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
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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF SOMALIA PRRO 6073.00

**Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in
Somalia**

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
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Executive Summary




The protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) has functioned with general success, although more resources for relief have been used than originally planned. This is a legitimate use of the operation's built-in flexibility to switch resources between sectors. Projects have been numerous and mainly small scale and short term, which can be more burdensome for field staff to monitor. Monitoring formats are currently being revised to be more practical.

The lack of strong implementing partners (IPs) has been a major problem, and has necessitated direct programme administration and dealings with local government and communities for rehabilitation/recovery and social institution support projects. In the north at least, it is time to look for opportunities for longer-term activities, including work with fledgling government departments and those reaching poor pastoralists.

Logistics problems have been well handled, largely by engaging Somali agents under a security bond system and by increasing competition between them, thereby reducing costs.

Draft Decision



The Board notes the recommendations contained in this evaluation report (WFP/EB.1/2002/5/4) and notes also the management action taken so far, as indicated in the associated information paper (WFP/EB.1/2002/INF/11). The Board encourages further action on these recommendations, with considerations raised during the discussion taken into account.



SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

1. This evaluation began two years into the first three-year phase of the PRRO. It covered diverse issues, but its central points were the policy and guidelines WFP initially established for PRROs in general,¹ as well as the project document for the Somalia PRRO.² The Somalia PRRO invites particular interest in its flexibility in engaging in emergency activities or recovery projects as the situation demanded; its setting of appropriate roles for food aid in non-emergency activities; and its meeting of logistical challenges and costs associated with local security problems.
2. The mission took place between 2 and 23 July 2001. The team leader was briefed at Rome Headquarters and then, on 4 July, joined the second member, a logistical consultant based at the Somalia country office located in Nairobi. The mission also included two senior staff throughout its field visit: the Deputy Country Director and the Programme Coordinator.
3. The mission was well briefed in Nairobi and Somalia, with specially prepared reports and other material from the five continuing areas of operation: northwest region (Hargeisa), northeast region (Bossaso), Benadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shebelle (Merka) and Bay/Bakool (Baidowa). From 29 October to 2 November 2000, the country office held an internal meeting to review the PRRO's progress to date. This led to a substantial and self-critical written record, of much use to the mission.
4. Travel in Somalia was from 7 to 14 July. It had been curtailed as a result of insecurity in one of the three locations scheduled for a visit. However, the mission visited two of the biggest regions of WFP activity: Bay/Bakool in the south, and the northwest region. At the time of the visit, no emergency activities were under way; the team observed current PRRO recovery/rehabilitation and social support activities. The mission witnessed serious crop failure in the main sorghum belt (Bay/Bakool), however, and discussed the assessment of emergency relief needs for later in 2001.

OVERVIEW OF THE PRRO

5. In the project document, two threats to food security appeared to be linked: periodic droughts and crop failures were exacerbated by civil insecurity, which reduced people's capacity to apply the coping mechanisms they traditionally used in times of shortage. The central strategy of the PRRO was to invest in recovery, given, as the project document states, "the emergence of some relatively peaceful areas in Somalia, and the remarkable determination of rural communities to re-establish a sense of normalcy in their lives and take charge of their own recovery and communal rehabilitation".
6. To this end, over the three-year period, 51 percent of total food aid was projected to go towards rehabilitation and recovery (hereafter called "recovery"), 30 percent for relief and 19 percent towards support to social institutions. The PRRO would reach a yearly total of 1,320,000 beneficiaries, just under half of whom would be indirect recipients. This

¹ As stated in the documents: *From Crisis to Recovery* (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) and *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO* (WFP February 1999).

² WFP/EB.1/99/7-A/3, 22/12/1998.



coverage would represent 21 percent of the national population of 6.2 million in 2000.³ Over the three years, the Somalia PRRO would cost WFP just under US\$55.5 million, with a projected distribution of 63,104 tons of food commodities.

7. Of the beneficiaries, 70 percent were to be in southern Somalia, concentrated especially in the Bay/Bakool and Shebelle riverine areas⁴, and 30 percent in the northern regions. The south as a whole has some 60 percent of the national rural population, as opposed to 32 percent in the north and 8 percent in the central zone.⁵ The north, taken together with the central zone, differs from southern Somalia in two principal ways. First, it has been much more peaceful than the south during the last ten years. Second, the northern population is characteristically pastoralist, representing 89 percent of the rural population. As a comparison, pastoralists form 57 percent of the national rural population. The south, though containing 43 percent of the country's pastoralists, is the home of agriculture with 80 percent of the country's farmers, whether agro-pastoralists or settled cultivators, forming 57 percent of the southern rural population. Bay/Bakool is the source of some 80 percent of the country's sorghum, the principal nationally produced cereal.
8. From the outset, therefore, the majority of WFP beneficiaries were likely to be southerners involved in farming. The project document states that food supply insecurity, caused by drought and flood as well as warfare, was "widespread among small-scale agriculturists and agro-pastoralists, seasonal agricultural wage labourers and the urban poor". Nevertheless, pastoralists are noted as commonly subject to food stress towards the end of the dry seasons. In the relief sector, apart from people affected by crop failure, targets were to be internally displaced persons (IDPs), such as female heads of household, elderly and widowed people without sufficient clan or family support, and the elderly and disabled among the urban poor. Other targets of food aid as part of the recovery sector were again to be female heads of household, and returnees from refugee camps. Also, targets in the support to social institutions sector were to be malnourished children and infants, expectant and nursing mothers through mother and child health (MCH) centres, children in orphanages, primary-school children during lean periods, and patients at tuberculosis hospitals.
9. Attention to gender strategies, aimed at sensitizing communities and mainstreaming gender in all activities, were to be extended to recovery and social support projects, as targeting female beneficiaries was successful in previous drought relief distributions. Project implementation was to be carried out in partnership with local authorities, international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and sister United Nations organizations.

³ As quoted in UNDP 2001 Somalia Human Development Report.

⁴ As of 1999, food aid to the far south/southwest of the country riverine areas has largely come from USAID and been handled by CARE.

⁵ These and the following proportional figures are calculated from food economy group population estimates by the Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia.



ASSESSMENT OF PRRO PERFORMANCE

The Balance between Relief and Other Sectors

10. The PRRO performed substantially according to the outline above, but circumstances forced adaptations. However, the original three-year projection of the division of resources between the three activity sectors was indicative rather than binding, otherwise the PRRO's flexibility would have been compromised from the start.
11. The PRRO began in mid-1999 with relief predominating owing to a series of factors. Scant *Gu* (main) rains led to a poor rain-fed harvest; both conflict and drought caused some population movement; and currency devaluation, a ban on exports of livestock to the main Saudi/Gulf markets and a closure of the border with Kenya added economic stress. Relief distributions occurred up to March 2000, continuing somewhat later in the northwest region. Over the first 22 months of the PRRO, therefore, the relief sector took up 42 percent of all food distributed as opposed to the 30 percent projected over 36 months, while recovery took 40 percent as opposed to the 51 percent projected. Social support stayed almost exactly as projected, at 18 percent.
12. However, the above percentage points mask considerable differences among areas of operation. In Bay/Bakool 53 percent of food aid went to relief, as opposed to 44 percent in the northwest and 32 percent in the northeast. Again in 1999, 55 percent of food aid in the northeast went to relief as opposed to only 9 percent in 2000; by contrast the respective figures for the northwest were 39 percent and 56 percent. In Gedo, a temporary area of operation in the far southwest, 93 percent went to relief; in Benadir 100 percent went to social support in the form of assistance to IDPs and tuberculosis patients.
13. Clearly circumstances on the ground have required the PRRO to respond with varied intensity in different areas. The evaluation team acknowledges that results differed from sectorial projections. The PRRO's intended focus is on recovery activities; yet when required, relief distributions must take precedence. From early 2000 onwards the PRRO was increasingly successful in recovery. However, as of July 2001 the same elements of stress as in July 1999 had arisen, and it seemed likely that relief would again become an important factor later in 2001, at least in the south.

Vulnerability Assessment and Targeting

14. The Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia (FSAU), funded principally by the European Commission, continues to provide WFP with essential information and analysis required for targeting food aid geographically. FAO took over from WFP as coordinator of the FSAU from January 2000, but the strong focus on early warning of emergency requirements remains. WFP relies heavily upon FSAU for identifying relief needs down to the district level and for justifying relief plans to donors. Below the district level WFP tends to use its own local information to target specific populations for relief distributions. The quality of information from WFP field monitors is of the first importance.
15. The FSAU analysis of the country's food economies, although still developing, has provided WFP and others with a good base for understanding food security issues. WFP has to use its own local knowledge and contacts to determine actions in the recovery and social support sectors. The number of beneficiaries targeted for these projects has depended more on opportunities on the ground than on reaching a prescribed number of needy. In general, the availability of food aid does not appear to have been a constraint.



16. In the PRRO project document, pastoralists appear to be considered the least vulnerable livelihood group among the rural population, as producers, consumers and traders of the country's most valuable product—livestock. They have, however, been included in relief distributions and some food-for-work activities. The second ban on livestock exports in three years, together with some local drought, triggered a further modest relief effort in the north early in 2001, but on the whole pastoralists have not been prominent WFP beneficiaries. The evaluation team appreciates that pastoralists can be especially difficult to reach for assessment or with aid. But they are in the majority in the country, especially in the north, and the team was not convinced that they had received all due attention.

Recommendation

- ⇒ Further information on the status of poorer pastoralists should be sought via FSAU and other sources, and consideration given to the feasibility of project assistance to them.

17. On a tangential matter, the evaluation team did not agree with the initial logic behind the exclusion of edible oil from the emergency ration, resulting in a reduction in the calorific value of the ration from the customary 2,100 kcal to 1,950. As stated in the project document, this decision was first made on the basis that “fat is available in Somalia from three sources: livestock, local sesame production and imported oil”. But this does not address the problem of the accessibility/availability of these items to poor people, including pastoralists, in an exceptionally bad year. After all, no similar reduction is suggested in the grain ration in agricultural areas. A more persuasive WFP argument is that because of its high value, the transport and distribution of oil presents an unacceptable security risk. On the other hand, the calorie value of the ration still needs to be addressed.

Recommendation

- ⇒ Accepting that oil is still not to be distributed for security reasons, the ration should be made up to 2,100 kcal by some other item. Sugar, which would undoubtedly be appreciated, could be considered if it were not either too expensive or a security risk. Otherwise, the cereal or pulse ration could be increased.

18. WFP tries to keep to the principle of targeting the poorest and most disadvantaged people for aid. This involves consulting with local authorities and community elders on who should receive relief rations, or in supporting recovery and social institution projects. There is some tendency for the delivered relief rations to be redistributed within the community.
19. A study on targeting of emergency food distribution in southern Somalia, funded by WFP in late 2000, offered an informative and sensitive contextual analysis. But it was unable to show whether traditional networks offered a practical alternative to current operations in present-day Somalia. The evaluation team also felt there was more to know about the status of a number of recovery and social support project beneficiaries, and about how the beneficiary selection process was conducted.



Recommendation

- ⇒ Funds remaining from the food distribution study might usefully be invested in obtaining more in-depth information on beneficiaries of selected projects, and on creating case studies for better post-distribution monitoring.

Recovery Issues

20. The PRRO concept encompasses not only relief and recovery but also aid in development, including disaster prevention and mitigation. In Somalia, the project design concentrated on relief to recovery, in view of security threats in target areas. These are the lack of a government in the south and the still-rudimentary “governments” in the north; the prevalence of recent returnees as well as IDPs; and the legacy of disruption of communal life as well as of a destroyed or decayed infrastructure country-wide.
21. These factors indicated shorter-term interventions, to decrease immediate vulnerability to hunger and economic insecurity. But they also favoured extremely small-scale projects, tailored to suit individual locations and communities in the general absence of an organizing government or agency.
22. The country office acknowledges that there is a tendency to look for quick projects to use food aid rather than the creation of a careful strategy of developing community-inspired and -designed interventions WFP aims to employ in more stable circumstances. The country office need not be too self-critical in this regard. In the south at least, WFP staff have shown considerable initiative and judgement in negotiating a position with local authorities that allows a relatively direct approach to communities.
23. The PRRO has established a wide and often imaginative repertoire of recovery activities. These include road rehabilitation and canal clearance; well-digging and water catchment de-silting; erosion control and reforestation; land clearance and inputs to agricultural rehabilitation, vegetable gardening and frankincense production; support to rural and urban craft training; and traditional-house construction for newly settled IDPs and returnees.
24. In the north, continued political stability and the gradual establishment of a stronger government presence may allow opportunity for a longer-term view, and WFP has begun to consider this. In the northwest region, for instance, WFP began an impressive food-for-work project of gully erosion control on prime farmland in technical cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture. One should neither exaggerate the capacity of government departments nor ignore the continuing lack of major IPs, but some further progress seems possible.

Recommendation

- ⇒ For the future, the country office should plan a recovery strategy that takes into account the differences between the north and south. WFP should look for further involvement with line ministries in the north, whether in agricultural, environmental and water projects, or in education.

25. The lack of similar opportunities in the south is well understood. However, hopes of continued political stability, always cautious, have somewhat strengthened in the Bay/Bakool programme area as the months have passed. In thinking of an extension to the PRRO, it may not be too early to consider which sectors should be emphasized in a potential movement from one-off micro-projects towards more consolidated programmes



in, say, agriculture and water provision, and in the sustainable rehabilitation of roads and bridges.

Partnership and Social Institution Support Issues

26. The PRRO has good partnerships with a limited number of international agencies/NGOs, notably UNICEF, the Coordinating Committee of the Organization for Voluntary Service (COSV) and Oxfam-Quebec. But as is clear from the above references, the major collaboration with IPs envisaged in the project document has not materialized. This has been because there are few, especially in the south, or because few have programmes easy to associate with food aid. As a result, in many circumstances WFP has effectively had to act as its own IP for relief and as its own NGO for projects.
27. Although they have involved less than one fifth of the available food aid, projects to support social institutions cover a wide spectrum: family rations for MCH programmes and IDP feeding; and food support to general and tuberculosis hospitals, schools and orphanages; adult literacy projects; and mine-awareness training. The projects have constructively helped many needy people, women in particular.
28. However, there are two problems associated with this sector. First, it tends to involve a large number of extremely small-scale projects, each of which nevertheless needs to be carefully scrutinized before initiation, and monitored in its performance. This greatly adds to the burden on WFP's limited number of field staff. Second, this is the sector where projects tend to remain "ongoing", even if a notional completion date is agreed upon—for example, an orphanage is expected to find its own alternative support, or a craft scheme is to become commercially self-supporting.

Recommendation

⇒ WFP should begin to limit the spectrum of its social institution support projects with a view to phasing out of this sector. Meanwhile the focus should be on those projects where there is more likelihood of eventually finding a strong IP or of developing government involvement. For example, in education, whether for school feeding or adult literacy, and in MCH programmes.

Meeting Commitments to Women

29. Project officers have been genuinely responsive to gender issues, including consulting women in project identification and design. They have also appreciated women's domestic status and burdens, noting the growing post-war number of women in small-scale commerce and other income-earning activities essential for the family budget. PRRO output statistics have been substantially expressed with figures for female and male beneficiaries, despite difficulties with accurate data collection.
30. As regards relief rations, WFP seems to have successfully instituted the "sit on the bag" system, involving exclusive delivery of rations to women. The aim is to ensure that food directly reaches the domestic sphere where women can better control its family use. This advantage outweighs the extra burden for women of queuing at the distribution site, often for several hours.
31. Women generally constitute about 20 percent of the participants in food-for-work (FFW) activities, but this is not necessarily a function of adverse discrimination. FFW typically consists of heavy labour tasks; women are offered lighter, secondary tasks. For many women, the time required by FFW participation might conflict with domestic requirements, childcare in particular. In some projects women are allowed to begin work



earlier than the men, and to return home after fewer hours of work. Finally, many men have lost their principal economic activity as a result of the war, whether in livestock herding or in trading or agriculture. There is increased pressure for them to travel away from home for long periods to find casual employment, to the social detriment of the family. FFW employment can offer a modest counter-effect.

32. Women have been particularly, but not exclusively, targeted in support for adult literacy, craft training and other projects, with a view to enhancing their commercial activities and employability. In addition, efforts have been made to capitalize on women's association or cooperative projects by offering them the tasks and payments associated with food handling in MCH-related activities.

Logistical and Security Issues

33. Logistics the PRRO has had to deal with include a damaged or rudimentary transport infrastructure and a variety of security problems mainly in the south, where trucks frequently have to pass through territories controlled by various armed factions. Thus, a high level of insecurity, compounded by lawlessness and anarchy, offers greater opportunities for banditry and looting in the region.
34. Food deliveries into Somalia from Mombasa are split into progressively smaller lots through transshipment and cross-border operations to minimize stocks held within Somalia. Different corridors for inland delivery are used according to the security situation. Nearly all logistics services, by sea and land out of Mombasa and within Somalia, are commercially contracted with Somali agents in the hope that their local knowledge and connections will promote the safe delivery of food cargo.
35. The system whereby a security bond must first be put up by the transport contractor has been in operation for a number of years. In the present PRRO it has been very successful in eliminating losses, although it tends to limit competition between potential agents as only some have the financial capacity to raise the bond. The bond level has recently been reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent of the cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) cargo value at final destination, partly reflecting reduced risks in Somalia. In 2000, WFP made a major effort to increase competition and the quality of services through the identification of new, qualified agents, and introduced a shortlist, which contributed to a reduction in contracts awarded.

Recommendation

- ⇒ Consideration should now be given to further reducing the security bond by 10–20 percent in relatively secure areas of operation, such as Bay/Bakool and cross-border out of Mandera. Further efforts are encouraged to increase contractor competition, in the northeast region in particular.

36. The security risks and extra vehicle maintenance needs inevitably make for relatively high food transport charges. Nevertheless, it is clear that major efforts have been made to reduce these costs. In 2000, WFP managed to reduce the Landside, transport, storage and handling (LTSH) component of the PRRO budget by 17 percent, to US\$228 per metric ton. Further reductions can be anticipated under the new arrangements for agents.
37. Food delivery times to extended delivery points have also been significantly reduced over the life of the PRRO. This has been accomplished through new contractual arrangements, the establishment of intermediate storage in Somalia and of a minimum



buffer stock in Baidoa at 5 percent, and the use of a strategic stock in Mandera. These arrangements allow increased flexibility in responding to security- and weather-related constraints, and in moving resources between relief and recovery activities.

38. There is some room for improvement in matching calls forward with estimated medium-term distribution needs, but projection of long-term food distribution needs is not feasible in Somalia. The pressure on logistics staff evidently fluctuates according to whether food throughput is increased by a relief distribution, but short-term local staff are employed during these periods. The logistics operation is satisfactorily monitored and accounted for, with few problems in tracking dispatches from the warehouse. In such cases it appears that appropriate action has been taken. Nevertheless, it might help to arrange further training for logistics staff in operations and logistics-related documentation.
39. Donors have not been willing to pledge resources for long periods, but pipeline breaks had not been a problem up to mid-2001 because of the availability of regional loans. However, the pipeline break anticipated later in 2001 appears to be serious.
40. The security arrangements WFP made for its cargo, staff and installations appear to be appropriate. In addition to contributing towards the cost of the United Nations common security system, WFP has made a significant investment in special security training for its Somalia-based staff over and above the standard WFP security awareness training, as well as in communications and other security equipment.

Budgetary Issues

41. The funds available to the PRRO have been adequate to cover overall needs. But this has been in part a result of funds transferred from the previous Emergency operation (EMOP), and the budget cannot be considered generously funded. After two of the three years of the current PRRO, there is a shortfall of approximately 54 percent against the planned tonnage contribution and 50 percent against the cash contribution, taking budgetary revisions into consideration.
42. The budget is not split into sectorial components nor into geographic areas of operation, enabling the reallocating of funds between expenditure lines, notably the recruitment of new staff such as national staff in South Somalia. There has been the flexibility to manage commodity and cash resources in relation to changing programme needs.
43. In addition to the reductions in the Landside transport, storage and handling costs mentioned above, WFP has made commendable efforts to reduce the level of direct support costs. During 2000 the budget for these costs was reduced by 14 percent to US\$177 per metric ton, mainly through reductions in the amounts deemed necessary for the air support service (UNCAS) and non-food items. Another significant cost-containment factor has been limiting staff deployment: at the time of the mission, three international posts were vacant. However, with an anticipated programme increase in the coming year, plans are under way to recruit staff against two of these posts. But actual PRRO expenditure to date has been lower than budget at about US\$120 per ton; hence a further reduction in direct costs may be possible.

Monitoring and Evaluation Issues

44. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was not examined in depth in the present evaluation for two reasons: first, the PRRO M&E systems are currently under detailed review by the resident M&E focal point officer. Second, M&E is to be the subject of a separate consultancy in September 2001. The focal point officer is revising the reporting formats,



which are excessively lengthy, and the use of certain indicators, which WFP field staff or IPs do not always see as relevant.

45. In practical terms, monitoring is often hindered by limited access to project sites because of long distances and/or security problems, limited staff time, limited IP capacity, local authority involvement in selecting beneficiaries, and pressure for quick relief food distribution for logistical and/or security reasons.
46. Monitoring to date in the PRRO has been far stronger in quantitative output reporting than in indicating outcome or impact—a situation not uncommon in WFP programmes. In addition, baseline information on recovery and social support projects has been somewhat informal. Once the M&E systems have been revised, there will be a need for both WFP field staff and IPs to receive on-the-job training.

Recommendation

- ⇒ More attention needs to be given to identifying formal indicators for beginning and ending projects and to doing qualitative reporting in general.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

47. Overall, the PRRO has been successful in difficult circumstances. To some extent solutions have come out of previous experience with emergency operations. However, WFP staff have shown initiative and judgement in negotiating a path alongside and beyond local power structures to allow a wide variety of activities, often organized at the community level.
48. The PRRO advantage of allowing both continuity and flexibility has been highlighted in the first two years of the operation. An initial requirement for relief assistance was followed by a marked improvement in food security after good rains and an extended period when recovery and social institution support projects could be developed. Continuity of field presence promotes orderly planning for further relief distributions in the south later in 2001. However, a PRRO can enjoy flexibility only if appropriate food pledges materialize. Here it remains to be seen if some difficulties will arise later this year in dealing with relief assistance at the same time as ongoing social support projects and actual or planned recovery projects.
49. Finding strong IPs has been more difficult than anticipated, and field staff have been considerably stretched in administering projects, however short-term, directly with communities. By the same token, field staff has also been somewhat constrained in achieving adequate monitoring. The country office has recognized, but not yet resolved, the issue of food-led versus project needs-led interventions. Even among WFP personnel it is possible to discern differing emphases between getting food to needy people and getting projects done. The two objectives seem to have coexisted reasonably comfortably in the short-run projects, which have so far been typical in the recovery sector. But as more stable circumstances, especially in the north, invite longer-term project involvement, tensions may emerge between careful development of activities with ministries and communities and the need for and expectation of a significant throughput of food.
50. This issue highlights the growing difference in circumstances and potential operations between south and north within the same PRRO, geographical differences that the PRRO has the flexibility to encompass. Specifically, a new normalcy is being established at least in the northwest as it enters a second decade of relative political peace, albeit without



international recognition of its government. As economic and social regeneration continue, however skewed towards the urban sector, new questions must arise about appropriate roles for food aid.

51. Periodic droughts will probably continue to require a relief food response, but in between, what kind of food aid projects will be justified? The plethora of often imaginative, short-term micro-projects has been a function of recovery from a socially and physically destructive war. At a certain stage, however, potential project beneficiaries must pass from being "returnees" or otherwise victims of a terrible episode in their national history to people who, though often poor, live in an economy where food is not usually critically short. In the case of much of Somalia, this will be determined by market availability of cereal-based staples. It seems possible that in a large part of the country, from the central zone northwards, that stage may be reached within the period of the anticipated extension of the PRRO. This will need to be reflected in the PRRO's design, perhaps putting a particular accent on more extensive or longer-run recovery projects.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

FFW	Food for work
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit for Somalia
IDP	Internally displaced person
IPs	Implementing partners
LTSH	Landside, transport, storage and handling
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MCH	Mother and child health
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation

