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COUNTRY STRATEGY OUTLINES

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COUNTRY STRATEGY OUTLINE— UGANDA

ABSTRACT

Uganda exhibits two diverse faces—one reflects the pride of economic miracles, the other the humility of abject poverty. It is a dichotomy founded by 15 years of political turmoil and later perpetuated by economic recovery programmes favouring infrastructure over people. While modest progress has been made on the social front, the country remains mired in poverty as natural calamities and rebel incursions hinder efforts to ensure all Ugandans benefit from the economic windfall. Thus far, impressive macroeconomic indicators have failed to mask the face of poverty. Scoring 0.328 and ranking 159th out of 175 on the Human Development Index, Uganda is one of the most impoverished countries in the world. Real per capita GDP is only 283 dollars, compared with 490 dollars for sub-Saharan Africa, and over 60 percent of the population lives below the absolute poverty line. Infant and child mortality rates are alarmingly high; the overall death rate is twice the norm for low-income countries, and life expectancy is a mere 42.6 years. Although 80 percent of Ugandans are employed in agriculture, the majority lack access to markets, with many reducing production or selling subsistence food to meet minimal cash requirements. Insecurity, low rural investment and high fertility rates have placed 52 percent of the population below WHO's minimum calorie intake level. Over the past two decades neighbouring civil wars and recurrent natural calamities and rebel incursions within Uganda have forced an average 500,000 refugees, displaced and drought/flood-affected to remain dependent upon food assistance.

The Country Strategy Outline (CSO) calls for a geographic and demographic concentration of resources that will provide a measurable impact on the poorest of the poor. Design discipline will be introduced within relief operations where a balance will also be struck between programming and logistical resources. Recovery programmes will aim to address the underlying problems of food insecurity rather than providing subsistence alone, and WFP will encourage investment in remote and insecure areas as an alternative to war and unsuccessful peace negotiations. Development programmes will be implemented only where donors and complementary inputs are fully committed. NGO partnerships will be formed where there is evidence of comparative advantage; both staff and project performance will be measured in terms of tangible outputs for the poor.

Alongside measured relief, future WFP assistance will be focused on the two weakest sectors, namely human resource development and agriculture/marketing support. Annual food needs for the planning period 1999–2003 are estimated at 56,677 metric tons, some 30 percent of which will be procured within Uganda as an indirect means of assisting the rural poor. The WFP strategy includes several measures that will enhance delivery capacity, and achieve relief and development objectives more cost-effectively. Considering the root causes of poverty and food insecurity in Uganda, the CSO is considered the most appropriate and responsible course of action that can be taken under prevailing circumstances.

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

Pursuant to the decisions taken on the methods of work by the Executive Board at its First Regular Session of 1996, the documentation prepared by the Secretariat for the Board has been kept brief and decision-oriented. The meetings of the Executive Board are to be conducted in a business-like manner, with increased dialogue and exchanges between delegations and the Secretariat. Efforts to promote these guiding principles will continue to be pursued by the Secretariat.

The Secretariat therefore invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff member(s) listed below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting. This procedure is designed to facilitate the Board's consideration of the document in the plenary.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Uganda, which is a least developed country (LDC) but not listed by FAO among low-income, food-deficit countries (LIFDC), with a population of 20.4 million, is yet to recover from 14 years (1971-85) of economic decline, and political unrest followed by civil strife. During this period, nearly all socio-economic indicators revealed a rapid, negative decline from their pre-1971 levels. Uganda's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 25 percent; exports by 60 percent, and government expenditures on education and health plummeted to a mere 27 and nine percent respectively of their previous levels. At the same time, a great number of Ugandans lost their lives and more than one million were displaced or forced to live in exile. Today, despite improved democratic governance and rapid economic growth, the country remains plagued by security problems, food insecurity and pervasive poverty.
2. Assuming power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government inherited an economy that had been shattered and a population that had been severely demoralized and poverty-stricken. Since launching its Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in May 1987, the Government has been able to marshal a steady and commendable recovery on the economic front. Between 1991 and 1997, the economy expanded at an annual rate of 6.5 percent; Government revenues increased from eight to 12 percent; the overall deficit fell from 15 to seven percent of GDP, and inflation declined from 300 to five percent. Unfortunately, the majority of Ugandans have yet to benefit from the economic rejuvenation and while Government expenditures on health and education have risen, they have not yet been able to compensate for the prolonged period of social and economic decay. With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.328 in 1997 (a ranking of 159th out of 175), and with real per capita GDP at 283 dollars¹ versus 490 dollars for sub-Saharan Africa (1996), poverty is clearly Uganda's most daunting challenge.
3. In its 1997 Human Development Report, UNDP refers to "the two faces of Uganda," and the "stark asymmetry between Uganda's economic performance and human development ranking." Indeed, by all conventional measures, Uganda today has some of the most alarming social indicators in the world. Over 60 percent of the population lives below the absolute poverty line of 135 dollars a year. Life expectancy is only 42.6 years and the already high infant and child mortality rates of 117 and 180 deaths per 1,000 are expected to rise because of AIDS. The country's crude death rate of 20 per 1,000 is twice the norm for low-income countries. Only 47 percent of children 12 to 23 months are immunized and 1.3 million of those who survive their infancy are orphaned. Overall, 23.2 percent of the country's children are involved in child labour, with a mere 27.1 percent of children aged 15 years and above completing primary education. While the proportion of women to men is higher (51:49) and women produce 80 percent of Uganda's food, only 19 and six percent of women finish primary school and secondary school, respectively.
4. Of growing concern is Uganda's high fertility rate which, at 7.3 percent, is the fourth highest in the world and twice the average of 3.8 percent for LDCs. Together with short child-spacing intervals, high fertility has had an adverse impact on mothers' and children's health. In causing the number of school-age children to grow rapidly, it reduces overall

¹ All monetary values are expressed in United States dollars, unless otherwise stated. One United States dollar equalled 1,150 Ugandan shillings in May 1998.



access to education facilities, particularly for females who are forced to drop out from school as a result of teenage pregnancies or to remain at home to care for younger siblings. At the household level, high fertility has prevented parents from saving and investing adequately in family welfare. Meanwhile, the high infant and child mortality rate has encouraged parents to have more children than desired while the high level of adult mortality has made it more difficult for surviving parents to care for themselves or their children. Overall, the ratio of the young and elderly to the working-age population, or “dependency ratio” is 113 percent, which far exceeds the average 66 percent for other LDCs. The burden of high fertility and dependency is particularly stressful for families headed by women which represent 29 percent of all households and which lack surplus farm labour and savings to elevate themselves from poverty.

FOOD INSECURITY AND THE HUNGRY POOR

5. The few published analyses of food availability in Uganda have concluded that food production is far in excess of demand and that the majority of Ugandans are food secure. This misconception is derived from inflated production estimates of cultivated areas and population growth rather than more reliable agricultural sampling methods. Independent studies undertaken in 1996 by the World Bank, USAID and the Bank of Uganda reveal considerable variance in the data and data collection methods employed by agricultural officers and by national-level crop surveys. They cited the sixties as the last time reliable agricultural production data were available. It has been impossible to gauge the degree or direction of error for all variables but in general, the incentive for district agricultural officers has been to inflate production figures by an average of 10 to 15 percent, with far-ranging consequences. Such anomalies have for years masked the gravity of Uganda’s food scarcity and have delayed or misguided strategies for effective intervention.

Food insecurity at the national level

6. Only in the wake of combined drought, flooding and rebel insurgency in 1996 was food insecurity first seen as more than an isolated or transitory phenomenon. In February 1997, FAO and WFP conducted their first crop and food supply assessment mission to Uganda and confirmed that available data contradicted more reliable, grass-roots reports of food scarcity from NGOs, traders and farmers’ associations. Official estimates had not taken into account post-harvest losses or cross-border movements of food to the neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania. The data disregarded population displacement which over the previous 12 years had prevented farming in over one fifth of the country’s cultivatable land area. The data failed to explain why WFP launched 26 operations, totalling 121,286,067 dollars or 46 percent of its cumulative expenditure in Uganda in favour of drought victims, schoolchildren and other vulnerable groups and in areas that were indisputably and chronically food-deficit. Also unexplained was the trend in WFP procurement which, despite a continuing availability of cash resources, fell, because of insufficient supplies on the local market, from 91,000 tons in 1994, to 26,000 in 1995, 28,000 in 1996, and 23,000 in 1997. Obviously, something was amiss in reporting on the country’s economic base and lifeline.
7. More in-depth analyses have revealed that Uganda is indeed less food-secure than its agricultural statistics suggest. Estimates by the Ministry of Finance, FAO and the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) confirm that in recent years Uganda has produced a small surplus of roots, tubers and cooking bananas (*matoke*), and that production of maize and



other cereals has been slightly in excess (five percent) of domestic demand. Much (15 to 20 percent) of the small surplus, however, moves unofficially across borders or is perishable (40 percent) and too costly to move inter-regionally given the generally poor state of rural markets, storage facilities and roads. Bananas account for 53 percent of total output; root crops (cassava and potatoes) 28 percent, maize, finger millet, sorghum and rice only 12 percent; and oil seeds and pulses seven percent. Moisture damage, spillage, pest infestation and poor storage reduce the total amount produced and available for either household consumption or sale by an average of 20 to 25 percent. Taking these percentages into consideration and adding to them the probability of error in agricultural statistics (10 to 15 percent), food surpluses available in-country would range from 70,000 to 110,000 tons; some 45 percent of this amount is purchased annually by WFP, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Union (EU) for redistribution within Uganda.

8. Grown primarily under rain-fed conditions with very little irrigation, the supply of both food and cash crops varies greatly from year to year and the lack of sufficient meteorological and market information prevents farmers from anticipating and responding to shortages of specific commodities. Staple food production is also threatened at the national level by crop diseases, with the Cassava Mosaic virus having destroyed over 60 percent of this drought-resistant staple in 1997 alone. As a result of these constraints and the need to feed the country's refugees and displaced persons, Uganda imported an average of 57,700 tons of food aid a year during 1990–96, out of which some 46,500 tons was delivered by WFP (i.e., about 81 percent). On average, an additional 9,900 tons of wheat, 2,300 tons of rice, 7,400 tons of sugar and 6,000 tons of edible oil were commercially imported annually to help cover the country's structural deficit for these commodities in primarily urban areas. In general, the 20-year trend (1979–98) has been one of stagnation, with minor gains in food production (2.4 percent per annum) being either absorbed by rapid population growth (3.2 percent) or undermined by impoverishment and low effective demand.

Conditions determining food insecurity and hunger

9. The primary cause of food insecurity in Uganda is not food shortage at the national level, but rather the underlying problem of poverty and access. Of the country's total population of 20.4 million, about 18.1 million or 89 percent live in rural areas which are also home to 92 percent of Uganda's poor or 12.5 million people. Some 81 percent of the rural population, comprising 2.4 million farm households, cultivate less than 2.5 hectares of land or approximately 31 percent less than in 1970 (3.6 hectares). Only 30–35 percent of the cultivable land is under crop in Uganda; this is primarily attributable to the disruption of farming systems during the period of civil strife, the loss of animal traction, and the isolation and increased poverty of farmers. Reflecting the level of impoverishment and its unequal distribution regionally is the percentage of household expenditure on food which rose from an average 37 percent in rural areas in 1979 to 64 percent in 1989/90, with variations of 49.8 percent for the Central Region, 64.2 for the Eastern Region, and 62.9 and 68.6 percent for the Western and Northern Regions, respectively. The FAO Aggregate Household Food Security Index (AHFSI) was 76.4 in 1992.
10. Factors constraining smallholder production in Uganda are similar to those across Africa; they include limited access to agricultural credit, poorly developed market channels, seasonal labour shortages, lack of information to allow farmers to participate effectively in the market and to acquire and apply knowledge of irrigation techniques, and a lack of improved seed, pesticides and fertilizers. The tendency of large traders to offer



below optimal prices for farm produce or to “collect and pay later,” combined with the lack of small farmers’ associations and procurement procedures favouring large traders have created disincentives, with many farmers moving to cash crops or reducing the area planted to subsistence levels.

11. Despite the country’s fertile soil, favourable weather and growing economy, over half of the Ugandan people simply do not have enough to eat. The Demographic and Health Survey of 1995 found that 52 percent of the population lives in districts where consumption (2,070 kilocalories) is less than the World Health Organization (WHO) food poverty line or minimum per capita daily calorie intake requirement of 2,200 calories, while only 48 percent are able to meet their food energy requirement. Most alarming is the fact that some 46 percent of children aged 0–60 months have stunted growth, as shown by their height-for-age, reflecting an over-dependence upon low-protein foods such as banana, sweet potato and cassava. Severe growth retardation occurs in 20 percent of the children in the sample group. Other factors contributing to stunting include frequent bouts of malaria, diarrhoea and measles; inadequate weaning; and an increase in women’s workload resulting in reduced time for breast-feeding and childcare. In the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Karamoja, malnutrition rates dropped considerably from 70 percent at the end of 1996 to 20 percent in May 1998 as a result of interventions combining food aid and seed distribution.

Target population

12. Assessments undertaken by the World Bank, WFP, UNICEF, FEWS and the Government of Uganda are consistent in their identification of those groups that are poor and food-insecure in Uganda, specifically: a) displaced and war-affected persons; b) victims of drought and other natural calamities; c) orphaned and abandoned children; and d) households headed by women. Although poverty is prevalent throughout the country, particularly with regard to groups c) and d), it is particularly severe in the northern and north-eastern districts (see Annex III). References to “target populations” and the concept of targeting in general are not generally appreciated in Uganda, where over half the population is below the poverty line and 4.2 million are classified as “core poor” and arguably “in need” of food and other assistance at any point in time.
13. **Displaced and war affected persons.** Since July 1996, there have been an average 500,000 persons displaced by rebel attacks, including 400,000 in the northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum districts and 110,000 in the western districts of Bundibugyo and Kasesse. Those affected represent 64 percent of the population and nearly the entire rural labour force in areas covering 20 percent of Uganda’s cultivatable land mass. Forced to abandon their farms, they lack the means to provide themselves with adequate nutrition and shelter, and are settled in trading centres where they will remain dependent upon basic food rations until security can be restored. The livelihood of non-displaced residents has also been severely affected in Gulu and Kitgum, where the pre-conflict HDI was already low, at 0.305 and 0.269 respectively, compared to 0.355 for other regions and a national HDI average of 0.328.
14. Nearly all children aged five to 14 years have been out of school since the conflict escalated in February 1996, with less than 30 percent currently enrolled on a full-time basis and with young girls disproportionately affected. According to the Ministry of Local Government, some 40,000 persons have lost their limbs to landmines over the last 12 years of conflict. UNICEF estimates that between 8,000 and 9,000 children have been abducted



by rebels since 1996 for military training and prostitution. There are also a significant number of orphans and traumatized children.

15. **Victims of drought and other natural calamities.** In any one year, there are 100,000 to 180,000 persons whose food security is affected by drought, flooding, pest infestation, plant viruses, poor grazing, post-harvest losses, or a combination thereof. Those in and around the insecure northern districts are confronted further by prohibitive transport rates and a lack of access to inputs, credit facilities, markets and social services. Continuous deficits in nearly all foodstuffs have been experienced in the north-eastern Karamajong districts of Kotido and Moroto, in the northern district of Kitgum, and to a lesser extent, in the central district of Luwero. Transitory food-deficit areas include the eastern districts of Soroti, Kumi, Pallisa and Tororo.
16. **Orphaned and abandoned children.** These are at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder, and generally live below subsistence levels. Orphans are estimated to number 1.3 million or 11.6 percent of all children under 17 (1991 census). The majority of orphans are concentrated in the war-ravaged areas of the North and Northeast, as well as in the areas with the highest incidence of AIDS such as the urban areas of Mpigi, Jinja and Kampala and the districts of Rakai and Masaka. The problem of orphans, especially AIDS orphans, is compounded by the fact that after they have lost one breadwinner, they can also expect to lose the other within a few years. Their young age, and lack of education and support significantly reduces their ability to become self-reliant. Finally, many orphans are forced to migrate to urban areas in search of employment. While a few become employed as domestics, the majority live in the streets, where they are forced to beg, steal or exchange sexual favours in order to cope.
17. **Households headed by women.** While poverty and rapid structural adjustment have affected both men and women in Uganda, they have done so in different ways, and it is evident that women, and particularly households headed by women and their dependants, are disadvantaged economically and socially. The lack of access to productive assets and unequal opportunities in education are fundamental in this regard, as reflected in the gender index value for men, which is 0.504 or 136 percent higher than that for women (0.372). According to the 1991 census, an average 29 percent of households are headed by women, with the proportion being as high as 53 percent in the north-eastern districts of Kotido and Moroto, 44 percent in the conflict-ridden northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum, and 38 percent in urban areas affected by HIV/AIDS.
18. Over 80 percent of the country's food is produced by women who carry out their tasks without the benefit of technological innovation, inputs or finance—least of all recognition. Women's contribution to agricultural production through their labour is not matched by their control over the most important factor of production, namely land. On average, women control 16.3 percent of the farm holdings of Uganda, while men control the remaining 83.7 percent. The few holdings that women do control consist of areas less than one hectare. Unlike men, they are constrained by competing claims on their labour time, being primarily (82 percent) responsible for household management, child rearing, food preparation, care of the sick and elderly, and family health and welfare. On average, Ugandan women work from 12 to 18 hours a day, compared to an average 8.2 hours performed by their male counterparts, and they lack sufficient time and flexibility to learn and adopt labour-saving technologies. Women generally form the subsistence, non-monetized sector in a society where one's contribution is measured in wage or cash terms. The cash economy is dominated by males, who represent 86 percent of management, 80 percent of professionals and 72 percent of technicians. Consequently, the contribution of



women is not valued or at most is undervalued and taken for granted, despite the enormous contribution of women to both family and national welfare.

19. The exclusion of women from the cash economy adversely affects their access to education and social and agricultural extension services as well as their involvement and participation in formal groups and decision-making fora. In rural areas, only five percent of women receive attention from extension or health workers, 18 percent are involved in women's groups and a mere two percent are members of agricultural cooperatives. Owing to their heavy workloads and isolation, women generally have very little knowledge of health, nutrition and hygiene, and they consequently face a higher health risk than males. Contraceptive use is low at five percent for women of reproductive age due to a lack of access to birth control and generally unfavourable male attitudes. Nationally, only 45 percent of the population above 15 years are literate, dropping to 27 percent in northern Uganda and a dismal six percent in the Northeast. Literacy, or the lack thereof, has been strongly correlated with nutrition and family well-being, including infant and under-five mortality rates. It is also attributed to the inability of women to compete effectively with males in the off-farm cash economy or to acquire and apply knowledge of their legal and 'inalienable' rights.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES ADDRESSING POVERTY AND HUNGER

20. The Government has consistently demonstrated its commitment to economic growth and poverty reduction and has engaged itself fully with WFP and the donor community towards meeting these objectives. In 1997 the Government introduced a new development strategy, "Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)", representing a shift in priorities towards public policy intervention on the premise that "people are both the ends and means of development."

Overall policies

21. In recognizing that the majority of Ugandans depend on smallholder farming and that the country's comparative advantage lies in agriculture, the top priority identified in the PEAP is to raise incomes from agriculture and to increase investment in rural infrastructure, education, health, agricultural extension and other services that will enable the poor to increase agricultural productivity and food supply. Other objectives include the reduction of child mortality, attention to vulnerable groups and good governance. Communities and NGOs are expected to be key players in providing safety nets to the disadvantaged, while the Government's role is to be limited to coordination, policy, increasing private-sector participation through competition, the provision of incentives and effective regulation, and to ensuring greater public financing of infrastructure, rural credit, small-scale enterprises, food security, environment and water.
22. The establishment of the National Agricultural Research Organization increased funding to the Ugandan National Farmers Association, large-scale decentralization and delegation of authority to local government. The implementation of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme in early 1997 reflects the seriousness with which the Government is seeking to achieve the objectives of its poverty reduction programme. Since January 1997, primary school enrolment alone has increased by 166 percent, or from 2.9 million pupils to 4.8 million, primarily in the rural areas. In recognition of the particular needs of women and children, the Government has created a Ministry of Gender and Community



Development, and in June 1998 a Ministry for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees was established to spearhead and coordinate humanitarian relief efforts.

Food security policies

23. During the period 1986–96, the agricultural sector was largely taken for granted, with its share of Government expenditure being extremely low by world standards at an average 1.5 percent per annum. While public financing is seldom a major factor determining growth in this sector and in any country, its absence during a period of pacification and relatively low private investment in Uganda's rural areas was noticeable. During the period, agriculture dropped from 57 to 45 percent of GDP with social indices in rural areas following similar trends as industry and the urban service sector received priority. It has now become evident that with 89 percent of Ugandans living in rural areas and engaged primarily in subsistence farming, much of the demand for manufactured products and services and the major impetus for fuelling and maintaining economic growth lies in food and cash crop development.
24. The "National Food Strategy" (NFS) identifies four key areas for boosting agriculture:
- a) labour-intensive, feeder road construction as a means of reducing transport costs, increasing access to the market economy and raising incomes of rural households;
 - b) strengthening agricultural extension services for those who are currently unable to pay for inputs and services provided through the private sector;
 - c) increasing access to credit and other financial services in order to increase acquisition of improved technology and the development of a monetary economy in rural areas; and
 - d) the education, empowerment and legal protection of women to ensure their access to inputs and services and their involvement in the decision-making that affects family welfare and, by extension, the welfare of the country.

Food aid policy

25. As expressed in the NFS, the Government is generally favourable to well targeted food assistance in support of a range of relief and rehabilitation initiatives for alleviating poverty. Food aid is to be used to address both the short- and long-term needs of refugees, displaced persons and people living in chronically food-deficit areas such as Karamoja, where the bulk of food assistance should be targeted. "Immediate emergency and humanitarian aid is to encourage self-sufficiency in the long term" through a "strategic shift to a new paradigm which links relief and development." This approach, which was conceived independently, is most consistent with the operational principles outlined in WFP's policy paper "From Crisis to Recovery," (WFP/EB.A/98/4).
26. The WFP practice of contracting private transporters and of purchasing food locally has supported the Government's structural adjustment and poverty eradication programmes. In providing a market for small farmers, traders and transporters, as well as food for redistribution to the poor, WFP procurement will continue as an indirect but effective strategy for alleviating poverty in Uganda.

ASSESSMENT OF WFP'S PERFORMANCE TO DATE

27. Whereas WFP signed a basic agreement with the Government only in 1972, its operations in Uganda actually commenced as early as September 1964, with the provision



of refugee assistance. During the past 34 years, WFP has launched 66 operations in Uganda worth a total 262 million dollars. Details are as follows:

WFP ASSISTANCE TO UGANDA (1964 TO 1998)		
Type of intervention	Value (dollars)	(%)
Integrated rural development projects	33 252 301	13
School feeding	59 951 948	23
Refugee operations	82 545 389	31
Assistance to displaced persons	58 340 828	22
Drought relief	28 081 818	11
Total	262 172 284	100

28. In theory, development projects and emergency operations represented 36 and 64 percent of the assistance, respectively. In practice, however, the distinction between these two types of operations remained blurred with development projects reverting back to relief-and-recovery operations as they confronted recurrent drought, insecurity, and general food insecurity. Analyses of WFP operations reveal an increase in the number and frequency (but not the size) of relief operations. This trend parallels a general decline in agricultural productivity, rural incomes, and the capacity of Ugandans to cope with abrupt shocks posed by unforeseen meteorological events, civil strife, and external market trends. The result was often delayed production of tangible outputs and long-term benefits on the development side as WFP concentrated on the more immediate task of saving and/or restoring human resources and capacities. Given that people are both the ends and means of development, and that such calamities were unforeseeable, the trade-off has been effective on financial and humanitarian grounds.
29. Decentralization and the establishment of Kampala as the hub office for the Great Lakes Regional Cluster has been advantageous for the Uganda programme. In a drive to reduce overall costs, the regional and country offices have been co-located with staff assigned dual regional-country roles. Thus, while Uganda was not included in the Great Lakes emergency operation (EMOP), it benefited considerably from the “neighbourhood effects” of telecommunications, commodity tracking, and financial systems that were established to facilitate decentralization and to support regional emergency operations. At the same time, the country office’s historical role as a logistics and procurement centre for the region has often resulted in expertise being skewed towards these functions and being weak on the programming, and particularly recovery and development, side. This is an area that will receive WFP attention to address relief and development issues simultaneously.

The WFP programme in Uganda

UGA 2642.O2—Assistance to education, health and rural development in Karamoja

30. Karamoja is a drought-stricken and chronically food-deficit area of the country where even in good years the cereal deficit alone averages 14,000 tons. While the majority of the population are nomadic pastoralists, only 40 percent of family food intake is in the form of meat products, with the remaining 60 percent depending primarily on food imported into



the region and on locally produced sorghum and millet crops which are grown once a year and heavily prone to drought. Typically, 30 to 35 percent of these mono crops fail each year. In three consecutive dry spells during 1996/97, losses averaged 60 percent. As a consequence, between 100,000 and 180,000 Karamojongs face severe food shortages, particularly during the lean season (May–September) with small children, the elderly, women and the disabled being the most vulnerable.

31. The above project was approved in 1990 but commenced only in mid-1993 because of insecurity and an initial lack of resources. A review of the project at the end of 1997 found that 75 percent of its targets in education and health/vulnerable group feeding had been met. Enrolment increased by 74 percent in the first year and 43 percent in the second, with enrolment of girls increasing from almost nil to 39 percent of total enrolment. The project constructed 45 new classrooms, repaired several others, and supported training institutes which graduated 339 student teachers. While enrolment has risen to high levels, the quality of teacher training and hence, that of primary/secondary education, has remained low. The WFP inter-agency evaluation mission carried out in 1997 noted that schools had become unofficial feeding centres for malnourished children. Furthermore, only 18 percent of resources had been allocated to tackle the underlying problems of health and nutrition (13 percent), and the latter only indirectly through agro-forestry (five percent). Lives were saved and yet strategies for Karamoja must clearly become multitudinal, simultaneously addressing immediate relief needs, the Karamajongs' basic rights to health and education, and their food security, with the full, collaborative support of actors other than WFP.

UGA 4664.00—Assistance to orphans and street children in Uganda

32. Uganda's 1.3 million orphans and street children are undernourished, illiterate and extremely vulnerable to molestation and vice and other criminal acts as a means of coping with their predicament. They are likely to remain that way and to cause considerable damage to themselves and to the country's welfare unless due and timely action is taken. Under a six-month WFP pilot project, WFP provided food aid to orphans, assuring them of at least one cooked meal per day in schools, orphanages and institutions for the homeless. The project has been most successful and continued support is proposed.

Protracted relief operation (PRO) UGA 5623.00—Assistance to Sudanese, Rwandese and Congolese refugees in Uganda

33. The Government's open-door policy and the ethnic ties that Uganda shares with its neighbours have made Uganda a country of first asylum also for Banyarwandans, Nubians and Luo, who have fled their countries since the early sixties. WFP has had 22 operations in support of refugees in Uganda since 1964, representing 31 percent of its cumulative assistance to the country at a value of 82,545,389 dollars. There are currently 220,000 Sudanese, Rwandans, Congolese, Somali and Kenyan refugees in Uganda, with 165,000 Sudanese and 29,000 Rwandans/Congolese remaining dependent upon food assistance.
34. WFP and UNHCR remain committed to meeting the basic food needs of the refugees, and the Government of Uganda has generously supported local settlement and the attainment of food self-sufficiency. In 1997, over 13,000 Sudanese refugees were settled on new land. The rapid settlement of refugees over the past year has been accompanied by a two-fold increase in agricultural inputs provided by UNHCR and NGOs. This has enabled food rations to be reduced in 1997 by 25 to 50 percent in several settlements and to be completely phased out in other locations. WFP and UNHCR have agreed on a strategy and timetable for phasing down food assistance over 1998 and 1999. Food rations were reduced



by 20 percent in March 1998, and further reductions are planned for June and December 1998.

35. It is considered feasible for the majority of Sudanese refugees to achieve self-sufficiency by end-1999. Some will become engaged in trading, while others will opt for repatriation when security is restored in southern Sudan. Many assign high priority to the education of their children and would consequently desire to remain in Uganda for the foreseeable future. Others fear immediate conscription into the armed forces in Sudan upon their return and would prefer the option of farming in Uganda for the time being. Of the total 29,000 Congolese and Rwandans, some 9,000 and 3,000 respectively or 41 percent are currently being repatriated through tripartite (UNHCR-Uganda-DRC) agreement. The region nevertheless remains volatile, and WFP and UNHCR are therefore monitoring the situation closely and regularly revising their contingency plans.

Emergency operation (EMOP) UGA 5833.00—Assistance to victims of drought in eastern Uganda

36. This short-term, three-month intervention was successful in meeting the basic food requirements of 341,000 persons most affected by three consecutive dry seasons in eastern Uganda. Initial distribution through local Government offices was discontinued when it became obvious that there was insufficient capacity at the district level to assess and target the most vulnerable. WFP food monitors and programme staff were preoccupied with other emergency operations and too few in number to monitor distribution simultaneously in six districts. Reliance upon a consortium of NGOs, parishes, the National Red Cross, and line Ministries acted to fill the resource gap and to restore transparency and control. Several cost-cutting measures and conditionalities were introduced: food handling through voluntary labour; use of Government lorries for food deliveries; and food storage in parish facilities.

EMOP UGA 5624.00—Assistance to displaced persons in western Uganda

37. Since July 1997, WFP has been providing food assistance to Ugandans that have been displaced by rebel attacks in the Western district of Bundibugyo. The original number of beneficiaries of 119,000 dropped to 79,000 in December 1997. With its regional procurement and storage centre being located in neighbouring Kasesse District, ICRC agreed to cover the food needs of displaced persons in neighbouring Kabarole and Kasesse Districts. Active attempts by WFP to mobilize farm implements through the donor community and to provide the displaced with resettlement packages proved premature for those returning to relatively less secure areas. Cassava and bananas nevertheless grow abundantly in and around the trading centres where the displaced are located, and WFP has found it possible to reduce and in some case halve the basic ration.

EMOP UGA 5816.00—Assistance to displaced persons in northern Uganda

38. The districts of Gulu and Kitgum in northern Ugandan have been ravaged by attacks by the rebels known as “Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA)”, with attacks on civilian targets, including looting, raping, killing and the abduction of thousands of children having escalated in 1996. This in turn resulted in increased displacement of village inhabitants from 110,000 in July 1996, to 260,000 in January 1997 and a current 402,000, 324,000 of whom in Gulu and 78,000 in Kitgum. WFP assistance grew correspondingly, commencing with a borrowing of in-country stocks in August 1996 followed by EMOP 5816.00 in January 1997; the latter provided 9,766 tons of commodities at a cost to WFP of 6,344,316



dollars. The present expansion covers 257,600 displaced persons with 21,044 tons of commodities for nine months at 22.5 million dollars.

39. In the initial months of the operation several WFP-contracted lorries, transporting food assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), were destroyed in ambushes or in negotiating heavily mined access roads. However, increased defence spending and attempts by Government armed forces to protect the border have slightly reduced the number of rebel attacks. Nevertheless, WFP convoys must move under military escort. Only WFP and ICRC operate outside the municipalities, with all other agencies limiting their activities to the towns of Gulu and Kitgum. This has reduced the amount of complementary assistance that could otherwise be provided, and in areas where reconstruction and interventions in health and education could otherwise have an immediate impact.
40. Much progress is nevertheless being made, with the World Bank, AUSAID, USAID and ICRC providing seed and farm implements and WFP transporting these items and distributing food in order to protect the seed from being consumed. The surface planted around the periphery of protected areas or trading centres quadrupled after the seed programme commenced. WFP is providing food to ex-rebels to facilitate their reintegration into the community. It is supporting food-for-work (FFW) seed multiplication schemes, and is exchanging food for brick for reconstructing schools and other community facilities. The strategy has been to provide much needed nutrients while gradually restoring social services, food production systems, and jobs as building blocks for stability, reconciliation and recovery. It is the most responsible, effective and humane intervention that WFP can make under prevailing circumstances.

FUTURE ORIENTATION OF WFP ASSISTANCE

41. WFP's strategic plan is consistent with the Government's development and poverty reduction plans. In general, and where circumstances permit, the WFP strategy will seek to phase out relief food distribution in favour of food aid modalities which support agricultural production, marketing and self-reliance. As an advocate for the poor, WFP will encourage donors and implementing partners to concentrate resources on those individuals that are most vulnerable and disadvantaged. WFP will focus on relatively insecure/high-risk areas where most of the poor live, and will assist the Government in laying the foundations for stability, rehabilitation and development 'during' and not after the emergency stage. In doing so, WFP will focus its resources primarily but not exclusively on women and children, a pre-investment in future health and productivity with proven high returns.
42. WFP will improve the quality and performance of its development activities by adopting feasible project designs that make a real and measurable difference for the poor; increasing its monitoring presence in remote areas; training counterpart staff; and linking its assistance with other donor programmes in order to increase complementarity and improve overall impact. WFP will continue to draw upon its regional resource base to provide Government, NGOs and other United Nations agencies with logistics support, information and technical services, including training on WFP's deep-field mailing (DFMS) communications system. It will co-locate and pool resources with the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) in August 1998 as a means of improving vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) at low cost. Finally, WFP will continue to purchase substantial quantities of food and non-food items locally to support its country and regional operations and to generate income for small producers. WFP is also actively pursuing the local



production of high-protein biscuits and blended food for school and supplementary feeding and for reducing internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs.

Geographical focus

43. The incidence and concentration of both poverty and food insecurity are highest in the North, where there is also a very discernible geographical pattern of food scarcity that allows for cost-effective targeting (Annex III). To enhance the impact of its projects, WFP will concentrate food distribution in the more chronically food-deficit and economically depressed areas of the country, namely, the six northern districts of Arua, Moyo, Gulu, Kitgum, Kotido and Moroto. Bulk procurement activities will continue in Hoima, Masindi, Lira, Mbale, and other surplus areas while pilot projects aimed at supporting women's farming associations will commence in 1999 in Iganga, Kumi and Soroti. Orphans and other vulnerable groups in the urban centres of Kampala, Mpigi and Jinja will also be targeted with food assistance and vocational training. Commensurate with the Government's decentralization policy, and in order to assist in local capacity-building and improve monitoring and implementation, in 1998/99 WFP will further shift the emphasis of its operations closer to its beneficiaries. Moreover, it will establish and/or maintain a full-time monitoring presence through field offices in Gulu, Kitgum, Kotido, Adjumani and Arua municipalities.

Key areas and target groups

44. In accordance with the Government's development plans and its own strategic priorities WFP will focus on the following key areas: a) relief and recovery; b) human resource development/institutional support in health and education; and c) food security, including agricultural and marketing support for women's associations. Free distribution of food aid will be limited to emergency situations and to individuals in dire need. Even then, the aim of food aid will be to restore the productive capacity of the affected groups, and will hence be linked, to the extent possible, to capacity-building through the provision of productive inputs and improvement of rural infrastructure via seed protection and food-for-work schemes. Support for formal and informal education, and capacity enhancement will be provided through joint collaborative ventures with donor governments, United Nations agencies and NGOs.
45. **Relief and recovery.** Given the uncertainties that surround the future of displaced persons in northern Uganda, no definite plans can be made for their resettlement. The insecurity they face is inextricably related to the civil war in southern Sudan which also reduces possibilities for planning local integration, repatriation and other durable solutions for Sudanese refugees. WFP will therefore devote its utmost efforts to improving the conditions under which they are currently living while building their resource capacity for the future. This will be done by meeting their immediate food needs, rehabilitating cases of acute malnutrition, and restoring their integrity, coping mechanisms and food security through agricultural, infrastructure and other income-generating schemes. As the host population in and around the refugee and IDP settlements are also living in absolute poverty, schemes aimed at improving water-supply, roads, and education for refugees and IDPs will also provide direct and long-term benefits for local communities.
46. The strategy will be to decrease food rations as refugees are settled or as the security perimeter around protected villages expands, allowing the displaced to gain access to increasingly larger areas of cultivatable land. Seed distribution and multiplication schemes will continue and be expanded to increase food self-sufficiency while reducing the food aid



bill. Construction and repair of roads linking settlements and protected areas will proceed as a means of generating employment and improving access to agricultural inputs and markets as well as health care. As IDPs are currently resident in the very trading centres that they previously frequented for schooling, health and other purposes, the reconstruction of 79 schools and 112 health and community centres destroyed by rebel forces will commence using FFW as a means of providing both construction material and labour. Health workers and teachers will be given additional food as an incentive to return to the affected areas while WFP continues to mobilize adequate donor support for recovery and development through joint assessments and monthly briefings.

47. **Human resource development.** Malnutrition, poverty and gender discrimination in Uganda are inextricably linked. Of the country's poor, women and children, including orphans and street children, are the most impoverished and disadvantaged. The WFP strategy will act towards correcting this imbalance by targeting women heads of household and women who are widowed, separated, abandoned, and/or have disabled husbands or insufficient productive/surplus labour in the family. WFP will also target those institutions providing literacy, primary health care, and income-generation schemes that address the basic needs of women in the most impoverished, food-insecure areas. It will grant assistance to social welfare institutions such as orphanages and vocational training centres for street children. To be eligible, such institutions must demonstrate that they are effectively providing orphans and street children with secure living quarters, quality education and skills that are applicable to the job market.
48. Nutritional surveys confirm that primary schoolchildren are typically the most vulnerable to chronic food shortages in Karamoja, where education is also given low priority. In collaboration with Adventist Development Relief Association (ADRA), USAID, Redd Barna and other agencies, in 1998 WFP will target initially 56,000 school-aged children with cooked meals. In addition to protecting the children from malnutrition and nutrition-related illnesses, the meals will act as an incentive for parents to send their children to school and will maintain the children's cognitive performance. Parents will be given additional dry, take-home rations to facilitate their daughters obtaining an education. Such rations will provide a strong incentive in food-deficit Karamoja. The food assistance will also be used as an incentive for the establishment of agro-forestry plots in schools and will promote the "Alternative Basic Education Programme for Karimojong Children" (ABEK) which aims to provide functional skills to nomadic children who have no access to conventional education facilities.
49. **Agriculture and marketing support.** On an exceptional basis, WFP has waived performance bonds, the limits placed on contracted tonnage, and other stipulations governing tendering and local procurement in an effort to provide a market and incentive to small farmers who cannot effectively compete with larger traders. These trials have proven successful, and opportunities for expanding the number of small suppliers and for improving overall food production are expected to increase with the attention and increased support now being provided to small farmers' associations by Sasakawa Global 2000, USAID's Investment in Developing Export Agriculture (IDEA) project, and by the Uganda National Farmers' Association. WFP will solicit project funding and bilateral support for animal traction, hybrid seed, hoes and other farm inputs for use by women family heads in the transitory food-deficit areas of Soroti and Kumi. Using monetized, bilateral food imports, IDEA will also establish a credit facility for small farmers through the Cooperative Bank. Windmills will be purchased and used to tap the vast but unused water resources of Basina Lake and to irrigate the flat terrain that surrounds the lake where many of Uganda's poor reside.



50. The NGOs will provide technical expertise, small business skills and supervision, and will organize the farmers into associations so that they can pool their resources and take advantage of their combined and greater economies of scale. Subject to the availability of cash resources, surpluses will be purchased by WFP on the condition that the farmers' associations meet quality control specifications and they deliver in sufficient quantities to render transport and handling cost-effective. Particular focus will be placed on associations in which women are the principal shareholders and decision-makers.

Scope for joint programming

51. WFP's strategy will be dependent upon joint collaboration with governmental and non-governmental agencies. Approximately 70 percent of WFP resources are currently channelled through projects supervised by NGOs, and it is expected that the trend will increase as security improves and more agencies are provided access to the northern districts. To help mitigate socio-economic collapse in the north, United Nations agencies established a United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) in mid-1997 which has pooled resources and intervened in several emergencies. Country teams comprised of United Nations heads of agencies have participated in workshops on the "Management of Field Coordination for Countries in/or Emerging from Crisis" at the United Nations Staff College in Turin. At these workshops and in retreats, they formulated a "Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Displaced People in Northern Uganda" which commits programmed and extra-budgetary resources towards joint recovery schemes in 1998/99. In June 1998, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) joined the United Nations system in Uganda with the establishment of a Humanitarian Service Unit (HSU). Its primary aim will be to improve information sharing and resourcing of United Nations and other recovery efforts. In both the northern conflict areas and in other relief operations, WFP has had generous support from bilateral donors. The United Nations agencies will complete their Common Country Framework in December 1998, at which time work on the Country Strategy Note (CSN) will commence. It is expected that the CSN will be completed by July 1999. This will permit United Nations agencies to harmonize their programme cycles.
52. On the development side, there have been fewer opportunities for joint programming and donor support owing primarily to the remoteness and insecurity of Karamoja and other areas in which WFP has typically intervened. These areas are nevertheless the most needy and WFP is therefore committed to advocating and mobilizing resources for them. A quick action project (QAP) for school feeding in Karamoja is expected to be implemented in mid-1998 in order to maintain school enrolment until a full-fledged and integrated development project can be formulated. Continued WFP support to education and food security in Karamoja and to orphans and street children has been contemplated in the Government's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The PEAP provides a programmatic framework for coordinating support to poverty eradication activities in the country. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development is responsible for coordinating implementation of the Plan, including the matching of resources for each sector and region from a multitude of Government and donor sources. USAID has a major programme designed to support primary school education which it plans to expand to Karamoja and other poor areas; the World Bank and the European Union are providing funds for road construction and smallholder support in the northern and central regions; UNICEF, WHO, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank, Danish Development Cooperation Agency (DANIDA), the Government of Italy and a number of NGOs are supporting the health and nutrition



sector; and there is scope for joint programming and collaboration in agriculture with FAO, USAID, the Netherlands, Denmark, the Italian Development Cooperation Agency, and with the German Government in particular.

Modalities of WFP assistance

53. Given the target groups and key areas suitable for WFP assistance, the most efficient way for WFP to reach the people in land-locked Uganda is through local purchases. The planned expansion of local procurement to include numerous women's associations with increased competition will result in 17,000 tons or 30 percent of the total 56,677 ton requirement being resourced in-country. Such purchases will further reduce overall shipping, port and landside transport costs. Rather than rely upon a few selected suppliers, WFP will advertise its commodity requirements via radio and newspapers to both increase competition and inform farmers of active markets. Instead of contracting large tonnage to maintain low administrative overheads, it will offset these costs by reducing the size of tendered lots, increasing the number of suppliers and overall amount of food available for purchase, and precluding the delays and other costs associated with imports.
54. Increased public sector spending on education, health and agriculture as well as the cost of decentralization and national defence will further tax the national budget and reduce the Government's ability to cover internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs. The country strategy will launch several measures aimed at reducing ITSH costs: a) shifting in July 1998 the main WFP warehouse from Ntinde to a location with rail-sidings to eliminate the need for shuttling and reduce costs per ton by an average 5.50 dollars; b) replacing a portion of the present food basket, containing five commodities, with locally produced high-protein biscuits and blended cereals for school and supplementary feeding; and c) aligning procurement and extended delivery point (EDP) delivery plans, enabling food to be delivered directly from procurement depots and avoiding the cost of trucking to and from the central WFP warehouse along the same routes. The WFP strategy also calls for an energetic drive to reactivate the Tororo-Gulu rail link and to establish Gulu as a logistics centre serving both northern Uganda and southern Sudan. This will depend on the increasing availability of back-haul loads/exports and the cost-effectiveness of railage from the area which is currently low because of insecurity. Under the strategy, WFP will pursue reactivation of barge traffic on the Albert Nile which is navigable into southern Sudan and which holds tremendous potential as a cost-saving alternative to overland transport. Savings will accrue to both WFP and small farmers.
55. Other measures will be taken to make WFP operations more efficient. These include the sharing of sub-office space and expenses, including utilities, equipment, telecommunications, vehicles and staff, with implementing partners. This approach has already been introduced in three of five WFP sub-offices with successful results. Contracting only those NGOs with expertise and independent resources will be yet another cost-reduction measure. Before being contracted, agencies must agree to cost-sharing and be able to demonstrate that a partnership will reduce costs otherwise incurred by WFP operating single-handedly, i.e., there must be added value.

Operational implications of a programme approach

56. WFP support to relief and recovery, human development, and agriculture and market support will be included in the 1999–2000 National Budget which is to be issued in July 1999. The first CSN for Uganda is expected to be completed by July 1999, thus coinciding with and accompanying the budget along with the PEAP implementation plan which will



also include the WFP Country Programme, pending the latter's preparation and approval. Mid-1999 will therefore be the "entry-point" for WFP to engage in long-term programming in collaboration with other United Nations agencies, NGOs, the Government and bilateral foreign Governments. Joint planning and the synchronization of resource delivery and implementation schedules will necessarily be a gradual process, with some partners becoming fully involved mid-stream. The common United Nations cycle will be from 1999 to 2003, coinciding with the WFP Country Programme. There is general consensus on target groups, key sectors and the need for geographical concentration and complementarity for increased impact. This in itself represents considerable progress.

57. There is also general agreement that the joint programming process is likely to be more successful to the extent that dialogue remains informal and the terms "collaboration" and "coordination" are not seen to be imposed from the outside as ends in themselves. These concepts will be effected through a combination of mutual trust, interdependence, information-sharing and assessed need. The most critical obstacle to joint programming has been the preoccupation of agency staff with ongoing operations. WFP will rely upon the United Nations Resident Coordinator to continue the present practice of making retreats routine, if not mandatory for senior United Nations staff as a means of ensuring full-time, devoted attention to joint programming issues. This, along with adherence to the Resident Coordinator and United Nations common systems in general, will continue to receive WFP's fullest support.

Resource requirements

58. The overall country programme, which will be submitted for approval to the Executive Board at its Second Regular Session of 1999, including relief and recovery, would require about 56,000 tons of food a year, representing a 13 percent increase over the yearly average of 50,000 tons distributed during the past five years (1993–97). Resource distribution over the next five years assumes a gradual phase-down of relief assistance and a parallel increase in human development, food security and education activities as these interventions phase in and stabilize at levels required to achieve their objectives. Taking into account WFP's current and foreseen resource level for development purposes, it is estimated that about 11,000 tons a year of the 56,000 required will be funded from WFP's development resources, leaving a balance of 45,000 tons to be mobilized through emergency operations and/or protracted relief and rehabilitation operations.
59. Uganda will need external food assistance for a considerable time to come. Continued need will be largely determined by how effectively this scarce resource is applied in the immediate future. It must be well targeted not only to the absolute poor, but also to the problems underlying and perpetuating their impoverishment. The overriding objective of the WFP strategy is to reduce dependency on food aid by building the resilience of the poor to recurrent calamities and their capacity for self-reliance. An integral part of the strategy is a mid-term review of its continued relevance and performance in meeting objectives, including a reduction in food assistance.

KEY ISSUES AND RISKS

60. *Internal security.* Insecurity is both a major cause of Uganda's food insecurity and an obstacle to those agencies seeking to address the problem. The position of some donors is that the stability and other preconditions for development must be addressed before



investments are made in the affected areas. WFP's view is that investment in roads, school construction and other employment-generating schemes would not only help reduce dependency upon food aid but would also have a positive psychological impact and facilitate the reconciliation process. As an indirect and alternative approach to military confrontation and unsuccessful peace negotiations, public and private investment would be a justified complement to "measured relief." Failure to address the underlying problem of poverty and to invest in people while relief operations are ongoing will likely prolong and/or expand the emergency and relief effort at undue cost.

61. *Natural calamities.* The privatization of the National Produce Marketing Board and the disposal of its warehouses and other assets reduced Government costs at the expense of increasing the vulnerability of the country's food security to climatic shocks. The only significant strategic grain reserve is comprised of WFP food stocks in Ntinde, Kampala and numerous, privately held stocks scattered throughout the country. The latter would likely be unaffordable, in the event of a food emergency. Moreover, since 1993 the annual budget for the Relief Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA) has averaged Ug. Sh. 38 million or 35,000 dollars. This is sufficient to purchase, transport and distribute only 80 to 90 tons of relief food. Although the Treasury has often released additional funds, raising the annual relief budget to Ug. Sh. 2–2.3 billion or 2.1 million dollars, food requirements often exceed this amount by a factor of three, making the country dangerously dependent upon WFP stocks in Kampala which are primarily regional, tied to specific countries and programmes, and subject to transport bottlenecks and pipeline disruptions. WFP will therefore encourage the Government to establish a minimum reserve of 5,000 tons.
62. *Decentralization.* The Government has made a strategic choice to use decentralization as an instrument for poverty eradication, yet the concept of devolving political power to local governments has yet to be put into practice. Two risks are envisaged: the impact of local government elections and of limited and weak institutional capacity of government and non-governmental institutions at the central, district and sub-district levels. Both could slow the pace at which programme activities are implemented if through nothing other than a lack of procedural clarity.
63. *Budgetary constraints.* The shift towards decentralization and smaller government has placed greater reliance upon the private sector and NGOs to provide agricultural and social services. The former is likely to fulfil this role only to the extent that it is profitable, while NGOs will continue to be constrained by the voluntary nature of their endowment. Increased Government spending in the social sector, as planned, will need to be encouraged while WFP attempts to minimize risks in the short term through co-financing arrangements with other agencies.



ANNEX I

UGANDA: SELECTED INDICATORS

Population	
Population (projections in millions) 1997	20.4
Population annual growth rate (%), 1960–1994	3.2
Urban population as a percentage of total, 1994	12.0
Annual urban growth rate (%), 1960–94	6.2
Land area (sq. km)	241 138.0
Human Development indicators	
HDI Value 1995	0.382
Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995	42.6
Adult literacy rate (%) 1994	54.1
Males	63.2
Females	45.0
Combined 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd level gross enrolment ratio (%), 1994	34.0
Males	39.0
Females	30.0
Gender-related development measures	
Gender index value, (women) 1995	0.504
Gender index value, (men), 1995	0.504
Women's share of adult labour force (age 15 and above), 1990	48.0
Women at ministerial level (%), 1995	13.0
Female economic activity rate as % of males, 1995	90.0
Women's share of agricultural labour force (%)	70.0
Human Deprivation	
Adult illiteracy rates (%)	38.9
% population > 15 years with primary education	27.1
Population without access to safe water (%) 1990–96	62.0
Population without access to health services (%), 1990–95	51.0
Human poverty index, (% of population) 1996	51.3
Population living below \$ 1 a day (%), 1994	50.6
% of population living below the national poverty line, 1994	59.8
% of population below WHO food-poverty line, 1992	52.6
Number of orphans and street children, (million) 1996	1.3
Economic Indicators	
GDP per capita (dollars)	290.0
GDP (billion dollars) 1995/95	5.4
Real GDP per capita 1995/96 (dollars)	283.0
Net foreign direct investment (as % of GNP), 1993	0.1
Gross domestic investment (as % of GNP), 1995	18.4
Gross domestic savings (as % of GDP), 1995	6.1
Rate of inflation (end June) (%), 1996	5.6
Health	
Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births, 1995	117.0
Child mortality rate per 1,000	180.0
Total fertility rate, 1994 (%)	7.3
Births attended by trained health personnel (%), 1990–96	38.0
Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births, 1990	1 200.0
Children dying before the age of 1 (thousands), 1995	235.0



ANNEX II

FOOD REQUIREMENTS 1999–2003 FOR UGANDA

Activity	Year	No. of beneficiaries	Cereals	Pulses	Oil	Sugar	Salt	Csb	Total tons
Vulnerable group feeding	1999	7 500	1 125	163	54	14	14	54	1 424
	2000	15 000	2 250	325	108	27	27	108	2 845
	2001	15 000	2 250	325	108	27	27	108	2 845
	2002	15 000	2 250	325	108	27	27	108	2 845
	2003	7 500	1 125	163	54	14	14	54	1 424
Food security and Education ¹	1999	60 000	8 715	1 295	431	109	109	430	11 089
	2000	75 000	12 500	1 620	540	135	135	540	15 470
	2001	75 000	12 500	1 620	540	135	135	500	15 430
	2002	75 000	12 500	1 620	540	135	135	400	15 330
Agricultural production and Marketing (Monetization)	1999	15 000	1 680	240	80				2 000
	2000	20 000	1 680	240	80				2 000
	2001	28 000	1 680	240	80				2 000
	2002	28 000	1 680	240	80				2 000
Refugees	1999	100 000	18 000	2 160	900	360	180	900	22 500
	2000	50 000	9 000	1 080	450	180	90	450	11 250
	2001	25 000	45 000	540	225	70	45	225	46 105
	2002	–							–
	2003	–							–
Relief and Recovery	1999	200 000	36 000	4 320	1 800			450	42 570
	2000	100 000	18 000	2 160	900			225	21 285
	2001	50 000	9 000	1 080	450			112	10 642
	2002								
	2003								

¹ Tonnage to be reduced, pending replacement of some commodities with locally produced biscuits and blended foods.



DISTRIBUTION OF POVERTY IN UGANDA

