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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT NICARAGUA EMERGENCY OPERATION 10700.0 AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSE EMERGENCY OPERATION 10695.0

WFP's Response to Hurricane Felix

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following Hurricane Felix on 4 September 2007 in the Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic in Nicaragua, WFP started: i) immediate response emergency operation 10695.0 to assist 38,000 victims; and ii) emergency operation 10700.0 to provide general food distributions for 80,000 people, supplementary feeding for 35,000 women and children under 5, and food for work for 55,000 people. The operations were 90 percent resourced.

Initially, 1,202 mt of food was borrowed from country programme 10044.0 and protracted relief and recovery operation 10212.0; it was subsequently imported because local sourcing was expensive. Following an emergency food security assessment in March 2008, a no-cost extension was made to emergency operation 10700.0 until 30 November 2008.

The design of emergency operation 10700.0 was appropriate to the remote location and the indigenous people who were the beneficiaries, accommodating their livelihood strategies and priorities. The operation was in line with the policies and priorities of WFP, donors and the Government. WFP provided the general food distributions very quickly; communities participated in targeting and distribution and used the food distributions and food for work to support recovery. Food assistance for vulnerable groups was less appropriate because it used mother-and-child health clinics for distributions rather than community structures.

There was, however, a two-month delay between general food distributions and food for work because of delivery delays and problems in finding cooperating partners. Through its partners, WFP supported a range of food-for-work activities that restored community and individual assets, but was less successful in supporting food security where beneficiaries prioritized housing. It was not possible to measure nutritional impacts.

Preparedness for the emergency in the four days following the alert from Headquarters that a hurricane was expected built on the foundation of routine planning and ongoing programmes. Partly as a result of WFP's advocacy, the emergency operation started quickly, in spite of logistics challenges and expenses, and WFP had innovative responses to logistical problems. The response was enhanced by five secondments from Panama and Rome, and by training for emergency food security assessments. Better food security indicators would have improved efficiency.


Impacts were mainly positive: community cohesion was maintained and there were improvements in housing, the position of women, water and sanitation, and attendance at health centres. There was some diversification of agriculture. There was no evidence of marginalization or aid dependency. WFP's assistance reduced beneficiaries' need for food purchases.



It is likely that emergency operation 10700.0 improved nutrition and food security. Partnerships are stronger, infrastructures have been improved and local capacity developed. Communities were resilient and self-reliant, using food aid to support recovery. However, chronic problems relating to food require longer-term solutions that address the causes of malnutrition.

There are 19 recommendations relating to preparedness, intervention design, assessments, the logical framework, monitoring, partnerships and programme delivery.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Nicaragua Emergency Operation 10700.0 and Immediate Response Emergency Operation 10695.0” (WFP/EB.1/2009/7-B) and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



BACKGROUND

Context

1. On 4 September 2007, category 5 Hurricane Felix hit the coast of the Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic (*Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte, RAAN*), one of the poorest regions in Nicaragua, affecting 185,000 people and damaging homes and farms; fisheries were affected by destructive waves and raised sea levels. Nicaragua is a low-income food-deficit country that experiences hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, floods, pest infestations and droughts; RAAN is remote and underdeveloped, with serious logistics problems. The response to Hurricane Felix can inform responses to other hazards in the region.

Description of the Operation

⇒ *Previous assistance*

2. At the time of the hurricane, WFP's country programme (CP) 10044.0 was in operation to improve the nutritional status of vulnerable women and children, relieve short-term hunger, increase primary school enrolment and attendance and reduce vulnerability to disasters. Regional protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 10212.0 included the RAAN in 2007. Emergency operation (EMOP) 6079.00 in response to Hurricane Mitch had previously covered Nicaragua.

⇒ *Objectives and main features*

3. WFP planned immediate response EMOP (IR-EMOP) Nicaragua 10695.0 to assist 38,000 victims of Hurricane Felix for three months with 410 mt of food at a cost to WFP of US\$500,000: individual rations for 20 days were to be distributed, using stocks already in RAAN. EMOP 10700.0 was planned to follow the IR-EMOP with general food distributions (GFDs) for 80,000 people and a supplementary feeding programme (SFP) for 35,000 beneficiaries to stabilize nutritional status, with special attention to women and children under 5; food for work (FFW) would enable 55,000 people to preserve assets and restore livelihoods and community infrastructures.

⇒ *Budget*

4. The budget of EMOP 10700.0 provided for distribution of 8,647 mt of food under:
 - i) GFD – 4,032 mt, 46 percent of the budget;
 - ii) FFW – 3,780 mt, 44 percent; and
 - iii) SFP – 835 mt, 10 percent.



As of 28 May 2008, the operation was 90 percent resourced. The budget is shown in Table 1.

| TABLE 1: BUDGET OF EMOP 10700.0 (US\$) | |
|---|-------------------|
| Direct operational costs | 8 646 991 |
| Direct support costs | 925 617 |
| Indirect support costs | 670 083 |
| Total WFP costs | 10 242 691 |

⇒ *Resources*

- Initial resources for IR-EMOP 10695.0 and EMOP 10700.0 consisted of rice, maize, yellow split peas (YSP), micronutrient-enriched vegetable oil and corn-soy blend (CSB) already in-country for CP 10044.0, PRRO 10212.0 and PRRO 10444.0; EMOP 10700.0 initially borrowed 1,202 mt. Food was subsequently imported because of the high cost of local purchase.

⇒ *Timeframe*

- IR-EMOP 10695.0 was started within a week of the hurricane and lasted until 1 October 2007, when it was replaced by EMOP 10700.0, which was implemented for nine months in five municipalities, in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and community organizations.
- The relief GFD phase of EMOP 10700.0 lasted until January 2008, with distributions primarily to women. In February 2008, the recovery phase took over with SFP and FFW activities selected with community participation and implemented with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Recovery was initially planned to last until 30 June 2008, but an emergency food security assessment (EFSA) in March recommended an extension; a no-cost five-month extension was made, until 30 November 2008.

Evaluation Features

- The evaluation took place from 6 to 23 September 2007. The team consisted of two men, specialists in emergency interventions and logistics, and a woman, specialist in nutrition and food security. Their objectives were: i) to assess the extent to which EMOP objectives had been achieved and the effectiveness of the means employed, and to account to stakeholders for expenditures; and ii) to identify lessons, make recommendations and highlight good practice.
- In Managua, the team interviewed staff of the country office, government agencies, United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners. In RAAN, it interviewed staff from the WFP field office, local government agencies and cooperating partners. Visits were made to Puerto Cabezas and Waspan, the main towns affected, three health centres and five communities representative of livelihoods, environments and socio-cultural characteristics; the team divided to interview community leaders and beneficiaries and to examine aspects of the programmes. The evaluation is confident that it succeeded in establishing the facts and securing valid interpretations.



PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS

Operational Design: Relevance and Appropriateness

⇒ Objectives

10. IR-EMOP 10695.0 aimed to provide food aid for 38,000 people for 90 days. EMOP 10700.0 sought to provide immediate food assistance, prevent deterioration of nutritional status – especially among pregnant and lactating women and children under 5 – and preserve and restore livelihoods and community assets through FFW.

⇒ Internal coherence

11. These operations, which are in line with WFP's Strategic Objectives 1 and 2 of the previous Strategic Plan (2006–2009),¹ were formulated on the basis of the 2005 comprehensive food security and vulnerability assessment (CFSVA), the first EFSA and the ongoing CP 10044.0 and PRRO 10212.0.
12. PRRO 10212.0 was suspended in RAAN during the EMOPs. The rationale was that: i) the immediate threat to food security necessitated a rapid response; ii) communications were severely disrupted; and iii) donors were willing to support an EMOP, while there was weak support for the PRRO.

⇒ External coherence

13. WFP coordinated with the National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response (*Sistema Nacional para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención de Desastres*, SINAPRED) and the government of RAAN to identify areas for food distribution. WFP played a significant part in the flash appeal and led the needs assessment. EMOP 10700.0 was in accord with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the United Nations 2000 Common Country Assessment, and supported the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

⇒ Project design

14. The project was designed by the country office and reviewed at Headquarters and the regional bureau; the latter also seconded four staff. Important inputs were: i) the 2005 CFSVA and two EFSAs, the first for initial design, the second after six months; and ii) WFP's knowledge of the context and links with the government of RAAN, communities and individuals.
15. Planned GFD and FFW rations met international standards in terms of protein and fat content; CSB added micronutrients. Rations were adequate if the four foods were supplied together.
16. The food security objective was well formulated: it included indicators that could be collected by monitoring households and communities and allowed identification of ways in which food provided under FFW complemented the recovery activities of other agencies. It also included elements – preserving assets, restoring livelihoods and restoring community infrastructures – that enabled WFP to engage in activities case by case in negotiation with

¹ Strategic Objective 1: Save lives in crisis situations; Strategic Objective 2: Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks.



cooperating partners, rather than prescriptively. This flexibility was advantageous in view of the range of cooperating partners, particularly where the community was the main partner.

17. The logical framework addressed Strategic Objectives 1 and 2, but it had limitations in terms of indicators, which allowed superficial monitoring of logistics rather than outcomes or outputs.
18. The risks and assumptions failed to consider factors that WFP staff were aware of through their work in the CP and PRRO such as the high probability of bad weather affecting logistics, food production, food security and nutrition, and slowing recovery during the EMOP.

⇒ *Appropriateness*

19. WFP responded to the hurricane by rapidly providing GFD, then moving from selective relief according to need, to the recovery phase. This was appropriate in view of chronic food insecurity, the knowledge that communities stressed collective responses and WFP's ability to access remote areas. WFP was flexible in increasing coverage even when decreasing the ration. The selection of mother-and-child health (MCH) for vulnerable groups targeted those most likely to be at nutritional risk.

Outputs and Implementation: Elements of Efficiency

⇒ *Levels of outputs*

20. WFP served 262 communities in 8 municipalities. It took over some communities that SINAPRED was unable to cover: eventually the split was 60 percent WFP to 40 percent SINAPRED.
21. WFP delivered the GFD and FFW components through community interventions and SFP for vulnerable groups through health centres.
22. GFD provided between 1,534 and 1,887 kcal/person/day for between 70,562 and 98,649 beneficiaries for 60 days, compared with the planned figures of 2,131 kcal/person/day for 80,000 beneficiaries over 90 days. In three GFD distributions WFP achieved regular supplies, but there was a shortfall of 53.7 percent per beneficiary compared with planned supply, though communities could access other food.
23. Under EMOP 10700.0, two FFW operations were planned, the first providing for 55,000 beneficiaries and the second for 20,000 beneficiaries; both were to last 90 days and provide 2,131 kcal/person/day. FFW actually provided for 62,385 beneficiaries for 90 days at 1,339 kcal/person/day and for 42,375 individuals for 75 days at 1,665 kcal/person/day. There was a shortfall of 36.9 percent per person, but the numbers of people provided for exceeded plans.
24. The SFP was planned for 35,000 people over 90 days at 1,063 kcal/person/day. It actually provided for 6,764 beneficiaries over 90 days at between 1,050 and 1,177 kcal/person/day. The shortfall per person was about 3 percent, but the total of 10,138 beneficiaries reported as covered probably includes double counting. Of the 835 mt of food planned for the SFP, only 242 mt – 29 percent – was needed. The beneficiaries were pregnant and lactating women and children under 3, continuing the PRRO modality, but they were limited to those able to access the 17 health centres used for the SFP and so were not necessarily the most vulnerable. When CSB was unavailable, it was substituted with YSP, extra oil and rice.



⇒ *Implementation mechanisms*

25. Geographical targeting focused on the most affected areas. WFP covered the less accessible communities that SINAPRED could not reach. Community committees used census lists to organize distributions, monitored by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
26. The logistics unit established rational routes for transport to distribution points. Competitive bidding was used to contract transport companies on WFP's conditions. WFP used sea and river transport where appropriate and arranged for coastal communities to collect food from Puerto Cabezas in their own boats, reducing WFP's transport costs considerably.
27. Monitoring focused on logistics and partners' FFW activities. No monitoring formats were created for nutrition and food security, but the 2005 CFSVA and EFSAs provided accounts of the situation. No nutritional indicators for women in the SFP were collected, nor did clinics analyse child nutritional data or examine links between nutrition and food security. This reflected limitations in the capacity of the Ministry of Social Action.

⇒ *External institutional arrangements*

28. WFP, communities and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry implemented GFD and FFW because few NGOs were in RAAN as potential partners. The programmes were facilitated by community leaders on the basis of equity and communal responsibility; the communities did not in fact distinguish between GFD and FFW rations. WFP also used 36 cooperating partners, including NGOs and health units. WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) coordinated the provision of supplementary food.

⇒ *Cost and funding of the operation*

29. Donors funded 91 percent of the appeal; 74 percent of the food was purchased externally because of the high prices in Nicaraguan markets. Compared with the budget, the price of rice increased by 18 percent, CSB by 3 percent, vegetable oil by 18 percent and YSP by 21 percent.
30. On the basis of expenditures on food in the Corinto warehouses, transport and the five distributions, the cost of providing food ranged from 38 US cents to 49 US cents per person per day.

Results

⇒ *Effectiveness*

31. IR-EMOP 10695.0 successfully delivered appropriate food aid to severely affected people in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Felix.
32. EMOP 10700.0 was planned to assist 80,000 of the 185,000 people affected by the hurricane; SINAPRED covered the rest. In response to a request by the Government, WFP reduced the GFD ration in order to increase coverage to 98,000 people, which helped to maintain the nutritional status of the population. Supplementary feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children under 5 may have been extended to only 10 percent of the planned 35,000, probably reflecting over-estimates of need. Provision was made for children under 3 rather than under 5.



33. FFW activities started slowly with shortfalls in deliveries, but in supporting livelihood recovery and the rebuilding of infrastructures they assisted recovery and were appropriate to the context. Some communities prioritized housing, which took longer than planned and hence reduced the time available for agricultural recovery. Overall in the communities there was a sense of normality and progress.

⇒ *Impact*

34. Impacts were generally positive. WFP food helped to stabilize populations, and there was little migration to towns. Supportive community structures were maintained, and there were some positive changes in settlements: better housing and building methods, improved water and sanitation, improved attendance at MCH centres and some diversification of agriculture. The EMOP had contributed to community awareness of disaster risk.

⇒ *Sustainability*

35. WFP modelled its SFP and FFW on activities under PRRO 10212.0, which provided continuity and facilitated the transition to EMOP 10700.0 and back again. An extension was needed to meet the aims of EMOP 10700.0 given that recovery of food production would be slight until the December 2008 harvest and that food insecurity and malnutrition are the norm in RAAN, as shown by the 2005 CFSVA.
36. FFW is expected to have lasting effects through the infrastructures it leaves: the “build back better” approach made houses more resistant to hurricanes, and new houses will not need repair or replacement for a decade. The skills acquired will be applied in future housing construction; this will allow more time for agricultural work. Innovations in farming such as increased planting of maize and fruit trees will make possible the sale of surplus production, and diversification of crops in new gardens near settlements should improve food security.
37. Supplementary feeding encouraged mothers to attend clinics for growth monitoring and to receive nutritional and medical attention. Improved nutritional status among women and children under 3 will improve overall health.

Cross-Cutting Issues

38. With the exception of the country director, women occupy the senior positions in the country office. In the administrative structures of RAAN, however, women are subordinate. WFP stipulated that deliveries of food should normally be made to women, particularly pregnant and lactating women, and supported women in the management of food and nutrition.
39. In line with WFP programming principles, the design of EMOP 10700.0 emphasized transition to recovery while ensuring that vulnerable groups continued to receive relief. Through FFW, progress was made in: i) the reconstruction of houses; ii) the restoration of clean drinking water sources; iii) improvements in sanitation; and iv) food production as a livelihood.
40. In the challenging environment of RAAN, the difficulties of intervention could be overcome only through effective partnerships. Because there were few NGO partners, WFP maintained its strong relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and formed partnerships with communities.



41. Training the implementers of the March 2008 EFSA ensured a sound product and developed the Government's capacity to assess food needs. FFW supported improved construction techniques and community skills.
42. Information from WFP alerted the Government, the media and donors to the need for a well-funded EMOP; it also contributed to the flash appeal and supported the Government's focus on food. One outcome of building emergency response capacity in the Government was to raise awareness of food-related problems.
43. IR-EMOP 10695.0 and EMOP 10700.0 addressed WFP's protection policies of: i) enabling young children and pregnant and lactating women to meet their nutritional needs; ii) mitigating the effects of natural disasters; iii) responding to sudden calamities; iv) targeting aid to vulnerable groups; and v) protecting women's interests through gender-sensitive action.
44. Replacing trees and clearing storm damage through FFW contributed to environmental rehabilitation. Improved housing will be more resistant to future hurricanes. Local people have become more aware of hurricane hazard, which is important in fostering community-based disaster response.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment

⇒ *Relevance and appropriateness*

45. The design was suitable for addressing the needs of a rural population affected by a rapid-onset disaster, was in line with the livelihoods and priorities of beneficiaries, and in accord with the policies and priorities of WFP, donors and the Government. WFP started GFD immediately in a time of intense need. Communities participated in targeting and distributing food, and used GFD and FFW to support recovery. Food assistance for vulnerable groups was less appropriate because it used MCH clinics to distribute food, bypassing community structures; but it revived support for clinics and thus helped to improve nutrition.

⇒ *Effectiveness*

46. Rapid intervention enabled immediate provision of food, but the two-month gap between GFD and FFW was unfortunate. WFP supported a range of FFW activities but was less successful in achieving food security when some beneficiaries prioritized housing. FFW restored community and individual assets, and communities made effective use of food to support recovery; nutritional impacts could not be measured. The food security objectives included measurable indicators of success, but these were not monitored.

⇒ *Efficiency*

47. Emergency preparedness in the four days after the alert built on the foundation of routine planning. Partly as a result of effective advocacy, EMOP 10700.0 was well funded and started quickly; the logistics unit moved food rapidly in spite of logistics challenges. Transport was expensive, but WFP responded innovatively to logistics problems. Five secondments and training for EFSA implementers enhanced the response of the country office. Better food security indicators would have improved efficiency. Delays in starting



and developing FFW and the SFP probably reflected problems in finding suitable cooperating partners.

⇒ *Impact*

48. Impacts were mainly positive: community cohesion was maintained; settlements were improved, including better housing, water and sanitation and attendance at MCH centres. There was some diversification of agriculture and some enhancement of the position of women. There was no evidence of marginalization or aid dependency, and WFP's food aid reduced beneficiaries' need for expensive food purchases.

⇒ *Sustainability of results or connectedness of processes*

49. The EMOP is likely to improve nutrition and food security. Partnerships were enhanced, infrastructures were improved and local capacity was developed: these will be of value in future emergencies and when WFP's interventions have been handed over. Communities were resilient and self-reliant, and made effective use of food aid. But chronic problems relating to food require long-term solutions that address the causes of malnutrition.

Issues for the Future

⇒ *Preparedness*

50. RAAN experiences chronic food insecurity and malnutrition. WFP has limited resources for PRRO 10212.0 and few partners, yet it must respond to chronic problems and prepare for emergencies. Different monitoring indicators must be designed for use in emergencies.
51. Contingency planning could benefit from WFP's knowledge of the context of intervention and the relationships developed in normal programmes to improve emergency preparedness, and CFSVAs could provide information about needs and opportunities to inform the planning of EMOPs. Other countries could benefit from CFSVAs and EFSAs in inaccessible emergency-prone areas in terms of updating contingency plans. It may be advisable to implement CFSVAs in all countries where WFP is active (see recommendation 1).

⇒ *Advocacy*

52. Well-supported and timely advocacy helped the country office to raise resources. The EFSAs were valuable for the Government and humanitarian agencies. WFP could consider ways to disseminate information from EFSAs more rapidly and widely (see recommendation 4).

⇒ *Intervention design*

53. The EFSAs were valuable snapshots of changing emergency conditions. The capacity to undertake EFSAs and incorporate them into other WFP programmes must be maintained with a view to monitoring trends; they can also be used as baselines in situations such as chronic emergencies and for extreme emergencies. The EFSAs built on the baseline CFSVA by using some of the same variables to identify trends (see recommendations 2, 3, 9 and 18).



⇒ *Logical framework*

54. The logical framework contained weak indicators and inadequate risk assessment. The capacity to develop logical frameworks for EMOPs cannot be deferred to the next emergency. Indicators must be suitable for emergencies but must also relate to the indicators for normal conditions so that they are not completely novel. Indicators for emergency nutrition and food security are needed (see recommendations 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9).

⇒ *Implementation*

55. Some beneficiaries prioritized rebuilding homes before agricultural recovery, so recovery of food production was slowed. WFP must seek partners for the recovery of food production, and must anticipate the effects of community priorities when designing FFW interventions.
56. In EMOP 10700.0, WFP chose to provide less food for more people, which was the right decision in the circumstances. It was a choice between coverage and quality of nutrition, and between nutrition and food security objectives. It raises the question of whether short-term EMOPs can realistically have the nutritional impact aimed for in project objectives.

⇒ *Monitoring*

57. Some logical framework indicators were imprecise or unsuitable. The country office must ensure that: i) indicators are suitable for emergency conditions; ii) monitors are competent to use the indicators; iii) monitoring partners are aware of WFP monitoring and reporting norms; iv) MCH indicators are in line with the activities of cooperating partners; and v) reports to partners are delivered on time.
58. The design of EMOP 10700.0 could have made better use of the more structured monitoring approach used for PRRO and CP activities. WFP could provide standardized monitoring forms and ensure that monitoring is not limited to reporting activities, but includes analysis of information for decision-making purposes (see recommendations 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13).

⇒ *Partnerships*

59. The established relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which enabled WFP to respond rapidly to Hurricane Felix, has benefited both parties and should be developed by monitoring of programme activities and the changing situation. WFP needs other cooperating partners for normal and emergency conditions.
60. WFP and UNICEF are concerned with nutritional outcomes; UNICEF is the United Nations lead agency for nutrition. Both were operating in RAAN in response to Hurricane Felix, but with different operational practices. It is important that the agencies coordinate their work to provide the same standards of service (see recommendations 14 and 15).

⇒ *Exit strategy*

61. The EMOP mechanism allows extensions, which have to be justified: more time may be needed to complete activities, for example, or changing circumstances may create new needs. In EMOP 10700.0, changing circumstances and delayed implementation created the need for extensions (see recommendations 18 and 19).



Recommendations

62. There are 19 recommendations (Rec.); higher-priority recommendations are in **bold**.

⇒ *Preparedness*

63. The country office should:

Rec. 1: **maintain and improve its emergency preparedness by building on experience gained in EMOPs 10695.0 and 10700.0; with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, it should undertake an after-action review of WFP and cooperating partner performance as soon as possible after the end of EMOP 10700.0, possibly including the regional bureau and cooperating partners; this should be used to develop the contingency plan and to inform preparedness and the planning of post-EMOP activities.**

⇒ *Intervention design*

64. The country office should:

Rec. 2: **maintain the quality of initial EFSAs by training in anticipation of emergencies, and of subsequent EFSAs by training such as that carried out for the second EFSA;**

Rec. 3: continue to involve the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in EFSAs, and consider multi-agency EFSAs; and

Rec. 4: develop a communications strategy, including rapid dissemination of EFSA results, to support advocacy, inform the work of other agencies and avoid duplication; formal and informal networks could be used.

⇒ *Logical framework*

65. The country office should:

Rec. 5: consider the selective participation of cooperating partners, and particularly the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, in preparing logical frameworks;

Rec. 6: **link the design of monitoring and reporting systems with the development of logical frameworks, bearing in mind the capacities of implementers and monitors, and build capacity as required to support this;**

Rec. 7: **assess the risk of emergencies thoroughly, with attention to probability, urgency and possible seriousness, and prioritize the risks;**

Rec. 8: **work with the Programme Design and Support Division to develop nutrition and food security indicators for short-term interventions (or, if this is not possible, approaches using proxy indicators such as food consumption surveys or household interviews could be developed); and**

Rec. 9: review the logical framework in the light of EFSA findings, routine monitoring of food security and nutrition, other contextual risk factors and information about the work of other actors.



Implementation

⇒ *Monitoring*

66. The country office should:

- Rec. 10: **consider monitoring in greater depth a few sentinel sites representative of livelihoods, environments and social structures, to identify food sources other than WFP which should provide information on the extent of recovery and would be in addition to routine monitoring (the method used in the second EFSA is a model); sentinel sites could be monitored under the CP and PRRO, bearing seasonality in mind;**
- Rec. 11: negotiate the design of the monitoring system with partners in anticipation of emergencies, maintaining compatibility with PRRO and CP activities as far as possible;
- Rec. 12: ensure that monitoring is related more to outcomes;
- Rec. 13: prioritize monitoring of market prices, given the 67 percent dependence on market purchases of food; and
- Rec. 14: ensure that the quality of the products of FFW is monitored, and that FFW supports the full range of recovery activities.

⇒ *Partnerships*

67. The country office should:

- Rec. 15: continue to seek longer-term partnerships to improve EMOP and PRRO interventions; and
- Rec. 16: **support institutional development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry with training for monitoring, including a computerized monitoring and evaluation system and database that enables the collection of timeline data.**

⇒ *Programme delivery*

68. The country office should:

- Rec. 17: factor seasonal aspects of food security into interventions, for example by planning EMOP hand-over strategies in relation to harvests to enhance the probability of recovery;
- Rec. 18: ensure that EMOPs aim where feasible to maintain modalities from pre-emergency activities to secure continuity; and
- Rec. 19: record the rationale for variations in the coverage of distributions, for example by modifying EMOPs through extensions.

ANNEX

Map of Nicaragua: WFP's Response to Hurricane Felix



Produced by WFP Food Security Analysis Service (OMXF) This map may be downloaded from <http://vam.wfp.org/vamsie>
 The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.



ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

| | |
|----------|---|
| CFSVA | comprehensive food security and vulnerability assessment |
| CP | country programme |
| CSB | corn-soya blend |
| EFSA | emergency food security assessment |
| EMOP | emergency operation |
| FFW | food for work |
| GFD | general food distribution |
| IR-EMOP | immediate response EMOP |
| MCH | mother-and-child health |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| PRRO | protracted relief and recovery operation |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| RAAN | Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic (<i>Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte</i>) |
| SFP | supplementary feeding programme |
| SINAPRED | National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response (<i>Sistema Nacional para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención de Desastres</i>) |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| YSP | yellow split peas |