

برنامج
الأغذية
العالمي



Programme
Alimentaire
Mondial

World
Food
Programme

Programa
Mundial
de Alimentos

**Executive Board
First Regular Session**

Rome, 11–14 February 2002

ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Agenda item 9

For consideration


E

Distribution: GENERAL
WFP/EB.1/2002/9
29 January 2002
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

A DECADE OF CHANGE: RENEWAL AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 1992–2002

This document is printed in a limited number of copies. Executive Board documents are available on WFP's WEB site (<http://www.wfp.org/eb>).

Note to the Executive Board



This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, Office of the Executive Director (OED): Ms Z. Mesa tel.: 066513-2002

Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Supervisor, Meeting Servicing and Distribution Unit (tel.: 066513-2328).



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Executive Summary	4
Introduction	7
Chapter I: WFP—The Early Years (1963–1992)	8
The First Three Decades	8
The Governance Challenge—Becoming an Autonomous Organization	9
Chapter II: Challenge and Response (1992–1995)	11
Challenges and Issues, 1992–1993	11
Addressing the Challenges	13
Focusing on Our Core Business—Targeting the Hungry Poor	14
Focusing on Countries with the Greatest Need	15
Targeting Resources to Women	15
Delivering Integrated and More Effective Programmes	16
Mobilizing Resources	16
Building a Robust Management Culture	17
Matching the Organization to Its Operations—Fine-tuning the Structure	18
Establishing Financial Controls	19
Strengthening Accountability and Oversight	19
Chapter III: A Comprehensive, Integrated Vision for WFP (1996–1997)	20
Taking Stock of Achievements to Date	20
A Comprehensive, Integrated Vision for WFP	20
Empowerment of the Field	22
Managing the Change Process	23
Change Management Principles	23
Chapter IV: From Vision to Transformation—A Continuing Process (1997–2002)	25
Towards Transformation	25
Pillar One: Purpose, Strategies and Policies	25
Pillar Two: Programmes	29
Pillar Three: Resource Mobilization and Public Information	32
Pillar Four: Staff and Managers	33
Pillar Five: Organizational Design	37
Pillar Six: Systems, Processes and Technology	40
Pillar Seven: Accountability and Oversight	42
Chapter V: Reflections and Ongoing Challenges	44
Reflections on the Change Process	44
Ongoing Challenges in the Change Process	45
The Prerequisites for Success	48
Bibliography	50
Acronyms Used in the Document	52



Executive Summary

Introduction

Over the past ten years, WFP has undertaken an extraordinary process of transformational change, a process that continues today.

This paper has been written to provide members of the Executive Board, managers and staff with a description of the change process during the period 1992–2002 and a summary of the key challenges that remain.

The paper is in fact an intrinsic part of WFP's change process and a key element of WFP's desire to take stock of developments and assess outstanding challenges. It seeks to describe not only what changes have been undertaken but also why they were so necessary and why certain decisions were taken.

The paper focuses on how WFP built its *capacity* to deliver programmes for the hungry poor, *not* its achievements in serving them.

WFP—The Early Years (1963–1992)

WFP started operations in January 1963 as a three-year experimental, multilateral programme for mobilizing and distributing surplus food.

WFP was formed as a joint undertaking of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations. In the early years of WFP, FAO played a major role in the way the Programme was run. During the 1980s, there was tension between FAO and WFP concerning the role, governance and management of WFP. New institutional arrangements came into force in January 1992, and the two organizations set the scene for internal changes that began in 1992–1993, and made them possible.

WFP's operations grew steadily throughout the first 30 years of its existence. The emphasis remained primarily on development, with a small but increasing involvement in emergencies. During the period 1990–1992, however, the situation changed dramatically. Resources for the development portfolio started to decline, while emergency funding increased significantly.

Challenge and Response (1992–1995)

In April 1992, Ms Catherine Bertini became the Executive Director of WFP. She was immediately faced with a paradoxical situation.

On the one hand, WFP was carrying out major humanitarian and development programmes. WFP was recognized as a significant actor in the United Nations' response to emergency situations. It had become a large organization with 82 field offices. It had a good reputation among the international community and the donors, and it had sound working relationships with many United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

On the other hand, WFP was facing significant external and internal challenges.

From the external perspective, emergency funding continued to grow while the humanitarian challenges became much more complex and demanding—and the traditional basis for WFP



development resourcing seemed to be under threat.

From the internal perspective, WFP was facing major organizational problems characteristic of any organization that grows rapidly and significantly changes the nature of its work over a very short period of time.

Throughout 1992–1993, the Executive Director engaged the Member States, managers and staff in a dialogue on options for strengthening WFP. A series of studies, audits and evaluations were launched that, taken together, provided a comprehensive organizational review.

The early change initiatives were as follows:

- targeting the hungry poor;
- delivering integrated and more effective programmes;
- mobilizing resources;
- building a more robust management culture;
- matching the organization to its operations;
- establishing financial controls; and
- strengthening accountability and oversight.

Towards a Comprehensive, Integrated Vision for WFP (1996–1997)

In late 1995, the Executive Director decided to initiate a review of the progress made to date. She then launched an expanded change programme based on ideas and suggestions from that review: a more comprehensive, holistic and long-term process designed to bring about a gradual but fundamental transformation in the way the organization worked.

In July 1996, she announced a new vision for the organization. WFP was to become a much more strategic organization, capable of responding flexibly and rapidly to the situations of greatest need and integrating emergency, recovery and development programmes. The organization's very culture would change, and a transformed WFP would emphasize the following organizational themes:

- keeping the field at the centre;
- strategic thinking;
- letting managers manage;
- flexibility and adaptability;
- communication;
- teamwork; and
- leadership.

This vision built on and integrated all the work done and all the change initiatives launched since 1992.

From Vision to Transformation—A Continuing Process (1997–2002)

During the following five years, a wide range of initiatives was implemented. These initiatives are referred to in this paper as the seven “pillars of change”:

- purpose, strategies and policies;



- programmes;
- resource mobilization and public information;
- staff and managers;
- organizational design;
- systems, processes and technology; and
- accountability and oversight.

Reflections and Ongoing Challenges

Over the past decade, WFP has been through a period of major change. Management believes that the investment in change has already resulted in significant advances in organizational responsiveness and management effectiveness. Management acknowledges, however, that many of the results of the change process may manifest themselves only in the long term.

WFP has identified the following *management* challenges for particular attention in the near future:

- fine-tuning the resourcing and long-term financing systems;
- sustaining empowerment and cohesion;
- mastering new roles at headquarters;
- keeping the focus on staff and managers;
- integrating results-based thinking;
- strengthening WFP's advocacy role;
- strengthening the knowledge base on the hungry poor; and
- maintaining the momentum of change.

WFP has been at the cutting edge of reform within the United Nations system and in the international community. These reforms have kept the organization vibrant and made it possible for WFP to meet the growing challenges of feeding the hungry poor.



INTRODUCTION

1. Over the past ten years, WFP has undertaken an extraordinary process of transformation that continues today. As a group of WFP Country Directors noted in 1996, “the backdrop to all our careers is constant change. It will not cease and it cannot be avoided. The way for the organization and the people in it to flourish is to prepare for, and embrace change”.¹
2. This paper offers a snapshot of the change process during the ten years 1992–2002, as well as a summary of the key challenges that remain. The focus is on how WFP built its *capacity* to deliver programmes for the hungry poor. The paper does *not* describe WFP’s achievements in serving the hungry poor, which are documented in many other papers.² Throughout the past ten years, WFP has never lost sight of the fact that the overall purpose of the change programme is to create a stronger organization that is capable of providing more effective programmes for the hungry poor.
3. This paper is in fact an intrinsic part of WFP’s change process and a key element of the Programme’s desire to take stock of developments and assess outstanding challenges. It seeks to describe not only what changes have been undertaken but also why they were so necessary and why certain decisions were taken.
4. The paper is divided into five chapters:
 - Chapter I: *WFP—The Early Years (1963–1992)*, provides a brief history of WFP before 1992.
 - Chapter II: *Challenge and Response (1992–1995)*, describes the challenges and problems faced by WFP in 1992 and outlines the first initiatives of the Executive Director to strengthen the Programme.
 - Chapter III: *A Comprehensive, Integrated Vision for WFP (1996–1997)*, outlines the vision enunciated by the Executive Director in 1996 and describes the framework for the subsequent change process.
 - Chapter IV: *From Vision to Transformation: A Continuing Process (1997–2002)*, describes the implementation of the most significant change initiatives between 1997 and 2001.
 - Chapter V: *Reflections and Ongoing Challenges*, draws some tentative conclusions from the experiences of the past ten years and outlines the main challenges that WFP still faces.

¹ Informal consultation, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, May 1996.

² This information may be found in WFP’s annual reports, the biennial Strategic and Financial Plans and other documents.



CHAPTER I: WFP—THE EARLY YEARS (1963–1992)

The First Three Decades

5. WFP was formally established in 1961³ by the United Nations General Assembly and the FAO Conference. It started operations in January 1963 as a three-year experimental, multilateral programme for mobilizing and distributing surplus food.⁴ In 1965, long-term arrangements for WFP were established and its life extended “for as long as multilateral food aid was found feasible and desirable”.⁵ The Programme was placed under the governance of the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), half of whose members were elected by the FAO Council and half by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
6. Working closely with FAO, WFP focused mainly on development programmes throughout the 1960s and 1970s. First, it provided “food for free distribution” in support of projects aimed at the development of human resources in such areas as school feeding and the feeding of especially vulnerable target groups. Second, it used food for work (FFW) to compensate workers for creating or preserving important development assets for a community, region or nation.
7. The World Food Conference in 1974 enhanced WFP’s role. A number of policy resolutions on food aid were adopted, and donors were urged to channel a more significant proportion of food aid through WFP. The Conference also called for the reconstitution of the original WFP governing body as the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), a global multilateral body responsible for considering strategies and policies in the area of food aid and food security.⁶ Both the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) and the Food Aid Convention created significant impetus for growth in WFP’s resources and programmes.
8. WFP’s operations grew steadily during most of the 1980s. Until 1991, the emphasis remained primarily on development, with small but increasing involvement in emergencies. During the period 1990–1992, however, the situation changed dramatically, as funding for emergencies increased significantly. In 1990, the development portfolio absorbed approximately 70 percent of WFP resources; by 1992, this had dropped to 40 percent.⁷
9. At the same time, the nature of WFP emergency operations was changing. Before this period, interventions typically concerned either natural disasters such as drought, floods or

³ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1714 (xvi), 19 December 1961; FAO Conference Resolution 1/61.

⁴ The rationale for the founding of the organization was that “the effective utilization of available surplus foodstuffs provide an important transitional means of relieving the hunger and malnutrition of food-deficient peoples, particularly in the less-developed countries, and for assisting these countries in their economic development”. (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1714 (xvi), 19 December 1961; FAO Conference Resolution 1/61).

⁵ Continuation of the World Food Programme, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2095 (xx), 20 December 1965.

⁶ The CFA was reconstituted as the Executive Board in 1996.

⁷ This trend continued, barely reaching 30 percent in 1994–1995.



hurricanes, or refugee and civil war situations.⁸ Between 1990 and 1992, operations started to involve far more complex emergencies that involved massive displacements of both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

10. Another important development was the creation by the CFA of a new relief category called Protracted Refugee and Displaced Persons Operations (PROs). This facilitated the allocation of new resources by the donors and led to an expansion of WFP's programmes in this area.
11. The needs of refugees and IDPs pushed WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to forge a new partnership. In so doing, the two agencies established a clear division of labour regarding the provision of food and non-food assistance.⁹
12. As time passed, WFP found itself working more and more with UNHCR and other agencies, especially the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and numerous NGOs.¹⁰

The Governance Challenge—Becoming An Autonomous Organization

13. WFP was formed as a joint undertaking of FAO and the United Nations, and the WFP Executive Director has always been appointed jointly by the United Nations Secretary-General and the FAO Director-General. In the early years, the Secretary-General was almost an "absentee parent" while the Director-General played a dominant role in how WFP was run. Many of the early WFP staff came from FAO.¹¹ FAO provided financial, administrative and personnel support,¹² and WFP was administered under FAO administrative and staff rules. The FAO Director-General approved all major emergency programmes and signed off on WFP's financial statements.
14. During the 1980s, the evolution and expansion of WFP programmes led to tension between FAO and WFP concerning the role, governance and management of WFP. In the 1990s, Member States began to feel that WFP was sufficiently well established with large enough programmes to become an autonomous organization, remaining a joint programme of FAO and the United Nations, but with a distinct institutional identity.
15. The negotiations required to establish WFP as an autonomous organization involved the CFA, FAO and the United Nations, and they took several years. In 1991, new institutional arrangements were established, which came into legal force in January 1992. These changes were embodied in a new set of basic texts, the General and Financial Regulations. The CFA was unequivocally defined as WFP's governing body with full oversight of the

⁸ Examples included Biafra, Bangladesh and Cambodia.

⁹ The first MoU between WFP and UNHCR was developed in 1985. This agreement was considerably enhanced through the subsequent 1994 MoU.

¹⁰ This was in addition to traditional partners such as FAO, International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO).

¹¹ The first Executive Director went on to become the Director-General of FAO.

¹² This was provided on a cost-reimbursable basis.



Programme,¹³ and its membership was increased from 30 to 42. It was formally agreed that WFP Headquarters would be in Rome, and a Headquarters agreement was developed with the Italian Government.¹⁴ The CFA gave the WFP Executive Director complete responsibility for the operations and administration of WFP.¹⁵

16. By 1 January 1992, the constitutional constraints had been resolved, thanks in large part to years of sustained effort by James Ingram, the Executive Director from 1982 to 1992. Much of his tenure was dominated by time-consuming governance issues in a period of increasing programmatic and management challenges to WFP. As his successor stated when Mr Ingram was presented with the Food for Life award in 2000, “without his commitment and tenacity, WFP would not be the effective and independent agency it is today”.¹⁶
17. The resolution of the governance challenge not only set the scene for internal changes that began in 1992–1993 but also made them possible. If WFP had not become an autonomous institution¹⁷ with its responsibilities clearly demarcated from those of FAO, WFP’s post-1992 organizational changes could never have taken place. As a donor evaluation report subsequently pointed out: “It was only in 1992, when the revised General and Financial Regulations came into effect, that WFP secured full management control over its personnel and finances from FAO.”¹⁸

¹³ WFP’s Programme Support and Administrative (PSA) budget and financial statements are still scrutinized by two bodies: the FAO Finance Committee and the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), both of which provide advisory services to WFP’s governing body.

¹⁴ This was formally signed a few years later, in 1994.

¹⁵ There are some residual restrictions. For instance, emergency operations with a food value greater than US\$3 million still have to be *jointly* approved by the FAO Director-General and the Executive Director.

¹⁶ Statement by Catherine Bertini on 19 October 2000.

¹⁷ WFP in the field was represented by UNDP until 1998, and the process of transferring the personnel functions for WFP’s locally recruited staff from UNDP to WFP has not yet been completed.

¹⁸ Evaluation of the World Food Programme, 1994. Commissioned by the Governments of Canada, Netherlands and Norway, and hence known as the “Tripartite Evaluation”. There are, however, still vestiges of the old system: for example, WFP still bases its staff rules on the FAO code.



CHAPTER II: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE (1992–1995)

Challenges and Issues, 1992–1993

18. In April 1992, Ms Catherine Bertini became the Executive Director of WFP. She was immediately faced with a paradoxical situation.
19. On the one hand, WFP was carrying out major humanitarian and development programmes, and its transport and logistics operations were widely praised.¹⁹ The Programme was recognized as a significant actor in the United Nations' response to emergency situations. It had become a large organization with 82 field offices.²⁰ It had a good reputation among the international community and the donors, and it had sound working relationships with many United Nations agencies and NGOs.
20. On the other hand, WFP was facing significant external and internal challenges.

External Challenges

21. By 1992, at least 60 percent of WFP's resources were being devoted to emergencies, and donors were increasingly interested in supporting WFP's emergency interventions. Humanitarian challenges were becoming much more complex and demanding, involving civil war, massive displacements of people and cross-border operations, requiring more sophisticated coordination mechanisms.
22. Moreover, civil conflict and economic disruption arising from the post-Cold War break-up of states in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans increased demand for food aid in a region that had not previously needed it. At the same time, emergencies in other parts of the world, such as Iraq and Somalia, were growing.
23. To make matters more difficult, the impact of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations on agricultural commodity surpluses was uncertain. It was no longer possible to assume that the massive food surpluses of the past would continue indefinitely, which created insecurity regarding the amount of food aid that might be available to WFP. During this period, development resources were declining worldwide, and a few donors started to question the validity of food aid as a development resource.
24. All of these factors put severe pressure on the food aid available for the development programmes that had been the core of WFP activities from its inception until the late 1980s. Moreover, these changes seemed to be threatening the traditional basis for WFP resourcing.

¹⁹ The Nordic Project recommended in 1990 that WFP "be formally designated as the United Nations agency with primary responsibility for matters relating to logistics and transport for both food and non-food items, including assistance to countries in developing their own transport arrangements".

²⁰ According to the 1991 Annual Report, WFP had 82 field offices providing programmes in 92 countries.



📌 *Internal Challenges*

25. WFP was also facing significant internal challenges. The rapid shift from relatively slow-moving development programmes to fast-moving, complex relief operations, the huge increase in emergency activities and a significant increase²¹ in the number of staff all combined to present the organization with significant challenges.
26. During 1992–1993, senior managers identified the following main areas of concern for WFP:
- Development resources were spread too thin, and the Programme was not good at targeting its programmes to the countries and population groups in greatest need.
 - Since WFP owed its origins to the transfer of surplus food to developing countries, the transport of food was the basis of WFP's work, and the traditional emphasis in its culture and systems reflected just that. WFP tended to define its success in terms of food tonnage delivered rather than the number of people fed.
 - While emergencies accounted for 60 percent of WFP programmes, the structure of the organization was geared to development, and WFP continued to dedicate most staff resources to development programming.
 - Because of the shift towards complex emergencies, many managers and staff were ill equipped to respond “on the run” to emergencies. They lacked the experience and skills needed for complex emergencies and more sophisticated coordination arrangements.²²
 - The skills and family situations of many managers and staff were not always geared to working in emergency situations. Many had joined the organization because they had wanted to work in a development agency, and the shift in focus from development to emergency programmes had happened almost by accident.
 - Systems for resourcing the programmes were inadequate. As a result, it was difficult to determine and cover WFP's cash needs such as transport, management and administrative expenses, and it was difficult to plan ahead.
 - Managers in the field were primarily advisers to the government and were under the supervision of UNDP. At Headquarters, managers were primarily administrators, and they concentrated on the management of food rather than the management of people.
 - There was a significant divide, almost a cultural gap, between Headquarters and the field. There was little communication between the two, misunderstandings were all too common and decision-making authority was centralized at Headquarters. Very few senior Headquarters staff had any intention of going to the field, and not many field staff got the opportunity to work in Headquarters.
 - Office facilities both in Headquarters and in the field tended to be in poor condition, and staff lacked some of the basic tools such as computers and e-mail systems needed for their work.

²¹ The staff increased by 21 percent between 1989 and 1992. With temporary staff recruited for emergency operations included, the increase was nearly 50 percent.

²² After the Gulf War, it became apparent that managers had to be able to handle very complex emergency operations with increasingly sophisticated coordination mechanisms. This challenge required much greater leadership and negotiation skills and an in-depth understanding of WFP's role and the food aid needs in a given country.



- Budgeting, financial management, human-resources management and information systems were out of date, cumbersome and inadequate. WFP did not have fast-track administrative procedures for its emergencies, and at one stage the Executive Director actually announced that “WFP suffers from unacceptable and inadequate financial controls”.
 - Reporting and accountability mechanisms were in poor condition, and audit and evaluation regimes were not particularly effective.
 - Despite the size of its programmes, WFP was one of the least-known United Nations organizations, particularly among the general public in donor countries.
 - Despite initial efforts, cooperation and coordination with other United Nations organizations were inadequate.²³
27. In defining these challenges, managers were not being critical of the past. They viewed these issues as the classic, almost inevitable challenges facing an organization that had grown rapidly and significantly changed the nature of its work over a very short period of time.
28. With the energies of senior management no longer fully absorbed by governance issues, it was now possible for senior managers to focus on the challenges identified above.

Addressing the Challenges

29. In November 1992, in one of her first major policy statements to the CFA,²⁴ the Executive Director set out some of the major challenges facing WFP. She stressed the need to focus WFP on the beneficiaries: poor and hungry people. She described the challenge of providing life-sustaining food in emergency situations and of the need to ensure the security of staff and of food in the field. She emphasized the need to strengthen development activities in the context of building self-reliant communities and of integrating WFP’s food aid programmes with national development priorities. She committed herself to strengthening the internal management of WFP, placing particular emphasis on decision-making, delegation, accountability and communication.
30. The Executive Director engaged the Member States, managers and staff in a dialogue on options for strengthening WFP. In a new era of governance, Member States were actively consulted, and the support and advice they provided at this stage were vital in contributing to the thinking on organizational development, the formulation of new strategic directions and the financing of the programmes.

²³ For example, there was a lack of close cooperation among the three food-based United Nations organizations in Rome: FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and WFP.

²⁴ Remarks of the Executive Director of the World Food Programme to the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes.



31. At this point, the Executive Director commissioned a series of studies²⁵ and audits,²⁶ and a group of donors carried out an evaluation²⁷ of WFP. Taken together, these provided management with a comprehensive organizational review and insights into the causes of the problems as well as the options for resolving them.
32. In September 1993, WFP senior managers outlined several initiatives that would strengthen WFP immediately. In launching these activities, management was well aware that WFP had to continue to deliver its food aid programmes at the same level as before while finding the resources and the energy to strengthen its own capacity and effectiveness. Simply put, food aid work could not stop while WFP addressed its internal problems. Senior managers also knew that the initiatives had to be carried out within the constraints inherent in an organization that was multilateral in nature, with a complex governance structure and even more complex administrative frameworks.²⁸
33. The change activities undertaken at this time are described below in terms of seven key initiatives, which can be seen as the origins of the seven pillars of change introduced in Chapter IV. The key decisions and building blocks for the whole change process during 1992–2002 were established during this period.

Focusing on Our Core Business—Targeting the Hungry Poor

34. One key strategic question has preoccupied WFP since 1992: How can the Programme best focus its efforts to achieve maximum benefits for poor and hungry people?
35. The first step in answering this question has been to establish WFP's purpose, strategies, and policies. In 1994, Member States in the CFA engaged in a major consultative process, thinking through the basic purpose of WFP, what it wanted to achieve and how its programmes should evolve. In doing so, the CFA discussed both what the Programme could not do and what it must do:

*Food aid cannot do everything. WFP should not attempt to do everything. WFP should concentrate on what it is best suited to do, with the resources that are made available to it. This basic premise is an essential starting point on the road to WFP's transformation.*²⁹

²⁵ Improving Financial Management Information Systems of WFP, McKinsey & Co, 1994.

²⁶ Audited Biennial Accounts 1992–93, Financial Report and Statement (CFA 38/12, December 1994), including a report by the External Auditors on financial controls in the field.

²⁷ Evaluation of the World Food Programme, 1994. Canada, Netherlands, Norway. Known as the “Tripartite Evaluation”.

²⁸ WFP did not have a standard set of administrative rules, regulations, policies and procedures. These were an amalgam of the United Nations common system and the rules and regulations of FAO, the United Nations Secretariat, UNDP, and WFP's own policies.

²⁹ Review of WFP Policies, Objectives and Strategies (CFA 37/P/7, 7 April 1994).



36. The result was a policy paper, *Review of WFP Policies, Objectives and Strategies*,³⁰ which was approved by the CFA in May 1994. In December 1994, WFP adopted a mission statement, one of the first in the United Nations system. The Mission Statement declared that:

WFP is the food aid arm of the United Nations system ... The policies governing the use of WFP food aid must be oriented towards the objective of eradicating hunger and poverty.

*Targeted interventions are needed to help to improve the lives of the poorest people—people who, either permanently or during crisis periods, are unable to produce enough food or do not have the resources to otherwise obtain the food that they and their households require for active and healthy lives.*³¹

37. This served to focus WFP's purpose in three areas, with the lives of people—the beneficiaries—as the starting point in each case:
- saving lives in refugee crises and other emergencies (food for life);
 - improving nutrition and the quality of life of the world's most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives (food for growth);
 - enabling development by first helping people to build assets that benefit them directly and then promoting the self-reliance of poor people and communities (food for work).

Focusing on the Countries with the Greatest Need

38. One immediate follow-up action was to refocus WFP's operations on countries with the greatest need. In late 1994, the CFA decided that by 1997 at least 90 percent of WFP's development assistance should be provided to low-income, food-deficit countries (LIFDCs), and at least 50 percent of its development resources should be allocated to the least developed countries (LDCs)³² among them.

39. Immediately following that session, the Executive Director initiated an ambitious internal review process to re-examine the entire portfolio of WFP country office coverage in the light of these criteria. As a result, WFP closed its country offices in 23 countries,³³ of which 16 were classified as “graduated” middle-income countries.

Targeting Resources to Women

40. At the same time, WFP decided to place particular emphasis on targeting resources to women, which led to a major effort to empower women by ensuring gender-sensitive analysis and planning in all its programmes.
41. This was based on the belief that strengthening opportunities for women was essential to solving problems of hunger and poverty. “Women are the key to change ... we should reach women as the people in the family who are the most dedicated to ensuring that the

³⁰ Review of WFP Policies, Objectives and Strategies (CFA 37/P/7, 7 April 1994).

³¹ Mission Statement (CFA 38/P/5).

³² Guidelines for Country Programme Resource Levels (CFA:38/P/7, 11 November 1994).

³³ Five of these offices were subsequently re-opened because of new emergency situations. Offices in other countries have also been opened for the same reason and other CPs have been phased out.



children eat and are educated and grow strong and as the people most dedicated to ensuring that the entire family is fed and has a chance to develop.”³⁴

42. WFP further determined that in all future programmes women would not only have direct access to food but also participate in decision-making on food management. At the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing, WFP made specific Commitments to Women that were designed to change significantly their role in development and humanitarian programming. WFP saw the preparations for Beijing as a process of consciousness-raising for itself, implicitly recognizing that it had not previously seen the importance of focusing on women either as an equity issue or as a programmatic issue.

Delivering Integrated and More Effective Programmes

43. Following a decision of the General Assembly,³⁵ it was agreed that WFP would plan its development activities in close consultation with individual governments and other international agencies. This approach, called the Country Programme (CP) approach, had profound implications for building cooperation at the field level and for delegating authority to senior management. It also ensured that WFP assistance in each country would be:
- better integrated with the priorities and other activities of the country itself, as well as with those of the United Nations system and other donors;
 - more coherent, with the elements of WFP sub-programmes in each country relating closely to one another to achieve a clear outcome;
 - more focused on the geographical areas and households representing WFP’s target groups; and
 - more flexible, with activities adjusting to changing circumstances.
44. As part of the effort to strengthen programmes, a number of policies, manuals and tools were developed in the field of emergency management, and Country Directors and staff received training in managerial and technical aspects of emergencies. Partnerships were strengthened with UNHCR, other United Nations agencies and NGOs.

Mobilizing Resources

45. With food surpluses steadily decreasing, resource mobilization became one of the early priorities of the Executive Director. Throughout the meetings of the CFA in 1992 and 1993, she engaged donors in an ongoing dialogue on how to increase their funding of emergency and development programmes.
46. The financing of WFP’s transport and overhead costs was also an issue in the early 1990s. Initially, emergency operations were carried out without a specific levy for indirect overhead costs. This was sustainable at a time when most resources were for development but became unsustainable with the significant increase in emergency relief. A subsequent agreement by donors to provide two-thirds food and one-third cash was not always respected.

³⁴ Statement by Ms Catherine Bertini to the CFA (CFA: 37/PV/3).

³⁵ United Nations General Assembly resolution 47/199, confirmed by the CFA (CFA: 35/17).



47. With no agreement either in the CFA or among donors on a new system for financing operational management and overhead costs to replace older budgetary practices, it was becoming increasingly clear that WFP had a serious financial problem.
48. Member States and management realized that they would have to develop new resourcing policies and systems. WFP needed to have a standard, fair and transparent approach to handling all donor contributions, as well as a reliable means of planning its programme support and administrative budgets.
49. In December 1994, the CFA established a Working Group on Options for WFP's Resource and Long-term Financing (R<F) policies to review the situation and make proposals for change. In 1995, the CFA approved the working group's recommendations, and in January 1996 the new R<F policies went into effect, leading to profound change in the financing of WFP's management and administrative costs. From that point on, contributions to the Programme were made in line with the concept of full-cost recovery. Moreover, each contribution covered all associated operational costs and a pro-rata share of the PSA budget.

Building a Robust Management Culture

50. To build a more effective management culture, the Executive Director identified and promoted current staff with key managerial skills and potential. This was complemented by the recruitment of some senior managers from outside WFP. The Executive Director also led a major effort to recruit, select and promote female managers and professionals, both at Headquarters and in the field.³⁶
51. She then formed a senior management team, the Executive Staff, and started organizing regular meetings and annual retreats for them. She convened a global meeting for all field managers in January 1994, only the second in the life of the organization. Another major retreat for Headquarters managers was held later in the same year.³⁷ Management training workshops were initiated, and performance management was emphasised.
52. As a result of the staff rotation policy, the 1994 Global Meeting and other measures to consult and involve field staff, there were some early successes in bridging the "cultural divide" between Headquarters and the field.

³⁶ In 1992, 17 percent of WFP's professional staff were women; as of 30 June 2001, the figure was 39 percent.

³⁷ One of the retreats held at about this time was for a representative group of General Service staff.



53. From the outset, the Executive Director insisted on the importance of delegating authority to managers and making them accountable for the exercise of that authority. She argued that this was essential for a field-based agency working primarily in emergency situations. In late 1992, she spelled out her ideas on delegation. These formed the basis of the WFP change programme over the next decade:

Decisions should be made at the lowest possible levels within the organization, with two factors determining what that level is: efficiency and accountability... in short, many decisions at WFP are now made at levels that are much higher than necessary to ensure efficiency and accountability... We must define the duties of each unit. Each manager must then work with each staff member so that that person knows what is his or her responsibility, and what the expectations are for his/her performance. An honest, transparent, fair performance appraisal policy is a key element of this ... Each staff member, each unit, each country office must know what their responsibilities are, what kind of decisions they can take and to whom they are responsible.³⁸

Matching the Organization to Its Operations—Fine-tuning the Structure

54. In 1992, the field offices tended to be small; the head of WFP's programmes in a country was called the Director of Operations. He (or, too rarely, she) reported to the WFP Representative, who was always the resident representative of UNDP.³⁹
55. Most of the country offices were development oriented and staffed by development advisers,⁴⁰ who helped the government to design projects and monitor the implementation of food programmes. In countries where there were sizeable emergency operations, WFP's Division of Transport and Logistics tended to take the lead. This division established its own units in countries where it operated. Emergency and development programmes were sometimes run independently, with different reporting lines to Rome.
56. In 1992, in a review of the principles governing WFP's organization and structure, the Executive Director decided that all staff in any country should report to the head of the country office. This gave the local Director of Operations responsibility for both emergency and development programmes.
57. At Headquarters, the number of bureaux was increased from five to six. Instead of sharing responsibility for emergencies with the Emergency Relief Division, the regional bureaux were assigned all WFP's activities in the countries in their region,⁴¹ and the Emergency Relief Division adopted an advisory and support role.

³⁸ Executive Director's statement to the CFA at its meeting on 3-6 November 1992 (CFA: 34/3).

³⁹ UNDP was therefore the accredited representative of WFP to the government, and administered national and local staff on behalf of WFP.

⁴⁰ Directors of Operations could be quite junior in grade, for example, P-3.

⁴¹ The bureaux had been the line of communication between country offices and Headquarters since 1987, but this role had not been rigorously implemented.



Establishing Financial Controls

58. By 1993, WFP's systems and processes were inadequate for the challenges facing the Programme. WFP could not plan properly, it could not track its resource use and it could not report satisfactorily to the CFA and donors.
59. These weaknesses were highlighted in the three reports mentioned earlier in this chapter. All reports highlighted the rapid increases in programme activity, significant changes in the characteristics of operations and growing donor expectations as sources of the deficiencies in planning, managing, controlling and reporting on resource use.⁴² Management also recognized that WFP's information systems could not keep pace with the Programme's reporting requirements and that WFP needed more modern information technology and telecommunications.
60. Once she had received the reports, the Executive Director discussed with the CFA both short- and long-term measures for rectifying the situation. In the short term, she set up the Accountability Management Project (AMP) to bring about some "quick wins" in strengthening financial controls and accountability.
61. The long-term solution was the Financial Management Improvement Programme (FMIP), which was launched, with strong support from the CFA, in 1995. This programme was designed to enable the organization to interrelate and manage *all* its resources—food, people and finances. The aim of FMIP was to guarantee financial accountability, cost-effectiveness, control, transparency and real-time reporting. It was designed to give managers more accurate and relevant information, leading to faster and more effective decision-making.

Strengthening Accountability and Oversight

62. Early on, the Executive Director identified the need to strengthen the accountability and oversight of WFP's programmes and organization. The need for oversight was particularly emphasized by the three reports mentioned above. It was decided to build WFP oversight on three key functions: evaluation, audit and inspection and investigation. The combination would enable WFP to keep an eye on the performance of the organization and its systems, individual managers and staff, to know when there were problems and to learn how to strengthen both capacity and performance. In 1994, WFP's internal audit and evaluation units were strengthened, and in 1995 the Office of Inspection and Investigation was created, one of the first in the United Nations system.
63. In internal audit, a risk-assessment instrument was developed, and higher-risk country offices were visited once every two years; those with a lower risk rating were visited on a four-year cycle. Innovative changes were made to the way audit results were reported, with a view to helping managers learn from best practices and, in some cases, to benchmark their operations. Since its establishment, the Inspector-General's office has conducted ad hoc inspections or investigations at Headquarters or in regional and country offices where the risk of mismanagement was high or where there was evidence of legal or regulatory violation, malpractice, gross waste of funds or abuse of authority.

⁴² One reason for the problems was that WFP had taken over most of its systems from FAO and these were not designed for fast-moving emergency operations in the field.



CHAPTER III: A COMPREHENSIVE, INTEGRATED VISION FOR WFP (1996–1997)

Taking Stock of Achievements to Date

64. By 1995, WFP believed it had achieved some significant improvements. There were indications, however, that the different initiatives were not going to be sufficient by themselves, and management was not satisfied with WFP's capacity to respond rapidly and flexibly to complex emergency operations. Despite past efforts, WFP remained a highly centralized, hierarchical organization, with Country Directors who lacked the expertise and tools to exercise delegated authority and manage operations effectively.
65. It was clear there were *systemic* forces or obstacles preventing the consolidation of change. For example, some attempts to delegate decision-making authority to the field were hampered by subtle forces that inhibited Country Directors from assuming their new responsibilities. In many cases, Country Directors lacked easy access to key information that would enable them to take decisions in rapidly evolving situations. They did not necessarily have the relevant technical and administrative skills. At Headquarters, senior managers did not have sufficient confidence in the field and found it difficult to delegate important decisions.
66. With these concerns in mind, the Executive Director decided in late 1995 to initiate a review of progress to date. Managers and staff at Headquarters and in the field were widely and informally consulted on their views about the future of the organization and the best ways of strengthening it.

A Comprehensive, Integrated Vision for WFP

67. In late 1995, the Executive Director decided to launch an expanded change programme, basing it on the ideas and suggestions from the review: a more comprehensive, holistic and long-term programme designed to bring about a gradual but fundamental transformation in the way the organization worked.
68. In July 1996, the Executive Director announced a vision for WFP, which built on and integrated all the work done and all the change initiatives launched since 1992. The vision focused on the organization WFP wished to become and provided the framework for the change programme that would help to make that vision a reality.
69. WFP was to become a much more strategic organization, capable of responding flexibly and rapidly to situations of greatest need and of seamlessly integrating emergency, recovery and development programmes. The organization's very culture would change, and a transformed WFP would be based on seven organizational characteristics:
- **Keeping the field at the centre:** ensuring a phased but fundamental shift of power to the field and making field experience an important consideration in the appointment of senior managers;
 - **Strategic thinking:** approaching every aspect of WFP in a more strategic way, defining WFP's position in the struggle against hunger and becoming more proficient in identifying the comparative advantage of food aid in meeting country development needs;



- **Letting the managers manage:** delegating decision-making authority to managers and ensuring that the role of support functions at Headquarters changed from controlling managers to helping them to manage;
- **Flexibility and adaptability:** ensuring that staff and managers could handle both relief and development activities, streamlining processes to ensure that WFP remained flexible and adaptable and committing WFP to becoming a learning organization;
- **Communication:** improving dialogue within WFP and with other agencies, creating a culture where information-sharing was encouraged and fostering more widespread dissemination of information on WFP policies and activities;
- **Teamwork:** developing a collaborative, collegial culture at all levels in the organization, within country offices and divisions, between divisions, between Headquarters and the field and with other agencies;
- **Leadership:** developing a culture in which all staff would show leadership, building a senior management team that was willing and able to manage strategically and strengthening management and leadership expertise.

📌 Why Change?

70. It is worth quoting directly from the opening paragraphs of the paper announcing the vision:

Why change? We are doing very well. We have a good reputation for delivering effective programmes to the hungry poor. Donors speak approvingly of our operational effectiveness, our commitment and our efforts to improve. Our resource levels are steadier than many other United Nations organizations. In the face of massive challenges, we have succeeded in delivering food aid to tens of millions of poor people every year. WFP has some real strengths: our commitment and expertise, the relatively small size of our staff and our capacity to respond to both relief and development needs.

But there are some danger signals. The United Nations as a whole is facing unprecedented pressure and criticism. The multilateral character of WFP is under siege. Contributions are increasingly directed to specific countries, projects or emergency operations. WFP is no longer the “only game in town” for targeted food aid. Other agencies are working hard to attain our competence and become competitors for increasingly scarce food-aid resources. Food surpluses, and the funding security they used to give us, are gone ...

Some of our systems and procedures do not serve us well. They are cumbersome and too often their value added is not evident. Worse still, they divert our energy and talent away from achievement of our objectives into “administrivia”. Though resources are increasingly scarce, the hungry poor still number in the hundreds of millions. To reach them, we have to be more effective and more efficient in every way.⁴³

71. The paper went on to consider the importance and relevance of WFP’s mission and strategic plan and ended: “But neither the Mission Statement nor the Strategic and

⁴³ Preparing WFP for the Future—An Organization to Meet Our Mandate, by the Executive Director, July 1996.



Financial Plan (SFP) tell us how we should organize ourselves to reach the goals they set out for us. This is the issue we are addressing now.”

72. This phase of the change process was driven by the need to delegate authority and accountability to the field and to empower staff and managers.

Empowerment of the Field

73. Much of the change introduced in the 1990s was driven by the need to answer a simple question: How can we serve the hungry poor more effectively? One WFP document answered the question this way: “WFP’s mandate is to assist the poor and hungry. They do not live in Rome. The heart of our work is therefore in the field.”⁴⁴

74. Given the need for WFP to become a field-based organization in every sense of the word, a phased but critical shift of power to the field was required. It was accordingly determined that managers and staff in the field needed the following:

- sound knowledge of the situation of the hungry poor and of food security and food aid issues in their countries of assignment;
- the expertise to be able to work in many different aspects of WFP’s programmes, particularly emergency operations, development projects and advocacy;
- the authority to make decisions rapidly in fast-moving emergency situations;
- access to advice, support and guidance from senior managers, who themselves should know the regional situation and the challenges faced by Country Directors;
- rapid access to organizational support functions such as procurement, human resources and financial management that can respond immediately and with a good understanding of the specifics of the region;
- solid support from systems, technology and processes that are efficient, rapid and relevant to requirements.

75. The implications of these ideas were very significant. First, within the framework of policies, strategies and the allocation of resources determined by senior management at Headquarters, field managers would have full responsibility for managing food aid operations and the resources entrusted to them. Second, many of the service and advisory functions, which at that time were being provided from Headquarters, would be provided from the country or region.

76. One of the main dilemmas in 1996 concerned the tension between the need to get structural changes in place and the importance of developing the necessary systems and guidelines and putting them in place to support the structural changes. WFP decided to do both at the same time. In early 1997, staff were advised that WFP would have to go ahead with the change process and not wait for the systems to be perfect: “We can manage in a imperfect world while the systems catch up, but we cannot afford to lose momentum because of them.”⁴⁵

77. This approach was essential to maintaining the momentum for change. The structural changes created operational demands without which essential systems and guidelines might never have been developed. This approach did, however, lead to a certain amount of

⁴⁴ Preparing Our Future, July 1996.

⁴⁵ Organizational Change—Time to Act, 25 November 1997.



confusion and frustration during the early months of the implementation process. A period of uncertainty and fear of the unknown was inevitable.

Managing the Change Process

78. The participation of staff at every level was a key aspect of managing the change process. Without such involvement, staff could not own the change process and organizational change could not succeed. Several working groups or task teams were set up, bringing field and Headquarters staff together.⁴⁶ The task teams developed the practical side of the new vision in such areas as decentralization, the streamlining of procedures, field-Headquarters relations, advocacy, communication, staffing and training. Throughout, each group made considerable efforts to communicate and interact with all staff.
79. An Organizational Change Team was established to facilitate, catalyse and integrate the work of the various working groups. This team produced three newsletters and held several briefing sessions with managers and staff. Task teams' suggestions and conclusions were consolidated by the Organizational Change Team in late 1996, and a change implementation strategy was announced in February 1997.⁴⁷ The Executive Director brought in a change manager to monitor the implementation of the decisions and to advise managers.
80. The Executive Staff discussed progress on an ongoing basis in their meetings, and regular reports were provided to the Executive Board.⁴⁸ At a later stage, a change management oversight committee was established.

Change Management Principles

81. During a series of meetings of the Executive Staff in 1996–1997, a set of guiding principles emerged, which formed the basis of WFP's ongoing approach to change management:
- Our change programme is driven by our shared vision for the organization.
 - We recognize from past attempts to change that organizational reform succeeds only when it is based on an approach that is systemic and thus addresses the root causes of problems, not just symptoms.
 - We must build on the traditions of the past and the strengths of the present in seeking to develop approaches and competencies that are relevant to the challenges faced by the organization.
 - Our staff must be involved and our organizational strengthening programmes must be driven from inside the organization; open dialogue and constant communication are essential to building commitment and maintaining momentum and energy; one of the challenges is inspiring people without setting up unrealistic expectations or encouraging cynicism.

⁴⁶ The five task teams were: (a) Field-Headquarters Team, (b) the Staffing and Training Team, (c) the Streamlining of Procedures Team, (d) the Communication Team and (e) the Advocacy and Resource Mobilization team. All held frequent meetings with interested staff and presented their reports in late December or early January of 1996.

⁴⁷ Implementing Organizational Change, by the Executive Director, 24 February 1997.

⁴⁸ Reform and Revitalization Measures (WFP/EB.A/96/6/Rev.1) and Reform and Revitalization Measures in the WFP (WFP/EB.A/97/5-B).



- The active support of all senior managers for the organizational change process is essential; these managers must lead the process, they must embody any new behaviours that are required and they must actively energize and communicate with the staff.
- We recognize that the change process takes time and that any changes must be integrated into all aspects of the organization.
- Momentum must be maintained; there will be periods of resistance that should be anticipated and resolved.
- We recognize that structural changes do not drive change; they do, however, support change.
- We know that there are rarely any quick fixes in organizational development; change is inherently messy—it means starting many things at once, realizing that not everything will work immediately, constantly rethinking and realigning and sometimes starting again.
- Finally, we know that organizational change is all about culture and that we cannot decree culture change; all we can do is to initiate change in many parts of the organization with the intention of bringing about behaviour change, which then becomes the measure of successful cultural change.



CHAPTER IV: FROM VISION TO TRANSFORMATION—A CONTINUING PROCESS (1997–2002)

Towards Transformation

82. Between 1997 and 2002, WFP implemented an extraordinarily wide range of change activities. These initiatives involved seven main “pillars”, which supported the vision of the new WFP. This chapter provides some of the highlights of the activities associated with each pillar. It does *not* attempt to discuss all the activities undertaken during this period.

Pillar 1: Purpose, Strategies and Policies

83. Throughout the change process, WFP has continued to reflect on its purpose, strengthen its capacity in strategic planning and policy formulation and crystallize strategic priorities to guide its operations.

📌 **Purpose**

84. In 1992–1995, the CFA and WFP management developed a Mission Statement. Taken together, the process of developing the Mission Statement and the statement itself provided a clear sense of purpose for WFP. CFA and WFP management also outlined the strategies and policies needed to help WFP focus and target its programmes.

85. Along these lines, WFP has shifted its focus from what it does (provide food aid) to why it does it (to help the hungry poor). This is perhaps the single most important change in WFP’s focus since the change process began in 1992.

86. As a result of these deliberations and decisions, WFP now seeks a leadership role in all aspects of food aid. This role requires WFP to have a sound knowledge of food security and food aid issues, to develop the skills to advocate and negotiate on behalf of the hungry poor and to be proactive in facilitating cooperation with all other actors involved in food aid programmes. In this way, WFP focuses its efforts where it can have maximum impact and acts as a catalyst in stimulating the work of others.

📌 **Building Capacity in Strategic Planning and Policy Formulation**

87. With the encouragement of the CFA and Executive Board, WFP has steadily strengthened its capacity in strategic planning and policy formulation. One of the most important tools is an improved SFP, developed in recent years through a more participatory approach with senior managers. The decision to transform the SFP into a Strategic Plan beginning in 2003 will be the next step in this evolution of WFP strategic development. The Strategic Plan will be linked to resources in a biennial Management Plan and assessed by way of an Annual Performance Report.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Follow-up to Executive Board Decision 2000/EB.A/6 on Governance (WFP/EB.3/2000/3-A).



88. These enhanced tools rely on a results-based approach that WFP has been developing since 1997. The goal of this approach is to make achieving planned results the focus of every decision and action. By so doing, WFP seeks to measure the improvements it has made in the lives of its beneficiaries.
89. The process of developing policy has also been improved through more extensive consultative processes with Board members and NGOs on issues such as the Enabling Development policy, IDPs and NGO partnerships. This has increased the role of WFP stakeholders in policy development.

➤ *Evolution of Strategic Priorities*

90. Following the Mission Statement and a series of internal strategic discussions such as the Global Meeting in Tunis in 1999, six strategic priorities gradually emerged to guide the evolution of WFP programmes and the work of WFP's managers and staff both in the field and at Headquarters. Many of these priorities have their origins in the 1992–1995 initiatives (see Chapter II) and were further refined during that period.

Strategic Priority One: Focus on Women

91. At the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, WFP made a series of commitments to women, pledging to address gender issues that affected millions of hungry poor. The Programme has gone considerably beyond proclaiming its support for this strategic priority: it has mainstreamed this principle into everything it does.
92. To meet these Commitments, a Gender Task Force was created, consisting of senior managers throughout the organization. In addition, each office and section appointed a gender focal point; some regions now have full-time gender advisers. A gender perspective has been incorporated in the Programme Design Manual, evaluations, data management systems, budgets and agreements with partners.
93. Numerical targets have been established and mechanisms created within the organization supporting this principle. All new project documents, for example, are systematically reviewed with a view to ensuring that the Commitments to Women are integrated into every aspect of the project cycle.
94. Efforts to continue building staff capacity on gender issues remain significant. In preparation for “Beijing+5”, WFP completed its programme of regional gender workshops in Cambodia, Egypt, Hungary, Mozambique and other countries.
95. As part of this priority, WFP has increased its emphasis on programmes that serve children, such as mother-and-child nutrition and school feeding. WFP has established a special School Feeding Support Unit to provide policy and programme direction for its expanded global School Feeding Initiative. It has expanded its efforts in food fortification to address micronutrient deficiencies particularly important to the health of expectant mothers and children under 5.

Strategic Priority Two: Sharpening the Geographical Targeting of Food Aid

96. In 1992–1995, WFP concentrated on targeting countries with the greatest need by allocating more resources to LDCs and LIFDCs. Since 1996, it has taken this targeting strategy one step further by seeking to identify the geographical areas within a country with the greatest concentration of hungry poor. The vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) system has been the principal tool for implementing this priority.



Strategic Priority Three: Advocacy on Behalf of the Hungry Poor

97. In 1994, the CFA argued that “WFP should serve as the global advocate for the hungry poor in bringing hunger to the centre of the development agenda”.⁵⁰
98. This strategic priority is of growing importance to WFP, and it is still being developed and defined as part of the change process. An essential element is recognizing that advocacy consists of two different but mutually reinforcing components:
- disseminating public information that seeks to put the needs of the hungry poor on the newspaper pages and television screens of the world; and
 - urging governments and other decision-makers to adopt policies that create an enabling environment for food aid and food security programmes.
99. Advocacy complements all of WFP’s programmes and operations; it is potentially as important as field activities for improving the lives of the hungry poor.

Strategic Priority Four: Support for United Nations Reform

100. In mid-1997, the United Nations Secretary-General announced a wide-ranging reform programme designed to strengthen the role, capacity, efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations. As part of these efforts, he included WFP as a key member of his humanitarian and development Executive Committees and he appointed the Executive Director as a member of the Senior Management Group.
101. On the development side, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) was established by the Secretary-General to create a policy forum for implementing change and for facilitating joint policy formation and coherent decision-making. WFP is an active member of the UNDG Executive Committee. The UNDG has produced major tools to reform the United Nations’ development assistance, focusing on the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). WFP has also been actively involved in the development of the resident coordinator system⁵¹ and has sought to build practical cooperation in other areas, for example among the three United Nations food-based organizations: FAO, IFAD and WFP.
102. On the humanitarian side, WFP plays an important role in all the main bodies: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC), and the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA).⁵² WFP participates in many other United Nations–led humanitarian initiatives; for example, the Executive Director was recently the Secretary-General’s special envoy to the Horn of Africa.

⁵⁰ Review of WFP Policies, Objectives and Strategies (CFA 37/P/7, 7 April 1994).

⁵¹ Several WFP staff members have been chosen to carry out the resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator functions in highly sensitive countries.

⁵² WFP is a member of ECHA and the IASC.



103. WFP has also strengthened its presence in New York and Geneva so that it can participate more actively in discussions on United Nations reform.⁵³

Strategic Priority Five: Partnership with United Nations Agencies, NGOs and Civil Society

104. Partnership has become a key aspect of all WFP programmes. The nature of partnerships varies widely. Some are purely operational in nature, and WFP has put considerable emphasis on developing partnerships with NGOs and inter-governmental organizations through the development of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), regular meetings and cooperative programmes. WFP participates actively within the United Nations country teams in exercises such as the CCA, UNDAF and the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). These help to shape the overall policy and operational orientation of the CPs of the sister agencies, and give practical substance to partnerships.
105. Other partnerships, usually more informal, are related to the efforts of WFP field staff to build—in a spirit of partnership—the capacity of national governments and civil society in host countries to strengthen their own food aid programmes. This often involves providing advice and building local networks that generate the sharing of practical experiences and food aid expertise among different agencies and institutes.

Strategic Priority Six: Close Cooperation between Governance and Management

106. Effective governance is an intrinsic part of any organizational change process. At all major stages of the change process, the governing body⁵⁴ and management have worked closely to analyse problems and develop solutions.
107. The active support of the Executive Board⁵⁵ for the change process since 1996 has been essential. The Board has been directly involved in many of WFP's organizational change strategies. Its confidence in the Secretariat has been essential to the gradual evolution of the change initiatives and the strengthening of all WFP programmes.
108. In 1999, the Board set up a Working Group on Governance, designed to strengthen the governance of WFP by clarifying the respective roles of the governing body and management and by developing ideas for improving working methods and relationships. This initiative had important implications for the management of WFP, and managers

⁵³ In 1992, WFP had only a small office in New York and was not involved in the coordination of operational activities. Today, its New York office is actively involved with all the major United Nations Secretariat departments. In addition, WFP has established an office in Geneva to deal with important meetings of the international community in that city.

⁵⁴ The vital importance of the role played by the CFA in bringing about governance reforms is described in Chapter I. The CFA also played an important part in many of the initiatives described in Chapter II, especially in the mission statement, WFP policies and the financing of FMIP.

⁵⁵ In 1993, as part of the initiatives coming out of the Nordic Project, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that transformed the governing bodies of WFP, UNFPA, UNDP and UNICEF into Executive Boards. WFP's CFA became the Executive Board in January 1996, with 36 members drawn from five regional groups. The role of the Executive Board remained unchanged, however, as WFP continued to report to the FAO Council and to the United Nations' ECOSOC. See Further Measures for Restructuring and Revitalisation of the United Nations in the Economic, Social and Related Fields, General Assembly resolution 48/162, 20 December 1993 and subsequent resolutions 9/95 and 50/8 adopted by the FAO Conference in October 1995 and by the General Assembly in November 1995.



actively supported the working group, particularly in the development of new policy, strategy and accountability mechanisms.⁵⁶

Pillar 2: Programmes

109. Within the framework of its strategic priorities and new operational policies, WFP has for the past decade been strengthening its capacity to deliver effective food aid operations. In 1992–1995, WFP concentrated on country planning and some initial efforts to develop emergency guidelines and training. During 1997–2001, the organization focused mainly on:

- mainstreaming the Enabling Development policy framework throughout the organization;
- developing an integrated approach to prevention, preparedness, relief, recovery and development;
- enhancing emergency systems, tools and training; and
- strengthening its knowledge base on food aid and food security issues.

📌 *Revitalizing Development*

110. During the 1990s, resources for development programmes continued to decline, and there were major concerns that WFP's dual mandate—emergencies and development—could be threatened. This was despite the fact that the CFA set targets for the development resources that at least 50 percent should be spent in LDCs, at least 90 percent in LIFDCs and no more than 10 percent in countries outside these categories.⁵⁷

111. In 1999, after an intensive consultative process, the Executive Board decided to adopt the Enabling Development policy,⁵⁸ designed to revitalize WFP's development programme.

112. The Board called on WFP to provide assistance only when and where food consumption was inadequate for good health and productivity, focusing on the five objectives⁵⁹ of the Enabling Development policy. CP and development-project priorities were to be selected in accordance with country-specific circumstances and the national strategy of the recipient country, consistent with CCA and UNDAF.

⁵⁶ Report of the Working Group on Governance (WFP/EB.A/2000/4-D, 19 April 2000) and Follow-up to the Executive Board Decision 2000/EB.A/6 on Governance (WFP/EB.3/2000/3-A).

⁵⁷ CFA 38/P/5, December 1994.

⁵⁸ Enabling Development (WFP/EB.A/99/4-A, 17 May 1999).

⁵⁹ The five policy objectives were as follows: (1) enable young children and expectant and nursing mothers to meet their special nutritional and nutrition-related health needs; (2) enable poor households to invest in human capital through education and training; (3) make it possible for poor families to gain and preserve assets; (4) mitigate the effects of natural disasters in areas vulnerable to recurring crises of this kind; and (5) enable households that depend on degraded natural resources for their food security to make a shift to more sustainable livelihoods.



113. The implementation of the Enabling Development policy has resulted in better designed and executed Country Strategy Outlines (CSOs), CPs and development projects. This has occurred mainly because of the strong focus on sound problem analysis and the selection of people-centred activities incorporating the central elements of the Enabling Development policy.
114. The Enabling Development policy framework is being mainstreamed throughout all phases of the preparation of CSOs, CPs and development projects. This change is shown, for example, by adherence to the five policy objectives, a focus on VAM geographic and beneficiary targeting, results-based monitoring and evaluation, partnership strategies, participatory approaches and effective monitoring and evaluation.
115. A major training effort has been launched, involving WFP facilitators as Food Aid and Development leaders in workshops for staff worldwide.

➤ *From Crisis to Recovery*

116. Another key area was the development of an integrated approach to prevention, preparedness, relief, recovery and development. In 1998, the Board approved the policy for strengthening this capacity in the paper *From Crisis to Recovery*,⁶⁰ which tackled one of the most pressing policy challenges facing humanitarian and development agencies in the 1990s—how best to manage the transition from emergency relief to medium-term recovery and eventually long-term development. As a result of this policy, WFP modified its existing programme structure to create the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) aid category. The ongoing effort to implement PRROs in accordance with the policy specified in *From Crisis to Recovery* remains one of the main programmatic and resourcing challenges facing WFP.
117. WFP was the first agency to create a financing mechanism that would allow donors to contribute funds for activities that bridge the transition from relief to recovery to development.

➤ *Tools for Emergency Management*

118. WFP has embarked on a multi-tiered effort to strengthen its ability to respond to emergencies.
- WFP's Augmenting Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE) acts as the focal point for mobilizing civil defence assets and mine action. WFP established an Operations Room, under ALITE's management, to backstop fast-moving emergency operations. This facility is currently evolving into a Situation Room.
 - WFP's rapid-response teams and emergency-operations training evolved into a more cost-effective Emergency Response Roster.⁶¹
 - There has been comprehensive training in many technical and managerial aspects of emergencies.
 - WFP's rapid-response stocks evolved into the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot in Brindisi, Italy. WFP manages this depot on behalf of all United Nations agencies and the international community.

⁶⁰ WFP/EB.A/98/4-A.

⁶¹ By the end of 2001, WFP had 100 staff members trained and on stand-by for deployment within 48 hours to an emergency anywhere in the world.



- WFP's partnerships in human resources evolved from being ad hoc secondments to formal stand-by agreements. There are now six such arrangements with various organizations.⁶²
- WFP's supply chains now extend from ports to extended delivery points closer to the beneficiaries, and WFP is assisting governments in handling and distributing food assistance.
- In 1996, WFP created a fourth programme category, Special Operations (SO), to address systematically logistical bottlenecks in emergency operations.
- Field-based logistics operations led to the development of logistics support systems such as the Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System (COMPAS), a commodity tracking system. Normative logistics guidance has been developed in The WFP Transport Manual.
- WFP has developed the Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Systems (FITTEST). This system makes available within 24 hours the staff, initial funds and information technology resources needed to set up a communications system adequate for one or two country offices with up to six sub-offices.
- The emergency preparedness framework, encompassing both policy and operational procedures, is currently under review.

📁 *Knowledge Base on Food Security and Food Aid*

119. One of the most important emergency management tools is the VAM system. WFP developed VAM to improve understanding of food security issues and to identify the most appropriate strategies for addressing food insecurity.
120. VAM takes into account such factors as seasonal differences, hunger at the community level and hunger at the household level; it is used by WFP decision-makers in the regional bureaux, in country offices and at Headquarters.
121. In 1999, the VAM Unit undertook a long-term quality improvement process intended to improve the overall effectiveness and usefulness of VAM analytical products and to enhance their integration into WFP major programme documents. In particular, WFP has designed a Standardized Analytical Framework, which incorporates best practices in secondary data analysis, participatory assessments, the use of geographic information systems and other analytical tools.
122. VAM is becoming an important advocacy tool for WFP in its efforts to mobilize governments and other agencies to work in critical areas of food insecurity. VAM maps are currently playing a key role in the global humanitarian response to the situation in Afghanistan, and it is clear that VAM will become an increasingly important part of WFP's work in future years.

Pillar 3: Resource Mobilization and Public Information

123. One of the key challenges in 1992–1995 was to establish fair and transparent policies for financing WFP's operational management and overhead costs. A new system, the R<F policy, came into effect in January 1996. In the following years, the priority was to

⁶² For example, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Danish Refugee Committee and Swiss Disaster Relief.



enhance the R<F approach and establish a broader and more robust basis for resource mobilization.

124. During this period, WFP established itself as a credible and widely heard voice on food aid issues through its public-information and media campaigns.

Resource Mobilization

125. As was pointed out in Chapter II, R<F policies were approved in 1995 and implemented in January 1996. There were, however, some outstanding issues, and in May 1998 the Executive Board decided to establish a working group to review the R<F policies. The report of the Working Group was approved by the Executive Board in 1999. It recommended a number of changes to improve the predictability, efficiency and flexibility of the existing policies, while retaining the principle of full-cost recovery by donor contribution. Since January 2000, a single indirect support cost (ISC) rate has been charged on all contributions, regardless of programme category.
126. The importance of these negotiations and policy agreements cannot be over-emphasized. The resourcing of WFP is extremely complex, involving different interests and administrative requirements of many Member States. Without a workable agreement, many of the other reforms in the decade-long change process could never have been achieved.
127. Once the R<F policy and models were successfully established, the attention of the Board and management turned to broader issues of resource mobilization.
128. In 1999, senior managers consulted with Member States to define a new resource mobilization strategy that would provide a more solid basis for resourcing the programmes. The aims were to broaden the donor base, maintain the multilateral nature of WFP and ensure greater predictability of resources. The resource mobilization strategy was approved by the Board in 2000 and is currently being implemented.
129. During the past few years, WFP has set up liaison offices in Brussels, Copenhagen, Washington and Yokohama. These, together with the inter-agency offices in New York and Geneva, play active roles in mobilizing resources. Efforts have been made to attract non-traditional donors, to carry out private-sector fundraising and to develop more long-term partnerships with traditional donors.
130. Resource mobilization at country and regional levels is also becoming a more important priority for the managers involved.

Public Information and Media Relations

131. Until the 1990s, the consensus within WFP was that promotion in the media was not necessary because WFP's donors already funded the organization generously. In 1992, the Executive Director decided to enhance and expand WFP's public affairs activities. Her vision of WFP as both a food aid organization and an advocate for the hungry poor required WFP to establish itself as a credible voice on food aid issues.
132. Between 1996 and 1998, WFP worked on branding the organization as fast, effective and efficient.⁶³ These messages appeared in all the materials produced by the Programme and were stressed by spokespersons talking to the media. In 1996, WFP embarked on its first series of public-service announcements for print and television.

⁶³ As part of this effort, the WFP logo was adapted to make it more consistent with United Nations logos.



133. With extensive media coverage during crises such as those in Kosovo and East Timor, WFP established itself among key external audiences. The Programme was often mentioned in the news, journalists increasingly requested interviews and WFP staff members began to regard media coverage positively. Perhaps most important, there was a self-reinforcing relationship between the increase in WFP's visibility and its funding from donors.
134. In 2001, as part of its efforts to create greater public awareness of global hunger, WFP developed the Hunger Map, which illustrated the extent of malnutrition in individual countries and regions of the world. The map has been distributed to government representatives and to teachers and schoolchildren in many countries around the world.
135. By 2002, WFP had come to be seen by many donors and major media as a credible source of information on hunger, especially in crisis situations, for example the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. The organization was regularly and positively referred to in the media, and among donors the Programme was synonymous with efficiency and effectiveness in providing critical food aid to the hungry poor.

Pillar 4: Staff and Managers

136. An early priority in 1992–1995 was to establish a robust management culture. The efforts associated with this commitment have continued since 1996, but with an increasing emphasis on leadership development and the expansion of senior management teams at Headquarters and in the field.
137. At the same time, WFP has heavily invested in *all* of its staff, seeking to build the expertise and commitment of staff and to create an environment that facilitates mobility. Considerable effort has gone into creating a diverse and gender-balanced workforce, particularly at management level, and to ensuring improved staff security.

📌 **Skilled, Experienced, and Motivated Staff**

138. Early on, WFP identified that it needed staff to have a solid grounding in emergency management skills, including logistics, procurement, personnel, finance and public relations, as well as a good understanding of development issues and programme design skills. Skills profiles were drawn up in all the main areas of competence required by WFP.
139. WFP actively recruited for these new skills and designed training programmes to fill the skills gaps of existing staff.⁶⁴ Hiring targets were set for the recruitment of international professional women and international professionals from developing countries.
140. Today, WFP believes that it has achieved a better balance of skills through its “re-profiling” skills training programme and the expansion of external recruitment rosters to 18 specific skills categories. WFP further feels that these profiles provide a sound basis for tracking individuals' career and skill development.⁶⁵
141. Training and staff development have played a crucial role in building the skills and the motivation of staff members.⁶⁶ In 1996, as part of the Executive Director's commitment to

⁶⁴ For a number of years, WFP has had a buy-out programme for staff who have not been able to come to terms with changing demands and expectations.

⁶⁵ Strategic and Financial Plan, 2002–2005 (WFP/EB.A/2001/5-B/1).

⁶⁶ At the beginning of the decade, training consisted almost exclusively of the so-called counterpart training.



training, she set up a Staff and Training Change Team, which was the basis for what became a comprehensive training strategy. During the past five years, WFP has invested considerably in training in terms of staff time and financial resources.

142. There have been comprehensive training programmes⁶⁷ in most aspects of WFP's work. In addition to participation in inter-agency training initiatives, staff members have attended in-house training programmes on security and safety of staff, information and communication technology, emergency response, the Enabling Development policy, gender, nutrition, and leadership and management.
143. Because of the nature and the location of their work, WFP staff members and their families are more likely to be involved in traumatic incidents and affected by high levels of stress. In an effort to provide psychological support to WFP staff, the Executive Director initiated a staff counselling programme in 1995.⁶⁸
144. In 2000, a Peer Support Volunteer Programme was established with confidential counselling and referral services for all WFP employees and family members. Ninety-six qualified peer support volunteers throughout WFP are available to provide appropriate support to colleagues and their families in times of emergency or stress.

Mobile Staff Able to Serve in All WFP Situations

145. The work done on recruitment, skills profiling and staff development has played an important part in WFP's goal of having a mobile workforce that can be deployed to different and sometimes very difficult field situations on very short notice. This is in addition to being able to move smoothly between positions at Headquarters and in the field.
146. Clear policies on mobility were established and implemented in a number of formal and informal ways.⁶⁹ Mobility is now mandatory for more than 90 percent of international professional posts; today, professional and managerial staff move between Headquarters and the field and between duty stations in the field. This enhances staff development and increases the versatility of the workforce.
147. Another step was to provide managers with broad exposure to different work settings, field posts and programmes. Through the recruitment, promotion and transfer process, WFP has given priority to bringing senior managers to Headquarters and transferring senior managers from Headquarters to the field. It has also insisted that prior relevant field experience be a prerequisite for promotion to the D-1 and D-2 positions, with very few exceptions. In 1996, there were just a handful of senior-level managers in the field. Today, there are almost 40 D-1 and D-2 level managers in country and regional offices, representing 50 percent of all D-1s and D-2s in the organization.
148. Overall, these changes have encouraged staff to take more responsibility for their careers and to see mobility as an important aim in itself. This has also brought about a remarkable transformation of the Headquarters-field divide, described in Chapter II.

⁶⁷ Many of these training programmes are described elsewhere in this report.

⁶⁸ Today there are seven WFP staff counsellors based in different regions, who travel extensively to provide assistance to troubled or traumatized staff.

⁶⁹ One contribution has been WFP's spouse employment policy that enables the organization to hire suitably qualified spouses provided that neither spouse reported directly to the other.



✧ *A Diverse and Balanced Workforce*

149. At one of her first CFA meetings, the Executive Director made clear her commitment to increasing significantly the proportion of women at the professional and managerial levels. WFP subsequently adopted the Secretary-General's goal that 50 percent of all professional staff should be women. The proportion of women among WFP's international professional staff increased from 17 percent in January 1992 to 39 percent in June 2001.
150. At management level there are more than eight times as many women at the P-5 level and above as there were in 1992—from 6 to 56, representing 28 percent of such positions. In January 1992, there were no women at the D-2 level or above. Today there are six women D-2s, one Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) and one Undersecretary-General (USG) (the Executive Director), representing 29 percent of such positions.
151. Another objective set by management has been to increase the percentage of staff from developing countries. The target is currently 40 percent, which has been met and exceeded in the past two years. A remaining challenge is to increase the number of professional staff from under-represented donor countries.
152. Throughout this period, WFP has stressed the need to hire national staff rather than significantly increase the number of international staff. Such a policy has helped to build national capacity, reduce operating costs and provide more opportunities to hire qualified women, as well contributing to programme continuity and institutional memory.

✧ *Security for Staff*

153. Staff security has been one of the Executive Director's main concerns over the past ten years. WFP staff work in difficult and dangerous situations. Staff members have lost their lives through acts of violence, aircraft have been fired on, staff have been intimidated at checkpoints and roadblocks, and relief convoys have been hijacked and ambushed. Between 1992 and 2002, 56 staff members died in the line of duty.⁷⁰
154. WFP has given very high priority to the security issue inside and outside the organization. It has taken an active role in raising the issue of staff security, especially those who work in conflict areas or war zones. The Executive Director has spoken before the United Nations Security Council and in other fora, with the result that the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) has been strengthened by the United Nations General Assembly.
155. Inside the organization, a Security Unit and a Field Security Task Force were created to provide a forum for talks regarding security-related issues. As a result, new policies, procedures and training programmes have been instituted.
156. The Security Awareness Training Programme became mandatory for all WFP staff in 1999 and workshops have been conducted across all regions. Since the beginning of this initiative, more than 8,000 WFP staff members and partners have been trained by 72 internal trainers.⁷¹
157. In 2000, an IASC Staff Security Task Force, chaired by WFP, developed new arrangements for United Nations–NGO field collaboration on security for humanitarian workers. The same year, with increased security capabilities both at Headquarters and

⁷⁰ In the 30 years before 1992, two staff members lost their lives in the line of duty.

⁷¹ In five languages: English, French, Arabic, Spanish and Russian.



field-office levels, security guards' involvement and responsibility became more diversified.

✧ *Building a Robust Management Culture*

158. In 1992, managers tended to focus on the management of food rather than on the management of people. One of WFP's first priorities was to establish a definition of management that included specific roles and responsibilities:

- acquiring a sound knowledge base on all aspects of food aid operations and any relevant specialist area;
- thinking strategically about opportunities, constraints and priorities;
- empowering, inspiring, motivating and encouraging staff;
- managing performance, developing staff and handling unacceptable performance;
- taking decisions on the main policy, strategic, management and financial aspects of operations, programmes and services;
- delegating decision-making authority and accountability; and
- showing personal integrity and self-mastery.

✧ *Management and Leadership Development*

159. Over the past five years, WFP has trained more than 300 managers. This training started at senior management level, where the focus was on leadership; next, mid-level managers received training that focused on management skills. WFP is now training more junior professional officers in basic supervisory skills.

160. This training programme, complemented through workshops and coaching, has increased WFP's management capacity and created opportunities to increase communication throughout the organization. WFP has emphasized the use of 360-degree feedback questionnaires⁷² that provided individual managers with insights into their own management styles and practices. Used throughout the organization, the process also serves to improve communication between managers and staff.

✧ *Management Teams*

161. A key part of the efforts to enhance WFP's management culture was the emphasis on building management teams at various levels that would think strategically together, formulate decisions and ensure a collegial and disciplined approach to the implementation of those decisions.

162. In 2000, the Executive Director, recognizing that many WFP managers were under-graded in relation to their responsibilities and to the relative grades of counterparts in other United Nations agencies, sought and received the Board's approval to upgrade

⁷²The 360-degree feedback questionnaires provide managers with feedback on how they are perceived by their supervisors and staff in terms of management and leadership behaviour. These questionnaires have been used in all the leadership and management workshops organized since 1997 and were administered to all senior managers a second time at the Global Meeting at Tunis in 1999.



many existing posts. New senior management posts, including one at the level of Assistant Executive Director, were created at this time.⁷³

163. As a result, new institutional arrangements were established in 2001. A small Executive Group⁷⁴ was set up to act as the senior management team for key operational and management decisions. This was complemented by the Executive Staff,⁷⁵ which comprised the Executive Group plus 15 senior managers. The Executive Staff deals with the broad strategic, policy and managerial issues facing WFP.⁷⁶ In addition, management teams were created within each department, division, bureau and country office.

📌 **Organizational Culture**

164. The nurturing of WFP's organizational culture has been a constant preoccupation of senior management since the beginning of the 1990s. This focus reflects the fact that true transformation will occur only when new principles and behaviours are embedded in the organizational culture.
165. Management knows full well that cultures cannot be decreed or engineered. For that reason, management has avoided formalizing lists of organizational values that every staff member has to practise. But it has nevertheless consciously sought to inculcate basic principles into every aspect of the work of WFP. It is too early to assess the changes in the culture, but there are some indicators of success: the frequently expressed pride of the staff in being part of WFP, the impact of gender commitments in terms of programmes and staffing patterns and the extraordinary solidarity shown recently during major tragedies experienced by the organization and by individuals within it.

Pillar 5: Organizational Design

166. Throughout the change process, management has been preoccupied with establishing a structure that would facilitate and enhance WFP's ability to work in field environments that are increasingly unpredictable and fast moving. The new vision for WFP contained the basis for radical change in the way WFP was designed and organized. The basic characteristics of the approach were described in the document *Preparing WFP for the Future*:

WFP needs in the field experienced, senior managers able to think strategically, to be communicators and mobilizers, take greater responsibility, manage teams and stand accountable for management of the allocated resources and for achievement of results.

Even the most experienced manager cannot do this alone. He/she needs appropriate support capacity in financial management, human resource management, logistics procurement, administration, media and resource mobilization.

⁷³ The increase in the number of D-2s also helped WFP to place a significant number of its D-2s in the field.

⁷⁴ This group comprises the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director, the two Assistant Executive Directors and the Director of the Office of the Executive Director.

⁷⁵ The Executive Staff is composed of 20 members; 13 were with WFP before 1992; 11 are from developing countries and 9 are from developed countries; 13 are male and 7 are female.

⁷⁶ The Executive Staff meets four times a year: one annual retreat and three working sessions immediately after a Board meeting, plus occasional teleconferences.



The large numbers and uneven sizes of our Country Programmes do not permit us to build up this capacity in every country office, nor to appoint senior, experienced managers to run each of them. And our more senior managers will sometimes be needed in particularly difficult emergency operations.

Neither does our country office structure facilitate a coordinated approach to complex emergencies. Flexible structures that can transcend national boundaries and that can be set up and dismantled easily and rapidly would meet our needs better than our present self-standing country offices.

We need a field structure that is both more flexible and more able to carry the increased authority and responsibility to be shifted to the field.⁷⁷

📁 Cluster Offices

167. A new organizational concept for the field was introduced, based on clusters of countries placed under the responsibility of experienced regional managers. These regional offices enabled the organization to position senior managers closer to field operations, thereby facilitating decision-making and encouraging regional programmes. They represented the first stage in the *decentralization* process.
168. Starting in 1997, WFP created 13 cluster offices.⁷⁸ These offices provided technical programme support and managerial guidance to the country offices in their cluster. To make this possible, specialist functions were *devolved* to the field in such areas as programming, logistics, procurement, public information, financial management and human resources management.
169. The cluster offices also directly managed operations involving regional and cross-border relief. Cluster offices were designed so that they could be re-aligned or dismantled flexibly, thus giving WFP the option of selecting rapidly the most appropriate organizational structure to meet the needs of the situation.

📁 Empowerment of the Country Office

170. The establishment of cluster offices was intended to support, not undermine, the country office, which remained a key organizational unit in the field. The process of building WFP's capacity in the country office has continued, and in 1998 the WFP Country Director became the WFP Representative.⁷⁹ WFP is gradually taking over all management and administrative functions handled by UNDP.
171. Country Directors were given increased *delegated* authority to approve expenditures on emergency operations and to take decisions on the hiring of staff and consultants and procurement contracts. Delegation of authority to Country Directors was further stepped up in the areas of programme approval, logistics, procurement, finance and resource mobilization.
172. Country Directors have successfully expanded their roles in such areas as:

⁷⁷ Preparing WFP for the Future, op. cit.

⁷⁸ Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Islamabad, Kampala, Lima, Managua, Maputo, Nairobi, New Delhi, Ouagadougou, Pristina and Yaoundé.

⁷⁹ In 1995, it was agreed that WFP should have its own representative (CFA/40). The changes were made in the General Regulations in 1997 and came into effect in 1998.



- the knowledge base of food aid and food security;
- local advocacy activities;
- local resource mobilization and improved communication with donors in general;
- building of strategic partnerships;
- preparation of various planning documents; and
- management of emergency programmes and development food aid programmes.

✧ *Decentralization of the Regional Bureaux*

173. In 1998, many decentralization activities were still incomplete, for example in the areas of normative guidance and financial and information management systems. Nevertheless, it was clear that the decision to empower the field through devolution, delegation and decentralization was proving successful. In terms of organizational design, the one outstanding question was the future of the regional bureaux.
174. In 1996, there were strong concerns that the creation of cluster offices would mean an additional and unnecessary management level, and questions were asked regarding the role of regional bureaux. On the other hand, it was argued strongly that regional bureaux were needed in Headquarters in times of complex emergencies and would certainly be required while change initiatives were being implemented.
175. In late 1998, WFP decided to experiment with the out-posting from Rome of two regional bureaux.⁸⁰ These bureaux were chosen because they covered regions that had a major focus on development at that time. This experience proved very positive and led to a debate on the possibility of out-posting all the regional bureaux to the field or merging the regional bureaux and the cluster offices, except where there was a real and temporary need to maintain a cluster office.
176. The cluster offices had proved to be successful, but it was felt that the Programme could not afford two regional layers in the long term. It therefore seemed logical to increase the number of regional bureaux, merge most of the cluster offices into the regional bureaux and have them all based in the field.
177. The decision to move the regional bureaux to the field was thus a logical extension of the vision announced in 1996 and indeed a vindication of the decision to establish the cluster offices. By increasing the number of regional bureaux and by placing them in the field, WFP integrated the two concepts.
178. By September 2001, the decentralization of the Rome-based regional bureaux to the field⁸¹ was complete. Eleven of the former 13 regional cluster offices were closed.⁸²
179. It was agreed that each regional bureau would have a target of 16 core-funded international staff, which would include the regional director and his or her deputy,

⁸⁰ Middle East/North Africa Regional Bureau in Cairo and the Latin America/Caribbean Regional Bureau in Managua.

⁸¹ The additional bureaux were: West Africa (Dakar), Central Africa (Yaoundé), Eastern/Southern Africa (Kampala), Asia (Bangkok) and Eastern Europe (temporarily to Rome).

⁸² Only the Islamabad and Maputo Regional Cluster Offices were maintained, for operational and technical support purposes, especially in programming, logistics and information and communication technology. The Lima office was designated an outposted centre for resource mobilization, with the special role of raising awareness and mobilizing greater support for WFP in Latin America and the Caribbean.



programme advisers and support officers specialising in logistics, commodity pipeline management, human resources, finance and administration, procurement, public information and information/communications technology.

✦ *A New Orientation for Headquarters*

180. The devolution, delegation and decentralization measures initiated in 1996 had profound implications for the role of Headquarters. Headquarters was restructured in 1996, and a number of structural refinements have been carried out since then with the aim of gearing it to its new roles of providing normative guidance, advice and support.⁸³ The move to a new Headquarters building in the late 1990s significantly improved both the facilities and morale.

181. Headquarters divisions embarked during this period on the development of systems, procedures, tools and guidelines to help managers assume their responsibilities and reduce the need to control individual transactions and decisions. This has included greater efforts to establish standards and to ensure that these standards are respected through audit and evaluation reports, the monitoring of programme quality and organizational learning.

Pillar 6: Systems, Processes and Technology

182. The need to overhaul and strengthen all WFP's systems and technological infrastructure was clearly established early in the 1990s. WFP responded to these pressures mainly via the FMIP. This Programme, launched in 1995, was designed to give managers more accurate and relevant information, leading to faster and more effective decision-making. With the introduction of the WFP Information Network Global System (WINGS), FMIP is now complete.

✦ *Streamlining Procedures and Developing Guidelines*

183. Between August 1996 and February 1997, an organizational change team worked on a wide range of organizational processes, seeking to identify ways of streamlining and simplifying them. Many of the suggestions of this and other organizational change teams were eventually incorporated into FMIP.

184. Over the past six years, a consistent effort has been made to simplify processes and procedures and to codify them in the form of tools and guidelines.⁸⁴ These have been vital in the effort to establish the correct way to do things, to ensure consistency and to inculcate the habit of recording best practices.

✦ *The Evolution of FMIP*

185. The background to the establishment of FMIP has been described in Chapter II. FMIP started in 1995 as a financial initiative to improve WFP's financial management capability,

⁸³ Since 1996, there have been some adaptations to the Headquarters structure, particularly in the Operations Department. In 2001, with the appointment of a second Assistant Executive Director, the Administration Department was created, comprising the human resources, financial services, management services and information/communication technology functions.

⁸⁴ These include the Programme Design Manual (2000), which now encompasses the Project Budget Planning Guide (2001), the Non-Food Items Procurement Manual (1999), the Transport and Logistics Manual (1998), the Country Office Accounting Guide (1998), the Commodity Monitoring Processing and Analysis System and the Resource Mobilization System.



in particular its ability to account for and report on the use of the resources at WFP's disposal⁸⁵ in an accurate and a timely manner.

186. It later became apparent, however, that WFP's information systems were unable to keep up with such realities as the rapid growth in its activities, changes in financial regulations and policies, increasing reporting requirements by donors and the need to introduce more modern information technology and telecommunications capacity. FMIP was therefore reformulated to address these short and long-term issues with tactical and strategic systems and solutions.
187. More detailed planning of the components of FMIP resulted in the development of a phased implementation of FMIP. This involved improving the outdated legacy systems and developing some tactical systems to allow WFP to achieve immediate improvements and meet information requirements while long-term strategic systems were being designed and developed. As a result, all the legacy-related and tactical systems, including the physical infrastructures, were completed by the end of 1998. The design and development of the strategic systems began in 1999.
188. The strategic system was envisioned to include financial management, procurement and human resource management, resource mobilization, programming, project management, transport and commodity-tracking processes. An extensive evaluation of different business options led to the choice of Systems, Applications, Products (SAP) as the principal solution.
189. Based on SAP, the WFP Information Network and Global System is an integrated enterprise solution for all WFP's core business processes. It is an end-to-end information system for project management from idea planning through implementation to closure that includes accounting of costs and consistency between fund management and project cost structures, human resource management from recruitment to termination and extensive reporting and analysis.
190. WINGS went live in February 2001,⁸⁶ except for the human resources and payroll functions. These functions are expected to go live in January 2002.
191. However difficult the design, development and completion of WINGS may have been, WFP's management, the project teams and the implementing partner feel that WINGS, which is the final outcome of FMIP, is a success story in the United Nations common system.
192. WINGS empowers all managers to have at their fingertips the status of their budgets, projects, commodities pipeline and so on, so that they can make more appropriate decisions in a timely manner. It also provides every WFP staff member with easier access to the information they need for their work.
193. WINGS does, however, call for extensive changes in the way that work is done in the organization. There are still many challenges to resolve in terms of work practices, outdated procedures and attitudes to the new systems.

Telecommunications

194. In the mid-1990s, because of the nature of its emergency response activities, particularly those in Africa, WFP developed its own communications systems. The Deep Field Mailing

⁸⁵ FMIP Progress Report, October 1996.

⁸⁶ Financially, it started on 1 January 2001.



System (DFMS), for example, custom-designed for conditions in Eastern Africa, operates via high frequency and has since become a standard for humanitarian organizations. The system is cost effective, mobile and user friendly; it has even been replicated by a number of commercial operators.

195. For monitoring food and personnel movements, WFP's information systems now permit effective management of real-time information that can be distributed or accessed anywhere in the world. In the majority of countries where WFP is present, standardized information systems are now deployed to track food movements and storage capacity, implement and monitor financial transactions, optimize the use of donor resources and communicate effectively with partners. For many field offices, and in the absence of public infrastructure, this network offers a seamless worldwide communications system, and is one of the largest available to the international humanitarian community.

Pillar 7: Accountability and Oversight

196. The need to ensure sound and credible approaches to accountability and oversight was one of the earliest challenges of the change process. In the past decade, WFP has focused on establishing and strengthening key oversight mechanisms. In the latter part of the decade, the Programme has placed increasing emphasis on sharing lessons and helping managers to learn from their experiences and translate their new learning into changed behaviour.

Accountability

197. There has been considerable improvement in the development of accountability systems, but progress has not been as fast as hoped. This is partly because the new financial management and information systems are not yet fully in place. More important, it takes time, particularly in a decentralized field-based organization, to establish an accountability and management culture based on transparent and effective systems for monitoring and evaluating programmes, for providing accurate and timely reports, and for effective learning.

Oversight

198. During the latter part of the 1990s, the audit and investigation initiatives of 1994 and 1995 were implemented and consolidated. In 1999, WFP introduced a further innovation in developing and implementing an Audit Tracking System, unique in the United Nations, that enhanced recording, analysis, monitoring and reporting on all audit findings and recommendations.
199. The oversight functions have improved internal communication on the recurring and systemic issues identified during investigations and audits with a view to encouraging remedial action and learning.
200. The function of evaluation in WFP underwent important changes in the latter part of the 1990s. Although evaluation was always considered an essential component and key management tool in WFP's project cycle, WFP country offices have often been slow to embrace it as a useful management tool and as a learning opportunity for the future.
201. A number of initiatives have been undertaken since 1998 to establish a closer relationship between evaluation recommendations and operational practice. To improve the implementation of programmes, projects and operations, a system was put in place to monitor how managers applied recommendations. Standard performance indicators were established to move the organization towards outcome-oriented monitoring, reporting and



evaluation. Throughout WFP, country office monitoring staff have been linked through a monitoring and evaluation network based on e-mail.

202. Evaluation, audit and investigation developed throughout the 1990s as relatively independent services. At the end of the decade, the Executive Director decided to strengthen and increase coordination and synergy among them by creating a new Division of Oversight Services to formalize the relationship among the three existing offices.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ The Director of the Division also exercises the key function of Inspector General, providing information and reporting directly to the Executive Director to further elevate the importance of improved oversight and accountability.



CHAPTER V: REFLECTIONS AND ONGOING CHALLENGES

Reflections on the Change Process

203. The preceding chapters have shown that WFP has been through substantial and wide-ranging changes during the past ten years. These changes have absorbed a significant amount of the time and energy of WFP managers and staff over a long period. To put it simply, has the change process been worth it?

✧ *What Would Have Happened if WFP Had Not Engaged in Its Process of Change?*

204. The answers are fairly clear. First, the pressure of the massive emergencies during the decade has been enormous. A less resilient, less effective organization would have buckled under the strain. Its attractiveness to donors for emergency programmes would have been diminished and its emergency funding would have decreased significantly. Since WFP is a voluntarily funded organization, the implications would have been serious. Second, it would probably have lost even more of its development programmes, which might have threatened its dual mandate of development and emergencies.

✧ *Was the Enormous Effort Necessary?*

205. If organizations do not invest heavily in change, change simply does not happen. It is not possible to empower managers of remote emergency operations without establishing local support functions and state-of-the-art management information systems. Similarly, it is not wise to decentralize an organization without agreeing on a unifying purpose, strategies and policies. And it is not possible to attract and retain excellent staff without investing in training, career support and mobility. Organizational change is a substantial, all-encompassing endeavour, and intensive efforts are essential to success.

✧ *Was It a Good Investment?*

206. The major expense of the change programme was the funding for FMIP/WINGS. These initiatives cost some US\$40 million,⁸⁸ with virtually all the other change initiatives, including a very comprehensive training programme, covered by overheads—in other words, the PSA budget.

207. These numbers do not, however, tell the whole story. Given the serious state of WFP's management, financial and information systems in the early 1990s and the shift in emphasis from development to emergencies, immediate action was absolutely essential. Furthermore, with the size of WFP, as well as the new demands on it and donors' requirements, the investment in new systems would have happened even without the change process. And finally, *all* WFP programmes would have suffered immeasurably had these costs not been incurred.

⁸⁸ In May 1999, the Executive Board agreed to allow the use of General Fund resources to cover the FMIP funding shortfall. Thus far, US\$20.8 million has been raised from a combination of direct donor contributions, WFP resources and interest income generated in the FMIP Special Account, indicating a shortfall to be covered from the General Fund of about US\$16.2 million. (WFP/EB.1/20001/INF/13.)



📌 *Were the Right Decisions Taken?*

208. Apart from deciding to invest in FMIP/WINGS, another important decision was the decentralization of the regional bureaux. Decentralization must be viewed as a cornerstone in the overall change process. One of the key objectives of the change process was to bring senior managers, programme and administrative staff closer to the beneficiaries so that decisions would be better informed and programmes more effective. Decentralization has achieved this.
209. The real cost⁸⁹ of decentralization has been the time and energy that managers and staff have dedicated to getting the new approach off the ground. While this investment has been considerable and although the benefits are intangible, they bring the final strands of the change process together. In so doing, they also force Headquarters to abandon its traditional central decision-making style and to assume new roles and behaviours.

Ongoing Challenges in the Change Process

210. The change process of the 1990s, led by the Executive Director, has already resulted in significant achievements in organizational responsiveness and management effectiveness. Now that the culture of constructive change is well established, the achievements of today are making way for the challenges of tomorrow.
211. The challenges described below will critically affect the ongoing change process and the WFP of the future. Underlying all eight challenges is the importance of keeping the needs of people—both the beneficiaries of WFP programmes and WFP’s own staff—at the centre of the change process. Change is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Designing and implementing the mechanisms of change must not be allowed to overshadow the vision and soul of WFP: helping the hungry poor.

📌 *Challenge 1: Fine-tuning the Resourcing and Financing System*

212. WFP needs the right people, the right knowledge and the right strategies to help the hungry poor. But it also has to have the financial resources to carry out its programmes.
213. In close consultation with the Executive Board, WFP needs to reflect on its current R<F system and adapt it to meet new challenges. Such adaptation should be consistent with WFP’s commitment to cost-effectiveness, of which the organization is justly proud and which its donors demand. In this regard, a number of ideas are being explored in order further to streamline operations and to improve budget estimates so that actual expenditures can be more accurately anticipated.

📌 *Challenge 2: Sustaining Empowerment and Cohesion*

214. While much has been achieved in terms of empowering country offices, it is necessary to be on the alert for inadvertent tightening of controls by Headquarters or by the outposted regional bureaux.
215. At the same time, vigilance is needed to ensure that empowerment of the six field-based regional bureaux does not result in the creation of six separate, miniature WFPs. Rather, the regional bureaux and Headquarters have to work closely with one another to achieve the goals of one WFP through a standard and consistent global approach.

⁸⁹ There have, of course, been special costs in setting up the regional bureaux. However, the regional bureaux are outposted from Headquarters and the move was “staff-neutral”—in other words, there were no staff increases as a result.



216. WFP will also have to ensure that the physical separation of its senior managers dispersed throughout the world does not result in a total loss of face-to-face time. Not all decision-making can be done through reports, e-mail or even audio-visual conferencing. Meetings, workshops and retreats, which nurture collegiality and team-building, must occur regularly.
217. Clear definitions of the linkages, roles and responsibilities of Headquarters and the field in new and high-profile emergencies,⁹⁰ particularly at their onset, remains a major challenge for WFP in light of decentralization.
218. It is also essential to maintain the rotation of managers and staff between Headquarters and the field as one of the ways of ensuring the cohesion of WFP in a decentralized environment.

📌 **Challenge 3: Mastering New Roles at Headquarters**

219. The change process has meant a fundamental transformation in the role of Headquarters. Adapting Headquarters structures and procedures to the new realities of a truly field-based operational structure is an immediate challenge.
220. The culture in Headquarters has to adapt to reflect the two main tasks of the *centre* in a decentralized organization. First, Headquarters must provide strategic and normative guidance to ensure global coherence in WFP policy. Second, it must provide customer-oriented, flexible and efficient services in such areas as budgeting, human resources, financial management, procurement and logistics. These services have to be genuinely supportive of the line manager in the field.
221. Some of the key challenges for Headquarters are:
- continuing to develop tools and normative guidance on all aspects of operations, administration and management;
 - ensuring that WFP continues to develop core knowledge and expertise in key substantive areas, such as needs assessment and nutrition;
 - developing more technical and substantive networks that transcend organizational boundaries, enabling specialist groups⁹¹ to share knowledge, learn together and provide mutual support;
 - engaging the field in the development of policies and new tools, without overloading them with requests for information and consultation;
 - facilitating the communication of information, knowledge and ideas throughout the organization;
 - reviewing, streamlining and possibly combining the programming and budgeting functions; and
 - creating a collective corporate memory, perhaps the challenge that many decentralized organizations have the most trouble addressing.

⁹⁰ For example, the current situation in Afghanistan.

⁹¹ The Transport and Logistics Division is currently developing some innovative approaches in this area.



📌 **Challenge 4: Keeping the Focus on Staff and Managers**

222. Meeting all of these challenges requires a systematic approach to developing people within WFP. A career-management system is essential to an integrated approach to training, staff rotation and workforce planning that ensures that current and future staff will learn throughout their career the skills they need to meet current future challenges. This approach to career management should not be limited to international staff; the needs and aspirations of national staff must also be a central concern.
223. WFP must be able to identify potential field managers and nurture their careers through careful assignment, training and support. Efforts in the area of leadership development must be continued and enhanced so that a robust management culture is finally achieved, based on effective performance management.
224. Communication remains a major challenge for WFP. Senior management has recognized the importance of communicating with staff from the very beginning. While the level of information sharing has grown exponentially, WFP has not yet been able to ensure that effective communication systems are in place throughout the organization.
225. The challenge remains of ensuring a gender-balanced and geographically diverse workforce, especially at senior levels. There is more work to be done on recruitment, human resources administrative systems and contractual arrangements for international and national staff. Staff security remains an overriding concern.

📌 **Challenge 5: Integrating Results-based Thinking**

226. A strategic framework for a results-based approach is in place in WFP. The immediate focus should be on developing results-based management and reporting tools that the field can use. They should be designed and implemented so that the mechanics of the tools do not divert staff energy from their core work.
227. At a strategic level, the Programme must remain true to its dual mandate for both development and emergencies. This requires stronger linkages between lessons learned in emergencies and those learned while carrying out the Enabling Development initiative. In this way, WFP can show that the dual mandate is a unified mandate that makes WFP stronger in both areas of its operations. It also implies a continued expansion of VAM as the key tool in building WFP's knowledge base in all countries.
228. The new results-based management, planning and reporting tools and the change in culture implied by results-based thinking will take a considerable amount of the time and energy of senior management and staff during the next five years.

📌 **Challenge 6: Strengthening WFP's Advocacy Role**

229. WFP's strategic plans have made advocacy on behalf of the hungry poor a central organizational goal. There have been some interesting and important initiatives, especially at country level. Best practices need to be identified and shared, and the capacity of country offices to carry out advocacy needs to be strengthened.
230. At the institutional level, however, the Programme needs to develop further a shared understanding of, and agreement on, the various elements of WFP's advocacy such as public information activities, policy support and advice to governments.



📌 **Challenge 7: Strengthening the Knowledge Base on the Hungry Poor**

231. To be effective over the long term, WFP staff must be fluent in country-specific knowledge of the status of the hungry poor: who they are, where they are and why they are hungry. With this information, WFP can target its own resources, act as an advocate to convince governments to direct their resources to the hungry poor and influence donors, NGOs and others to do the same. It may be possible for WFP to take up this role even in poor countries where it does not have any operations. VAM is, of course, the essential tool.

📌 **Challenge 8: Maintaining the Momentum of Change**

232. Managers and staff feel they are under increasing stress as they struggle both to deliver effective programmes and bring about complex organizational change. They are expected to develop new expertise in many different areas, to contribute to the development of new systems, processes and tools and to adopt a leadership mindset in their work. Future change processes should therefore give staff time to consolidate and internalize changes while maintaining the momentum of the change process. This approach requires the continuing and robust commitment of all senior management.

233. Change fatigue is to be expected, and managers need to set aside time to listen to staff, invite feedback and, if necessary, work with staff to adapt the change process. The more that staff members are involved in the implementation of change, the greater the chances of success.

📌 **A Final Challenge**

The Successful Leadership Transition for the Organization During 2002.

The Prerequisites for Success

234. The WFP experience has shown that fundamental change and transformation are possible in a United Nations agency. Such change is not easy, and it sometimes takes years before the results of change are evident in programme performance.

235. WFP's experience suggests that there are several prerequisites for success.

- There has to be unequivocal, proactive and committed leadership from the executive head of the agency. This must be accompanied by strong and active ownership and involvement by all senior managers. The support of the governing body is equally essential.
- The change process must be grounded in the active participation of staff from the very beginning. Staff must feel that they co-own the process and that their contribution will have an impact. It is therefore essential to communicate the case for change from the start, focusing on the need for change, the consequences of not changing and the benefits that change brings.
- Change must be driven by a holistic vision of the new organization, together with a flexible and sound change strategy.
- The organization must invest in change, ensuring that the necessary energy and resources are provided at the right time.
- Finally, it is important to combine "quick wins" with longer-term systemic solutions. The organization must demonstrate to staff immediately that change is working while



quietly solving systemic problems via new strategies, systems, structures and competencies.

236. Change is a continuous process. To remain relevant and effective, WFP must be committed to learning and to strengthening its own capacity, while constantly adapting to external challenges and demands.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Executive Director's Documents on Organizational Change

*Remarks of the Executive Director of the World Food Programme to the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes.*⁹²

Preparing WFP for the Future—An Organization to meet our Mandate, July 1996.

Implementing Organizational Change, 24 February 1997.

Headquarters Reorganization (Executive Director's memorandum ED97/18.26.97).

Organizational Change at WFP (Executive Director's Circular ED97/018).

CFA and Executive Board Documents

Review of WFP Policies, Objectives and Strategies (CFA 37/P/7, 7 April 1994).

WFP's Mission Statement (CFA 38/P/5, December 1994).

Audited WFP Biennial Accounts 1992–93, Financial Report and Statement (CFA 38/12, December 1994).

Reform and Revitalization Measures (WFP/EB.A/96/6/Rev.1).

Reform and Revitalization Measures in WFP (WFP/EB.A/97/5-B).

Guide to WFP's Resource and Long-Term Financing Policies (WFP/EB.3/99/INF/18).

Organizational Change at WFP—A Status Report (WFP/EB.1/99/3-B).

Report of the Working Group on Governance (WFP/EB.A/2000/4-D).

Follow-up to the Executive Board Decision 2000/EB.A/6 on Governance (WFP/EB.3/2000/3-A).

A Resource Mobilization Strategy for the World Food Programme (WFP/EB.3/2000/3-B).

Status Report on WFP's Decentralization (WFP/EB.3/2001/11-B).

Guidelines for the Meetings of the Executive Board of WFP (WFP/EB.1/2001/4-B).

WFP Annual Reports.

Internal Reports on Organizational Change

Update on Organizational Change at WFP. Joslyn, D., 11 September 1998.

Making Decentralization Work: The Report on Decentralization and the Workflow of Country Programmes, EMOPs, PRROs and Development Projects. International Resource Group, 2000.

⁹² Many of the Executive Director's statements and reports to the CFA and the Executive Board contain important information on the change process.



Background Documents

Evaluation of the World Food Programme (Bergen, Norway, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994).

Improving Financial Management Information Systems (Rome, McKinsey & Company Inc., 1994).

The World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid. Shaw, D.J. (Wiltshire, UK, Anthony Rowe Ltd., 2000).



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ACABQ	United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ALITE	WFP's Augmenting Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies
AMP	Accountability Management Project
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CFA	Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes
CP	Country Programme
CSO	Country Strategy Outline
DFMS	Deep Field Mailing System
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECHA	Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	food for work
FITTEST	Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Systems
FMIP	Financial Management Improvement Programme
IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IEFR	International Emergency Food Reserve
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGC	Intergovernmental Committee
ISC	Indirect support cost
LDC	Least developed country
LIFDC	Low-income, food-deficit country
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PROs	Displaced Persons Operations
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation
R<F	WFP's Resource and Long-term Financing
SAP	Systems, Applications, Products
SFP	Strategic and Financial Plan
SO	Special operations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework



UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
VAM	Vulnerability analysis and mapping
WINGS	WFP Information Network Global System

