

# COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

Burundi: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011- 2015)

## Evaluation Report

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## **Disclaimer**

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
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## Fact Sheet: WFP Burundi Country Portfolio Summary (2011- 2015)

Operation	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	External events 			Flooding February 2014	Political unrest April 2015
CP 200119 - Country Programme (2011 - 2016)	Req: 105,366,484		Rec: 52,271,399	Funded: 50% (as of Dec. 2015)	
PRRO 200655 - Assistance for Refugees and Vulnerable Food-Insecure Populations (2014 - 2016)				Req: 69,753,058 Rec: 29,391,288 Funded: 42% (as of Dec. 2015)	
IR-EMOP 200678 - Emergency assistance to victims of flooding (Feb. - May 2014)				Req: 1,361,213 Rec: 687,101 Funded: 50%	
PRRO 200164 - Assistance to refugees, returnees and vulnerable food-insecure populations (2011 - 2014)	Req: 98,480,619		Rec: 63,840,369	Funded: 65%	

**LEGEND**

**Funding Level**


- Between 50 and 75%
- Less than 50%

### Distribution of Portfolio Activities, Modalities and WFP Corporate Strategic Objectives (SOs)

Operation	HIV/ AIDS	School feeding	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/ FFA	Cash/ Vouchers	WFP Strategic Plan SOs 2008-13 and 2014-2017
CP 200119	X	X	X		X	X	2, 3, 4, 5
PRRO 200655		X	X	X	X	X	1, 2, 3, 4
IR-EMOP 200678			X	X			1
PRRO 200164		X	X	X	X	X	1, 2, 3, 4
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>	<b>0,8%</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>12%</b>	

Source: WFP Dacota as of Dec. 2015


### Top 5 donors for WFP's Portfolio in Burundi (2011-2015)



Top 5 Donors to the Portfolio	
Overall	USA, Burundi, Canada, Netherlands, European Commission
CP 200119	Multilateral, Netherlands, Burundi, Canada, Germany
PRRO 200655	USA, Multilateral, European Commission, UN CERF, Norway
IR-EMOP 200678	-
PRRO 200164	USA, Multilateral, European Commission, UN CERF, Canada

Source: Resource Situation as of December 2015

**Map: Burundi Country Office, Geographic Coverage & Activities (2015)**



## Executive Summary

### Introduction

#### *Evaluation features*

1. Selected as part of the ongoing cycle of country portfolio evaluations (CPEs) managed by the Office of Evaluation (OEV), this CPE covered WFP's portfolio of operations in Burundi from 2011 to 2015, and the 2011–2014 country strategy (CS). Conducted by an independent evaluation team, the CPE assessed WFP's alignment and strategic positioning; the factors and quality of its strategic decision-making; and the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole. After extensive document review, fieldwork took place in April 2016, including interviews with 350 stakeholders from WFP, national authorities, donors, partners and beneficiaries. In addition, 38 schools, health centres, refugee camps and social institutions were visited. There has been no previous evaluation of WFP's portfolio in Burundi.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Context*

2. Burundi is a low-income, land-locked country with per capita gross national income of USD 758.<sup>2</sup> Agriculture is the backbone of the economy, accounting for 90 percent of the population's income.<sup>3</sup> Internal conflict, political uncertainty and weak institutional foundations have constrained economic development. The 2015 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranked Burundi 184th of 188 countries. Estimated at 11 million, the population has been growing by 3.51 percent a year, and population density is the second highest in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>4</sup> Gender inequality is a major contributing factor to food insecurity; Burundi was classified 109th of 155 countries in the Gender Inequality Index.<sup>5</sup> With the highest levels of hunger in sub-Saharan Africa,<sup>6</sup> approximately 3 million – 32 percent – of Burundi's population were food-insecure in 2014, with an additional 4 million experiencing marginal or limited food security.<sup>7</sup> Malnutrition is a major problem, with very high stunting prevalence of 58 percent and an underweight rate of 29 percent.<sup>8</sup>

3. During the evaluation period, the Government pursued assertive development-oriented policies shaped by its Vision 2025 and two successive poverty reduction strategy papers comprising the three pillars of good governance, economic development and access to basic services. Although heavily dependent on international assistance from very few donors, Burundi recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 4 percent until early 2015. Since then, the contested presidential election has triggered civil unrest, economic stagnation and an outflow of a quarter of a million Burundians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries amid reported widespread human rights violations.<sup>9</sup> Major donors have suspended direct financial support to the Government. Burundi now stands at a cross-roads of uncertainty regarding whether long-term development will resume or instability deteriorate further.

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<sup>4</sup>The previous protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) and the current country programme (CP) were reviewed in a country-led mid-term review in 2013.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BDI>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/burundi/burundi-economic-outlook/> - 2014.

<sup>4</sup> <http://countrymeters.info/en/Burundi>

<sup>5</sup> UNDP. 2015. *Human Development Report 2015*.

<sup>6</sup> International Food Policy Research Institute. 2014. *Global Hunger Index 2014*.

<sup>7</sup> WFP. 2014. *Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis 2014*.

<sup>8</sup> The World Health Organization (WHO) threshold for "very high/alarmed" stunting is 40 percent. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 2014. *The State of the World's Children 2015*, p. 42.

<sup>9</sup> See full evaluation report, page 8, paragraph 23.

## WFP country strategy and portfolio

4. Building on 48 years of WFP presence in Burundi, the 2011 CS articulated WFP’s role as a supporting partner to the Government in facilitating Burundi’s move towards lasting peace and sustainable improvement of nutrition and food security. Reflecting the optimistic development vision that prevailed in the Government and among partners in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), WFP’s CS identified three priorities: i) food and nutrition security;<sup>10</sup> ii) capacity development of government institutions; and iii) humanitarian response action. As illustrated in Figure 1, WFP implemented a portfolio comprising a CP (2011–2016), PRRO 200164 and PRRO 200665, ending in 2016, and the short-term immediate-response emergency operation (IR-EMOP) 200678.

5. While the CP aimed to support the Government’s development and new education policy, the PRROs were launched to enable the transition from emergency support to recovery and reflected WFP’s shift from food aid to food assistance. The CP and PRROs continued to provide the operational framework for WFP’s assistance even after the context declined from April 2015.

**Figure 1: WFP Burundi country portfolio summary, 2011–2015**

Operation	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	External events →			Flooding February 2014	Political unrest April 2015
CP 200119 - Country Programme (2011 - 2016)	Req: 105,366,484		Rec: 52,271,399	<b>Funded: 50% (as of Dec. 2015)</b>	
PRRO 200655 - Assistance for Refugees and Vulnerable Food-Insecure Populations (2014 - 2016)	LEGEND				
	Funding Level				
	Between 50 and 75%				Req: 69,753,058 Rec: 29,391,288 <b>Funded: 42% (as of Dec. 2015)</b>
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Sources: Standard Project Reports (SPRs) 2011–2015; Resource Situation Updates for December 2015 for CP 200119 and PRRO 200655.

Req = requirements; Rec = contributions received. Figures in US dollars.

## Evaluation Findings

### Alignment and strategic positioning

6. The themes of the CS and the corresponding portfolio were relevant to the identified needs of the population and aligned with WFP corporate policy objectives and

<sup>10</sup> The objectives of the CS were to: i) address chronic hunger and undernutrition among children, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable groups; ii) address hunger in school-age children and support their education; and iii) reduce vulnerability to acute undernutrition and rebuild food and nutrition security in households and communities affected by shocks, through community recovery and development.

government priorities. The first CS (2011–2014) in Burundi, which WFP saw as a “challenge for innovation”, reflected optimistic perspectives towards development, taking into account WFP’s comparative advantages. The evaluation found widespread appreciation among stakeholders for WFP’s expertise in food assistance, policy support, flexibility and transparency. The country office was renowned for its capacity to act as a catalyst in innovative endeavours, and maintained excellent relations with stakeholders including ministries, United Nations partners, donors and non-governmental organizations, at all levels, reinforced by its extensive field presence.

7. The CS was coherent with the priorities of a wide range of United Nations partners and donors. WFP actively participated in UNDAF processes, which were reported as being transparent and harmonized with national development priorities, such as poverty reduction strategy papers. Considering the recurrent climatic shocks and the fragile wider context for food security, the country office should be commended for insisting on including an emergency response component in the CS and the UNDAF despite the optimistic spirit at the time of their design. The country office also identified activities where synergies with partner United Nations agencies were expected.

### ***Factors and quality of strategic decision-making***

8. The decision-making process for formulation of the CS was well documented, mitigating the limited “institutional memory” within the country office that resulted from staff turnover over the CS period. Strategic decision-making was both policy-led and practical. The main factors influencing it were: i) WFP’s mandate; ii) the national context and policies; iii) WFP’s strategic shift from food aid to food assistance; and iv) the availability of funding.


9. The country office analysed the political, security and socio-economic context thoroughly, based on its own expertise, comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis from 2008, internal studies<sup>11</sup> and external analyses from partners including UNDP and the World Bank. Lessons learned, comparative advantages and challenges were also appropriately analysed. To the extent that lessons from other countries could be applied in Burundi, Brazil and Côte d’Ivoire were considered as references for school feeding, and Kenya for Purchase for Progress (P4P).

10. In 2011–2012, operational design and activities were geographically and conceptually separate, as programming did not integrate portfolio activities to achieve catalytic effects (Figure 2). In 2013, the country office introduced significant revisions including in: i) CP 200119, to integrate school feeding with P4P and home-grown school feeding in three northwestern provinces, and to introduce the use of vouchers in refugee camps; ii) PRRO 200164, was revised to synchronize supplementary feeding, school feeding and food assistance for assets (FFA) with the 18-month reintegration plan for returnees from the United Republic of Tanzania, as requested by the Government; and iii) PRRO 200655, revision when the 2015 emergency food security assessment triggered an increase in targeted food assistance.

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<sup>11</sup> These included analysis of hunger and nutrition in Burundi; the framework for WFP’s national partnerships; a cash and voucher study on market and trader information; the country office’s nutrition strategy for 2011–2014; the mid-term review of PRRO 10528; and a draft resource strategy.

Figure 2: Geographical coverage and activities of the Burundi country office, 2015



11. The evaluation found no evidence of internal duplications of geographical targeting, but gaps remained in coordination and coherence among activities. First, there was a lack of synergy between support to the national disaster risk reduction (DRR) platform in setting up a countrywide strategic approach to natural disaster mitigation and response, and the FFA anti-erosion activities implemented in eastern provinces, which were more affected by climate change-related shocks than western and southern provinces. Second, given the need for stronger coordination between the CP and PRROs, school feeding selection criteria were not sufficiently and coherently applied. Third, resource and capacity constraints led to inconsistent and thinly scattered implementation of activities.

## Portfolio performance and results

### Targeting

12. Based on a transparent community participatory approach, beneficiary targeting criteria were well defined for all groups. Criteria were relevant<sup>12</sup> and suitably flexible for potentially large-scale coverage of beneficiaries, such as returnees. Targeting also relied on guidance from specialized partners, including WHO and the Ministry of Education for school feeding and nutrition activities. However, the targeting of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) treatment did not correspond fully to international guidance<sup>13</sup> and was influenced by government requests to bridge the time needed to roll out the National Integrated Nutrition Programme. Overall, because of funding shortfalls and the low implementation capacity of partners, some activities were sparsely dispersed across geographical areas. Targeting of some schools under the CP was unclear.

13. Table 1 shows total planned and actual beneficiaries for the portfolio in the evaluation period. Of an aggregate planned target of 4.3 million people, WFP provided food assistance to 3.6 million in northern, northeastern and southern parts of Burundi. Of the total required budget of USD 287 million, only USD 175.4 million was received.

**Table 1: Total planned and actual beneficiaries of the Burundi portfolio, 2011–2015**

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual vs. planned
2011	628 650	702 041	112%
2012	674 330	629 076	93%
2013	835 800	647 213	77%
2014	1 022 084	865 308	85%
2015	1 105 559	791 134	72%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4266 423</b>	<b>3634 772</b>	<b>85%</b>

Sources: SPRs 2011–2015.


14. In response to the combined effects of increasing food needs and funding shortfalls, the country office adjusted initial targets, some of which were overestimates,<sup>14</sup> and reduced the duration and quantities of some food ration deliveries, to less than 2 100 kcal per day. The negative impact on beneficiary coverage was mitigated by introduction of home-grown school feeding and P4P.

<sup>12</sup> Based on school enrolment rates, stunting rates and levels of food insecurity, poverty, vulnerability and global acute malnutrition.

<sup>13</sup> MAM treatment should commence when the global acute malnutrition (wasting) rate exceeds 10 percent, or 8 percent with aggravating conditions such as displacement, civil unrest, disease outbreak or other destabilizing factors. Stunting prevention is recommended in any situation where stunting rates exceed 30 percent. As noted in paragraph 2, the stunting rate in Burundi was 58 percent.

<sup>14</sup> 2014 SPR for PRRO 200164. The target for supplementary feeding of pregnant and lactating women was not achieved because planning targets were overestimates. As no recent data were available during development of the PRRO, beneficiary needs were estimated based on the 2010 Health and Demographic Survey, which reported MAM prevalence of 16 percent versus the 3.5 percent assessed by the February 2014 Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey.

**Figure 3: Percentages of beneficiaries reached against targets, by activity, 2011–2015**



Sources: SPRs 2011–2015.

FFT = food assistance for training; FFW = food assistance for work; GFA = general food assistance; TB = tuberculosis. *A. Food and nutrition security*

15. As Figure 3 shows, in 2011 and 2012, the country office effectively met or exceeded planned targets in school feeding, GFA, FFA and HIV/TB, with fluctuating performance in nutrition. However, in later years, its ability to meet planned targets declined.

16. *School feeding* activities met 98 percent of planned targets and provided children with daily hot meals for 9.5 months of each school year, although this was reduced to 6 months during funding shortfalls. Performance was stable. Under the CP, the number of children provided with school meals increased from 186,869 in 2012, to 315,823 in 2013 and 440,427 in 2014, mostly due to the linkage of home-grown school feeding to P4P. WFP introduced fuel-efficient stoves in more than 140 schools.

17. Aimed at addressing hunger in school-aged children and supporting their education, WFP school feeding included four outcome targets for assisted schools: i) 6 percent increase in enrolment rates in 80 percent of assisted schools; ii) attendance rates reaching at least 90 percent; iii) gender parity; and iv) drop-out rates of no more than 3 percent. The evaluation found that the programme contributed to increased enrolment and attendance in assisted schools, with lower drop-outs and gender parity. Statistics from the Ministry of Education indicated better completion rates in provinces where WFP was active, but the specific contribution of school feeding could not be attributed. It was not possible to verify whether increased enrolment rates were a result of pull factors drawing children from nearby schools where there were no canteens, as there were no data on this effect. In addition, the large increase in class size, from 50 to 80 children, was bound to affect education quality – a crucial factor for Burundi’s peace and long-term development.

18. *Nutrition*: The objective of nutrition activities was to improve nutritional outcomes for children under 5 years of age and pregnant and lactating women in five of the most

vulnerable target provinces. The programme approach included: i) MAM treatment; ii) MAM prevention; and iii) stunting prevention through blanket feeding for 12,700 vulnerable children aged 6–23 months. WFP provided nutrition assistance to 412,761 children and pregnant and lactating women – meeting 71 percent of the planned target; and to 10,231 people living with HIV on anti-retroviral therapy – 35 percent. It also provided training in stunting prevention to 33 health promotion technicians and 1,582 community health workers. Performance in meeting coverage targets fluctuated (Figure 3).

19. The food security outcomes monitoring of November 2014 showed that the proportion of children consuming an acceptable diet increased by 100 percent after five months of food distribution. However, in 2011–2014, monitoring activities were often lacking in quality and quantity. The effectiveness of MAM activities during this period could not be determined because relevant outcome data were not available. As shown in Table 2, benchmarks for performance indicators became visible only in 2015, after WFP increased its efforts to monitor interventions.

**Table 2: Performance indicators for MAM treatment, 2015**

Indicator	Benchmark	Performance in 2015
Cure rate	> 75%	90.0%
Non-respondent	< 10%	5.0%
Abandoned	< 15%	5.0%
Died	< 3%	0.4%
Transferred	< 10%	4.4%

Source: Country office programme data.

20. With the reinforced presence of WFP field monitors mitigating serious staffing shortages in health centres, MAM treatment followed the national protocol in 2015. However, food rations were reported as being frequently shared among all family members, or sold, and treatment was not systematically combined with nutrition education and gender empowerment, thus making it a short-term solution.

21. Funding shortages constrained systematic and consistent application of the first 1,000 days window of opportunity for enhancing nutrition outcomes among young children, and food packages varied. As piloting of the stunting prevention activity started only in 2015, it was too early to assess evidence of the effectiveness of the blanket feeding approach in preventing stunting. In addition, the limited operational presence of UN-Women and the United Nations Population Fund was not conducive to synergies, for example with the One UN initiative among WFP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and WHO.

22. *GFA/cash-based transfers (CBTs)*: Overall, GFA was provided to 953,376 internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and vulnerable households, of whom 165,288 benefited from CBTs. However, performance by year was erratic, as shown in Figure 3. WFP supported the implementation of a national social protection programme, contributing its experience in vulnerability assessment, targeting and CBTs. The growing

consequences of current crises and the increasing need for safety nets for the most vulnerable people resulted in the need to locate WFP's GFA within the national social protection framework. The country office was flexible in using different transfer modalities, but stakeholders' opinions regarding the appropriateness of these food assistance transfer modalities varied. Beneficiaries reported improvements in the quality of feedback and complaints mechanisms using smartphones for quick reporting and feedback regarding voucher transfers. Post-distribution monitoring in 2015 showed that the introduction of CBTs in refugee camps provided refugees with access to fresh food and diversified diet.

23. *P4P* activities were introduced in 2013 and aimed to connect smallholder farmers to markets, reduce post-harvest losses, and transform food assistance into a productive investment in local communities. Focusing largely on local food purchase of 20,032 mt, P4P supported almost 14,000 farmers in cooperatives. Review of programme records shows that P4P has generated a significant amount of cash in the local economy, valued at USD 4.75 million. However, from available data, it was not possible to identify who had benefited, and gender-disaggregated data on income changes were not available. WFP provided training in market access and post-harvest equipment to improve food warehouse management in the 39 cooperatives supported by P4P, enabling them to meet adequate post-harvest handling and quality standards.

24. *Community recovery and development*: With the objective of restoring, building and enhancing community resilience to shocks, WFP supported 242,029 participants in FFA activities such as construction of feeder roads and erosion protection – considered highly relevant in Burundi. Performance was stable but activities reached only a relatively low 71 percent of planned coverage. Monitoring data indicated that FFA projects in the context of the WFP/International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) anti-erosion programme (*Programme de Développement des Filières – PRODEFI*) were effective in improving children's nutrition in targeted communities, when combined with other – non-FFA – activities delivered in synergy with those of other partners. Community asset scores were not measured consistently, but indicated an improvement from 58 to 63 percent – the target was 80 percent.<sup>15</sup> A final evaluation<sup>16</sup> in June 2015 showed that the proportion of people with poor food consumption scores had decreased by 7 percent and the adoption of harmful coping strategies by 5 percent. However, activities did not achieve a truly holistic resilience approach, which would have included sensitization on gender-based violence and fuel efficiency, for example.

### *B. Capacity development*

25. *Capacity development* activities aimed to develop government capacities to formulate and implement national food security strategies. WFP contributed to Burundi's first Forum on Nutrition and Food Security in 2011, and to policy formulation for food fortification, school feeding, community development, gender and the DRR platform. Capacity development was implemented as a cross-cutting intervention, consistent with the Strategic Plan 2014–2017. Support from the country office was relatively small in scale and insufficiently frequent. No programme officer was assigned to this important CS priority. Stakeholders assessed results in provincial DRR platforms as moderately effective, while institutional capacities remained weak.

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<sup>15</sup> SPR PRRO 200655.

<sup>16</sup> Commissioned by the country office.

### *C. Humanitarian emergency response*

26. The objective of this CS priority was to save lives and address acute undernutrition among refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in four camps, returnees, IDPs and vulnerable households whose food and nutrition security was affected by disasters. In 2014, the country office effectively delivered 418 mt of food assistance to 22,160 IDPs affected by flooding, through IR-EMOP 200678. However, the response did not ensure linkages with recovery and sustainability activities. The country office diligently applied its logistical capacity for humanitarian response as a strong comparative advantage.

#### *Efficiency*

27. The CS described the timeliness of WFP response as a challenge. The evaluation assessed that despite some operational delays in food dispatches and delivery, overall, WFP's delivery of assistance was timely. However, there were trade-offs between increasing beneficiary coverage and reducing the quantities of food distributed and the duration of distributions. Despite prior consultation with refugees on the timing of food distributions, women members of refugee committees reported delays at the beginning of the month, which contributed to growing debts for some households, a concern that was also expressed by cooperating partners. Under P4P, late collection of crops entailed additional storage costs for participating farmers. The country office's analysis comparing local purchases with imported food concluded that local purchases were relatively cost-efficient, reflecting Burundi's geography and infrastructure.

#### *Gender*

28. The country office considered gender issues as cross-cutting, but the CS did not explicitly elaborate these issues. Analysis of gender in food security issues was limited, even though pressure on land has been putting women at risk of destitution, and gender-based violence is a critical issue in Burundi. WFP collaborated with the Ministry of Solidarity as a strategic partner in enhancing gender and protection commitments. During 2012–2015, women covered 50 percent of positions in food management committees, increasing their influence in the management of GFA. WFP adopted a more holistic approach to gender in the most recent PRRO 200655, both in its contextual descriptions of women living on marginal lands, women's lower education levels and gender roles in nutrition and FFA activities, and in its programme priorities, supported by gender-disaggregated data.

#### *Partnerships*

29. The CS and portfolio design considered several categories of partners. Some of the envisaged synergies materialized only partially at the operational level. On the positive side, WFP implemented FFA activities in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, IFAD and World Vision, and the school feeding programme in partnership with the Government's Ministry of Education and Welthungerhilfe. However, stronger synergies and coordination were needed with other United Nations partners, including in nutrition, and with UNICEF in school feeding, especially concerning quality of education.

#### *Humanitarian principles and protection*

30. WFP policy requires supporting the protection of crisis-affected people, recognizing that food-insecure and vulnerable populations are most at risk of human rights violations. Country office interventions were consistent with humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence – although close cooperation with government ministries, and the challenging political context since the April 2015 crisis could have threatened the

application of these principles. The country office also followed the wider principle of humanity in alleviating human suffering, and the do-no-harm approach. Indirectly, the country office used social protection to adhere to the protection policy by providing basic material needs and advocating with in-county stakeholders on behalf of beneficiaries, including young destitute children at risk of sexual and gender-based violence.

### *Sustainability and connectedness*

31. The sustainability of portfolio results was constrained by weak national institutional capacities, exacerbated by high turnover among government staff, the chronically challenging context, and funding shortfalls. The evaluation did not find evidence of sustainable results except, potentially, in P4P, when combined with endogenous school feeding. The hand-over of vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) and logistics to national ministries envisaged in the CS did not materialize. The country office formally communicated with relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Education, when WFP assistance ceased. However, gaps in communication between counterparts and ultimate beneficiaries in the field meant that beneficiaries experienced sudden cessation of interventions because of funding shortfalls, undermining effective exit strategies.

## **Conclusions**

### **Overall Assessment**

32. WFP's first CS in Burundi added value to its positioning and alignment, making optimal differences in Burundi compared with the project-based approaches prior to 2010. The CS was relevant in reflecting the strategic shift towards long-term development in Burundi. It was realistic and far-sighted in its insistence on maintaining an emergency component. Until April 2015, Burundi relied heavily on a few donors, partly because of the envisaged long-term development trend and improved stability.

33. The political instability of April 2015 is threatening the humanitarian situation of most Burundians; if this issue is not resolved soon, there is an evident risk of reversing the initial gains of economic growth. While desiring a return to stable political dynamics, the country is facing crucial and inter-related contextual challenges in balancing the need for resumption of long-term development processes with preparedness for possible further emergencies.<sup>17</sup> The CS correctly identified the structural development issues that are still relevant, although lasting solutions will require increased synergies among all concerned stakeholders and resolute national political guidance.

34. At a strategic level, stakeholders perceive WFP's country office in Burundi as a leading and influential partner diligently applying its comparative advantages in GFA, VAM, disaster response, logistics and the introduction of innovative approaches such as P4P. Several national policies and strategies were successfully developed with the assistance of WFP. Learning from experience, the country office implemented its support for capacity development as a cross-cutting intervention. Overall, WFP's delivery of food assistance was relevant, effective and timely. The country office was largely effective in meeting beneficiary targets in 2011–2012. In later years, with the exception of those for school feeding, GFA and WFP's response to the 2014 flooding emergency, the country office achieved high beneficiary coverage targets in spite of funding shortfalls. However, there were trade-offs between increasing beneficiary coverage and reducing the quantities and duration of food distributions.

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<sup>17</sup> Challenges include poverty, rapid demographic growth, increasing scarcity of arable land, effects of climate change, food insecurity, poor education quality, and malnutrition, combined with gender inequality.

35. Positive factors explaining the portfolio’s performance and results included strong logistics, the quality of staff and the organizational structure, respect for humanitarian principles and protection coverage, and flexible adaptation of transfer modalities to situations. Performance was negatively affected by weak integration and synergies with other major stakeholders and partners, with which more proactive dialogue and advocacy were needed, often within wider platforms. For example, FFA activities as components of anti-erosion and asset protection programmes are highly relevant in Burundi, but need to adopt a holistic resilience approach. Funding shortfalls were a major factor negatively affecting programming, performance and results of the country portfolio. Resource constraints for surveys, weak documentation by implementing partners, and insufficient human resources constrained the ability of the country office to conduct outcome data analyses and capacity development.

### Recommendations

36. The evaluation makes nine recommendations, ranked in order of importance.

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
1	Strategic alignment and positioning	<p>In the new Country Strategic Plan (CSP), maintain the two CS priorities – i) food and nutrition security; and ii) emergency preparedness and response – in a two-pronged strategic approach. Include readiness<sup>18</sup> to respond more effectively to current challenges. Capacity development should be mainstreamed as a cross-cutting theme in the new CSP and operations.</p> <p>Externally, strengthen synergies with national strategic partners – ministries of agriculture, health, education, and solidarity – and United Nations partners, complemented by institutional advocacy for synergies on major food security issues.</p>	<p>The CS is still aligned with population needs and government priorities, and coherent with the UNDAF, donors’ objectives and WFP Strategic Objectives; the three priorities are still relevant, but face crucial challenges given the need to balance possible emergency and long-term development needs.</p> <p>In practice, synergies were weak throughout the CS; activities often lacked coordination and harmonization with partners.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from the Nairobi Regional Bureau (RBN) and Headquarters</p> <p>2016–2017</p>

<sup>18</sup> Strategic pre-positioning of supplies and contingency planning for disaster preparedness and response, while addressing long-term development challenges.

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
2	Targeting and integration	Internally, strengthen geographical and programme integration through better-targeted multi-sectoral operational planning. Strengthen coordination with government and non-government implementing partners.	Activities were scattered across the country and lacked consistency in objectives, with some variation in application of the targeting criteria.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
3	Gender	Enhance women’s economic empowerment through gender-sensitive income-generating activities and the formation of partnerships with other actors in gender and family planning. Programming should focus on young people – men/boys and women/girls – using the national nutrition platform to support gender empowerment and applying gender markers systematically.	Population pressure on land, lack of sensitization and instability have been resulting in widespread and increasing gender-based violence and gender inequalities. These issues are major contributing factors to food insecurity in Burundi.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
4	Social protection, humanitarian and protection principles	In partnership with the Ministry of National Solidarity, expand carefully designed safety nets for social protection programming to respond to population needs arising from the crisis and adhering to humanitarian and protection principles.  Explicitly include the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and protection in WFP strategic and programme documents.	Given the growing consequences of crises and the increased needs for safety nets for the most vulnerable people, there is need to locate GFA within the social protection framework  Risks remain high although WFP interventions have been consistent with humanitarian principles and protection policy and despite close cooperation with government authorities.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
5	Nutrition	In partnership with the Ministry of Health and UNICEF, enhance the country office's role in nutrition through: i) consistent application of WFP nutrition guidelines; ii) a continuum of care services at health centres and in communities integrating nutrition with access to food; iii) support to the development of a national stunting reduction strategy, while continuing to promote the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative; iv) improving monitoring, evaluation and analysis of nutrition outcome data; and v) advocating for the engagement of young people in prevention of malnutrition.	The reinforced presence of WFP field monitors has mitigated the lack of trained staff in health centres and allowed MAM treatment to follow the national protocol. Combining MAM treatment with nutrition education and gender empowerment could contribute to optimizing results. Consistent and systematic application of stunting prevention guidelines and the SUN window of opportunity for reaching young children could reinforce the country office's efforts to prevent stunting through pilot blanket feeding, which started in 2015.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
6	School feeding	Support the development of national school feeding programmes with greater focus on education quality, working in partnership with the Ministry of Education and UNICEF, and through gap analysis and mapping. Internally, strengthen linkages with P4P to deliver a standard package to targeted schools.	School feeding has contributed to increased enrolment, attendance and gender balance in schools. However, it has also led to far larger class sizes, which have affected education quality – a crucial driver of change in Burundi. Greater clarity in the process for selecting schools, and work with United Nations partners to address education quality would boost educational outcomes.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017

<b>No.</b>	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Responsibility and timing</b>
7	Resilience <sup>19</sup>	In collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, FAO and IFAD, support communities by integrating comprehensive and sustainable FFA packages into community development plans.	Within the framework of a comprehensive approach to resilience, WFP can contribute to mitigating climate shocks. In early 2016, the Ministry of Agriculture introduced a new anti-erosion policy. Lessons have been learned from collaboration with IFAD.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
8	Resource mobilization	Update the country office's resource mobilization strategy and advocate for more flexibility in donor funding, allowing multi-year resource commitments.	Funding shortfalls, earmarking and the short programming cycles of donors were major problems for portfolio performance and results.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
9	Outcome monitoring and analysis	Enhance the consistency of outcome data monitoring and analysis.	Corporate outcome indicators were not consistently collected over the period; SPRs indicate resource constraints for surveys or lack of recording by implementing partners.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017

<sup>19</sup> In the second half of 2015, the country office started repositioning its resilience response towards more integrated packages for better-quality FFA interventions, to be implemented for several years in the same localities and in synergy with other activities.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Evaluation Features

1. This Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) for Burundi was commissioned by the WFP's Office of Evaluation (OEV). Annex A presents the Terms of Reference. CPEs encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole, and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions concerning the positioning of WFP in a country, and its strategic partnerships, program design, and implementation. CPEs help Country Offices (CO) in the preparation of Country Strategies (CS) and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations. CPEs are meant to provide answers to three key evaluation questions:

- i. What has been the Strategic Alignment and positioning of WFP's Country Strategy (CS) and Portfolio?
- ii. What have been the factors driving strategic decision-making?
- iii. What have been the WFP portfolio's Performance and Results?

2. The scope of this CPE has been defined as the entirety of WFP's interventions in Burundi covering the evaluation period between 2011 and 2015. WFP has been present and active in the country since 1968. The evaluation focuses on the four operations that were ongoing during the evaluation period as well as the CS 2011-2014, which represents the WFP CO strategic framework during this period. This first WFP CS in Burundi was developed to align with the WFP Strategic Plan of 2008-2013 as well as the national policies. Section 1.3 provides descriptions of the operations.

3. Conducted by an independent evaluation team, the CPE aimed to inform ongoing programming cycle of the country portfolio and CS design in 2017 and to be a source of information for WFP's contribution to the planning for the next United Nations Development Action Framework (UNDAF). However, due to the volatile political context, major donors have suspended direct financial support to the Government. The current UNDAF (2012-2016) will remain operational until the end of 2017, and the CO is accordingly extending the current Country Programme and PRRO.

4. The CPE did not evaluate each of the portfolio components separately, but rather addressed the entire country portfolio as a whole, from a strategic perspective. The evaluation is intended to serve the objectives of accountability and learning equally. The CPE team has assessed the strategic alignment of the CS, the performance and results of the country portfolio with regard to WFP's mandate and the humanitarian and development needs in Burundi. It has also identified the reasons for observed success or failure and drawn lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings. This is expected to inform CO's strategic decisions about positioning itself in Burundi, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible. The evaluation has also assessed the extent to which the portfolio has appropriately analyzed and integrated the gender context of Burundi.

5. Using the detailed methodology outlined in Annex B, the evaluation process started with the inception phase to ensure that the evaluation team has acquired an in-depth understanding of the TOR and translated them into an inception report or operational plan for the CPE. The inception phase involved preliminary analyses of background materials, a briefing at WFP's Headquarters in Rome in January 2016,

and an in-country inception mission in February 2016. The field evaluation mission in Burundi from April 14 to May 4, 2016. Fieldwork involved 23 meetings with 350 stakeholders at national level (WFP CO, ministries, UN agencies) and field visits in 10 provinces, where 55 interviews and workshops – gender sensitive when feasible – were carried out with beneficiaries, WFP field staff, local authorities, UN and NGO partners. In addition, 38 schools, health centers, refugee and IDP camps, P4P projects, FFAs, social institutions were also visited. Annex D lists those consulted during the inception and main evaluation phases. There was no limitation experienced by the CPE in terms of access or data availability. A stakeholders learning workshop was held in Burundi during July 13-14, 2016 to further refine the results of the CPE. Annex E presents analysis of stakeholders and users of the CPE.

## **1.2. Country Context**

6. Burundi is a land-locked country bordering Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Rwanda. It has very few natural resources beyond agriculture<sup>1</sup>, a land surface of 27,834 Km<sup>2</sup> and a fast-growing population of nearly 11 million in 2015. The proportion of children below the age of 15 years is 45.7 percent, while only 2.52 percent are 65 years or older; 88 percent of the total population was living in rural areas in 2015.<sup>2</sup>

7. Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has faced tensions between the ruling Tutsi minority and the predominantly smallholder-farming Hutu majority. A devastating ethnic conflict broke out in 1993. The civil war lasted until 2005, and claimed an estimated 300,000 victims. The conflict ended with a peace process that produced a new constitution providing guaranteed representation for both Hutu and Tutsi. Parliamentary elections led to the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu, as President. The 2005 democratic government brought a gradual improvement, even though for the next 10 years, the regional security and political situation remained volatile.

8. In that context, the national authorities and the international community envisaged a return to peace and development, a trend reflected in the WFP CS of 2011. Building upon 43 years of presence in Burundi<sup>3</sup>, the CS emphasizes WFP's role as a supporting partner to the Government, facilitating Burundi's move towards comprehensive and lasting peace, and sustainable and substantive improvement of the population's nutritional and food-security situation. However, on 25 April 2015, the ruling political party announced that the President would run for a third term in the 2015 presidential election. The opposition party deemed this unconstitutional. The situation sparked numerous protests, a flow of refugees seeking refuge from the violence in neighboring countries, an attempted coup d'état leading to renewed civil unrest, reportedly multiple human rights violations and many casualties. The opposition boycotted the elections of 21 July 2015.

9. The current security situation remains unpredictable but relatively stable while the ongoing political impasse continues to impact food and nutrition security in the country. By mid-2015, fear of an upsurge in violence has resulted in early harvesting

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<sup>1</sup> Main export products are coffee, tea and cotton.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Statistiques mondiales, Burundi, novembre 2015: <http://www.statistiques-mondiales.com/burundi.htm>

<sup>3</sup> WFP's involvement in Burundi dates back to 1968, based on multipurpose projects in education, rural development, health and nutrition. At the onset of Burundi's crisis in 1993 and until the end of the civil war in 2006, WFP food assistance was shifted more towards humanitarian aid with relief support targeting displaced populations. There is no information on the background of the UN overall mandate in Burundi before the current crisis.

of crops and the sale of assets by people preparing to flee. This has led to the disruption of markets, further worsening the food and nutrition insecurity in the country.<sup>4</sup>

### *Poverty and social indicators*

10. Burundi is a low-income and food-deficit country. While it enjoyed a decade of relative stability (2005-2015), Burundi is still facing food security and nutrition challenges. The 2015 UNDP Human Development Report ranks Burundi 184 out of 188 countries compared to 180th in 2014. Poverty is widespread, particularly in rural areas, with nearly 90 percent of the population living on less than US\$2 per day. For 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has ranked Burundi as the fourth poorest country in the world, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of US\$359 despite recent GDP increases. Burundi's traditional donors including the European Union have suspended direct financial support to the government because of the contested presidential election and its violent aftermath.

11. Rapidly expanding demography has exacerbated severe pressure on land.<sup>5</sup> Many documents of reference for this CPE still mention the population figures from the last census of 2008 (8,053,574). In 2011, the population was 9,625,634 and had reportedly grown to 10,997,891 in 2015 by 1,372,257 (+14.26 percent).<sup>6</sup> As of January 2016, the figure is 11,364,011; and is projected to increase by 378,308 people and reach 11,742,319 in the beginning of 2017. At the current growth rate, the population of Burundi will have almost doubled in 20 years (21,464,470) by 2035.<sup>7</sup>

12. Burundi population density is the second highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (421 people per square kilometer in 2014).<sup>8</sup> Burundi's population growth rate fluctuated between 3.35 percent and 3.51 percent over the period 2011 - 2015, which is the highest in the world after some wealthy Gulf States, South Sudan and Niger.<sup>9</sup>

### *Food insecurity*

13. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy accounting for nearly 35% of GDP.<sup>10</sup> It is dominated by subsistence farmers who depend heavily on crop production to meet their food and income needs.<sup>11</sup> According to the 2014 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), 32% of households were food insecure in 2014, including 7% who were severely food insecure and 25% who were moderately food insecure. This equates to more than 600,000 households that were food insecure, slightly less than 3 million people. About 37% of household experienced marginal or limited food security, and are vulnerable to food insecurity, while 31% are food secure. The poorest and most vulnerable communities generally depend on marginal lands. Land availability for cultivation is extremely limited due to high population density. On average, farming households own 0.5 hectares. These communities lack the capacity to cope with severe climate change-related shocks such as floods and droughts, which often claim lives and undermine livelihoods. Burundi has been and continues to be one of the most hunger-affected countries in the world. The country

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<sup>4</sup> No less than 46% of households are now estimated to be food insecure (EFSA April 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Burundi has an estimated 1 million ha of total arable crop land. 86% of farmer households have less than 0.5 ha, and 21% less than 0.1 ha. (USAID, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> Source : <http://countrymeters.info/en/Burundi>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.metamorphosisalpha.com/ias/population.php>

<sup>8</sup> Source: <http://countrymeters.info/en/Burundi>

<sup>9</sup> Source: *ibid.*


<sup>10</sup> Main GDP components are: agriculture: 34.4%; industry: 18.4% ; services: 47.2% (World bank, 2014)

<sup>11</sup> 32% of households were food insecure in 2014, including 7% who were severely food insecure and 25% who were moderately food insecure. This equates to more than 600 000 households that are food insecure, slightly less than 3 million people. 37% of household experience marginal or limited food security, and are vulnerable to food insecurity, while 31% are food secure. Source: USAID (see also Annex I)

faced a food deficit of up to 26 percent<sup>12</sup> leading in the 2014 Global Hunger Index (GHI) score. The prevailing political unrest linked to the 2015 elections is creating additional uncertainty in terms of food market stability.

14. According to the 2014 GHI report, the country had the highest levels of hunger in sub-Saharan Africa. It was ranked among the 16 with a global index score of 35.6 classified as “extremely alarming” The humanitarian needs in Burundi however are not evenly distributed geographically. Poverty levels coincide largely with the severity of food insecurity and nutrition needs. Food and nutrition interventions of WFP’s humanitarian partners have focused on the North, Centre and East areas that are generally more affected than the South (see Map on page iv).

**Figure 1: The Countries worst affected by hunger**



### Nutrition

15. Under-nutrition is a major concern with 58 percent prevalence of stunting and 29 percent classified as underweight in 2010.<sup>13</sup> The 2014 combined Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) and Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART) show a prevalence of chronic malnutrition above 50 percent in no less than 10 of the 18 provinces of Burundi.

16. In accordance with the recommendations of the first Forum on Nutrition and Food Security, held in Bujumbura in December 2011, the government has set up a Multi-Sector Platform for Food Security and Nutrition to coordinate the fight against child malnutrition. The platform brings together all in-county stakeholders involved in addressing chronic malnutrition, namely the Government of Burundi, the

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.wfp.org/countries/burundi/overview>

<sup>13</sup> *The State of the World's Children 2015: Executive Summary*, UNICEF, Nov 2014, see page 42: Table 2- Nutrition

concerned United Nations agencies (WFP, FAO, WHO, IFAD and UNICEF), bilateral partners and civil society.

### *Education*

17. In 2012, a Sector Plan for the Development of Education and Training (PSDEF) was set up for the period 2012-2020. The plan has put particular emphasis on the completion of primary school, reflected in a report<sup>14</sup> outlining that Burundi has made education a priority by allocating 29 percent of the national budget – essentially abolishing school fees. In 2013, 50 percent of this sum was dedicated to primary education, which has experienced a significant quantitative increase in a decade. The report indicates that enrollment has doubled between 2004 and 2013 (2 million children registered). The figures were confirmed by the 2014 UNICEF annual report, which indicated that primary school net enrolment ratio over 2009-2013 has reached 94 percent and net attendance ratio is 73.7 percent; girls constituted 50.6 percent compared to 46.1 percent in 2004.<sup>15</sup>

### *Gender equality*

18. The 2011-2025 National Gender Policy aims to correct the historical disadvantages faced by women through substantial gender-sensitive budgetary support. The policy includes some relevant indicators for harmonization into the National Public Administration Reform Program.<sup>16</sup> A law on prevention, protection of victims and punishment of violence based on gender is still waiting presentation to the National Assembly expected to reduce the real social problem of gender-based violence significantly.

19. In Burundi, women hold 34.9 percent of parliamentary seats and 5.3 percent of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education, compared to 8.3 percent of their male counterparts. However, the 2015 Human Development Report (HDR) ranks Burundi 109th out of 155 countries on the Gender Inequality Index.<sup>17</sup> The 2013 USAID Food Security report for Burundi identified gender inequality as one of the major contributing factors to food insecurity. Women in rural areas bear a large part of the responsibilities for agriculture production but are not yet fully involved in making decisions regarding household expenditures or use of land, nor do they have the right to own land.

### *National policies*

20. On the side of the Burundian Government, the period 2011 to 2015 was shaped by the second edition of the 2012 “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” (PRSP II) with four strategic pillars. They include provisions for strengthening good governance, scaling up social safety nets and access to basic services. Social safety nets aimed to reduce the structural vulnerability of the poorest layers of the population, although contribution from the national budget was limited. In 2012, international aid accounted for over 85 percent of non-contributory social protection expenditure.<sup>18</sup> This strategy was complemented, among other measures, by several policies: National Food Security Program (2009-2015), National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2007, updated in 2009), Sector Plan for Development of Education and Technical

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<sup>14</sup> Rapport national de l'Éducation Pour Tous, Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base et Secondaire, de l'Enseignement des Métiers et de l'Alphabétisation, République du Burundi, December 2014, see page 18

<sup>15</sup> Unicef, Inequality in Burundi's school system, 2014. No page n°.

<sup>16</sup> UNDP, Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Public Administration, Burundi Study 2012. No page n°.

<sup>17</sup> There was no GHI in 2015 for Burundi due to insufficient data.

<sup>18</sup> Assessment of Social Safety nets in Burundi, UNICEF Sep 2014

Training (2009-2016, revised 2012-2020), National Health Policy (2005-2015), Community Development Planning, and a National Gender Policy (2011-2025).

### *Humanitarian aid, protection and coordination*

21. In a transition from humanitarian to development context, the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) formally closed its office in June 2010, followed by most key humanitarian donors and agencies (European Commission/DG ECHO, International Confederation of the Red C, and Norwegian Refugee Council). An integrated United Nations mission, led by the UNDP Resident Representative, took over and assumed the triple mandate of humanitarian, recovery and development activities in support of peace consolidation. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (2010-2014), promoted peace, consolidation and development.

22. However, the contested presidential elections in 2015 and the resulting humanitarian challenges have prompted OCHA to reactivate a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Burundi and to develop a Humanitarian Response Plan. Core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and protection needs have been considered again in view of the large numbers of 239,754 Burundian refugees who have fled mostly to Rwanda and Tanzania, and 25,081 IDPs registered at the end of 2015.<sup>19</sup> Since the refugee movement started in April 2015, the European Commission has suspended direct financial support to the government<sup>20</sup> and allocated €14 million to address the needs of the displaced population.<sup>21</sup> New patterns of human rights violations included cases of sexual violence, increased enforced disappearances and torture. Since April 2015, 439 documented killings, 262 arbitrary arrests, and 263 cases of torture/ill-treatment.<sup>22</sup>

### *International development assistance to Burundi*

23. Burundi is still heavily dependent on donors. Recent figures are hard to find, but data from 2010 indicate that donors funded nearly half of the country's US\$970 million budget requirements, against 45 percent in Rwanda, or 27 percent in Ghana.<sup>23</sup> This share has further increased in response to the main Governmental plans supported by the international community. These include the *Cadre Strategique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvreté* (CSLP II for 2012-16) and Vision 2025, as the Official Development Aid ranged from US\$523 to 575 million between 2011 and 2013. However, most of this assistance was conditional upon the inclusion of components of national reconciliation, human rights and good governance in a State of Law (UNDAF or the CSLP II), which have now been seriously undermined because of the current political instability.

## **1.3. WFP's Portfolio in Burundi**

24. For the period 2008-2013, WFP adopted a corporate Strategic Plan marking a major transition for the organization from food aid to food assistance. The WFP CS for Burundi (2011-2014) partly covered the same period but included extension of some operations until end 2016 in order to align with UNDAF's work plan in the country. The analytical process that has led to the definition of the CS is outlined in Chapters 2.1 and 2.2. Meanwhile, the current WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017) has been

<sup>19</sup> OCHA Inter-Agency Monitoring report, 29 January 2016, page 1. At the time of writing of this report, numbers of refugees have exceeded 265,000.

<sup>20</sup> EU Council 14/03/2016, no page n°.

<sup>21</sup> DG ECHO, 17/12/2015, no page n°.

<sup>22</sup> OCHCR, January 2016, no page n°. The total number of killings – not all are documented – exceeds 1,000.

<sup>23</sup> Actionaid, 'Ending aid dependency', Sep 2011. No age n°. see also GDP figures per capita in \$16

operational. The CS appears to have reflected the then prevailing forward-looking atmosphere of 2011, which envisaged a gradual return to lasting peace and development. It indicates key lessons learned from past operations, such as the need to strengthen targeting of food assistance, coordination with the Government, technical expertise and local capacities. The CS accordingly identified three main priorities: (i) Food and Nutrition Security; (ii) Capacity Development of Government Institutions; and (iii) Humanitarian Response Action.<sup>24</sup> During the evaluation period, WFP implemented portfolio of 4 operations across the country:

- i. Country Program (CP) 200119 – (initially January 2011 – December 2014, extended to December 2016)
- ii. Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200164 (initially January 2011 - December 2012, extended to June 2014)
- iii. PRRO 200655 (initially July 2014 – June 2016, extended to December 2016)
- iv. Immediate Response Emergency Operation IR EMOP 200678 – food assistance to victims of flood-related displacement, February-May 2014).

#### *Chronological development of the Portfolio- Beneficiaries and Funding*

25. In 2011, WFP CO initiated the CP 200119 to cover the period 2011-2014. Towards the end of 2013, by extension until December 2016, the CP was aiming at aligning to the Government's new education policy providing free primary education to children aged 7-13 years. Implementation of CP has comprised school feeding (81% of beneficiaries), health and nutrition activities to vulnerable groups (15%), support for community recovery and development including cash and vouchers transfers (4%) and Government capacity development, not shown in the CO statistics.

26. Concurrent to the CP, the first PRRO (200164) covered the period January 2011-December 2012 to provide assistance for highly food insecure people, including returnees, refugees and vulnerable host communities affected by successive shocks.<sup>25</sup> Since December 2014, a second PRRO (200655) has been running and will continue until the end of 2016. Both operations comprised relief and recovery activities, for enabling a good transition between emergencies and post-emergency and reflecting the global shift from food aid to food assistance. These two PRROs also aimed to address the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition and contribute to the building of long-term resilience for food insecure households. This approach was an integral part of implementation of new sets of activities under the Purchase for Progress (P4P), Food for Assets (FFAs) and cash-based transfers (CBTs).

27. The second CS Priority (Capacity Development of Government Institutions) was less frequent, because this type of support has been mostly implemented as a cross cutting intervention, rather than an activity in itself. This was consistent with the Strategic Plan 2014-2017, which mainstreamed capacity development as a cross cutting theme.

28. In February 2014, the sudden flooding around Bujumbura led to an adjustment of the WFP portfolio during the evaluation period. This justified the launch of EMOP 200678 to assist about 20,000 displaced people, completed within 4 months. The

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<sup>24</sup> 99% of the total portfolio beneficiaries (2.4 million, see table 1) received assistance from food and nutrition security activities, and 1% (24,000) from emergency aid. Beneficiaries of Capacity Development number less than 0.1%.

<sup>25</sup> For a list of major landslides and other disasters during the evaluation period, see section IX of Annex I.

political tension, which started in spring 2015, also led WFP to provide food assistance to populations affected by political violence, without requiring an additional EMOP.

**Table 1: Beneficiaries and funding per operation (2011-2015)**


<i>Operation</i>	<i>Beneficiaries Planned</i>	<i>Beneficiaries Actual</i>	<i>% actual beneficiaries</i>	<i>Approved budget (SPR 2015)</i>	<i>Confirmed contributions (SPR 2015)</i>
CP 200119	1,404,300	1,223,419	87.1	105,366,484	57,560,980
PRRO 200164	1,971,880	1,723,580	87.4	98,480,619	63,840,369
PRRO 200655	870,243	665,613	76.5	81,804,494	52,920,363
IR-EMOP 200678	20,000	22,160	110.8	1,361,213	1,074,533
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,266,423</b>	<b>3,634,772</b>	<b>85.2</b>	<b>287,012,810</b>	<b>175,396,245</b>

29. During the evaluation period, about 61% of required budget was funded across WFP's operations in Burundi. **Figure 2** highlights WFP's main donors per operations. The United States of America remained the main donor to WFP's operations in Burundi (US\$45.4 million and 50 percent of country portfolio funding over the period 2011-2015), mostly supporting the two PRROs.

30. Other significant contributors to WFP activities are multilateral donors such as the European Union or non-earmarked funding to WFP's general budget<sup>26</sup> (US\$34.4 million), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) with US\$25.2 million and the Netherlands US\$ 12.1 million earmarked funding for an integrated approach to P4P and school feeding in the North-West provinces. The Government of Burundi also provided the equivalent in kind of US\$10.9 million of co-financing to the WFP Country Program.

<sup>26</sup> WFP Orientation Guide, December 2015, page 48

**Figure 2: Main funding for WFP Portfolio in Burundi (2011-2015)**



31. Due to resource constraints, the disruption of activities caused by the funding gap has been perceptible in Standard Project Reports, such as the suspension of some program components (e.g. CBT in PRRO in 2014). However, partly due to new modalities such as endogenous school feeding, CBT and P4P, but also shorter delivery periods and reduced rations, the funding shortage had a limited impact on the numbers of beneficiaries reached.

**Table 2: Cumulative direct project costs until 31/12/2014 (in %)**

Main activities	Food and related costs	C&V and related costs	Capacity development and augmentation	Support costs
CP 200119	80.76%	6.86%	1.64%	10.74%
PRRO 200164	74.12%	9.91%	0.44%	15.53%
PRRO 200655	53.13%	28.20%	1.15%	17.52%

32. Table 2 provides an overall perspective on the relative budgetary weight (in percent) of the major components mentioned in the Standard Project Reports (SPR) made in 2014 for the CP and PRROs. The EMOP was entirely dedicated to emergency assistance. The SPRs did not show such detailed figures for e.g. nutrition, or school feeding, FFA or P4P.

33. As stated in the CS, gender equality was considered as a cross cutting issue, and the Ministry of Solidarity is a “key and strategic partner in the execution of its objectives in enhancing gender and protection commitments in its operations”. Gender sensitivity is stated visibly under objective 1.1 of the CS. Nutrition assistance to vulnerable groups aimed to improve the nutritional status of targeted women, including pregnant and nursing women (PLW), girls and boys, and children aged 6–59 months.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1. Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

#### *Relevance to the Burundi national context and needs*

34. The CS was globally realistic and relevant in its analysis of the national context in 2010-11, as well as its constraints and opportunities – with some caveats as detailed below. Annex F provides a detailed analysis of the strategic alignment.

35. Although the CS did not present either a logical framework, a theory of change or a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis, the various chapters of the document offer a comprehensive approach to the strategy. The CS analysis was based on the CO's in-depth knowledge – dating back to 1968 - of the country's political, social and economic context. WFP positioned itself to utilize the comprehensive lessons learnt from previous programs, such as multipurpose development until 1993, humanitarian aid and relief for IDPs during the civil war, and two successive PRROs aiming at recovery from 2007 to 2010. This experience has provided a thorough understanding of humanitarian and development needs - and actors - It is consistent with the continuum from emergency and development covered by the two WFP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013 and 2014 – 2017, as shown in Table 3.

36. The CS relied extensively on the results of the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA 2008),<sup>27</sup> which outlined the growing food deficit, poverty, and regional specificities in food insecurity, malnutrition and environmental hazards.

37. As explicitly stated in its vision statement, the CS was aligned with the national agenda, in particular the “Vision 2015” for Burundi and the corresponding 1<sup>st</sup> Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-I). Vision 2025, also published in 2011, is a document of national consensus and a roadmap for economic and social development. The CS was specifically aligned with the Vision's objectives 2 economic development and objective 3 - improvement of living conditions. In 2012, the PRSP-I was followed by PRSP-II, in order to capitalize on lessons learnt and challenges to better support Vision 2025.<sup>28</sup> This did not modify the alignment of CS priorities. Capacity development remained aligned with Government priorities in Vision 2025 under the 1<sup>st</sup> pillar of Governance) and in PRSP II; “Capacity building was also a high priority for the success of the priority programs identified”.

38. In addition, the CS was coherent with the 2009 National Food Security Policy, the 2005-2015 National health policy, and the Integrated National Nutrition Program (PRONIANUT, 2010 Protocol) for reducing hunger and under-nutrition among vulnerable groups. WFP has been instrumental in this framework, with an overall emphasis on micronutrients. The other key relevant national policies and plans considered in the CS were the 2009-15 National Food Security Program; the 2007 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (DRM); Sector Plan for the Development of Education and Technical Training, 2009-2016; National Strategic Framework to fight HIV/AIDS 2007-11; and Community Development Plans. Over the evaluation period, WFP operations have been aligned with relevant national policies

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<sup>27</sup> Primary data for the CFSVA covered 5,011 sampled households, key informants and through focus groups discussions. Information on health and nutrition included 4,006 children below the age of five. A market survey and a secondary data analysis were also conducted

<sup>28</sup> Lessons learnt included: weak food crop production, lack of diversification of exports, under-developed private sector. Challenges were: Demographic growth; inefficient agricultural production; weak public expenditure execution; under-investment in the private sector; persistent electricity deficit; and lack of capacity to manage development.

such as the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2015-2020), the National Gender Policy (2012-2025); and the National Social Protection Policy.<sup>29</sup> The CS was furthermore aligned until 2015 with the Millennium Development Goals 1 to 7, as it aimed at hunger, education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV and environment.

39. Notwithstanding that the formulation of WFP’s vision as being “the” catalyst to support the government was overly ambitious, the CS duly reflected the optimistic, forward-looking vision of development prevailing in 2010, at the time of drafting. In that context, the 1<sup>st</sup> WFP CS for Burundi was seen as a “challenge for innovation”, to reflect prevailing optimistic perspectives towards development and taking into account WFP’s comparative advantages.

40. In that context, the three CS priorities: food and nutrition security, capacity development of government institutions, and humanitarian response action - remained realistic and relevant. CS themes and the corresponding portfolio were relevant to the identified needs of the population. Considering recurrent climatic shocks, the CO should be commended for insisting on including an emergency response component among priorities – in line with WFP Strategic Objective (SO) 1, despite the prevailing focus – by government and UNDAF - on development, reconciliation and governance.

41. Until the new political deadlock of April 2015, Burundi has enjoyed a period of growing peace and stability as well as moderate economic growth - between 4 and 5 percent annually<sup>30</sup>. During that period, even stunting rates declined on average from 58 to 48 percent, but remained well above the WHO threshold of 40 percent countrywide.<sup>31</sup> However, Burundi has remained fragile with generally low institutional resources. It is still one of the poorest countries in the world, with a very high level of food insecurity. Compared to 27.8 percent of food insecurity found by the 2008 CFSVA,<sup>32</sup> the CFSVA of 2014 estimated the proportion at 32 percent.<sup>33</sup> Increasing pressure on land has been putting women at risk of destitution as customary laws still prevent them from inheriting land.

42. Both CFSVAs (2008 and 2014) analyzed the crucial issues in nutrition security. In 2011 however, the Government did not have a specific nutrition strategy – as this was finalized only in 2014. In Vision 2025 and PRSP I, chronic malnutrition was not seen from the “humanitarian” perspective but from the development one, through agricultural, educational and economic strengthening. PRSP II provided only some general indicators about chronic malnutrition. Nutrition as a sub-sector was recognized and population pressure was identified as one of the major causes of malnutrition, but there was no specific focus on stunting prevention at the government level when the CS was being prepared. The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative started in 2010, and the multi-sectorial platform for Nutrition and Food Security was established in Burundi in 2013, paving the way for a national strategic plan. This approach has been integrated in WFP activities.

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<sup>29</sup> The draft of a national policy on social security for the most vulnerable (civil servants etc. are covered) had been prepared by ILO in April 2010<sup>29</sup>, but it has not yet been finalized. This very ambitious document foresees an overall sickness insurance coverage for ‘at least 50 percent of the target population in the informal sector and 30 percent in the rural sector’ in the short-term, i.e. within 5 years - although resourcing is unclear.

<sup>30</sup> Real GDP growth was e.g. estimated at 4,3 percent in 2013 and 4.7 percent in 2014 (AfDB)

<sup>31</sup> Pictures are very different at provincial level; in some parts, stunting rates deteriorated (USAID/ CRS, IFPRI research).

<sup>32</sup> CFSVA 2008: 4.8 percent of severely food insecure households, 23 percent of moderately food insecure ones.

<sup>33</sup> 7 percent of households severely food insecure, and 25 percent moderately.

43. In Vision 2025, humanitarian needs of the population were also addressed from the development perspective.<sup>34</sup> Improving social indicators was therefore implicitly the way forward and no humanitarian needs, other than emergency response to natural disasters (component 3), were mentioned as such in the CS – although risks were clearly outlined. Humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality or independence were not mentioned in the CS and project documents. Nevertheless, the CPE did not find evidence of lack of compliance with the principles in the design and implementation of the operations. Close relations of cooperation were maintained with the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education or Solidarity, and with national institutions such as PRONIANUT, HIV council or the Civil Protection platforms.

44. Gender issues were only mentioned explicitly in one instance in the CS, and rather indirectly. Institutional memory in the CO<sup>35</sup> indicated, however, that gender was being considered as a cross-cutting issue, even if not explicitly noted. Gender sensitivity is shown under objective 1.1 of the CS, where nutrition assistance is planned to be provided to vulnerable groups to improve the nutritional status of targeted women, including pregnant and lactating women (PLW), girls and boys, and children aged 6–59 months. When assessed by the IASC Gender Marker, the CS was appropriately ranked at level 1 as insufficiently gender mainstreamed; operations were positively ranked at level 2.

45. Direct participation of beneficiaries was not a priority in the CS as the concept of Accountability to Affected People (AAP) was developed after CS formulation. The development-oriented focus relied on the comprehensive and generally reliable administrative structure of Burundi. This ranged from groups of 10 households to sous-colline, colline, zone, commune to province and national levels to reflect local concerns of the population. This approach was complemented by WFP's good relations with the ministries and its extensive field presence through sub-offices in Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) assessments and monitoring.

46. Probably reflecting the absence of a theory of change and its regular updates, a number of strategic gaps were noted for the period under evaluation – although the efficient CO has often already started to reposition its approaches accordingly in recent months. Responding to government's requests, the PRROs have applied Food For Assets (FFA) activities, as planned in the program document. These are concentrated on the three eastern provinces that received most of the returnees from Tanzania. This, however, lacks strategic consistency with the FFA activities under the CP, which have attempted a countrywide approach to disaster risk reduction (DRR) in the areas most at risk from climate changes. Neither the CP nor the PRROs were coordinated with DRR activities to support National Platform and emergency response for victims of natural disasters in other –mostly western- provinces. The PRROs have also engaged in school feeding in the same returnee areas. This did not overlap with school feeding activities under the CP, but selection criteria varied. The activity was due to be transferred to the CP in order to enhance synergies with the Government school feeding policy, which is a strategically correct approach.

47. The arrows in Table 3 show the overall strategic alignment of WFP's CS priorities and main components of portfolio operations with national policies, UNDAF and Strategic Plans.

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<sup>34</sup> The Vision aims at “transforming the victims of disasters (returnees, IDPs) into true development stakeholders...”.

<sup>35</sup> The CPE could discuss with 2 of the 3 staff members who were already present in 2010-11.

**Table 3: Alignment of strategic priorities between CS, portfolio operations, and national of corporate priorities.**

Vision 2025	PRSP I	PRSP II	Other relevant national policies	UNDAF 2010	WFP SO 2008-13	WFP SO 2014-2017	CS	CP	PRRO 200164	PRRO 200655	EMOP 200678
Governance	Governance	Governance		Governance							
Economic development	Economic growth	Economic development		Community recovery							
Living conditions		Access to basic social services	Food security, health, nutrition, education, community development	Community recovery	SO 2, 3, 4	SO 3, 4	1.1. Chronic hunger and malnutrition 1.2. School feeding 1.3. Food security	2.Nutrition to vulnerable groups 1.School feeding 3.Community recovery	Recovery : FFA	Recovery: school feeding Recovery : FFA	
		Social safety nets			SO 1	SO 1, 2			Relief: institutional feeding	Recovery: institutional feeding	
	Human capital				SO 5	SO 1-4	2. Capacity development	4.Capacity development			
	HIV				SO 4	SO 4		3.HIV			
				Strategic planning Peace, Rights							
			DRR		SO 1	SO 1, 2	3. Emergency response		Relief : food for refugees, returnees ; seasonal targeted food distribution	Relief : food for refugees, returnees; MAM ; food-insecure HHs	Emergency response
			Gender				Cross-cutting				

### *Coherence with the international partners*

48. Several groups of partners were considered in the portfolio design and implementation. National strategic partners were line Ministries and national institutions with whom the CO was cooperating for policy-making and implementation. WFP cooperates with international partners such as UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR, IFAD, IOM; Food for Peace/USAID, and the Netherlands cooperation. In addition, the CO works with a large number of implementation partners including NGOs, provincial or local authorities, the Red Cross, and dioceses. Annex E presents a matrix of stakeholder analysis.

49. Overall, the CS was coherent with priorities of a wide range of UN partners. Individual strategies and programs of key United Nations agencies were not outlined in a specific section of the CS, as these were apparently seen in the integrated UN development assistance framework. Activities of UN agencies were, however, mentioned in the components of the CS priority actions, for which synergies were expected. These included UNICEF, WHO, FAO and IFAD for school feeding; UNICEF for nutrition; UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, WHO, and FAO for capacity development; FAO, and not IFAD, for community recovery. The CS states merely that “WFP works closely with a range of NGOs – both national and international”.

50. Some of these synergies materialized only partially at the operational level, in particular the cooperation with UNICEF for school feeding and nutrition. Reasons are not clear, but a better initial identification of strategies, programs and resources may have been relevant. Cooperation with FAO was generally reported by both agencies as excellent. However, in some instances, it did not happen due to a lack of clear division of tasks and – more frequently – to funding shortfalls. There was no evidence of duplications.

51. UNDAF did not integrate institutional capacity development as a distinct pillar, and emergency response was not included in UNDAF’s development perspective. Such dimensions should have been viewed as an added value by WFP, mainly due to the appropriateness of Strategic Plans to cover both relief and recovery situations.

52. There was a gap in synergy among WFP, UNFPA and UN Women regarding a common approach for demography and family planning, although UNFPA and UN Women were not yet fully operational at field level. Nevertheless, their presence in Burundi is highly needed, as Gender Based Violence (GVB) and population pressure are critical challenges. A case in point is the absence of the two agencies in the One-United Nations (UN) nutrition project implemented in Ngozi by WFP, UNICEF, FAO and WHO. WFP’s involvement in this project, funded by the Swiss cooperation, was very limited in scale due to the limited budget share. There was a recent missed opportunity in terms of collaborating in the performance-based financing (PBF) implemented by the NGO Cordaid in health and education.

53. UNDAF (2010–2014) should be seen as the follow-up of the previous post-conflict 2007-2009 strategy, which was an attempt to coordinate national and international programming for returns and reintegration activities. It promoted peace consolidation and development with four pillars: i) strategic planning and coordination; ii) community recovery; iii) peace reconciliation and human rights; and iv) democratic governance. Pillar 2 was particularly relevant for WFP’s contribution to meet hunger and nutrition goals. WFP’s portfolio activities - together with activities of key United Nations agencies (FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNDP) - reflected a suitable coherence with Pillar 2 of UNDAF’s strategic priority.

54. In 2012, the UNDAF was revised to better align itself with PRSP II and a new framework was put in place, around three areas: i) strengthening of state, good governance and promotion of gender equality; ii) transforming the economy towards sustained growth and job creation; and iii) improving access to basic services and strengthening social protection. WFP activities became coherent with new Pillar 3.

55. With regard to partnership with bilateral donors, until mid-2015, due to the recurrent funding shortfalls that reflected Burundi's situation as a "forgotten crisis", the CO was careful to consider coherence of its activities with priorities of major donors. Reasons for funding shortfalls included relatively less donor attention to Burundi as small country next to DRC and Burundi's long-term development focus. CO was coherent with USAID which has funded 50 percent of the overall portfolio 2011-2015 with Food For Peace emergency funding to the PRROs but no development activities. The CO and activities were also coherent with the Netherlands covering 7 percent of the portfolio which focused on integrated P4P and endogenous school feeding in three provinces. At the end of the CPE period, the CS is still coherent with the current USAID Food Security Country Framework (2014-2019) and the Netherlands cooperation in Burundi' Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (2014-2017).

56. Three multilateral strategic partners were referenced in the CS analysis namely IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank. However, their actual roles in the implementation of the strategy and portfolio were rather limited. These partners were only active in development, sometimes at the macro-economic level, not humanitarian activities.

#### *Coherence with WFP Corporate Strategic Plans and Policies*

57. WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013) had five Strategic Objectives (SOs), and 14 corresponding goals, whereas the current Strategic Plan (2014–2017) has only four SOs and 14 goals. The reduced number of SOs is explained by the fact that the former SO 5 - capacity development - has become a cross-cutting goal within the four SOs. The CS, the CP and the two PRROs are coherent with all the SOs in the two Strategic Plans.

58. WFP corporate policies were not mentioned in the CS. Based on the CO's "institutional memory", however, the necessary analyses were made to ensure that the CS provided adequate coherence. The main policy objectives, expectations and constraints were considered in emergency response, DRR, protection, nutrition, school feeding, food security, FFA, CBTs, safety nets, HIV and capacity development. The concept of resilience has been developed after 2011 and is therefore explicitly mentioned only once in the CS, as a sub-objective of community recovery. WFP has some comparative advantages in enhancing resilience through food security and nutrition. However, this is still a far cry from an integrated approach to resilience in order to respond to the definition proposed in 2013 by UNDP, OCHA and UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) which calls for multi-sector synergies.<sup>55</sup>

#### *Strategic use of WFP comparative advantages*

59. In the CS, the CO had adequately analyzed the comparative advantages of WFP in Burundi. These include a wide knowledge of the country's hunger and nutrition situation, recognized past contributions, and assistance in policy formulation and capacity development in the management of food assistance programs. WFP is also renowned for its ability and capacity to act as a catalyst in innovative endeavors such as climate change

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<sup>55</sup> "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner". Source: Irinnews.org "Understanding Resilience, 2013, p.1.

through FFA. It occupies a lead position in assessments through VAM, extensive field presence, logistics capacity, strategic partnerships, and excellent relations with the Government, donors, sister United Nations agencies, and key NGOs. Strong connections are maintained with local communities. In addition, WFP has demonstrated its ability to mobilize funds and to link with due flexibility policies and strategies to national priorities. In 2011, the CS also identified challenges which included timeliness of response, limited scope of financial resources by both WFP and its main partners, and issues of avoiding beneficiary dependency on food aid. Such comparative advantages and acknowledged challenges were part of the country strategy formulation. The three key priorities reflected this approach adequately.

60. As a result of applying comparative advantages and challenges in strategy development, stakeholders agreed that the CO was competent and well organized; reinforced by extensive field presence. WFP was also widely appreciated for its expertise, policy support, flexibility and transparency. WFP has been perceived as pro-active, leading and influential partner in emergency assistance, food fortification, organizing the 1<sup>st</sup> forum of 2011 on nutrition and food security, school feeding, PNIA, advising on policy formulation, and well engaged in various national platforms for DRR, education, food security, nutrition. WFP has also been well positioned to support the implementation of a national social protection program through its experience with cash-based transfers, vulnerability assessment and targeting. Comparative advantages still include the VAM capacity for assessments (CFSVA 2014, emergency assessments in 2015 and 2016). Timeliness has been appropriate for emergency assistance in case of disasters, and innovative approaches have included P4P and electronic vouchers.

## **2.2. Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making**

61. The decision-making procedure for the CS in 2010 and 2011 was outlined in an annex to the CS document, mitigating the limited “institutional memory” within the CO from that period, due to staff turnover. There are no available reports which indicate whether some factors were more decisive than others in this process. Only three staff members were already present during CS formulation – none from the management was involved at various levels in the process.

62. WFP CO thoroughly analysed the political, security and socio-economic context, based on its own expertise, (CFSVA-2008) and internal studies.<sup>56</sup> Lessons learnt, comparative advantages and challenges were also appropriately analysed. To the extent that lessons from other countries could be replicated in Burundi, Brazil and Ivory Coast were considered as references for school feeding, and Kenya for P4P.

63. In that framework, the CO benefited from advice from the Regional Bureau (RBN), in commissioning studies to prepare specific background information, regarding partnerships, market information for CBTs, and a draft resource mobilization and communication strategy. An experienced bilingual expert was also delegated by the RB to assist in the preparation of the CS. The level of support by mostly English-speaking WFP Headquarters and RB gradually improved with induction of bilingual staff in the CO, and regular monthly visits by RB staff. A complete analysis of the decision-making factors is shown in Annex G.

64. The CS preparation followed a truly participatory approach but no specific analytical methodology. The CS was seen by the CO staff as a challenge for innovation, geared towards development after a protracted conflict and post-conflict period. A

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<sup>56</sup> These included Burundi Hunger and Nutrition Analysis; WFP/national Partnership Framework; A Cash and Voucher study on market and traders' information; Burundi Nutrition Strategy for 2011-2014; Mid-term Review of PRRO 10528; and draft resource strategy

comprehensive consultative process entailed therefore extensive discussions internally and externally, with the RB for guidance, the United Nations Management Team, national and international NGOs, donors, and –crucially - the Government.

65. For systematic review of the political, and socio economic contexts, the CS analysis relied on reports by IMF, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, the World Bank, national indicators drawn from Vision 2025, the corresponding PRSP-I, and relevant national policies. Three joint working groups were set up for deciding about programming (food security and rural development; health; and education, led by delegates from five technical Ministries: Agriculture, Education, Health, Environment and Solidarity.

66. National line-ministries were also leading the discussions during a three-day retreat in Gitega, which was facilitated by the Ministry of External relations. Areas of interventions were prioritized and this approach led to the definition of the three main CS components: i) food and nutrition security, ii) capacity development, and iii) humanitarian response. The draft CS was circulated internally, and then presented to relevant external stakeholders.

67. In the UNDAF framework, analysis was similarly carried out in an optimistic spirit of reconstruction and development, and “all hopes were allowed”. UNDAF was felt as an “acte d’engagement vis à vis du gouvernement” concentrating on issues which could change the situation. Environment was not discussed, for unclear reasons.

68. Components of operations were decided accordingly. In the CP, activities included (1) support for school children in food-insecure areas, (2) nutrition assistance for vulnerable groups, (3) support for community recovery and development, and (4) capacity development of government institutions. The overall objective of PRROs was to assist highly food-insecure people, including returnees, refugees and vulnerable host communities affected by successive shocks. Emergency humanitarian response was to be delivered through IR-EMOPS on an ad-hoc basis.

69. Despite the overall strategic approach defined in the CS, at the beginning of the review period – in 2011 and 2012, decision-making in programming did not attempt to integrate portfolio activities in order to reach catalytic effects. Activities were rather vertically separated from each other (“en silos”). Integration between programs improved in 2013 with P4P and endogenous school feeding in the three Northwestern provinces, and the introduction of CBTs in refugee camps in combination with food distribution activities.

70. Over the evaluation period, decision-making was dictated by WFP mandate; WFP’s strategic paradigm from food aid to food assistance; national context and policies including requests from the Government; and funding availability. These factors modified scales and locations, but not strategic priorities. Revised approaches with significant budget increases were decided. These included i) CP 200119 to integrate school feeding with P4P, ii) revision the 1<sup>st</sup> PRRO (200164) following the Government’s request of end 2012 to synchronize targeted supplementary feeding, school feeding and FFAs with the 18 months reintegration plan for returnees from Tanzania, and iii) revision of the 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO (200665).

71. Although this does not fall under the CPE period, it should be noted that the CO was planning to formulate a new PRRO and a new five-year CP starting in 2017, in alignment with the new UNDAF and the Government’s new generation PRSP (after 2017). Due to the current political context and the suspension by some donors of direct financial support to the Government, the current UNDAF has been extended by 1 year.

### *Analysis of food and nutrition security, and gender issues*<sup>57</sup>

72. The CS analysis of food and nutrition security, vulnerabilities of specific groups, numbers and locations of most food insecure households, effects of climatic shocks and regional focus, was mainly based on the CFSVA of December 2008. It provided a set of key conclusions and recommendations, which were integrated in the CS and portfolio. The CFSVA also identified two major geographic priorities: the five Northeastern provinces with 34 percent of the population and 63.3 percent of the food insecure, and the three North West provinces which were not highly food insecure, 17.5 percent of the population, 23.5 percent of all the food insecure, but had the highest prevalence of poverty both in terms of asset poverty and wealth index.<sup>58</sup> The portfolio in the northeast covered school feeding, stunting prevention and targeted supplementary feeding, managed from the field office of Ngozi. In the North West, P4P and endogenous school feeding activities have been implemented, funded by Netherlands since 2013. In this case, donor's strategy was a critical factor of decision.

73. The CFSVA also identified four social groups most vulnerable in terms of livelihood strategies: the marginal households, laborers, agro-brewers and agriculturalists, which comprised 58.3 percent of the population and 68.8 percent of the food insecure. These groups were covered in part by social safety nets for protection, FFAs, and targeted food distributions to the worst affected households during lean seasons. The portfolio interventions also integrated the first five key CFSVA recommendations, which concerned the inclusion of food security-centered programs in national poverty reduction strategies, supporting the national nutrition policy, reinforcing food security monitoring, support the establishment of an institutional social support system, and monetizing rural areas through CBTs.

74. CS and portfolio had limitations in the analysis of gender issues, not considering root causes and impact of detrimental behaviors on food and nutrition security. Selected MAM interventions were also not in line with CFSVA findings on MAM prevalence rates (threshold > 8 percent)<sup>59</sup>. Regarding stunting prevention, WFP decided to pilot an intervention in areas with highest stunting rates, whereas such rates were far above the critical threshold of 40 percent in all provinces except Bujumbura Mairie, which would warrant a nationwide intervention.

### *Contribution to developing national and partner strategies, and national capacity*

75. Capacity development was a less recurrent part of the CO's efforts in supporting national policies in terms of budget and numbers of activities. Such activities were rarely accounted for the annual Standard Project Report (SPR).<sup>60</sup> Their strategic importance is however crucial to contribute to ownership and sustainability.

76. As noted earlier, WFP's comparative advantages in supporting policy formulation and capacity development in a number of sectors, were part of the strategy definition. In accordance with the 2009 WFP policy on Capacity Development and the Strategic Plans, it was duly acknowledged that capacity of targeted institutions is a condition for the envisaged handovers for VAM and logistics. Objective 2.1 of the CS focused on capacity

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<sup>57</sup> Annex H and Annex I provide an analysis of Nutrition and Food Security components.

<sup>58</sup> CFSVA conclusions strangely did not highlight their huge food production potential.

<sup>59</sup> This threshold is disputed by the CO saying "MAM interventions can also be initiated in areas with 5-9 percent of GAM rate with aggravating factors such as high level of food insecurity, morbidity, displacement of populations (provinces with high concentration of returnees/expellees), etc.

<sup>60</sup> SPRs sometimes (CP 2012) include a narrative description of the few capacity development activities; DRR simulation exercise in 2014 is exceptionally well documented. Beneficiary numbers seem to amount to less than 0.1% (2,400) of the total over the period. Costs were not reported.

development of activities most relevant to the other strategy components, such as food security and livelihoods analysis, DRR/DRM, nutrition assistance, school meals, data collection and analysis through DPAEs and PRONIANUT, logistics and monitoring. In addition, “collaboration” (not capacity development) was envisaged with the Ministry of Solidarity in terms of advocacy for the formulation of a safety nets program. Except for 2012, there were no quantitative objectives nor resulting data for capacity development in the Standard Project Reports. The main capacity development activities were:

- i. WFP initiated and supported the national forum on food security and nutrition in 2011 to put food security and nutrition on the national policy agenda. Following that forum, the government of Burundi decided to develop the multi-sectorial strategy to fight against food insecurity and malnutrition, and to become an active member of the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) movement, with the support from WFP and other concerned United Nations actors. WFP also played a critical role in supporting the government to put in place a legal and strategic framework for local food fortification, and in reviewing the national nutrition protocol, supported by a common approach of WFP, FAO and IFAD based in Rome.
- ii. Supported by WFP, the Ministry of Education was in the process of establishing and maintaining at the national level a school feeding program and policy linked to local agricultural production;
- iii. WFP was also the lead agency in the sector of emergency humanitarian assistance until the return of OCHA in 2015; significant support was dedicated to developing DRR platforms at national and regional levels.
- iv. In 2013, WFP supported government's efforts to formulate a national strategy to fight HIV/AIDS (2014-2017), including by collecting evidence on the role of nutrition support as a key component of the strategy.

77. There was not evidence regarding the development of other implementing partners’ strategies by WFP, except in the support provided to safety net institutions – which prompted such activities by the dioceses, or in the cross-fertilization of experience related to food distribution between the Red Cross and OXFAM. Partners were chosen based on their skills, capacities, presence throughout Burundi, or the recognized high quality of their performance.

#### *Factors affecting WFP choices in CS and Portfolio*

78. Ranking and comparison of strategic decision-making factors was not recorded in the available documents. The CS vision statement stated: “WFP will assist the government of Burundi in achieving the Burundi Vision 2025, which envisions a Burundi at peace with itself and economically integrated into the East African Community”. The *national policies* are summarized in the Vision 2025. The Vision is based on eight connected pillars<sup>61</sup> and defines three main objectives: (i) the installation of good governance within the rule of law; (ii) the development of a strong and competitive economy; and (iii) the improvement of the living conditions of the people of Burundi.

79. This guiding framework has guided the CS – taking into account WFP SOs in its corporate Strategic Plan. Interventions were planned in the context of objective iii of the Vision 2025 (as well as objective 2, to a limited extent). They included specific sections concerning the reinvigoration of the agriculture sector; the improvement and protection of the environment; an improvement of transport infrastructure; support to the

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<sup>61</sup> Good Governance and Capacity-Building of the State; Human Capital; Economic Growth and the Fight against Poverty; Regional Integration; Demographics; Social Cohesion; Regional Planning and Urbanization; and Partnership.

education sector; the health sector; strengthening of social protection; and the reinsertion of the most vulnerable returnees. In addition, provision was also made on the fight against HIV/AIDS and the medical and psycho-social support to people living with HIV.

80. In 2012, PRSP-II replaced PRSP-I and was based on 4 strategic pillars: i) strengthening the rule of law, consolidating good governance, and promoting gender equality; ii) transforming Burundi's economy to generate sustainable, job-creating growth; iii) improving access and quality in basic social services and strengthening the social safety net; and iv) promoting development through sustainable environmental and space management. Most relevant for WFP CS were pillars 3 and 4 of PRSP-II. They focus on food security for all through transforming the food system from subsistence farming to market-oriented and household agriculture, and ensuring a decent income while managing natural resources in an integrated and sustainable manner.

81. The stated factors of decision and choices relate to *WFP's mandate*, and the "*evolving shift of WFP from a food aid to a food assistance agency*" which is mentioned once in the CS document. This may reflect the uncertainty of the CO regarding this policy due to gaps in guidance, in the light of the perceived isolation of Burundi. Strategic Objectives were included in the overall alignment table, but not in the narrative. None of WFP corporate policies were mentioned until the 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO 200655, which integrates the new policies on gender and protection.

82. In respect of the application of WFP mandate, the CS seems to have relied rather more on lessons learnt from previous programs than on corporate policies. Such lessons encompassed the whole range of humanitarian, recovery and development activities adapted to Burundi. Since 1968, WFP has intervened in multipurpose projects in education, rural development, health and nutrition. At the onset of Burundi's civil war in 1993, WFP food assistance shifted towards humanitarian aid and assistance to IDPs. Between 1995 and 2006, WFP also integrated lessons learnt from the crisis in neighboring Rwanda. As from 2007, two successive PRROs were implemented. PRRO 10528.0 (2007 – 2008) addressed food security concerns in support of the country's transition from conflict to peace building, reconstruction and reintegration. The recovery component of PRRO 10528.1 (2008 – 2010) furthermore aimed to enhance the nutritional status of vulnerable groups and to provide food as an investment to rebuild and protect human and productive assets.

83. Factors of decision-making were often practical in addition to policy-led. The reasons to stop interventions were very often determined by the *availability of funding* and donor decisions - e.g. to stop school feeding under the PRRO, or the Global Fund support to antiretroviral therapy (ART) due to reporting problems by the Ministry of Health. The engagement in stunting prevention through the blanket feeding approach was largely due to the international focus on this topic – especially under the SUN movement.

84. Another factor that influenced CS and operations choices was the resource mobilization study that had been launched in preparation to the strategy. In a context of "forgotten crisis", results from the study appear overambitious. On that basis, the CS concluded rather optimistically that "given the huge donors interest in and support for WFP's strategic shift from humanitarian and recovery phase to a development continuum, the CO was well positioned to raise the US\$20 million required annually in support of the newly planned CP". Even though the required CP annual budget has consistently remained under the \$20 million threshold, funding shortages have ranged from 29 percent to 57 percent over the period 2011 – 2014 (see Annex J.2.).

### *Learning from experience, adapting to changing contexts*

85. The annual SPRs presented lessons learnt from the CP and the two PRROs. Some highly relevant issues were reported: general need of more sensitization against malnutrition; particular relevance of DRR activities, community assets rehabilitation and sustainable land management, without citing the term resilience, in a poor and disaster-prone country, high dependency on agriculture (CP); success of the CBTs in refugee camps, and of joint field assessments for capacity development from PRRO experiences). Nevertheless, some key findings from this CPE including the need for synergies, better focusing of activities and better integration, and mainstreaming of gender issues into programming do not appear in the list.

86. Among risks, the CS should have identified more clearly the potential medium to longer-term consequences of some of the challenges that were correctly identified in the socio-economic and development context. Such challenges, when combined, now appear as major threats to the future of the country. In particular, the fast-growing demography, combined with the scarcity of arable land that is being eroded by recurrent natural disasters, or the lack of in-depth change of behaviors, towards gender equity or nutrition, - probably a major contributor to malnutrition - combined with the poor quality of education.

87. There were no benchmarks used in the CS, but informally – and to the extent that lessons from much more developed countries can be replicated in Burundi – Brazil and Ivory Coast are considered as benchmarks for school feeding, as well as Kenya for P4P.

88. Overall, WFP remained at the forefront of policy thinking and tools (new electronic vouchers, m-VAM, P4P), although not enough seems to have been done in terms of integrated approach to resilience in Burundi, or in the guidance for improved capacity development in a difficult environment. The CO introduced the (much-delayed) fuel-efficient stoves in schools and households for environmental protection purposes. However, while 141 stoves were introduced since 2012, they were not as energy saving as predicted and some of them had collapsed already.

89. The international move from classical school feeding (SF) to a more home-grown based SF approach was duly considered by the CO. Home-grown school feeding was not feasible in areas suffering from high population pressure, food insecurity and land scarcity. The Netherlands-funded approach was to combine endogenous school feeding with P4P in the North-Western provinces where agricultural potential is still significant.

90. In addition to monitoring, field visits for survey purposes (CFSVA, EFSA, VAM) were regularly carried out jointly and transparently with government officials. Such activities, on top of the reporting from the implementing partners and complaint mechanisms e.g. in refugee camps, provided adequate feedback about beneficiaries needs and attitudes. There was evidence that such feedback was generally acted upon by the CO, as much as budget, capacities and logistics allowed. There were reports concerning recurrent complaints about some poor quality food, especially beans.

## **2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results**

### ***Targeting- Overall***

91. The targeting criteria were relevant for well-defined groups: refugees from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in camps, HIV victims under treatment (based on BMI values below 18.5), vulnerable groups in social institutions, and moderately acute malnourished (MAM- levels above 8%) in health clinics. As stated in chapter 2.1, the

targeting approach in the CS in 2011 was based on the 2008 CFSVA complemented by the 2nd CFSVA carried out in 2014.

92. Targeting relied also on guidance from specialized partners (WHO, Ministry of Education) in the case of school feeding; this approach was WFP's preferred choice for reaching large numbers of beneficiaries with relative ease. Criteria were suitably flexible for potentially large groups that could not be accurately estimated<sup>62</sup> based on projections or trends over past years such as returnees and worst affected agricultural households during lean periods. However, they appeared to be driven by budgetary constraints on top of policy in the case of very large needs such as nutrition and Food For Assets (FFA). Survey results were used to target the most vulnerable among already vulnerable people in some very restricted areas, and were even sometimes distorted in order to remain within budget limits.

93. Implementing partners were carrying out targeting according to WFP criteria, in a participatory way and in close cooperation with affected communities. After a 1st round selection, the list of preselected households was published and publicly validated by the affected community. In case of pressure from local authorities, partners have generally been able to solve issues through advocacy.

#### *Targeting - Food and Nutrition Security*

94. In the 2008 CFSVA, 63,900 households or approximately 300,000 persons were deemed severely food insecure, and 302,700 households (1.5 million people) moderately food insecure falling on borderline food consumption score. In addition, 52.7 percent of under 5 years old children were stunted, and 8.4 percent suffered from wasting. The households most affected by food insecurity were located in five North-East provinces (Cankuzo, Karusi, Muyinga, Ngozi, Kirundo).<sup>63</sup>

95. In 2011 and 2012, the targeted numbers of beneficiaries started to approach the CFSVA 2008 figures (see Table 34 in Annex J, column 4). In 2011, the largest numbers of expected annual beneficiaries were in school feeding (200,000) and Food For Assets/Food for Training (FFA/FFT) - 100,000. This was complemented by GFA (184,000 people targeted) and FFA (272,000 people). However, the combined effects of increasing food insecurity problems and funding shortages have done much to undermine these efforts in 2013 and 2014, except for CBT (42,650 beneficiaries in 2014) and school feeding.

96. In 2014, despite the gradual economic recovery, food security indicators had become significantly worse. One third of households –more than 600,000 (compared to total of 366,600 in 2008) or nearly 3 million people - were severely (130,000) and 470,000 moderately food insecure households. Geographically, the most affected areas were in the center of the country, although the North-East was still severely food insecure. CFSVA cited the main reasons as interlinked crucial challenges of expanding demography, scarcity of lands, effects of climate change, floods, soil erosion, and general lack of economic resources. Gender inequality was not part of the CFSVA. Stunting rates had decreased from 58 percent in 2010 (DHS) to 48.8 percent, but it was still well above the WHO threshold of 40 percent countrywide.

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<sup>62</sup> Numbers of beneficiaries per activity may vary significantly from year to year, as shown in table 33 (Annex J), and they are sometimes very different from projections. This tends to show that the CO has been able to adapt to circumstances when budget was available.

<sup>63</sup> CFSVA 2008, Table 24, page 60.

## *School Feeding*

97. The targeting for school feeding under the Country Programme was conducted in close collaboration with the ministry of education and taking into consideration the completion rates which were by far the lowest in Muyinga (33.1 percent), Kirundo (34.5 percent) and Ngozi (37.1 percent). The selection of schools was done in close collaboration with provincial authorities and followed also some of the WFP criteria, e.g. water availability and road accessibility. The question of water availability at the schools needed to be ascertained, as according to reports from the Ministry of Education for the school year 2012/13, water availability varied for the districts e.g between 27.2 percent (Cibitoke) and 48.1 percent (Ruyigi). This was partly overcome by parents' committees volunteering to bring water and fill in containers at school sites. Targeting coverage in these three initial provinces decreased over the period due to funding shortfalls.

98. The two PRROs also introduced emergency school feeding for children among returnees and their host communities in Makamba, Bururi, Ruyigi and Rutana in 2014 and 2015. Whilst the schools were targeted due to high numbers of displaced, primary completion rates - based on 2012/13 data - were not taken into account. These rates have been comparatively high with 89.9 percent (Bururi), 84 percent (Makamba) and 74.5 percent (Rutana). Ruyigi had much lower completion rates with 59.4 percent only. However, the returnee children had to catch up as they were neither speaking French nor Kirundi.

99. The endogenous school meals program was implemented in Cibitoke, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural because Netherlands cooperation was already funding P4P there, and it was an opportunity to link these activities with home-grown school meals. Targeting seemed to have ignored issues of food insecurity, even though there were also relatively low completion rates in 2013: respectively 66.4 percent, 57.2 percent and 71.4 percent as compared to the national average of 68.5 percent. The targeting of schools in these provinces was not always clear to the CPE team: schools were targeted, which did not appear vulnerable and enjoyed already support from the churches, for example.

## *General Food Assistance (GFA)*

100. GFA<sup>64</sup> and Targeted Food distribution (TFD) in PRROs were appropriately focused on the displaced - refugees from DRC, returnees from Tanzania, IDPs victims of disasters, and the most vulnerable categories hosted in social institutions. GFA targeting was relevant to seasonal vulnerable food-insecure households in communities with the highest levels of severe food insecurity during the lean seasons, and groups such as the Batwas.<sup>65</sup>

101. As outlined in the April 2013 mid-term evaluation of the CP,<sup>66</sup> the issue of increased protection for the most vulnerable categories – victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence, orphans, elderly, disabled - had become a crucial problem by early 2013, although this component was not funded under the CP. Following a request by the Ministry of Solidarity, WFP targeted “institutional feeding” in the relief component of PRRO 200164 and in the recovery component of PRRO 200655. Such targeting was judged as very relevant and effective and enabled response to the increasing numbers of

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<sup>64</sup> Full daily ration of 2100 kcal per beneficiary.

<sup>65</sup> The Batwas are an indigenous related to the pygmies; they have long kept their traditional livelihoods of hunters-gatherers and makers of clay pottery – which are not sustainable anymore. According to the 2008, they represented less than 1% of the population (78,071 people).

<sup>66</sup> Revue à mi-parcours du programme de pays Burundi 200119 (2011-2014, mars-avril 2013), page 61.

“enfants des rues”<sup>67</sup> due to crisis and growing poverty. Social institutions “could not cope without WFP”.

102. The GFA and TFD approaches were in line with WFP’s protection policy<sup>68</sup>. Although WFP does not have a mandate for protection as such, the “practical definition” adopted as to the implementation of the policy<sup>69</sup> is very relevant in this case, and WFP CO promoted protection by providing basic material needs and advocating with authorities on behalf of beneficiaries. WFP recognized the Burundian Government’s primary responsibility while the lack of resources of the Ministry for Solidarity is acknowledged. The CO focused its accountability to crisis-affected populations (AAP), food-insecure people consistent with the first humanitarian principle (Humanity) and furthermore protecting young destitute children from Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV).

103. Targeting most vulnerable Batwas with GFA was very relevant especially as there were recent cases of mortality from famine. Visited Batwas are much willing to learn agricultural techniques but they need time to do it properly on a regular basis, which involves a change of behavior.<sup>70</sup> As for the IDPs victims of natural disasters, the short-term nature of the IR-EMOP was not sufficient to ensure any meaningful transition.

104. Targeting refugees from Eastern DRC (32,496 in 4 camps)<sup>71</sup> was relevant, as they were highly dependent on food assistance. Many had been in the camps since 2004, and military operations in Eastern DRC were still taking place. Refugees received GFA in 3 parts: rations, vouchers for trade fairs, and cash for buying fresh products. However, attractiveness of the refugee camps is likely to decrease after the end of the “pull factor” provoked by the current UNHCR reinstallation program by 2017.<sup>72</sup>

### *Nutrition Security*

105. As compared with the international guidance<sup>73</sup> and the latest WFP nutrition policy guidelines, activities of treatment of MAM should take place if the rate lies between 10 to 15 percent, or is above 8 percent with aggravating conditions. In 2011, MAM activities took place in Bubanza, Karuzi, Rutana, Bururi and Ngozi and the selection of these provinces was not really corresponding to the guidelines.<sup>74</sup> Annex J.4. presents a table showing discrepancies between targeted provinces, CFSVA (2008) and Demography and Health Survey (DHS) 2010

106. In 2012 and 2013, WFP decided to intervene in MAM in all provinces except Bujumbura Mairie. This was due to the request by the Burundi Government to introduce Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) program.<sup>75</sup> The government saw WFP’s

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<sup>67</sup> Boys born out of legal marriage are rejected by their family as they can inherit scarce lands. Girls are sent to work in other houses as early as they can (10 years), for a pittance in dreadful conditions. These beneficiaries are typical victims of 2 key problems in Burundi: over-population and gender violence / SGBV

<sup>68</sup> Policy Issues – Agenda Item 5, Jun 2014; page 5.

<sup>69</sup> Protection means designing and carrying out food assistance activities that do not increase the protection risks faced by crisis-affected populations, but rather contribute to the safety, dignity and integrity of vulnerable people.

<sup>70</sup> Coaching to accompany such change is also needed, otherwise they may drop out as they are not used to work continuously; they need agricultural training, tools, seeds and chickens, which could be provided e.g. by FAO

<sup>71</sup> Source: UNHCR Regional Update 25, Burundi Situation, April 2016; pages 8-9.

<sup>72</sup> Between 2015 and 2017, up to 18,000 refugees in Burundi have an opportunity to be relocated to USA, Australia, Canada or the EU.

<sup>73</sup> MAM treatment should commence if the global acute malnutrition (wasting) is above 10%, or is above 8% with aggravating conditions such as displacement, civil unrest, disease outbreak or other destabilizing factors; stunting prevention is recommended in any situation where the stunting rates exceed 30%. As noted in paragraph 2, stunting rate was 58% <sup>73</sup> SPR 2014-PRRO The underachievement of the targeting supplementary feeding for PLW was caused by an overestimation of planning targets. Since no recent data was available during the development of the PRRO, beneficiary needs were estimated based on the 2010 Health and Demographic Survey (16% MAM prevalence) versus 3.5% assessed by the Feb. 2014 SMART survey.

<sup>74</sup> If WFP had based the selection on data from CFSVA 2008, Cankuzo, Cibitoke and Muyinga should have also been targeted with prevalence rates above 10 percent. Cankuzo was leading the Severity table with 18.5 percent, which would have warranted even a blanket feeding approach to prevent further deterioration. According to DHS, Ruyigi should have been targeted

<sup>75</sup> The main reasons are summarized in paragraphs 6, 12 and 13 of budget revision 3 to PRRO 200164 -BR3.

intervention as a temporary instrument to bridge the time needed to roll out the Foyer d'Apprentissage et de Réhabilitation Nutritionnelle (FARN) approach to all communities. Due to funding shortfalls which prevented managing and monitoring these activities appropriately, combined with the problematic roll out of FARN, WFP stopped this holistic approach and restricted interventions in 2014 to Rutana and Ruyigi, which was in line with the DHS data. The CFSVA 2014 results indicated an aggravating problem in Ngozi (8.5 percent) which led to the extension of MAM interventions in this district. The improvement in Rutana province (6 percent), however, did not lead to closing down the intervention.

107. Stunting prevention started in 2014 as a reaction of WFP to the launch of the SUN movement in Burundi. The portfolio focused appropriately on the crucial issue of chronic under-nutrition in Burundi, particularly in terms of stunting prevention. CFSVAs of 2008 and 2014 both analyzed the issue – recording respectively 52.7 and 48.8 percent of stunting prevalence. This was reflected in the CS.<sup>76</sup> Annex H includes a review of stunting.

108. According to the international classification, a stunting rate above 40 percent indicates a very high prevalence and thus calls for action. The WFP nutrition policy (§49) recommends to start stunting prevention “In countries, provinces, districts or communities where stunting prevalence is at least 30 percent – or at a lower threshold established in national policies – or in high-risk situations”. However, given the widespread stunting in Burundi and the lack of resources, the CO set the threshold for WFP intervention at 50 percent and above, taking into consideration the presence of other actors on the ground. In the case of Burundi, only Bujumbura town (27.8 percent) had a prevalence rate below 40 percent in 2010. In 2014, Mwaro (37.1 percent) joined Bujumbura on the more positive side. The present approach is targeting 12,700 children for stunting prevention.<sup>77</sup> This rather low figure is due to funding shortfalls and the pilot design of this intervention, which still needs evidence of effectiveness. In any case, WFP targeted some of the worst affected districts, but not always systematically according to highest levels. This again was due to the presence of other actors on the ground.

### *HIV/AIDS*

109. The targeting of WFP CO assistance to support people living with HIV/AIDS was relevant. It concentrated on pregnant and lactating women (PLW) as well as malnourished patients at the beginning of the ARV treatment. Numbers and quantities were reduced in 2014 due to lack of resources. WFP was urged by the Global Fund to support the SEP-CNLS through logistical expertise by managing the food supply chain from food procurement, storage up to the delivery to the centers. The MoH was responsible to manage food at health centers and the distribution to beneficiaries, as well as report to the Global Fund on food utilization. The partnership for this project ended in December 2015, partly due to problems in such reporting as well as under-achievement.

### *FFA for Community Development*

110. Lessons learnt from the SPRs show that FFA and related approaches of FFT and CFA – as components of anti-erosion and asset protection programs - are still highly relevant in Burundi. The country is essentially dependent on agriculture and subject to recurrent climatic shocks. While FFA focussed on resilience, this concept was only

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<sup>76</sup> §16-17, regional statistics in §23, 26, 28 and 30, and priority 1 in §61.

<sup>77</sup> CP 200119, component 2, §28: “Blanket feeding will be provided for 12,700 children under 2 during the lean seasons to address chronic malnutrition and stunting in Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke and Karusi provinces. Targeting will be based on stunting rate, food insecurity, poverty, vulnerability and global acute malnutrition levels”.

developed after 2011. This objective was tackled indirectly in the portfolio, as provision of FFA inputs to improving food security.


111. Under the CP, FFA targetted the eastern provinces of Kirundo, Gitega, Cankuzo and Karusi. These province are poor and affected by climate shocks. WFP CO provided vouchers or cash transfers for watershed management resilience. FFA was also funded under the PRROs in Rutana (PRRO 200164) for returnees, Cankuzo and Kurusi (PRRO 200655) for victims of drought, with cash. Targetting FFA activities was severely undermined by funding shortfalls. Under the IFAD/PAIVA-B program, the contribution from WFP was reduced from \$4.6 million to 1.5 million.

112. The term of resilience is a holistic concept not achievable by WFP alone under its mandate. It needs to be considered in a synergy perspective. Instead, the rehabilitation of damaged assets, ensuring adequate food consumption or improved access to basic services were stated as separate objectives. Various would-be components of resilience packages such as CBTs and WFP contribution in partnership to food production, home gardening, livelihoods, anti-erosion forestry or watershed management projects, were included distinctly in IFAD’s PRODEFI program.

### **Portfolio Performance at output level**

113. During the evaluation period, compared to the aggregate planned target of 4.3 million people, WFP provided food assistance to 3.6 million in North, North-East and South parts of Burundi. Of the total required budget of US\$287 million, only US\$175.4 million was received. Review of the above data points to the priority given to various components of the portfolio. School feeding in the programs accounted for about a third of the total actual beneficiaries. In terms of statistics, school feeding can benefit large numbers of children through the school system, as it can also be readily demonstrated through the statistics on enrollment and retention rates collected by Ministry of Education on a regular basis. GFA covered 953,376 actual beneficiaries of whom 165,288 benefited from CBT. Nutrition accounted for 412,761 beneficiaries despite the widespread stunting problem. FFA interventions reached only 242,029 beneficiaries despite the importance of protecting agricultural assets in Burundi. FFAs were more successful while targeting areas of returnees under the 1st PRRO, compared to the Country Program.

**Table 4 :Total planned and actual beneficiaries of portfolio: 2011- 2015**




114. In response to the combined effects of increasing food needs and funding shortfalls, the CO made adjustments to initial targets, which in some cases were overestimated,<sup>78</sup>

<sup>78</sup> SPR 2014-PRRO The underachievement of the targeting supplementary feeding for PLW was caused by an overestimation of planning targets. Since no recent data was available during the development of the PRRO, beneficiary needs were estimated based on the 2010 Health and Demographic Survey (16% MAM prevalence) versus 3.5% assessed by the Feb. 2014 SMART survey.

and reduced some food ration deliveries both in terms of duration and quantities below 2100 kcal per day. On the other hand, negative impact on beneficiary coverage was also mitigated by introduction of home grown school feeding and P4P.

**Figure 3: % of Beneficiaries reached against targets 2011-2015, by activity**



Source: SPR 2011 – 2015

**Table 5 Planned and actual beneficiaries as a percentage of total number of beneficiaries by activity 2011 –2015<sup>79</sup>**

Activity Operation		HIV/AIDS	School feeding	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/FFA	Cash/Vouchers
CP 200119	Planned	19,375 1%	1,118,000 72%	331,969 21%		82,543 5%	50,000 3%
	Actual	10,231 1%	1,120,983 81%	205,051 15%		40,835 3%	42,650 3%
PRRO 200655	Planned		225,000 81%	108,030 21%	168,000 32%	20,000 4%	70,000 13%
	Actual		182,876 40%	92,249 20%	162,249 36%	19,261 4%	64,809 14%
IR-EMOP 200678	Planned			3,500 15%	20,000 85%		
	Actual			1,567 7%	22,160 93%		
PRRO 200164	Planned		195,288 18%	136,963 12%	600,088 54%	182,040 16%	171,000 15%
	Actual		211,507 21%	113,912 11%	534,998 53%	141,234 14%	57,829 6%
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>		19,375 0.6%	1,538,288 48%	580,462 18%	788,088 25%	284,583 9%	291,000 9%
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>		10,231 0.4%	1,515,366 53%	412,779 14%	719,407 25%	201,330 7%	165,288 6%

Source: Dacota as of Dec. 2015

115. The collection of data on planned and actually tonnages distributed was not consistent between CP and PRROs. Whilst the CP presented annual figures for school

<sup>79</sup> Data for beneficiaries are cumulative; refugees and school children are e.g. considered from 2011 to 2015.

feeding, nutrition, and community recovery and development, the SPRs for the two PRROs provided global figures only, not disaggregated by type of activities. Therefore, no overall analysis can be made for the different activities on that basis.

116. Of the total planned quantity (169,000 MT), only 85,800 or 50.8 percent was distributed. Worst affected were the CP and the 2nd PRRO, although neither the 1st PRRO nor the IR-EMOP were able to deliver more 60 percent of the planned amount. Furthermore, performance in distribution of tonnage were generally lower than achievements in reaching beneficiaries. Of the 40, 180 MT planned for school feeding, 21, 142 MT was distributed. For FFA/FFW, 22,812 MT was planned and 9,870 MT was distributed. For nutrition, 16,900 MT was planned and 3,700 MT was distributed. Narratives of output sections in SPRs generally mention lack of resources for under-achievements. Only SPR 2013 for PRRO 200164 and SPR 2014 for PRRO 200655 provide more actual explanations (respectively: inappropriate targeting mechanism and overestimation of pregnant and lactating women for supplementary feeding). In terms of volume of food assistance, Table 6 shows SPR figures of planned and actually delivered metric tons (MT). It includes: maize, beans, rice, CSB, salt, peas, sugar and oil.

**Table 6: Planned versus Actual Tonnages (SPRs)**

Operation \ Activity		HIV/AIDS	School feeding	Nutrition	GFA	FFW/FFT/FFA	Total
CP 200119	Planned	-	40,183	16,898	-	22,812	79,893
	Actual, % of planned	-	21,142	3,770	-	9,879	34,791 43.5%
PRRO 200655	Planned	-	-	-	-	-	10,476
	Actual, % of planned	-	-	-	-	-	4,812 45.9%
IR-EMOP 200678	Planned	-	-	-	699	-	699
	Actual, % of planned	-	-	-	418	-	418 59.8%
PRRO 200164	Planned	-	-	-	-	-	77,938
	Actual, % of planned	-	-	-	-	-	45,811 58.8%
<b>Total planned quantities of MT and %</b>		-	-	-	-	-	169,006
<b>Actual total quantities of MT and % of planned MT</b>		-	-	-	-	-	85,832 50.8%

117. In the P4P program, good progress towards target outputs was achieved as follows:

- i. Indicator 1: 20,000 MT of food procured locally through local and regional purchase. Data provided by the Procurement Office in Bujumbura reveal that by mid-2015, the CO had procured 20,032 MT of food through local and regional purchase (see Table 30 in Annex I). The table further evidences that purchases from cooperatives rapidly increased from less than 1 percent to over 25% of the total commodities procured through local and regional purchase.
- ii. Indicator 2: At least 6,000 MT of food procured locally. Updated M&E figures indicate that 4,255 MT procured from cooperatives (Table 29 in Annex I).
- iii. Indicator 3: 500 farmers trained in market access and post-harvest handling. Quick roll out of P4P activities and enthusiasm of local producers enabled WFP to

provide training in production and post-harvest management to 900 members in 39 cooperative as from the 1st year of implementation.<sup>80</sup>

118. Within nutrition, FFA, school feeding, GFA and, between 71 and 100 percent of all intended beneficiaries were reached. Data on food assistance for HIV and CBTs show comparable figures ranged between 35% and slightly over to 55% of targets reached. Table 7 shows an inverse association between increasing numbers of beneficiaries and a parallel decrease of tonnage distributed. Beneficiaries increased from 702,041 in 2011 to 791,134 in 2015, while tonnage distributed fell from 21,396 in 2011 to 13,678 in 2015. On that basis, the average food ration per person decreased from 30.5 Kg in 2011 to 17.3 kg in 2015. Testimonies and SPR (2014)<sup>81</sup> indicate some inflated estimates of food requirements in 2011 and 2012.

**Table 7: Association between n° of beneficiaries and MT distributed (SPRs)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Actual beneficiaries</b>	<b>Total Food Distributed (MT)</b>
2015	791,134	13,678
2014	865,308	15,809
2013	647,213	15,731
2012	629,076	19,209
2011	702,041	21,396
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,634,772</b>	<b>85,832</b>

119. However, the simultaneous increase in beneficiaries and decrease in tonnage distributed was due to the increased numbers of children reached through endogenous school feeding in the North Western provinces including 144 schools with their own gardens, where most of the food produced by nearby P4P cooperatives was distributed. Both the introduction of vouchers instead of GFA and the P4P assistance to smallholder farmers who do not need external food played a role in explaining this trade-off. These figures demonstrate that gains in efficiency and effectiveness have been achieved by modalities such as vouchers, endogenous school feeding and P4P, although they cannot be accurately measured. Finally, shorter delivery periods and lower nutritional intakes following some of the approaches used under nutrition and GFA food parcels for IR-EMOP beneficiaries, contributed to such trade-off.

<sup>80</sup> 2014 SPR CP 200119 ; no page n°.

<sup>81</sup> Testimonies from CO “institutional memory”, and one reference in SPR 2014 for PRRO 200655 saying that “the underachievement of the targeted supplementary feeding program targeting PLW was caused by an overestimation of the planning figure ». Beneficiary needs had been estimated based on the 2010 Health and Demographic Survey, which was not in accordance with later surveys.

## ***Portfolio Performance at outcome level***

### *Overall findings*

120. As shown in Figure 3, in 2011 and 2012, WFP CO effectively met or exceeded the planned targets in school feeding, GFA, FFA, HIV/TB with fluctuating performance in nutrition. However, in later years, its ability to meet planned targets declined.

121. There were gaps in adherence to corporate outcome indicator measurements for some years, outcomes are difficult to systematically assess in a consistent manner. CP SPR show Community Asset Score (CAS) were not measured (2011-2015), Coping Strategies Index (CSI) and Food Consumption Score (FCS) were not measured in 2013 and 2014<sup>82</sup>. SPRs for PRRO 200164 record FCS between 2011 and 2014, but figures of “previous follow up” were not consistent with the previous year. CSI was measured only in 2012, and CAS only in 2013 and 2014. Some figures were also inconsistent. For example, in 2014 under PRRO 200655, CAS indicated an improvement (rated at 63% against a baseline of 58% and an end target value of 80%). However, borderline food consumption score, contrary to ideal association depending on the type of asset, was at 46% for female-headed households and 54% for male-headed ones, against respective baselines of 13% and 27%, and end-line targets of 2.6 and 5.4.<sup>83</sup> SPRs mention resource constraints for surveys, lack of recording by implementing partners, planning scheduled for the next year, or indicate that analyses were not carried out “due to insufficient human resources”.

### *Food and Nutrition Security*

#### School feeding

122. School feeding met 98% of planned targets and provided children with daily hot meals for 9.5 months of each school year, although at times of funding shortfall it was reduced to 6 months. The outcomes of school feeding were assessed against CP indicators: i) enrolment rate increases by 6 percent in 80 percent of assisted schools; ii) attendance rate reaches at least 90 percent; iii) gender balance is reached in the assisted schools; and iv) rate of drop outs is not more than 3 percent. In 2013 and 2014, SPRs for CP 200119 indicate sharp increases in numbers of children provided with school feeding: from 186,869 children in 2012 to 315,823 in 2013, and 440,427 in 2014. This is mostly due to the linkage of endogenous school feeding with P4P in the three North Western provinces where enrollment increased. In parallel, enrolment rates decreased in the Northern provinces where standard school feeding was affected by funding shortfalls and drought. Data on attendance were not recorded separately for North-West and northern provinces which did not provide enough evidence for indicators 1 and 2 for these 2 years.

123. In 2015, positive outcomes were registered in school feeding, as the number of children enrolled increased for both boys and girls by 7.52 percent, although the effect on neighboring schools without canteens was not measured. School feeding also contributed to stabilize the retention rate in the northern areas of Burundi, which were affected by the new socio-political crisis.

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<sup>82</sup> CP SPR 2013 FFA activities were implemented within the framework of an agreement between WFP and IFAD. As the activities only began in November 2013, WFP could not measure some of the outcomes of the project during the reporting period. In 2014, Outcome measurement for FFA projects carried out in Cankuzo, Karuzi and Kirundo provinces could not be undertaken as they were still going on in December 2014. In 2015, the community asset score (CAS) was not measured in Karuzi as a result of errors in the targeting during the baseline survey. Outcome indicators were not measured for FFA implemented in Kayanza as the programme was implemented for a short time.

<sup>83</sup> SPR PRRO 200655 - 2014 – no baseline FCS (Rutana), although Outcome measurement for FFA projects carried, final FCS for SO1 were not reported, out in Cankuzo and Karuzi provinces could not be undertaken as activities were still ongoing in December 2014.

124. The CO collected data on gender balance in schools but only for the PRRO in 2014 and 2015.<sup>84</sup> There were also indicators for dropouts during the same years.<sup>85</sup> These data were available only for one school year so performance could not be assessed. However, gender balance was achieved, whilst the rate of dropouts was still above the critical threshold.

125. The CPE team stresses the importance of quality of education as a key driver for much needed change in the country; and the need to include educational quality considerations in programming of school feeding interventions. Much larger class sizes rising from 50 to 80 children were bound to affect education quality. The stated objectives of the school feeding intervention did not address the often cited poor quality of education, including in the CS.<sup>86</sup> From the point of view of successful school results (“taux de réussite au concours national”), Ministry of Education statistics provide a positive picture for the provinces which benefited from school feeding, although there was no assessment of the exact attribution of the program in these achievements. In 2015, 10 out of the 18 provinces which benefited from school feeding in traditional, endogenous or returnee areas showed an average success rate of 83.7 percent against a national average of 82.5 percent. It should be noted that the national success rate increased significantly across the board from 2014 (average of 66.2 percent) without clear reasons.

#### General Food Assistance (GFA) / Cash based Transfers (CBT)

126. Overall, GFA was provided to 953,376 IDPs, refugees and vulnerable households of whom 165,288 benefited from CBT. Outcomes of food security activities were generally positive. WFP also supported the implementation of a national social protection program contributing its experience in vulnerability assessment, targeting and CBT. The growing consequences of the current crises and increased needs for safety nets for the most vulnerable resulted in the need to locate GFA within the national social protection framework. In some cases, GFA activities were not effective, as certain activities were not perceived as directly linked to beneficiaries in particular in feeder roads and due to climatic conditions. For example, beneficiaries appreciated kitchen gardens as they tended to auto-replicate, but only during the rainy season. Dry season could be harsh, the water source was sometimes 3-4 km away, and kitchen gardens were often abandoned.

127. The CO used different transfer modalities with flexibility. After a period of sensitization in 2014, the introduction of vouchers and trade fairs in refugee camps was also highly appreciated for the diversity of food choices. WFP CO conducted a post-distribution monitoring of the combined voucher and in-kind food assistance program for refugees in June 2014. It showed that the food security situation of the refugees continued to improve as evidenced by an increase of 4% in the proportion of households with acceptable food consumption scores between September 2013 and June 2014.

#### Nutrition and Health

128. The objective was to improve nutritional outcomes for children under 5 years of age and pregnant and lactating women in five of the most vulnerable target provinces. Program approach included: i) MAM treatment; ii) MAM prevention and iii) stunting prevention through blanket feeding for 12,700 vulnerable children aged 6-23 months. Meeting 71% of the planned target, WFP provided nutrition assistance to 412,761 children, pregnant and lactating women and 10,231 people living with HIV on antiretroviral therapy; training to 33 health promotion technicians and 1,582 community

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<sup>84</sup> Cibitoke (0.96), Bujumbura (1.01), Bubanza (1), Bururi (1.02), Makamba (1.03).

<sup>85</sup> Cibitoke (girls: 6%, boys: 7%), Bubanza (girls: 6%, boys: 6%), Bujumbura (girls: 3%, boys: 4%), Bururi (girls: 5%, boys: 5%).

<sup>86</sup> In §10 and - almost counterfactually - in §65.

health workers in stunting prevention. Under the nutrition component of the CP, the November 2014 Food Security Outcomes Monitoring (FSOM) indicated that the proportion of children consuming an acceptable diet considerably increased. While far from the target, the program saw a 100 percent increase in the minimum acceptable diet after a five-month food distribution. In 2015, however, the coverage rate of the nutrition component was below target because of funding shortfalls affecting the implementation of stunting prevention.

129. From 2011 to 2014, there were gaps in quality and frequency of monitoring activities. The effectiveness of MAM activities during this period could not be determined. During field visits, food rations were reported to be shared among all family members or sold, and treatment was not systematically combined with nutrition education and gender empowerment. Consequently, USAID was putting more pressure on WFP CO to have a better monitoring in place. WFP monitoring visits were done by field monitors including on the job training, corrections and assistance in bookkeeping, organizing stores, which kept them up to three hours in one center. The result is impressive, but inputs in terms of time and cost were large.

130. As Table 8 shows, MAM performance indicator benchmarks were met in 2015 after WFP stepped up efforts to monitor the MAM interventions. Due to the reinforced monitoring support, technical procedures at health center level were clear; staff and beneficiaries knew entitlements. There were also other observations which determined the effectiveness as well, see Annex J.4. However, USAID/ Burundi was not in favor of the way the MAM treatment approach was implemented and indicated during discussions with the CPE team that they wanted to stop supporting it financially.

**Table 8: MAM performance indicators and targets**

Indicator	Benchmark	WFP 2015
Cure Rate	>75%	90.0%
Non-respondent	<10%	5.0%
Abandon	<15%	5.0%
Died	<3%	0.4%
Transfer	<10%	4.4%

131. Stunting prevention is at the heart of the SUN Initiative (“1000 days window of opportunity”). WFP was trying to contribute by providing fortified food to the target group comprising PLW and children between 6 and 23 months of age. Despite efforts to prove the effectiveness of the intervention, the activity is still quite recent (2015) and there is still no clear evidence of effectiveness in Burundi. Other partners have shown that dietary diversity was increasing, but only due to the fortified food from food assistance and not from locally available food. The implementation had to be stopped in Muramvya and Rutana provinces due to funding problems.

132. In general, there was an inconsistent implementation of stunting prevention, sometimes omitting PLW, sometimes including children only up to 18 months to make sure that they can stay in the project for at least 6 months. The distributed food varied as well, based on availability of food item: plumpy’doz with CSB, only 250g of CSB per person. The food was calculated based on three household members, which does not

appear appropriate as the average household size is well above 5 members. As the food is usually distributed among the whole household, the impact was bound to be much reduced for the beneficiaries.

133. In the absence of WFP data, neighboring projects were able to provide some insight. The Catholic Relief Service (CRS) was implementing a stunting prevention project in Muyinga with an applied research component (IFPRI, FANTA and implementing partners). The results on maternal nutrition did not evidence any impact on weight gain between intervention and control groups. Dietary diversity in mothers and children increased only due to the Corn Soy Blend. During a presentation conference, the main message was that there was no reduction in stunting, but rather a general maintenance of stunting rates in the implementation area.

134. The project seemed to have merely protected the intervention group from further deterioration. It will be of utmost importance to understand the factors leading to deterioration in order to define perhaps more interventions to help reduce stunting. In addition, how was Burundi able to bring down stunting rates from 58% to 48.8% between 2010 and 2014 – without this kind of intervention? Results vary from district to district (see Annex H). There should be a determinant analysis to understand the driving forces behind such developments. It should also be noted that PRONIANUT expressed their preference for the FARN approach which according to them can bring more sustainable solutions. WFP CO is not supportive of the present way FARN approach is being implemented as it shows limitations in effectiveness.

#### *Food for Assets - Community Recovery and Development*

135. With the objective to restore, build, and enhance community resilience to shocks, WFP supported 242,029 participants in FFA activities such as construction of feeder roads and erosion protection considered highly relevant in Burundi. Performance was stable but remained relatively low at 71% of planned coverage. There was evidence of positive outcomes from FFA in the field.

136. In the context of the IFAD PRODEFI agricultural development program in Karusi (one of the few examples of synergies), activities were reportedly effective in improving nutrition of children and perhaps erase Kwarshiokor in targeted communities. In particular, they were more effective when combined with other (non-FFA) activities: bouillie (porridge for young children, also delivered by WFP), irrigation, composting, kitchen gardens, VSLA (village-level savings and loans association), small cattle, training/capacity development, gender equality in management committees, and “bio-fortified” beans (much more productive and better priced than normal beans). Community Asset Score (CAS) was not measured consistently but indicated an improvement from 58% to 63% (80% being the target). A final evaluation<sup>87</sup> carried out in June 2015 showed that the proportion of people with a poor food consumption score (FCS) had decreased by 7%, and that the adoption of harmful coping strategies had decreased by 5%.

137. Some activities of a truly holistic resilience approach were usually found missing during field visits: GBV sensitization, fuel-efficient stoves, village savings and loans association (VSLA). In addition, there was a need for better synergies with FAO for agricultural inputs and training, with SUN/FARN for nutrition and with UNICEF and WHO for hygiene, education and health. There was also a need for a network of voluntaries supported on the longer term by a small “care and maintenance” budget to

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<sup>87</sup> Commissioned by WFP country Office

ensure real change of behaviors, ownership and sustainability, as implemented by some partners. The “heart of resilience” is however to be found in the integration intervention design into the Communal Development Plan.

138. In Rutana, there was another very positive example of a crest reforestation and erosion protection project. Despite a three-month contract that was far too short due to budget cuts, WFP food contribution was crucial. Because, there was very little to eat before and children abandoned school because they were hungry. The partner-implemented VSLA was active. Appreciated by stakeholders, it helped to send children to school, buy food for the whole family, provide health care, buy goats and open small business. Beneficiaries were enthusiastic about future prospects. In contrast, a visited FFA-related activity of housing construction for vulnerable returnees in Rutana did not appear to be effective. Houses were useful, but not integrated into a more comprehensive resilience approach.

#### Purchase for Progress (P4P)

139. The P4P initiative is a result of WFP transition from food aid to food assistance rolled out following the WFP 2008–2013 Strategic Plan. An analysis with SWOT table is in Annex I. While Burundi did not take part in the pilot phase, the CO introduced P4P activities in the 2013 revision of CP adopted by the Executive Board. P4P activities fall under a revised CP Component 3 “Support for community recovery and development”. The formulation of this added component revolves around Goal 2 “Leverage purchasing power to connect smallholder farmers to markets, reduce post-harvest losses, support economic empowerment of women and men and transform food assistance into a productive investment in local communities”.

140. Towards the end of 2013 and in due alignment with the Multi-Annual Strategic Plan of the Netherlands Cooperation, the CO started rolling out a four-year « P4P-like » initiative with the aim of supporting agricultural production of smallholder farmers by providing them reliable market opportunities, and transforming food assistance into a productive investment in local communities. In this respect, WFP made a commitment to supply maize, rice and beans to meet the needs of school feeding activities largely through local purchases. The rationale was to increase in-country commercialization of food commodities and therefore increase financial resources of low-income farmers.

141. Focused largely on local food purchase of 20,032 MT, P4P supported almost 14,000 farmers in 39 cooperatives. The tonnage sold by cooperatives generated a significant amount of cash in local economies. Data from CO Procurement Office indicate that WFP procured local food with a total value of \$4.75 million (Annex I). However, it was difficult to establish the exact number of farmers who benefited from this increase of financial resources, as the impact on their livelihoods and overall food security could not be demonstrated. In-depth data analysis highlighted that production costs of the food commodities were not precisely known. Deducing actual profit per capita was impossible.

142. WFP is aware of the necessity to collect precise data about production and productivity of farmers involved in cooperatives, and is preparing an assessment of each group admitted in the vendor register, with clear guidelines. Overall, WFP has complied with the objectives of its strategic document, although procurement through « non-competitive transactions » proved to be difficult in Burundi in spite of a comprehensive and approved Procurement Plans.

143. Capacity was built to improve farm productivity, reduce post-harvest losses and globally increase quality of products. However, cooperatives continue to face governance and management difficulties. WFP and partners are strongly committed to reinforce

capacity building and further tailor assistance to these groups to graduate and become vendors able to stand competitive bidding.

144. In terms of procurement and contracting, reports and interviews highlighted a situation that became sometimes conflictual between WFP and its partners. The roll out of P4P seems to have raised expectations among farmers to sell their products at higher prices given the additional efforts required to supply WFP. However, the cost of added workload to deliver required quality was still under calculation. The fact that WFP did not offer premium prices for products of premium quality was a main source of frustration from the cooperatives, who also regretted the lack of contractual commitment about quantities for purchase. More predictability about expected sales to WFP would encourage farmers to increase their production without having to deal with the risk of not selling or not being able to store their harvests.

#### *Capacity Development*

145. With the assistance of WFP, a number of national policies have been successfully developed in food fortification, agriculture, nutrition and education. WFP was instrumental in setting up the 1st forum of 2011 on nutrition and food security. Capacity development was implemented as a cross-cutting intervention, consistent with the Strategic Plan 2014-2017. The CO support was relatively small scale and insufficiently frequent. There was no program officer assigned to this important CS priority.

146. There was a large DRR simulation exercise at the end of 2014. Results of capacity development support to the national DRR/DRM platform were rather poor, and prospects for sustainability appeared low. After the simulation, the degree of preparedness and response of Burundi was evaluated at 2.2 on a scale going from 0 to 4, and the Emergency Preparedness Capacity index (EPCI) was rated at 13 out of 20. Despite WFP's support to provincial DRR/DRM platforms, results were mixed. Platforms in Muyinga, Gitega and Rutana were assessed by stakeholders as moderately effective. Provincial contingency plans were defined, but their local resourcing and effectiveness remained limited.

#### *Humanitarian Response*

147. Outcomes of emergency humanitarian response activities were positive although linkages with recovery and sustainability were not ensured. The objective of WFP in disaster response and mitigation in Burundi was to provide emergency assistance to the IDPs and victims of natural disasters through IR-EMOPs, with standard GFA parcels for three months. IR-EMOP 200678 delivered 418 MT of food assistance to 22,160 IDPs. This has been effective, timely and much needed as the victims had lost all their assets and belongings and other assistance was scarce. The three months emergency food aid was too short-term when the IDPs have lost their fields, cattle and tools under torrents of mud and rocks resulting from flash floods.

148. Community development plans were unable to cope with such disasters, due to the lack of communal land and other local resources. Local authorities and victims sent their requests to the Ministry of Solidarity to resettle them elsewhere - even in far-away provinces. However, there was very little land available due to overpopulation and the IDPs seem to have been "forgotten" by the under-resourced Ministry after some initial assistance in terms of non-food items. Early warning activities over the 2012-2014 period concerned the regular publication of regional bi-annual Early Warning and Preparedness bulletins, and bi-monthly Early Warning Reports for Burundi only since the end of 2014. There was no evidence about their effectiveness.

### *Factors explaining performance and results*

149. A number of factors explain the performance of WFP operations in Burundi. By order of perceived importance, on the positive side, they included logistics, quality of staff and organizational structure, respect for humanitarian principles and protection coverage, and flexible adaptation of transfer modalities to situations. On the other hand, weak programmatic synergies and integration (see section 2.3.7), and funding shortfalls negatively affected the programming, performance, results and sustainability of operations.

#### Logistics

150. The logistical support offered by WFP to GFA activities was a strong comparative advantage in Burundi. Burundi is land-locked between DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania, and international supplies arrive by land transport covering 1400 Km from the port of Dar-Es-Salaam, which makes logistics difficult. Very few humanitarian organizations and partners could deliver food assistance using their own logistics - until the “last mile”. They sometimes did it with the lighter delivery resources of the local actors. The trucking capacity of the Red Cross was severely curtailed by overall limitations of funding. The relevant Ministries such as the Ministry of Solidarity or institutions like the National DRR platform, and Civil Protection had also logistical problems. In cases of large crisis, authorities have requested support from Ministries of Public Security or National Defense.

151. This important comparative advantage of the WFP CO work needed therefore to be maintained<sup>88</sup> as both private and WFP-owned truck fleets were used to transport food commodities in Burundi. WFP logistics was a key factor in the relatively positive appreciation of the DRR simulation exercise in 2014. CO reports indicate WFP’s suitable adaptation to challenges including many delivery points and small quantities of food to be delivered for school feeding, reluctance by private transporters to comply with this situation, poor road conditions and inaccessibility during the rainy season. Trucks and pickups adapted to slippery roads.

152. Nevertheless, stakeholders expressed some concerns. WFP trucks that bring food to general distributions points were regularly late, disrupting the process. According to security rules, partners’ staff must leave the field early enough to be back at base before nightfall, which becomes very difficult when trucks arrive at 2 PM in the afternoon instead of 10 AM in the morning. When distributions were cancelled, because of delays they could create riots. Despite prior consultation with refugees on timing of food distributions, female members of refugee committees reported delays at the beginning of the month which contributed to growing debts of some households, a concern also expressed by cooperating partners. Under P4P, late collection of crops entailed additional storage costs accruing to participant farmers.

#### Staffing and organization

153. The CO staffing structure appeared overall adequate for the country portfolio as testified by the very positive appreciation of all the implementing partners, and the good relations maintained with authorities at national and local levels. There were some anecdotal remarks from stakeholders about the lack of WFP presence at some camp distributions, and about the lack of autonomy of the Gitega field office – which could not be solved for the time being as only the Ngozi field office is headed by a P3 professional

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<sup>88</sup> Total current fixed costs for logistics are \$60,224/month (\$24,614 for salaries; \$10,500 for warehouse rental; \$25,110 for fleet management fixed costs).

staff. Annex J.4 presents an analysis of the disaggregated Human Resources data and statistics for gender repartition among CO staff members. Nearly all key sectors reviewed by the CPE are filled in by skilled program officers and associates for school feeding, protection and gender; nutrition, P4P, FFA, DRR, emergency response, refugees, HIV, M&E and VAM.

154. However, there was a gap in the programming of capacity development of government institutions, as no officer was currently assigned to this important component of the CS. This may explain the absence in the CS of a framework of expected results and performance, except only indicated in SPR 2012 for the CP. Staffing for programming social safety nets should also be strengthened. Review of staffing priorities indicated should the MAM treatment in widespread health centers be maintained and not be refocused on some centers of excellence, the monitoring function in Gitega will need to be further reinforced and resourced.

#### Humanitarian principles and protection policy

155. WFP CO adhered to humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, in its operational activities and technical assessments. Close cooperation with the government ministries and the challenging political context since the April 2015 crisis could have threatened their application. Political issues were never part of the equation. When assistance was not provided to potential beneficiaries, this was due either to funding shortfalls or to the lack of capacity of implementing partners.

156. The CO also followed the wider principle of humanity to alleviate human suffering, as well as the do-no-harm approach. The very broad 1st humanitarian principle of Humanity did not only target life-saving activities but also encapsulated the much wider factors of human suffering and dignity. Its application, which should have arguably concerned a majority of the Burundi population suffering from food and nutrition insecurity, was not considered in the PRROs, and would have been even more subject to funding limitations.

157. In the WFP Protection Policy, updated in June 2014, the practical application of protection is closely related to the principle of Humanity. Integrating protection into programs involves ensuring that WFP “take into consideration the safety, dignity and respect for the rights of beneficiaries”, combined with integrated programming and accountability to affected populations (AAP). Food, cash based transfers to the most vulnerable, FFAs and school feeding were considered by WFP as key instruments for social protection.<sup>89</sup> This approach is consistent with the protection applied by the CO. It should essentially be seen as food, nutrition and training input that are increasingly needed through multiple activities. These included social safety nets in cooperation with the very much under-resourced Ministry of Solidarity; communities at risk from shocks; and support to victims of gender violence. The growing need of supporting safety-nets for social protection was outlined in the mid-term CP evaluation<sup>90</sup> – although institutional feeding was not implemented in the CP but in the two PRROs.

#### Flexible Modalities of Transfer

158. WFP CO used transfer modalities such as cash, vouchers and food parcels with flexibility. Opinions of the stakeholders regarding appropriateness of such modalities varied, but the majority agreed on a limited and controlled use of cash for specific

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<sup>89</sup> WFP's role in social protection and safety nets: a strategic evaluation; Feb 2011

<sup>90</sup> §187, « Revue à mi-parcours du programme de pays – Burundi 200119 », Apr 2013

purposes buying fresh food in refugee camps, and were otherwise in favor of either food parcels or vouchers.

159. Some development partners, such as IFAD and FAO, who work not only with the most vulnerable but also with those who can best grow crops or raise cattle, expressed preference for cash that can be used for health, school, or clothing expenses. However, the implementing partners who have worked with vulnerable beneficiaries of FFA<sup>91</sup> confirm that food or vouchers was generally preferred to cash; while for safety considerations, vouchers were seen as more secure. There was one exception concerning the shift from FFW to vouchers under FFA. Food parcels did not require any reference to market prices as outlined in the refugee camps, prices of vouchers that are negotiated beforehand are almost never equivalent to fluctuating market prices. This transition also often required explanations and advocacy. Traders appreciated vouchers, as these are easily integrated in local market flows.

160. Most field actors also agreed that food parcels and vouchers were used by women for household nutrition, whilst “volatile” cash risked being appropriated by husband, for other purposes. One partner stated however that in their project the use of cash revenues is jointly decided by husband and wife to buy goats and improve nutrition of children. Any deviation is likely to be found by monitors and reported to the complaints committee; as a result, the general assembly of the community may decide to withdraw the culprit from the list of program beneficiaries.

161. The vouchers’ approach often required, however, some advocacy with the beneficiaries. In the refugee camps, cash was initially preferred, but recently vouchers associated with the variety of goods offered in trade fairs were overwhelmingly appreciated. The introduction of electronic vouchers was also appreciated by refugees and implementing partners as it provides more security, flexibility, and “modernity”.

### Funding shortfalls

162. Over the CPE period, annual funding shortfalls ranged from 29 percent (CP in 2013) to a maximum of 57 percent (CP 2012). On the whole, funding shortfalls averaged to 40 percent of requirements (CP and PRRO 200655 are still operational) and were impacting development activities under the CP, and relief, recovery and emergency assistance under PRROs and IR-EMOP (See **Table 9**).

163. This situation may be due to the fact that – until the new political and social deadlock of mid 2015 – Burundi seems to have largely become a “forgotten crisis” by donors due to its small size, landlocked and linguistic isolation, the proximity of a much larger and crisis in Eastern DRC, and the fact that the country was supposed to be safely on the road to development. There was also a lack of donor diversification, as funding heavily relied on USAID.

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<sup>91</sup> The NGOs World vision and Floresta were interviewed, together with Red Cross, Dioceses, authorities and beneficiaries.

**Table 9:** Budget requirements and actual funding per operation 2011 – 2015 (source: WFP)

Operation	Requirements US\$	Actual received US\$	% Funded
CP 200119	105,366,484	57,560,980	<b>54.6%</b>
PRRO 200655	81,804,494	52,920,363	<b>64.7%</b>
IR-EMOP 200678	1,361,213	1,074,533	<b>78.9%</b>
PRRO 200164	98,480,619	63,840,369	<b>64.8%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>287,012,810</b>	<b>175,396,245</b>	<b>61.1%</b>

164. Although there were no details of funding shortfalls by activities, only aggregate data by operations were readily available, disruptive effects were reported in the descriptive parts of all the annual SPRs. They concern all sectors: reductions in school feeding from 2012 onwards in the three North-East provinces most affected by food insecurity; in FFA, FFT, CBTs; supplementary feeding for under 5 years old and PLW in 2011, 2013 and 2014. There was limited blanket feeding against stunting or GFA in 2014. Support to HIV victims under ART was negatively affected by funding shortages in 2014<sup>92</sup> and lack of cooperation between MoH and Global Fund.

165. During field visits, there was evidence of detrimental effects in particular in and around refugee camps: some riots were avoided thanks to advocacy and rehabilitation of surroundings access roads under FFA. More details on funding shortages are shown in Annex J.2.

#### *Efficiency of the country Portfolio*

166. Table 34 in Annex J presents the available information in terms of cost-efficiency from SPRs until 2014 and budget revisions. These statistics concern however only the global cost figures per operation, and not for each activity. Indeed, calculating the cost of outputs and outcomes is difficult because of challenges with consistency and completeness of expenditure data.<sup>93</sup> An exception was the cost-effectiveness analysis carried out by the CO Procurement unit to justify P4P local purchases as compared to imported food. Whilst local prices for rice did not compare favorably with imports from Asia, other main staples (maize, beans) appeared often cheaper if bought in Burundi – probably due in part to the land-locked nature of the country, and difficult mountain roads. In 2014, the selling price for a ton of rice from the cooperatives' warehouses was estimated at \$809, which was lower than regional purchases (\$852 for Tanzanian rice) - but significantly higher than \$605 for imported rice from Thailand. In 2015, prices for locally-produced maize and beans were generally lower than regional purchases in neighboring countries (Rwanda, Uganda).<sup>94</sup>

167. Results of cost-efficiency analysis must furthermore be mitigated in the light of funding shortages, affecting the budgets and numbers of beneficiaries. On the basis of global operations' costs and actual numbers of beneficiaries, a measure of cost-effectiveness could be calculated, however not comparable with any relevant benchmarks in other available CPE evaluations, due to the regular lack of cost-efficiency analyses by the CO. The value of benchmarks depends also on the context, and examples of middle-income countries would often not be applicable to low-income countries. Average costs per beneficiary are therefore shown in Table 34 when related to budget requirements,

<sup>92</sup> "Due to a lack of resources, less than 2,000 PLWHIV/aids could be reached with food assistance" (SPR 2014 for CP).

<sup>93</sup> It was not possible to get data on actual spending for each activities without having to pull many reports from Wings (WFP's financial management database); as a result, limited analysis has been carried out.

<sup>94</sup> Comparative tables from CO Procurement Office.

and actual available budgets after deducting funding shortfalls. In both cases, the overall cost-efficiency ratio per beneficiary was more favorable in the CP (\$47.69 with full budget and \$23.83 after deduction of funding shortages) than in the PRROs: respectively \$76.31 before shortages and \$34.91 after deduction for PRRO 200164, and \$68.68 and \$39.80 for PRRO 200655.

168. There was an efficiency/ effectiveness trade-off in increasing number of beneficiaries reached, and in parallel reduced quantities of food distributed. However, this was partly mitigated by the introduction of new modalities (endogenous school feeding, vouchers, P4P), although nutritional intakes of some daily rations were also decreased, as were delivery periods.<sup>95</sup> Annex I presents further information on other efficiency indicators such as planned budgets per year (2001 – 2015) for the CP and the PRROs, and results per operation.

169. Findings during the field visits point to the extensive network of WFP CO and field offices (Bujumbura, Ngozi, Gitega, antenna in Cibitoke) and that the CO appropriately maintained good relations with provincial and local authorities (governors, DPAE, DPE, health districts), implementing partners in the field and – mostly through them – with final beneficiaries. As a result, local authorities are often partnering with the CO in identifying target schools, P4P cooperatives, health centers or communities for assistance - without any registered complaint about a lack of impartiality. The new field office of Gitega, opened in July 2014 and covering the central and south-eastern provinces of Gitega, Ruyigi, Rutana, Cankuzo and Mwaro, was adequately located to respond to the concerns of the CFSVA of 2014 in terms of added numbers.

170. WFP relied on its assessment capacity (VAM, CFSVA, EFSA) to remain in regular contact with the needs of the affected populations, even though funding shortages severely limited the scope and continuity of interventions. Joint assessments and monitoring visits were regularly conducted with the partners or by WFP alone, even though the spreading of operations and access problems to remote sites made the engagement with affected populations difficult and costly. For example, the three WFP monitors based in the Gitega field office assisted by one database operator were not able to cover at least once quarterly the numerous sites in three provinces. Their performance was rated at 75 percent. The sites currently include 70 health centers for MAM nutrition with added workload for backstopping shortcomings, 21 social institutions, 2 refugee camps, 41 school canteens, 7 FFAs, 8 returnees communities, and 33 stunting prevention sites. No studies were available to compare this workload and its costs with “standard” monitoring practices.

171. In the CS document, timeliness of response was described as one of the challenges of WFP operations in Burundi. Notwithstanding some operational delays in delivery by logistics, there was no evidence that WFP was not timely in its response in particular for overall emergency response to disasters. In its AAP section, the 2014 SPR for PRRO 200655 outlined the ongoing consultation and sensitization efforts to explain new modalities to target communities, such as vouchers or market fairs. Two WFP implementing partners in GFA and FFA reported transparent participatory approaches while selecting the most vulnerable households as beneficiaries. They also reported problems and complaints, despite sensitization, in identifying those among an overwhelmingly vulnerable population. Complaint boards (‘tables des plaintes’) were provided in refugee camps and by GFA actors after food distributions, where beneficiaries can explain their problems to all implementing actors sitting together.

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<sup>95</sup> GFA to beneficiaries of IR-EMOP 200678 was e.g. reduced by 10%, to 1,884 Kcal (source: SPR 2014).

172. In that framework, the opinion of in-country stakeholders about WFP's efficiency in Burundi was overwhelmingly positive and their partnerships were described as "win-win". Comments expressed that WFP CO was very responsive and flexible, taking due care to maintain good relations, welcomed joint visits, and was quite transparent about financial information. Key CO comparative advantages were the combined expertise in emergency and recovery; and its constructive engagement in food security and nutrition. WFP CO often took the lead and supporting the government, within resource limitations. Beneficiaries also expressed their appreciation of the CO; refugees agreed that the subdivision of GFA in three parts was effective and efficient. Trade fairs in particular were much appreciated as they allowed for some diversification in terms of type and quantities of food in the camps, even though they faced some implementation problems. These included prices different from markets, poor quality of beans, and suspicions of speculation. A professional Quality Control firm would be relevant.

173. Key weaknesses emphasized by stakeholders beside problems of delays, poor quality of some food items, concerned the implementation of trade fairs<sup>96</sup>, and the regular lack of synergies in the field with other key United Nations agencies, in particular UNICEF, to improve effectiveness and contribute to in-depth behaviors change. For example, implementation in Kirmba was made either through WFP (One-UN project in Kiremba) or through an NGO partner which was using a parallel structure, not integrated into the health system.<sup>97</sup> The CPE team could witness a very well organized distribution of food items in Kiremba that took place on a football field and was highly protected by the army. The distribution was organized in a very efficient way so that it did not take much time. However, this location was far from a health center and did not allow any integrated approach. This was provided through other United Nations agencies who intervene with their own measures in the same families.

174. The three provinces in the North (Ngozi, Muyinga, Kirundo) with identified high levels of food insecurity, chronic malnutrition and low enrolment rates were served with standard school feeding with daily hot meal from imported or local food. However, repeated pipeline breaks due to funding shortages impacted negatively on deliveries and dropouts. There was no US funding for school feeding and Dutch funds apply only in the Northwest provinces. A number of other critical issues for school feeding efficiency were identified, see Annex J.4.

175. Under P4P, delays in procuring basic drying equipment resulted in additional cost for cooperatives that were not yet compensated by WFP. In this respect, all interviews with partners mentioned the necessity for both parties to be subject to penalties for breaching contract provisions, including delayed payment. CAPAD<sup>98</sup> capitalization's report rightly highlighted the consequences of delayed payments for smallholders who were often cash-strapped and cannot afford to wait for their remuneration. By doing so, the system gave preference to less vulnerable producers and created tension between cooperatives' leaders and members. CAPAD also highlighted in its annual report that the

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<sup>96</sup> Large price differences were regularly found between what can be bought with vouchers during trade fairs in refugee camps and market prices just outside, e.g. 42.500 FBU in camp for bag 50kg flour, against 30.000 FBU outside. Market prices are changing much and fast: 1 kg of beans cost 600 FBU in June 2015, and 11-1200 FBU in April 2016. At the opposite, when fairs' prices are lower than on the market, some refugees speculate and buy all available concerned commodity at fairs (not leaving enough for others) to sell it at the market. Also due to price deviations, some traders come to fairs with only small quantities of items for which market prices are higher. There are suspicions of fake packaging (local maize sold in imported bags) and traders' cartels.

<sup>97</sup> The partner NGO has been storing and distributing the food at the health center level, but according to health staff, this was rather detached from the health center activities, as they had covered at least 90 % of the beneficiaries in their own area. The NGO provided monitoring data for a period of 4 months, in which it only described differences in MUAC and weight gain. They have collected height data but never analyzed them. The raw data were shared with the CPE team – data quality seems poor – and thus the analysis might not be meaningful.

<sup>98</sup> Confederation des Associations des Producteurs Agricoles pour le Développement

insecurity resulting from the mid-2015 crisis was reported by several farmers as a reason for them not to be able to wait for WFP payments, and to prefer selling at farm gate with immediate payment. Elements of efficiency in capacity development including some disappointing results are discussed in Annex J.4.

### *Enhancement of gender equity*

176. Among lessons learnt in the CP document (§16), “take-home rations distributed to girls reduced the gender gap in WFP-assisted schools and were discontinued in 2009”. This important lesson was not translated in the portfolio of operations as gender gaps in enrolment rates had closed already. Although latest data were not available from the Ministry, Table 10 below shows completion rates (gender disaggregated) in four provinces where WFP is active to a various extent. These are data from the Ministry of Education and not for WFP intervention. The data show that completion rates are improving and the gender gap is narrowing down, even in the absence of direct support to girls through take home rations. Data specifically for the WFP supported schools were not available.

**Table 10: Gender ratios of school completion rates in provinces with WFP presence**

	2011/2012		2012/ 2013	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Cibitoke	42.1	53.4	44.3	53.1
Ruyigi	52.6	60.7	57.3	61.3
Muyinga	33.5	46.1	48.6	56.8
Kirundo	33.6	43.9	42.3	50.0
Ngozi	39.1	46.6	52.6	56.3

Source: Indicators of Education in Burundi 2012/2013, Ministry of Education, December 2013

177. WFP CO is quite strict in reporting gender-disaggregated data, with the exception of MAM treatment where this did not happen.<sup>99</sup> All committees initiated or supported by WFP in various activities are gender balanced. During 2012-2015, women covered 50% of food management committee positions, increasing their influence in the management of GFA.

178. However, the evaluation team noticed some critical issues which need to be addressed. Due to population increase and increasing pressure on land, women tend to be increasingly at risk of destitution as the customary laws prevent them from inheriting land. In 2014, Burundi was ranked 109th out of 155 countries in the Gender Inequality Index.<sup>100</sup> The few concessions provided, for example allocating a plot to the girls of a household were increasingly flouted because of population pressure.<sup>101</sup> Women beneficiaries in the MAM intervention reported on increasing violence against them, men leaving the household to go to Tanzania and extended families of the husband taking the land from them. Women were being left with nothing but their children and being sent back to their own parents. Land pressure contributes to the fact that unwanted little girls

<sup>99</sup> Even though the SPR 2015 shows these data – the raw data excel sheets, provided by the office did not show this distinction

<sup>100</sup> UNDP, Human Development report 2015, page 5.

<sup>101</sup> IFAD, Strengthening Women’s Access to Land in IFAD Projects, March 2011, pages 6-7.

are not thrown in the street as boys, but suffer gender-based violence, as they are obliged to work in other houses as young as 10 years for very low salaries.

179. In 2012 – during the implementation of the Gender Policy 2008 – 2013, WFP started introducing the IASC Gender Marker (levels 0 – 2), although the CO staff were reportedly trained rather late on this (2014 - 2015). In that context, the CS was ranked at level 1 (insufficiently mainstreamed), but the CP and both PRROs were positively ranked at level 2 – as WFP adopted a more holistic gender approach both in its contextual description of women living on marginal lands, lower education level, gender roles in nutrition and FFA activities, and in its program priorities supported by gender-disaggregated data. The evaluation team applied the gender marker criteria level 2 for evaluating the gender sensitivity of the country portfolio and summarized the results in table 11 below. A more holistic gender approach has been adopted in the most recent operation (PRRO 200655), both in its contextual description (women living on marginal lands, lower education level, gender roles in nutrition, FFA) and priorities. The PRRO document duly provides gender-disaggregated figures for beneficiaries by type of activities.<sup>102</sup> The results show that the programming has still not reached the level 2 in terms of the gender marker, as very critical issues like gender-based violence, gender sensitization and nutrition messages to men were not dealt with as expected.

**Table 11: Gender marker applied to Portfolio**

Criteria	Achievement
Disaggregate all beneficiary data by sex	was done systemically, except MAM treatment
Discuss the gender-sensitive arrangements at distribution points or worksites	Was done, whenever necessary
Reflect and respond to the concerns of both women and men, timing, choice of modality (food, voucher or cash)	Mixed picture: Except WVI (only partly), all NGOs were preferring voucher or food (in favor of women)
Target at least 50% women participants in FFA	Was done
Participation and leadership of women in P4P	Achieved – around 50 % women participants
Promote women, or both women and men, as food entitlement. Provide sensitization on the reasons of such targeting to the assisted communities	unclear
Promote women's leadership and decision making in project management committees	Yes
Introduce gender sensitization whenever possible.	Not done but extremely important (sexual and gender based violence)
Target both men and women (and boys and girls) in nutrition messaging and counseling.	Not done
Discuss how the time burden, risks of violence and traditional harmful practices will be addressed	Not considered in MAM treatment and prevention Social institutions take care of street kids

<sup>102</sup> Table 1, page 12.

### *Synergies and multiplier opportunities between WFP programs*

180. At the beginning of the evaluation period – in 2011 and 2012 - institutional memory in the CO indicated that activities were vertically separated from each other (“en silos”). The capacity development activities envisaged in the CS to build on established institutional cooperation and support strategic priorities did not take place either during that period, as no significant activities were recorded in the “sustainability, capacity development and handover” section of the SPRs for CP 200119.

181. Integration between programs began in 2013 with P4P and endogenous school feeding in the three North -Western provinces and the development of the vouchers approach in refugee camps and other food distribution activities. Synergies could be further enhanced in linking e.g. P4P with school feeding activities in other regions of Burundi or with general or targeted food distributions, provided that the Netherlands cooperation agrees, and that such activities do not disrupt the vouchers approach.

182. An NGO partner of the CO combined MAM treatment with cash for work activities in Rutana in the same families. No evidences of duplications were found between programs. School feeding under PRROs, which was initiated at the government’s request in areas with large numbers of returnees and high levels of food insecurity, was due to be integrated into the CP in the areas where it was not yet stopped.

183. However, there were gaps between programs in the lack of coordination between support to the national DRR platform to set up a countrywide strategic approach to disaster mitigation and response (such concepts are still to be considered together in the precarious situation of Burundi), and scattered FFA anti-erosion activities implemented in some eastern provinces more affected than western or southern ones by climatic shocks.

184. In general, WFP spread its interventions almost across the whole of Burundi and given the limited resources this led to the fact that highly needed synergies were not visible. MAM treatment or stunting prevention were classical examples, where success could be only achieved if the situation at community level were changing in terms of behavior change (education, gender, population, agricultural production or income opportunities).

185. Synergies envisaged e.g. in the CP 200199 (§29: “UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, WFP and NGOs will pool resources for capacity development” for nutrition) were poorly implemented. The conclusion of the 2008 evaluation regarding “the absence of a results framework with clear objectives” was still valid, as no planning of capacity development activities or log frame could be found with inputs, deadlines and expected outcomes. As stated above, there was no dedicated program officer within the CO for capacity development; the matter was considered cross-cutting among sectors, but this absence did not allow any RBM-like approach. There are currently only 2 joint United Nations programs: the “One-UN” stunting prevention in Kiremba, and the EU-funded PROPA-O (Projet pour accélérer l'atteinte de l'OMD1c) in the West, together with FAO, UNICEF, WHO and IFAD, who manage these EU funds. Other synergies seemed to happen mostly by coincidence. It should be noted that in March 2016 (after the review period) a retreat was organized in Nairobi with the heads of all the agencies in Burundi, to discuss the feasibility of more synergies.

186. There was no evidence of duplications, but several gaps were identified with UNICEF (MAM, school feeding<sup>103</sup>), or FAO (more synergies are needed for endogenous school feeding, kitchen gardens, resilience in FFAs), or with NGOs who implement multi-sector IGA and VSLA, also in resilience projects.

187. There were very strong synergies in the school feeding project, implemented by another NGO partner. The partner identified very important interventions that complemented the school feeding project, namely, introducing nutrition education in schools, implementing the kitchen gardens not only in schools but in the community, providing nutrition and health training as well to parents in the communities, establishing important infrastructure, like water, latrines, kitchens, energy saving stoves etc. It showed the importance of choosing strong implementation partners. However, in the current context in Burundi it is very difficult to identify them as many have left the country and/ or stopped intervening.

188. With government partners, synergies – and potential sustainability– depended to a significant extent on capacity development, as resources and skills are generally poor. In 2013 and 2014, the most relevant activities have targeted school feeding, nutrition (SUN/REACH Secretariat), PRONIANUT, and a simulation exercise for the National DRR Platform<sup>104</sup>. Results were rather limited: an action plan to guide the development of a national school-feeding program; more efficient implementation of school feeding at local level; and the rating of the degree of disaster preparedness of Burundi at 2.2 on a scale going from zero to four, (see Annex J.4.)

### *2.3.8 Sustainability of results of the Portfolio*

189. The CS did not mention handing over programmes to government partners. But, the CP's component 4, (in §47-48 of the CP project document, handing over responsibilities to the government) refers to i) Surveys: Food security and vulnerability assessment methodologies and tools are to be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, including through provincial structures), and ii) Logistics: the CP even foresaw that transfer of transportation, warehousing and contracting functions to a relevant government institution would begin as from mid-2012.

190. Component 3 of the CP (§32) furthermore envisaged the gradual handover of nutrition support activities by MoH (which took place through health centers for MAM – although strong backstopping by WFP monitors is still needed), and the handover of HIV activities by the Ministry of Health. As stated, this approach was hindered by inadequate Ministry of Health reporting to the Global Fund, but may be continued through the Red Cross with possible WFP support for procurement and delivery.

191. The CPE team found sustainability in some FFA and P4P activities. Such sustainability was however conditioned by i) the application for FFA of a comprehensive resilience package in which FFA would be integrated – and corresponding synergies with other relevant actors – and ii) reaching in P4P a catalytic breaking point where cooperatives become autonomous and start having access to banks, credits, and external investors who would also be interested in the development of local production rather than imported food.

192. The SPR 2014 for PRRO 200164 mentions “enthusiastic” training in school feeding management for the provincial and communal directorates for education, although actual sustainability could not be ascertained; SPR 2014 states that: “resource limitations did

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<sup>103</sup> Synergies between SAM and MAM treatment were not clearly planned from the onset and the schools under WFP and UNICEF support have little planned synergies too

<sup>104</sup> In parallel, training was provided e.g. for 900 P4P cooperative farmers and some primary school managements.

not allow for a full coverage of the intended schools in the districts and the carryover (between the 2 PPROs) allowed a continued implementation in only slightly more than half of the planned schools”. Unfortunately, some schools were not adequately informed about the end of school feeding and felt quite unprepared.<sup>105</sup> The result of a missed exit strategy for these schools led to the fact that even kitchen gardens, which are part of the school feeding program were immediately abandoned in the few schools that have been visited by the evaluation team.

193. Home-grown school feeding is a very important step in terms of handing over a school feeding program to national partners. The P4P approach in combination with home grown school feeding was therefore highly appreciated, although – as already stated - the question remains, whether the schools which have been selected were those most in need of school feeding support. There is often a logistical trade-off: P4P linkage to schools in the same area lowered transport costs, while storage - in poor condition - was taking space from already overpopulated classrooms.

194. Sustainability could also be reinforced by synergies with other actors. UNICEF was usually not present in the schools targeted by WFP. The rapidly growing school population, due to demography but also attractiveness of school meals, was preventing exit strategies due to lack of own resources and space. However, some targeted schools were enrolled as well under the pilot Performance Based Financing (PBF) which looks at education quality and provides funds to schools according to performances. Coordination with PBF could enhance opportunities for sustainability.

195. More generally, sustainability depends on criteria such as i) integration into communal development plans – especially for access roads - and supervision by local monitoring committee of committed (volunteers) community leaders, ii) fruitful cooperation with decentralized government services such as the DPAE (Direction provinciale pour l’agriculture et l’élevage), and iii) continuous support from some concerned local NGOs in terms of “agents villageois” or “agents communautaires” (volunteers who keep receiving after project ended some training /refresher courses and small “care and maintenance” incentives - transport costs to training, though no fees or per diems), as well as IGA/VSLA.

196. Sustainability depended furthermore on a well-defined exit strategy that includes information of the relevant stakeholders about timing and preparatory measures to empower stakeholders and communities to carry on. The abrupt stopping of activities (MAM, stunting prevention, school feeding)<sup>106</sup> without prior notice was definitely counter-productive to sustainability.

197. Interventions, which provide food, vouchers or cash to beneficiaries, will help them in the short run. However, sustainable food and nutrition security in Burundi needs interventions that take issues like population development, gender inequality as well as change of behavior and attitudes seriously. It is not all under the mandate of WFP, but seeking synergies with stakeholders working in this field needs to be strengthened.

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<sup>105</sup> One school reported that WFP came in the summer break to collect the remaining food but even at this point did not tell them that there would be no continuation.

<sup>106</sup> At least WFP had sent an official letter to the MoE informing them about the discontinuation. The schools, however, did not receive this information from MoE or WFP.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1. Overall Assessment**

198. WFP's first country strategy in Burundi was an added value to its positioning and alignment to make optimal difference in Burundi compared to project-based approaches prior to 2010. The CS was relevant in reflecting the strategic shift toward long term development of Burundi. It was realistic and far-sighted in its insistence on maintaining an emergency component. Until April 2015, Burundi relied heavily on a small number of donors, partly due to the envisaged long-term development trend and improved stability.

199. Burundi is currently in a quandary. Besides a desired return to stable political dynamics - a main pillar of PRSP and UNDAF -, the country is facing a series of crucial and inter-related contextual challenges in terms of stability, poverty, fast-growing demography, increasing scarcity of arable land, effects of climate change, food insecurity, poor education quality, and malnutrition combined with gender inequality. The CS, Vision 2025 and PRSPs have already identified these challenges although lasting solutions will require increased synergies between all concerned actors and stakeholders, and a resolute national political guidance. Despite improved peace, stability and some economic growth between 2011 and April-2015, food insecurity has remained high, at 32 percent in 2014 - and growing worse as the context has again deteriorated since April 2015. The humanitarian situation of the majority of Burundians is being threatened by the new crisis in addition to the structural problems.

200. Overall, WFP CO was widely appreciated in this context for its expertise, policy support, flexibility and transparency. Positive factors included quality of staff and organizational structure, respect for humanitarian principles and protection coverage. WFP maintained excellent relations with other international actors, key donors, and relevant authorities at all levels due to its extensive field presence. Strategically, WFP CO was perceived as a leading and influential partner in emergency aid, food fortification and school feeding policies. WFP was engaged in various national platforms (DRR, food security and nutrition, education). The CO diligently applied comparative advantages, which included assessment capacity (VAM), emergency response, strong logistics, innovative approaches such as FFA and P4P, and flexible adaptation of transfer modalities to situations.

201. WFP was relevant, effective and timely in its delivery of food assistance. The CO was largely effective in meeting beneficiary targets in 2011-2012. In later years, with the exception of school feeding, GFA and WFP's response to the 2014 flooding emergency, the CO maintained high beneficiary coverage targets in spite of funding shortfalls. However, there were inverse association between increasing beneficiary coverage and reducing quantities and duration of food distributed. Performance was negatively affected by weak integration and synergies with other key stakeholders and partners, with whom more pro-active dialogue and advocacy was needed – often within wider platforms. For example, FFA approaches as components of anti-erosion and asset protection programs are highly relevant in Burundi, but need a holistic resilience approach. Funding shortfalls were a major factor negatively affecting programming, performance and results of the country portfolio. Resource constraints for surveys, weak documentation by implementing partners, and insufficient human resources constrained the ability of the CO to conduct outcome data analyses and capacity development.

### *Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning*

202. The main themes of the WFP Country Strategy, its three priorities and the corresponding country portfolio were relevant, realistic and duly aligned with the identified national needs, WFP's Corporate Strategic Plan Strategic Objectives and government priorities. Considering recurrent climatic shocks and the fragile wider food security context, WFP alone insisted to keep an humanitarian response component - in line with the 1st Objective of the WFP Strategic Plan. The CO must be commended for this vision, despite the optimistic spirit at the time. The three key priorities are still relevant, but face some crucial challenges given the need to balance possible emergency and long-term development needs.

203. WFP CS was coherent with priorities of a wide range of UN partners and donors. WFP actively participated in UNDAF processes which reported to be transparent and harmonized with national development priorities (e.g. PRSPs); UNDAF which itself reflects national vision towards Development. It also identified activities where synergies with partner United Nations agencies were expected.

### *Factors and quality of strategic decision-making*

204. The decision-making process for the CS was participatory and transparent. The CS formulation was well documented, mitigating the limited "institutional memory" within the CO for that period, due to staff turnover. While being both policy-led and practical, the main factors influencing strategic decision making were: i) WFP mandate; ii) national context and policies; iii) repositioning of WFP's strategic paradigm from food aid to food assistance; and iv) funding availability. The political, security and socio-economic contexts were thoroughly analyzed in the CS based on WFP's own expertise and analyses from partners such as UNDP and the World Bank.

### *Portfolio performance and results*

205. Targeting criteria were relevant for some well-defined groups: DRC refugees in camps, HIV victims under treatment, most vulnerable groups in social institutions, or moderately acute malnourished in health clinics. Criteria were suitably flexible for potentially large groups that could not be accurately estimated, based on projections or trends over past years: returnees, or worst affected agricultural households during lean periods. However, the combined effects of increasing food insecurity problems and funding shortages have done much to undermine these efforts during 2013-2015.

206. GFA was very relevant and effective in benefiting returnees, DRC refugees, most food-insecure households during lean periods, victims of natural disasters, Batwas and social institutions. But, it faced growing consequences of the crises and increased needs for protection and safety net for the most vulnerable.

207. Nutrition and Health: MAM Treatment was not systematically combined with nutrition education and gender empowerment, thus making for short-term solutions only. Stunting prevention activities appear rather inconsistent (not applying systematically the window of opportunity of 1000 days, varying food packages) and sometimes poorly implemented and partly not well coordinated with MoH. As the pilot activity started only in 2015, it was too early to assess evidence of effectiveness of the blanket feeding approach to prevent stunting. Support during the first 6 months of ART was important for HIV patients to cope with side effects of medication, and to encourage voluntary testing. After the support has stopped, it was difficult to encourage patients to continue the treatment.

208. School feeding positively contributed to increased enrolment and attendance in targeted schools, and lower dropouts; all with gender parity in the assisted schools. Whether increased numbers of children are due to pull factors from nearby schools without canteens needs to be verified. However, much larger class sizes (rising from 50 to 70-80 children) are bound to negatively impact education quality – a crucial factor of change in Burundi.

209. Community Development – as components of anti-erosion and asset protection programs - are highly relevant in Burundi that is essentially dependent on agriculture and subject to recurrent climatic shocks. Erosion and climate effects have become a major concern for all, even in isolated rural communities. However, FFAs were much affected by funding shortages and projects are scattered. When implemented by skilled partners with longer-term local focus, and integrated in a holistic resilience package adapted to Burundi, in synergies, FFA can ensure ownership and become a key way forward against climate shocks. The new national anti-erosion Protocol, if well implemented, would be an opportunity to integrate FFA into a countrywide approach.

210. Despite limited implementation, P4P-like activities encouraged increased production by cooperatives. More revenue could help cooperatives reaching a threshold with catalytic effect that would allow them to start working with banks, buying equipment, attracting new investors etc. P4P is not yet optimally used in combination with school feeding or other activities throughout Burundi.

211. Results of capacity development efforts appeared limited and insufficiently frequent. Institutional capacity is a condition for sustainability, as resources and skills of most concerned Ministries and national or local institutions are still weak. The situation was exacerbated by frequent staff turnover, as trained civil servants regularly changed positions without handing over their learned skills. Envisaged VAM and logistics handovers in the CS did not materialise. At the CO level, there was a gap in the programming of capacity development of government institutions, as no focal point seems to be currently assigned to this important component of the CS, which furthermore lacked a framework of expected results and performance.

212. Emergency humanitarian response, through IR-EMOP, was useful in the very short-term. But, there was a need for longer-term protection of landless victims from disasters pending their relocation by authorities.

213. CO interventions were consistent with humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence - even though close cooperation with the government ministries and the challenging political context since the April 2015 crisis could have threatened their application. The much wider principle of humanity to alleviate human suffering was followed.

214. Synergies were still weak across the board, some activity implementation was often scattered and lacked integration with other key implementing and government actors, with whom more pro-active dialogue and advocacy was needed – often within wider platforms on demography, gender, effects of climate change. Identified gaps in synergies, such as the lack of common approach on gender, or the missed opportunity so far in collaborating with the quality-based programmes in the nutrition, health and education<sup>107</sup> sectors, undermined effectiveness and potential sustainability of projects.

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<sup>107</sup> The pilot phase I education is still quite new and WFP will seek opportunities to collaborate in those schools that are enrolled under the two systems

215. Pressure on land was putting many women at risk of destitution. Lack of sensitisation in programs, gender-based violence and gender inequality are widespread and even increasing in Burundi. Gender inequality is a major contributing factor to food insecurity in Burundi.

216. Sustainability was problematic and the CPE did not find any evidence of sustainable results except – potentially - in P4P if a catalytic threshold could be reached for the cooperatives, and in endogenous school feeding - if combined with approaches aiming at education quality. The CO formally communicated with relevant ministries such as the ministry of education when WFP assistance ceased. However, gaps in communication by counterparts with ultimate beneficiaries in the field meant beneficiaries experienced sudden cessation of interventions due to funding shortfalls, undermining effective exit strategies.

### **3.2. Key Lessons for the Future**

217. Capacity development required time, and there was a need of a “dynamic core” of committed people within an organization to slowly modify behavior of others, and minimize problems. Lessons about the need of a truly holistic resilience approach in Burundi were collected during field visits to several FFA projects in the context of the IFAD PRODEFI program in Karusi watershed and hill crests protection.

218. FFA was effective to improve nutrition of children in targeted communities, if combined with other (non-FFA) activities delivered by partners in synergies: kitchen gardens, VSLA (village-level savings and loans association), small cattle, training/capacity development, composting, and “bio-fortified” beans (much more productive and better priced than normal beans). Appropriate duration of support is at least 1 year. Some items of a holistic resilience approach were always missing in the visited projects, such as fuel-efficient stoves. Synergies were incomplete, either with FAO for agricultural inputs and training, with SUN/FARN for nutrition, or with UNICEF and WHO for education and health. Some projects (but not all) had focused on poverty reduction and coordination with authorities (government, DPAE, other local authorities, communal development plan). A few partners had foreseen a network of local voluntaries supported on the longer term by a small “care and maintenance” budget to ensure real change of behaviours, and sustainability.

219. Although this takes place well after the end of the evaluation period, a new anti-erosion policy has been decided by the Ministry of Agriculture in early 2016. The policy reportedly drew lessons learnt about the lack of effectiveness of the programs (in which FFA is involved): scattered activities, not enough synergy, few vulnerable people involved, and lack of sustainability because lack of ownership. Another key factor in the policy decision seems to have been the security concern that erosion and soil/production degradation may entail more IDPs, famine, and violence. The resulting national anti-erosion Protocol envisages compulsory community work every Saturday morning as from May 2016 that would be used to systematically implement anti-erosion activities including watershed management and re-forestation of crests) in every “colline”.

220. Some relevant lessons were shared by strategic partners, such as IFAD about anti-erosion programs and related FFA: to protect 100 hectares of fields from erosion, watershed management needs to be implemented on 10 to 50 times the same surface. Implementation periods for watershed are key to have workers, during May-August, who should not be otherwise occupied with their farming.

### 3.3. Recommendations

221. The evaluation makes nine recommendations, ranked in order of importance.

No	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
1	Strategic alignment and positioning	<p>In the new Country Strategic Plan (CSP), maintain the two CS priorities – i) food and nutrition security; and ii) emergency preparedness and response – in a two-pronged strategic approach. Include readiness<sup>108</sup> to respond more effectively to current challenges. Capacity development should be mainstreamed as a cross-cutting theme in the new CSP and operations.</p> <p>Externally, strengthen synergies with national strategic partners – ministries of agriculture, health, education, and solidarity – and United Nations partners, complemented by institutional advocacy for synergies on major food security issues.</p>	<p>The CS is still aligned with population needs and government priorities, and coherent with the UNDAF, donors' objectives and WFP Strategic Objectives; the three priorities are still relevant, but face crucial challenges given the need to balance possible emergency and long-term development needs.</p> <p>In practice, synergies were weak throughout the CS; activities often lacked coordination and harmonization with partners.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from the Nairobi Regional Bureau (RBN) and Headquarters</p> <p>2016–2017</p>
2	Targeting and integration	<p>Internally, strengthen geographical and programme integration through better-targeted multi-sectoral operational planning. Strengthen coordination with government and non-government implementing partners.</p>	<p>Activities were scattered across the country and lacked consistency in objectives, with some variation in application of the targeting criteria.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters</p> <p>2016–2017</p>
3	Gender	<p>Enhance women's economic empowerment through gender-sensitive income-generating activities and the formation of partnerships with other actors in gender and family planning. Programming should focus on young people – men/boys and women/girls – using the national nutrition platform to support gender empowerment and applying gender markers systematically.</p>	<p>Population pressure on land, lack of sensitization and instability have been resulting in widespread and increasing gender-based violence and gender inequalities. These issues are major contributing factors to food insecurity in Burundi.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters</p> <p>2016–2017</p>

<sup>108</sup> Strategic pre-positioning of supplies and contingency planning for disaster preparedness and response, while addressing long-term development challenges.

No	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
4	Social protection, humanitarian and protection principles	<p>In partnership with the Ministry of National Solidarity, expand carefully designed safety nets for social protection programming to respond to population needs arising from the crisis and adhering to humanitarian and protection principles.</p> <p>Explicitly include the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and protection in WFP strategic and programme documents.</p>	<p>Given the growing consequences of crises and the increased needs for safety nets for the most vulnerable people, there is need to locate GFA within the social protection framework</p> <p>Risks remain high although WFP interventions have been consistent with humanitarian principles and protection policy and despite close cooperation with government authorities.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters</p> <p>2016–2017</p>
5	Nutrition	<p>In partnership with the Ministry of Health and UNICEF, enhance the country office's role in nutrition through: i) consistent application of WFP nutrition guidelines; ii) a continuum of care services at health centres and in communities integrating nutrition with access to food; iii) support to the development of a national stunting reduction strategy, while continuing to promote the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative; iv) improving monitoring, evaluation and analysis of nutrition outcome data; and v) advocating for the engagement of young people in prevention of malnutrition.</p>	<p>The reinforced presence of WFP field monitors has mitigated the lack of trained staff in health centres and allowed MAM treatment to follow the national protocol. Combining MAM treatment with nutrition education and gender empowerment could contribute to optimizing results. Consistent and systematic application of stunting prevention guidelines and the SUN window of opportunity for reaching young children could reinforce the country office's efforts to prevent stunting through pilot blanket feeding, which started in 2015.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters</p> <p>2016–2017</p>

No	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
6	School feeding	Support the development of national school feeding programmes with greater focus on education quality, working in partnership with the Ministry of Education and UNICEF, and through gap analysis and mapping. Internally, strengthen linkages with P4P to deliver a standard package to targeted schools.	School feeding has contributed to increased enrolment, attendance and gender balance in schools. However, it has also led to far larger class sizes, which have affected education quality – a crucial driver of change in Burundi. Greater clarity in the process for selecting schools, and work with United Nations partners to address education quality would boost educational outcomes.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
7	Resilience <sup>109</sup>	In collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, FAO and IFAD, support communities by integrating comprehensive and sustainable FFA packages into community development plans.	Within the framework of a comprehensive approach to resilience, WFP can contribute to mitigating climate shocks. In early 2016, the Ministry of Agriculture introduced a new anti-erosion policy. Lessons have been learned from collaboration with IFAD.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
8	Resource mobilization	Update the country office's resource mobilization strategy and advocate for more flexibility in donor funding, allowing multi-year resource commitments.	Funding shortfalls, earmarking and the short programming cycles of donors were major problems for portfolio performance and results.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017
9	Outcome monitoring and analysis	Enhance the consistency of outcome data monitoring and analysis.	Corporate outcome indicators were not consistently collected over the period; SPRs indicate resource constraints for surveys or lack of recording by implementing partners.	Country office, with support from RBN and Headquarters 2016–2017

<sup>109</sup> In the second half of 2015, the country office started repositioning its resilience response towards more integrated packages for better-quality FFA interventions, to be implemented for several years in the same localities and in synergy with other activities.

## Acronyms

C&V	cash and voucher
CBT	cash based transfer
CD	Country Director
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CNLS	Conseil National de Lutte contre le Sida
CO	country office
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
CP	country programme
CS	country strategy
CSLP	Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvreté
DCD	Deputy Country Director
DRR	disaster risk reduction
EB	Executive Board of WFP
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EQ	evaluation question
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFA/W/T	food for assets/work/training
FGD	focus group discussion
GFD	general food distribution
GHI	Global Hunger Index
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HQ	Headquarters
IR	inception report
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOE	Ministry of Education
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance

OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
PD	project document
P4P	Purchase for Progress
Pronianut	Programme National Intégré d’Alimentation et de Nutrition
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
QA	quality assurance
QC	quality control
RB	regional bureau
SO	strategic objective
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition

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