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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF DARFUR EMOP 10339.0/1

**Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict
in Greater Darfur, West Sudan**

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of the Mission

This independent evaluation examined the work of the emergency operation in Darfur from April 2004 to December 2005. The purposes were:

- accountability to the Board, donors, beneficiaries and cooperating partners;
- guidance for the operation, bearing in mind the scale and complexity of the problem and lessons from previous operations; and
- learning from WFP's programme in Darfur, one of its largest-ever operations.

Methods

The methods used by the team¹ consisted of:

- research, largely centred on documents gathered by the preparatory study undertaken by Tufts University on behalf of the Office of Evaluation;
- interviews with key informants in Rome and in Sudan: staff of WFP, cooperating partners, other United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross in Khartoum and Darfur, and the Government;
- focus group meetings with beneficiaries in Darfur; and
- direct observation.

Constraints included the delicate political and security situation at the time of the evaluation, which made it impossible to visit some areas of WFP assistance.

This report presents the results of the evaluation in terms of the criteria proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee in 1999 for the evaluation of humanitarian action.

Conclusion

WFP's staff in Sudan worked hard to fill the food gap in Darfur, and did so in a very difficult logistics environment. Distributing 560,000 mt of food between April 2004 and December 2005 was a triumph. There was a clear need for food, and without it there would have been significant nutritional distress, increased illness and death. To avert such a

¹ The team consisted of a humanitarian response and logistics expert as leader, a public health and nutrition expert, a rural development/food security expert and a specialist in organizational management and community empowerment; the latter two were Sudanese nationals.



disaster was an achievement that justifies the existence of WFP.

This achievement was possible because WFP management in Sudan put humanitarian concerns first: they ignored the bureaucratic rule that “those who do nothing, do nothing wrong”; they worked round problems, took calculated risks, found innovative solutions and did not always comply with WFP policy – indeed, a senior interviewee in Rome thought that the Darfur operation would not have reached so many beneficiaries if every detailed requirement had been observed. The result was that WFP Sudan achieved a great deal by focusing on meeting humanitarian needs.

Programming priorities cannot be discounted for the sake of logistics priorities: both must be recognized to ensure an effective response to a complex emergency. WFP is hugely capable in terms of logistics, but this is not matched by an equivalent sophistication in food programming. The evaluation found that WFP Sudan achieved its results at the cost of reduced attention to some issues:

- lack of effective monitoring and evaluation of the distribution process and the work quality of cooperating partners;
- continuing focus on general food distribution when more sophisticated targeting might have been appropriate;
- inadequate response to firewood and milling issues;
- poor commitment to gender mainstreaming and gender issues; and
- inadequate human resources to assist area offices in their tasks.


It is not for the evaluation team to second-guess priority strategies of the Darfur operation, but monitoring protection, gender and nutritional impact cannot be addressed after an emergency: these issues are integral to the response and must receive attention and funding from the start.

WFP Sudan decided to invest the available resources in maximizing the number of beneficiaries reached rather than maximizing programme quality. The evaluation team agreed that the strategy was appropriate, at least until mid-2005, in view of the huge need for food assistance. Given the limited capacity of WFP and its cooperating partners, paying more attention to the quality of the programme would have reduced the flow of food into Darfur.

WFP food aid saved lives and prevented suffering in Darfur. The evaluation team was impressed by what WFP achieved in a very difficult environment.



DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Report of the Evaluation of Darfur EMOP 10339.0/1” (WFP/EB.1/2007/7-A) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document (document WFP/EB.1/2007/16) issued at the end of the session.



BACKGROUND

1. The current armed conflict in Darfur began in early 2003, leading to large-scale displacement. Before the conflict, WFP had a small operation in Darfur dealing with residual internally displaced people (IDPs) from southern Sudan and was supporting small development programmes such as food for education (FFE) and assistance for drought-affected populations in North Darfur.
2. This report does not analyse the root causes of the conflict in Darfur – increasing political marginalization, environmental stress with increasing population, changes to pastoral migration patterns caused by the conflict in the south and tensions between farming and herding communities – because other reports discuss them thoroughly² and because the issues are contentious; discussion would detract from the main focus of this report, WFP's performance in Darfur.
3. At the simplest level of analysis in terms of food aid needs, the conflict left two groups: (i) the farming community, many of whom had been displaced by the violence or denied access to their land or other livelihood options by the threat of violence; and (ii) the nomadic herding community, who were able to move throughout much of Darfur but who suffered indirectly through the loss of the trading relationship with the settled community

WFP'S RESPONSE

4. WFP provided limited food in 2003 and 2004 under emergency operation (EMOP) 10048 – in support of Operation Lifeline Sudan – which was evaluated in Broughton *et al.*, 2004, so this evaluation makes no further reference to it.³
5. This evaluation concentrated on EMOPs 10339.0 and 10339.1. In this document, “2004 EMOP” refers to 10339.0 and “2005 EMOP” refers to 10339.1. The 2004 EMOP was launched in April 2004, months after the population movements began. Access to Darfur was severely limited and a large-scale WFP operation was precluded.

² For example: Bairiak, 2004.; Buchanan-Smith *et al.*, 2006; House of Commons: International Development Committee, 2005; Young *et al.*, 2006 and 2005. See bibliography.

³ This team was not able to visit Darfur for security reasons.



TABLE 1. EMOP 10339.0 AND ITS TWO BUDGET REVISIONS				
EMOP	Main theme	US\$ million	mt	US\$/mt
10339.0 Apr–Dec	1.18 million beneficiaries exclusively in Darfur; part ration planned for post harvest.	99.4	107 959	921
10339.0 BR* 1 Oct to Dec	Provided full ration; increased beneficiaries from 1.18 million to 2.0 million because of poor harvest; augmented capacity.	95.9	109 630	875
10339.0 BR 2 Aug to Dec	Provided blanket supplementary ration for children under 5.	8.5	7 104	1 197
	Planned Expenditure and Tonnage	203.6	224 693	906
	Confirmed contributions	162.2	80%	
	Actual expenditure and distribution	126.8	126 583	1 002
	Actual as % of planned	62	56	111

* budget revision

6. The situation worsened significantly during 2004: insecurity,⁴ the resulting increased displacement and a poor harvest led to an increased number of beneficiaries. The 2005 EMOP saw the number of beneficiaries rise to 3.25 million.

TABLE 2. EMOP 10339.1 AND ITS TWO BUDGET REVISIONS				
EMOP	Main theme	US\$ million	mt	US\$/mt
10339.1 Jan–Dec	Increased beneficiaries from 2.0 million to 2.3 million; ration has 25 g sugar and 10 g salt.	438.2	453 216	967
10339.1 BR 1 Apr–Dec	Cereal ration increased from 13.5 kg to 15 kg to compensate for milling losses and support markets; augmented capacity.	28.9	31 608	914
10339.1 BR 2 Jun–Dec	Increased beneficiaries from 2.3 million to 3.25 million and extended relief to remote areas.	94.4	84 379	1 119
	Planned expenditure and tonnage	561.5	569 203	986
	Confirmed Contributions	481.5	86%	
	Actual expenditure and distribution	472.9	438 804	1 078
	Actual as % of planned	84	77	109

7. A series of special operations (SOs) supported the EMOPs, ranging from augmented logistics capacity to running the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). The estimated cost of SO support was US\$91 million. These SOs are not covered by this evaluation.
8. The Darfur operation was enormous. WFP Sudan was responsible for 24 percent of WFP expenditure in 2005; most of this was used for the Darfur operation.

⁴ Insecurity may increase the need for food assistance even where there is no displacement because of the restriction on livelihoods. For example, people may not be able to cultivate their land at a distance from their village or exchange their goods or labour for money or food.



RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

9. The need for food in Darfur was undeniable. WFP's food basket was generally appropriate in 2004; it was improved in January 2005 by the addition of sugar and increasing the amount of salt and in March by increasing the amount of cereals.

GFD ration element	2004 EMOP from April 2004	2005 EMOP from January 2005	2005 EMOP from March 2005
Cereals (g)	450	450	500
Pulses (g)	50	50	50
Vegetable oil (g)	30	30	30
Salt (g)	5	10	10
CSB* (g)	50	50	50
Sugar (g)	-	25	25
Total (g)	585	615	665
Nutrition value			
Kcal (gross)	2 130	2 226	2 390
Protein (g)	69	70	81
Fat (g)	47	47	41

* Corn-soya blend

10. The design of the EMOPs was broadly appropriate at the outset, but they proved to be too complex in view of the situation on the ground; for example, WFP included food for recovery in the 2004 EMOP but dropped it in 2005; it included emergency school feeding (ESF) in both EMOPs but never implemented it.
11. In both years, ESF targeted internally displaced children who were already receiving a full ration. Low school enrolment was a result of lack of schools rather than competing demands for children's time. The experiences in 2004 showed that ESF was not relevant in Darfur; WFP should not have included it at the level it did in the 2005 plan.
12. The two EMOPS included ration scales for therapeutic, supplementary and institutional feeding in addition to those for school feeding and food for recovery in 2004. Mechanisms other than general food distribution (GFD) accounted for only 1.3 percent of the food distributed in 2004 against a planned 9 percent; the figure for 2005 was 2.8 percent of a planned 8 percent. This was partly because of lack of partners for therapeutic and supplementary feeding; but even where therapeutic and supplementary feeding were available, enrolment rates were low and default rates were high. The causes are not clear.

13. The inclusion of CSB or a fortified blend in GFD was important because it improved the nutritional quality of the ration; CSB in the general ration was appropriate for young children, the elderly and the chronically ill. This was particularly appropriate in Darfur, where there was little therapeutic and supplementary feeding.⁵ But household use of CSB depended on their understanding its advantages: some households had received no information about it.
14. The addition of sugar and extra cereal in 2005 served as an income transfer, especially for IDPs with limited access to alternative livelihoods. But the calories in the 25 g of sugar did not replace the calories lost through milling; the 50 g of cereal did not cover the cost of milling. The introduction of sugar into the ration was particularly useful, because it had favourable terms of trade against cereals.
15. Overall, WFP's assistance was relevant to the situation and appropriate. The evaluation team concluded that WFP's focus on GFD was appropriate in view of the lack of partners for supplementary and therapeutic feeding and the inappropriateness of food for recovery and school feeding.

SUSTAINABILITY AND CONNECTEDNESS

16. WFP's interventions in Darfur were clearly temporary, intended to save lives and prevent suffering; they were not intended to be sustainable. Connectedness considers whether WFP's short-term humanitarian actions took longer-term and interconnected problems into account.
17. An issue often raised in food assistance operations is the risk of impacting local markets and food producers. In Darfur, this was not a major problem, because there was a significant need for food and the cereal supplied was not millet, the local staple.
18. WFP attempted to support local market mechanisms in 2005 by supplying additional cereal, which was intended to be commercialized by beneficiaries to promote local trade in grain. The aim was to support local markets and to reduce food prices for those who could not be reached directly by WFP rations. The evaluation team was unable to determine the effectiveness of this strategy but noted that commercialization of cereals by families to pay for milling costs was greater than the extra rations provided.
19. There are broader issues of connectedness in Darfur, including stress on livelihoods from increasing competition for scarce land. But the issues are difficult to address during the current conflict and are not suitable for food-aid interventions.


EFFECTIVENESS

20. Darfur lies in the west of Sudan; the main port is Port Sudan, 2,000 km by road from WFP's field office in Geneina, the logistics hub for Western Darfur.

⁵ The appropriateness of including a fortified blended food is illustrated by the International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) decision to follow WFP's example and include such a food in their Darfur ration basket for 2006.




Figure 1. Map: the position of Darfur in the Sudan



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.

21. Logistics were constrained by the large distances, the lack of transport infrastructure and the nature of the soils. There are no paved roads between Darfur and the rest of the Sudan; during the rains, trucks cannot access some areas for up to three months. The rail link to Nyala was unreliable. Competition for transport from rapidly growing parts of the Sudanese economy⁶ and lack of fuel and spares for local contractors also constrained logistics capacity.
22. The logistics team overcame these constraints through their ability to mobilize capacity and apply lessons from past operations. Figure 2 compares the volume delivered during the 2004 and 2005 operations and during the Darfur food-aid operations of the mid-80s, underlining WFP's achievement.

Figure 2. Two Darfur emergency food operations compared




23. There were various logistics issues: warehouse tents were not properly anchored and a number blew away in bad weather; there were instances of poor warehouse hygiene, though warehouse practices were generally good; stacking posed an unacceptable risk of collapse, though the practices conformed with WFP guidance; and there was a shortage of pallets.
24. Logistics staff set up a spreadsheet-based tracking system because the Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS) did not meet their needs. COMPAS requires stable electricity supply, good communication links and trained staff, which are usually unavailable at the start of a large emergency. WFP is thus exposed to the risks of such informal systems, and logistics officers who prioritize getting food to the needy are vulnerable to negative assessments from oversight authorities.

⁶ Sudan's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 5.2 percent in 2004 and by 8.0 percent in 2005 (World Bank, 2006).

25. Weak monitoring on aspects other than logistics denied managers the information required to ensure maximum effectiveness of the programme. There was as a result little objective analysis of the operational strengths and weaknesses. Effective distribution and post-distribution monitoring would have flagged issues for management action, from the milling cost to partners' non-compliance with the Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW).
26. WFP supported the annual emergency food security and nutrition assessment (EFSNA), but this was not a substitute for regular monitoring. WFP monitoring improved noticeably towards the end of the period under review, but it was not sufficient to inform programming decisions in a timely manner.

EFFICIENCY

27. The difficult logistics environment led to significantly increased costs. WFP used airlifts in 2004 and 2005, but phased them out for Darfur by the end of 2005 by building up stockpiles so that needs could be met without airlifts in the wet season. Darfur is isolated from other markets in the Sudan, so the quantity of food needed was larger than normal market mechanisms could provide in the short term. The delivered cost per mt of cereals for WFP was several times higher than the local price in Darfur, but the local price would have been higher without WFP food aid. WFP's assistance was more efficient than cash alone would have been.
28. WFP did not distribute cash, but it distributed sugar, whose value to recipients in Darfur was higher than its cost to WFP. This was an efficient means of income transfer to the beneficiaries. WFP's delivered cost per mt of sugar was less than the local price, even for sugar procured in the Sudan.
29. GFD accounted for almost all the food distributed. GFD has a lower support cost than other means of distribution such as food for work (FFW) or FFE, so WFP's preference for it increased efficiency in the early stages when maximizing food flow was the priority.
30. WFP Sudan took some innovative measures to improve efficiency and effectiveness, including: (i) using internal borrowings, (ii) assisting contractors to get trucks, (iii) providing a security team to clear areas and (iv) providing a distributed storage network. The improvements in efficiency and effectiveness between 2004 and 2005 are shown in Figure 3. WFP's improvement in performance was constrained, however, by lack of effective monitoring over the whole programme; learning was most evident in areas such as logistics, where WFP monitoring was concentrated.

Figure 3. Changes in WFP Performance, 2004 - 2005

31. WFP Sudan replaced the normal matrix management structure, in which technical staff are responsible to a line manager and a technical manager, with a hierarchical management model with a single node for all communications. The evaluation team concluded from comparison of the Darfur operation with EMOPs by other agencies that the move to a hierarchical structure was effective in that it enabled WFP to focus its efforts on the primary task set by the Darfur unit in Khartoum, and field staff did not have to handle multiple reporting lines or tasks of different priority from other WFP units.
32. The approach also had costs. Communications flowed through a single node, placing strain on heads of area offices; the structure also limited interaction between programme specialists and field staff, particularly on context-rich⁷ topics such as nutrition, vulnerability assessment, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and gender.

IMPACT

33. WFP food aid interventions prevented widespread nutritional distress and mortality. In interviews with all major stakeholders there was agreement – among beneficiaries in particular – that WFP food flows had averted a humanitarian catastrophe.
34. Pockets of malnutrition continued throughout 2004 and 2005 in some areas, but the annual EFSNA statistics reflect the overall trend of a substantial reduction in the rates of global acute malnutrition (GAM), severe acute malnutrition (SAM), crude⁸ mortality and

⁷ Context-rich topics require communication of more information than more straightforward areas such as logistics, because the raw data needs to be set in context.

⁸ “Crude” refers to the fact that the mortality rates are not adjusted for age.



under-5 mortality (see Table 4). Coverage for therapeutic feeding programmes (TFPs) and school feeding programmes (SFPs) was low. WFP's role in TFPs is limited to providing items to programmes managed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); WFP can only support SFPs where there are willing and able partners.

TABLE 4. CHANGES IN NUTRITIONAL INDICATORS, 2004–2005⁹

Year	GAM Z-score ¹⁰ basis	SAM Z-score basis	CMR (deaths/ 10,000/day)	<5 mortality (deaths /10,000 /day)	SFP ¹¹ coverage	TFP coverage
2004 EFSNA	21.8% 95% CI ¹² (18.2% -25.3%)	3.9% 95% CI (2.3% -5.6%)	0.72	1.03	18%	0%
2005 EFSNA	11.9% 95% CI (10.3% -13.6%)	1.4% 95% CI (0.9%-2.0%)	0.46	0.79	20.2%	28.3%
Benchmark values	15%	2-3%	1.00	2.00	>50%rural >70%urban >90% camp	

35. WFP's impact depends on the level of access to affected populations and four other areas: (i) the level and nature of donor support; (ii) the performance of WFP's programme and logistics systems; (iii) the performance of cooperating partners; and (iv) the ways in which households use the food.
36. WFP handled donor support and logistics well, but the other areas were problematic. WFP has some excellent partners in Darfur, but poor performance by others limited WFP's impact. The performance of some partners was not good enough, even though they perform well alongside WFP in other countries.
37. Lack of monitoring by WFP meant that some aspects of poor performance by partners were overlooked. WFP should have recognized earlier that the difficult conditions in Darfur made it hard for partners to recruit staff, which should have induced WFP to increase monitoring of partners and support development of their capacity.

⁹ Preliminary unweighted results from the 2006 EFSNA show an increase in GAM (13.0 percent, 95 percent confidence interval [CI] 10.3–13.6) and SAM (2.0 percent, 95 percent CI, 1.4 percent–2.6 percent). This is hardly surprising, given the pipeline breaks, reduced rations and access problems in 2006.

¹⁰ Z-score basis means that the children measured have been compared with the distribution curve for children of the same height in the reference population. This is more rigorous than using a fixed percentage of the mean weight to classify children as malnourished.

¹¹ SFPs address the food needs of moderately malnourished children; TFPs address the food and possibly medical needs of severely malnourished children. The coverage shows the number of children reached.


¹² The first figure gives the prevalence of GAM or SAM in the sample population. The 95 percent CI means that there is only a 5 percent chance of it falling outside the range in the population from which the sample is drawn.




38. Weak monitoring failed to identify the serious reduction in “rations consumed” as a result of the high cost of milling, especially for IDPs in camps. In camps near towns, most grain is milled at small-scale commercial mills. Milling costs and losses consumed 25 percent of the WFP food ration and significantly reduced its nutritional value.
39. In some camps food aid recipients had to pay 7– 15 percent of their cereal ration to traditional leaders to cover the “costs” of porters, guards and oversight. Figure 4 shows two cases: (i) where beneficiaries receive the full ration and (ii) where they have to pay part of their ration to cover the “costs” of distribution.

Figure 4. Impact of milling costs and losses on the cereal ration

Source: Data from EFSNA documents for September 2005.
450g cereal ration. Milling loss taken as 7% of the milled ration.



Effect of a 15% portorage charge on a 450g cereal ration.




40. The result was that the caloric value of the ration that households “consumed” was significantly less than WFP appreciated or reported. This was a particular issue for those dependent on food aid, such as IDPs in camps where security prevented alternative livelihood activities.
41. WFP Sudan has begun to improve the quality of performance of cooperating partners. Recent innovations include the introduction of monitoring indicators as part of field level agreements (FLAs), translation of the *How to Work with WFP* handbook into Arabic and development of partnership performance indicators.

COVERAGE

42. WFP’s planning figures in the EMOPs and the budget revisions match the estimates made by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as shown in Figure 2. The average monthly GFD target was 96 percent of those in need, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.96.

Figure 5. WFP and OCHA planning figures compared

Source: various Humanitarian Updates and WFP figures. Note that there are inconsistencies between some Humanitarian Updates




43. WFP focused initially on IDPs in camps; it later assisted the host population and IDPs outside camps. The numbers are approximate because (i) the ICRC was distributing food¹³ to different populations¹⁴ in coordination with WFP and (ii) the number of beneficiaries accessible in any month varied with security and access conditions.
44. WFP’s operations peaked in November 2005 when 57,000 mt of food was distributed in preparation for Ramadan.

¹³ ICRC distributed 8,500 mt of food in 2004 (6.7 percent of WFP distribution) and 32,000 mt in 2005 (7.3 percent).

¹⁴ ICRC focused on assistance to rural populations. At the time of the field work, ICRC was considering ending its food assistance project by the end of 2006 because IDP beneficiaries were served by WFP and settled populations were no longer in need of assistance.



Figure 6. Actual distributions compared with the level planned in the EMOP

45. In April 2004, 92 percent of those targeted for WFP food were IDPs; by December 2005, IDPs were 50 percent of the caseload, though the number had increased (see Figure 5).
46. Inclusion and exclusion errors are inevitable in any food aid operation. From the start of the Darfur operation, WFP risked high inclusion rates to minimize exclusion.
47. Inclusion errors were a problem for IDP camps near towns. This improved in late 2004 and early 2005, but exclusion errors persist with regard to new arrivals in IDP camps.
48. WFP worked with partners to develop a registration system for the camps, but it tried to collect too much data. It is surprising that WFP does not have a registration system that can be used in emergencies.

COHERENCE

49. The 2004 and 2005 EMOPs targeted WFP's Strategic Objectives¹⁵ 1, 3 and 4. The 2004 EMOP targeted Strategic Objective 2 through food for recovery, but this was dropped in the 2005 EMOP. In Darfur, activities were in line with Strategic Objective 1.
50. WFP Sudan's steps to meet ECW in many cases did not reflect sufficient commitment to gender concerns. Food distribution committees had women representatives, but some had no role in food distribution or monitoring. Apart from one improved stove project, WFP has taken no action on collection of firewood – a major risk faced by women.
51. Improvement was needed in (i) the number of women food monitors, (ii) monitoring of gender issues, (iii) monitoring of extremely vulnerable people, (iv) communication between the gender adviser and gender focal points in the field and (v) attention to gender issues by senior managers.

¹⁵ Strategic Objectives: 1 – Save lives in crisis situations; 2 – Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks; 3 – Support the nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people; 4 – Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training.

52. Cooperating partners were not always aware of WFP's expectations in terms of gender. Issues such as the problem of female genital mutilation and HIV/AIDS training fall outside WFP's remit. The team nonetheless recognized that many areas in need of improvement depend on WFP having partners with the capacity to implement gender-sensitive programmes.
53. The generous funding provided by donors enabled WFP to perform well in Darfur. But the timing and conditions attached to contributions were not always coherent with donors' objectives and imposed significant costs on WFP and sometimes promoted pipeline breaks. Donors who allowed WFP to use their funds to repay internal loans helped to prevent pipeline breaks. Such internal financing was important in WFP's performance in Sudan.
54. The innovative approaches to internal borrowing, security arrangements and support for transporters enabled WFP to maximize coverage; some were not covered by WFP policies, but they offer lessons for other WFP operations, in particular the management of risks.
55. The evaluation did not address coherence between WFP's activities in Darfur and international political action to promote a settlement of the conflict.

COORDINATION

56. WFP has participated in normal coordination and particularly in two areas that have facilitated access to beneficiaries – staff security and transport.
57. Security has been a constant concern in Darfur: it improved between 2004 and 2005 but significant concerns remained, including banditry and violence by groups wishing to control food aid. Armed attacks or fighting accounted for 30 percent of security incidents, many of which threatened staff of WFP, cooperating partners and contractors because they controlled WFP assets or needed to travel in Darfur.
58. WFP deployed its own security teams, including a security-assessment element, which allowed faster assessments of routes and areas. WFP also operated UNHAS, which with the security teams allowed quick access to new areas and enabled international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to continue to work in areas from which they would otherwise have had to withdraw. UNHAS and the WFP security assessment team have contributed significantly to the work of other agencies.
59. WFP coordinated well with ICRC, whose staff praised WFP's readiness to ensure a coordinated approach to food distribution.

PROTECTION

60. WFP's programme had a positive impact on protection (i) through the associated international presence in operational areas and (ii) because food aid reduced the necessity for risky foraging outside the camps. If WFP reduced rations or failed to deliver full rations because of pipeline gaps, populations were placed at risk. These risks are not the same for all camp populations: some face different levels of risk when engaged in livelihood activities. Disappointingly, these risk differentials were not reflected in ration policies.



61. WFP gave preference to IDPs in camps, but did not distinguish camps in terms of the available alternative livelihoods. Those in camps with no available alternative livelihoods were given no higher priority by WFP than those in camps with better access to livelihoods. An effective monitoring system could have highlighted beneficiary groups vulnerable to violence as a result of gaps in food baskets.
62. WFP has no formal definition or policy for protection, but WFP Sudan helped significantly in protecting IDPs.

ANNEX I

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**ANNEX II. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF DARFUR
EMOP 10339.0/1**

Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
<p>Improving effectiveness</p> <p>WFP Sudan must continue to improve the quality of monitoring of needs, targeting, timing, delivery, partner performance and impact so that managers have the information to make evidence-based decisions.</p> <p>When dealing with shortfalls or limited resources, WFP should prioritize Darfur food deliveries to households or individuals most dependent on food aid or whose livelihood strategies place them at greatest risk to violence or death.</p> <p>Where there is evidence of threat to life or well-being, WFP should consider providing augmented rations to households or individuals who would otherwise have to engage in life-threatening livelihood activities.</p> <p>WFP Sudan should work with partners to determine the causes of the high rates of default and low rates of recovery in SFP and TFP centres and to improve the coverage of these programmes.</p> <p>WFP should adopt more comprehensive and objective monitoring and reporting of “rations” to understand the true nutritional value of WFP assistance. This should reflect what is intended, what is distributed and what is actually available for consumption.</p>	<p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p>	<p>Throughout 2006, WFP capitalized on experience gained from: (i) security/VAM assessment teams to guide expansion into rural areas; (ii) a second joint EFSNA, which helped with revising plans for 2006; and (iii) development of the CMEA toolkit for improving M&E at the field level. The focus is now on streamlining decision-making to ensure that monitoring translates efficiently into programme adjustments.</p> <p>WFP Sudan developed criteria for dealing with shortfalls and continues to prioritize assistance to IDPs in camps. Further targeting of individuals and households or distinguishing needs between camps is too costly and inappropriate in that it could fuel tensions between recipients and non-recipients.</p> <p>WFP Sudan recognizes that food aid is an essential component of the livelihood economy and believes food aid has limited exposure to high-risk livelihood strategies. Provision of additional food is not necessarily the best response: other incentives such as providing stoves or cash could be considered.</p> <p>WFP Sudan continues to advocate with partners to address these issues, to understand the causes of malnutrition and identify responses. Technical guidelines were developed in 2006 to harmonize the design of SFPs. Partners’ capacity and complementary funding remain the major constraints. The nutrition surveillance system has been effective (i) in identifying areas where malnutrition rates are high and where SFP should be set up, and (ii) in strengthening outreach activities.</p> <p>Food-basket monitoring and post-distribution monitoring have become more consistent since mid-2005. Systematic monitoring of actual food aid available for consumption using standard tools remains a challenge because of (i) insecurity, limited access for random sampling and staffing constraints; and (ii) post-distribution and food-basket monitoring protocols affect consistency.</p>



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<p>WFP Sudan should expand sensitization of targeted populations to the nutritional usefulness of CSB and its preparation and use.</p> <p>If school feeding is continued, WFP Sudan should clarify the objective: to encourage girls' enrolment, support child nutrition, promote rapid re-establishment of schools or help to pay for teachers.</p> <p>WFP Sudan should improve warehouse hygiene, increase the use of pallets, anchor storage tents more firmly and improve stacking.</p>	<p>ODS</p> <p>PDP</p> <p>ODS</p>	<p>Agreed. A CSB sensitization workshop involving NGO partners and the Government was conducted in North Darfur in 2006. It recommended that health and nutrition education should complement food distribution. Similar CSB sensitization workshops will be conducted in West and South Darfur in 2007. WFP Sudan is (i) compiling local recipes using CSB into a booklet and will produce tapes demonstrating CSB cooking, (ii) reviewing current nutrition and health education in each state and (iii) monitoring WFP-supported health/nutrition education.</p> <p>Agreed. In the 2007 EMOP, WFP has reduced the planned number of children to be reached to a more realistic figure.</p> <p>PDP notes this issue is not specific to WFP's Darfur operations. PDP recognizes that there is a need to improve definition of the objectives of school feeding in EMOPs; the thematic evaluation by OEDE should provide insights.</p> <p>The practices mentioned have been enhanced since the mission visited Sudan. Additional cleaners were trained on daily upkeep of warehouses; 30,000 plastic pallets have been distributed, with 44,000 more expected; warehouse managers regularly conduct refresher training in warehouse practices; 1.5 m spikes have been introduced to anchor wiikhalls.</p>
<p>Improving protection</p> <p>Collecting firewood is risky for women. WFP should lead the humanitarian community in assessing the risks of firewood foraging and propose solutions to reduce them.</p> <p>WFP should formalize the concept of protection and include advice on providing augmented rations for populations who are restricted to high-risk livelihood strategies.</p>	<p>ODS</p> <p>PDP</p>	<p>WFP Sudan strives to mitigate risks to vulnerable populations, but it is not the leader on protection issues, which is the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the coordinator, UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC. Some solutions were proposed in West Darfur, where WFP advocated firewood patrols, and in North Darfur, where WFP introduced fuel-efficient stoves on a small scale.</p> <p>The Sudan country office had two protection review missions in 2005 and 2006; workshops in November/December 2006 improved understanding of WFP's role in protection in all stages of the food distribution cycle.</p> <p>PDPT is finalizing research on WFP's potential contribution to the protection of communities where it works. Over the past 18 months, PDPT has carried out seven field studies, provided protection and "do no harm" workshops for field staff in five countries including Sudan; this was complemented by desk reviews on gender and protection and a review of protection literature. The resulting reports have been included in the <i>Programme Guidance Manual</i> as reference material for WFP staff. PDPT will continue to support country offices, offer training, integrate protection parameters into programming steps in training programmes and consider institutional protection guidance.</p>



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Recommendations	Action by	Management response and action taken
<p>Improving efficiency</p> <p>WFP Sudan should reinforce administrative support in area offices because the hierarchical management model places considerable responsibility on them.</p> <p>WFP Sudan should revisit procedures for communication between Darfur and Khartoum to improve the flow and quality of information between Khartoum and the field.</p> <p>WFP should review COMPAS in Darfur to determine what led to inefficiencies and how such inefficiencies can be avoided.</p> <p>Where whole grains are supplied to populations dependent on food aid, WFP should provide milling facilities or a ration sufficient to cover milling costs and milling losses.</p> <p>WFP Sudan should seek donor resources to support a subsidized milling programme in IDP camps in Darfur.</p> <p>WFP should continue to employ, and develop, the inclusion of food in beneficiary rations that serve as income transfers.</p> <p>WFP Sudan must set up better mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of ECW internally and with respect to cooperating partners. WFP senior managers in Sudan should ensure that ECW are integrated into all aspects of programming in Darfur.</p>	<p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODTF</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p> <p>ODS</p>	<p>Noted. In 2006 WFP improved the area office structure to reinforce support functions in all of them; it is being further improved in 2007.</p> <p>Current efforts to encourage communication among specialists and field staff are being revisited to ensure that adequate technical assistance is provided.</p> <p>ODTF recognizes the difficulties of operating COMPAS in the early stages of an emergency; these are exacerbated in areas with poor infrastructures. In early 2005, with the assistance of TNT, WFP reviewed COMPAS and made a number of improvements such as using scanners to enter data, centralizing data entry at points where capacities and infrastructure are assured, introducing quick-start laptops with stand-alone software that does not require network connectivity, using Oracle Discoverer-based reporting systems, capacity-building and quicker preparation of project status reports.</p> <p>ODS notes that more cereals may not equal the milling losses/costs, but in Darfur providing additional food may not be the only solution. In the Darfur EFSNA in September 2005, beneficiaries preferred whole grain rather than flour because it was more flexible in food preparation and could be stored for longer.</p> <p>Noted: WFP is considering such a programme in 2007.</p> <p>WFP Sudan recognizes that programmatic adjustments to increase the food basket have supported the livelihoods of conflict-affected populations.</p> <p>Noted. As highlighted in the evaluation, WFP Sudan has made progress with regard to women's involvement in food distributions and will implement these policies where possible.</p>



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<p>Ensuring adequate performance of cooperating partners</p> <p>WFP Sudan should revise procedures for ensuring that cooperating partners and food distribution committees understand its policies and can implement them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ ECW: attention should be given to weaknesses in women’s participation in food distribution committees and to distribution arrangements to reduce gender-based violence. ➤ Registration of beneficiaries: attention should be given to weaknesses in basic registration practices and protocols, collection, treatment and protection of personal information and treatment of new arrivals. ➤ Distribution of food aid: attention should be given to addressing weaknesses in: (i) informing beneficiaries about the size and composition of rations, explaining that they must not provide favours in exchange for rations, and making known channels for reporting abuse linked to food aid; (ii) providing and using suitable measures and procedures; (iii) avoiding unsanctioned overhead charges on beneficiary rations; and (iv) providing shade and water at distributions. 	<p>ODS</p>	<p>The FLA format between WFP and partners establishes the responsibilities of both parties. It is acknowledged that improvements are required with regard to dialogue and understanding and to ensuring that partners implement and monitor to WFP standards. WFP Sudan is leading work on partnership performance indicators and monitoring that could become the basis for best practice.</p> <p>The registration system was built by WFP Sudan and IOM in late 2004. Beneficiary records are continuously updated; operational practices in cooperation with partners have improved. The challenges of registration in Darfur are considerable: limited staff to undertake large-scale registration and verification in camps, lack of major commitment from the government, the vested interests of community leaders and insecurity – all are factors in the inability to comply with agreed procedures.</p> <p>Noted. Improvements are being made at the field level through training, workshops and regular meetings that provide guidance and technical support. The main performance indicators are effective.</p>



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<p>The above could include revised guidance, increased or improved training, regular re-training, mandatory debriefings, increased technical support and greater empowerment of/dependence on FDCs.</p> <p>To implement the above, WFP Sudan must monitor the performance of its cooperating partners more effectively, especially if it has reason to believe that they may not be operating in compliance with policies and protocols. Where problems persist, WFP must intervene to ensure the safety and dignity of beneficiaries.</p>		<p>Agreed. WFP will implement a partnership performance monitoring system based on experiences in 2005 and 2006. Agreed indicators will be collected to monitor expectations and commitments formally. Results will highlight causes for concern and provide the basis for corrective action.</p>
<p>Beneficiary registration</p> <p>WFP should develop a ready-to-use beneficiary registration system as a starting point in emergencies, including guidelines, protocols, forms and software.</p> <p>WFP Sudan should develop guidelines for verifying new arrivals and distribute emergency rations to ensure that new arrivals at camps receive food assistance promptly.</p>	<p>PDP</p> <p>ODS</p>	<p>PDP, ODO and ODA in consultation with UNHCR are updating registration guidance; it will include registration policy and protocols, sample forms, examples of good practice and links to guidance from partners.</p> <p>WFP and IOM Sudan will refine and communicate operational guidelines. WFP does provide emergency rations during verification where necessary.</p>
<p>Recognizing innovation</p> <p>WFP should document lessons learned from the logistics and financial innovations in Darfur that enabled the highest monthly food aid delivery rates in WFP's history. It should also examine the risks of such innovation and show how they were managed as a step to improving risk management in similar programmes in future.</p>	<p>PDP</p>	<p>Agreed. WFP will use learning tools such as <i>PASS it on</i> to share lessons from the logistics and financial innovations applied in Darfur and from management of the associated risks.</p>



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

BR	budget revision
CI	confidence interval
CMEA	common monitoring and evaluation approach
CMR	child mortality rate
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CSB	corn-soya blend
DAC	Development Co-operation Directorate
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EFSNA	emergency food security and nutrition assessment
EMOP	emergency operation
ESF	emergency school feeding
FDC	Communications Division
FFE	food for education
FFW	food for work
FLA	field level agreement
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GDP	gross domestic product
GFD	general food distribution
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Assessment, Analysis and Preparedness Division
ODO	Office of Director of Operations
ODS	Stand Alone Country Offices
ODTF	Freight Analysis and Support Branch
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEDE	Office of Evaluation
PDP	Policy Strategy and Programme Support Division



PDPT	Emergencies and Transitions Unit
SAM	severe acute malnutrition
SFP	school feeding programme
SO	special operation
TFP	therapeutic feeding programme
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping