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
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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS 6077.00 AND 6077.01—GREAT LAKES REGION

**Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in the Great
Lakes Region**

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Note to the Executive Board



This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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Executive Summary

Since 1995, through a series of regional emergency operations (EMOPs) and two phases of a regional protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO), WFP has cumulatively committed more than US\$1 billion to the Great Lakes Region. In budgetary terms, the Great Lakes operation is currently WFP's largest PRRO. The current 18-month PRRO expansion phase covers four countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania) and provides assistance to an estimated 1.12 million beneficiaries, with an approved budget of US\$167 million.

Overall, the PRRO has been effective in helping maintain favourable nutritional status for beneficiaries targeted under its relief and protracted refugee components. However, food supply and delivery problems at times contributed to transitory increases in malnutrition rates among the populations assisted by the PRRO in late 2000. Restricted access in many parts of Burundi has also tended to limit opportunities for reaching nutritionally at risk populations.

The PRRO's recovery strategy assumed an orderly and quick transition from relief distribution to increased support for recovery-based programming. This has not proven to be realistic. With an unfavourable operating environment, and limited resources, the PRRO has had to continue prioritizing relief, at the expense of its recovery objectives. Increased earmarking of contributions for specific countries has also tended to prevent reallocations in favour of recovery, even when relief stocks cannot be distributed.

The regional approach seeks to enhance disaster preparedness and to provide flexibility for responding to unforeseen crises. Although poor resourcing performance (including a lack of commitments to regional contingency reserve during the first PRRO phase, 6077.00) tended to limit the extent to which this objective could effectively be met, the evaluation ultimately favours the continued use of a regional approach. Such an approach is the most appropriate for the highly complex and unpredictable regional environment. It enhances flexibility and facilitates forward planning through regional logistics and pipeline management. Regional backstopping (i.e. support) has also proven to be useful for smaller country offices.

The evaluation has made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the regional implementation processes for the PRRO, including the strengthening of regional reporting systems, more qualitative post-distribution monitoring of outcomes, and reinforced regional-level backstopping for country offices.

Draft Decision

The Board notes the recommendations contained in this evaluation report (WFP/EB.3/2002/6/10) and the management action taken so far, as indicated in the associated information paper (WFP/EB.3/2002/INF/20). The Board encourages further action on these recommendations, with considerations raised during the discussions taken into account.



EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHOD

1. An evaluation team¹ of four visited the Great Lakes Region between 23 February and 28 March 2002, with the purpose of evaluating the regional PRRO from its inception through to the present.
2. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of WFP assistance to the Great Lakes Region. It also sought to provide inputs and recommendations for the formulation of the next phase of the PRRO, in order to enhance understanding of the usefulness of the PRRO category and the regional approach.
3. The team adopted a combination of methods, including content and gender analysis of programme documents, key informant interviews using structured questionnaires for data triangulation, and site-visit checklists.
4. The team undertook country office and field visits in each of the four countries and held interviews with country office staff and implementing partners (IPs) in order to gain their perspectives and learn about their experiences. A workshop with Country Directors and bureau staff was held in Kampala to help finalize the initial evaluation findings and to build consensus on key follow-up issues related to the next phase.

WFP'S REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE GREAT LAKES CRISIS

5. At the onset of the regional political and social crisis, which accompanied the escalation of civil war in Burundi in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda a year later, WFP provided emergency assistance to refugees on a country-by-country basis. Beginning in April 1995, however, a regional EMOP mechanism was devised. The rationale for this related to the growing recognition that since the beneficiaries were affected by a single regional conflict, a regional approach offered a more neutral channel for providing food assistance in such a politically charged environment. As noted in a 1997 EMOP document, "in a region replete with ethnic tensions, the maintenance of impartiality in the provision of food assistance must be central to the regional programme strategy".
6. In January 1999, the Executive Board approved the first regional PRRO, for a two-year period and with an approved budget of US\$269 million. In February 2001, a second 18-month expansion was approved, with a total budget of US\$167 million. The current expansion runs until January 2003 and assists some 1.12 million people in four countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania).

¹ The mission was composed of a WFP Evaluation Officer/team leader, a socio-economist (consultant), a nutritionist (consultant) and a geographer/environmental specialist (consultant). The full mission report is available in English.



THE RECOVERY STRATEGY

7. There are two main elements of the PRRO recovery strategy:
 - a gradual phasing-out of free distributions towards more targeted approaches, including food-assisted recovery activities; and
 - a short-term exit strategy of one year or less for recovery activities.
8. Recovery in the Great Lakes is not a straightforward process. The PRRO operates within a highly complex mosaic of micro-environments, or a patchwork of sub-national frameworks within which opportunities for recovery tend to emerge suddenly, only to slide quickly back into relief. Differing national policy frameworks related to recovery, the need for complex implementing partner arrangements and unpredictable security conditions, including a plethora of United Nations and government rules, all impose severe restrictions on staff movements and complicate the overall recovery picture. This complex operating environment makes the Great Lakes area a prime candidate for the regional approach.
9. The Great Lakes PRRO was designed as a flexible instrument. In times of resource shortfalls, relief and protracted refugee components have been prioritized over the recovery component, however, and this has harmed the PRRO's basic recovery objectives. This is especially so in Rwanda, where food-assisted recovery activities have gone into sharp decline. A key challenge will be to ensure that such activities do not collapse when the PRRO switches back to relief.
10. The PRRO's exit strategy envisaged recovery activities that would be "of short duration, with objectives achievable within a period of less than a year", after which time any further investments required would be handled through other agencies or under WFP-assisted development projects. This was optimistic given the protracted and complex nature of the crisis, and this points to the need for longer time frames than those proposed for the first two initial PRROs, which were of 24 and 18 months, respectively. It is not clear exactly how long a time frame would be required. However, for the PRRO to carry conviction as a credible move towards recovery, it needs to retain the flexibility to support recovery in more settled areas, even if there continue to be risk and uncertainty elsewhere.
11. Attempts to shift support for recovery activities towards WFP's regular development category have met with limited success. The general lack of development resources to WFP would not readily permit meaningful recovery activities, as demonstrated in the Rwanda case. Some success in moving towards more targeted approaches has been achieved in Uganda, however, through the gradual reduction of refugee rations based on self-sufficiency levels.

Recommendations

- Formulate a new regional PRRO, effective February 2003, based on the maximum allowable time frame of three years.
- Undertake a review of the 1999 Guidelines for the Formulation of a PRRO in light of various country experiences in applying the guidelines and the programme category to address relief-recovery trajectories, especially in complex regional operations.



EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRRO: ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

12. The PRRO's objectives were reformulated once for the expansion phase and a second time during the recent logical framework analysis. Although the language of the revisions often varies, there are three main objectives.

Objective 1: Meet Nutritional Needs and Maintain Favourable Nutritional Outcomes for Targeted Groups

⇒ *General Refugee Distributions*

13. Overall, the PRRO has successfully maintained satisfactory nutrition levels within internationally acceptable limits in all refugee camps. Despite pipeline problems in the United Republic of Tanzania, the prevalence of malnutrition is lower in the refugee camps assisted by the PRRO than among the national population.
14. Due to resourcing problems and pipeline difficulties, the PRRO has not always been able to provide complete general rations. In response to one pipeline break,² a phase-down of rations was begun in the Tanzanian refugee camps, starting in July 2000. Rations dropped by 40 percent over five months, with pulses being among the most affected. Kilocalories fell to about 60 in August/September 2000, gradually rising to 75 percent in December 2000. Kilocalories did not return to 100 percent until December 2001. The annex provides full details of ration cuts in the Tanzanian camps by month, from January 1999 through December 2001.
15. In the absence of a monitoring system that follows monthly nutritional data,³ it is difficult to assess properly the immediate effects of ration cuts on nutritional status in the refugee camps. However, according to the nutrition surveys that are carried out in all camps twice a year by December 2000, global acute malnutrition rates in the Tanzanian camps had doubled over the July 2000 figures, to 7.4 percent.
16. The mission was also concerned that weight-for-height measurement should not be the only indicator of nutritional status in protracted refugee situations, and that other measures should be added for the purposes of regular surveillance.

⇒ *Supplementary Feeding at Selective Feeding Centres*

17. The PRRO has been generally successful in maintaining nutritional status within acceptable levels for children between 6 and 59 months residing in refugee camps and among internally displaced person (IDP) populations in Burundi and Rwanda. In some nutrition surveys in Rwanda and Uganda, however, global acute malnutrition among children 6–29 months is shown to be almost double that of the older age group.⁴ These rates are higher than the normal 10-percent cut-off point used as an international benchmark for phasing out selective feeding programmes. In response to this information, a correct decision was made to target only children below 3 years of age in selective

² This pipeline break was due to several resource, management and pipeline factors converging simultaneously, and involved a diversion of a shipment at sea to a new emergency operation in another region.

³ As per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that existed between WFP and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the time, responsibility for establishing and implementing a nutritional monitoring system rested with UNHCR.

⁴ Weight-for-height <-2 S.D.



feeding programmes in Rwanda. There is a tendency, however, for nutritional status to relapse after discharge.

⇒ **Targeted Food Distributions for Vulnerable Groups (Burundi and Rwanda only)**

18. It has been more difficult to improve nutritional status in the case of targeted distributions to vulnerable groups and households. Whereas supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes have been maintained at times of pipeline breaks or shortfalls, targeted distributions to other vulnerable groups are frequently scaled back.
19. In Burundi, a pipeline break in July 2001 required a small decrease in the ration, i.e. of less than 20 percent. Under normal circumstances, this reduction might not have posed a big problem, but in this case it occurred at the time of a malaria outbreak, which according to IP reports caused malnutrition rates to soar. Mortality and morbidity data should be included in any monitoring system.

Objective 2: Support Recovery Opportunities and Asset-Creation

20. The complex regional environment is not wholly conducive to effective recovery programming on any significant scale. Constraining factors identified by the evaluation mission include national policies that do not favour some recovery activities, such as building self-reliance among refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania. In addition, throughout the life of the PRRO, both United Nations and government security restrictions have continued to place serious limitations on programming opportunities beyond the provision of immediate relief (e.g. in Burundi and Rwanda). Another factor has been the reluctance of some WFP staff to serve in the difficult and unpredictable duty stations that make up much of the Great Lakes region. Given these constraints, outputs under the recovery component have declined significantly. During a five-month period, the Rwanda country office had to stop approving new food-for-work (FFW) interventions.
21. Many of the recovery activities observed by the mission in Rwanda have been heavily biased towards rural infrastructure improvements, without a strong focus on building lasting assets for beneficiaries. At one site visited, although the technical quality of the work was quite good, the labourers—the majority of whom were women—appeared to have gained only short-term benefits, mainly through the receipt of food rations. In refocusing the recovery aspects of the successor PRRO, greater emphasis should be placed on developing lasting and sustainable benefits for beneficiaries.
22. Also of concern was the sustainability of the nutritional outcomes achieved within the PRRO's other components, and this should be addressed as part of the broader effort at building meaningful recovery linkages. Given that many of the children discharged from the PRRO's selective feeding programmes are likely to relapse, more efforts are needed to link up graduates with other longer-term programmes. Some positive efforts at achieving this have already been undertaken in Rwanda.
23. Rigid labelling of PRRO activities as either relief or recovery sometimes hides the dualistic aspects contained in many activities. One very good example is the Seed Protection Ration Programme (SPRP) in Burundi, which is implemented jointly with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). That programme not only provides short-term relief but also assumes that having received food aid, beneficiaries will be less inclined to sell the seeds they receive under an associated FAO programme. From mid-1999 through



the end of 2000, the SPRP was the single largest channel for distributing food under the PRRO in Burundi.

Objective 3: Enhance Disaster Preparedness to Respond to Unforeseen Crises, Both Man-Made and Natural

24. It has been difficult to respond to sudden and unforeseen crises within the context of the regional PRRO, and resourcing problems have hampered the PRRO's ability to meet even anticipated relief requirements. To support disaster preparedness, the original PRRO had included a 20,000-ton food contingency reserve, but the lack of resource commitments from donors resulted in that reserve's being dropped from the current expansion. According to discussions with donor representatives, this lack of support for the reserve may reflect not necessarily a refusal to support contingency stocks per se, but rather a lack of understanding as to how those stocks would be managed and used. WFP may need to improve its marketing of this option.
25. As part of the regional approach, both a "food follows the people" approach, in the event of sudden mass population movements, and built-in flexibility to reallocate resources among countries were also intended to enhance disaster preparedness. Lacklustre resourcing performance in the initial phase led to a marked reluctance to make use of the regional PRRO as the primary channel for responding to new disasters and additional relief requirements. Some donor representatives meeting with the evaluation mission expressed the view that the regional PRRO should have the flexibility to cover all contingencies through budget revisions. They also felt that the frequent use of EMOPs should be avoided, given that such use reduced programme coherence at the national level and raised issues of transparency. In practice, however, most country offices implement relief and recovery programmes quite independently from the actual source of funding, and in fact greatly welcome the added flexibility that results from the availability of resources from a number of sources. Given these circumstances, it is clearly desirable to retain the option of making use of EMOPs when needed for unforeseen emergencies. Budget revisions to the PRRO could also be considered, especially in the event of smaller-scale emergencies.
26. Scenario-based contingency planning has been undertaken for a number of years, with varying degrees of success. Such planning has been carried out at the individual country level in collaboration with key partners such as UNHCR. There have been a number of extensive, time-consuming regional exercises based on scenarios that have not come to pass. The individual country-level exercises, on the other hand, appear to have been more useful for formulating effective punctual responses to rapidly evolving situations.⁵

⁵ The 1999 contingency planning exercise undertaken in the United Republic of Tanzania was mentioned to the mission as having been useful in formulating a more rapid and effective response to a refugee influx.



Recommendations

- To better assess the nutritional effects of ration cuts, consider instituting regular growth monitoring and promotion programmes through partners and/or through sentinel sites (sample sites chosen as being representative of a larger geographic area or population cluster), which could become early warning centres.
- Consider using stunting indicators to monitor child nutrition in more protracted situations.
- Undertake an independent review of the lasting benefits accruing to FFW participants in rural infrastructure schemes.
- In all countries where selective feeding programmes are in place, mothers of graduates should be referred to recovery-based activities, provided those activities do not put an unacceptable burden on these women.

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

Regionality

27. The PRRO's regional aspect remains the subject of ongoing debate. Some WFP staff in the region consider the regional approach to have been highly successful in providing additional support and resources to national-level operations than might otherwise have been available. Other WFP staff have been less appreciative, and consider that the regional approach is no longer relevant and constitutes an extra management layer that is both expensive and lacking in transparency.
28. The evaluation found that the roles and responsibilities for regional decision-making within the PRRO on matters related to strategic planning, resource allocation and the pipeline were not clearly spelled out or understood by WFP staff. It was reported that important management decisions have at times been either delayed or taken without approval. There also have been competing needs among Country Directors for limited food resources, direct support costs (DSC) and unarmarked contributions. For a time the Country Director for one of the countries within the PRRO even served as Regional PRRO Manager, raising concerns about possible conflict of interest between the two roles. Regional-level accountability is also more challenging given the large number of offices involved.
29. The view of the evaluation mission, however, is that in general a regional approach continues to represent the most desirable option. The main factors supporting continuation of the regional approach are that:
- in the complex regional environment it helps facilitate forward planning through regional logistics and pipeline management;
 - it provides additional support to smaller countries through a dedicated core regional staff and by facilitating the shifting of resources across borders;
 - it is more neutral in character, allowing the operation to be seen outside of any specific national context; and
 - it acknowledges the close proximity of the total affected area—which includes two very small countries and constitutes an area of only about 400 km in diameter and



is in fact much smaller than many states and conflict zones where other PRROs are implemented.

⇒ **Regional Management Support**

30. Until December 2001, the PRRO had been supported through a system of dedicated regional staff located within a Great Lakes Support Unit (GLSU) in Kampala. Staff routinely undertook visits to country-level operations to provide additional support. At the time of the mission, however, all former GLSU staff had been merged into the new Eastern and Southern Africa Bureau (ODK) in Kampala, which then had responsibility for all of Eastern and Southern Africa. Staff who had previously devoted the majority of their time to the PRRO were, at the time of the evaluation mission, no longer able to do so. This has resulted in a difficult transitional situation in which the overall day-to-day level of dedicated support to the PRRO has needed to be substantially curtailed. This issue needs to be addressed if the full benefits of a regional approach are to continue to be realized.

⇒ **Regional Logistics and Pipeline Management**

31. Regional logistics and pipeline management strengthen forward planning and disaster readiness. The use of dedicated fleets has greatly facilitated food deliveries when commercial transport either has failed or is not available. The fleet of Hino trucks for example has proven extremely useful in overcoming a shortage of available commercial transport in Burundi. The regional fleet of Bedford trucks has also been deployed on numerous occasions to augment private transport capacity in response to sudden emergency situations, including the recent volcanic eruption in Goma.
32. Regional pipeline management has made some use of inter-country loans, reallocations and local purchases as a means of mitigating delivery problems. However, donor earmarking of contributions serves to restrict flexibility. For example, under the first phase of the PRRO, only 1.1 percent of the total tonnage contributed was reallocated, while 18 percent was shifted through inter-country loans. Under the expansion phase, the same figures as of March 2002 were 1.8 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
33. Until quite recently, there were no established procedures in place for decision-making on the pipeline, and coordination between regional pipeline management and the individual country-level programming processes needed strengthening. Early warnings about impending pipeline breaks have also been problematic. The major 2000 pipeline break, for example, did not appear in WFP's resources document (the "Yellow Pages")⁶ sufficiently ahead of time for corrective action to have been taken.
34. The decentralization of the bureau from Rome to Kampala in late 2001 is likely to strengthen regional pipeline management. Since January 2002, standardized pipeline reports have now been used as a means of further strengthening early warning about anticipated pipeline breaks.

⁶ The document, issued by the Resources Programming Service (ODP) at WFP Headquarters on a regular basis, gives an overview of WFP resource requirements on a global basis. It is used, *inter alia*, as a tool for resource mobilization. The official title of the document is: Estimated Food Needs and Shortfalls for WFP Operations and Projects.



⇒ *Regional Monitoring and Reporting*

35. At present, there is no regular consolidated regional report for the PRRO that tracks inputs and outputs by country and by component. Each country adopts a slightly different approach, and the mission found it difficult to obtain consistent and comparable data from the individual country offices.
36. A logframe has been developed for the PRRO, which identifies a number of outcome indicators. Planning matrices and new reporting formats have also been developed; thus far, however, the initiative does not appear to have had a significant impact on day-to-day monitoring activities, which are carried out at the country and sub-office levels. Clearly more time is needed to effect meaningful changes.
37. At present, monitoring systems are not well linked to ongoing programme modification and follow-up. There is an urgent need to streamline reporting activities, placing emphasis on analysis and synthesis of more limited, qualitative information on outcomes rather than on collecting and compiling large amounts of information. Streamlining the monitoring system and focusing on a limited number of indicators, which can be tracked and analysed in real time, is needed.

⇒ *Coverage, Assessment and Targeting*

38. When the operating environment and lack of resources are not limiting factors, the PRRO has generally performed well in modifying its targeting approaches to meet evolving needs. Government policy plays a major role in shaping the operation's ability to target beneficiaries as planned. At one end of the spectrum, the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda have worked closely with WFP and IPs to move from a situation of relief to one of self-reliance, recovery and development. Uganda offers one good example of where WFP and IPs are able gradually to reduce rations over time, and hence reduce dependence on WFP resources. In Rwanda, considerable effort has been made to undertake food-for-work/assets/training/education programmes, although resources for these have often not been available. In addition, the country office and its partners appropriately concluded that priority in WFP-supported supplementary feeding activities should be given to infants.
39. At the other end of the policy spectrum, the security situation in Burundi and the resultant United Nations security restrictions have posed significant obstacles to achieving more targeted approaches. In Burundi, access problems have limited the PRRO's ability to consistently direct and deliver food to the most food insecure and nutritionally at risk areas.

⇒ *Appropriateness of Food Rations*

40. Due to resource shortages, the PRRO has not been able consistently to provide rations in the required quantities, and the higher malnutrition figures seen after rations were cut underline the high level of dependency many refugees have on food aid. The purchase of white maize, beans and other foods in Uganda has been made in a timely manner in order to mitigate the effects of pipeline breaks in that country and elsewhere in the region.
41. Local purchases clearly offer alternatives to commodities disliked by the refugees. They also help the local economy. This is especially relevant in the United Republic of Tanzania, where local purchases can help improve relations with the local community in refuge-affected areas.



Recommendations

- Reassess the regional staffing support requirements to be funded under the successor PRRO's DSC so as to reduce the percentage of the DSC allocated to the regional bureau. Options might include cost-sharing among 16 ODK countries or a fee-for-service approach.
- Clarify procedures for regional management decision-making in the successor PRRO, especially for situations where food resources cannot meet all planned distributions.
- For the duration of the present phase of the PRRO, reactivate a regional report focusing on inputs and outputs, possibly adapting the new "Guidelines and Format for Completing the Country Office Report".
- Continue gradually to adapt monitoring systems to be more in line with the logframe, with a view to obtaining more qualitative data on outcome.

PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION

Partnerships

42. The PRRO has made effective use of partnerships and coordination processes. In Burundi, a limited number of partnership arrangements have allowed the operation to continue to function in a situation where the United Nations imposes strict limitations on WFP staff access to insecure areas. This has necessitated that the PRRO depend on the ability and willingness of large international NGOs (CARE and World Vision International [WVI]) to accept the responsibility of delivering programmes in insecure environments.

Coordination

43. Effective coordination has been achieved through both formal and informal relations, through such mechanisms as joint work plans, strategic discussions with the United Nations and governments, and regular meetings at sub-offices. These are more easily done in the more secure environments of Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania, but even in Burundi WFP participates in the Committee on Food Aid.
44. The transition from the EMOP to the PRRO modality has had consequences for WFP's participation in the regional consolidated appeal process (CAP). One problem is that the regional CAP includes requirements for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), whereas the recent PRRO did not include the DRC. Moreover, insofar as the PRRO framework calls for WFP to adopt longer time frames for planning resource requirements, WFP has in recent years opted for annexing the regional PRRO's total requirements to the CAP instead of separating out one-year requirements within the CAP. UNHCR has adopted a similar approach. Regarding this, two United Nations partners expressed concern to the mission, claiming that this practice undermined the credibility of the CAP funding mechanism.



RESOURCING OF THE PRRO⁷

Contributions

45. The regional EMOPs, which ran from May 1996 through December 1999, often were resourced at well over 100 percent of total requirements. By contrast, under the first phase of this PRRO, resourcing levels dropped significantly. The original PRRO (6077.00) managed to cover only 75 percent of its food tonnage requirements and 67 percent of its cash requirements. Pipeline management problems aggravated the overall food supply picture on the ground. Since the beginning of the expansion phase (6077.01/10062.0), however, short-term performance appears to have improved, with 42 percent of tonnage requirements and 45 percent of cash requirements pledged within six months of the expansion's start up.

Securing Longer-Term Commitments

46. There is little evidence to suggest any increase in longer-term donor commitments to the PRRO, as most donors continue to pledge on an annual basis. While it would make sense from the perspective of programme sustainability, management has been reluctant to adopt longer time frames for the PRRO, for fear that the higher total costs may deter donor commitments. At the policy level, many donors are interested in building synergies among relief, recovery and development. However, they have their own definitions and funding sources that do not necessarily coincide with WFP's programme categories.

Flexibility for Shifting Funds and Other Resources

47. By the end of the first phase, some 63 percent of total contributions to the regional PRRO had been earmarked. This earmarking reflects the national policies and priorities of key donors, and does not appear to be linked to the PRRO's regional character. The situation seems somewhat improved under the present expansion, with only 56 percent of contributions having been earmarked as of April 2002.

48. Donor earmarking limits the intended flexibility of the commodity re-allocation process. A good example of its consequences for efficient programming allocation occurred between November 2000 and June 2001, when Rwanda experienced a serious break in its pipeline. Although other countries, such as Burundi, had some available stocks—as distribution in some areas could not be carried out due to insecurity—Rwanda was unable to ask Burundi for an inter-country loan, since at that time there were no pledges for Rwanda within the regional PRRO. FFW activities in Rwanda subsequently had to be scaled back significantly, and many new potential projects were never approved.

49. Full flexibility for shifting PRRO resources between relief and recovery diminishes when resources and food supply are constrained. At such times, it will probably be necessary to continue prioritizing relief. The negative effects for recovery efforts may in fact be exacerbated within a regional operation where more limited recovery opportunities need to compete within a much wider regional context of unstable and unpredictable relief needs.

⁷ As stated in "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A), resourcing performance needs to be measured in terms of the extent to which PRROs have successfully secured longer-term financial commitments from donors.



Recommendations

- Intensify/diversify regional resourcing strategies with a view to obtaining unearmarked contributions in cash or in kind. Donors need to be encouraged to make up-front and timely pledges, given shipments and delivery lead times, as soon as an operation has been approved.
- Reinforce a longer-term resourcing perspective by extending the time frame of the successor PRRO to 36 months.
- Strengthen forward planning by anticipating better how the PRRO could be used to respond to potential unforeseen relief needs (due to man-made or natural crises), possibly including the establishment of a WFP-managed contingency food stock.

MEETING WFP'S COMMITMENTS TO WOMEN

50. WFP has been quite successful in including women in decision-making bodies, such as food management and distribution committees, and in IDP and refugee food distribution activities. Field visits also confirmed that there is a good understanding of gender issues among WFP and IP staff at the country and field levels. Certain gender issues appear to have been addressed in FFW programmes: women are usually full participants or group leaders and are responsible for keeping records and receiving food. However, it was not always clear how they benefit in the long-term from the food security assets being created.
51. In order to consolidate these achievements, it is important to ensure that women are not overburdened with responsibilities and activities related to food distribution, transportation, and collection. Future activities to promote gender equity need to incorporate men, focusing more on strengthening and maintaining families and promoting and consolidating women's participation and achievements, while helping men to adapt to their changing circumstances and maintain important components of their traditional roles.

Recommendation

- To encourage the sustained participation of women in asset-creating activities and reduce domestic workload, WFP should consider working with IPs to introduce child-care centres at FFW sites or in the community, and providing food resources for care providers and children.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

52. Environmental concerns have been incorporated into the design of the PRRO with some positive results. Adjustments have been made to the food basket—the addition of local and quick-cooking beans and milled cereals—that take into consideration the amount of fuel and water required for food preparation.
53. Several recovery activities, supported through FFW have similarly contributed to environmental maintenance and restoration. The mission saw terraces that had been constructed many years ago using the same technology, and these were proving durable and producing good crops. Tree-planting schemes have been developed in western Tanzania using indigenous species and allowing participants to choose from a selection of



trees valued for their fruit or as fodder. Similar projects have been implemented with WFP support in Rwanda, where land-terracing is protecting against erosion and swamp reclamation is contributing to food security.



ANNEX

**RATION LEVELS AND KILOCALORIE EQUIVALENTS DISTRIBUTED IN THE TANZANIAN
CAMPS UNDER THE REGIONAL PRRO 1999–2001**

TABLE 1: 1999

Month	Cereals (%)	Pulses (%)	Corn-soya blend (%)	Vegetable oil (%)	Salt (%)	Approved ration (kcal)	Kcal distributed	Kcal (%)
January	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 093/1 953	1 953.00	100.00
February	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 093/1 953	2 023.00	100.00
March	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 116.00	100.00
April	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 053.76	100.00
May	100.00	80.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	1 956.05	98.24
June	80.00	80.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	1 736.00	88.88
July	50.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	1 448.50	74.17
August	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 073.23	99.00
September	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	2 166/1 991	2 119.12	97.84
October	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	2 166/1 991	2 166.00	100.00
November	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	2 166/1 991	2 100.38	100.00
December	100.00	100.00	60.00	100.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	2 042.66	94.28
Annual average	94.17	96.67	96.67	100.00	85.83	2 166/1 991	1 982.31	96.03

Note: Approved ration: 2,166 kcal with maize grain, 1,991 kcal with maize meal. When both maize grain and maize meal were distributed, the target kilocalories are calculated at the average.



ANNEX (cont.)

**RATION LEVELS AND KILOCALORIE EQUIVALENTS DISTRIBUTED IN THE TANZANIAN
CAMPS UNDER THE REGIONAL PRRO 1999–2001**

TABLE 2: 2000

Month	Cereals (%)	Pulses (%)	Corn-soya blend (%)	Vegetable oil (%)	Salt (%)	Approved ration (kcal)	Kcal distributed	Kcal (%)
January	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 077.99	99.98
February	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 061.50	99.18
March	100.00	100.00	50.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 027.01	97.52
April	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 061.25	99.17
May	100.00	80.00	100.00	60.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 014.80	93.00
June	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	100.00	2 166/1 991	2 077.50	95.91
July	80.00	55.00	80.00	50.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 579.20	72.91
August	60.00	60.00	60.00	50.00	60.00	2 166/1 991	1 281.90	59.18
September	60.00	60.00	67.50	50.00	60.00	2 166/1 991	1 287.98	59.46
October	60.00	75.00	80.00	72.50	75.00	2 166/1 991	1 412.43	65.21
November	60.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 445.80	66.75
December	68.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 516.62	72.97
Annual average	82.33	82.50	83.13	74.38	86.25	2 166/1 991	1 737.00	81.77

Note: Approved ration: 2,166 kcal with maize grain, 1,991 kcal with maize meal. When both maize grain and maize meal were distributed, the target kilocalories are calculated at the average.



ANNEX (cont.)

RATION LEVELS AND KILOCALORIE EQUIVALENTS DISTRIBUTED IN THE TANZANIAN CAMPS UNDER THE REGIONAL PRRO 1999–2001

TABLE 3: 2001

Month	Cereals (%)	Pulses (%)	Corn-soya blend (%)	Vegetable oil (%)	Salt (%)	Approved ration (kcal)	Kcal distributed	Kcal (%)
January	80.00	80.00	80.00	60.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 572.43	75.65
February	80.00	80.00	80.00	60.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 662.60	79.99
March	80.00	80.00	80.00	70.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 680.30	80.84
April	82.00	80.00	65.00	80.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 746.30	80.62
May	85.00	80.00	56.00	80.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 768.11	81.63
June	89.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 774.80	85.39
July	85.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 166/1 991	1 714.24	82.47
August	100.00	100.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 032/1 857	1 878.70	96.62
September	100.00	100.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 032/1 857	1 791.20	96.46
October	100.00	100.00	80.00	80.00	80.00	2 032/1 857	1 881.83	96.78
November	100.00	100.00	96.00	96.00	96.00	2 032/1 857	1 861.34	95.72
December	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	2 032/1 857	1 857.00	100.00
Annual average	90.08	88.33	79.75	78.83	83.00	2 166/1 991	1 765.74	87.68

Note: Approved ration: 2,166 kcal with maize grain, 1,991 kcal with maize meal. When both maize grain and maize meal were distributed, the target kilocalories are calculated at the average.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CAP	Consolidated appeal process
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSC	Direct support cost
EMOP	Emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	Food for work
GLSU	Great Lakes Support Unit
IDP	Internally displaced person
IP	Implementing partner
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
ODK	Eastern and Southern Africa Bureau
ODP	Resources Programming Service
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation
SPRP	Seed Protection Ration Programme
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

