruff, B.A. 2011. *Analysis of Anthropometric Data for May–September 2009 on the Cohort of Children in North and South Darfur*. January. Sudan country office.

<sup>16</sup> WFP. 2012. *Impact of the Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (IBSFP) on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Mukram Village, Kassala State*. Sudan country office.

<sup>17</sup> Acharya, P. and Kenefick, E. 2012. *Improving Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP) Efficiency in Sudan*. January. Sudan country office.

compared with non-WFP-assisted schools or aligned with indicators used by the Ministry of Education.

49. In-depth analysis of the efficiency of single operations was beyond the scope of the CPE. However, the evaluation observed that all activities in Darfur involved relatively high transportation costs and time because of the distances from Port Sudan and the main hubs in Khartoum and El Obeid. The wet season constrains truck movement, necessitating considerable pre-positioning of food in Darfur. The continued need for security escorts from the Government or the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur increases logistics costs and transit times. UNHAS provided a vital service, enabling transport in the face of poor infrastructure and high insecurity.

50. WFP's current engagement with more than 200 local and international partners is largely via six-month field-level agreements. The high transaction costs incurred by almost continuous negotiation of contracts detracted from operational efficiency and caused widespread dissatisfaction. Efficiencies may be gained with longer-term and broader partnership agreements. The availability of technically qualified staff was reported to have become more difficult since the upgrade of the United Nations security classification, especially for posts outside Khartoum.

## **Conclusions**

51. The Sudan portfolio is one of WFP's largest and most complex portfolios, involving security risks and logistic challenges. The evaluation period witnessed important changes in the humanitarian situation in the Sudan: initial improvements in security in 2010 – prior to the separation of South Sudan in 2011 and the border conflicts of 2011/2012 – contributed to improved food security in the early part of the period, but continuing needs meant that the requirement for humanitarian assistance did not significantly diminish in the Darfur region in the latter part of the period.

52. WFP is the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan, unmatched in size of operations, geographic coverage and food assistance and food security assessment capacity, and covering more than 25 percent of the needs reflected in the Humanitarian Work Plan. WFP's shift from food aid to longer-term food assistance was found to be coherent with the Government's strategic framework and the UNDAF. WFP has made efforts to move away from in-kind GFD, but newly occurring emergencies and the provision of 60–70 percent of funding in kind limits the extent and pace of this shift.

53. The evaluation found the WFP portfolio to be coherent with international humanitarian principles. While restricted access to non-government-held areas excluded some populations in need of emergency relief, the evaluation concluded that WFP's approach to negotiating access was in line with its mandate and corporate policy and provided maximum reach, albeit with compromises. WFP was aligned

with the principles for conflict-affected and fragile states, which was important in the move towards longer-term recovery activities.

54. The operational scope was broadly relevant to humanitarian needs. In Darfur, WFP provided life-saving food assistance, primarily through GFD, and started to pilot recovery and livelihoods-oriented projects through FFW, FFA and FFT. Although projects were small, the evaluation found them well-received by beneficiaries and in line with longer-term needs. The persistently high levels of malnutrition in the CETA region warrant increased focus in future operations.

55. In addition to ration reduction, refined targeting and more accurate beneficiary lists enabled the portfolio to maintain 80–100 percent coverage of intended beneficiaries for most activities – reflecting GFD’s flexibility and adaptability. Profiling of camps and communities should continue, to ensure that food assistance reaches the most vulnerable.

56. Reporting on results was largely output-based and limited in content and reliability, especially given the scale of WFP operations in the Sudan. The limited range of monitoring data, with discontinuities and inconsistencies among EMOPs, constrained the assessment of portfolio effectiveness, especially at the outcome level.

57. Separate studies indicated initial positive outcomes from integrated interventions such as SAFE and the IBSFP, but there was very little evidence on the contributions of BSF and SF to mitigating malnutrition rates. GFD undoubtedly had an effect on household food consumption, especially for IDPs, given the scale of the resource transfer over the three years, but the seasonal nature of food insecurity, and ongoing conflicts make it difficult to quantify these effects. There was little documentation of results from WFP’s capacity development efforts with the Government.

58. The cost-efficiency of portfolio activities could not be assessed directly. WFP’s unprecedented logistics capacity in the Sudan enabled the delivery of food over a large area and to remote locations, albeit at high costs in Darfur. The adaptation of logistics capacity to the scale-up of vouchers was critical to the continued coverage of the portfolio. UNHAS provided essential access to all areas and contributed to the efficiency of all humanitarian actors in the Sudan. The country office reported considerable progress in cost savings; the evaluation identified further potential efficiency gains by reducing transaction costs through longer-term partnerships, continued refining of targeting, and better monitoring of results to inform responsive decision-making.

59. The sustainability of recovery activities was limited by the lack of a long-term recovery strategy. The Government has sufficient capacity in some technical areas, but the evaluation found it unlikely that the Government will have sufficient resources to take over activities such as school feeding and FSMS in the near future. Enhanced sustainability of FFA activities, SAFE and F2M will require the incorporation of long-term technical support. While some pilot activities had positive

results, comprehensive and rigorous measurement of their impacts was lacking, and there is considerable scope for enhancing analysis in specific portfolio areas.

60. WFP will decide whether to use an EMOP or a protracted relief and recovery operation from January 2014 onwards. The evaluation found that although WFP has to remain prepared for a sudden emergency, the annual cycle of EMOPs created a large work burden, often hampered the effectiveness of operations, and made longer-term planning difficult.

## **Recommendations**

### **Partnerships and Coordination**

61. **Recommendation 1: The country office must improve its partnerships and coordination with United Nations and other development actors in the Sudan.** Coordination and information-sharing regarding planning and decision-making should be more regular; as the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan, WFP should use its presence to support strategic partnership building:

62. **Recommendation 1a: The country office should strengthen its role in inter-agency mechanisms such as the Humanitarian Country Team and the food security and livelihood sector mechanism at the federal and state levels.**

63. **Recommendation 1b: WFP should establish long-term, formal partnerships with United Nations agencies to ensure appropriate selection and sustainable implementation of recovery activities.**

64. **Recommendation 1c: WFP should move from six-monthly to annual field-level agreements with more field partners, to increase efficiency and effectiveness through longer-term planning and support.**

### **Strategic Shift Towards Longer-Term Planning**

65. **Recommendation 2: In the next country strategy, beneficiaries and development actors should have a greater role in identifying the mix of emergency, relief and recovery activities, and activities should be oriented towards improving self-reliance.** While WFP needs to retain flexibility and the capacity to respond to recurrent and emerging crises, the portfolio should have a longer-term horizon with the aim of saving lives and rebuilding/protecting livelihoods.

66. **Recommendation 2a: The portfolio and its operations should be designed with longer-term objectives wherever possible. Planning cycles should be more aligned to those of United Nations partners and the Government.**

67. **Recommendation 2b: The school feeding strategy should be revised and aligned with those of partners, and new ways of increasing the possibility of Government ownership should be explored.**

68. **Recommendation 2c: The portfolio should include more activities for developing the self-reliance of communities and the emergency preparedness capacities of the authorities.**

### **Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting**

69. **Recommendation 3: With support and guidance from Headquarters and the regional bureau, the country office's M&E framework and system must be thoroughly reviewed and enhanced, with a shift in emphasis from counting beneficiaries and food tonnage to measuring results, outcomes and impacts achieved.**

70. **Recommendation 3a: Data collection should be expanded, focusing on outputs, coverage, outcomes and impacts.** Outcome indicators specific to the Sudan portfolio should be added to the M&E framework, enabling inter-year comparison of outcomes and results. Existing nutrition data should be compiled and information gaps filled, in collaboration with partners. Data collection for all activities should be more regular and better adapted to context, and results should be used systematically in decision-making.

71. **Recommendation 3b: Dissemination of M&E information to all partners should be structured and regular, with accountability established for the application of standardized data collection methods and the consistency of data reporting.**

72. **Recommendation 3c: One-off assessments should be conducted to fill major knowledge gaps,** including: i) comparative assessments of modality effectiveness; ii) the contributions of supplementary feeding and BSF to mitigating malnutrition rates, in collaboration with partners; iii) review of evidence of IDPs' coping mechanisms in Darfur, with further data collection if needed; and iv) measurement of the effects of decisions such as ration cuts and gaps in assistance, taking advantage of comparative conditions, to generate evidence and lessons on results and impacts.


### **Assessment and Targeting**

73. **Recommendation 4a: The optimal use of limited resources should be ensured by further refining targeting, continuing the verification exercises, and expanding regular community profiling so that the most vulnerable people in prioritized communities are reached.**

74. **Recommendation 4b: More regular engagement with communities should be planned, and feedback used to refine the targeting of food assistance.**

# Map of the Sudan

SUDAN: Administrative Map (May 2012)



Source: UNOCHA

## Preface

In July 2011, the former country of Sudan officially separated into two states, now known as the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. The geographical focus of this evaluation is on the current Republic of the Sudan, and all references to “the Sudan” in the following pages, unless specified otherwise, refer to the Republic of the Sudan as shown in the map above.

Prior to the formal separation, WFP operations were directed and managed from a WFP regional office in Khartoum, with a devolved structure of area and sub-offices across the larger country. Since July 2011, WFP has been running independent operations out of two separate country offices in Khartoum and Juba.

The timeframe for the evaluation was 2010–2012, but the team has not considered any work undertaken in the areas now located in the Republic of South Sudan. The presentation of figures, statistical information or other data for the initial 18 months has, as far as possible and unless specifically indicated, used disaggregated data as supplied by WFP Khartoum (or other acknowledged sources). Information may therefore differ from data and figures previously presented in WFP’s consolidated Standard Project Reports for 2010 and 2011, which used consolidated information.

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. Evaluation Features**

1. Country portfolio evaluations (CPEs) encompass the entirety of World Food Programme (WFP) activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole, and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design and implementation.

2. The Sudan CPE covers three years of emergency operations in the Sudan (2010–2012), and the results of the evaluation will contribute to the design of the next operation, starting in 2014. This period was chosen to correspond with the 2009–2012 WFP country strategy and the 2009–2012 UNDAF, both of which provide major points of reference for strategic planning and alignment with partners. As noted in the preface, the evaluation covers the period of time before and after the July 2011 separation of South Sudan from the Sudan. During the inception phase of the evaluation, it was determined that because the activities in each area were relatively discrete, although planned, budgeted and reported under one EMOP prior to 2012, it would be feasible to focus solely on the portfolio activities in the Sudan for the 2010–2012 period.

3. The Sudan portfolio has been one of WFP's largest and most complex portfolios, including security risks, limited access to affected populations, a restricted operating environment and logistic challenges because of long distances and poor infrastructure. The balance and spread of WFP interventions across the country and the ability to meet humanitarian needs within the complex environment and continuous nature of the crisis are therefore important focus areas of the evaluation.

4. This evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation:

- assesses and reports on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian challenges in the Sudan (accountability); and
- determines the reasons for observed success/failure and draws lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the country office to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in the Sudan, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

5. The Sudan CPE has been guided by the original Terms of Reference developed by the WFP Office of Evaluation in Rome (attached as Annex 1) and by the Inception Report. This report defined the scope and approach of the evaluation, and represented the understanding between the Office of Evaluation and the independent evaluation team of how the exercise would be conducted. An evaluation matrix was developed to guide the process (Annex 5). In light of the strategic nature of the

evaluation, it was intended to focus broadly on the portfolio as a whole and not to evaluate each operation individually.

6. The inception phase consisted of an introductory visit by the team leader to WFP Rome on 25 January 2013. The international team members then conducted a briefing visit to Rome from 6–9 March 2013, and the full team met with WFP staff in Khartoum from 10–14 March for further briefing and consultation regarding the purpose and priorities of the evaluation. The list of people met and the meeting schedule are presented in Annex 2a. The field mission schedule and deliverables are reflected in Annex 4.

7. The field phase of the evaluation was conducted from 30 March to 29 April 2013. Structured interviews were held with a broad range of respondents, including WFP staff in Khartoum, South, North and West Darfur and Kassala based upon a stakeholder analysis undertaken in the inception phase. In addition, focus group discussions were conducted with beneficiaries of different gender and age groups and their communities in a number of areas of implementation. A list of respondents to this evaluation is provided in Annex 2b, and the principal reference documents consulted by the evaluation are presented in Annex 3.

8. Debriefings of the initial evaluation findings were conducted by the evaluation team in Khartoum on 28 April 2013 (internal to WFP), and on 11 and 12 June, also in Khartoum, to WFP and stakeholders. These debriefings contributed to fine-tuning the findings and finalizing the evaluation report.

9. The evaluation team comprised three senior team members, two international and one Sudanese, with experience in strategic thinking and the skills and capacity for evaluating food and nutrition security outcomes. The team has expertise and experience related to humanitarian response management, working in fragile/conflict states, food assistance targeting and intervention design, food security and livelihoods, and monitoring and evaluation, and all team members have previously conducted numerous evaluations in the Sudan and elsewhere.

### **Limitations to the evaluation**

10. Because of local unrest and insecurity in South Darfur, the evaluation team was only able to visit the Otash IDP camp, and field visits outside Nyala town could not be made. In North Darfur, the planned field visit to Tawilla, where WFP has been piloting early recovery interventions, had to be shortened for security reasons. Regarding school feeding, interviews were held with Ministry of Education officials at several levels, but because of the school holiday period, the actual distribution and preparation of school meals could not be witnessed and school staff and children could not be interviewed.

11. The evaluation team travelled under the auspices of WFP, using United Nations provided transport and logistics. Travel arrangements within the Sudan included government approval and permits; as a result, the evaluation team

was not able to access non-government held areas directly, and, as a non-essential mission, elected not to travel to some of the newly accessible border areas. This was accepted at the evaluation design stage, but represents a systematic limitation of the evaluation.

12. To address the limitations to the evaluation, the evaluation team collected information from a wide range of WFP programme activities' stakeholders and triangulated different perspectives on key points of the analysis. Secondary data were gathered from the Sudan country office, WFP corporate M&E systems, and external United Nations, government, NGO and research agencies; these secondary data contributed to the address of the key evaluation questions, filled data gaps that were evident from the fieldwork schedule, and were triangulated with the primary data collected.

## **1.2. Country Context**

### **The Sudan**

13. The Sudan has been a country in conflict for five decades. The cultural, linguistic and historical roots in the Sudan contributed to differentiated governance structures and, in mid-2011, the separation of the Republic of South Sudan. Outstanding issues remain under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and border disputes still have a negative impact on populations in Abyei Administrative Area and Blue Nile and South Kordofan States.

14. The Sudan's human development outcomes are weak, and the progress to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is limited. The incidence of poverty in the Sudan stood at 46.5 percent<sup>18</sup> in 2009, suggesting that achieving the Sudan's MDG 1 target of 23 percent by 2015 will not be possible. Poverty levels range from 25 percent of the population in Khartoum to over 65 percent of the population in Northern Darfur. Some progress on MDG 2 (access to education), MDG 3 (gender equality and empowerment of women) and MDG 6 (HIV/AIDS and malaria)<sup>18</sup> are indicated, but MDGs 4, 5 and 7 are unlikely to be achieved unless current efforts are scaled up on all fronts to reverse the trends.

15. The Sudan is classified as a lower middle-income country,<sup>19</sup> but this obscures the fact that the wealth distribution is skewed and the country operates as a dual economy.<sup>20</sup> The principal urban centres, Khartoum and Port Sudan in particular, have benefited significantly, while the population in rural areas have remained little touched by the effects of investment in services and infrastructure.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations Development Programme, 2012. *Status of MDGs in the Sudan in 2012*. New York. [http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg\\_fact.htm](http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg_fact.htm).

<sup>19</sup> World Bank Global Monitoring Report 2012. *Rural-Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Development Goals*.

<sup>20</sup> de Waal, Alex (2009). *Are we part of Sudan? An Architectural Commentary*. Retrieved 3 June 2013, from <http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/07/05/are-we-part-of-sudan-an-architectural-commentary/>

16. The economic situation has deteriorated over recent years (2012: negative GDP growth at -7.3 percent, inflation at 46.5 percent<sup>21</sup>). The shutting of the oil transit pipeline in January 2012 deprived the government of income, and its reopening in April 2013 will take time to deliver results; further austerity measures had to be introduced. Individual states receive limited resources from the central government and are obliged to try to raise their own income locally, and local state taxes have been significantly increased.

17. In 2011, the Sudan ranked 171 out of 187 countries, with comparable data based on its Human Development Index of 0.414 in 2012 (down from 0.439 in 1999).<sup>22</sup> In 2011, the average life expectancy at birth was 61.5 years; the mean years of schooling of adults was 3.1. Prevalence of HIV/AIDS was 1.1 percent.<sup>23</sup> The Global Hunger Index decreased from 28.7 in 1990 to 21.5 in 2012.<sup>24</sup>

18. The United Nations Children's Fund has estimated the under-5 (U5) mortality rate at 108/1000 for the Sudan and South Sudan together, but no official figures are available.<sup>25</sup> In 2011, 31.7 percent of U5 children were underweight<sup>26</sup>; 40 percent of children from 2003–2009 were moderately or severely stunted; for 2010 rates, around 35 percent are suggested, but localized surveys have also found rates up to 54 percent. Between 2003 and 2009, 16 percent of children were moderately or severely wasted.<sup>27</sup> Global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates at the national level remain above the critical threshold of 15 percent<sup>28</sup> and the incidence of chronic malnutrition of U5 children in 2011 was 35 percent.<sup>29</sup>

19. A (unofficial) 2010 estimate of maternal mortality indicated 730 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.<sup>30</sup> Less than 70 percent of women access antenatal care and over 80 percent of births take place outside health facilities; only a third of children are exclusively breastfed.<sup>27</sup> Prevalence rates of diarrhoeal disease (30 percent) and malaria (20 percent) contribute to chronic malnutrition. Table 1 displays demographic, food security and nutrition related indicators in the Sudan, broken down into the Darfur states, East Sudan and South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Annex 6 contains more details.

20. In April 2012, approximately 4.7 million people were food insecure;<sup>31</sup> the worst affected areas being Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and eastern Sudan.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Source: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/sudan/inflation-cpi>.

<sup>22</sup> UNDP. Human Development Report 2013.

<sup>23</sup> WHO; World Health Statistics 2011.

<sup>24</sup> IFPRI; 2012 Global Hunger Index.

<sup>25</sup> Spoorenberg, T; Pelletier, F. Under-five mortality estimates for Sudan and South Sudan. *Sudanese Journal of Public Health*, October 2011, Vol. 6, No 4.

<sup>26</sup> WHO; World Health Statistics 2011.

<sup>27</sup> 2011 UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children. Middle East and North Africa: Sudan.

<sup>28</sup> UNOCHA; Humanitarian Bulletin, Sudan Issue 6, 1–31 July 2012.

<sup>29</sup> Sudan National Ministry of Health and Central Bureau of Statistics. Sudan Household Health Survey Second-round 2010. Summary Report, August 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Includes Sudan and South Sudan. Estimate from: WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA and World Bank: *Trends in Maternal Mortality, 1990 to 2010*, available at: [www.unfpa.org](http://www.unfpa.org).

<sup>31</sup> USAID; FEWSNET. Sudan Food Security Outlook, April–September 2012.

<sup>32</sup> FAO; IPC. Acute Food Insecurity Situation Overview, 15 August 2012.


Besides conflict, crises are caused or aggravated by natural events, drought in particular. The persistence of crises has disrupted livelihood patterns and destroyed household assets, forcing many households to become reliant on humanitarian assistance. The main lean or hunger season is May to September/October, and the main cereal harvest season is from November to January, leading to a seasonal hunger pattern. Figure 1 displays the seasonal agricultural calendar for the Sudan.

**Table 1: Demographic, food security and nutrition related indicators, 2009–2012**

Indicator	Sudan	North Darfur	West Darfur	South Darfur	Red Sea	Kassala	South Kordofan	Blue Nile
Population (million)	30.9	2.1	1.3	4.1	1.4	1.8	1.4	0.8
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)		69	93	67	66	76	66	76
Gross primary school enrolment (%)		66	86	40	36.1	44.8	80.8	64.3
Access to improved drinking water (%)	57	50	45	52	33	39	72.8	54
Access to improved sanitation (%)	34	51	42	44	51.3	38.9	16.9	5.3
Food-insecure IDP population, 2011 (%)		65	71	70			42	27.5
Global acute malnutrition, 2011 (%)		21.6	18.6	14.0	28.5	16.7	17.4	16.2

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Sudan (2009), 5th Population and Housing Census; CBS Statistical Yearbook 2011; UNICEF; State of Sudanese Children Report, 2011; United Nations and Partners Work Plan, the Sudan, 2010–2012; WFP, Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring System Darfur (FSMS), 2010–2012.

**Figure 1: Sudan seasonal calendar for agricultural activities**



Source: FEWSNET.

21. Gender remains a challenging issue for humanitarian and development programming in the Sudan. Only half of Sudanese girls of school-going age attend school,<sup>33</sup> and literacy rates for females over 15 are around 50 percent. Rates of early marriage and acceptance of domestic violence are high in the poorest areas. The Government of the Sudan has a national Women’s Empowerment Policy<sup>34</sup> dating back to 2007; there is little evidence it is being implemented.

## Darfur

22. The Darfur crisis began in 2003 when a complex armed conflict exacerbated the long-standing food insecurity. The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in 2006,

<sup>33</sup> UNICEF; The State of Sudanese Children Report, 2011.

<sup>34</sup> Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Social Welfare, Women’s and Children’s Affairs. *Women’s Empowerment Policy 2007*.

but groups on both sides continued the conflict. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was signed in 2011 between the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement. The Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) (created in February 2012) had the mandate to implement the DDPD and lead the recovery and reconstruction of Darfur some armed groups have remained outside the peace process.

23. A large part of the Darfur population has been displaced. According to estimates by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2011), about 4.2 million people in the Darfur region have been affected by the conflict and 2.7 million people became displaced at some point. Currently, over 1.4 million IDPs from North, West and South Darfur live in ten camps in North Darfur (1.5 percent of the state population), 18 camps in South and East Darfur (6.5 percent), and 28 camps in West and Central Darfur (10 percent).<sup>35</sup> Under the DDPD agreement, these IDP camps are to be closed, but the security situation is still compromised. In Greater Darfur, the majority of rural areas are under government control, but many areas still host a variety of factions and militias. IDPs in rural areas live primarily in informal gatherings clustered next to villages rather than in camps, with access to water and other resources. Most of the large organized IDP camps are situated in peri-urban areas, occasionally with checkpoints on the roads, but allowing free movement.

24. Many of the Darfur camps are tightly managed by camp sheikhs and remain the power bases for at least one of the non-government political groupings. It is in the interest of both to keep the camps populated; not only is resettlement hampered by the security situation, but the direct discussions about possible resettlement packages are also difficult and contentious. While the sheikhs have been critical interlocutors with the international community, they also tend to be highly politicized.

25. The protracted and multifaceted crisis has led to devastation of key infrastructure and services, and curtailed economic, agricultural and livestock related productive activities. Combined with the problems of getting to markets, this has led to a severe decrease in accessibility, availability and quality of food. Furthermore, solidarity systems, social networks and coping mechanisms have been disrupted, and competition over very limited natural resources has increased.

26. Insecurity in Darfur stems from military clashes involving armed opposition groups and government forces and fighting within and between armed groups and inter-tribal clashes. The increase in inter-tribal violence and banditry in recent years has complicated humanitarian assistance access. The areas under control of armed opposition movements have been largely inaccessible for WFP for various reasons. Still, WFP has been able to access many areas according to plan; in 2012,

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<sup>35</sup> WFP Comprehensive Food Security Assessment, 2011.

467 distribution points out of 500 planned were reached. Access to the “deep field” was enabled by the network of partners and UNHAS.

27. In West Darfur, the improvement in relations between the Sudan and Chad and the establishment of joint border patrols resulted in an improved security environment in the state. This has enabled a significant number of IDPs and Sudanese refugees (approximately 46,000 IDPs and 15,000 refugees<sup>36</sup>) residing along border areas in Chad to return to their areas of origin.

28. In January 2012, Greater Darfur was divided into five states; two new states of East and Central Darfur were announced. In response, WFP upgraded its sub-offices in both new states without changing the management and reporting channels. The sub-office in Central Darfur has become more directly involved in implementation of interventions but still falls under the authority of the area office in West Darfur.

### **East Sudan (Kassala, Red Sea and Gedaref States)**

29. The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement was signed between the Eastern Front and the Government of Sudan in 2006, but Eastern Sudan has felt far less impact from conflict than Darfur. Still, Eastern Sudan remains food insecure because of chronic poverty, lack of basic services, intermittent drought and environmental degradation. The food security and nutrition indicators for East Sudan, and especially Kassala State, are worse than in Darfur (see Table 1). Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and GAM indicators are high and have not improved over decades. Because of the ongoing conflict, however, Darfur is receiving far more support and attention from the international community, including WFP, than East Sudan.

30. The lack of feed, drought and poor husbandry has led to a reduction in animal stocks, which has eroded the coping capacity of the communities. Seasonal migration in search of pasture has become limited because of the inadequate rainfall for pasture development and water.

31. In Kassala and the Red Sea States, approximately 2,000 refugees per month arrive from Eritrea and settle in camps, or move onward to the capital or to border countries. Currently, there are 93,500 registered refugees in 12 camps and 21,000 residing in urban areas. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies, Eastern Sudan persists as a hub for human trafficking and smuggling networks.

### **The Three Areas (Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei)**

32. The continuing conflict in the Three Areas presents a serious obstruction to humanitarian access. The areas are contested by armed groups, including the SPLM-N in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, and by the governments of South Sudan and the Sudan in the Abyei area. Referred to as the Protocol Areas, the

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<sup>36</sup> United Nations and Partners Work Plan, the Sudan, 2012.

areas remain in dispute between the two countries as their status was not agreed under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.

33. Because of civilian displacement in 2011, most rural residents missed the planting season, and food prices increased sharply. By mid-2012, around 275,000 people had been displaced or affected by conflict in government-controlled areas, and 420,000 in SPLM-N controlled areas. Over 110,000 people were displaced by conflict in Abyei in 2011 and only a few have returned.<sup>37</sup> In 2011, access to government-controlled areas could only be obtained by governmental and national organizations, and the movement of United Nations international staff was restricted. A tripartite initiative by the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations to gain approval for access from the Government of the Sudan and SPLM-N had little success. Government-controlled areas in South Kordofan could be accessed by international agencies and staff from 2012, and in Blue Nile only from 2013.

### **Key stakeholders**

34. The stakeholder analysis confirmed several key internal and external stakeholders to the evaluation. Internal stakeholders included the WFP country office, regional bureau and management at Headquarters. External stakeholders included Government of the Sudan authorities, United Nations Country Team (UNCT), African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), national NGOs and CBOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. Table 2 provides an overview of the stakeholder groups, their roles and responsibilities and interest in the evaluation.

35. The primary user of the evaluation findings and recommendations is the WFP Sudan country office in its design of the next operation and refinement of existing activities through budget revisions and partnership agreements. The WFP Executive Board and WFP senior management are important stakeholders in this regard because of their role in strategic planning and operational approval.

36. The Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) was the key interlocutor through which WFP and other humanitarian actors engaged with the authorities, planned and implemented operations. WFP also worked with specific government ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Education at national and state levels. Additionally, WFP worked with the Zakat Chamber, the Strategic Reserve Authority, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, the Central Bank of Sudan (microfinance unit) and the National Forests Corporation. In Darfur, the recently renewed Darfur Development Authority (DDA) was a key government liaison.

37. During the evaluation period, WFP Sudan received approximately US\$1.7 billion from its donors (see Table 3). The biggest donor, funding more than

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<sup>37</sup> United Nations and Partners Work Plan, the Sudan, 2012.

50 percent of the operations, has been the Office of Food for Peace within the United States Agency for International Development. Other important donors have been the governments of Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission (ECHO). The Government of Japan has also been a consistent supporter up until 2012.

38. WFP operates through a large number of partners in the Sudan, including INGOs, as well as Sudanese NGOs and CBOs. The number of INGO partners decreased since the government's initiative to channel funds through national institutions, but there remained several important field-based INGOs that were key stakeholders in this evaluation.<sup>38</sup> WFP also worked with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a large number of CBOs. The private sector was also a key stakeholder for WFP over the evaluation period, most importantly in logistics, supply and transport work.

39. WFP is one of 22 organizations<sup>39</sup> in the UNCT for the Sudan. WFP's principal United Nations partners in food and nutrition related interventions and disaster mitigation operations are UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, OCHA and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The humanitarian operations were coordinated through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee cluster approach, called "sectors" in the Sudan. WFP is (together with FAO) co-lead of the Food Security and Livelihoods Sector and has been co-lead of the Nutrition Sector together with UNICEF. WFP is a member of the Health Sector. WFP has also been lead of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, which is no longer operational.

40. Beneficiary communities and interest groups were key stakeholders in the evaluation. The evaluation fieldwork aimed to cover as many beneficiary groups as possible and gather their views on WFP food assistance. Limited access constrained the triangulation and coverage of beneficiary views from all regions and WFP activities.

41. WFP Sudan staff were an important stakeholder for the evaluation, with a wide range of experiences and perspectives contributing to the evaluation findings. The Sudan country office is located in Khartoum; area offices are located in el Fasher (North Darfur), el Geneina (West and Central Darfur), and Nyala (South and East Darfur). North Darfur has three sub-offices; West and Central Darfur has four; and South and East Darfur has three. CETA sub-offices are located in the capitals of Red Sea State, Kassala, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and North Kordofan. WFP Sudan employs 897 national staff (717 men, 180 women) and 89 international staff (71 men, 18 women).<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> The principal INGOs with which WFP partnered in the evaluation period were CARE, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision International and German Agro Action (GAA).

<sup>39</sup> AO, IFAD, ILO, IMF, IOM, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNDP (including UNV), UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UNJL, UNMAO, UNOPS, World Bank, WFP, WHO.

<sup>40</sup> As of January 2013.

**Table 2: Stakeholder analysis**

<b>Stakeholder group</b>	<b>Role in country portfolio, 2010–2012</b>	<b>Interest in evaluation</b>
WFP Executive Board	Executive Board is accountable for approved portfolio of WFP's operations	Conclusions and recommendations contribute to strategic direction for the Sudan portfolio within corporate priorities and plans
WFP Headquarters and regional bureau	Programme support to country office (regional bureau only recently)	Conclusions and recommendations to guide strategic direction of future interventions in the Sudan
Country office and area offices	Coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the country portfolio	Findings, conclusions and recommendations to support design of new operations and strategies
<u>Government of the Sudan</u> HAC Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Education Ministry of Health Ministry of Social Welfare Strategic Reserve Authority	Recipient and implementer of operations. Coordinates and supports operations. Ultimate owner of portfolio.	Review of existing capacity and gaps. Synergies with interventions by other donors and development actors. Input to national strategies, policies and plans.
<u>United Nations agencies</u> UNHCR UNICEF FAO IOM UNOCHA	Coordinated planning and action through clusters; complementary interventions and inputs	Assessment of appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, targeting and connectedness contribute to future strategy and direction of UNDAF and UNCT
<u>Donors</u> United States of America ECHO Canada DfID Switzerland Germany Italy Japan	Funding of portfolio and operations; by choice of funding give specific direction to interventions	Review of efficiency and effectiveness of WFP operations. Added value of WFP versus other development actors. Findings, conclusions and recommendations may contribute to funding strategy regarding location and duration.
<u>INGOs</u> CARE WVI CRS GAA/ICRC	Implementing partners	Assessment of partnership. Review of performance, efficiency of implementation and effectiveness of targeting. Observed relevance, appropriateness, results and value added of WFP activities may contribute to future strategy.
ICRC	Cooperating partner	As above
<u>National NGOs and CBOs</u> Sudanese Red Crescent Society –Other national NGOs and CBOs <sup>41</sup>	Implementing partners, linking to communities at the field level	Assessment of partnership. Observed relevance, appropriateness, results and value added of WFP activities may contribute to future decisions regarding actions at the field level.


<sup>41</sup> See full list in evaluation terms of reference.

Beneficiaries and beneficiary interest groups	Direct beneficiaries of interventions; establishment of target groups and committees; feedback of interventions	Identification of needs, gaps, constraints, successes, best practices and lessons learned contributes to increase of results and impact of WFP interventions.
<u>Private sector</u> Suppliers Transporters	Local and market traders, mill owners; transporters	Assessment of partnership. identification of needs, gaps, constraints, successes, best practices and lessons learned contribute to future planning and strategies

### The aid environment


42. The international aid environment changed significantly over the evaluation period. Since 2009, humanitarian funding through the CAP dropped by approximately 50 percent (Figure 2), although a large portion of this was due to CAP funds directed to South Sudan. Figure 3 indicates the significant decline in ODA since 2010, and that both ODA and humanitarian funding levels have been dropping since 2009, well before the separation of South Sudan in mid-2011.

**Figure 2: CAP funding, 2010–2012**



Source: UNOCHA (2012). Sudan: United Nations and Partners Work Plan 2012, mid-year review.


**Figure 3: Aid flows to the Sudan, 1996–2012<sup>42</sup>**



Source: OECD-DAC, UN-OCHA; FTS.

43. The decrease in aid flow was due to several factors: donor fatigue with the protracted crisis in Darfur; further restrictions on international actors operating in Darfur and a push to close IDP camps in the area; lack of access to humanitarian agencies in the three border area states in the south; the Government of the Sudan’s policy of channelling aid through national institutions; and the overall fiscal constraints facing most donor countries. There has also been an increase in longer-term funding and a gradual shift away from funding requests for emergency interventions such as food assistance (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Funding shifts under the Humanitarian Work Plan**



Source: Revised CAPs, 2007–2013; OCHA, the Sudan FTS.

### 1.3. WFP’s Portfolio in the Sudan

44. WFP is the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan with over 40 percent of the total Consolidated Appeal (CAP) request in each year of the 2010–2012 period (see Table 3). In combination with UNHAS, this permitted a good reach into the

<sup>42</sup> Figures prior to 2011 include both the Sudan and South Sudan; 2011 and 2012 figures are only for the Sudan.

deep field (467 out of 500 planned distribution points in 2012), but WFP rarely works in non-government held areas.

**Table 3: WFP portion of total Consolidated Appeal request, 2010–2012**

Year	Total Sudan CAP request US\$ (updated)	WFP Sudan request US\$ (updated)	% WFP of total CAP request
2010	1 843 386 608	894 651 879	48.5
2011	1 132 952 016	456 871 616	40.3
2012	1 051 018 271	447 664 857	42.6

Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service.<sup>43</sup>

45. A number of events played a role in the design and implementation of the Sudan CPE from 2010–2012, as reflected in the timeline in Table 4.

**Table 4: Timeline of the Sudan portfolio and critical events, 2010–2012**

WFP Sudan: Country Portfolio Evaluation, 2010–2012		
EMOP 200027		
	EMOP 200151	
		EMOP 200312
		SO 200470
		SO 200354 (UNHAS)
SO 200073 (UNHAS)		
SO 108450		
SO 10342.2 (UNJLC support)		
SO 10368.0 (Emergency Road Repair)		
CP (DEV 10105.0)		
<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<p><b>Sept:</b> Kidnapping of UNHAS staff in South Darfur</p> <p><b>Dec:</b> Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi withdraws from the Doha Peace Agreement</p>	<p><b>Jan:</b> Kidnapping of three UNHAS crew</p> <p><b>May:</b> Outbreak of fighting in Abyei</p> <p><b>June:</b> Establishment of United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei</p> <p><b>June:</b> Relocation of Abyei, Kadugli and Kauda offices in SKS</p> <p><b>July:</b> Secession of South Sudan</p> <p><b>July:</b> Outbreak of fighting in SKS &amp; BNS. State of emergency declared in BNS</p> <p><b>July:</b> Signing of Doha Document for Peace in Darfur</p> <p><b>Sept:</b> Kidnapping of WFP staff in Darfur</p> <p><b>Sept:</b> Relocation of Damazine and Kurmuk offices in BNS</p> <p><b>Sept:</b> Expiration of UNMIS mandate</p> <p><b>Nov:</b> Creation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front</p>	<p><b>Jan:</b> Division of Darfur into five states</p> <p><b>Jan:</b> South Sudan halts flow of oil, increasing economic pressures</p> <p><b>March:</b> Kidnapping of WFP staff member in Nyala</p> <p><b>May:</b> Expulsion of seven NGOs from East</p> <p><b>May:</b> Devaluation of Sudanese pound</p> <p><b>June:</b> Austerity measures introduced</p> <p><b>July:</b> Change of senior management team in WFP country office</p> <p><b>Aug:</b> Ambush of WFP vehicle in SKS; death of driver and injury of one staff</p> <p><b>Aug:</b> Attack and looting of Kutum special operation in North Darfur</p> <p><b>Sept:</b> Darfur Joint Assessment Mission</p> <p><b>Sept:</b> the Sudan and South Sudan sign political and economic agreement</p>

<sup>43</sup> <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=home>.

46. The WFP Sudan country strategy document for the 2009–2012 period outlines three components to the portfolio: humanitarian/emergency activities, early recovery activities and safety-net activities. The country strategy provides a framework for the portfolio, including the regional scenarios, strategic objectives and focus areas of intervention. A timeline for implementing activities from 2009–2012, dependent on security, access and other considerations, was used as a basis for strategic planning. The country strategy document includes a “results and risk matrix”, outlining planned outcomes, performance indicators and associated risks under WFP Strategic Objectives 1, 3, 4 and 5. The internal WFP Sudan Vision 2011-2015 document further clarifies the relationship between the SOs, the EMOPs and the ultimate goal of “food security in the hands of the people and their government”.

47. WFP’s interventions in the Sudan can be grouped into four categories: (i) GFD; (ii) food-based nutrition programmes for malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women (PLW); (iii) targeted FFA and FFW activities to improve access to food and offset seasonal hunger in vulnerable areas; and (iv) support to children in conflict and post-conflict areas through school meals. GFD has been the most important activity in terms of the number of beneficiaries and food distributed, with the majority of GFD being distributed in Darfur. Table 5 displays the activities per category and the total number of beneficiaries in each activity.

**Table 5: WFP’s intervention categories, activities and actual cumulative beneficiaries, 2010–2012**

Category	Activity	Beneficiaries	
		Incl. South Sudan*	The Sudan (estimate)**
General food rations	In-kind and voucher distribution	14 288 810	10 372 191
Food-based nutrition	Blanket supplementary feeding	1 728 451	1 145 732
	IBSFP		367 989
	Targeted supplementary feeding	14 620***	No data
	Institutional/therapeutic Feeding		
FFA	FFT	275 629	Data not available
	FFW/FFR	203 459	No data 2010–2011
	SAFE		
	F2M		
School feeding	Support to primary schools	3 985 693	3 129 197
	Take-home rations	43 075***	No data
	Support to girls’ boarding schools	54 000	54 000

\*Source: SPR EMOP 200027, 200151, 200312. \*\*Trend table as of 6 Feb. 2013, provided by WFP Staff. \*\*\* SPR data 2010 only.

48. Three consecutive EMOPs and five SOs have been used in the Sudan since January 2010. In addition, one development operation finished in mid-2010. From 2010–2012, 89 percent of the total budget consisted of EMOPs (see Table 6); 83 percent of the total funds requested for EMOPs were received, and approximately US\$1.3 billion was spent.

**Table 6: WFP portfolio budget and expenditure by programme category, 2010–2012**

	No. of operations	Requirements (US\$ million)	% breakdown	Actual received (US\$ million)	Requirement vs received (%)	Direct expenditure (US\$ million)
EMOPs	3	1 833.9	89.35	1 528.2	83	1 189.9
SOs*	5	1 71.8	8.37	129.4	75	132.4
CP/DEV**	1	46.7	2.28	40.5	87	1.1
<b>Total</b>		<b>2 052.4</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 698.1</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>1 323.4</b>

Source: SPR 2010–2012, Resource Situation.

\* SO 10368.0, which entirely focused on road and mine clearance in South Sudan, has not been included.

\*\* CP/DEV requirements and actual received April 2003–August 2010; expenditure only 2010.

49. The three WFP EMOPs had the objectives to save lives, reduce food insecurity and malnutrition and restore livelihoods of conflict-affected and vulnerable populations. EMOPs are prepared in June of one year for the following calendar year to enable discussions for early contributions, to allow additional time to transport in-kind contributions to the Sudan and to pre-position food in advance of the rainy season.

50. Five SOs, consisting primarily of the humanitarian air service and logistics support to humanitarian partners, were implemented during the evaluation period, as shown in Table 7. These are acknowledged to have played a strong supporting role to the principal focus of food deliveries, but they have not been assessed in detail as part of the evaluation. With regard to the country programme (CP), there was a very limited overlap and only the part related to school feeding was carried over into continuing operations.

**Table 7: Summary of special operations**

<b>Special operations</b>		
10342.2	04/08–12/11	UNJLC, Common Logistics Services, Logistics Planning & Facilitation, Support to NFIs and Emergency Shelter Sector
108450	05/09–11/10	Operational Augmentation for WFP and NGO partners in Darfur in Support of EMOP 10760.0
200073	01/10–12/11	UNHAS: Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sudan
200354	01/12–12/12	UNHAS: Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sudan
200470	06/12–12/12	Logistics Augmentation and Coordination in Support of Humanitarian Operations in South Kordofan

Source: WFP Standard Project Reports, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1. Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

51. This section addresses the question “What has been the strategic alignment of the WFP portfolio?” by assessing to what extent objectives and activities were relevant to the needs in the Sudan and the strategic alignment with all key stakeholders. The evaluation has assessed the alignment with humanitarian and fragile/conflict state principles and the connection of WFP’s assistance to longer term livelihoods and coping strategies of the targeted populations.

#### Alignment with international humanitarian principles

52. Humanitarian agencies, by definition, need to uphold the acknowledged core humanitarian principles, particularly when such interventions take place in the context of conflict and unsettled social contexts. In a long-running conflict situation such as Darfur, adhering to these principles becomes a key consideration, even if often difficult to achieve. But assistance can also be a significant factor in the context of conflict, impacting inter- and intra-group relations and perpetuating or changing the nature of conflicts.

53. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/182<sup>44</sup> provides the specific humanitarian principles that guide the provision of all United Nations humanitarian assistance. Consistent with these principles, the WFP Executive Board endorsed the core principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality in provision of WFP humanitarian assistance<sup>45</sup> (see box). In addition, the WFP Executive Board also endorsed the principles of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the state in which WFP is working, self-reliance, participation, capacity development, coordination, accountability, and professionalism. WFP recognizes that a standardized approach to negotiating and securing humanitarian access is not possible and in all cases the sovereignty of the state must be respected.<sup>46</sup> Humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of the host government request and the security of United Nations staff and personnel is to be provided by the state.

54. Parameters for negotiating humanitarian access include a thorough situation analysis, security awareness and management, international law, humanitarian principles and minimal operational requirements, coordination with the humanitarian community, civil-military

#### Core Humanitarian Principles

1. Humanity
2. Impartiality
3. Neutrality

#### Additional Principles for Effective Humanitarian Action

4. Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the state in which WFP is working
5. Self-reliance
6. Participation
7. Capacity development
8. Coordination
9. Accountability
10. Professionalism

<sup>44</sup> UNGA Resolution 46/182, 19 December 1991.

<sup>45</sup> Humanitarian Principles. WFP/EB.A/2004/5-C.

<sup>46</sup> Note on humanitarian access and its implications for WFP; WFP/EB.1/2006/5-B/Rev.1.

relations, advocacy, partnerships (with neutral entities), and learning/training.<sup>47</sup>

55. The evaluation found that the WFP Sudan portfolio was broadly aligned with the core principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, albeit in a manner complicated by the role of the Government of the Sudan in the dual role as host government to the United Nations agencies and party to the conflicts in the WFP operating areas. WFP based its food assistance operation on food security assessments and targets all accessible food insecure areas, taking into account the differing needs of the population and without taking sides in the conflict. In addition, the evaluation noted that WFP was active in negotiating access to insecure areas in order to conduct food security assessments and deliver food assistance.

56. However, the evaluation team noted, and this was repeated by external stakeholders, that WFP's restricted access, including very limited access to non-government held areas, excludes specific food insecure populations of the Sudan. This points to some of the inherent dissonance within the humanitarian principles themselves; state sovereignty must be respected, coordination involves consent of the host country, and participation also means working closely with local and national authorities, even if it means that WFP may appear non-neutral from the perspective of some stakeholders.

57. Given WFP's extensive experience operating in many parts of the Sudan over past decades, a reasonable understanding of the various programmatic and contextual risks has been developed, although the evaluation considers that this could be significantly improved. The scale and impact of the food inputs, the changing nature of the conflict, influences on market prices by the distribution or voucher programmes, official restrictions, and the lack of WFP's (and others') access to all or parts of the affected population *inter alia* contribute towards a certain lack of direct control and relevance over programming decisions.

58. The country office has maintained a detailed risk register since early 2011, which has been recently updated. While it is fully acknowledged that many of the identified issues are beyond the direct control of WFP or the country office, it is significant to note that a number of the issues of concern to the evaluation<sup>48</sup> were already identified in 2011, and insufficient remedial action appears to have been taken in some cases.

59. The evaluation found that WFP consistently referenced its "principled approach" in relations with government and other stakeholders in the Sudan – examples included negotiating access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and the camp verification process in Darfur where food supplies were only provided after consent to verification of beneficiary lists. The principled approach also included agreements for access to both national and international staff when assessments are being done.

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<sup>47</sup> Note on humanitarian access and its implications for WFP; WFP/EB.1/2006/5-B/Rev.1, pg 13.

<sup>48</sup> For example, inadequate staffing resources and capacity, inability to provide food to beneficiaries on a timely basis, failure to demonstrate project impact, deteriorating security conditions, poor quality of reporting, limited resources restricting programme capacities were, among others, all issues identified in the risk analysis, and remain relevant in 2013.

As a result, food assistance delivery in the border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile ceased in 2011 only to resume in 2012 and early 2013.<sup>49</sup> The evaluation views this principled approach as probably necessary for the protection of WFP staff and resources. However, stopping or delaying humanitarian food assistance to food insecure and displaced populations is a very difficult compromise.

60. WFP strictly followed the United Nations Department of Safety and Security rules and procedures in terms of security of staff and assets. Nonetheless, WFP were exposed to several security incidents, including looting of food, hijacking of vehicles and kidnapping of staff. A critical analysis examining the reasons behind the occurrence of such incidents, and whether there is any causal relationship with WFP's position vis-à-vis the Government of the Sudan, has not yet been conducted.

61. Donor representatives interviewed for this evaluation reported that WFP's accountability to them was relatively good with a high level of engagement and responsiveness to information requests. Donor field trips were facilitated and several donors undertook complementary monitoring visits. The United States donor, requiring weekly "new updates", was reported to be quite demanding on WFP's ability to produce detailed programmatic information from the field level quickly.

62. Selected beneficiary groups interviewed for the evaluation felt that they had not always been sufficiently consulted about their priorities and needs by WFP and its partners. An example reported was in the "Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy Project" (SAFE), where components such as *Jatropha* (biodiesel tree) and gum arabic were started after recommendation by an INGO partner without checking with the community itself. Beneficiaries and implementing partners reportedly found two-way communication flows with the beneficiaries at times to be controlled by government representatives and camp sheikhs. Where direct beneficiary consultation had taken place, it was often the result of many months of negotiation.

### **Alignment with international good practices in conflict and fragile states**

63. While there is no solid consensus on the definition of a "fragile state", the term can be considered to apply to "states that fail, in various ways, to provide adequate public goods to their people, including safety and security, public institutions, economic management, and basic social services such as roads and water. These are the minimal or core functions of the state rather than more elaborate policy roles".<sup>50</sup> Other authors<sup>51</sup> suggest that this classification also needs to consider the underlying

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<sup>49</sup> OCHA reported that by the end of 2011, some 300,000 people in South Kordofan and another 66,000 in Blue Nile were "displaced or severely affected. Limited activities were continuing, and the Government of the Sudan made some food stocks available, but refusal to allow access to WFP's international staff meant no WFP food deliveries were made to the states from September 2011. Despite plans and availability of food resources, the number of beneficiaries reached in the two states dropped to zero from mid-2011; in February 2012, WFP finally initiated deliveries to government-held areas, but access to non-government areas remained impossible. Access to government-held areas in Blue Nile State was only regained in March 2013.

<sup>50</sup> Torres, M. and Anderson, M. (2004). *Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction*, London: DFID. Available at : [http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/doc\\_1\\_FS-Diff\\_environ\\_for\\_pov\\_reduc.pdf](http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/doc_1_FS-Diff_environ_for_pov_reduc.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> Kaplan, S. *What the OECD Does Not Understand About Fragile States*. January 2013.

socio-political dynamics in play in the country, issues around different identities, ideologies and interests, which contribute towards its inability to deliver.

64. The “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations” (FSPs)<sup>52</sup> were drawn up to provide a framework to guide international actors in achieving better results in very difficult operating contexts. When engaging in such situations, international partners can affect outcomes in these states positively and negatively and it is vital to consider the ten principles and the way their activities will impact (although not all will apply in every situation).<sup>53</sup> These principles are supported by WFP’s Strategic Plan (2008–2013)<sup>54</sup> and are applicable to WFP’s activities in the Sudan.

Ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations:

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Do no harm
3. Focus on state building as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognize the links between political security and development objectives
6. Promote non-discrimination as the basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion

65. The evaluation found that WFP was well aligned with several of the principles, but not with all. In Darfur, the context (FSP1) is complex and changes regularly; tribal and ethnic relationships are unsettled. The different approaches taken by the various area offices aimed to address these different contexts, and remained flexible as the conditions and needs around them changed (FSP7). WFP worked to develop some capacity with certain state level ministries (FSP3) and engaged in a range of cooperative activities with them, despite the limited levels of positive commitment seen from the federal level.

66. The principles FSP4, FSP5 and FSP10 are more challenging. WFP’s negotiation of access included all areas where people are in need (FSP10) but was often blocked, despite regular communications with the government and contact with non-state actors. WFP did not contribute directly towards conflict prevention activities (FSP4) (which is extremely difficult in the Darfur or South Kordofan/Blue Nile contexts) but was directly involved in post-conflict response. A robust engagement in the development-focused approach outlined in the Doha Document

<sup>52</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. 2007. *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, Paris.

<sup>53</sup> The OECD undertakes occasional surveys of progress against these principles in a number of countries, but the Sudan did not participate in the last round in 2011. South Sudan did participate, and the report can be found at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48697972.pdf>.

<sup>54</sup> WFP’s Strategic Plan 2008–2013 (p. 10) states: “WFP will ensure that its activities support overall United Nations aims and multilateral efforts on behalf of conflict prevention, peace building, development, humanitarian assistance, human rights and the United Nations Charter”.

for Peace in Darfur, in collaboration with other partners, would help address FSP5. Better inter-agency coordination between the various partners is needed to address FSP8.

67. The Do No Harm Framework (DNHF), FSP2, can be an effective tool for risk mitigation if used robustly.<sup>55</sup> The operational tools of the DNHF can help assistance programmes better understand the complexity of the environments in which they work, how assistance decisions affect inter- and intra-group relationships, and provide advice on the design of more effective and informed assistance strategies. There is also a number of “implicit ethical messages” contained within the DNHF that deserve consideration in the current WFP operating contexts, particularly around areas such as the use of armed escorts and local decision-making. The findings of previous studies,<sup>56,57,58</sup> although primarily based on fieldwork in South Sudan, are relevant to Darfur and other parts of the Sudan (see box). The core message in these prior assessments is that humanitarian agencies do not necessarily have a clear understanding of the impact of their interventions and activities on the conflict.

68. In Darfur, a generation of young people has been brought up in peri-urban camps, with access to a range of reasonable-quality services, and with little interest in or experience of land cultivation. While parents and younger children may choose to return to the villages when they can do so, there is a likelihood of the youth not joining them. This will diminish the ability of the families to cultivate land, decrease agricultural production, increase pressure on urban resources and limited employment opportunities, and create problems such as

*“There is currently no resistance to DNH ... However, one challenge would be that there is no overarching policy for project design. Each project is designed separately, so projects are highly dependent on the individuals designing them. If they know about conflict sensitivity and DNH and like it, they may use it. If not, they probably won’t.”*

Agency interviewee quoted in Bauman & Deng (2009).

*“Particularly where the state is a belligerent in the conflict, operational aid agencies are sensitive to the role of the state in directly and proximately protecting humanitarian workers. For the most part, agencies do not want the state to provide ‘protection’ for humanitarian workers directly; rather, they prefer to distinguish between the provision of ambient security (the general security environment in which humanitarian work takes place) and proximate security (such as travel escorts and protection of property). Overly protective state arrangements for aid agencies can, in fact, increase insecurity due to perceptions of partiality, and can in practical terms influence the ability of agencies to respond impartially to the needs of the population by making them dependent on state police or military escorts for time-bound access”.*

Source: Stoddard et al (2006) *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations*. Background paper. London: HPG/ODI.

<sup>55</sup> The Do No Harm “analytical framework” provides a tool for mapping the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance programmes. Further details available at: [www.cdainc.com](http://www.cdainc.com).

<sup>56</sup> Anderson, M. and Wallace, M. (1999). *Challenges for Food Aid in Conflict Situations*. Available at: [http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/issue/challenges\\_for\\_food\\_aid\\_in\\_conflict\\_situations\\_Pdf.pdf](http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/issue/challenges_for_food_aid_in_conflict_situations_Pdf.pdf)

<sup>57</sup> Anderson, M. (ed.) (2000). *Options For Aid in Conflict – Lessons from Field Experience*. Available at: [http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/book/options\\_for\\_aid\\_in\\_conflict\\_Pdfi.pdf](http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/book/options_for_aid_in_conflict_Pdfi.pdf)

<sup>58</sup> Bauman, P and Deng, D. (2009). *Do No Harm in the Wake of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement*. Available at: [http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/casestudy/dnh\\_ssudan\\_reflective\\_case\\_Pdf.pdf](http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/casestudy/dnh_ssudan_reflective_case_Pdf.pdf)

increased urban poverty.<sup>59</sup>

69. WFP was not always able to display to the evaluation a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the community dynamics in many of these areas, or indeed within the camps themselves. Beneficiary dialogue appears to have been limited, which is sometimes reflected by a decrease in levels of trust (FSP2 and FSP4). One example of this was a WFP plan to create a “community structure” in a camp without any consultation with the beneficiaries. In another case, community members noted that creating a large *hafir* (water reservoir) via FFA for the benefit of their community brought with it the risk that others (notably livestock herders, whose more traditional watering holes are no longer accessible) seek to use these reliable new water sources for their animals. While the community did the work, they were now at risk of losing ownership. Conflict over the management of resources is thus possible, reintroducing to the community one of the initial reasons for the outbreak of conflict ten years ago (FSP2 and FSP4). The evaluation concludes that a more detailed understanding of household and community-level dynamics would help inform the design of some of WFP’s interventions.

### **Alignment with and involvement of authorities**

70. WFP’s main government counterparts are the former Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and the Ministry of International Cooperation. Both ministries were dissolved in 2011 and their responsibilities transferred to the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The HAC, the principal government interface, is now linked to the Ministry of Interior. Early recovery and recovery/development activities are planned and implemented with the relevant technical ministries at the state level – including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Welfare and Ministry of Agriculture.

71. Security considerations are – and have long been – a tool used by the authorities to restrict the work of humanitarian agencies, including the United Nations, and to control movement. The Government of the Sudan remains responsible for the provision of “ambient security”<sup>60</sup> and also insists upon security escorts for WFP food convoys. WFP uses security escorts provided by UNAMID in Darfur, but escorts by agencies of the Government of the Sudan are enforced in other locations, and in both cases available capacity impacts on efficiency and timeliness. This liaison may call into question WFP’s perceived impartiality, and in some places directly limits access to non-state areas.

72. The evaluation found that WFP maintained a close and positive relationship with its key government interlocutor, the HAC and WFP staff, contrary to other

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59 Pantuliano, S.; Buchanan-Smith, M.; Murphy P.; Mosel I. *The long road home. Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas Report of Phase II Conflict, urbanisation and land.* September 2008.

60 Stoddard et al (2006). *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations.* Background paper. London: HPG/ODI.

humanitarian agencies in the country,<sup>61</sup> benefited from a waiver for official permits for travel between Khartoum and Darfur. WFP has not capitalized upon its closer relationship by negotiating, for example, the same benefits for other United Nations agency staff; WFP, however, reported that involving all stakeholders in consultation with government potentially jeopardizes its own access to affected areas and populations. United Nations partners saw WFP's relationship with HAC as a direct benefit of the Government of the Sudan needing WFP's inputs, and suggested that WFP is often perceived to be too close and too compliant to the official position.

73. WFP supported the functioning of the Strategic Food Reserve Unit (SFRU), an autonomous body established in 2000 to manage food reserves at a countrywide level. WFP's engagement included capacity development on food handling, technical assistance in warehousing, data management, and transport and training for staff on food security monitoring and reporting. In 2011, the management of SFRU was moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, a governmental bank with a commercial facility. States are still able to access food from the strategic reserve, but now have to pay for it from their own budgets, which is usually impossible. This further removes the government's statutory obligations to its citizens, and increases expectations upon external partners.

74. Other capacity development work has been directed towards various state government departments and ministries, notably the Ministry of Agriculture, whose field staff are instrumental in collecting the FSMS data. WFP technically supported the Ministry of Agriculture in developing tools for data collection, analysis and reporting for pre- and post-harvest assessments. Between 2010 and 2011, a total of 200 ministry staff were trained in FSMS and CFSAs. The Ministry of Agriculture now manages the fieldwork themselves, supported through the VAM Unit. The pre- and post-harvest assessments are now carried out without WFP technical support; evidence of successful capacity development by WFP.

75. The WFP county portfolio was found coherent with the content and the focus of the government's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Five-Year Strategic Plan 2008–2011, and the official strategies and policies to alleviate poverty through increased agricultural production and productivity, in particular the Agricultural Revival Programme 2008–2012. However, WFP's planning cycle does not align: most of the strategic planning and instruments mentioned above are based on two- to five-year cycles, whereas WFP's plans are mainly shaped by one year EMOPs. Some stakeholders saw this mismatch in planning and programming between WFP and other actors (including other United Nations agencies) as potentially hampering WFP's ability to contribute strategically to longer term improvement.

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<sup>61</sup> WFP still is obliged to secure official security clearances for "deep field" locations and for other areas of the country deemed by the authorities as "insecure". These are not always granted and indeed the rules change frequently and without warning, and even if granted officially, actual movement is still subject to refusal by individuals on the ground.

76. A national nutrition policy is in place as well as a national nutrition programme within the Ministry of Health, targeting timely identification, prevention and treatment of malnutrition, with support and collaboration from partners. WFP contributed to the development of the national strategies on HIV and nutrition in 2010, and towards related capacity development at the state level in 2011 and 2012. WFP attends the nutrition coordination forum chaired by the federal and state level Ministry of Health. At the federal level, WFP has no signed agreement with the Ministry of Health formalizing its relationship (unlike the World Health Organization [WHO] and UNICEF), possibly because of the limitations created by WFP's one year EMOP framework. The evaluation concludes that, while there is evidence of technical support and advocacy for nutrition policies and programming, it appears more informal than formal and often reliant on key individuals in WFP to maintain momentum.

77. In Darfur, since June 2012, the DDPD has become the primary focus for finding long-term solutions for the conflict-affected population. In support of this, the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission was launched<sup>62</sup> in September 2012 and identified recovery needs were presented in Doha in April 2013 at the International Donors Conference for Darfur. WFP has been working with the DRA in Darfur but the evaluation was not able to identify concrete progress and was unable to confirm any alignment of WFP's plans with those of the DRA.

### **Alignment with local partners**

78. WFP's country portfolio is implemented to a large extent with and through the support of implementing partners. Table 8 displays WFP's range of partners across the Sudan, and their type and role.

79. The number of INGOs had already decreased significantly following the expulsion from Darfur in 2009 as part of the Government of the Sudan policy, and was further aggravated by another expulsion of seven INGOs from East Sudan in May 2012. This initially forced WFP into direct implementation and then to identify a wider range of national agencies<sup>63</sup> than before.

**Table 8: WFP implementing partners and their role**


<b>Partner</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Role</b>
Donors	Bilateral and multilateral	Funding, coordination
Federal government	Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Welfare, Central Bank of Sudan, Strategic Reserve Authority, HAC	Policy framework and strategy formulation, planning, coordination and facilitation
State government	Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, HAC	Planning, implementation, M&E

<sup>62</sup> UNDP; USAID; the World Bank. Darfur Joint Assessment Mission 2012. November 2012.

<sup>63</sup> National NGOs and CBOs.

United Nations	Sister organization	Planning, coordination, joint implementation, M&E
INGOs	CP	Planning, implementation, M&E
Sudanese NGOs	CP	Planning, implementation, M&E
CBOs	CP	Planning, implementation, M&E

**Figure 5: Proportion of partners (in numbers) in Darfur in 2010, 2011 and 2012**



Source: Figures provided by WFP FLA unit; note that these represent number of partners and not the size of implementation in financial, food quantity or beneficiary terms; still a clear trend is visible in the selected type of partners.

80. As Figure 5 indicates, the number of government partners in Darfur sharply increased (10 in 2010, 14 in 2011 and 47 in 2012). The number of CBOs slightly increased in 2011, but decreased again considerably in 2012. For the CETA, only the 2012 numbers were available: there were 22 government partners, five INGOs, one Sudanese NGO and four CBOs.

81. Many of the CBOs were relatively small structures with few partners and limited institutional experience of emergency food distribution modalities. The evaluation found that pressure was put upon WFP to identify, train and support these agencies and their staff. Feedback from the national agencies was generally positive, although to some extent they felt that the capacity development was geared towards areas directly impacting on their ability to comply with WFP's reporting expectations. Other support, such as material or administrative assistance, has also been provided.

82. Many of the local organizations saw their relationship with WFP as implementers rather than full partners. Even though WFP has introduced longer term Field Level Agreements (FLAs) for some specific activities during the evaluation period, the majority of the organizations work on six-month FLAs for GFD distributions. According to a range of key stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation, the FLA negotiations are long, delayed and bureaucratic. Many CBOs reported that WFP placed unreasonable demands upon them in the FLAs, especially in the administrative and reporting areas.

83. Staff of national agencies indicated that operational costs paid by WFP are significantly lower for national partners than for INGOs, which WFP justifies by higher staff costs and better equipment of INGOs. The CBOs considered this inequitable, indicating the rates should be equal since the outputs are similar. They

suggested that a more balanced level of support would help them find appropriate additional resources to better meet WFP's expectations. As an example quoted by several, when pipeline breaks or security blockages lead to food not being distributed, the local agencies struggle to cover their fixed costs and often have to lay off staff as they cannot finance their salaries, as they have no reserves or alternative resources to draw from. All agencies interviewed also stated that cancelled deliveries or delayed payment of invoices by WFP regularly created significant cash flow problems, particularly for the smaller groups.

### **Alignment with and involvement of United Nations partners**

84. WFP has been an active partner in the discussion and development of the UNDAF 2009–2012 and the subsequent 2013–2016 UNDAF. The shift in WFP strategy from food aid to food assistance is coherent with the different policies and strategic frameworks of the various stakeholders in the Sudan. This shift in approach further reinforces the strategy adopted by the High-Level Committee, which include the Government of the Sudan, United Nations partners and representatives from the international community. Here, humanitarian partners have embraced a two-track approach to assistance in Darfur, recognizing the need to continue life-saving assistance, as well as support the emergence of durable solutions. In addition, WFP's portfolio is a key part of the United Nations HWP.

85. Even though WFP has chaired a number of working groups in the Humanitarian Country Team, United Nations agencies found interaction with WFP in the past had been suboptimal, at least until mid-2012, and some felt that WFP had not sufficiently coordinated their programme activities with others in previous years. Given that the food security and livelihoods (FSL) component of the HWP was significantly larger than the other parts and WFP's own budgets were consistently well-funded, United Nations agencies indicated that WFP had not considered it necessary to engage in the HWP development process beyond submitting its own plans. WFP's better ability to consistently raise its own funding as compared to other agencies was seen as a significant factor.<sup>64</sup>

86. WFP is co-lead, jointly with FAO, of the food security and livelihood cluster and a member in the nutrition, logistics and non-food items (NFIs) clusters. The co-leadership of the FSL sector began in 2011, and in 2012 in some states this co-leadership was actually undertaken, although the coordination and information sharing did not work optimally at national level. In some of the Darfur states, WFP played its part in the FSL sector, but in Kassala, WFP's involvement was close to zero. Numerous informants considered that WFP was often not committed to its sector coordination obligations. An attempt was made in 2012 to improve and clarify joint roles and responsibilities: an external consultant was hired for four months to establish a local structure and to develop guidelines and responsibilities. After the

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<sup>64</sup> For example, at a meeting in early 2013 where the FSL sector was appealing for significant allocations from the United Nations CHF funds, FAO made the presentation on behalf of the sector partners but WFP did not attend the meeting.

departure of the consultant though, WFP country office made no further commitment. Requested support from the Global FSL Cluster in Rome was reported to have been equally limited.

87. The WFP coordination and partnership with the United Nations, in general, was seen as weak. For example, although staff members of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) share accommodation with WFP in North and West Darfur, programmatic discussions rarely take place. UNICEF in Kassala criticized the lack of WFP partnership in the supplementary feeding programme and education sectors. WFP's coordination and link with OCHA was found to be ad hoc and slightly compromised.

88. It was acknowledged by United Nations respondents that since mid-2012 there had been a much closer engagement and involvement of the current WFP management team, a point welcomed by United Nations colleagues. Two particular areas of good cooperation were noted among others: WFP's role in advancing the universal salt iodization programme, complementing UNICEF's inputs, and the logistics support provided to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to move their heavy equipment from Darfur to South Sudan in mid-2011.

89. The evaluation noted good examples of inter-agency cooperation in Darfur, such as in the task distribution of SAM and MAM with UNICEF, and with FAO and UNAMID on a few local level projects. WFP's move from GFD to other food assistance programming suggests accessing staff and resources of other United Nations agencies to complement WFP's inputs, in terms of improved joint programming and use of complementary technical skills. WFP's recovery agenda is moving towards areas of agricultural support and FFAs, which require knowledge and competencies that WFP does not always have, particularly related to activities in the field of agriculture, environment and water. Some support is available via the local government departments, but a more integrated United Nations approach would be sensible. Even though FAO's staff numbers were significantly reduced in Darfur in 2012, they repeatedly assured the evaluation that their technical support is still available.

90. When WFP's access to Blue Nile was approved, many stakeholders were unaware even though they were also lobbying for access. Though WFP may have had good reasons for this singular approach, partners felt that not sharing information served the WFP agenda; WFP believes that involving all stakeholders in consultation with government may jeopardize its effort to gain access and reach affected areas and populations. While technically within WFP's policy on negotiation of access,<sup>65</sup> this approach may be compromising WFP's partnership options in the longer term.

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<sup>65</sup> Note on humanitarian access and its implications for WFP; WFP/EB.1/2006/5-B/Rev.1.

## **Relevance of objectives and activities to humanitarian needs**

91. All EMOPs addressed WFP's Strategic Objective 1: to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies. EMOP 200027 also proposed that operations would increasingly contribute to Strategic Objective 3: to restore and re-build livelihoods in post conflict situations, and Strategic Objective 4: to reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition. In the second and third years, however, the focus entirely shifted to Strategic Objective 1, and all outcomes have been brought under that objective. Table 9 below lists the planned outcomes and performance indicators grouped per Strategic Objective for each EMOP.

92. It is difficult to judge whether planned outcomes were realistic or consistent over time, as the number and type of outcomes reflected in the SPRs of each EMOP are different. The food consumption score (FCS) is reflected as an outcome in the SPRs, but without consistency. The three types of FCS (acceptable, borderline and poor) are not represented equally in all reports, and some are included for Darfur and CETA while others are there for only one area. Also, the "previous outcome" values of one year are rarely equal to the "latest values" of the preceding year; in one case, the link is even incomprehensible (Darfur, acceptable FCS end 2010 90 percent, start value 2011 27.3 percent). It is thus almost impossible to use the outcomes for estimating WFP's contribution to addressing the needs. Table 9 lists the outcome indicators as reflected in the respective SPRs, and Table 14 (Section 2.3) illustrates some of the dissonant reporting of outcome indicators.

93. The feasibility of the planned outcomes looks doubtful; few positive results are reported. The extent and longevity of, for instance, child malnutrition and the high and persistent levels of food insecurity imply difficulties in achieving a significant reduction by one actor implementing mainly food support based interventions.

**Table 9: Planned EMOP outcomes and indicators per Strategic Objective**

2010 EMOP 200027		
Strategic obj.	Outcomes	Performance indicator
1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	1.1: Reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted and emergency-affected populations .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under-5s in WFP intervention area (assessed using weight-for-height as %). Target: &lt;15 %</li> <li>• Low mid-upper arm circumference prevalence stabilized for 80% of targeted pregnant women.</li> </ul>
	1.2: Improved food consumption over assisted period for targeted emergency-affected households.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household food consumption score exceeds threshold for 80% of targeted households.</li> </ul>
3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	3.1: Adequate food consumption over assistance period for target households, communities, IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household food consumption score exceeds threshold for 80% of targeted households.</li> <li>• Percentage (%) or number of returnees received WFP food package against the plan. Target: 187,000</li> <li>• Percentage (%) or number of demobilized soldiers received reintegration package against the plan.</li> </ul>
	3.2: Targeted communities have increased access to assets in fragile and transition situations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Functioning and useful productive assets increased for 80% of the targeted communities.</li> </ul>
4: Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition	4.1. Improved nutrition and health status of vulnerable groups affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other chronically ill.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Treatment adherence rate by specific treatment and care programs.</li> </ul>
2011 EMOP 20151		
1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	1.1: Reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition among children under-5 in targeted and emergency-affected populations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderate acute malnutrition among children under 5.</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding recovery rate (%).</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding death rate (%) .</li> </ul>
	1.2: Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household food consumption score.</li> </ul>
	1.3: Retention of girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools are stabilized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retention rate met for 80% of the schools.</li> </ul>
2012 EMOP 200312		
1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	1.1: Reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition among children under-5 in targeted and emergency-affected populations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderate acute malnutrition (weight-for-height z-score wherever possible) and/or mid-upper arm circumference among children under 5.</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding recovery rate (%).</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding death rate (%).</li> </ul>
	1.2: Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Household food consumption score.</li> </ul>
	1.3: Retention rate of girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools are stabilized.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retention rate met for 70% of the schools.</li> </ul>

Source: Project documents EMOP 200027,20151 and 200312.


94. The amount of food and cash available decreased each year (see Fact Sheet) and often fewer resources were available than planned, but by lowering the ration per beneficiary (for IDPs in camps) and shortening the duration of food assistance to the lean season only (outside camps), almost all the planned beneficiary numbers were reached. According to cooperating partners, most beneficiaries had found ways to cope with these reductions by finding small jobs or moving to their plots of lands intermittently. As the adaptation in food support was made for entire target groups, it is doubtful whether the ultra-vulnerable groups (such as households headed by women and the sick and elderly) were adequately served; in a number of focus

group discussions with beneficiaries, these were the people acknowledging facing severe hunger.

95. The number of actual beneficiaries decreased between 2010 and 2012 from 6,069,938 to 5,497,820 to 3,560,883 (Figure 6), a reduction of 41 percent; and the actual amount of food distributed in the Sudan also fell from 402,438 mt in 2010, to 312,865 mt in 2011, to 230,506 mt in 2012 (Figure 7), a reduction of 42 percent over the evaluation period.

96. The bulk of the food commodity goes to Darfur, with many more beneficiaries in those states. While in 2010 69 percent of the beneficiaries resided in Darfur, by 2012 this percentage had increased to 82 percent even though food security and nutrition indicators had not worsened in Darfur when compared with Eastern Sudan. Nationally, WFP reached about 75 percent of the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) prediction of 4.7 million people being food insecure<sup>66</sup> in 2012 with some form of assistance.


**Figure 6: Actual beneficiaries by geographic area**



Source: SPR 2010–2012, PPIF-EMOP data and data from programme staff.

<sup>66</sup> Sudan United Nations and Partners Work Plan 2012, mid-year review.

**Figure 7: Food and vouchers (MT counter-value) distributed per geographic area**



Source: SPR 2010–2012, PPIF-EMOP data and data from programme staff.

97. The National Nutrition Survey 2010 reported<sup>67</sup> a GAM rate of 16.4 percent, corresponding to approximately 750,000 children under the weight for height threshold. Table 10 shows the number of children actually reached by WFP’s blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP) and SFP programmes. While the SFP programme is entirely aimed at malnourished children, BSFP is an intervention to prevent seasonal hunger peaks covering all U5 children in a targeted group and it is thus impossible to assess to what extent the needs of malnourished children have been covered through BSFP. In SFP, the percentage of malnourished children reached decreased from 25 percent to 8 percent.

**Table 10: Number of children covered by SFP and BSFP**

	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>SFP</b>	186 452	100 031	61 426
<b>BSFP</b>	415 306	412 368	281 546

Source: SPRs 2010–2012 and data from WFP programme staff.

98. While, broadly speaking, the country portfolio activities were aligned with needs in Darfur and CETA, the evaluation noted that the geographic balance of activities was more dependent on previous activity concentrations and commitments rather than assessed food insecurity. For example, the high levels of malnutrition in CETA warrant a greater focus vis-à-vis Darfur than that observed over the evaluation period. However, the evaluation recognizes that this cannot be in the form of substitution from existing resources, given the scale of food insecurity in Darfur, and would require additional funding; a constraint noted by WFP stakeholders.

<sup>67</sup> Sudan Nutrition Programme Brief, August 2012.

99. The evaluation notes that alignment of planned outcomes with needs has required complex targeting arrangements. The first level of targeting was done geographically by using FSMS food security data; relevant localities with various levels of food insecurity are identified for intervention; within these areas refined targeting takes place such as for SFP. Targeting, and especially dropping of beneficiaries based on FSMS data showing areas had become food secure, has led to a lack of understanding in the school feeding programme in Darfur because partners such as UNICEF, parents and teachers had participated and invested in the school feeding programme and then saw WFP withdraw based on the FSMS data. Many informants did not agree with the relevance of using food security monitoring data to stop school feeding; the evaluation team also questions this relevance.

100. Within IDP camps, WFP initiated refined targeting by verification in cooperation with IOM and supported by donors. Since 2005, WFP had assisted the IDP camp population without rechecking the numbers, and donors encouraged a comprehensive verification exercise; this process started in April 2011, and was due to be completed by June 2013. At the end of 2012, new temporary ration cards had been distributed to 73 percent of the original caseload number, indicating up to 27 percent of previous beneficiaries had been “non-existent”.

101. WFP has started to pilot camp profiling exercises, to further refine the targeting within the camps based on household food security levels, access to livelihood activities and poverty levels. The profiling is based on qualitative data collection methods to better understand some of the food security and vulnerability aspects in the camp, complementing already existing quantitative data from FSMS and verification exercises. The draft profiling study produced an overview of the distribution of food security and poverty-related needs among the camp population and suggested future assistance, although the data do not identify specific households or beneficiaries for this assistance.

102. The food assistance to refugee camps in Kassala has also decreased, in consultation with UNHCR. A full ration is given for a short duration only, under certain conditions, and half rations cease two years after arrival in the camps. Some complaints were received from various stakeholders, but already in 2011 UNHCR reported<sup>68</sup> that despite various constraints many of the refugees had found ways to sustain themselves and some had even acquired Sudanese identity documents and moved into work in urban areas.

103. From 2010 to 2012, targeted food assistance programmes were initialized, such as “Connecting Farmers to Markets (F2M)” and “SAFE”. An IBSFP helped to better cover nutrition security-related needs and the voucher programme also contributed to the move away from in-kind food aid. The implementation of FFA

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<sup>68</sup> UNHCR: Policy Development and Evaluation Service; *No turning back – A review of UNHCR’s response to the protracted refugee situation in eastern Sudan*. November 2011.

activities has connected the food distribution to recovery-related activities and limited the food assistance duration.

104. The evaluation concludes that, overall, the shifts in targeting of GFD over the evaluation period are generally appropriate and recognizes the significant difficulty in altering distribution arrangements that have been in place for several years.


### Connection of portfolio with livelihoods and coping strategies

105. The WFP 2009–2012 Country Strategy provided the initial vision for the country office over the evaluation period, moving from food aid to food assistance through a gradual shift to recovery activities and this was further clarified in the 2011–2015 WFP Sudan Vision document. The core focus of this shift was a planned move away from GFD to recovery activities, primarily FFA.

106. This planned shift was coherent with shifts in food assistance articulated in the 2010 CAP document. Within this, the FSL sector aimed to support strengthened natural resource management for local communities, while the NFI and emergency shelter sector would promote the use of sustainable, environmentally friendly emergency shelter for affected people.


107. For WFP, the percentage of the total food distributed as in-kind GFD has steadily decreased (Figure 8) over the three years, mostly in favour of vouchers. The aim was to decrease in-kind GFD assistance but this only happened from 2010 to 2011; it increased again from 2011 to 2012 (Figure 9). Because of new emergencies since 2011, WFP has been obliged to increase GFD distributions, in South Kordofan (2012) and Blue Nile (2013). The total amount of food distributed decreased because the amount of food per beneficiary decreased.

**Figure 8: Actual food distribution per activity (percentages of total)**



Source: SPR 2010-2012, PPIF-EMOP data and data from programme staff.


**Figure 9: Actual beneficiaries per activity (percentage of total)**



Source: SPR 2010–2012, PPIF-EMOP data and data from programme staff.

108. Many of the displaced families in camps in Darfur have been there for up to ten years, and while they may desire to return to their villages, often this is impossible because of insecurity. A good number of families have tried to return to cultivate land, and to some extent successfully, which has in turn helped their transition from food dependency. As illustrated in Figure 10, more than 200,000 people have done so. However, in many cases the families did not make a “one way” move, but maintained family presence in the camps to ensure they could return there if necessary and to ensure continued access to assistance.

**Figure 10: IDP returns by state (2011/2012)**



Source: UNHCR annual reports.

109. Figure 10 also indicates the impact of changing security and other challenges on the potential return of IDPs from the camps in the five Darfur states over the last two years. In some states, more IDPs returned in 2012 than the previous year; in other states the 2012 numbers dropped off significantly. It is not known how many of these returnees may have later returned to the camps. In East Darfur, most of the displaced were from South Sudan, who had returned there by 2012.

110. The Government of the Sudan is actively encouraging the return of IDPs to their places of origin, but WFP staff members and cooperating partners only make food assistance interventions available to support families choosing to return, not associated with promoting the government's policy, given the security considerations. This is in accordance with WFP's Humanitarian Protection Policy (2012). UNHCR still sees itself with the protection mandate in Darfur, and also stressed the "voluntariness of return" being critical. WFP is discussing a "returns package" of up to six months of food rations for families who return their ration cards and leave the camps. In West Darfur, WFP (in partnership with UNHCR and the Government of the Sudan) is currently providing FFW to build a health clinic and school in the villages of return, Government of the Sudan provides security and teachers/health workers and returnees build their homes.

111. With ration levels cut back (to up to half of the originally planned caloric value of the food basket), many stakeholders reported that the majority of beneficiaries have developed adequate coping mechanisms to cover the remainder of their needs, although the evaluation did not find sufficient evidence to make this conclusion. In a protracted dispute about reverification in Kalma camp (South Darfur, 2011) rations were suspended for eight months; INGOs working in the camp did reported there was no noticeable change in the malnutrition rates, but a screening by UNICEF<sup>69</sup> and partners showed that nutrition indicators deteriorated after three months.

112. Beneficiaries interviewed at a North Darfur distribution reported that the previous evening they had eaten meat and fresh vegetables, indicating access to cash and the markets, at least for some. Participants in focus group discussions indicated they would support a more comprehensive targeting approach to ensure the more vulnerable people received full rations, even if it meant others receiving none.

113. This raises the question whether IDPs are supported because of the right to food derived from their position as an IDP or because they genuinely need food. Many stakeholders stated that people remained in the camps because of the food distributions, but these statements could not be verified. Many IDPs could probably cope without the current reduced rations, but others cannot, and as WFP does not have detailed community data the current blanket ration is the only justifiable approach. The evaluation considers that the camp profiling exercise needs to be done at the household level to elicit information for more appropriate targeting and to identify the plans and expectations of the wider community.

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<sup>69</sup> SMOH, Merlin, IMC and UNICEF. Nutrition Screening Report, Kalma camp, South Darfur. August 2012.

114. The F2M programme links food support to agricultural activities; SAFE does so to a smaller extent, as agricultural activities are only part of the package. Recovery-related activities are implemented throughout WFP’s geographical target area as long as security allows, but both activities are still implemented as pilot programmes led by the various area offices. There was no preceding assessment, plan or clear overall strategy on future implementation of these activities with regard to size and geographical location, and while they may be seen as “flagship” programmes, they remain very limited in scale and are still in their infancy.

## 2.2. Factors Driving Strategic Decision-Making

115. This section examines the main factors driving decision-making. This includes the extent to which WFP has analysed the national and household food security and nutrition situation, performed conflict and risk analyses and used the results in programming. The section also assesses the consequences of the need of funding, the availability of sufficient technical expertise and the incorporation of gender sensitivity. Finally, the evaluation has looked at the monitoring framework and its value for decision-making.

### The importance of funding and its consequences

116. From 2010–2012, the annual EMOPs were relatively well funded, with funding shortfalls between 6 and 32 percent (Table 11). Planned budgets decreased each year, dropping 49 percent between 2010 and 2012, corresponding to a 61 percent reduction in planned beneficiaries. Actual beneficiary coverage, using disaggregated data for the Sudan, was found to have decreased by 41 percent over the evaluation period.

**Table 11: Funding and beneficiaries: planned vs actual, 2010–2012**

	Beneficiary needs (US\$*)	Total available (US\$)	Funding shortfall	Planned beneficiaries	Actual beneficiaries**	
					South Sudan + the Sudan	The Sudan
<b>2010</b>	951 480 882	772 984 555	19%	11 032 000	9 234 074	6 069 938
<b>2011</b>	640 997 532	600 278 937	6%	7 296 609	7 549 226	5 497 820
<b>2012</b>	489 583 679	333 987 656	32%	4 213 185	6 282 489	3 560 883

Note: The table reflects beneficiaries’ needs and planned in 2010 and 2011 for the Sudan and South Sudan combined, as disaggregated data were not available. The data for 2012 relate to the Sudan only. The final column shows the breakdown of actuals.


\* Annual resources in US\$ required to meet the beneficiaries’ needs based on objectives of approved projects.

\*\* Combined actual beneficiary data for South Sudan and the Sudan is taken from SPRs. Disaggregated data for actual beneficiaries for the Sudan in 2010 and 2011 were obtained from the WFP Programme Unit in the country office.

Source: WFP Factory, SPRs 2010–2011, Programme Division, WFP Khartoum country office.


117. The United States of America has provided at least half of the budgeted amount each year (61.5 percent of the 2010 income;  $\pm 50$  percent in the other years (Figure 11). Much of this contribution is given in-kind (Figure 12), resulting in long pipeline delays between announcement and availability (4–6 months between pledge and availability at the field level), and a frequent mismatch of food availability and seasonally based needs.<sup>70</sup> Even though the United States of America has facilitated the process by allowing front-loading of support (providing food support before the actual contract start), in-kind is still less flexible than cash support, especially in the case of quick onset emergencies, and limits any attempt by WFP to move to other distribution modalities.

**Figure 11: Percentage of budget covered by the United States of America**



Source: WFP SPRs.

**Figure 12: In-kind versus cash contributions**



Source: WFP SPRs.

<sup>70</sup> The United States of America is currently (June 2013) discussing a reduction of the percentage of in-kind support in its overall development assistance.

118. While there was a perception within WFP that the separation of South Sudan had drawn “Sudanese funding” away from the north, donors interviewed during this evaluation did not concur with this view. Several donors indicated that their funding strategies towards the two countries had not changed, and that they remained focused on areas with greater needs, but not necessarily that the Sudan was losing out. Others did indicate a certain fatigue with the lack of development in the peace process, and highlighted the need to make more progress on the recovery and livelihoods agenda. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, for example, is focusing its support on “resilience” programming, and humanitarian funding through the common humanitarian fund (CHF). The number of individual donors has also dropped from 22 to 14 (see Figure 11).

119. The global economic crisis, which has forced donor countries into fiscal austerity, has reduced donors’ ability to continue to support the the Sudan’s long-running emergencies. Additionally, humanitarian emergencies such as the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and other crises have drawn on the humanitarian budgets too. Donors in the Sudan welcome the gradual move away from GFD, although several indicated their desire to see some “real” results in the area of sustainability, recovery and resilience. WFP is caught between genuinely wanting to move the recovery agenda ahead and the severe constraints in doing so, caused by the prevailing insecurity across much of Darfur and in the Three Areas. Several of the donor stakeholders interviewed questioned WFP’s role and technical capacity in building resilience and strengthening livelihoods and, in general, the appropriateness of food aid as a tool for recovery.

120. WFP Sudan has been unsuccessful in attracting significant financial support from “non-traditional” donors, as much of the funding from these sources was directed bilaterally. Expectations of accessing new funding from the recent (March 2013) Doha conference were unmet and there was little new money pledged.

121. WFP has accessed the United Nations CHF in the years under review, partly for food and partly for contributions to the UNHAS flight service and other special operations. However, given the high costs of the food component and the generally good levels of funding of the WFP appeal, the country office reported that it has been cautious about approaching the common funding mechanisms. The contributions received from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) have been for new onset emergencies or to cover critical funding gaps in programming. As indicated in Table 12, funding from CHF and CERF represented approximately 3 percent of WFP’s annual income over the evaluation period.

**Table 12: Funding details for WFP from the CHF and CERF, 2010–2012**

	CHF	CERF
	<i>Amounts received for WFP Programme, and as percentage of total disbursements</i>	
2010 (the Sudan + South Sudan) – Food	\$12 million (7.68%)	\$8.0 million (33.5%)
	<i>Together representing 3.29% of WFP Sudan income for 2010</i>	
2011 (the Sudan + South Sudan) – Food	\$3.06 million (1.97%)	\$5.3 million (12.9%)
	<i>Together representing 2.09% of WFP Sudan income for 2011</i>	
2012 (the Sudan) – Food	\$3.75 million (4.88%)	\$2.7 million (13.4%)
	<i>Together representing 2.57% of WFP Sudan income for 2012</i>	
Additional amounts received for special operations or common services	\$12.96 million (2010) \$0.25 million (2012)	Nil
Additional amounts received for UNHAS	\$14.2 million (2010–11) \$8 million (2012)	\$3 million (2012)

Sources: WFP SPRs, OCHA CERF and CHF annual reports.

122. Overall, the evaluation found funding was a significant factor in determining the direction of, and flexibility in, WFP’s portfolio. The significant percentage of in-kind contribution limited options to shift food assistance programming strategy away from GFD. Donor demand for evidence of results was concomitant with the reported perspective that WFP was not technically proficient in recovery/resilience areas, further challenging WFP’s intended shift to longer term activities.

### **Analyses and assessments of the food and nutrition security situation**

123. WFP carries out regular food security and needs assessments through the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM), the CFSA, the FSMS framework and the emergency food security assessments in Darfur. Other food security or nutrition related assessments are carried out by, or with the support of, WFP, as well as others on specific activities such as the vouchers or SAFE programmes. Table 13 identifies these studies between 2010 and 2012.

**Table 13: Surveys and assessments conducted or supported by WFP, 2010–2012**

<b>Food security related</b>	
May 2010	Emergency food security assessment – Blue Nile State
Oct 2010	Emergency food security assessment – North Kordofan
Oct 2010	Emergency food security assessment – South Kordofan
Oct 2010	Emergency food security assessment – White Nile
Jan 2011	Government of the Sudan and FAO-WFP crop and food security assessment mission to 15 Northern States of the Sudan
Nov 2011	Comprehensive food security assessment Darfur
<b>Nutrition related</b>	
Jan 2011	Analysis of anthropometric data for May-September 2009 on the cohort of children in North and South Darfur
Aug 2011	Sudan National Ministry of Health and Central Bureau of Statistics. Sudan Household Health Survey Second-round 2010
Nov 2011	Effectiveness of lean season supplemental ration on nutrition status of children aged 6-59 months in Greater Darfur
Nov 2011	Effect of seasonal blanket supplementary feeding programme on nutritional status of children 6-59 months of age in Darfur

Feb 2012	Impact of the integrated blanket supplementary feeding programme (IBSFP) on infant and young child feeding (IYCF) Mukram Village, Kassala State
<b>SAFE related</b>	
May 2011	Evaluating fuel-efficient stove programme in Darfur
Sep 2011	Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy WFP – North Darfur.
Oct 2012	SAFE impact assessment mission in North Darfur: qualitative findings
<b>Voucher related</b>	
Aug 2010	Market assessment for cash/food vouchers programme, North Kordofan and North Darfur
Nov 2011	Operational review of ODS voucher programme
Nov 2012	Case study effects of voucher transfers on WFP’s safety and dignity, gender and social dynamics

Source: Documents provided by WFP country office in the Sudan.

124. With the FSMS-based assessments, WFP tries to optimally address the underlying factors of food insecurity through geographical targeting of interventions within states. FSMS data are used in the design of EMOPs, and to target certain areas (or to drop activities such as school feeding) in certain areas. Under EMOP 200151, FSMS assessments showing improved food security provided the justification for a downwards budget revision, reducing the size and duration of the GFD ration. FSMS data are also used in a wider context: in the United Nations (HWPs) to define the food security related needs, in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and FEWSNET maps, and by other development actors in their planning.

125. FSMS assessments are currently only carried out in WFP intervention areas and are collected from the same sentinel sites for a number of consecutive years. If the situation required that WFP enters a “new” area such as Blue Nile or South Kordofan, rapid food security assessments are carried out, often jointly with other players. Constraints are faced related to general accessibility and lack of access to non-government held areas.

126. A number of other development partners also conduct food security related assessments. The FAO, with the Ministry of Agriculture, conducts a regular crop and food security assessment. WFP used to be fully involved in this assessment, but currently only provides logistical support as full involvement was found no longer relevant; WFP staff reported that the much larger scale of WFP’s operations, their better access and better deep field presence made their own data most reliable. WFP staff also reported that they mainly rely on their own FSMS data and apart from UNICEF nutrition data and FEWSNET data, seldom utilize data produced by other United Nations agencies.

127. Partners such as the Ministry of Health, UNICEF and NGOs all collect nutrition data. The NGOs’ nutrition surveys are often localized and too small scale to be used for WFP’s purposes. UNICEF collects nutrition data, but often is not permitted by the federal Ministry of Health to publish it. While it is not WFP’s mandate to collect nutrition data, the lack of relevant data at the state level is a constraint.

128. In 2010, nutrition data were collected as part of the Sudan Household Health Survey,<sup>71</sup> but these were not very detailed and not disaggregated to the state level,

<sup>71</sup> Sudan National Ministry of Health and Central Bureau of Statistics. Sudan Household Health Survey, Second-round 2010, Summary Report, August 2011.

apart from some data tables only available in raw format. Apart from that, nutritional indicators have not been collected at the national or state levels between 2010 and 2012; in East Sudan, this problem is even more pressing than in Darfur, where the presence of development actors conducting surveys is higher.

129. Even though all interviewees did agree that the nutrition situation is poor and little improvement has been seen over the past decades, they were not able to sustain this with sufficient hard data. WFP initially collected nutritional data as part of FSMS, but after it was found that they are unrelated to the food security data, they were no longer used for decision-making.

130. Programmatic changes have been made throughout the evaluation period, such as ration changes, switch to seasonal support, dropping schools from the programme in food secure areas and stopping GFD in camps after refusal of verification. Lessons learned or the effects of these decisions do not appear to have been captured by WFP. Given this, the evaluation found that there remains considerable scope to improve data collection and analysis in areas of high priority for programmatic decision-making.

### **Availability of sufficient technical expertise**

131. Throughout the evaluation period (2010–2012), WFP Sudan functioned as a regional bureau<sup>72</sup>, and since February 2013 it has been classified as a country office. Its earlier status and profile meant it was well-resourced and reasonably able to attract appropriately skilled staff to the programme. WFP has conducted three structure and staffing reviews between 2010 and 2012 and outsourced some tasks. According to the human resources department, this led to a staffing reduction of 46 percent compared with 2009 and an overall saving of more than US\$5 million. After the separation of South Sudan, it took considerable time to revise the staff structure, assign staff to the two countries and fill the gaps.

132. Attracting good quality international staff with the right skillset matching the remaining requirements was reported as especially difficult for posts outside Khartoum. More recently, the hardship classification in all parts of the Sudan has changed, leading to a change in overall United Nations conditions of employment regarding contract duration and hardship pay. These changes are considered as less favourable by staff, and according to the human resources department, it is now harder to recruit international staff with the right technical expertise.

133. WFP reported acquiring technical expertise through partnerships, which has worked particularly well with the Ministry of Agriculture and with UNICEF in addressing moderate and severe malnutrition. In other areas, WFP partnership efforts were found to be short term and directly linked to project implementation. Additional Headquarters support was reported to be available for subjects such as specific evaluations and policy. Following the restructuring, the technical support from regional bureau has yet to be defined.

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<sup>72</sup> In February 2013, an internal WFP restructuring exercise saw the Sudan become a country office linked to the regional bureau in Cairo.

134. According to key stakeholders, the WFP country office enjoys a well-established and recognized technical expertise in the field of food security monitoring and assessments. The information made available by the VAM Unit is used to inform decision-making and programme design within and beyond WFP. On the other hand, various United Nations partners found the limited technical expertise and experience in other sectors to be holding back WFP effectiveness, particularly in discussing policy issues relating to transition from emergency to development.

135. Government and others perceive WFP's operative work in the Sudan only within the realm of emergency. Few acknowledge the role played by WFP in recovery, rehabilitation and beyond, partly because most of WFP's recovery-related interventions are either small scale or at a piloting stage. Additionally, WFP's disengagement from technical fora, such as the FSL, has affected its link with relevant actors in the sector.

### **Quality and use of monitoring and evaluation framework**

136. WFP's monitoring and evaluation system is the framework used to monitor and adjust operations and measure achievements; it has been in development throughout the entire evaluation period. Several software systems have been trialled during the period, and a new global corporate system (Country Office Monitoring and Evaluation Tool, or COMET) is due to be introduced during 2013.

137. Beneficiary and food distribution data are collected and compared to planning, based on partners' distribution reports. The country office, in consultation with area offices, has been instrumental in developing a new monitoring framework with tools and checklists and training staff. Capacity development of partner staff has been conducted as well, but the evaluation found there is no uniformity in partners' data gathering and provision. The majority of the partners use WFP formats, but some of the INGO partners still use their own formats and templates; the frequency of data collection and reporting also differs between partners. Many partners indicated they are still in need of guidance around the monitoring standards; their data collection and reporting are different in quality and timing, and they were not always sure about what was expected.

138. Sub-offices develop quarterly monitoring plans under the overview of the area office, indicating project sites and type of monitoring. Monitoring of a range of activities takes place throughout the month with the majority of distributions being covered, but clear overall monitoring targets were found to be absent. The monitoring itself focuses mainly on collecting output data and these are reflected in the reports. Outcomes were seldom reported on, and even the SPRs contained very few outcomes.

139. If urgent issues surface during a monitoring visit, action is reportedly taken at local level immediately. Reports are sent to Khartoum, and all reports are collated into one monitoring report, but area offices and partners shared that they rarely receive those consolidated reports and that there is no follow-up discussion with the

country office on adaptations, based on the M&E findings. They found analysis tools available at local level insufficient to analyse their findings in an in-depth manner.

140. The evaluation found no evidence of the use of M&E data at a strategic level. Whereas FSMS data are referred to in relevant documents regarding the design of new operations or geographic targeting, M&E data were hardly ever referred to in any WFP Sudan document, outside the purely M&E related documents.

141. The evaluation identified very few efforts to measure impact; evaluations are not planned in the framework, and any Headquarters-initiated evaluations that have taken place are related to certain operations, such as vouchers and SAFE, and are not part of the regular M&E framework.

142. Overall, the evaluation found that the M&E framework and associated products/reports are not oriented as inputs to programmatic decision-making but primarily for reporting for external parties. The evaluation noted that considerable demand is placed on the M&E unit for regular donor and WFP reporting and the opportunity to innovate and adapt the M&E systems is constrained by resources and the slow roll-out of the WFP corporate system. There remains considerable scope for one-off assessments in specific areas, in addition to further collaboration, with partners, on outcome level data collection in order to improve the integration of M&E data in programme planning and decision-making.

## Gender

143. Gender equality (ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men) has become an important priority in development interventions. Gender mainstreaming ensures that all implications of planned interventions for women and men have been taken into account; no intervention should have a negative impact on gender equality. In the box alongside, focus areas for gender mainstreaming are reflected.

### Focus areas for gender mainstreaming

- Respecting, protecting and promoting the human rights of both women and men
- Ensuring equal access to economic independence, education and health services
- Increasing the participation of women in decision-making at all levels
- Raising women's and men's awareness on the shared responsibility towards gender equality
- Decreasing gender-based violence

144. The 2009 WFP gender policy states that achieving gender equality remains crucial to reach the poverty and hunger goals of the Millennium Declaration. It also reports that positive measures focusing on women need to be continued, but that a more holistic approach is needed to achieve an optimal decrease in rates of poverty, hunger and food insecurity. In the Sudan, positive measures focusing on women are incorporated into WFP's programmes, but a holistic approach was found to be lacking.

145. The WFP Gender Corporate Action Plan 2010–2011 translated the policy into concrete actions with verifiable indicators and set priorities for the period. This included increasing staff knowledge and capacity to carry out gender analysis, and

the establishment of a gender-sensitive accountability framework. These requirements were only partly addressed in the Sudan. In 2012, a series of gender training and sensitization sessions were held for over 200 staff of WFP and cooperating partners, but knowledge and capacity was still found limited. Many interviewees confused gender parity in targeting or focusing on women with gender mainstreaming. Prior to the design and implementation of operations, gender related implications of the planned interventions and a gender-sensitive accountability framework have not been documented. The recent voucher case study<sup>73</sup> was the only identified research into the appropriateness of interventions.

146. Field observations confirmed distribution of GFD and vouchers was only done to women, which led to a high presence of women at markets and distribution points. In the voucher programme beneficiary women interviewed reported they felt empowered through negotiating with traders and by the freedom of choice. The extent to which the distribution of ration cards and vouchers gives the women actual control over the use of food at the household level has not been assessed.

147. In some areas, women play an important role in voucher committees. Beneficiaries in focus group discussions were highly positive about these committees in Darfur, including about the setting of the price levels by women from the IDP communities, which they felt gave credibility and openness to the value of the vouchers set against the commodity cost. This is not standard, though: in Kassala, WFP and partners were responsible for price setting with no beneficiary involvement, which led to frequent disputes with the beneficiaries who felt their vouchers were often undervalued.

148. In 2012, WFP signed a joint memorandum with the General Directorate of Women's and Family Affairs to ensure gender equality in all joint projects in Darfur. This facilitated further involvement of women in SAFE, enhancing their protection, contributing to decreasing sexual and gender-based violence and enabling women to participate in women's interest groups in training and awareness-raising of the community. No other gender-related cooperation efforts were documented or reported by WFP or stakeholders.

149. In nutrition related interventions, gender-sensitive examples of implementation were found: in East Sudan, awareness-raising on mother and child health and nutrition was carried out for 200 male community leaders; replication is planned in Darfur. Under the IBSFP, women are trained on food safety, hygiene and nutrition and their membership of community clubs enables further networking.

150. In the monitoring framework, data are collected and reflected in a gender-disaggregated manner, but no further analysis is done into the implications of the observed gender balance and the possible need for adaptations. Gender indicators are reported in the SPR, but they are few and most consist of yes-no questions.

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<sup>73</sup> Case Study on the Effects of Voucher transfers on WFP's Safety and Dignity, Gender and Social Dynamics. 6-20 November 2012. Draft Summary of Findings.

151. Gender disparity is documented as one of the selection criteria for inclusion in school feeding, but partners in the programme were not aware of this and saw enrolment numbers as the most important criterion, whereas WFP uses food security levels. The ongoing support to 11,738 girls in secondary boarding schools in East Sudan has kept girls at school at an age where they often give up for various reasons; evidence of a positive effect on gender disparity.

152. Even though WFP's Human Resource Strategy aims at improving gender balance among staff, according to the staff list of March 2013, management positions were mostly filled by men; overall, only 25 percent of national and international staff were women, notwithstanding efforts to attract more women employees. For Darfur, WFP could only attract 9 percent international women staff. Even though it is not obligatory to have 50 percent women staff, the current figure is far from balanced.

### 2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results

153. This section looks at the extent to which the planned outputs and outcomes have been achieved and what the constraining factors may have been. Documented information available to the evaluation team was scant. Even official reports such as SPRs contained limited information, and discrepancies were found in data in "unofficial" reports, which hampered the evaluation team in conducting a proper quantitative analysis. WFP staff members were always supportive but were often unable to provide detailed output data. The analysis covers the coverage and effectiveness of key activities, issues relevant to efficiency and factors affecting the results.

**Table 14: Outcome indicators reported in SPRs**

	2010		2011		2012	
	Previous	Latest	Previous	Latest	Previous	Latest
Prevalence % malnutrition children U5						
Darfur	21	16	19	16	16	18.9
CETA				17.9		
Mid-upper arm circumference						
Darfur			9.9	8.8		
Supplementary death rate						0
Supplementary feeding recovery %						85%
% of households with acceptable FCS						
Darfur			96	90	27.3	25.9
Kassala			99	96.7		
RSS			99	97.3		
% of households with poor FCS						
Darfur					6.2	5.3
Kassala						5.7
% of households with borderline FCS					66.5	68.8
Retention rate WFP-assisted schools	99	98.8				98
Darfur			94	96		
Darfur-girls						97
Darfur-boys						97
CETA			95.5	97.7		
CETA-girls						98
CETA-boys						97
Attendance rate WFP-assisted schools	94.8	96.8				
Gender ratio WFP-assisted schools						
Darfur						0.8
CETA						0.73

Source: SPRs 2010–2012.

## Coverage and effectiveness

154. Table 14 reflects a compilation of available outcome data as reported in the consecutive SPRs. Especially for recovery-related activities, only data on coverage of food support and number of trainings, *hafirs* (water reservoirs), seedlings were identified, which obstructs a quantitative analysis into the result and impact of these activities.

### *General Food Distribution*

155. Through GFD, WFP distributes a combination of mixed food commodities assuming that providing GFD reduces the use of negative coping strategies to cover pressing food needs. In 2012, the 50 percent ration of in-kind GFD consisted of cereals and pulses; the full-size ration also contained oil and salt.

156. Even though funding decreased over the evaluation period and WFP struggled with access and security issues, achieved actual output has mostly been above 80 percent of plan. Table 15 below shows actual GFD delivery against plan; for 2010 and 2011 it was not possible to find gender-disaggregated data. The number of women reached was overall higher than men; whether this led to different intra-household distribution was not assessed.

**Table 15: Actual and planned beneficiaries GFD per year**

Year	Beneficiaries	Men	Women	Actual vs planned
2010	4 165 618			82.2%
2011	3 402 775			87.6%
2012	2 803 798	1,246 640	1 557 158	84.5%

Source: SPR 2010–2012 and data provided by WFP programme staff.

157. GFD is a flexible activity and therefore suitable when new access is obtained, such as in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The size of GFD in calories per person per year slowly decreased by shifting from year-round to seasonal support or by decreasing ration sizes. The IDP caseload receives a year-round 50 percent GFD ration with seasonal BSFP for their U5 children. While the original ration size was equal to 2,094 kcal in 2010, in 2011 the lowest size was 914 kcal; in 2012, a 50 percent ration was provided to IDPs in Darfur of 1,012 kcal. Even though anecdotal evidence was offered about IDPs being able to cover the calorie gap by themselves, no data or in-depth analysis were available to support this.

### *Food for Work/Food for Recovery*

158. Under FFW/FFR, a range of activities is carried out, such as school/classroom/health centre (re)construction, feeder road construction, building of *hafirs* (water reservoirs), tree nurseries and latrine construction. The concept is that the community benefits with a sustainable product, while workers receive food to address their food insecure situation. The rate of actual versus planned FFW outputs, reflected in Table 16, varied between 87.6 percent and 108.8 percent. Table 17 provides the gender disaggregated participant details for FFW.

**Table 16: Actual vs. planned beneficiaries FFW per activity (%)**

	2010	2011	2012
Feeder roads built and maintained	100	97	
Classrooms rehabilitated	89.60		
Excavated community water ponds	88.80	94.50	100
Number of communities with improved physical infrastructure		100	
Number of households receiving fuel-efficient stoves			106.90
Number of tree seedlings produced			87.60
Tree seedlings provided to individual households			95.50
Tree seedlings used for afforestation, reforestation			108.80

Source: SPR 2010–2012 and data provided by WFP programme staff.

**Table 17: Actual and planned participants FFW per year**

Year	Beneficiaries	Men	Women	Actual vs planned total beneficiaries (%)
2010	101 564	42 657	58 907	113.90
2011	43 646	18 331	25 315	148.40
2012	58 249	24 465	33 784	166.40
<b>Total</b>	<b>203 459</b>	<b>85 453</b>	<b>118 006</b>	<b>132.47</b>

Source: SPR 2010–2012 and data provided by WFP programme staff.

159. The longer term effectiveness of assets created through FFW/FFR was questioned by several implementing CBOs. It was acknowledged that these assets have assisted communities to rebuild damaged and destroyed assets and start regenerating their livelihoods. However, these CBOs reported that after the implementation period, it was often difficult for beneficiaries to find further employment. Also, long-term technical support was not ensured and long-term maintenance and repair (including responsibilities and capacity development) was not clearly documented. The evaluation did not find an overall strategy guiding the choice of these activities in each area, nor details on the risks and conditions or the type of support and partnership needed during implementation and subsequently.

### *Food for Training*

160. In food for training (FFT), trainings are supported by WFP's food assistance, while partners are responsible for the implementation of training-related aspects. Subjects are agriculture and forestry, income generation, literacy, life skills for women and teacher support. SAFE, the Connecting Farmers to Markets project (F2M) and IBSFP are also supported by FFT. Percentages of actual FFT versus plan varied from 82 percent to 102 percent. Only teacher support in 2011 was much lower than planned, at 20 percent.

161. The SAFE project started in 2009 co-chaired by UNHCR in various countries and in July 2010 it was introduced into North Darfur; it consists of a combination of support to produce fuel-efficient stoves and briquettes, establish plant and community tree nurseries (for fuel wood, gum arabic and biodiesel), livelihood and community capacity development training, and activities focusing on care practices, health and nutrition with a focus on women. In 2011, 33 SAFE centres were established, increasing to 38 in 2012, entirely as per plan. The project was supported by several CBOs, and with food supplies for FFT and/or FFW provided by WFP.

162. In SAFE, interviewed women beneficiaries found making fuel-efficient stoves and fire fuel briquettes (from animal waste) useful and simple activities with direct benefits; wastage and the use of firewood were decreased, and better protection and less spending were identified by participants as positive. These observations were confirmed by impact assessments (November 2011<sup>74</sup> and October 2012<sup>75</sup>), revealing savings in time and money and reduction of SGBV and illness.

163. The agri-business centres and community tree nurseries had not shown any impact.<sup>75</sup> Several CBO partners observed that generating results from the tree nurseries would take at least three years, and marketing may be difficult for the beneficiaries. CBOs are now covering the technical input on bio-pesticides, good agricultural practices and agri-business, but technical assistance will continue to be needed to guide natural resource management and income-generating activities.

164. The F2M project falls within the broader government strategy for microfinance, and targets 500,000 small farmers in ten states out of which WFP covers 125,000 in six states (North, South and West Darfur, Kassala, Red Sea and Blue Nile). The concept behind F2M is to enable small-scale farmers to increase production, become self-sufficient and also contribute to general food security through connecting them to microcredit, micro-insurance, extension services and sales. WFP's role within the F2M programme is as a mediator or facilitator, formalized through a signed Memorandum of Understanding between the Central Bank of Sudan (microfinance unit), the Ministry of Agriculture and WFP. WFP is supposed to enhance partnerships with other organizations, to select beneficiaries, to provide FFT and to hire project staff.

165. Field support for F2M is provided from Khartoum, and VAM officers were found to assume additional responsibility as focal points for F2M. The project is directly supporting WFP beneficiaries, but it was reported that parts of F2M interactions are beyond WFP's influence and technical capacity. A partnership with FAO was reportedly considered but was not achieved.

166. In 2012, through the FFT-supported training the programme reached 91,734 farmers out of 95,000 planned in five states (Blue Nile was excluded for security reasons). In South Darfur, only 600 out of 30,000 targeted farmers received microcredit because of the limited financial and outreach capacity of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, combined with insecurity; in other areas, the coverage was better. The repayment rate remained low, though, and the number of farmers making repayments was not expected to exceed 21 percent.

#### *Supplementary Feeding Programme/Blanket SFP/Integrated Blanket SFP*

167. BSFP is provided to IDP families in Darfur during lean seasons to boost the nutritional value of the GFD ration for U5 children. All pregnant and lactating women and children between 6-59 months are targeted with BSFP, providing approximately 500 kcal/day. The supplementary ration consists of a mix of fortified

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<sup>74</sup> Serrar M.; Jahangiri V. Evaluating Fuel-Efficient Stove Program in Darfur. SAFE Project, November 2011.

<sup>75</sup> SAFE Impact Assessment Mission in North Darfur: Qualitative Findings, 7–10 October 2012.

cereal, sugar, dried skimmed milk and oil for a period up to six months. Moderately malnourished children are referred to the targeted SFP, severely acutely malnourished children to UNICEF's outpatient therapeutic programme. In 2012, BSFP only reached 60 percent of the targeted number, but reports did not clarify whether this resulted from specific decisions or was caused by other reasons such as access or shortage of funding.

168. An analysis of WFP's BSFP in North and South Darfur<sup>76</sup> showed very little improvement in the nutritional status of children in the programme. Other BSFP surveys<sup>77,78</sup> confirm the fact that in general BSFP often has a very limited effect on GAM and MAM rates. An interim report<sup>79</sup> found that BSFP has decreased the seasonal hunger peak, but the method used is not very robust. Respondents indicated that food is probably shared within the household; because BSFP takes place in food insecure areas, all household members are likely to be food insecure. Because there are no control groups or cross-sectional surveys, it is not possible to estimate the impact of BSFP in this evaluation.

169. An IBSFP, integrating activities to address multiple causes of malnutrition, was piloted in Kassala in 2009 and appeared successful.<sup>80</sup> IBSFP aims to enhance the long-term impact of feeding programmes on wasting and stunting by improving feeding, food hygiene and safety practices for young children. In the Kassala pilot (March to May 2010), GAM prevalence decreased from 21.8 percent to 4.8 percent.<sup>81</sup>

170. SFP is implemented to address moderate acute malnutrition in IDPs and settled populations and to lower the related risk of mortality; it is given to U5 children identified with moderate malnutrition in areas where WFP is active. SFP is implemented as part of the community-based management of acute malnutrition, endorsed by UNICEF and WHO. From the data provided (see Table 18), it appears that 85.5 percent of planned beneficiaries were reached in 2012. No disaggregated data for all target areas on gender or comparison to planning targets could be obtained for 2010 and 2011.

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<sup>76</sup> Woodruff, B.A, *Analysis of Anthropometric Data for May-September 2009 on the Cohort of Children in North and South Darfur*. January 2011.

<sup>77</sup> ACF International. Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme, Garbatulla District, Kenya. February 2012.

<sup>78</sup> United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Evaluation of a Blanket Supplementary Feeding Program in Two Counties in Kenya, August 2011–March 2012. 26 September 2012.

<sup>79</sup> Effect of Seasonal Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme on Nutritional Status of Children 6-59 Months of Age in Darfur – WFP Interim Summary Report.

<sup>80</sup> Impact of the Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (IBSFP) on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Mukram Village, Kassala State.

<sup>81</sup> WFP: Impact of the Integrated Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (IBSFP) on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Mukram Village, Kassala State.

**Table 18: Actual beneficiaries of supplementary feeding, 2010–2012**

	BSFP				SFP				PLW	
	Children	Men	Women	Actual vs planned	Children	Men	Women	Actual vs planned	Women	Actual vs planned
2010	415 306				186 542				12 348	387.60%
2011	421 387				100 031				2 312	118.60%
2012	281 545	136 837	144 708	59.90%	61 427	29 867	31 560	85.50%	29 585	127.60%

Source: SPR 2010–2012 and data provided by WFP programme staff.

171. In Darfur, SFP is implemented by INGOs, and in East Sudan, SFPs are carried out in the Ministry of Health’s feeding centres set up under the National Nutrition Programme.<sup>82</sup> Supplementary feeding is part of that programme and guidelines are in place<sup>83</sup> to facilitate the integration of the management of moderate acute malnutrition into the primary health care system. WFP has financially and technically supported the development of the guidelines and trained the Ministry of Health staff on their use. In East Sudan, the state Ministry of Health uses its survey data to target localities for SFP, but admitted that even though they are capable of covering the technical part, they will not be able to progress the food provision without external support. SFP was reported to generate recovery rates between 71.4 percent and 95.4 percent.<sup>84</sup>

#### *School feeding*

172. The school feeding programme (ongoing since 1969) was stopped from 2003 to 2006 and restarted in 2007, when WFP introduced a unilaterally redefined strategy. The WFP school feeding strategy now has three different angles: emergency in South Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile; recovery in Darfur and development in North Kordofan, Red Sea and Kassala. The objectives of WFP school feeding are to: (a) ensure daily dietary consumption; (b) promote retention; (c) improve cognition and educational achievements; and (d) reduce gender and environment disparities. The main partner (Ministry of Education) has enrolment, attainment and retention as objectives, which staff members of MOE and UNICEF saw as a source for misunderstanding.

173. A five-year hand-over strategy of school feeding was developed in consultation with the federal Ministry of Education, but at the state level the commitment to take over the first 10 percent of schools in 2012 could not be realized. The Ministry of Education was unable to take over the responsibility, and therefore the schools were dropped from the programme. The Ministry of Education has set up school feeding units, but lacks funds to continue the support. School feeding is often introduced into the states’ yearly budget, but fund allocation from federal level is not guaranteed and state budgets cannot cover the costs.

<sup>82</sup> Federal Ministry of Health, Republic of the Sudan. Maternal and Child Health Directorate, National Nutrition Programme, National Nutrition Policy and Key Strategies, 2009.

<sup>83</sup> Federal Ministry of Health, Republic of the Sudan. National Supplementary Feeding Programme Guidelines, 2011.

<sup>84</sup> SPR 2011–2012.

174. WFP has targeted between 960,000 and 1,166,000 children per year in primary schools for feeding (Table 19). The actual number of beneficiaries decreased after 2011, partly because target areas in Darfur became food secure (according to FSMS) and partly as a consequence of the failure of the hand-over strategy. The evaluation considers that future government “ownership” of school feeding seems highly unlikely.

**Table 19: Planned and actual beneficiaries of school feeding**

	<b>Beneficiaries school meals</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Actual vs planned</b>
2010	1 002 746			90.40%
2011	1 166 438			95.30%
2012	959 279	527 603	431 676	101.50%

Source: SPR 2010–2012 and data provided by WFP programme staff.

175. Retention rates are used by WFP as an outcome indicator for school feeding (as reflected in Table 14). The first retention rate in 2010 was 99 percent, with further measurements between 96 percent and 98.8 percent; the retention seems thus to be stable and well above the global benchmark of 70 percent. The gender enrolment ratio went up from 0.74 to 0.8 (girls per boy enrolled) in Darfur in WFP-assisted primary schools in 2012, whereas in CETA it remained stable at 0.73. There is thus no evidence of improvement in enrolment rates for boys. Furthermore, retention rates and gender enrolment ratio are not compared to non-assisted schools, limiting their value for assessing the impact of the programme.

### *Iodized Salt Initiative*

176. The iodized salt initiative started in 2007 as part of the Headquarters-led five-country initiative (Pakistan, Ghana, India, Senegal and the Sudan). In the Sudan in 2011, WFP was instrumental in promoting universal salt iodization through advocacy and support for monitoring, resulting in the adoption of food fortification legislation in six states, including Red Sea State where 95 percent of domestic salt is produced. Although spearheaded initially by UNICEF, WFP’s involvement produced significant progress in the approach; now there is a joint input into the universal salt iodization project.


### **Food Assistance Modalities**

177. From 2010 to 2012, WFP increasingly shifted part of the food distribution modality to the use of food vouchers (4,817 mt or 1 percent of total food distribution in 2010, 17,025 mt or 5 percent in 2011 and 35,001 mt or 13 percent in 2012). Vouchers were first piloted in October 2009 in Kassala and expanded to Gedaref, Red Sea State and White Nile for institutional feeding and vocational training. After a market assessment was conducted (August 2010),<sup>85</sup> the programme was expanded to North Kordofan and North Darfur and to other activities like FFA, FFT and GFD for IDPs. Figure 14 shows the actual number of voucher beneficiaries per state, and

<sup>85</sup> Market Assessment for Cash/Food Vouchers Programme, North Kordofan and North Darfur. August 2010.


Figure 13 compares actual against planned number of beneficiaries. While in 2012 an ongoing increase was planned, actually there was a slight decrease because the complexity of constantly recurring serious emergencies required in-kind food distribution.

**Figure 14: Actual number of voucher beneficiaries per target state**




Source: WFP SPRs 2010-2012 and internal data.

**Figure 13: Actual and planned total number of voucher beneficiaries, 2010–2012**



178. As reflected in Figure 15, the vouchers were increasingly used to support the GFD activities. In 2010, a large part of the expansion of vouchers was used for FFW in North Kordofan. From 2011, vouchers were used also in Darfur to support IDPs with GFD in six camps.

**Figure 15: Percentage of total vouchers' food replacement value used per activity**



Source: WFP SPRs 2010–2012 and internal data.

179. Vouchers enable WFP to adapt the supply of food items to the local preference and habits. Multiplier effects on local economies, including stimulating local production, were reflected as possible benefits<sup>86</sup> but no data were found by the evaluation team to sustain this. Beneficiaries often reported that the voucher programme brought them into contact with the markets, even if in certain places it was only a mobile market. Beneficiaries enjoyed the increased choice and felt empowered to be better able to select their preferred commodities. In some cases, community members were involved as casual workers.

<sup>86</sup> WFP Operational Strategy for Darfur: 2010–2011.

180. According to the 2011 ODS Voucher Review Report,<sup>87</sup> enhanced dietary diversity was less than expected despite most markets having numerous commodities available, up to 14 in some instances. The poorest beneficiaries tended to choose mostly the same two or three cheapest items, without using dietary diversity for themselves or their children as a criterion for decision-making. A further voucher case study<sup>88</sup> reported that beneficiaries had limited knowledge of their entitlements.

181. As a result of the requirements of the trader selection process, most of the traders involved were medium to large traders who already had a large market share. Only a few small retailers were allowed to participate. Competition among traders present in the markets was limited, also due to the fixed prices, but some traders were seen to be able to attract more clients by improving their services or offering additional benefits or small “gifts” or incentives.

182. The evaluation was unable to identify any assessments or evaluations into the quality of trainings or the performance of the implementing partners. Assessments of appropriateness and usefulness of trainings have not been reported.

### **Efficiency**

183. Assessment of the overall efficiency of the portfolio and of the singular activities is very difficult. Financial data are generally only available at a highly aggregated level. Data are mainly broken down per cross-cutting cost category (e.g. transport, commodity, landside transport, storage and handling [LTSH], other direct operational costs, direct support costs, and indirect support costs). The evaluation team therefore could not compare cost efficiency of the activities directly. Nevertheless, some observations on efficiency are outlined below.

184. Distribution of GFD started off on a monthly cycle, but many logistical and security problems were faced. As most of the food items had a sufficiently long shelf life, food deliveries changed to two-monthly cycles in a number of places; INGO and CBO partners found that this had made the planning less complicated.

185. In FFW implementation, the percentage of actual participants was considerably higher than planned (Table 17), up to 66 percent higher in 2012 (58,249 actual vs. 35,000 planned), but the outputs produced as a result of FFW as compared to plan (Table 16) centred around 100 percent.<sup>89</sup> From the reports there is no clarity about the reason why this much greater quantity of food had been budgeted for the same amount of work output.

186. IBSFP as an approach is promising, but implementation is very resource intensive. The total cost per child per year in IBSFP was found to be US\$34, whereas the cost of the SFP ranged from US\$12 to US\$15 per child.<sup>90</sup> Provision of FFW and training are needed for community mobilizers. A Knowledge Attitude Practice survey

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<sup>87</sup> Harrison C.; Wagabi C. Operational Review of ODS Voucher Programme. 8 December 2011.

<sup>88</sup> Pattugalan G.; Bonsignorio M.; Goublet L. Case Study on the Effects of Voucher transfers on WFP's Safety and Dignity, Gender and Social Dynamics. 6-20 November 2012. Draft Summary of Findings.

<sup>89</sup> SPR 200312.

<sup>90</sup> Acharya, P., Kenefick, E. *Improving blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP) efficiency in Sudan*. January 2012. WFP Sudan.

has to be conducted, food distributed, cooking classes held and nutrition, sanitation, food safety and health related education imparted; child growth must be monitored. Therefore, it will be difficult to bring IBSFP to a large scale or to start in new areas, and the Ministry of Health may not be capable of continuing such a programme without external support.

187. Institutional feeding (mainly for HIV and tuberculosis patients) was phased out during the period 2010–2012. Various key stakeholders shared in interviews that treatment completion had decreased as a result, which was especially worrisome in the case of tuberculosis. From a cost-efficiency point of view, this is justifiable as it was a very small part of the portfolio (2010: 9,193 beneficiaries) and thus the costs to deliver and administer the food were relatively high. Unfortunately though, there was no actor ready to take over the responsibility.

188. The introduction of vouchers has shown a number of advantages for WFP. The logistics are easier, since the physical quantity is much smaller, delivery is less time bound, storage is easier and the percentages of losses smaller; pipeline breaks are much less of an issue and the approach is more flexible. Skill enhancement and adaptation by logistics staff are needed although according to the logistics department this was ongoing and covered in house.

189. External economic effects and volatile markets have affected the voucher programme. In 2012, WFP had to increase monitoring efforts as a result of increasing food prices, currency depreciation and inflation. If markets become too volatile or goods no longer available, WFP has to be prepared and able to return to in-kind assistance. In Zalingei (Central Darfur) in 2012, cereals had to be distributed alongside vouchers for non-cereal commodities. External effects can also have positive results, such as the depreciation of the Sudanese pound that was in fact beneficial because donor contributions were in United States dollars.

190. As the voucher programme expanded incrementally, the paper-based caseload reportedly became more onerous for WFP and partners; data entry, voucher reconciliation and redemption are time-consuming procedures. WFP is trying to decrease the voucher-related workload by introducing electronic vouchers. This plan is still in its infancy and the first pilot was due to take place in North Darfur in May 2013, and it will have to be seen if electronic vouchers will be an effective solution.

191. Measuring whether vouchers are more cost-efficient than in-kind food is difficult, and comparing the value of the voucher with the cost of the same amount of in-kind food is not sufficient. An in-depth study needs to be undertaken to make a comprehensive cost effectiveness comparison, with other non-monetary benefits and costs to be taken into account.

192. This evaluation acknowledges that WFP Sudan's logistics capacity has played a critical part in the successful programme implementation over the three years. It is one of the largest and most complex systems in WFP's history, working over enormous distances in a country with poor infrastructure, environmental and

climatic challenges and the constant threats from insecurity in many of the operational areas.

193. The principal port of entry for commodities for the Sudan operation was Port Sudan, the seaport on the Red Sea coast. Food was moved by rail and road to WFP's main logistic hubs (in Khartoum and El Obeid, plus Kosti for onward transport to South Sudan until mid-2011), for intermediate storage, before being sent to field locations. Primary deliveries were undertaken by the commercial transport sector.

194. WFP Sudan split its logistics operation into two separate units at the time of the separation of the countries in mid-2011. Its truck fleet of 170 trucks (in 2010) was also split, with about 100 vehicles remaining in the Sudan. Secondary and tertiary deliveries are handled by these vehicles or under commercial contracts with local transport companies. About 100 of these contracts were in force at the end of 2012.

195. After the separation of South Sudan, management of landside transport, storage and handling was complicated. The financial and security situation in the Sudan had deteriorated and commercial transporters often preferred to be involved in cross-border trading or working inside South Sudan where payment was better and in dollars. This improved from May 2012, when the Government of the Sudan managed to curb illegal trade; WFP also started to pay in United States dollars, which made WFP contracts more attractive.

196. The logistics operation includes planning for pre-positioning in advance of the rainy season in Darfur, and as part of contingency planning elsewhere (such as in advance of the 2011 separation referendum). The wet season has a significant impact on truck movement, necessitating significant pre-positioning of food in Darfur before the roads become impassable in mid-year. Some two months of distribution supplies are also generally maintained at the Darfur warehouses. Nevertheless, pipeline breaks were reported by cooperating partners as occurring from time to time, often resulting in a reduced food basket or only selected commodities.

197. Similar to complaints from the NGOs and CBOs regarding late payments, transporters indicated they faced long delays in being paid for jobs completed, even with all paperwork submitted and approved by the Logistics Department. There is a complete reverification of all waybills and documentation by WFP Khartoum's finance department, duplicating the work done by the Logistics Department, and thus slowing down the whole process.<sup>91</sup>

198. The operation in Darfur – which accounts for the majority of the food commodities delivered – involves high transportation costs and time. For example, because of the poor infrastructure and large distances, moving food from Port Sudan to el Geneina takes up to 40 days, even if the roads are open and security is reasonable.<sup>92</sup> LTSH costs dropped from an average rate of US\$390 per metric ton in

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<sup>91</sup> This duplicated procedure is said to be unique to WFP Sudan.

<sup>92</sup> During the evaluation mission, some 2,000 WFP and commercial trucks had been stopped from moving into Darfur for several weeks because of insecurity.

2010 to US\$297 per metric ton in 2011, but because of the currency devaluation and additional transport costs in 2012, this rose to US\$345 per metric ton.

199. The continued need for security escorts (from the Government of the Sudan or from UNAMID) not only increases logistics costs but also affects transit time. Although UNAMID is mandated to provide security escorts for food convoys in certain areas of Darfur, availability of vehicles and personnel is sometimes limited, which impacts on WFP's ability to operate. At other times, the Government of the Sudan security services provide escorts, but with similar restrictions on capacity, often resulting in long delays or cancelled convoys.

200. The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service operation has been running in the Sudan since 2004 and has proved to be a vital and well-used service across the country, particularly in view of the large distances, the poor infrastructure and the levels of insecurity. It has focused on scheduled access into remote and otherwise inaccessible locations, allowing agency staff time on the ground. Two special operations (SO 200073 and SO 200354) were in force during this evaluation period, to manage and finance UNHAS. It is recognized that without the flight service provided the work of WFP and most of the rest of the humanitarian community in Darfur (and South Sudan in earlier years) would have been close to impossible.

201. The operation split into two units following the countries' separation in mid-2011. The UNHAS fleet of 18 aircraft (serving 108 locations in both South Sudan and the Sudan) in 2010 reduced to eight aircraft in 2012 in the Sudan, principally serving remote locations in Darfur, as well as providing an air bridge between the region and Khartoum. The evaluation has found that the UNHAS flight schedule has been rationalized over the last years as passenger numbers have changed, and UNHAS Khartoum remains confident that the utilization rate and the current fleet meet passenger requirements and efficiency targets.

202. Staff members of UNHAS have been subject to two kidnappings: three crew were abducted in November 2010 and held for a month; a second abduction saw another three crew detained early in 2011, and they were held for five months before release. While the UNHAS service is vital to allow United Nations and NGO staff to access the "deep field" locations across Darfur, these incidents once again highlight the inherent risks and levels of insecurity in these areas, prompting WFP to base a flight security officer in the Sudan to identify and manage the particular risks involved.

### **Factors affecting results**

203. Poor quality of reporting has certainly affected communication and decision-making across the programme. If the size of the operation is taken into account, the size and content of information available is surprisingly limited. A large number of inconsistencies were observed between reports; even the SPRs contain a number of flaws. Calculations of indicators are based on different data in various years but no mention is made of the change in calculation method. Numbers of beneficiaries appear differently between various reports and participant numbers are derived by

dividing the estimated number of beneficiaries by the estimated size of households. Participant numbers of FFT could not be broken down into details of trainings followed. It is difficult to conduct an effective operation and take relevant decisions without such detailed information on which to base them. This was already identified in the risk analysis in 2011, but no improvement seems to have been made.

204. The evaluation noted in particular that the level of support available to the CETA region (Central, East and Three Areas) was underresourced at WFP country office level, resulting in programme support inevitably focusing on the emergency interventions to the detriment of other offices. For example, with the current interventions in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, programme support and engagement with the Kassala office was significantly reduced.<sup>93</sup>

205. The approach to capacity development was insufficiently structured, which may reflect on the quality of implementation and results. Apart from SAFE related trainings, few training reports, training plans, training gap assessments or quality assessments of trainings could be identified; only information on the overall number of participants in FFT per year was available. There is no feedback on quality of training, and evaluations at the end of trainings are not conducted.

WFP Sudan has worked under an EMOP for a number of years now, justified by the fact that the situation in Sudan, albeit a protracted crisis, remains highly volatile and WFP has to remain prepared for a sudden emergency. While this is true, it is understood that the sequence of regular EMOP preparation created a large work burden and sometimes hampered the effectiveness of operations. The one-year duration makes it impossible to develop longer term planning, which is especially difficult when implementing or moving towards more recovery related activities and which is a major constraint for many partners.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1. Overall Assessment**

206. The conclusions are categorized according to the DAC criteria of relevance and coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, coverage and connectedness, and impact and sustainability. The conclusions are followed by four main recommendations in areas identified as most important by the evaluation.

#### **Relevance and coherence**

207. WFP has been the largest humanitarian actor in the Sudan, unmatched in size of operations and geographic coverage, food assistance and food security assessment capacity, covering over 25 percent of the needs reflected in the HWP. WFP's ongoing shift in strategy from food aid to longer term food assistance was found to be broadly coherent with the different policies and strategic framework of the government and the UNDAF in the Sudan. WFP has made an effort to move away from in-kind GFD,

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<sup>93</sup> This point was brought up in the initial feedback to the WFP country office and the evaluation was informed at that time that plans are under way to significantly strengthen the CETA structure to address this issue.

but newly occurring emergencies and the fact that between 60 and 70 percent of the funding is in-kind limits the extent and pace of this shift.

208. The evaluation found that the WFP Sudan portfolio was aligned with the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality; however, this alignment is complicated by the role of the Government of the Sudan as both host to the United Nations agencies and party to the ongoing conflicts within the WFP operating areas. WFP has appropriately based its intervention targeting on food security assessments in all areas and has been active in negotiating access to insecure and inaccessible areas in order to conduct these assessments and deliver food assistance.

209. The evaluation notes that WFP's restricted access to non-government held areas effectively excludes specific populations that are food insecure and in need of emergency relief. This points to some of the inherent dissonance within the humanitarian principles themselves, whereby state sovereignty must be respected, coordination involves consent of the host country, and participation requires working closely with national and local government authorities, even if it means that WFP may appear non-neutral from the perspective on some non-government stakeholders. The evaluation concludes that WFP's own principled approach, a careful balancing of negotiating access to affected populations while maintaining positive relationships with the host government, allows WFP to reach the maximum number of people possible. WFP must consider the long-term implications of this approach though, as other humanitarian actors, even within the UNCT, do not have the same level of access.

210. The evaluation found that WFP was well aligned with several of the principles for engagement in fragile and conflict states. In Darfur, the context is complex and changes regularly; the different WFP area offices were found to be adapting to the changing conditions on a regular basis and had used different approaches to engagement with partners and beneficiaries in each area office. WFP has worked to develop some capacity within state level ministries and has engaged in a range of cooperative activities at the state level, despite the limited levels of positive commitment seen from the federal level.

211. WFP does not contribute directly toward conflict prevention activities but does deal with the aftermath of conflict. The evaluation concludes that a more robust engagement in the development-focused approach outlined in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, in collaboration with others, would help address the links between political security and development. Better inter-agency coordination between the various partners is needed and a more detailed understanding household and community level dynamics would help inform programme areas such as resettlement. All of these factors will contribute to further alignment with the fragile/conflict state principles.

212. Accountability to donors and to affected populations was mixed. Donor stakeholders reported that WFP's accountability was relatively good with detailed

reporting and facilitation of donor monitoring visits; despite this, the evaluation notes that funding is reducing as donor priorities are shifting away from emergency modalities. Beneficiary groups indicated that they had not always been sufficiently consulted about their priorities and needs. This was partially because two-way communication with beneficiaries is often controlled by the government and camp sheiks and direct beneficiary consultation is often the results of months of negotiation and preparation.

213. The WFP country portfolio was found to be coherent with the content and focus of the government's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the 5-year Strategic Plan 2008–2011, and the official strategies and policies relevant to poverty reduction, in particular the Agricultural Revival Programme 2008–2012. However, the WFP planning cycle, through one-year EMOPs, did not align with the 2–5 year cycles of government instruments. Some stakeholders saw this mismatch as potentially mitigating WFP's ability to contribute strategically to longer term improvements.

214. Even though improvement was reported after the change in WFP Sudan's senior management during 2012, United Nations partners found inter-agency coordination and information sharing suboptimal. In the food security sector coordination, the evaluation found that WFP often played a very limited role and seemed to lack commitment, notwithstanding the important role it has in the food security and nutrition arena of the Sudan and the relative size of food security in the HWP. When starting new interventions or when taking significant programme decisions, WFP's consultation with other partners was found to not always be sufficient. The evaluation found that WFP did work with a wide range of partner organizations, but generally only in areas that benefited its operations and related reporting requirements. The incremental value of working in a strong partnership with other development actors was largely ignored, which may have consequences for WFP's ability to plan strategically for longer-term operations and the possibility to benefit from the expertise of United Nations sister organizations.

215. The evaluation concludes that, overall, the country portfolio activities were aligned with beneficiary needs in Darfur and CETA but it was noted that the geographic balance of activities was not necessarily proportional to the scale of food insecurity or malnutrition. This was partially due to the numerous fund commitments to Darfur and the continuing caseloads in that region. The high levels of malnutrition in CETA warrant a greater focus vis-à-vis Darfur than that observed over the evaluation period.

216. The shifts in targeting of general food distribution over the evaluation period were generally appropriate, with a greater focus on camp profiling, rationalizing beneficiary lists, and shifting to voucher modalities that provide greater flexibility for beneficiaries. The recovery related activities were found to be highly relevant to the needs but most are at a small scale and require further analysis and assessment to ensure that they remain relevant to beneficiaries. The targeting of school feeding activities was found to be mismatched with the objectives of the programme.

By operating “emergency school feeding” as a modality, WFP dropped schools if they were in a food secure area, undermining longer-term inputs made by other partners.

217. Many stakeholders stated that people remained in the IDP camps because of the food distributions, but the evaluation did not find enough significant evidence to either support or refute this. In addition, insecurity is a very real concern in many areas of Darfur. WFP does not have detailed community data required for more granular targeting and thus the blanket ration approach is the only justifiable approach. Reaching the most vulnerable with the continuously decreasing budgets becomes more and more important though, and improved targeting needs to focus on the needs of the most vulnerable individuals. The evaluation considers that the camp profiling exercise needs to be done at the household level for more appropriate targeting and to identify the plans and expectations of beneficiary communities.

218. Even though gender is an important focal area at corporate level and a critical issue for programme effectiveness, in the Sudan it has not been always adequately addressed. Women are targeted in certain activities but no in-depth gender analysis has been done to identify the different needs and opportunities, and WFP has not assessed the impact of the activities on gender equality.

219. WFP has used food assistance to address food and nutrition insecurity in the Sudan according to its mandate and strategy. WFP Sudan has sufficient experience and expertise in offering food assistance, supported by the necessary skills and logistic capacity. Strategic Objective SO1 (save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies) was the main focus of the country portfolio. Flexibility has been demonstrated via budget revisions on EMOPs, scaling back or increasing if new emergencies arise.

220. The WFP Strategic Plan should provide adequate planning space to facilitate the long-term strategy for WFP in the Sudan, but under the one-year duration of the EMOPs there is little long term planning done, complicating the move towards more recovery related activities. The fluidity of the conflict in the Sudan, however, requires flexibility to address emergencies; maintaining this balance within the portfolio is necessary to keep it relevant to the humanitarian situation in the Sudan.

### **Coverage and connectedness**

221. The coverage of beneficiary populations has been according to plan with few exceptions. The number of beneficiaries reached and the amount of food distributed has varied between 85 percent and 100 percent of targets across all the activities of the portfolio. The number of GFD beneficiaries decreased from 2010 to 2011 and then increased again from 2011 to 2012, but with a lower amount of food per beneficiary. The percentage of food distribution covered by vouchers increased from 1 percent to 13 percent. The number of beneficiaries in nutrition and school feeding programmes has remained fairly stable throughout the evaluation period.

222. WFP was challenged to replace a number of its INGO partners when they were expelled from Darfur (2009) and Eastern Sudan (2012), but has since identified and

contracted a number of national agencies and CBOs in their place. The proportion of government partners has sharply increased over the same period but capacity levels existing with these agencies were limited, necessitating considerable technical and training inputs by WFP. There are now partners identified for all WFP's 500 distribution points, with only a handful not being reached, mainly because of insecurity.

223. The evaluation found that WFP has improved its coverage by conducting camp verifications and improving the accuracy of beneficiary lists that are the basis of general food distribution. On the other hand, FSMS-based rationalization led to interventions of shorter duration and/or decreased amount of food support, and the evaluation found no significant evidence that the more vulnerable individuals are adequately served and not excluded by this rationalization. Coverage of beneficiary populations is thus an evolving process of improvements in targeting.

224. Activities such as FFA have enabled WFP to connect food aid to recovery related activities, but their contribution to the overall portfolio is small. Even though the aim was to shift the focus towards FFA (and FFT), the number of beneficiaries as well as the tonnage of food used to support FFA increased only until 2011 and decreased again in 2012. The shift from emergency response to recovery related programming was mitigated by the decrease in funding (with funding received going toward emergency food distributions as first priority) and the occurrence of new emergencies.

225. There is thus considerable scope to further connect short-term general food distribution (either through in-kind or voucher modalities) to longer term recovery activities. The needs of the most vulnerable populations, both in an outside camp settings in Darfur, are largely chronic in nature; further understanding of their situation will help in targeting food assistance and in scale-up of recovery related interventions that address this chronic food insecurity.

### **Effectiveness and efficiency**

226. The reporting of outcome level data was limited and inconsistent over the evaluation period and this makes a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of WFP's activities difficult. Although each EMOP is discrete, in terms of funding and reporting, analysed as a group over time the lack of continuity and consistency in outcome-level data is apparent. Overall, reporting on the results of the operations has been largely output based and limited in content and reliability, especially in view of the scale of WFP operations in the Sudan. This deserves attention both at the country office level (in rationalizing data from one year to the next, working with partners to collect and analyse data on outcomes, and ensuring high quality reporting) and corporately (in ensuring external validity of planned and reported data, consistency in the use of indicators, and providing support and solutions in a timely manner).

227. General food distribution showed a decrease in beneficiaries over the evaluation period; in addition the size of rations and the duration of support both

decreased. The evaluation noted that the flexibility of GFD was critical to WFP's ability to meet the needs of beneficiary populations, with the ability to quickly move food commodity into newly accessible areas or in response to new humanitarian crises. The logistics capacity of WFP in the Sudan, including the pre-positioning of food commodity, fleet management, and support of voucher scale-up has been critical in ensuring the effectiveness of GFD as the key emergency response intervention.

228. Food-for-work/food-for-recovery interventions were a minor portion of the overall portfolio and most were considered pilot activities. It was acknowledged by implementing partners and beneficiary communities that the assets created did help communities to rebuild their asset-base and start regeneration of livelihoods. Still, the longer term effectiveness of assets created through these activities was questioned by several CBOs; long-term technical support was not ensured for some assets and long-term maintenance was not clearly planned. The evaluation did not find an overall strategy guiding the choice of activities in each area, associated risks, and technical support or partnerships needed.

229. Food for training was found to be effective in the case of SAFE projects, where women beneficiaries found direct benefits in the form of increased savings, less wastage of firewood and better protection. This was confirmed by an evaluation, which revealed savings in time, money and a reduction of SGBV and illness. In the case of agri-business centres and tree nurseries, there have been very limited results to date, partially because of the time required for tree production, and continued inputs are required. The F2M programme reached most of its planned beneficiaries, but much of the programme is beyond the control of WFP, being part of a larger government managed microfinance scheme. It was not clear how WFP would assess the effectiveness of its inputs nor whether the beneficiaries of F2M will ultimately be food insecure small farmers.

230. WFP's nutrition related interventions include supplementary feeding (SFP), blanket supplementary feeding (BSFP), and an IBSFP. There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of these three supplementary feeding interventions. The evaluation noted that there are some unofficial and unreleased nutrition survey datasets, contributing to the paucity of comparable nutrition data. Overall though, the collection and analysis of more nutrition data will be key to better measuring the effectiveness of these interventions.

231. An analysis of WFP's BSFP in North and South Darfur in 2011 showed very little improvement in the nutritional status of children in the programme; this confirms evaluations done elsewhere that show it has little effect on GAM and MAM rates. IBSFP, piloted in Kassala in 2009/10, showed a significant decrease in GAM prevalence and appears to be an effective, although resource intensive, intervention. SFP, implemented to address MAM and through both community and facility-based approaches, was reported to generate recovery rates between 71 percent and 95 percent but more data need to be generated to properly track the effectiveness of these activities.

232. School feeding is designed primarily as an emergency intervention, targeting food insecure areas. The effectiveness of the school feeding activities has been mitigated by the mismatch between its design and the long-term expectation and inputs of partners. WFP-assisted schools seem to show slight deteriorations in their retention rates over the evaluation period, a stable enrolment gender ratio in CETA and a slight increase in girl enrolment in Darfur. These data are of limited use in determining the effectiveness of the programme as they are not compared to non-WFP-assisted schools, nor are they aligned with indicators used by the Ministry of Education.

233. The effectiveness of the voucher modality has been studied in the Sudan context, with internal (2011, 2012) reviews and external (2012) assessments conducted. These reviews demonstrate mixed results; with limited effects on dietary diversity when given the choice of food purchases as beneficiaries prioritize quantity and cheaper items, and beneficiaries reported limited knowledge of their entitlements under the voucher system. Positive effects included greater contact with mobile markets and greater control over decision-making for beneficiaries. While the vouchers appeared to be a preferred option, more rigorous study of the effectiveness of the voucher modality, compared to in-kind food assistance, is needed.

234. Assessment of the efficiency of the portfolio and of the singular activities is very difficult. Financial data are only available in highly aggregated form and therefore comparison of cost efficiency between activities or between WFP and other agencies was not possible. However, the evaluation noted several issues with respect to efficiency.

235. General food distribution has seen a number of efficiency gains as distribution moved to a two-monthly distribution cycle and the beneficiary lists have become more accurate. Implementing partners confirmed that planning has become less complicated as a result of the longer distribution cycles. It is yet unclear whether the voucher modality is more or less efficient than in-kind distribution. The evaluation observed that the administration of paper-based vouchers has been very time consuming and onerous for WFP and partners, although delivery is less time-bound, storage is easier, losses are smaller, and pipeline breaks are much less an issue. A comprehensive cost effectiveness comparison, with other non-monetary benefits included, is needed and should take into account the different contexts in which vouchers are, and could be, used.

236. The IBSFP approach was found to be very resource intensive, with average costs of US\$34 per child whereas the cost of SFP ranged from US\$12–\$15 per child. Scaling up IBSFP may prove problematic as a result, but the costs may be justified if the IBSFP activities continue to demonstrate better outcomes over the long-term.

237. The evaluation acknowledges that WFP Sudan's logistics capacity has played a critical part in programme implementation over the evaluation period and a number of efficiency gains in logistics were found. LTSH costs dropped from an average rate of US\$390 per metric ton in 2010 to US\$297 per metric ton in 2011, although these

gains were interrupted by currency devaluation and additional transport costs in 2012. The capacity development of commercial transporters, shifting to payment of transporters in United States dollars, and planning for pre-positioning of food in advance of the rainy season all contribute to the overall efficiency of the logistics capacity of WFP. The evaluation also notes that there may be potential efficiency gains in the processing of payments to transporters as the complete reverification of all documentation in WFP Khartoum delays this process.

238. WFP's UNHAS operation has been running since 2004 and contributes directly to the efficiency of operations for all humanitarian agencies in the Sudan. UNHAS allows access for all partners to remote and otherwise inaccessible areas. The evaluation found that the UNHAS flight schedule has been rationalized over the evaluation period, and UNHAS Khartoum reports that the utilization rate and the current fleet meet passenger requirements and efficiency targets.

239. WFP's current engagement with more than 200 local and international partners is largely via six-month FLAs. The high transaction costs incurred with the almost continuous negotiation of contracts detracts from the operational focus and causes dissatisfaction with partners, which is then compounded by cancelled food distributions or delayed invoice settlement. Efficiencies may be gained with longer term and broader partnership agreements.

### **Impact and sustainability**

240. The evaluation could not empirically assess the impact of the WFP portfolio given limited reporting on results and the lack of comparable data. Given the scale of food assistance over the 2010–2012 period there has undoubtedly been life-saving impact for food insecure populations; general food distribution, or its equivalent in vouchers, is a resource transfer into resource poor and food insecure areas.

241. Nutritional indicators in the areas WFP works in the Sudan have remained stable for decades, despite the scale of food assistance and specific nutrition targeted activities. It is unclear whether SFP and BSFP have had any significant impact, but initial results from the IBSFP pilots appear to show positive impact on GAM rates.

242. As a result of austerity measures, the Government of the Sudan has limited funds available, and despite WFP's capacity development inputs, the sustainability of nutrition related interventions and school feeding activities is questionable. Whereas the Government of the Sudan reported that it is ready to give technical support, it is unlikely that it would be able to provide food commodities for activities such as SFP and school feeding, even though a hand-over strategy has been agreed. The activities may not be taken over by the government in the foreseeable future.

243. The sustainability of FFA related activities is also uncertain. The assets initially may be a valuable contribution to the community, but maintenance and repair have not been ensured. The lack of involvement of organizations with specific technical expertise threatens the continuation of FFA, SAFE and F2M after WFP input ends.

## **4. Recommendations**

### **1. Partnership and coordination**

WFP Sudan must improve its partnership and coordination with United Nations partners and other development actors in the Sudan. Coordination and information sharing regarding planning and decision-making should be more regular, and as the largest player in the humanitarian community in the Sudan, WFP should use its presence to leverage strategic partnership building efforts. Specifically:

- 1a. WFP Sudan should strengthen its role in inter-agency mechanisms, such as the Humanitarian Country Team and the food security and livelihood sector mechanism at federal and state levels.
- 1b. WFP should establish long-term, formal partnerships with relevant United Nations partners to ensure appropriate selection and sustainable implementation of recovery related activities.
- 1c. WFP should move from six-month to one-year FLAs with an increasing number of key field partners to increase efficiency, and promote increased effectiveness through longer term planning and support.

### **2. Strategic shift towards longer term planning**

For the next country strategy, beneficiaries and development actors should have a stronger role in identifying the mix of emergency, relief and recovery activities, and activities should be oriented towards improving self-reliance. While WFP needs to retain flexibility and capacity to respond to recurrent and emerging crises, the portfolio should have a longer-term horizon with the aim of saving lives and rebuilding/protecting livelihoods. Specifically:

- 2a. The portfolio and its operations should be designed with longer term objectives wherever possible. Planning cycles should be more aligned to those of United Nations partners and government.
- 2b. The school feeding strategy should be revised and aligned with other partners, and new paths explored to increase the possibility of enhancing government ownership.
- 2c. The portfolio needs to include more activities to build self-reliance of communities and emergency preparedness capacities of the authorities.

### **3. Monitoring, evaluation and reporting**

With Headquarters and regional bureau support and guidance, the country office's M&E framework and system must be thoroughly reviewed and strengthened, with a shift in emphasis from counting beneficiaries and food tonnage to measuring results, outcomes and impacts achieved. Specifically:

- 3a. Data collection should be expanded, focusing on output, coverage, outcome and impact. Outcome indicators specifically related to the WFP Sudan portfolio should

be added to the M&E framework, enabling inter-year comparison of outcomes and results. Existing nutrition data should be compiled and information gaps filled in collaboration with partners. Data collection for all activities needs to become more regular, better adapted to context and results systematically used in decision-making.

3b. Feedback of M&E information to all partners should be structured and regular, with accountability established for application of standardized data collection methods and for consistency of data reported.

3c. Conduct one-off assessments to fill key knowledge gaps, including: (i) comparative assessment of modality effectiveness; (ii) contribution of SFP and BSFP in mitigating malnutrition rates in the Sudan, in collaboration with relevant partners; (iii) evidence review of Darfur IDP coping mechanisms, with further data collection if needed; and (iv) measurement of effects of programme decisions, such as ration cuts and gaps in assistance (taking advantage of the natural comparative conditions) to generate evidence and lessons on results and impacts.

#### **4. Assessment and targeting**

Ensure optimal use of limited resources by further refining targeting, continuing the verification exercises, and expanding regular community profiling so that the most vulnerable people in prioritized communities are reached. More regular engagement with communities should be planned and feedback used to refine the targeting of food assistance.

## Acronyms

BSF	blanked supplementary feeding
BSFP	blanket supplementary feeding programme
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CBO	community-based organization
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CETA	Central and Eastern Regions and Three Areas
CFSA	comprehensive food security assessments
CHF	common humanitarian fund
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DfID	Department for International Development
DNHF	Do No Harm Framework
DRA	Darfur Regional Authority
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission
EMOP	emergency operation (WFP)
F2M	Farmers to Market
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS	food consumption score
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFA	food for assets
FFR	food for recovery
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FSL	food security and livelihoods
FSP	Fragile States Principle
FSMS	food security monitoring system
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GDP	gross domestic product
GFD	general food distribution
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission

HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
HPG/ODI	Humanitarian Policy Group/Overseas Development Institute
HWP	Humanitarian Work Plan
IBSFP	integrated blanket supplementary feeding programme
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MT	metric ton
NFI	non-food item
NGO	non-governmental organization
ODOC	Other Direct Operational Costs
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OEV	Office of Evaluation
OTP	Outpatient Therapeutic Programme
PHC	Primary Health Care
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
RB	Regional Bureau
SAFE	Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy
SAM	severe acute malnutrition
SFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
SFRU	Strategic Food Reserve Unit
SO	special operation
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
SPR	Standard Project Report
U5	under-five
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USA	United States of America
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WVI	World Vision International

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