

measuring results,  
sharing lessons

2011

# Annual Evaluation Report

Office of Evaluation May 2012



**World Food Programme**



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# Foreword

This year's Annual Evaluation Report focuses on lessons arising from implementation of WFP's Strategic Plan 2008–2013 to date. It puts strong emphasis on learning from indications of progress to date in implementation and performance, to guide necessary adjustments and provide evidence for planning of the next strategic plan.

Four strategic evaluations assessed progress on specific dimensions of WFP's transformation from a food aid to a food assistance agency. They looked at WFP's roles in social protection and safety nets and in addressing long-term hunger, WFP working in partnerships, and country offices' adaptation to change.

The mid-term evaluations of two ground-breaking initiatives – Purchase for Progress and the Agricultural Market Support project in Uganda – provide lessons on using WFP's procurement "footprint" for development objectives. The evaluation of the school feeding policy identifies lessons on the transition of this long-standing activity to encompass the wider objectives of the Strategic Plan. This evaluation draws on evidence from a series of five impact evaluations of school feeding, three of which were completed in 2011.

The four country portfolio evaluations offer lessons concerning implementation of the Strategic Plan from a country perspective.

Together, the evaluations conducted in 2011 provide important insights into performance against the five Strategic Objectives and progress on the core transitions implied by the Strategic Plan: from food aid to food assistance; from planning by project to a more strategic approach; from implementing operations to enabling government ownership, capacity and accountability; and from partnerships for implementation to strategic partnerships with shared objectives.

The work of the Office of Evaluation and the types of evaluation conducted also reflect these transitions. The office completed its transition to higher-level more strategic evaluations and initiated more joint evaluations with strategic partners.

Looking ahead, the Office of Evaluation will continue to improve the relevance, quality and use of evaluations, and contribute to enhancing WFP's approach to the use of evidence in policy, planning and implementation.



Helen Wedgwood  
*Director, Office of Evaluation*  
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# Executive Summary

## 2011

This year's Annual Evaluation Report focuses on learning from implementation of the Strategic Plan 2008–2013. Of the 16 evaluations completed in 2011, 15 were higher-level evaluations, either global in scope or covering multiple operations in one country. As well as creating synergies among evaluations, the focus on higher-level evaluations promises greater added value to WFP with its limited resources, by providing evidence to inform strategic level decisions. This year's report is structured according to the themes evaluated: the strategic shift from food aid to food assistance; school feeding; WFP support to agricultural smallholders and markets; WFP's country portfolios; food assistance in protracted refugee situations, jointly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and the emergency operation in Niger.

The four strategic evaluations of different dimensions of the transition from food aid to food assistance showed striking commonality in their analysis, despite having different foci: WFP's role in social protection and safety nets; its role in ending long-term hunger; WFP working in partnerships; and country offices' adaptation to change. Together they found that the changes initiated under this transition have the potential to enhance WFP's effectiveness in addressing the complex dimensions of hunger in diverse contexts. WFP has made important adaptations and innovations in each of the dimensions covered, especially at the country level, with some promising results. Country portfolio evaluations also found promising results, especially in broadening and deepening WFP's engagement with national governments and in the use of tools other than food aid.

However, halfway through the Strategic Plan cycle, organizational support for the transition is weak, including leadership of the initiative and the clarity of goals and priorities; adaptation of the supporting systems, procedures, guidance, staff capacity, monitoring and evaluation and funding mechanisms has been slow. Investment in management of the change process does not yet match requirements, and ensuring maximum effectiveness in the future will depend on it. These conclusions were supported by findings from the country portfolio evaluations and the

policy evaluation of the 2009 School Feeding Policy. This policy was found to be timely, well aligned with international debate, evidence-based and innovative. There is evidence of each of the multiple benefits from school feeding that it envisages, but these benefits are not inevitable and there may be trade-offs among them, as shown in the series of impact evaluations of school feeding completed in 2011. There is need for greater analysis of cost effectiveness in programme design and in determining whether or not school feeding is the best means of achieving specific outcomes. Targeting and the adequacy and frequency of the ration were found to be essential variables influencing school feeding's effectiveness as a safety net instrument; the same was true of other activities in country portfolio evaluations.

WFP's food security analysis was repeatedly found to be a major asset for many organizations, but it requires further refining and more disciplined use to increase effectiveness. The evaluations of country portfolios and the 2010 emergency operation in Niger evidenced WFP's continued strength in emergency response in diverse contexts – Strategic Objective 1. They also give insights into both the possibilities and the challenges for progressing towards the other Strategic Objectives in emergency contexts. The mid-term evaluations of the Purchase for Progress pilot initiative and the Agricultural Market Support programme in Uganda found high relevance and innovation, with important achievements so far. It is essential to continue the testing of diverse modalities, to generate evidence by the end of the pilot on the most appropriate entry point along the value chain, bearing in mind cost-effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The monitoring and evaluation system should be adapted to maximize learning at this level.

Four over-arching lessons for WFP emerge from the evaluations conducted in 2011, with accompanying recommendations: i) invest more in managing the changes to WFP's ways of working that are required by the Strategic Plan 2008–2013; ii) continue enhancing external and internal programme synergies; iii) follow through on the monitoring and self-evaluation strategy; and iv) strengthen learning in WFP's "can-do" culture.

# Introduction

2011 marks the end of the 2010–2011 biennium and a change in the Director of the Office of Evaluation (OE). As in 2010, this report<sup>1</sup> has two main parts. Following this introduction, Section 2 synthesizes findings and lessons from evaluations completed in 2011, and concludes with recommendations for consideration by WFP senior management. Section 3 reviews OE’s activities for continuing to improve the quality and

usefulness of WFP’s evaluations, and the outlook for the future.

This year, to reflect the 2011 evaluation work programme, Section 2 is presented by theme, rather than type of evaluation. Table 1 provides a list of the 16 evaluations completed by OE in 2011. Table 2 shows the themes covered.

**Table 1: Evaluations Completed in 2011, by Type**

Global evaluations	Country portfolio evaluations
Strategic Evaluation of WFP’s Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets	WFP’s portfolio in Haiti
WFP’s Role in Ending Long-term Hunger: a Strategic Evaluation	WFP’s portfolio in Kenya
From Food Aid to Food Assistance – Working in Partnership: A Strategic Evaluation	WFP’s portfolio in Rwanda
How WFP Country Offices Adapt to Change: a Strategic Evaluation	WFP’s portfolio in Yemen
Mid-Term Evaluation of the Purchase for Progress (P4P) Initiative 2008–2013	Impact evaluations
WFP’s Agriculture and Market Support (AMS) in Uganda 2009–2014: a Strategic Mid-Term Evaluation	Impact Evaluation of School Feeding in Bangladesh
WFP’s School Feeding Policy: a Policy Evaluation	Impact Evaluation of School Feeding in Côte d’Ivoire
Operations evaluations	Impact Evaluation of School Feeding in the Gambia
Niger Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200170	Joint WFP and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Evaluation. The Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: Ethiopia

<sup>1</sup> This report was prepared by Sally Burrows, Senior Evaluation Officer and Officer-in-Charge from 1 October 2011 to 8 January 2012, with Helen Wedgwood, Director, Office of Evaluation from 9 January 2012. Inputs were prepared by consultants Everett Ressler, Terrence Jantzi and John Markie and by Claire Conan, Evaluation Officer, and Cinzia Cruciani, OE junior consultant analyst.

**Table 2: Themes and Corresponding Evaluations Completed**

Theme	No. and type of evaluations 2011
School feeding	3 impact evaluations 1 policy evaluation (global)
WFP in agricultural markets	2 strategic evaluations (global)
From food aid to food assistance	4 strategic evaluations (global)
Strategic positioning of country portfolios	4 country portfolio evaluations
Food assistance in protracted refugee situations	1 impact evaluation, jointly with UNHCR
Individual operations – EMOP	1 operation evaluation

## Evaluation Strategy

**Value added through synergies among evaluations.** In 2011, two types of synergy increased the depth and breadth of evaluation insights: synergy among the four interrelated strategic evaluations of the transformation from food aid to food assistance (Table 1); and synergy from the five impact evaluations of school feeding, which provided important in-depth evidence for the broader global evaluation of WFP’s school feeding policy (Table 2) and were also used in-country to inform national strategies on school feeding.

Continuing its search for synergies among evaluations, OE began a series of four impact evaluations on food assistance’s contribution to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations. Conducted jointly with the UNHCR, these evaluations apply one methodology, adapted to the context as necessary, and generate comparable findings that can be synthesized to provide greater insights into the common strengths and weaknesses of programme areas and evidence for policy development.<sup>2</sup> The series will be completed in 2012.

**Focus on higher-level evaluations.** OE completed its planned transition to focus on higher-level evaluations: global evaluations – strategic and policy

evaluations; country portfolio evaluations; and a series of impact evaluations. Its only evaluation of a single operation in 2011 was of the Niger EMOP. Given the limited resources, this approach promises greater value-added to WFP by providing evidence to inform strategic-level decisions regarding policies, country strategies or corporate strategies. Each country portfolio and impact evaluation covers multiple operations, and impact evaluations provide more in-depth assessment of outcomes, impact and unintended effects than single operation evaluations do. The sub-sections Evaluation Activities and Outlook provide further information on the rationale in evaluation planning.

Evaluation coverage in 2011 reflected this higher-level focus. The geographical coverage included more countries<sup>3</sup> than usual and was reasonably evenly distributed across all the countries where WFP is active (Figures 1 and 2). This increase is largely because figures include countries covered by the multi-country case studies<sup>4</sup> conducted by global evaluations (listed in Table 1). In 2011, there were more of these evaluations than usual: seven,<sup>5</sup> compared with seven in total over the previous four years.

As in previous years, evaluation findings should not be considered representative of all WFP operations.

<sup>2</sup> Additional series are planned for 2012 to 2014, in a rolling programme.

<sup>3</sup> This refers to countries in which at least one evaluation was conducted, not necessarily covering all the operations in that country.

<sup>4</sup> The depth of these case studies varied among evaluations.


<sup>5</sup> Four global strategic evaluations were approved in the Evaluation Work Plan 2010–2011; a fifth global evaluation – of the school feeding policy – was commissioned by the Board in November 2009; and two others on WFP in agricultural markets were requested by management.

# Evaluation Findings


This section synthesizes significant findings from the groups of evaluations shown in Table 1 and highlights important insights and learning for WFP from each

group. Four over-arching lessons from across all the evaluations, and corresponding recommendations, are brought together at the end of the section.

**Figure 1: Evaluation coverage, by WFP region**



**Figure 2: Evaluation coverage, by WFP region**



## From Food Aid to Food Assistance

This sub-section synthesizes common messages emerging from the four strategic evaluations<sup>6</sup> that aimed to inform WFP's transition from food aid to food assistance, which is at the core of the Strategic Plan 2008–2013. Conducted mid-way through the period covered by the Strategic Plan, they were intended to provide timely and relevant learning about progress on four dimensions of this transition. They do not constitute an evaluation of the Strategic Plan itself.<sup>7</sup>

The evaluations visited 16 countries and analysed three others through desk review, including telephone interviews with major stakeholders in the country.<sup>8</sup> This was supplemented by a review of programme documents, a wider thematic literature review, interviews with global-level external stakeholders, and staff interviews at regional bureaux and WFP Headquarters.<sup>9</sup>

The Strategic Plan 2008–2013 authorized WFP to make more choices on how it responds to needs. WFP has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to respond to emergencies rapidly and with agility. The Strategic Plan foresees a similar agility in adapting programmes to recovery and development situations, as these alternate in cycles with emergencies. The evaluations therefore gave considerable, but not exclusive, attention to post-crisis and non-emergency contexts.

Although the evaluations were conducted by four different independent teams, there were some striking similarities in their findings and conclusions, especially concerning systemic issues that WFP can address. These “central messages” are highlighted in the following paragraphs to maximize learning as WFP prepares its next strategic plan. This complements, but does not substitute for, the rich learning regarding the distinct subject area of each individual evaluation.

**Message 1: The shift from food aid to food assistance is relevant, widely welcomed and very demanding.** The shift from food aid to food assistance envisioned in the Strategic Plan is relevant to ongoing changes in the external context in which WFP operates, especially as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that nearly 1 billion people are categorized as “hungry”. The evaluations found widespread agreement among stakeholders – both external and internal – on the need for the adjustments that WFP has made, especially in post-crisis/non-emergency

contexts. The newly endorsed tools and operating principles for implementing this programme shift also have broad support.

At the same time, the shift is very demanding and the related changes have significant organizational implications. The change evaluation suggested that the current process is probably the most substantive strategic shift since WFP was founded, affecting virtually every aspect of WFP's approach and operations.

**Message 2: Expansive and positive change is under way.** The evaluations all found an expansive process of change and innovation under way at all levels of WFP. In their respective areas of focus, the evaluations found positive adaptations and innovations towards the new strategic direction. These comprise new forms of strategic engagement, as well as modifications to “traditional” interventions. They include:

- a) expanded collaboration with a wider array of government entities, including greater integration into existing social protection programmes and more coordination with other ongoing government programming;
- b) increased use of non-food aid in operational modalities, including initiatives to enhance local production and local purchase, and the use of vouchers and cash;
- c) restructuring of the nature and quality of WFP's partnering relationships, to meet new needs and build on the basic finding that WFP is overall considered a good partner. At the same time, WFP has maintained strong performance in emergency preparedness and response – both individually and as a partner – especially in logistics;
- d) increased involvement in such non-operational arenas as policy development, advocacy, and participation in inter-agency coordinating bodies;
- e) the initiation of a more strategic programme planning approach, through country strategies.

**Message 3: To enhance effectiveness, this process of change needs greater leadership, guidance and support.** Each of the four evaluations concluded that WFP's effectiveness in the areas assessed was weak enough to require substantive corrective measures. There was striking consensus on the underlying issues and factors affecting these weaknesses. All four evaluations found that the principal constraints to improving effectiveness in the transition from food aid

<sup>6</sup> “WFP's Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets”; “WFP's Role in Ending Long-Term Hunger”; “From Food Aid to Food Assistance – Working in Partnership”; and “An Evaluation of How Country Offices Adapt to Change”. Hereafter these are referred to as the evaluations of social protection, long-term hunger and partnerships, along with the change evaluation.

<sup>7</sup> This would need to be larger in scope and to use different methods.

<sup>8</sup> In Africa – Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia; in Asia – Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Nepal; in Latin America and the Caribbean – the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti and Guatemala; and in the Commonwealth of Independent States – Georgia.

<sup>9</sup> Four country offices were engaged in more than one strategic evaluation.

to food assistance are internal – within WFP’s control – and relate largely to how WFP has approached implementation of the Strategic Plan.

Management of the Strategic Plan has been limited to providing overall strategic direction, giving country offices the authority to adapt and innovate, while gradually developing support systems and structures. This has not provided sufficient leadership, guidance or support.

***Message 4: Lack of clarity on concepts and programme priorities leads to multiple interpretations and uncertainty among external stakeholders regarding WFP’s positioning.*** All the evaluations reported an absence of conceptual clarity to underpin the new ways of working, leading to diverse interpretations of core concepts from “food assistance” itself to “safety nets” and “partnership”. Each evaluation found ambiguities and uncertainty among stakeholders – within and outside WFP – as to what the shift to food assistance involves, particularly regarding what WFP should do and how it should carry out those functions.

Greater clarity is needed on the conceptual framework, programme prioritization and operating principles. Conceptual clarity drives programme direction and priority setting, investment decisions regarding systems and staff competencies, and – ultimately – programme performance and WFP’s credibility. These in turn drive the ability to establish strategic partnerships and attract funding.

*Clarity of the conceptual framework.* All four evaluations emphasized the importance of developing a deep understanding of a range of new concepts and theories, including social protection approaches, the nature of long-term hunger, and the principles of partnering.

*Programme prioritization.* Without conceptual clarity, there is neither a clearly articulated framework for coherent programme prioritization nor adequate understanding of WFP’s role and positioning in the larger system. The evaluations found that programme prioritization is pragmatically built on a set of operating principles that include ensuring a needs-based approach, enhancing national capacity, promoting government ownership, a greater role in policy and advocacy, encouraging widespread participatory engagement, ensuring general alignment with government priorities, and harmonization with United Nations general strategies.

Other principles include the need to build long-term engagements predicated on predictable funding, to move

from partnering for operational purposes to more strategic partnering relationships, and to maintain high flexibility in WFP to respond to situational shifts.

Although these operating principles are valuable and derive from the Strategic Plan, they are not sufficient to ensure coherence. In particular, the needs-based approach has frequently been interpreted as “gap-filling” and not sufficiently focussed on specific objectives. It forms a weak foundation on which to build operations and organizational capacity. In some instances, it has led to an array of interventions that offer some contributions and are in line with government priorities, but lack conceptual coherence and prioritization, leading to ambiguity about WFP’s role. The changes made have been driven by factors external to WFP and have been largely reactive, rather than proactive.

***Message 5: That clarity needs to be communicated widely.*** The lack of clarity prevents WFP from communicating on the “front line” in-country how its new ways of working flow from its mandate and how it envisions its roles and responsibilities in relation to other players in the larger system. The absence of clear communication feeds a perception commonly found among external stakeholders of lack of focus, concerns about duplication and fears of “mission creep”.

***Message 6: Changes to internal WFP systems and processes are lagging behind the needs arising from new ways of working.*** This is especially true for funding, planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), targeting and needs assessment, support to learning – knowledge management – and partnering.

*Funding:* The inadequate processes available for WFP to acquire multi-year, predictable funding are a significant operational barrier, creating a cascade of undesirable effects for expanded programming in the food assistance arena. In addition, roll-out of the new financial framework has not reached the country level, delaying work on capacity development.

*Planning, monitoring and evaluation.* All four evaluations noted that the existing planning, monitoring and evaluation systems were largely geared to the food aid and project approach, rather than to more strategic programme approaches. Two evaluations noted the potential of the new country strategy planning approach, but this approach is not yet fully linked to operations nor yet reached its potential in terms of the quality of the process. Monitoring and self-evaluation systems need significant redesign, especially to include outcome-level monitoring that enables subsequent evaluation of outcomes and impact.

*Targeting and needs assessment.* The more sophisticated programming implied by these new ways of working requires more sophisticated targeting and priority-setting/needs assessment. WFP's expertise in vulnerability analysis and mapping was repeatedly recognized as a core strength, a comparative advantage and a positive contribution to partnerships. Further development of this expertise is essential to support the transition to food assistance, and could provide an expanded basis for planning country strategies.

*Headquarters and regional bureaux support and learning.* The evaluations found a strong need for guidance in proactive problem solving to help staff and partners as they grapple with innovation in the changing context, using peer-to-peer exchanges to promote practical learning. Three of the four evaluations also perceived a need to refine organizational structures at Headquarters.

*Partnering mechanisms.* Many existing memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with sister agencies or governments pre-date the shift in programming approach and are predicated on assumptions that are not related to food assistance activities. MOU templates have not yet been adapted to strategic partnering.

***Message 7: WFP has good staff, but investment is needed to ensure the necessary technical expertise and skill sets for implementing the food assistance approach fully, within WFP and among partners.*** All four evaluations found committed and pragmatic personnel with drive for addressing needs and bringing organizational improvement. Staff were seen as having strong problem-solving capabilities, flexibility and strong interest in learning about the implications of the Strategic Plan. Other assets include extensive operational knowledge of the actors and socio-political dynamics in the field. Staff's creativity enables innovative responses to the changing environment, often in spite of insufficient direction and support from WFP.

However, the four evaluations noted diverse issues related to human resources, resulting in a need to be assertive in adapting recruitment, promotion and the development of capacity and expertise in new sectors and skill sets for the new roles required in the food assistance approach. Clear distinction needs to be made between which capacities and competencies should be developed among WFP personnel, and which obtained through or developed in partners.

The required skill sets and staff profile include technical expertise in new sectors such as nutrition, social protection and long-term hunger; partnering expertise,

including skills and principles; skills in policy-making, advocacy and capacity development – enabling rather than doing; and monitoring expertise in, for example, research and analysis in new fields, and the measurement of progress towards attainment of new objectives.

The conclusion emerging from all four evaluations is that the changes initiated under the strategic shift from food aid to food assistance have the potential to enhance WFP's effectiveness in addressing the complex dimensions of hunger in diverse contexts, including rapid and slow-onset emergencies, recovery, and more stable development. Important adaptations and innovations on the front line have had some promising results.

However, halfway through the Strategic Plan cycle, organizational support for the transition is weak, including in the areas of leadership, clarity of goals and priorities, and development of supporting systems. Adaptation of systems, procedures, guidance and staff capacity has been slow and is lagging behind the pace of change in the field. Investment in leadership and management of the Strategic Plan's implementation has not yet reached the level required by the scale of change envisaged. Maximizing WFP's impact will depend on concerted organizational efforts to address this.

## **School Feeding**

This sub-section reports on the group of school feeding evaluations completed in 2011. Three impact evaluations of school feeding were completed, in the Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire and Bangladesh, bringing the total to five. The series fed in-depth evidence into the broad, global policy evaluation of the 2009 school feeding policy, commissioned by the Executive Board when approving the policy.

### **• Impact evaluations**

To maximize learning for the future, each of the OE-managed impact evaluations covered school feeding operations over several years, and assessed results against the three main sectoral objectives in the 2009 school feeding policy. However, most operations had been designed when school feeding was confined to educational objectives. Where found, contributions towards the new nutrition and/or value-transfer objectives therefore constitute positive unintended impacts.

***Education outcomes.*** In Bangladesh and the Gambia, positive outcomes were seen in enrolment and attendance. In the Gambia however, the evaluation team was unable to ascertain to what extent school feeding had contributed (if at all) to improvements in enrolment compared with other initiatives in the education sector over the same period.

Data on attendance were considered too unreliable to draw conclusions. In Côte d'Ivoire, no significant difference was found between schools with and those without school meals. The evaluation concluded that this was because during the years of instability in Côte d'Ivoire, meals were delivered on too few days to have an impact, even though large numbers of children were reached.

As in 2010, all the impact evaluations found that education quality – combined with economic pressures – is a major factor affecting long-term educational outcomes and household decision-making on whether or not to send a child to school. School feeding can contribute to – but is insufficient on its own to ensure – educational impact.

**Nutrition.** There was clear evidence that school feeding contributed to daily nutrition requirements in Bangladesh and the Gambia. This was particularly important in Bangladesh, where the diets of school-age children are known to be deficient in macro- and micronutrients. However, there were insufficient data for any of the evaluations to measure nutrition outcomes.

**Value transfer.** The 2009 school feeding policy introduced “value transfer to households” as an objective and identified it as school feeding’s main contribution to safety nets and social protection. School feeding ranges from in-school snacks, as in Bangladesh, to large take-home rations. Although “unintended” in the period under review, positive value transfers were found in Bangladesh and the Gambia, representing 4 and 9.6 percent, respectively, of household income for the most vulnerable, and also enabling food savings at home. In Côte d'Ivoire, evidence was weak. In household decision-making, this positive value transfer has to be weighed against the costs of attending school, which in the Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire include cash contributions for the meal and, in Côte d'Ivoire, the opportunity cost of children being unavailable for work. For the most vulnerable households, the value transfer was approximately equal to the costs of attending school.

Targeting and the adequacy and frequency of the ration are essential variables influencing the effectiveness of school feeding as a safety net instrument. All three evaluations remarked that school feeding was not available during the lean season when food insecurity and hunger are highest, because it coincides with school holidays. This has profound implications for achievement of the wider objectives under the new policy.

#### • Policy evaluation

The impact evaluations fed evidence into the policy evaluation of the 2009 school feeding policy, also completed in 2011.<sup>10</sup> The evaluation was required to: i) assess the quality of the policy; ii) assess the results of the policy and activities for implementing it; and iii) determine the reasons for the findings, in order to draw lessons for the future. The evaluation placed strong emphasis on learning because this was one of the first policies developed under the Strategic Plan 2008–2013, and because the evaluation took place within 18 months of policy approval, which was too soon to expect outcomes from operations.

The policy has important strengths. It is responsive to the international context and global debate, including on aid effectiveness, and is fully aligned with WFP’s Strategic Plan 2008–2013 and other policies. Its presentation was timely and it was clearly and persuasively written, drawing insights from evidence published at the time of its drafting, which showed that school feeding can contribute to multiple outcomes on education, nutrition, agricultural economy and social protection. It contributes to a holistic view of school feeding as an instrument for social protection, the need for sustainable government-run systems, and the possibilities for linking school feeding to agricultural development. Its eight quality standards<sup>11</sup> are an important, commendable innovation.


However, the policy also has significant weaknesses. It makes insufficient distinction between the general case for school feeding and WFP’s specific role: what will WFP do differently? Its treatment of social protection is too narrow: a social protection approach is more radical than the policy acknowledges and school feeding has weaknesses as well as strengths as a social protection instrument. The policy should emphasize the need to focus each case on a sub-set of the multiple possible objectives. Multiple benefits are not inevitable – as the impact evaluations of WFP operations show – and there can be trade offs, especially among sustainable hand-over, universal coverage and targeting the most vulnerable, as part of social protection. In that light, the policy also pays insufficient attention to cost-effectiveness as a criterion in the design of school feeding programmes and in determining whether or not school feeding is the best means of achieving specific outcomes.

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<sup>10</sup> Findings of ten impact evaluations – five managed by OE, three by the World Bank, and two by WFP country offices – were diverse, but not inconsistent. A synthesis of these findings is annexed to the evaluation report.

<sup>11</sup> These are: a strategy for sustainability; sound alignment with national policy frameworks; stable funding and budgeting; needs-based and cost-effective programme design; strong institutional frameworks for implementation, monitoring and accountability; a strategy for local production and sourcing; strong partnerships and inter-sector coordination; and strong community participation and ownership.

**Figure 3: Multiple outcomes, multiple stakeholders**



Source: S. Lister et al 2011

### HEALTH AND NUTRITION

BMGF – Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; CSO – civil society organization; FTI – Fast-Track Initiative; GEP – Global Education Partnership; IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development; MDB – Multilateral Development Bank; MOF – Ministry of Finance; PCD – Partnership for Child Development; PTA – parent-teacher association; SP – social protection; SUN – Scaling Up Nutrition; UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund; WB – World Bank; WHO – World Health Organization

Overall, the pursuit of multiple outcomes complicates WFP’s tasks, roles and relationships, especially at the country level. Although the policy draws on solid evidence, it oversimplifies and emphasizes advocacy rather than balanced guidance. The policy is relevant and is already reflected in WFP’s portfolio and activities in important ways: there has been impressive work on programme guidelines and on WFP’s support to emerging national systems; and there are strong new partnerships with multilateral agencies and national governments. The policy endorses many good practices and initiatives that country offices are already following, and embodies principles – such as government ownership – that are already familiar aspects of WFP’s overall strategy. Country offices are thus often implementing important elements of the policy, but this falls short of a conscious commitment to implementation, and neglects other important elements such as the eight quality standards, which are not yet being used systematically to monitor and report on school feeding programmes.

The sustainability of WFP’s approach depends on WFP implementing the radical changes in its way of operating that the policy implies, particularly by providing sustained and complex technical advice, reorienting approaches, and using the eight quality standards. This will require major changes to WFP’s corporate systems, incentives and procedures, and the development of new skills and funding models. While some of these have been put in place, much remains to be done.

### WFP Support to Agricultural Smallholders and Markets

This sub-section synthesizes key findings and lessons from the two mid-term evaluations of new WFP programmes designed to experiment in using WFP’s food aid procurement to raise agricultural smallholders’ income.<sup>12</sup> This developmental objective is WFP’s most distinctive and innovative feature and is of central importance to the organization.

<sup>12</sup> Since the evaluations were conducted, changes have been made to the projects. This report discusses the position at the time of the evaluations.

### • The programmes

The purpose of the five-year Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative, launched in 2008, is to pilot and learn from innovative activities that use WFP's demand platform to stimulate agricultural and market development in ways that maximize benefits for low-income smallholder farmers, particularly women. It aims to generate an annual income gain of US\$50 each for 500,000 smallholders.

Purchase for Progress is implemented in 21 countries:<sup>13</sup> 15 in Africa, four in Central America and two in Asia. The P4P pilot in Uganda is a supportive subset of the broader Agriculture and Market Support (AMS) project, which is a pillar of the WFP country strategy in Uganda.

At the time of the evaluations, AMS' goal was for farmers and traders to sell US\$100 million of locally produced food to WFP per year. AMS aims to improve post harvest handling, and increase and diversify local purchase – which are also P4P objectives – but it also focuses on developing market infrastructure, notably for the warehouse receipt system (WRS).

Funding requirements in the P4P initiative are for technical assistance, with grants for supply-side partnerships; in AMS, significant infrastructure development also requires funding. Additional funds received for the food purchases are not included in the evaluation. At the time of the evaluation, the P4P initiative had received US\$140 million from nine private, bilateral and multilateral donors. Contributions to AMS amounted to US\$14 million, of an estimated project cost of US\$101 million.

### • Programme relevance and design

The objective of enhancing the developmental impact on smallholders and markets of WFP procurement – as the largest global purchaser of food aid – was found highly relevant to contemporary development debates, and in line with national policies and WFP's Strategic Objectives. The multi-faceted character of P4P allows the coexistence and testing of different models. One of the four core facets of P4P is research, which is unusual for WFP. The evaluation found adequate M&E resources for facilitating a learning loop and comparisons among countries. However, P4P needs to adopt a more iterative action research approach, to test and review the assumptions underlying the intervention logic and to change aspects of the design as implementation continues.

In particular, the evaluations identified four unacknowledged assumptions in the global programme design that did not necessarily hold true in all contexts and that merit further testing. These assumptions are that women can be empowered through participation in farmers' organizations (FOs); that grain production has the potential to help lift smallholders, especially women, out of poverty; that markets are inaccessible, inefficient and exploitive for smallholders; and that collective action through FOs is effective in addressing market failures.

Project design was more rigorous for the country-level pilots, especially in Latin America, than at the global level. More attention was devoted to analysing the problems and risks facing smallholders – particularly women – in the value chain and to addressing the underlying assumptions.

Design of AMS, in particular, was based on good analysis of these issues. It recognized that markets in Uganda are not generally exploitive, but are inefficient because of organizational, volume and infrastructure constraints. However, the evaluation found that the intervention did not follow through consistently from the conceptual approach to implementation and M&E. AMS was found to be an innovative project covering an unusually diverse and broad range of activities along the market chain, but it risks becoming a miscellaneous collection of different elements that do not support each other, if decisions continue to be insufficiently supported by M&E evidence.

### • Efficiency

Purchase for Progress is on track to meet its procurement targets. At the time of the evaluation, 160,000 mt of food – nearly all grains and mostly maize – had been contracted. More than three quarters of the food contracted from smallholders has been delivered within time, price and quality specifications, which is an important achievement.

Defaults have not seriously disrupted the provision of food aid to WFP beneficiaries, and steps have been taken to streamline business processes. Nevertheless, default rates were high at the time of the evaluations, at 24 percent for P4P overall and 29 percent in Uganda. Evidence suggests that this was owing to quality issues and side-selling by farmers, which indicates that: i) the meta-assumptions related to market benefits and collective action may not always hold; and ii) WFP prices are not always attractive to farmers, given the extra costs of dealing with WFP compared with traders – quality requirements, protracted price negotiations, late

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<sup>13</sup> Twenty at the time of the evaluations.

payments. The Uganda evaluation found that payment delays could sap confidence in a rising market when, at the time of payment, traders' spot prices are higher than WFP's; the reverse applies in a declining market.

Purchase for Progress adheres to WFP procurement principles, ensuring that P4P purchases compare favourably with the costs of imported and local food. Nonetheless, when the costs of supply-side investments are included, P4P purchases were found to be generally less cost-efficient than regular local purchases. The AMS evaluation found that this appears to be largely a question of low volumes. Cost-efficiency varied greatly among P4P modalities, with evidence that costs are higher when purchasing through weak FOs, lower through strong FOs, and lower still through market institutions such as commodity exchanges and WRS.

#### • Effectiveness: smallholder development

Purchase for Progress has successfully engaged many thousands of smallholder farmers, but it is difficult to demonstrate the projects' effect on smallholders at this point in the pilot. First, farm-gate prices have not been routinely monitored – or even collected – in some pilots. Second, the tracing and counting of beneficiaries selling to WFP through market institutions is problematic. So far, the income benefit to smallholders seems rather muted, but the evaluation questioned the validity of this indicator and noted some positive effects on productivity and FOs' governance.

Purchase for Progress beneficiaries tend to be among the more productive poor smallholders. This finding is congruent with patterns of the green revolution in Africa, which show that this group's assets and social and human capital enable them to respond quicker to development processes.

There had been considerable progress in enrolling women in FOs, and some success in raising women's formal participation in management boards. However, it was found that women are often not responsible for the family's grain cultivation and marketing, and their membership of an FO does not necessarily confer any power within that FO. There was qualitative evidence that women are the beneficiaries of a relatively small proportion of sales. Programme assumptions concerning benefits to women need further testing and targets revising.<sup>14</sup>

#### • Effectiveness: market development

Purchase for Progress is on the cusp between two different approaches to market development: i) direct provision of

subsidized inputs, services and infrastructure; and ii) support for sustainable changes to markets that bring direct and indirect benefits for the poorest.

Nearly two-thirds of P4P procurement has been contracted from FOs. Despite the short implementation timeframe, the evaluations found early signs of success in the development of FOs' capacity, mainly through strengthening their governance. In Uganda, considerable support has been provided to improving FOs' post-harvest grain handling. FOs' capacity development efforts are popular with beneficiaries, although serious questions remain about many FOs' sustainability.

More than a quarter of purchases have been conducted through new market institutions. The P4P evaluation highlighted the importance of commodity exchanges in P4P procurement in Uganda, Zambia, Malawi and Ethiopia, and welcomed the flexibility to purchase from traders.

In Uganda, the AMS project clearly supports development of the WRS, which is regulated by the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UCE). Sellers deposit commodities in a warehouse against a receipt that can be used to obtain credit, and can choose when to sell their produce. Although the UCE/WRS achievements cannot be attributed to AMS support alone, WFP's demand has been a powerful driver. WFP purchases have facilitated market development by expanding the demand for quality grain. However, to be financially sustainable, the WRS must reach a much larger scale, and the evaluation believed that AMS' contribution to Uganda's grain marketing system could be increased by progressively and predictably adopting the WRS for mainstream procurement while monitoring the governance of UCE-licensed warehouses.

The AMS plan, but not the currently available budget, foresees a substantial investment in market infrastructure: collection points, feeder roads and warehousing. There has been insufficient consultation with traders to optimize these investments. Unless volumes can be raised quickly, questions of sustainability arise.

There was evidence that having a guaranteed market improves smallholders' access to commercial credit, as in Kenya and Uganda, but the full potential – particularly of forward selling arrangements – has not always been realized. As well as weaknesses in the formal credit markets, confidence in the virtues and guarantee of forward sales is lacking and needs to be built among both lenders and producers.

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<sup>14</sup> The Institute of Development Studies' gender study, which had not been conducted at the time of the evaluation, should inform these strategic choices.

### • Partnerships

Purchase for Progress involves a network of 250 partner organizations with very variable capacity for and experience of production and marketing. It was found that more evidence could have been placed on technical support, as distinct from implementation partnerships, and to involving the commercial sector. The Rome-based United Nations agencies could make fuller use of the opportunities for working together provided by P4P, which falls at the interface of their mandates. It was also concluded that greater realism is needed about the often very limited support capacity of government institutions.

### • Sustainability

The P4P evaluation welcomed the use of P4P to strengthen commercial marketing capacity beyond WFP’s own procurement needs – given that these fluctuate in some countries, such as in Central America – and its expansion into other forms of support beyond the direct provision of food aid.

Some of the “old style” direct linkages to relatively weak FOs are likely to be less cost efficient and have lower impact and sustainability than would working with more market-based solutions that incentivize local market actors. However, new market institutions require a conducive policy environment and their advantages have yet to be evidenced, so P4P should limit their use to a few pilots.

The evaluations concluded that maintaining a diversity of modalities is essential, to generate evidence on what is the most appropriate entry point for WFP along the value chain from the farm gate to traders and market institutions, based on their respective cost effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Learning from comparative studies that draw on the results of M&E systems would

be very important for this. The evaluations argued that to provide answers to the research questions set by the pilot, the use of M&E resources needs to be rebalanced to increase investments in deeper and more interactive analysis of what works and what does not, collecting less and more focused data.

### Country Portfolio Evaluations

The four evaluations in Haiti, Kenya, Rwanda and Yemen bring to nine the total number of country portfolio evaluations (CPEs) completed since the introduction of this type of evaluation. CPEs are designed to inform the development of country strategies that address the objectives of the WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013. Therefore, they cover all the operations that WFP undertakes in a country over a period of five or six years, and address three principal questions. How well did:


- WFP position itself strategically, and align with government and partners’ strategies?
- WFP make choices, and how strategic were these?
- WFP’s portfolio perform, and what were the results?

All four country portfolios evaluated are in least developed countries and rank low in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index. The countries vary significantly in size of population and WFP portfolio, with Kenya having the largest of both. They have also had different patterns of assistance, with Haiti moving from development assistance to sudden-onset emergency – floods and earthquake; Yemen suffering armed unrest and growing numbers of Somali refugees – the programme moved from 95 percent development in 2006 to 85 percent humanitarian in 2010; and Kenya facing recurrent slow-onset emergencies – droughts.


**Table 3: Main National Indicators**

Haiti	Kenya	Rwanda	Yemen
Total population in millions (United Nations data), 2010			
10.0	40.5	10.6	24.1
Rank in human development index, out of 169 countries, 2010			
145	128	152	133
Population undernourished (FAO), 2006–2008			
57%	33%	32%	30%


**Figure 4: Actual beneficiaries**



**Figure 5: Food distributed (mt)**



**Figure 6: Direct expenses**



• **Alignment and strategic positioning**

**Alignment with WFP’s Strategic Plan.** All the country portfolio interventions were found to be well aligned with WFP’s Strategic Plan 2008–2013. As most funding was available for emergency response and immediate rehabilitation, the evaluations illustrate how Strategic Objectives 2 to 5<sup>15</sup> were addressed mainly within emergency and recovery operations. Country offices demonstrated considerable flexibility and strategic thinking in this, especially for the largest portfolio in Kenya, where only 13 percent of total funding was available for development. However, the Kenya portfolio was large enough to support a country office unit for piloting new initiatives. This unit provides a good example of how to apply WFP’s strategic objectives at the country level in a changing situation. In Kenya, WFP demonstrated how it can work towards longer-term strategic objectives while saving lives during emergency and recovery operations.

In Haiti, however, the evaluation found that there had been inadequate corporate guidance and input for transitioning from emergency to post-emergency and back to emergency, as emergency action and longer-term strategic development need different skill sets at the management level in country. This had disruptive effects on a programme that was at its best when rapidly responding to food assistance and logistics needs in an emergency, which accounted for about half the beneficiaries reached since 2005.

**Alignment and coordination with governments.**

As reported in the 2010 Annual Evaluation Report (AER), overall alignment of WFP programmes with

government objectives and strategies was found to be good. WFP’s role in government-led committees was valuable. In Rwanda, the change from a regional to a national programme to address recent instability in the area improved alignment with national government priorities. Where government policy, planning and implementation capacity was weak, development and humanitarian agencies filled the gaps, while reinforcing the Government’s capacity to take responsibilities. This was also sometimes the case in Haiti, where the evaluation found that WFP dialogue with government and advocacy could have been more proactive.

In Kenya and Rwanda, WFP needs to improve its coordination with decentralized planning and decision-making bodies, reinforcing districts’ capacity to use food security data and to plan and take responsibilities in emergencies and rehabilitation.

Conflicts could arise between WFP’s immediate humanitarian mandate and government priorities. To some extent, this was the case in Yemen, where the Government and some development agencies emphasized development and resilience in emergencies – rather than short-term interventions – as the approach to overcoming food insecurity. The Government and some donors also favoured cash safety nets and asset development, but WFP considered these to be too high-risk at this stage and unlikely to serve beneficiaries, owing to the lack of food in local markets. In Rwanda, WFP’s mobilization of resources for development did not meet targets, which was disappointing given the resources that had been available for emergency and recovery. The policy of spreading WFP’s activities across

<sup>15</sup> Strategic Objectives 2 – Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures; 3 – Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations; 4 – Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition; and 5 – Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase.

the whole country contributed to logistic inefficiencies, but synergies with national programmes facilitated nutrition targeting among thinly spread recipients of school feeding and national HIV-AIDS programmes.

**Alignment and coordination with partners.** As in the 2010 evaluations, coordination with partners was found to be generally good. WFP's leadership in food security, logistics and telecommunications was considered particularly positive. WFP programmes were generally well integrated in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and consolidated appeals, and WFP was a strong player in the United Nations pilot initiative for Delivering as One in Rwanda. However, in Yemen, working-level collaboration with other international agencies was negligible, even when they shared office space. All the evaluations concluded that there is need for substantially more joint work on technical matters in which WFP could benefit from other agencies' expertise.

**WFP programme coherence and implications for the interface with government and international programmes.** Conclusions and recommendations on WFP programme coherence varied. In Haiti, echoing the 2010 evaluations, WFP's own programme was found to need more internal coordination and coherence. The other evaluations emphasized primarily a need for more coherent selection of project sites to improve logistical efficiency. In Kenya and Rwanda, the evaluations focused more on WFP's relations with national programmes than on coherence of the WFP programme or alignment with international partners; the Rwanda evaluation made specific reference to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Plan of Action.

#### • Making strategic choices

**Analysis and planning.** All the evaluations found that WFP's analyses of food security had been very valuable to both programme and operational decision-making, not only for WFP but also for government and other international and national partners.

In situations of limited resources and major need there were difficult trade-offs, such as that between WFP's nutrition objective and educational objectives in school feeding in Kenya; in some cases, food provision provided an incentive for education but did not meet an acute nutrition need. This was also an issue in Rwanda, where support for school feeding greatly exceeded that for more direct nutrition interventions.

The geographic spread and dispersion of WFP activities was mentioned as a factor affecting outputs and outcomes in 2010. The 2011 CPEs raised the logistical implications of this. Hard choices had to be made

regarding isolated communities in Haiti (see paragraph 85); in Kenya and Rwanda, the evaluations concluded that insufficient attention had been given to the logistical implications of planning projects in the WFP portfolio separately and over many small sites.

**Operational choices.** The Haiti evaluation found that the recommendations drawn from food situation analyses were not always optimal, as the most needy communities were often the most inaccessible and thus logistically expensive to reach. Hard choices had been made correctly to meet the needs of as many people at risk as possible.

Also in Haiti, corporate systems and directives were found to have been inadequate for supporting operations such as cash for work in situations where field offices – rather than the country office – conducted day-to-day operations.

All partners in Haiti appreciated the proactive engagement of the WFP-led logistics cluster, but it was observed that WFP could have made more use of opportunities to combine logistics operations with those of other agencies. Combining WFP transport with that of the main national relief agency was concluded to be an example of best practice in Yemen.

**Funding availability.** WFP's greater success in mobilizing funding for emergencies than for development was shown, explicitly or implicitly, to have influenced programming decisions in all four countries. WFP was particularly successful in mobilizing emergency funding from private sector sources in response to the Haiti earthquake, where it accounted for 20 percent of WFP's relief funding.

Pipeline breaks due to funding shortfalls were a problem in all countries, bringing reputational risk to WFP, beneficiaries' loss of confidence in such programmes as school and clinical feeding, and serious nutrition implications. Shortfalls were a particular problem in development interventions, but also became an issue in recurrent slow-onset emergencies, such as in Kenya. Evaluations concluded that part of the solution was tighter targeting to concentrate available resources on the most needy. The Kenya and Haiti evaluations were also positive about the flexible use of reserve funds and the judicious sharing of available funds among projects, to meet needs. In Rwanda it was concluded that multi-year funding would help address this problem, as it had done for school feeding.

**Monitoring and evaluation.** The need to strengthen the assessment of outcomes has become a recurrent finding of CPEs. The situation was found unsatisfactory

in all four countries, although there appeared to be more use of monitoring data for management decisions in Kenya than elsewhere. It was also recognized, for example in Haiti, that improving M&E depends not only on WFP but also on the capacity of its implementing partners. It was noted that some other major agencies operating in Haiti have systems in place that provide better data on outcomes. This could give these agencies a comparative advantage with donors.

Inadequate monitoring of implementation costs was highlighted in Haiti. The WFP accounting system does not yet facilitate identification of the costs of activities that do not include food aid, and management capacity for cost analysis is limited.

### • **Portfolio performance and results**

**Attainment of objectives and impacts.** Poor outcome-level monitoring data made it difficult for the evaluations to assess outcomes, impacts and their sustainability, with the evaluation methodology applied. Nevertheless, a considerable volume of perception and anecdotal data were triangulated, and analytical studies were used, where available.

*Relief.* All the evaluations found that WFP had performed well in emergencies. Emergency interventions in Haiti and Kenya had clearly saved many lives. The Haiti evaluation identified the rapid response to storms and floods in 2008 and the earthquake of 2010 as a major success story. Although it lost staff in the earthquake, WFP delivered an emergency programme 20 times larger than the previous portfolio. The evaluations documented other examples of success:

- In Kenya, early intervention in the slow-onset emergency reduced the development of acute malnutrition.
- WFP led the United Nations negotiations with armed groups in northern Yemen, and demonstrated its impartiality in establishing safe corridors and delivering relief.

*Use of cash, vouchers and food for assets.* Food for assets is a well-established feature of WFP programmes and its use in emergencies has become more widespread. Regarding the extension of this modality to cash and vouchers, evaluations found the following:

- Piloting of cash for assets began in Kenya in 2010, where food- and cash-for-assets programmes were found to be undertaking useful works, although crop production assets were overemphasized in essentially pastoralist areas. Such programmes were found to be less open to political interference than general food

distribution, and could result in better targeting, as those who need the food/cash would choose to work – assuming they were capable of doing so, which would not always be the case for the most needy. Food and cash for assets also accounted for about a quarter of the targeted food distribution programme in Haiti.

- The use of vouchers or smart cards in Kenya was found to be particularly appropriate for pastoralists, as it did not tie them to one place. There was anecdotal evidence that cash and vouchers helped traders to develop their businesses and obtain better access to credit. Beneficiaries appreciated cash and vouchers, but WFP agreed that there could be a return to food provision if food prices in the market were subject to significant inflation. In Yemen, WFP regarded the use of vouchers as premature and markets in emergency-affected areas as underdeveloped.
- In Kenya, it was recorded that although food and cash for assets required far more technical inputs and monitoring than general food distribution, the cost was justified by the results, including the contribution to sustainable agricultural and natural resource management in drought-prone areas. This was echoed in Rwanda, where food for assets in earlier years appeared to have contributed sustainably to erosion control through terracing, and the evaluation team reported that the rehabilitated land was improving livelihoods.

*Nutrition, health and education.* Work in education, mother-and-child health and nutrition, and the needs of those affected by HIV/AIDS and other pandemics are addressed in WFP Strategic Objective 4. School feeding accounted for more than a third of targeted food distribution in Haiti. In Kenya, there was evidence of considerable success in raising attendance rates through school feeding. However, when resource limitations led to the discontinuation of food provision for children affected by emergencies – to combat severe risks of malnutrition – attendance rates dropped back and there was also reputational risk for WFP and the Government.

Supplementary feeding to strengthen HIV/AIDS patients in Kenya and Rwanda was found to have suffered from unclear programmes, dispersion of sites and lack of alignment with other WFP activities, which increased logistic costs. Similar problems of lack of critical mass and dispersion of activities were reported for mother-and-child health and nutrition activities. In Rwanda, there was evidence that supplementary feeding for clinical malnutrition in children and mothers brought benefits, but HIV/AIDS supplementary feeding did not demonstrate success as an incentive for adhering to anti-retroviral treatment.

**Capacity development.** In all four countries, WFP worked with national civil services and, to some extent, partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to establish national capacity for the production, analysis and reporting of food security and nutrition data regarding vulnerable populations. This analysis was increasingly oriented around the principles of food and nutrition security, including the sustainability of availability and access. In Kenya, WFP was crucial in developing capacity for and conducting the first comprehensive urban food security and nutrition baseline survey. In all four countries it was found that national civil services did not yet have the capacity to conduct all assessment work, but assessment results were being used for independent national operational decision-making, especially in Kenya and Rwanda.

WFP was found to be well positioned to influence the national hunger and development agenda in Kenya. WFP played a key role in advocating for and supporting the development of Kenya's national disaster management policy (2009) and a national disaster management plan. WFP's contribution to the national food security strategy was widely acknowledged.

All the evaluations considered that WFP should devote more attention to capacity development, and the Kenya and Rwanda evaluations in particular noted the absence of separate funds for this. More cooperation with other agencies is needed in institutional capacity development, and there is some need for WFP to expand its own technical capacity, particularly in nutrition. The larger size and more continuous funding of the WFP portfolio in Kenya probably facilitated more attention to capacity development and policy input.

**Sustainability.** Where outcomes and their impacts were seen to be sustainable, because the government was gradually taking over WFP's role, results were found to be linked to overall government capacities. These were relatively strong for policy decisions in Kenya and Rwanda, and particularly weak in Haiti following the earthquake, which devastated government departments. There was progress in the hand-over to national authorities of school feeding in Kenya and Rwanda, and of support to mother-and-child health and nutrition in Rwanda. Although government agencies were beginning to manage execution of programmes, they still needed donor support.

The most sustainable results in asset programmes were seen where communities valued the assets created, such as terracing in Rwanda. This emphasizes the need for community involvement in and, perhaps, piloting of asset programmes. However, the Kenya evaluation was critical of the emphasis on assets for cultivation in pastoral areas,

despite the extensive discussions with communities. Cash and vouchers in Kenya could have a systemically sustainable influence on the provision of services by traders and on the use of locally produced protein sources as a substitute for WFP beans.

In contrast, there is no prospect for sustainable refugee operations in Kenya or Yemen, as national legislation does not permit refugees to work or farm. This could also have environmental implications, where refugees forage for fuelwood, etc. but cannot undertake rehabilitation activities.

### Joint Impact Evaluations: Food Assistance in Protracted Refugee Situations

In 2011, OE completed the first in a series of four impact evaluations on the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in protracted refugee situations. Each evaluation will provide evidence for improving operations in the country concerned; together, they will provide an evidence base for developing new strategies. For the first time, OE is conducting impact evaluations jointly, with UNHCR; WFP leads evaluation management and has provided 90 percent of resources, but there is joint decision-making. This series on food assistance complements UNHCR studies on other aspects of protracted refugee situations.

The first evaluation in the series was conducted in Ethiopia, just before the recent crisis in the Horn of Africa. The main findings were that most of the short-term impacts were achieved – saving lives, mitigating hunger, enhancing security and basic protection – as were about half the intermediate outcomes, such as improved nutrition rates among children and lactating women. However, the programmes are not yet producing the longer term effects, desired and in theory intended, of improved livelihood opportunities and asset-building. The evaluation concluded that without large-scale investment in livelihood programming, UNHCR and WFP will simply be perpetuating chronic food insecurity in the hope that refugees are resettled sooner rather than later.

The 2012 AER will give more detail, when the series is complete. Owing to instability in Yemen, where an evaluation was planned for 2011, the evaluation in Rwanda – planned for 2012 – was started in 2011, and UNHCR and WFP agreed to substitute Bangladesh for Yemen. Chad will be the fourth country in the series.

### Operations Evaluations (of Single Operations)<sup>16</sup>

In line with the Board-approved focus on higher-level evaluations, OE conducted only one operation evaluation,

<sup>16</sup> In past years, this section also covered decentralized operation evaluations, managed by country offices or regional bureaux with quality assurance from OE. However, in the Board-approved work plan for 2010–2011, there were insufficient resources to enable OE to provide quality assurance for decentralized evaluations in 2011, so their findings are not included in this report (see Sections Evaluation Activities and Outlook).

of EMOP 200170 in Niger. This was requested by the regional bureau with the express objective of illuminating differences between WFP's response to the crisis in 2010 and its much-criticized response in 2005.

The 2010 EMOP in Niger demonstrated again WFP's ability to respond rapidly and flexibly in emergencies. The response was found to be appropriate and relevant and to have saved lives. However, the operation reached 74 percent of planned beneficiaries, which led to dilution of rations and ration sharing. In the circumstances, the secondary objective of improving nutrition status was overambitious. Overall, WFP made strategic, coherent and targeted choices, such as the decision to do blanket supplementary feeding. The WFP response was well aligned with actions of the Government and other partners, including United Nations agencies. The EMOP was well managed – especially its logistics and procurement – and efficient, with good partners and high staff commitment.

There was room for improvement in targeting, owing to gaps in the M&E framework, and in developing a more coherent approach to cash-based programmes. This did not progress as far as might have been hoped, owing to insufficient expertise and low incentive, with food stocks left in storage.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The evaluations completed in 2011 generate important insights for WFP at this mid point in the Strategic Plan cycle. Clear over-arching lessons related to the Strategic Plan emerge for all of WFP. These cut across the various

types and thematic foci of the evaluations<sup>17</sup> and are outlined in the following paragraphs, with corresponding recommendations. They do not replace the recommendations from individual evaluations, which are often more technical and/or specific to a particular country or activity; rather they complement them.

**Invest more in managing change.** The changes to WFP's ways of working required by the Strategic Plan 2008–2013 are relevant and appropriate but also demanding and complex. Once again, WFP has demonstrated its ability to adapt and respond to emergencies and deliver on Strategic Objective 1.<sup>18</sup> There are also good examples of programmes contributing to the other strategic objectives in emergency contexts. WFP has also provided innovative examples of its ability to adapt programmes to changing contexts in the transition to recovery and/or development – where there is greater focus on these other objectives – but these efforts have been less consistent and more reactive than proactive.

Important work has started in providing policy and programme guidance for expanding WFP's role in specialist areas relevant to achieving the other strategic objectives. However, with multiple stakeholders/actors and decreasing funding in these contexts, WFP must be very conscious of and able to articulate its strengths, added value and comparative advantages. It needs to create a virtuous cycle where well-defined programmes attract partners and funding, are implemented with all the necessary expertise and skill, and deliver results at scale.

**Recommendation 1:** To achieve a virtuous cycle in which well-defined programmes incorporating the new ways of working attract partners and funding, are implemented with all the necessary expertise and skill, and deliver results at scale, more direct management of the changes envisioned in the Strategic Plan is required, along with greater investment in support to the front line, to ensure that the changes succeed. There is need for an internal review of ways of strengthening structures and processes that support change, with particular attention to:

- clarifying/developing conceptual frameworks as WFP increases its role in specialist fields where it is not yet well-established, such as social protection, nutrition, and integrating long- and short-term hunger;
- clarifying WFP's comparative advantage, roles and responsibilities compared with those of other actors, to define parameters and identify appropriate partnerships;
- developing the necessary workforce – expertise and skills – especially for nutrition;
- enabling support systems, such as adaptations to targeting and needs analysis, programme guidance, planning and M&E;
- developing a system that assures more predictable, multi-year funding to support the type of activities undertaken in the food assistance approach.

The approach should be a pragmatic and problem-solving process with broad participation complemented by strong leadership (see "Change Evaluation").

<sup>17</sup> Even when language is drawn from one evaluation, each lesson is underpinned by findings from others.

<sup>18</sup> Strategic Objective 1 – Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.

**Continue enhancing synergies.** Enhancing programme synergies was a recommendation in the 2010 AER. There is still need to further improve coordination with other actors/partners, increase synergies among WFP operations in a country – including among

activities within a programme – and focus programmes more closely; for example, in school feeding, intermittent national coverage is less effective than consistent coverage for the most needy. This is particularly important in times of limited resources.

**Recommendation 2:** To enhance programme synergies, during the planning, approval and implementation of operations and programmes, particular attention should be given to: i) ensuring coherence with other actors in the larger systems that WFP is entering; ii) strengthening vertical linkages between country strategies and operation design and implementation; and iii) finding horizontal synergies among the operations/programmes within a country.

**Follow through on the monitoring and self-evaluation strategy.** M&E systems still do not meet organizational needs. In particular, WFP cannot yet adequately determine outcome-level results and their value added in core areas. This is particularly crucial because: i) it provides evidence for decision-making on how to meet objectives with the growing menu of options

in WFP’s toolbox; ii) once these choices have been made, it enables WFP to check whether it is on track and where adjustment may be needed – in the short and medium terms – in highly dynamic environments; and iii) it provides a base for evidence of whether results are being achieved in the longer term.

**Recommendation 3:** M&E needs are well recognized by senior management and broadly reflected in the monitoring and self-evaluation strategy. WFP must ensure that the strategy is resourced and implemented in ways that support the changes implied by the Strategic Plan, by streamlining M&E systems and developing capacity at the field level, particularly for self assessment and decentralized evaluation (see Recommendation 1).

**Strengthen learning in WFP’s “can-do” culture.** WFP’s can-do culture and highly committed staff are conducive to innovation. All the evaluations conducted in 2011 found evidence of this to a greater or lesser extent. However, even in pilot work – such as country pilots of the new school feeding approach and the P4P initiative,

and work on AMS in Uganda – less attention than expected has been devoted to making strategic choices regarding which data to gather, analyse and document and how to integrate lessons for learning from the results.

**Recommendation 4:** To maximize positive learning from WFP’s positive can-do culture, pilot programmes should devote more attention to:

- deciding what strategic questions need to be answered and focusing data/information collection accordingly;
- analysing and managing this information so that it can feed into transparent decision-making and peer exchange;
- basing policy and operational decisions on careful and balanced appraisal of all the evidence available;
- giving far more attention to analysing costs and cost-effectiveness; and
- adjusting internal procedures to support work in the areas of innovation arising from the Strategic Plan.

# Evaluation at WFP

This chapter provides an overview of the evaluation work carried out compared with the original plans. It also outlines OE's: i) contributions to enhancing learning from evaluations; ii) continuing work to improve the

quality of evaluations, to ensure their credibility and usefulness; iii) participation in evaluation networks; and iv) human and financial resources.

**Table 4: Implementation Status of 2011 World Food Programme**

	Global evaluations*	Country portfolio evaluations	Impact evaluations	Operation evaluations	Total evaluations
<b>Foreseen in WFP Management Plan (2010–2011)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	–	18
Additional requests in 2011	3	–	–	1	4
<b>Total actual 2010–2011 work programme</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>22</b>
Completed during 2010	-	3	2	-	5
Completed during 2011	7	4	4	1	16
<b>Total completed 2010–2011</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>21</b>
Completion rate of 2010–2011 actual work programme	100%	88%	100%	100%	95%
Ongoing from 2012 plan	1	1	2	-	-

\* Global evaluations include strategic and policy evaluations.

## Evaluation Activities in 2011

The first section of this AER noted the two major changes in the evaluation strategy implemented in 2011: i) adding value by creating synergies among evaluations; and ii) shifting from single operation evaluations to higher-level evaluations that cover several countries and/or operations in a single evaluation. These changes were designed to generate independent evaluation insights and evidence to inform strategic decisions at the country, regional and corporate levels, in order to support WFP's transition from a project to a more strategic approach, as envisaged in the Strategic Plan

2008–2013. They also maximize the depth and breadth of evaluation using limited resources.

Although OE is not responsible for ensuring that decentralized operation evaluations managed by country offices or regional bureaux are conducted, figures received by OE from regional bureaux indicate that fewer of these were carried out in 2011. Only three<sup>19</sup> are known to have been completed in 2011, compared with eight in 2010, but others may have been commissioned by country offices and not reported to regional bureaux. This is well below the target of 30 operation evaluations per year, set by the 2008 evaluation policy to ensure a sufficiently

<sup>19</sup> The Plurinational State of Bolivia, India and São Tomé and Príncipe. Figures reported include only evaluations completed – with a finalized report – and not other reviews or surveys.

representative sample from which to draw conclusions for WFP's global portfolio.

**Work programme implementation.** By the end of 2011, OE had completed 95 percent of the evaluation work programme for 2010–2011, including additions made in 2011 to the original programme approved by the Executive Board. This was achieved despite the slow start-up of the 2010–2011 work programme (see 2010 AER), disruptions caused by insecurity in Yemen and Somalia necessitating the rescheduling of evaluations, and departure of the Director of OE in September 2011.

The additional evaluations completed were either commissioned by the Board or requested by WFP management at Headquarters or regional bureaux. Table 4 shows details of the implementation status of the actual work programme at the end of 2011.

**Evaluation and result-based management.** In line with WFP's corporate framework for management results, OE continued to monitor its performance against WFP goals and indicators, developed in 2010. This section of the AER reports on many of these indicators.

### Activities to Enhance Learning from Evaluation

#### **Evaluation consultations with Board members.**

The annual consultation on evaluation is an opportunity for WFP's membership to provide guidance on priorities for evaluation and to discuss the findings of the AER. In 2011, as requested by Board members, the WFP Secretariat organized an informal round-table consultation prior to each Board session, enabling more detailed discussion of the evaluation reports presented formally at the session. This appears to have enriched the interaction between the Board and management concerning issues raised by evaluation reports, and also enabled shorter, more focused discussion of evaluations during formal Board sessions.

**Closing the learning loop.** OE's work in this area has progressed. The aim is to increase access to and use of relevant and timely evidence from evaluations for WFP's policies and operations. This is achieved through: i) information products designed for specific audiences; ii) provision of information and lessons from evaluations to strategic decision making processes; and iii) post-evaluation learning events.

**Regular information products.** Two new "top ten lessons" were prepared: on gender and on safety nets. One evaluation country synthesis was produced, providing lessons from past evaluations relevant to the preparation of a country strategy. Evaluation briefs have been prepared, or are in preparation, for all evaluation reports completed in 2011.

**Input to strategic decision-making processes, both regular and one-off.** In 2011, OE consolidated its inputs to the regular processes of preparing new country strategies and policies. For instance, it is an observer in the Strategy Review Committee, highlighting lessons from evaluations relevant to country strategies, and participates in the Policy Committee. In December, OE provided lessons from evaluations relevant to the one-off corporate Work Force Planning Review and prepared inputs for the Mid-Term Review of the Strategic Plan (in 2012).

More structurally, following the Board's approval of the WFP policy implementation cycle in June 2011, policy evaluations are now planned to feed into the planning, monitoring and evaluation cycle of new and existing policies, and CPEs are already timed to provide evidence for the preparation of WFP country strategies.

**Learning events.** OE presented lessons from the impact evaluations to the consultation on school feeding, organized by the School Feeding Service in March, and to an international technical meeting on home-grown school feeding, organized by the Partnership for Child Development in September. Other events included a lunchtime seminar on partnerships for WFP staff, led by a renowned expert from the evaluation team on this subject. Field-based staff participated by telephone link.

**Website development.** In line with the evaluation policy and good practice, all OE's evaluations are accessible in the evaluation library on WFP's official website. The evaluation site also provides information about OE's objectives and work programme, the types of evaluation WFP undertakes, and the tools it employs. Early in 2011, OE launched a site on WFP's intranet, where a variety of products are available for drawing lessons from evaluations tailored to specific audiences.

### Continuous Evaluation Quality Improvement

**Evaluation process.** In 2011, for the first time, OE organized two learning workshops jointly with major WFP stakeholders, to discuss findings of two evaluations and – at one workshop – recommendations. These went deeper than the regular end-of-evaluation debriefings and comments on draft reports. The workshops enabled the evaluation team to ensure that the messages it wishes to convey are those received, deepen the team's understanding of the dynamics behind their evaluation findings and to refine recommendations. This helped participants to internalize evaluation findings. OE also acted as an information resource during senior management discussions of the management responses to strategic evaluations.

The Office of Evaluation provided inputs to the monitoring and self-evaluation strategy prepared in 2011, and started to update tools for self-evaluation in line with this strategy.

**Office of Evaluation staff skills and knowledge development.** OE maintained its staff groups focusing on the types of evaluation being conducted. In effect, these are communities of practice, which facilitate the informal and formal development of skills and knowledge for all OE professional staff. Topics are selected in response to staff needs and include exchanging practices, developing theories of change in the subjects being evaluated, and designing tools to support the systematic use of both WFP and international standards. A total of 37 person-days – or 1.5 percent of staff working time – were spent in formal training in 2011, including two staff members attending a week of training with the International Programme for Development Evaluation Training. Formal training declined when OE was understaffed in the last quarter of the year. However, from their desks, some staff have attended “webinars” organized by networks of evaluation professionals on technical evaluation topics.

**The Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS).** OE has continued to use EQAS materials, which were made publicly available. Standardized requirements have improved the quality of evaluation reports, and the collaborative process used to develop the materials increased understanding and application of these standards. In 2011, OE expanded its use of external reviewers for those evaluations with especially high levels of stakeholder interest with diverse perspectives. These review panels are separate from the independent consultants who conduct evaluations, and provide an additional dimension for the quality assurance of methodology and/or content.

Work began on developing guidance materials for self-evaluation, in line with the corporate monitoring and self-evaluation strategy. This will continue in 2012.

The Office of Evaluation’s impact evaluations include a firm focus on the perspectives of beneficiaries – the people whose lives WFP seeks to improve lastingly and significantly. This is an important step towards greater accountability to beneficiaries, although OE still has only limited ability to provide beneficiaries with feedback on evaluation findings. OE has been seeking improvements in this area for some time, while recognizing that the most important accountability loop lies in the implementation of operations.

### Cooperation with Evaluation Networks

The Office of Evaluation continued its participation in the inter-agency working group convened by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to improve real-time evaluations. OE also completed its work on the advisory group for the OCHA-led evaluation of the United

Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

The Office of Evaluation continued to be active in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), participating in UNEG’s task forces on impact evaluation and on joint evaluation and the inter-agency working group on joint humanitarian impact evaluations, led by OCHA.

The Office of Evaluation was selected to present its experience of impact evaluation to the 2011 UNEG Evaluation Practice Exchange, and began serving on the organizing committee for the 2012 exchange, to be held in Rome. It attended the annual conference of the Network of Networks for Impact Evaluation, and deepened dialogue with the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation.

### Human and Financial Resources for Evaluation

**Human resources.** Until the departure of the Director at the end of September, OE maintained its full staff complement, and the balance between WFP staff on rotation and externally recruited experts (4:4) foreseen in the evaluation policy. Over the year, the office had a 95 percent occupancy rate for professional staff positions.<sup>20</sup> The overall number of staff did not change, but OE continued to hire junior consultants as evaluation analysts, providing invaluable support to the evaluation teams. The G3 General Service position was upgraded to G5 from 1 January 2012. Table 5 provides details of the staffing situation, and Annex 4 the full list of staff, including junior consultants.

**Table 5: OE Staffing, 2011**


	WFP staff on rotation	Externally recruited evaluation experts	Total
Director (D2)		1	1
Senior Evaluation Officers (P5)	1	2	3
Evaluation Officers (P4)	3	1	4
General Service Staff (G6 and G3)	3		3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>

<sup>20</sup> Calculated as the full staff contingent for the year, minus the number of staff months lost when a position was vacant.

In 2011, OE made extensive use of the five consultancy firms with which it had established long-term agreements (LTAs) in 2010. This method of hiring provided 44 independent evaluation consultants for the teams for 56 percent of the evaluations completed in 2011 (Figure 7); 33 of these consultants constituted new contacts for OE, bringing fresh specialist expertise. Other hiring methods included contracting individuals from an established roster and through advertisement, and using a competitive tender to identify suitable firms for technically specialized evaluations.

In total, OE employed 87 consultants for 16 evaluations and closing the learning loop products in 2011. Ten consultants participated in more than one evaluation. The average team size was five consultants per evaluation: 28 percent of consultants came from developing countries and 72 percent from developed countries, compared with 25 and 75 percent in 2010; while 60 percent were men and 40 percent women, representing a 5 percent increase in women compared with 2010.

**Figure 7: Composition of evaluation teams**




Based on positive experience with LTA firms, OE initiated a new competitive tender in late 2011 to broaden the stable of LTA firms and ensure access to high-quality technical expertise in the specialist areas required for evaluations planned for 2012–2014.

**Financial resources.** The 2010–2011 Management Plan allocated a total of US\$9.6 million to staff and non-staff expenditures for evaluation – US\$1.4 million more than in the 2008–2009 biennium. The US\$2.81 million for non-staff resources in 2011 was for implementing evaluations and related activities, such as the closing the learning loop initiative. The ratio of resources allocated to the Office of Evaluation over total WFP expenditure was 0.14% – still low compared with many other United Nations agencies.

In addition, OE raised US\$186,425 in extra-budgetary income for joint evaluations: US\$50,000 from UNHCR for the series of WFP-UNHCR impact evaluations on the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions in

**Figure 8: Evaluation staff, by type of recruitment**



protracted refugee situations; and US\$136,425 from the Government of the Netherlands for the joint evaluation of the global logistics cluster, which will be reported on in 2012.

## Outlook

WFP is not yet meeting the 2008 evaluation policy commitments regarding the coverage of operation evaluations on a sufficiently timely basis for project-level decision-making. The policy indicates that at least 30 operation evaluations a year be carried out by OE or by decentralized units with OE’s quality assurance. Currently, OE has neither the structure nor the resources to meet this target, and has shifted its focus – with Board approval – to more complex policy, strategic, impact and portfolio evaluations. OE suggests that the policy target on operations evaluations is no longer relevant, given the increasing diversity within WFP’s operations portfolio under the Strategic Plan.

As it is neither possible nor desirable to evaluate everything, during 2012 OE will review evaluation coverage and will work with the Operations Department and others to develop an approach to project-level evaluation that is in line with the new monitoring and self-evaluation strategy, wider approaches to corporate risk management, and OE’s lead role in setting standards and developing capacity for evaluation. Development of the new approach will include exploring opportunities for appropriate extra-budgetary funding and piloting innovative mechanisms.

In the quest for continuous improvement in evaluation quality, OE will review the various needs already identified for updating EQAS: efficiency and value-for-money, attention to gender issues and the environment, and accountability to beneficiaries. Revisions will be planned and introduced systematically.

The Office of Evaluation will continue its proactive role in closing the learning loop, focusing, as before, on feeding evidence into specific decision-making processes at the country, regional and corporate levels. OE will continue to seek synergies among processes and products to maximize learning opportunities, including by producing syntheses of evaluation findings and lessons.

### Haiti (2005–2010)

#### Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distribution

Operation	Title	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
DEV 10217	Country Programme	← 2003	Req: US\$37.0 Contrib: US\$30.9 <sup>1</sup>				
PRRO 10382	Response to Food Insecure Persons in Crisis Situations		Req: US\$43.8 Contrib: US\$32.3				
DEV 10386	Reduction of Vulnerab. through the Implem. of Enviromental Labour Intensive Activ. at the Comm. Level				Req: US\$9.2 Contrib: US\$7.1		
PRRO 10674	Food Assistance for the Relief and Protection of Vulnerable Groups Exposed to Food Insecurity				Req: US\$154.7 Contrib: US\$132.5		
PRRO 10844	Food Assistance for Vulnerable Groups Exposed to Recurrent Shocks						Req: US\$147.7 Contrib: US\$28.5
EMOP 10785	Food Assistance for Flood-Affected Population in Haiti				Req: US\$0.5 Contrib: US\$0.3		→ 2011
EMOP 10781	Food Assistance for Flood-Affected Population in Haiti				Req: US\$31.6 Contrib: US\$22.3		
EMOP 200107	IR EMOP						Req: US\$0.5 Contrib: US\$0.5
EMOP 200110	Food Assistance to Heartquake-Affected Population in Haiti						Req: US\$475.3 Contrib: US\$375.3
SO 10449	Latin America and Carribean Emergency response Network		Req: US\$2.9 - Contrib: US\$2.0				
SO 10779	Air Operation in Response to the Floods in Haiti				Req: US\$8.0 Contrib: US\$7.1		
SO 10780	Logistics Augmentation and Coordination in Support of the Humanitarian Community in Haiti					Req: US\$10.8 Contrib: US\$8.0	
SO 200108	Logistics and Telecom. Augmentation and Coord. for Relief Operations in Response to the Earthquake in Haiti						Req: US\$79.9 Contrib: US\$47.7
SO 200109	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Response to the Victims Affected during Earthquake in Haiti						Req: US\$31.7 Contrib: US\$17.6
Beneficiaries (actual)		1 043 933	718 763	965 021	2 671 324	2 130 597	4 012 907
Food distributed (mt)		25 729	20 118	24 131	50 349	65 835	127 199
Direct expenses Haiti* (USD, millions)		21	15	22	60	73	29
% Direct expenses Haiti vs World		0.7	0.6	0.8	1.7	1.8	1

Source: Last Standardized Project Report (SPR) available, Resource Situation (5 July 2010, for ongoing projects), Annual Performance Report 2010.

<sup>1</sup> Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are millions US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req.).

\* Excludes PSA costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses presented are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 and previous years' values based on UNSAS

#### Legend

Funding level

>75%

Between 50 and 75%

n/a

#### Donors and partners

**Donors:** United States of America, Canada, private donors, Spain, European Commission


**Partners:** Government of Haiti, 73 local and 23 global NGOs

#### Activities by operations

Operations	Education	Nutrition	GFD	FFW FFA/FFT	HIV	CASH
DEV 10217	X	X		X	X	
PRRO 10382		X	X	X	X	
DEV 10386	X			X		
PRRO 10674	X	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 10844	X	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 10785			X			
EMOP 10781	X	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 200107			X			
EMOP 200110			X	X		X

Source: DACOTA (April 2011)

#### Planned beneficiaries by activity



Source: WFP External Relations Department, WFP Government Donor Relations Division.

This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation.

## Kenya (2006–2010)

### Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distribution

Operation	Title	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
DEV 102640	Country Programme	2004		Req: US\$103.0 Contrib: US\$82.2 <sup>1</sup>		2012
DEV 106680					Req: US\$113.1 Contrib: US\$58.4 (July 2010)	
PRRO 102581	Food Assistance for Somali and Sudanese Refugees	Req: US\$75.2 Contrib: \$53.4		Req: US\$129.4 Contrib: US\$103.1		
PRRO 102582						
PRRO 102583					Req: US\$180.6 Contrib: US\$92.0 (July 2010)	2011
PRRO 106660	Protecting and Rebuilding Livelihoods in the Arid and Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya				Req: US\$474.3 Contrib: US\$290.9 (July 2010)	2012
EMOP 103740	Food Assistance to Populations Affected by Drought and 2008 Post-Election Violence	2004		Req: US\$375.9 Contrib: US\$360.3		
EMOP 107450				Req: US\$132.2 Contrib: US\$123.4		
SO 105960	Air Operation in Support of the Flood Emergency		Req: US\$16.6 Contrib: US\$10.4			
P4P	Pilot Purchase For Progress Project					Contrib: US\$1.8 2014
Beneficiaries (actual)		5 046 438	4 201 169	2 546 435	4 141 267	4 819 991
Food distributed (mt)		345 638	241 580	223 116	317 028	306 835
Direct expenses Kenya* (USD, millions)		153	190	162	247	214
% Direct expenses Kenya vs World		11	4.5	3.7	7.3	5

Source: Last Standardized Project Report available. For ongoing projects, Resource Situation as per 5 July 2010.

<sup>1</sup> Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are millions US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req.).

\* Excludes PSA costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses presented are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 and previous years' values based on UNSAS.

#### Legend

##### Funding level

- >75%
- Between 50 and 75%
- n/a

#### Donors and partners

**Top five donors:** United States of America, European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department, United Kingdom, Japan International Cooperation Agency, World Bank.


**Partners:** Government of Kenya, 60 NGOs

#### Activities by operations and beneficiaries proportion by activity

Operations	GFD	Education	Nutrition	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV
DEV 102640	X	X	X	X	X
DEV 106680		X			X
PRRO 102581	X	X	X		
PRRO 102582	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 102583	X	X	X	X	X
PRRO 106660	X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 103740	X	X	X	X	
EMOP 107450	X	X	X	X	
% of planned beneficiaries	61	29	5	3	2
% of actual beneficiaries	60	33	4	2	1

Source: DACOTA (April 2011)

#### Planned beneficiaries by activity



Source: WFP External Relations Department, WFP Government Donor Relations Division.

This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation.

## Rwanda (2006–2010)

### Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distribution

Operation	Title	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
DEV 10156	Country Programme	Req: US\$47.5 Contrib: US\$26.4 <sup>1</sup>				
DEV 10677	Food Assistance Education	2003		Req: US\$41.3 Contrib: US\$37.4		
PRRO (Reg) 100622	Food Aid Relief and Recovery (Great Lakes Region)	Req: US\$33.6 Contrib: \$14.0				2012
PRRO 10531	Assistance to Refugees and Recovery Op. for the Most Vulnerable HHs		Req: US\$54.0 Contrib: US\$35.3			
PRRO 200030	Assistance to Refugees, Recovery Support to Host Communities and the Most Vulnerable HHs					2011 Req: US\$36.6 Contrib: US\$13.6
Beneficiaries (actual)		556 638	509 740	582 215	453 717	529 000
Food distributed (mt)		23 910	26 078	22 332	20 488	18 803
Direct expenses Rwanda* (USD, millions)		23	15	19	22	19
% Direct expenses Rwanda vs World		0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4

Source: Last Standardized Project Report (SPR) available, Resource Situation (5 July 2010, for ongoing projects), Annual Performance Report 2010.

<sup>1</sup> Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are millions US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req).

\* Excludes PSA costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses presented are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 and previous years' values based on UNSAS

#### Legend

##### Funding level

- >75%
- Between 50 and 75%
- Less than 50%
- n/a

#### Donors and partners

**Top five donors:** United States of America, Japan, Private Donors, Saudi Arabia, Italy


**Partners:** Government of Rwanda, 22 NGOs and 16 International Agencies

#### Activities by operations and beneficiaries proportion by activity

Operations	GFD	Nutrition	FFW/FFA/FFT	HIV	Education
DEV 10156				X	X
DEV 10677					X
PRRO (Reg.) 100622	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 10531	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 200030	X	X	X	X	
% of planned beneficiaries	14	7	34	5	40
% of actual beneficiaries	9	9	25	7	50

Source: DACOTA (April 2011)

#### Planned beneficiaries by activity



Source: WFP External Relations Department, WFP Government Donor Relations Division.

This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation.

## Yemen (2005–2010)

### Timeline, funding level, beneficiaries by activity and food distribution

Operation	Title	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
DEV 101370	Country Programme - Yemen (2002-2007)	Req: US\$45.4 Contrib: US\$33.6 <sup>1</sup>					
DEV 104350	Country Programme - Yemen (2007-2011)				Req: US\$80.5 Contrib: US\$20.5		
PRRO 102320	Food Assistance for Refugees		Req: \$3.8 Contrib: \$3.2				
PRRO 102321	Food Assistance for Somali Refugees in Yemen				Req: US\$4.7 Contrib: US\$4.8		
PRRO 200044	Food Assistance for Somali Refugees in Yemen					2011	Req: US\$7.0 Contrib: US\$3.1
EMOP 106750	Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate			Req: US\$0.5 Contrib: US\$0.4			
EMOP 106840	Humanitarian Assistance to IDPs in Sa'ada Governorate				Req: US\$33.8 - Contrib: US\$24.7		
EMOP 107940	Immediate Response Emergency Operation Support to People Affected by Floods				Req: US\$0.5 Contrib: US\$0.4		
EMOP 108060	Food Assistance to Flood-Affected Persons in Eastern Yemen					Req: US\$3.9 Contrib: US\$2.1	
EMOP 107670	Targeted Food Support to Vulnerable Groups Affected by High Food Prices					Req: US\$61.2 Contrib: US\$30.4	
EMOP 200039	Food Assistance to Conflict-Affected Persons in Northern Yemen					2011	Req: US\$47.9 Contrib: US\$27.6
SO 200130	Air Passenger Service and Logistics Cluster Coordination in Support of the Humanitarian Response in Sa'ada					2011	Req: US\$0.9 Contrib: US\$0.4
Beneficiaries (actual)		1 196 060	1 183 681	676 420	715 598	1 576 509	1 998 429
Food distributed (mt)		24 689	19 781	11 410	14 455	46 419	59 979
Direct expenses Yemen* (USD, millions)		8	8	6	13	27	39
% Direct expenses Yemen vs World		0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.7	1

Source: Last Standardized Project Report available, Resource Situation (11 January 2011, for ongoing projects), Annual Performance Report 2010.

<sup>1</sup> Requirements (Req.) and Contributions (Contrib.) are millions US\$. The colours indicate the percentage funded (Contrib./Req.).

\* Excludes PSA costs. 2008 and 2009 expenses presented are according to IPSAS and not comparable to 2007 and previous years' values based on UNSAS

#### Legend

##### Funding level

- >75%
- Between 50 and 75%
- Less than 50%
- n/a

### Donors and partners

**Top five donors:** United States of America, Germany, United Kingdom, United Nations CERF, Italy


**Partners:** Government of Yemen, nine non-governmental organizations and seven International agencies

### Activities by operations and beneficiaries proportion by activity

Operations	Education	Nutrition	GFD	CASH	FFW FFA/FFT HIV	HIV	Nutrition MCH
EMOP 108060			X				
EMOP 107940			X				
EMOP 107670		X	X				X
EMOP 106840		X	X				
EMOP 106750			X				
DEV 104350	X	X				X	X
PRRO 102321	X	X	X		X		X
PRRO 102320	X	X	X		X	X	X
DEV 101370	X	X			X	X	X
EMOP 106750		X	X				
PRRO 200044	X	X	X	X			X
% of planned beneficiaries	13	13	60	0	2	0	11

Source: DACOTA (April 2011)

### Planned beneficiaries by activity



Source: WFP External Relations Department, WFP Government Donor Relations Division.

This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation.

### Bangladesh

#### WFP Operations with School Feeding Component (2001–2009)

Operation	Timeframe	Title	Total approved budget*	Total received*	% funded
EMOP 63170	Feb. 2001–Nov. 2003	Assistance to Flood-Affected People in Southwest Bangladesh	40.1	22.6	56
CP 100590	Jan. 2001–Dec. 2006	Country Programme – Bangladesh 2001–2005	209.9	165.1	79
EMOP 103800	Aug. 2004–Nov. 2005	Assistance to Flood-Affected People in Bangladesh	73.7	32.2	44
EMOP 107150	Nov. 2007–Feb. 2009	Food Assistance to Cyclone-Affected Populations in Southern Bangladesh	78.9	69.1	88
CP 104100	Jan. 2007–Dec. 2011	Country Programme – Bangladesh 2007–2011	378.5	229.0	61
EMOP 107880	Nov. 2008–Jul. 2010	Emergency Safety Net for Vulnerable Groups Affected by High Food Prices and Natural Disasters in Bangladesh	182.1	55.2	30


Sources: Evaluation Report, SPR, Resource Update, Evaluation Report.

\* Million US\$

#### Geographical Coverage of Programmes with School Feeding 2000–2009



#### Proportion of school feeding beneficiaries by programme type




Sources:

Fig.1 (Project document, SPR, Coates J., & Hassan, Z. 2002; Surch. 2007.

Fig.3 (SPPR). Main donors and partners (WFP NGO and Donor Relations Unit).

\*The Evaluation does not cover operations supporting refugees from Myanmar (PRRO 100451/2/3/4). This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation.

#### Children receiving school meals (country programme)



#### Donors, Partners and Cooperating Communities

**Donors:** Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, European Commission, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, CERF, United States of America

**Partners:** United Nations agencies: UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNESCO

**Government of Bangladesh agencies:** Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, Directorate of Primary Education, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture

**NGOs:** local and international

**Stakeholders:** WFP, DPE, MoPME, MoHFW, Donors, NGOs partners, United Nations agencies, School Head Teachers and teachers, School Management Committees, schoolchildren, beneficiaries and non beneficiaries, District and Upazila Education Offices, Biscuit manufacturing companies.


# Côte d'Ivoire

## WFP Operations with School Feeding Component (1999–2009)

Operation	Timeframe	Title	Total approved budget*	% funded
DEV 33582	Oct 1999–Mar 2004	Support to Community Programme	5 610 836	88
EMOP102440	Nov 2002–Jan 2004	Civil Strife in Côte d'Ivoire and Regional Implications	6 894 969	69
Regional EMOP 102441	Jul 2003–Feb 2005	Targeted Food Assistance to People Affected by the Côte d'Ivoire Crisis	43 378 653	81
Regional PRRO 103720	Mar 2005–Jul 2007	Cote d'Ivoire Crisis and Regional Impact	69 630 413	87
PRRO 106720	Aug 2007–Jun 2010	Assistance to Populations Affected by the Côte d'Ivoire Protracted Crisis	78 407 798	60
DEV 107590	Jan 2009–Dec 2013	Support to Sustainable School Feeding	11 617 439	19

\* Million US\$

### Main Activities by Operation



### Distribution of school feeding programmes supported by WFP and the Government in Côte d'Ivoire




#### Main stakeholders

- Schoolchildren and their families
  - Parents and teachers
  - National Directorate and Canteens
- Ministry of Rural Development
- Private non-profit organizations
- United Nations agencies
- WFP

#### Main donors

- France
- Germany
- Japan
- Multilateral
- United Nations CERF
- United States of America

#### School feeding



Sources: Project Document, Standardized Project Reports, Government Donor Relations Division, Evaluation Report.

This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation and adjusted during the evaluation phase.

## The Gambia

### WFP Operations with School Feeding Component (2001–2010)

Operation	Title	Timeframe	Total approved budget*	% funded
DEV 59321	Community-based School Feeding Project in the Gambia	Oct 1999–Dec 2004	10 155 058	79
DEV 103110	Support to Basic Education in Rural Vulnerable Regions	Oct 2004–Jul 2007	8 295 922	76
DEV 105480	Support to Basic Education in Rural Vulnerable Regions	Aug 2007–Jul 2011	13 635 330	46

Source: Project Document and Standardized Project Report

\* Million US\$

### Donors, Partners and Cooperating Communities

#### Donors:

United States of America, Italy, Faroe Islands, private donors.

#### Partners:


- Department of State for Basic and Secondary Education
- International non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Future in our Hands, Christian Children’s Fund/USA, and Catholic Relief Services
- Local NGOs: Gambia Food and Nutrition Association, Action Aid the Gambia, Nova Scotia Gambia Association, National Nutrition Agency

#### Cooperating communities:


Parent teacher associations, village development committees, women farmers’ groups

Source: NGO Unit

### Children Receiving School Meals



### Planned versus Actual Food Distribution (mt)



Sources: Standardized Project Reports, Evaluation Report.

This fact sheet was produced at the time of the evaluation.

## Ethiopia

### Impact Evaluation of the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations

Operation	Title	Timeframe	Total WFP cost	% funded
PRRO 101270	Food Assistance for Refugees in Ethiopia and for Refugee Repatriation	Jul 2002–Dec 2004	41 245 423	61
PRRO 101271	Food Assistance to Somali, Sudanese and Eritrean refugees	Jan 2005–Dec 2006	27 490 764	76
PRRO 101272	Food Assistance to Sudanese, Somali, and Eritrean Refugees	Jan 2007–Dec 2008	42 970 156	61
IR-EMOP 108190	Response to Somali Refugees Influx	Feb–Apr 2009	266 056	51
PRRO 101273	Food Assistance to Sudanese, Somali and Eritrean Refugees	Jan 2009–Dec 2011	94 511 370	49




Source: WFP Standardized Project Report and latest resource situations.

Operations by Activity						
Operations	Supplementary Feeding	Therapeutic Feeding	School Feeding	General Food distribution (GFD)	FFW participants	MCH Feeding
PRRO 101270	X	X	X	X	X	X
PRRO 101271	X	X	X	X		X
PRRO 101272	X	X	X	X		X
PRRO 101273	X	X	X	X		X

Source: WFP Standardized Project Report

#### Proportion of each Activity over the Total of Refugees Assisted (2003-2009)




#### Donors and Partners

**Donors:** United States of America, United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Finland, Canada, France and 17 others.


**Partners:** Administrative for Refugees and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), International Rescue Committee, Danish Refugee Council, Lutheran World Federation, Zuidoost-Azië (ZOA), Refugee Care Netherlands, OASIS, Ethiopian Orthodox Church/Development and Inter-Church Aid Commission, Hope for the Horn

#### Planned vs Actual Number of Beneficiaries, by Year



Source: Standardized Project Report, Evaluation Report. IR-EMOP 108190 figures are not included.

#### Refugee Statistics (September 2010)



Source: ARRA

## Niger

## EMOP 200170 operation figures

Operation name	Saving Lives and Improving Nutrition in Niger		
Operation number	200170		
<b>Important dates</b>			
Expected start date	1 August 2010		
Approval	19 July 2010		
Actual start date	1 August 2010		
Current close date	30 June 2011		
Dates covered in evaluation	1 August–31 December 2010		
<b>Number of revisions</b>	1 = BR1: changes in timeframe (+6 months), activity (CFW/cash transfer) and budget (+US\$65 million)		
<b>Purpose</b>	Saving lives and improving nutrition in Niger		
<b>Objectives (prior to BR1)</b>	1 – Reduce the level of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age 2 – Improve food consumption during the period of assistance for targeted households and households affected by the crisis 3 – Improve food consumption among targeted households in Ouallam (pilot area) through cash transfers		
<b>Overall characteristics</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Tonnage</b>	<b>US\$</b>
Initial figures approved	7 886 655	212 518 mt	213 405 202
Figures at time of evaluation (BR1)	10 246 420	265 591 mt	278 155 393
<b>Activities (prior to BR1)</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Tonnage</b>	<b>US\$</b>
Blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) 6–23 months of age	924 982	29 732	n/a
Protection rations (household)	6 474 876	153 841	n/a
Supplementary feeding (children 6–59 months of age)	455 625	6 687	n/a
Supplementary feeding (pregnant and nursing women)	105 000	4 331	n/a
Caregiver rations	27 630	439	n/a
Targeted general* food distribution	1 000 000	17 489	n/a
Cash for work (CFW)	38 500	0	500 000
<b>Principal partners</b>			
Government	DNP-GCA and 7 CRPGCA, CCA, CIC, SAP, INS, DN		
NGOs	Plan, Care, Caritas, MSF (B, CH, F), CRS, ACH, HKI, IRD, IRS, Oxfam, WVI		
Bilateral	FEWS		
Multilateral	UNICEF, FAO, WHO, CILSS		
Principal donors	USA, EU, UN CERF, UK, Norway, Spain, Canada, France		
<b>Other WFP operations in progress</b>	PRRO 106110, CP/DEV 106140, SO 107340, SO 200124		

# Annex IV

## **Office of Evaluation Staff (as of 31 December 2011)**

Ms Caroline HEIDER, Director (to 30 September 2011)

Ms Sally BURROWS, Senior Evaluation Officer and Officer-in-Charge (from 1 October 2011)

Ms Marian READ, Senior Evaluation Officer

Ms Jamie WATTS, Senior Evaluation Office

Ms Claire CONAN, Evaluation Officer (on special leave without pay from 14 November 2011)

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Ms Diane PRIOUX DE BAUDIMONT, Evaluation Officer

Mr Ross SMITH, Evaluation Officer

Ms Cinzia CRUCIANI, Evaluation Analyst

Mr Jan MICHELS, Consultant (from 26 October 2011)

Ms Stefania SPOTO, Evaluation Analyst (from 2 November 2010 to 30 April 2011)

Ms Federica ZELADA, Evaluation Analyst

Ms Rosa NETTI, Programme Assistant

Ms Eliana ZUPPINI, Senior Staff Assistant

Ms Jane DONOHOE, Administrative Clerk (to 7 November 2011)

# Acronyms

ACH	<i>Acción contra el Hambre (Action Against Hunger)</i>
AER	Annual Evaluation Report
AMS	Agriculture and Market Support
ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (Ethiopia)
BR	Budget Revision
CCA	<i>Cellule crises alimentaires (Niger)</i>
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CFW	cash for work
CIC	<i>Centre d'information et de communication (Niger)</i>
CILSS	Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
CRPGCA	<i>Comité régional de prévention et de la gestion de la crise alimentaire (Niger)</i>
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DN	Direction nationale
DNC	<i>Direction nationale des cantines (National Directorate of Canteens)</i> (Côte d'Ivoire)
DNPGCA	<i>Dispositif national de prevention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (Niger)</i>
DPE	Directorate of Primary Education (Bangladesh)
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS	famine early warning system
FFA	food for assets
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
FO	farmer organization

GFD	general food distribution
HH	household
HKI	Helen Keller International
INS	<i>Institut national de la statistique</i> (Niger)
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
IRD	International Relief and Development
IR-EMOP	immediate response emergency operation
IRS	Islamic Relief Suisse
LTA	long-term agreement
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCH	mother-and-child health
MoHFW	Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Bangladesh)
MoPME	Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (Bangladesh)
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSF	<i>Médecins sans frontières</i>
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PSA	Programme Support and Administrative (budget)
SAP	<i>systeme d'alerte precoce</i>
SF	school feeding
SO	special operation
SPR	Standardized Project Report
UCE	Uganda Commodity Exchange
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSAS	United Nations system accounting standards
WHO	World Health Organization
WRS	warehouse receipt system
WVI	World Vision International





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