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Alimentaire
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Mundial
de Alimentos

**Executive Board
Annual Session**

Rome, 9–12 June 2008

ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL MATTERS

Agenda item 13

For information*

WFP SECURITY REPORT 2007

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Chief, OMF* and Security Focal   Mr M. Lorentzen   tel.: 066513-2343
Point, a.i.:

Security Analyst, OMF: Ms N. Goltsova   tel.: 066513-3229

Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms C. Panlilio, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

*Field Security Division

DRAFT DECISION*

The Board takes note of "WFP Security Report 2007" (WFP/EB.A/2008/13-E).

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* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document (WFP/EB.A/2008/16) issued at the end of the session.

FOREWORD BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The field is a hard and hazardous place for humanitarian workers in the early twenty-first century. As this Information Note shows, security incidents involving WFP staff rose dramatically last year and three staff members died in the line of duty as a result of malicious acts for the first time in four years. WFP Finance Officer Gene Luna was one of 17 United Nations staff members killed in the tragic bombing of the United Nations office in Algiers on 11 December 2007. Driver Richard Achuka died in a vehicle ambush in Uganda in May; a similar ambush claimed the life of security guard Emmanuel Chaku Joseph in Southern Sudan in January. In today's world, the simple act of going to work can lead to the ultimate sacrifice for the humanitarian cause.

WFP is facing another security risk in the unprecedented crisis of high food prices. The doubling and tripling of global commodity prices has opened up the potential for social unrest among desperate people who may well be tempted to target the drivers and security guards for the WFP vehicle fleets as well as the warehouses storing increasingly precious supplies of rice, maize, wheat flour and cooking oil.

In Darfur, WFP provides the only access to food to more than three 3 million people a day. But with insecurity so great in Darfur, 13 of our trucks were ambushed between September and December 2007. Seven of the drivers are still missing and three were killed. Since January 2008, more than 60 trucks have been attacked in Darfur; the majority are still missing and nearly 30 drivers unaccounted for. Two contracted drivers were killed in Darfur, and four killed in Southern Sudan. Following these events, we put out an urgent announcement that due to this violence we are able to get only half the necessary supplies into Darfur, threatening a 50 percent cut in rations just as the lean season is arriving.

Piracy has been another security threat, with the 2007 spike in attacks on the high seas threatening to cut WFP's main supply route to Somalia where we are working to feed 1.2 million people. With the support of French, Dutch and Danish naval escorts, WFP food was able to move safely on the shipping lanes off Somalia.

WFP has the utmost concern for the safety and security of all those who work for us, whether they are our staff, employees of contracted companies or people seconded from NGOs and other aid agencies. And yet, on an almost weekly basis, reports of security incidents arrive in Headquarters. This level of insecurity is, quite simply, unacceptable. It is why we continue to call upon our host governments, which are primarily responsible for the safety of United Nations staff, to ensure protection for humanitarian workers. Without safety, there cannot be humanitarian action.

The WFP Secretariat and Board have urged the world to observe to the fullest extent the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the 2005 Protocol that expanded protection for humanitarian workers. The Board approved unanimously in October 2007 a statement which says, in part: "The Executive Board of WFP calls on all countries to renew their commitment to the protection of humanitarian workers, and to help ensure safe and unhindered access to those in need, in keeping with international law and humanitarian principles." Deeply encouraged by your support, I raised these issues in the 29 October meeting of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). The CEB, in turn, publicly called on all Member States to renew their commitment to the protection of humanitarian workers and to ensure safe and unhindered access to all people in need, in keeping with international law and humanitarian principles.

In addition to the inaugural WFP Security Report for the Executive Board, you will receive in this annual session a report on security measures and attendant costs, drawn from an exhaustive global security review in the wake of the Algiers bombing. Out of this review, during which WFP often worked in collaboration with other United Nations agencies, we project security costs for 2008–2009 based on the harsh reality in which humanitarian workers perform their duties. I urge Board members to give their full support to meeting the needs outlined in the report.

On behalf of all those who work for WFP, I sincerely thank the Executive Board for its collective strong showing of concern and support. It is so important for our women and men on the front lines to know they are not alone out there, that we here in WFP Headquarters and in the capitals around the world are with them in spirit and soul, and that we are using every means at our disposal to create the conditions in which they can work with no fear of harm.

Josette Sheeran
Executive Director

BACKGROUND

1.   The targeting of humanitarian and United Nations personnel is a disturbing trend that has been high on the agenda of discussions at various levels within the United Nations system. The discussions culminated in the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 December 2007 of the resolution "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel".[1] In the resolution, which was co-sponsored by more than 50 countries and adopted by consensus, the General Assembly expressed deep concern about the dangers and security risks faced by humanitarian personnel and United Nations and associated personnel in the field as they are operating in increasingly complex contexts. The General Assembly noted that primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations and associated personnel rests with the host governments. Therefore, current security challenges call for global collective responsibility and joint concrete steps to promote compliance with internationally agreed principles governing the safety and security of humanitarian and United Nations personnel.

2.   The resolution underlines the need to: (i) strengthen the normative framework for the safety and security of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, including the obligations under relevant international laws; and (ii) promote universality of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and its Optional Protocol, and include applicable elements of the Convention in host country agreements. The resolution also emphasized the importance of information on the range and scope of security incidents involving humanitarian personnel and United Nations and associated personnel.

3.   This report is submitted to the Board for information and supplements the Secretary-General's report on the "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel" submitted to the General Assembly at its 62nd session.[2] The present report provides updates on the threats to the safety and security of WFP staff and/or assets, and of non-WFP workers (cooperating and standby partners, and contractors) engaged to support WFP operations. This report is based only on those 2007 security incidents that came to the knowledge of the WFP Field Security Division (OMF) and were registered as significant incident reports (SIRs). It is not an exhaustive record but is indicative of the threats and incidents experienced by WFP and partners in the line of duty.

Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff and/or Assets, and Partners Engaged to Support WFP Operations

4.   In 2007, as in every year, WFP staff deployed in a broad range of field operations around the world faced multiple threats, such as terrorism, crime, armed conflict, harassment and detention. In recent years, a number of factors have brought about an increase in these threats for all United Nations personnel, and for humanitarian workers in particular. Firstly, there has been a dramatic worldwide escalation in terrorist threats to the United Nations, which manifested itself in the suicide vehicle bomb attack on the United Nations premises in Algiers on 11 December 2007. WFP staff member Gene Luna was among the 17 United Nations staff members killed in the attack. Another WFP staff member, Lynda Matougui, was seriously injured, along with 39 other United Nations staff

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[1] A/RES/62/95
[2] A/62/324

members. The WFP office located on the third floor of the United Nations Development Programme building was completely destroyed. It was the deadliest attack on the United Nations since the 2003 bombing of its Iraq headquarters in Baghdad. It is now clear that the United Nations has become a priority target of international terrorism, with staff being exposed to elevated security risks in all operations worldwide. Other key factors contributing to security challenges for United Nations and humanitarian staff are related to expanded and sustained operations, particularly in conflict and post-conflict areas, and to the rising criminality that stems from deteriorating public security and the limited capacity of local authorities in countries facing economic, political and social tension, even without the presence of armed conflict.

5.   Reflecting the heightened threat to United Nations and humanitarian personnel, the year 2007 was marked by disturbing trends and developments that affect WFP staff safety and security. Overall, 484 security incidents involving WFP staff and assets were reported in 2007, a 31 percent increase on 2006. The number of work-related security incidents involving WFP staff and/or assets was also 50 percent higher in 2007 than in the previous year.

6.   In 2007, three WFP staff members were killed in the line of duty as a result of malicious acts. In contrast, there had been no work-related staff deaths resulting from malicious acts since 2003. As indicated above finance officer Gene Luna lost her life in the attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers. WFP driver Richard Achuka was killed when a WFP convoy was ambushed in northeastern Uganda, and WFP security guard Emmanuel Chaku Joseph was killed during a vehicle ambush in Southern Sudan. Another national staff member, Ellings Maseko, was stabbed to death in Malawi by robbers in an incident unrelated to work. Two staff members died as a result of traffic accidents, one of whom while on duty.

7.   Five staff members were injured in work-related incidents. WFP staff members were detained by national authorities in 26 cases, of which 12 were work-related. The number of cases of staff members being harassed by state and non-state actors rose by 60 percent in 2007, 88 percent of which occurred in the Sudan.

8.   In 2007, 18 staff relocations and evacuations were carried out, all of them successfully, of which 13 were initiated because of civil unrest. The Sudan had the highest number of WFP staff relocations in 2007 (five); Guinea followed with two evacuations and one relocation. Three relocations were reported in Somalia, two in Nepal, two in Timor-Leste, and one each in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lebanon and Sri Lanka.

9.   Table 1 below summarizes the security incidents occurring in 2007 with reference to the WFP performance indicators for security and in comparison with 2004–2006 data.

TABLE 1: SECURITY AND SAFETY OF STAFF IN WFP OPERATIONAL AREAS ENSURED*				
Number of staff killed, injured or detained through malicious acts while on duty	2007	2006	2005	2004
- Staff killed	3	0	0	0
- Staff injured	5	2	9	12
- Staff detained	18	18	17	47
Percentage of designated staff evacuated or relocated	100	100	98	100

*Management Objective 5.1

10.   Twelve attacks on WFP warehouses were also reported during 2007, all of which resulted in WFP property being lost or damaged.

11.   In terms of geographic distribution, most security incidents involving WFP staff and/or assets occurred in Africa. The countries with the highest incident rates in 2007 were the Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Chad, Guinea, and Kenya. Overall, 370 incidents took place in Africa, most of them in three countries: 119 incidents in the Sudan, 91 in Liberia and 46 in Somalia. The second highest rate of security incidents was registered in Asia, with 47 incidents in Afghanistan, 20 in Timor-Leste and 16 in Nepal. Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of significant security incidents involving WFP staff and/or assets in regions and countries during 2007, while Figures 3 and 4 illustrate recent trends in the number of incidents by regional bureau and country.[3]

12.   The overwhelming majority of work-related security incidents occurred in the Sudan (mainly Darfur), where WFP staff and operations face extreme insecurity. Increased levels of violence, banditry and harassment continue to plague humanitarian activities in Darfur, despite Article 24 of the Darfur Peace Agreement which prohibits violence against civilians and relief workers.

13.   Figure 3 shows that the number of incidents in the Asia Regional Bureau (ODB)[4] and the East and Central Africa Regional Bureau (ODK) was significantly higher in 2007 than in 2006. This was a result mainly of the volatile security situations in Afghanistan, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Somalia.

14.   Locally recruited WFP staff members remained particularly vulnerable to attack and accounted for most of the injuries, detentions or harassments in areas where their services are critical in sustaining WFP activities (Figure 5).

15.   An analysis of 2007 data showed that, as in previous years, most incidents were against property (armed robbery, theft, burglary and carjacking). WFP staff operate in environments often characterized by high rates of crime and unemployment, socio-economic instability and political unrest, and staff are affected by the rising levels of street crime and home invasion in the same way as is the public. The status of WFP staff members as representatives of the international community, and of the United Nations in particular, also contributes to the risk of being targeted by disaffected groups.

16.   The year 2007 saw an increase in robberies affecting WFP staff and their property, and in cases of damage to WFP property (Figure 6). Eighty percent of all property crimes resulted in the loss of WFP assets, while 20 percent of such crimes resulted in the loss of staff members' personal items. In many countries with high criminality rates staff members face the threat of opportunist crime, regardless of their position. On a positive note, there were no kidnapping incidents affecting WFP staff members in 2007.

17.   In 2007, WFP began recording security incidents involving non-WFP workers (cooperating and standby partners, and contractors) engaged to support WFP operations. An analysis of these incidents shows that WFP partners and contractors are increasingly targeted by armed groups and criminals, particularly in conflict and post-conflict areas. Attacks on commercial trucks transporting WFP commodities continue to rise, particularly in Darfur (the Sudan) and Afghanistan. In 2007, 66 commercial trucks in the service of WFP were attacked or held up by armed groups. Most incidents (45 percent) occurred in Afghanistan, followed by the Sudan (33 percent) (Figure 7). Six drivers of WFP-contracted

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[3] All figures are in the Annex.

[4] This document, including figures in the Annex, reflects the WFP regional structure and regional bureaux acronyms current in 2007.

trucks were killed in banditry attacks (three in South Darfur, and one each in Afghanistan, Chad and northwestern Kenya). Three attacks resulted in injuries to contracted drivers and five in the drivers being held by the perpetrators. Seventy-three percent of the attacks on commercial trucks resulted in WFP assets being lost or damaged. Four incidents involved WFP cooperating partners, including one resulting in the death of a worker with *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ; German Agency for Technical Cooperation) after a vehicle ambush in Southern Sudan.

18. Traffic accidents continue to account for most incidents categorized as "Other", with 64 accidents being reported in 2007 (see Table 2, next page). As in 2006, the West Africa Regional Bureau (ODD) and the Central Africa Regional Office, Yaoundé (ODDY) reported most of the traffic accidents, followed by ODB (Figure 8).

TABLE 2: SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS IN 2005, 2006 AND 2007: ALL TYPES													
Number of significant incidents	Total 2005	% of total 2005	Total 2006	% of total 2006	Total 2007	% of total 2007	% of increase/ decrease 2006/2007	Total work-related 2005	% of total 2005	Total work-related 2006	% of total 2006	Total work-related 2007	% of total 2007	% of increase/ decrease 2006/2007
Detentions	30	7	25	7	26	5	4	17	5	18	7	12	3	-33
Injuries	20	4	14	4	8	2	-43	9	3	2	1	4	1	100
Deaths	16	4	13	4	17	4	31	3	1	0	0	4	1	400
Subtotal	**66**	**16**	**52**	**14**	**51**	**11**	**-2**	**29**	**9**	**20**	**8**	**20**	**5**	**0**
Evacuation	4	1	1	0	2	0	100	4	1	1	0	2	1	100
Relocation	23	6	28	8	16	3	-43	23	7	28	11	16	4	-43
MEDEVACs	23	6	8	2	19	4	138	23	7	8	3	19	5	138
Subtotal	**50**	**12**	**37**	**10**	**37**	**8**	**0**	**50**	**16**	**37**	**15**	**37**	**10**	**0**
Traffic accidents	56	14	52	14	64	13	23	38	12	40	16	49	13	23
Thefts	85	21	91	25	89	18	-2	63	20	64	25	80	21	25
Robberies	34	8	21	6	80	17	281	22	7	2	1	68	18	3 300
Threats	25	6	12	3	22	5	83	20	6	9	4	18	5	100
Assaults	14	3	9	2	29	6	222	11	4	5	2	21	6	320
Damage to WFP property	2	0	8	2	15	3	88	2	1	8	3	15	4	88
Harassment	2	0	5	1	8	2	60	2	1	3	1	4	1	33
Carjacking	14	3	4	1	5	1	25	13	4	4	2	5	1	25
Plane incidents	8	2	6	2	5	1	-17	8	3	6	2	5	1	-17
Food rebagging	10	2	1	0	0	0	-100	10	3	1	0	0	0	-100
Burglary	9	2	13	4	10	2	-23	5	2	6	2	4	1	-33
Others	38	9	59	16	69	14	17	37	12	47	19	52	14	11
Subtotal	**297**	**72**	**281**	**76**	**396**	**82**	**41**	**231**	**75**	**195**	**77**	**321**	**85**	**65**
TOTAL	**413**		**370**		**484**		**31**	**310**		**252**		**378**		**50**

19.   Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the trends in security incidents for 2005–2007 by number and type. The Annex contains additional figures which are self-explanatory and compare several parameters for SIR 2007 statistics with those for 2006 and 2005, when the SIR overview and analysis were first prepared. Table 2 lists all types of significant security incidents in 2007 involving WFP staff and/or assets.

Overview of WFP Field Security Activities

20.   In 2007, WFP continued efforts to improve security and staff safety, while maintaining the standards reached in the 2004–2005 biennium under the Security Upgrade Programme. In order to capitalize on the progress achieved, the Security Maintenance Fund has made provisions to ensure compliance with minimum operating security standards (MOSS) should an office be opened in a new location and/or the United Nations Security Phase designation be raised to a higher level in any location; it also provides for the updating of security risk assessments for WFP offices.

21.   WFP Field Security continued to maintain its emergency response capacity. Three senior security advisers have been appointed at Headquarters to coordinate security activities in the main geographical areas and ensure that immediate redeployment can take place in an emergency. During 2007, there were six professional security staff at WFP Headquarters and 38 field security officers (FSOs) deployed to selected countries to provide more robust support for WFP operations, in cooperation with United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) personnel.

22.   FSOs continued to be instrumental in the delivery of food aid in complex and hazardous security environments, particularly in the Sudan and Somalia. It is important to note that without the effective risk mitigation strategy and measures implemented by WFP Field Security, and by WFP security teams in the Sudan and Somalia in particular, the number of security incidents affecting WFP staff or assets could have been much higher. High security standards were implemented in all WFP operations, and those standards enhanced operations in volatile security environments. In Somalia and Chad, WFP security teams worked with programme and logistics units to establish good relations with the local population and authorities, increasing the level of WFP acceptance and encouraging a safer environment. FSOs often were the only WFP international staff on the ground in particularly risky environments. In Sri Lanka and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the role of WFP FSOs was crucial in negotiating access for WFP teams and commodities. FSOs were also used extensively by country offices to address national staff problems with national authorities.

23.   WFP deployed FSOs to Pakistan and Sri Lanka in response to the deteriorating security situation in those countries. Additional FSOs were posted to Afghanistan and Somalia. Senior security advisers were deployed on a temporary basis to Algeria, the DRC, Pakistan, Timor-Leste and Zimbabwe to reinforce the support provided for WFP operations in volatile security situations.

24.   Limited resources prevented a global analysis of the impact on operations of elevated security risks. However, a regional survey conducted in the Sudan found that, between January and November 2007, 114,000 beneficiaries were not reached each month as a result of security restrictions. Despite the dramatic increase in the security threat, figures for 2007 were much lower than for the previous year, when 225,000 beneficiaries per month were not reached. This significant achievement has been enabled by the continued

efforts of WFP security teams to conduct threat and risk assessments, develop operational continuity plans and integrate the activities of the programme, logistics and security units.

25.   WFP Field Security is now focusing more on analysing the security situation in areas where WFP implements operations with a view to ensuring early warning and early action, and evaluating the threats and risks for staff and operations. A systematic approach is taken by WFP Field Security in addressing various aspects of security and staff safety, such as staff training and increased security awareness, and in analysing security incidents involving staff or assets in order to identify trends and improve preventive measures.

26.   In order to raise staff awareness of existing and potential threats, and of the policies and measures in place to mitigate risks, the staff safety and security website created in 2006 has been further developed and is updated regularly to offer all WFP staff easy access to security information relevant to their work, travel and training. Steps have been taken to promote the "Advanced Security in the Field" learning programme which is mandatory for all United Nations staff who are either working in or travelling to a location designated as Security Phase One or above. The course is aimed at enhancing field security knowledge and skills and follows the "Basic Security in the Field" interactive learning programme, which provides security awareness training for all United Nations personnel. OMF conducted an information session at Headquarters on the new security clearance procedures to be implemented worldwide through the integrated security clearance and travel notification system. OMF is continuing to develop specialized training for all WFP FSOs, primarily through workshops designed to upgrade professional skills and further improve security support for WFP operations.

27.   The devastating terrorist attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers demonstrated that the United Nations has become a prime target of international terrorism and is exposed to elevated security risks in its operations worldwide. The change in the threat profile of the organization has resulted in the increased vulnerability of its personnel and premises around the world. The United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) must adapt the way in which it tackles this critical and dramatically altered threat. Although progress has been made in addressing security shortcomings since the 2003 bombing of the United Nations offices in Baghdad, UNSMS now faces stiff security challenges posed by the determined forces of terrorism, which call for adequate resources to be made available and reinforced cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and host country authorities on security issues, as well as within the United Nations common system itself.

28.   As part of its commitment to UNSMS, WFP is participating in the post-Algeria global review of security at all duty stations following the Secretary-General's decision and subsequent instructions by the WFP Executive Director. To this end, WFP has adopted the Concept of Operations, which outlines priorities in: (i) identifying areas warranting security enhancement in response to threats and hazards; (ii) determining means of mitigating such threats and hazards; and (ii) providing advice, including cost-benefit and feasibility analyses, in response to any proposed improvements. A list of high-risk countries is being prepared in collaboration with UNDSS and other United Nations agencies. On the basis of this list, WFP will review the security situation, evaluate the prevailing security conditions, threats and risks, and identify the level of MOSS compliance and any need for mitigation measures. WFP continues to view its security risk management as a mainstream business activity which ensures good corporate governance and is in keeping with the expectations of WFP staff, beneficiaries, donors and stakeholders.

29.   The foremost challenge is to establish a balance between programme objectives and the need to provide for the safety and security of staff, which remains a top priority. The

capacity of WFP security risk management needs to keep pace with the increased threat so that security risks can be addressed effectively (see the "Information Note on the Implementation of Security Management Arrangements" (WFP/EB.A/2008/13-D). WFP Field Security is continuing its work to create a culture of security within the organization by such means as: (i) promoting personal security awareness among staff; (ii) establishing secure methods of operation; and (iii) reporting and analysing all security incidents so that effective prevention measures can be identified and implemented. It has also begun training security focal points to enhance WFP's capacity for dealing with security and safety matters.

30.   WFP supports the Secretary-General's decision to appoint an independent panel to ascertain the facts of the Algiers attack and to address strategic issues vital to the enhancement of staff safety in United Nations operations around the world. WFP will be cooperating with this panel to analyse lessons learned from the Algiers bombing and ensure that WFP views are reflected in the outcome of the panel's work. At the same time, WFP continues to promote increased cooperation within the United Nations system in the planning and implementation of measures aimed at improving security and safety for staff and operations.

ANNEX

**Figure 1: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2007: by Regional Bureau**

Figure 2: Key Group of Countries with Highest Rates of Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2007

**Figure 3: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets
in 2005/2006/2007, by Regional Bureau**

**Figure 4: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2006/2007,
by Country**

**Figure 5: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff in 2005/2006/2007:
Local/International Staff Ratio**

**Figure 6: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2007:
Property Crime**

**Figure 7: Countries with Highest Numbers of Convoy Attacks
in 2007, Including on Contractors**

Others
10%

Somalia
6%

Chad
6%

Afghanistan
45%

The Sudan
33%

**Figure 8: Traffic Accidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2006/2007, by Regional
Bureau**

WFP

Figure 9: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005/2006/2007, by Type of Incident


Figure 10: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005/2006/2007

Figure 11: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff in 2005/2006/2007: Gender Ratio

Figure 12: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005/2006/2007, by Month

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FSO	field security officer
GTZ	*Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
ODB	Regional Bureau Asia
ODC	Regional Bureau Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe
ODD	Regional BureauWest Africa
ODDY	Central Africa Regional Office Yaoundé
ODJ	Regional Bureau Southern Africa
ODK	Regional Bureau East and Central Africa
ODP	Regional Bureau Latin America and the Caribbean
ODS	Country Office Sudan
OMF	Field Security Division
SIR	significant incident reports
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System

WFP