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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO PRRO 106080

**Targeted Food Aid for the Victims of Armed
Conflict and other Vulnerable Groups**

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

Director, Office of Evaluation: Ms C. Heider tel.: 066513-2030

Evaluation Officer, Office of
Evaluation: Ms C. Conan tel.: 066513-3480

Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms C. Panlilio, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The evaluation examined the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of interventions implemented under protracted relief and recovery operation 106080 “Targeted Food Aid for the Victims of Armed Conflict and other Vulnerable Groups” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The evaluation sought to measure how far the objectives set had been achieved and to draw lessons from them in order to strengthen WFP’s intervention in the country. The mission was undertaken by a team of external consultants who visited the field from 25 January to 14 February 2009.

Following the first presidential and general elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in more than 40 years, and in a context that was expected to become gradually more settled, the operation initially aimed at providing assistance to 3.4 million beneficiaries between July 2007 and December 2009 through relief and recovery activities. But the constant deterioration of the situation in the east of the country required six operation budget increases so that the initial budget doubled and the number of beneficiaries swelled to 6.6 million.

As regards relevance, the objectives of the operation took into account the main strategic issues facing the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Concentrating activities in the east is fully justified by the high rates of food insecurity and violence in the region, which is not the case in Equateur Province.

Support for school feeding in primary schools fully corresponds with national priorities; of less relevance is the fact that the programme is only classified as part of the emergency operations component. While the number of beneficiaries of school feeding has soared in Katanga following the arrival of a large number of internally displaced persons, results remain fragile, however. Furthermore the remoteness of many intervention zones makes it impossible to monitor activities systematically and reliably. Finally, joint targeting with the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is sometimes difficult. Coordination and monitoring need to be improved.

The enlarged vulnerable group category includes seven different groups. Ration size, duration of distribution and ration composition differ from one province to another, which needs clarifying.

A major pipeline break occurred between July and October 2008 following a series of problems attributed to the global crisis. Those delays, together with violence and increased population movements in North Kivu, forced WFP to concentrate on priority emergency activities and suspend food-for-asset activities.

Local purchasing by WFP increased considerably in 2008, which could contribute to revitalizing formerly prosperous agricultural areas. Therefore it would be useful to define more clearly the policies concerning logistical assistance to partners and Purchase for Progress.




Despite a lack of systematic and reliable monitoring, nutrition programmes, together with general food distributions, had a positive impact on nutritional status of children under 5. In addition, mortality has fallen throughout the country, particularly in the eastern part of the country – an improvement to which WFP has certainly contributed.

As part of efforts to make the operation more efficient, WFP's offices were decentralized in view of the huge size of the country and the variety of local conditions. But difficulties remain and the efforts should continue. WFP is working with a smaller number of partners selected on the basis of their capacity. Relations with certain critical ministries were recently strained, and the level of commitment shown by provincial authorities can vary considerably from one area to another; this calls for strengthening capacity and building on relationships.

Assets obtained may not prove sustainable because malnutrition is endemic and all too often linked to poverty, ignorance or traditions. This is particularly so in Equateur Province, which should benefit from a development programme. Only the Government has the ability and authority to impose sustainable solutions through its local representatives. Advocacy activities should also be increased in this area.

The protection of women, the main cross-cutting issue, is effectively taken into account in the main operational activities as far as local conditions allow. But gender disparity is very noticeable among national staff in WFP's offices in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Democratic Republic of the Congo PRRO 106080” (WFP/EB.2/2009/6-D) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2009/6-D/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.



BACKGROUND

Context

1. After many years of economic and political disintegration, between 1997 and 2003 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suffered a series of devastating conflicts which are estimated to have caused the deaths of 4.4 million people and vast population movements. Subsequently, the situation gradually stabilized as a result of the efforts of a new Government supported by the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and the international community. The reconstruction process culminated in presidential and general elections in 2006, the first in more than 40 years. Enormous challenges remain, however, and the pacification process is still very fragile in the east of the country as evidenced by the violence in North Kivu in late 2008 and the present troubles in Haut-Uélé in Eastern Province.
2. Despite its potential wealth, the DRC remains one of the world's poorest countries with a per capita gross national product of only US\$120 in 2005, compared with US\$380 in 1960 and US\$224 in 1990. The United Nations Development Programme 2007 human development index placed the DRC 168th out of 177 countries. Of a population recently estimated at between 58 and 65 million people, more than 70 percent live below the poverty line and 52 percent are "extremely poor". Despite the country's huge agricultural potential, 30 percent of households, particularly in the east, are reported to have access to "critical" food consumption of on average two incomplete meals a day; 6 percent consume a "poor" cassava-based diet. Endemic malnutrition accounts for 11 percent of deaths and is one of the main causes of mortality. The school enrolment rate dropped to 64 percent between 2001 and 2002, but appears to have recovered to some extent since then. In a country the size of the whole of Western Europe only 20 percent of the territory is accessible by road and there are only 2,000 km of paved roads. Deteriorated infrastructure also impedes aid delivery.

Description of the Operation

3. Following protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 102880, which assisted 3.5 million people in the DRC between 2004 and 2006 with 203,000 mt of food at a cost of US\$253 million, PRRO 106080 aims to help reduce hunger and poverty by distributing 210,000 mt of food to 3.4 million beneficiaries between July 2007 and December 2009 in a context that is expected to stabilize.
4. The objectives of the PRRO include: i) access to food for victims of conflict; ii) improvement in their health status; iii) protection against violence; and iv) school enrolment for children in returnee areas. The PRRO has two main components divided into five activities:
 - **Emergency relief:** i) general food distribution (GFD) for internally displaced persons (IDPs); ii) targeted nutritional programmes; iii) assistance for particularly vulnerable groups such as victims of sexual violence (VSVs), in-transit refugees or people living with HIV (PLHIV); and iv) emergency school feeding.
 - **Recovery:** i) food-for-asset (FFA) activities; and ii) assistance for demobilized child soldiers.



5. The continuing deterioration of the situation in eastern DRC and successive large-scale population movements resulted in six successive budget revisions which brought the initial budget of US\$230.8 million to US\$499.7 million in early 2009. The amount of food to be distributed increased to 376,000 mt in November 2008, with the share allocated to emergency relief rising from 78 percent to 90 percent, reflecting the increase in the number of beneficiaries to 6.6 million.

	Date	Budget (US\$)	Total tonnage	Beneficiaries (2007–2009)	% emergency relief	% recovery
PRRO	July 2007	230 874 212	210 084	3 367 770	78 (165 000 mt)	22 (45 000 mt)
Budget rev. 3	August 2008	426 878 043 (+ 149 330 759)	320 233 (+ 110 149)	6 594 690	90	10
Budget rev. 4	November 2008	497 022 609 (+ 70 144 566)	376 153 (+ 55 920)	6 355 490	90	10
Budget rev 5/6	2009	499 681 226	[Not available]	[Not available]	[Not available]	[Not available]

6. WFP also conducts other operations in the DRC, including special operation (SO) 105560 – coordination of the logistics cluster, inter-agency logistics services, management of a fleet of trucks, road and infrastructure repair, rail, air, river and lake transport – and SO 107440 – air services for the humanitarian community in the DRC (not currently operational) – and an emergency operation (EMOP) in 2009 to assist victims of insecurity in the Haut-Uélé District.

Evaluation Features

7. The evaluation aims to assess the degree of success or failure of PRRO activities until February 2009, to determine the reasons for and to draw lessons from them in order to strengthen WFP's operations in the DRC. It covers all of the PRRO's activities in six provinces (see map in the Annex).
8. The methods used were those of the WFP Office of Evaluation's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS), which are based on the norms of the United Nations Evaluation Group. An evaluation matrix served as a guide in the field. Certain constraints should be noted: the field mission was delayed for two months because of security problems in North Kivu and Eastern provinces and access was restricted by poor roads. But overall the mission was able to focus as planned on the three very different situations that coexist in the DRC and that represent the main stages of a necessary progression: from conflict-driven emergency in Kivu to recovery in Katanga and the beginnings of development in Equateur.



PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS

Operation Design: Relevance and Appropriateness

9. The objectives of the PRRO take into account the overall strategic directions found in the main reference documents for the DRC such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the Humanitarian Action Plan. The design of the operation took into account the recommendations of previous evaluations and reflected WFP's Strategic Objectives for 2004–2007 and subsequently those redefined in the Strategic Plan (2008–2011).
10. In view of the results of the food security assessments conducted in 2005 and 2008, the PRRO's focus on eastern DRC is fully justified. It was found that food insecurity is higher in Katanga and South Kivu, where food consumption is poor in more than 10 percent of households. Similarly, "critical" rates of food consumption are frequent in Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu, Eastern Province and Katanga. However, the latest assessment, undertaken after the PRRO was designed, indicates that vulnerability in Equateur Province appears to be structural and less marked than in the other provinces. Malnutrition is localized and endemic because of the province's isolation and poor nutritional habits linked to the traditions of local hunter-gatherers. Focus on that province therefore appears less justified.
11. The choice of activities is fully justified. As regards emergency relief, GFD and well-targeted, short-term emergency nutrition activities were recommended in the five eastern provinces, which are classified as the most vulnerable. Assistance to vulnerable groups is also relevant. In contrast, while support to school feeding in primary schools corresponds to national priorities, its classification as part of the emergency relief component is relevant only if population movements or returns continue. The PRRO also supports the United Nations Children's Fund's (UNICEF's) *Espaces communautaires d'éveil* (Community Early Learning Spaces) project for children under 5, which was not included in the description of activities.
12. As regards the recovery component the FFA concept implies greater participation by the communities concerned, which responds to the critical need to raise awareness among beneficiaries. Similarly, the number of former child soldiers to be reintegrated is dropping in Katanga and Equateur but may soon increase if the crisis in the Kivus is overcome.
13. The PRRO moved to greater decentralization in the face of constraints related to the huge size of the country, the variety of situations and communications problems between the country office and sub-offices. However, this contributed to the setting up of three different programmes that correspond to local realities but can be difficult to reconcile within a single operation. These three are:
 - emergency relief in response to the continuing conflict in Kivu and Eastern Province;
 - recovery following the return of IDPs to Katanga and Maniema; and
 - development in Equateur Province.

Results

14. Increased population movements in North Kivu and major supply difficulties between July and October 2008 following a series of problems arising from the global crisis forced WFP to concentrate temporarily on emergency activities, using 90 percent of the tonnage, at the expense of the recovery component. Nonetheless, judicious use of the main eastern supply corridors made it possible for transport to be organized satisfactorily, although the condition of the roads, the size of the target areas and security problems considerably reduced the coverage of activities beyond the main roads. Delivery times are particularly long in Katanga.
15. Given the problems outlined above, the level of achievement is on the whole very reasonable: in 2008 all activities registered a considerable increase in the number of beneficiaries (between 43 percent and 138 percent), with the exception of FFA (3 percent).
16. **GFD** is concentrated in the Kivus and Eastern Province; in 2008, they served 138 percent more beneficiaries than expected to meet increased needs resulting from successive population movements. Given the emergency situation and the absence of reliable data from other sources, WFP had to estimate the size of the populations concerned. The approach initially led to a substantial overestimate of needs; this reflects one of the major constraints in WFP's programming process in that it has to anticipate events to supply food at the right time, something which some donors find it difficult to understand. Failure to identify the phenomenon of "commuter" populations also led to some confusion. "Commuters" fall half way between the categories of IDPs and returnees: they live part of the time in camps for security reasons but return home as soon as they can to tend their land, which is often located close by. Their concern is to maintain their sharecropping rights because they are afraid of losing their fields. They are often perceived as double beneficiaries.
17. With regard to **nutrition**, the number of beneficiaries was more than 43 percent above the initially planned level; the emergency response was timely, notably in North Kivu. Nutritional programme coverage in Katanga and Equateur focuses on priority areas, but remains relatively limited. Coverage is better in the Kivus, but is nonetheless limited in relation to needs. Furthermore, supply problems have had a negative impact on the overall nutritional value of the ration, reducing protein and micronutrients. They also affected family protection rations, but the fact that there were no serious consequences in terms of attendance rates or the time taken by malnourished patients to recover calls into question the appropriateness of the family rations: they were clearly not justified in Equateur Province, where supplementary feeding provides two cooked meals a day. Outpatient treatment of malnutrition at the community level is practically non-existent in the DRC.
18. The broader category of **vulnerable groups** includes seven different groups: i) VSVs, ii) PLHIV undergoing anti-retroviral therapy; iii) PLHIV following a prevention of mother-to-child transmission programme; iv) patients receiving therapeutic nutritional feeding; v) patients receiving supplementary nutritional feeding; vi) refugees; and vii) victims of natural disasters. Ration sizes, duration and composition all differ. The reasons given to justify these differences are not always clear, and as a result WFP staff follow different policies in different sub-offices. Generally speaking, partners are satisfied with the coverage and the composition of rations provided to vulnerable groups, as well as the quantity and timeliness of the rations. It should be noted that in practice WFP policies are not always followed to the letter, especially feeding in hospital settings, with targeting including criteria not based strictly on vulnerability. The focus has been on urban settings and the duration of assistance for some groups has been reduced. But victims of violence and PLHIV benefited from income-generating activities as a result of WFP food-for-



training (FFT) activities, and WFP food contributes to reducing the impact of HIV/AIDS on the food security of the people affected.

19. In North Kivu, only 52 percent of the planned beneficiaries took advantage of **school feeding** activities, a reflection of the difficulties of enrolling IDP children in schools in often unpredictable and transitory circumstances. In Katanga, on the other hand, in order to provide for a mass influx of returnees and to avoid the previously criticized practice of spreading resources too thin, 95 percent of planned beneficiaries received assistance. However, this was achieved at the expense of other activities, especially FFA. In Equateur Province, school feeding reached more children in 2008.
20. If day-to-day management in schools appears to be efficient, coherence problems arise with the two main partners in this activity. WFP sometimes gives the impression of being pulled in one direction by UNICEF, which follows a policy of targeting a large number of schools and early-learning centres, and in the other direction by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which works to ensure the sustainability of activities through school gardens. Although identification missions are generally carried out jointly and selection criteria identical, there is a certain lack of cohesion and the number of jointly-targeted schools is still relatively low.
21. While evidence of the significant impact of school feeding is provided by the large increase in overall attendance rates of (10 percent more than the norm) and by its effect on gender parity (12 percent more girls), such results are quite fragile. Beyond the fact that the activity does not yet have an effective sustainability strategy – school gardens alone cannot provide all the food needed to prepare the meals – such results are often achieved at the expense of nearby non-assisted schools that may offer a better education. Gender parity is not achieved in the higher grades and attendance remains very sensitive to economic shocks; any increase in education costs can also result in a sudden drop in attendance levels despite school feeding.
22. The pipeline break had a negative impact on FFA, which was not implemented in North Kivu. WFP did ensure the protection of seeds distributed by FAO to returnees. FFA activities had to be suspended in Katanga, but prior to the break, WFP had contributed to the construction by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ, German Agency for Technical Cooperation) of 320 homes for returnees. These have since become a model reproduced by local people. The “rehabilitated villages” approach includes the formation of a local road-maintenance committee responsible for repairs. Equateur Province was expected to be less affected than other areas by the pipeline break and able to concentrate more on development, but FFA decreased by 29 percent in 2008: local people did not recognize the importance of the work and of maintaining the new assets. But WFP intervened to protect the seeds FAO had distributed and contributed to a major programme aimed at strengthening autonomous food production capacity which targeted 76,600 households in returnee areas.

Impact and Sustainability

23. Despite the lack of systematic data and some weaknesses, the nutritional programme combined with GFD had a positive impact on the nutritional status of children under 5. Two surveys in Katanga in 2008 showed that overall food security had improved slightly. WFP has undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in the mortality rate, particularly in the eastern part of the country. In addition, income-generating activities are expected to have a



beneficial impact for the most vulnerable PLHIV and VSVs, who are so often victims of exclusion.

24. The sustainability of activities is not assured. In Katanga and Equateur, the current operation cannot be a long-term solution to endemic malnutrition, which is basically linked to traditions, with a lack of protein to supplement cassava. This is evident from the many relapses that occur after completion of the nutrition programme. Local structures in Katanga and Equateur are not in a position to take over school feeding because school gardens, nutritional education and awareness-raising are inadequate. Certain harmful habits appear to be deeply rooted and may vary considerably from one area to another, requiring different approaches. Only the Government has the capacity and authority to impose long-term solutions.

Implementation Mechanisms

⇒ *Cost efficiency*

25. In terms of cost efficiency, the evaluation concluded that the traditional major transportation corridors through Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa were used judiciously and that new routes through Zambia accelerated transport and reduced costs. But initiatives to improve internal transport, such as the rehabilitation of railway equipment, were inconclusive because of the weakness of institutional actors. Imports across Lake Tanganyika are also hampered by the limited capacity of Kalemie port. In Katanga, the huge spread of activities, the long distances and bad roads lead to considerable losses of money and energy.

⇒ *Logistics and procurement*

26. Logistics activities were adapted to regional situations and frequent fluctuations in the number and categories of beneficiaries. WFP assisted its partners through the Inter-Agency Logistics Service by making available a properly managed transport and storage capability. But in Katanga logistics assistance is sometimes provided beyond the normal final delivery points (FDPs), which involves extra work and additional expense. In North Kivu, insecurity prevalent in IDP camps requires secured and centralized distribution from Goma, which reduces the scope of the intervention and excludes many potential beneficiaries.
27. WFP's local purchases increased significantly in 2008 and are contributing to revitalizing agriculture in areas that were once prosperous but have suffered years of economic decline.

⇒ *Internal organization*

28. The PRRO had included a commitment to decentralization in view of the immense size of the country and the variety of situations in different regions. But difficulties remain, especially with regard to communications that are sometimes inadequately followed up, and to coordination and the boundaries of operational responsibilities – vulnerability analysis and mapping, programming, logistics, relations with partners and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, funds available to sub-offices in the east are insufficient in the light of activities there. That is liable to slow GFD during periods of more intense activity and could even create tension with local sub-contractors. In Katanga a permanent presence in remote areas would allow activities to be monitored more effectively and would reduce the costs of missions and logistics.



29. Monitoring of activities is often irregular and unreliable. Data are often not collected, and some figures appear unrealistic. A number of areas, especially in Katanga and Equateur, are so hard to reach that it is impossible to monitor activities systematically. The issue is particularly important in the area of malnutrition because some figures suggest that they were being heavily influenced by the time of year when surveys were conducted. Underlying causes of hunger, which are crucial for determining a comprehensive strategy for combating malnutrition, are often ignored. With regard to school feeding, it is difficult to reconcile the high overall attendance figures for 2008 published by the Lubumbashi office with the often much lower figures in partners' reports, which shows an inability to conduct regular monthly monitoring of activities in inaccessible areas.

⇒ *Partnerships*

30. The PRRO aimed to work together with a limited number of external partners – 72 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – selected on the basis of their operational capacity and experience in the field. This objective has essentially been achieved. Enhancing the capacities of WFP's partners while providing awareness-raising and information for beneficiaries should be continuous processes to be implemented throughout the operation, because those activities determine the overall effectiveness. A single session is not enough to train field personnel or local managers as they are often subject to rapid turnover.

31. The reorganization of the Government at the end of 2008 somewhat disrupted established relations with certain crucial ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture. At the provincial level the situation varies considerably, depending on the extent to which provincial governments are committed to international assistance.

⇒ *Protection of women*

32. In line with WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women, protection of women – the main cross-cutting issue – is taken into account in the operation as local situations permit. Women are the main recipients of family rations in the camps and lead most management committees. Recommended protection measures are applied during distributions to prevent violence and abuse. But most national staff in WFP offices in the DRC are men and the gender focal point has little influence on programme design.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Targeting

33. WFP should continue to focus its activities on work in accessible areas, using the resources available, especially in Katanga.

Programme

34. Equateur Province should benefit from a development programme as soon as the planned decentralization becomes effective. The region could serve as a pilot project requiring real involvement of the Government. An integrated strategy for ending the crisis in North Kivu should also be prepared that could possibly include cash-for-work activities, as long as careful preparations are made in advance. A study devoted to "commuter" IDPs should be undertaken as they could play a potentially important role in future recovery.



35. With regard to GFD, micronutrient-fortified products should be included in the food baskets for IDPs and pregnant and lactating women receiving nutritional support. It is also necessary to improve targeting; reduce the large number of ration types distributed to the various vulnerable groups; extend the coverage offered outside urban areas; speed up the setting up of therapeutic community feeding centres and of activities related to health and to mother-and-child nutrition; and promote income-generating activities based on FFT programmes. Finally, nutritional skills need to be strengthened.
36. The coherence of the approach to schools supported jointly by UNICEF, FAO and WFP should be improved, particularly with a view to preventing resources from being stretched too thinly and to ensure that infrastructures are properly maintained, as well as to provide seeds for school gardens on a systematic basis. As far as possible, eligible schools in any target zone should be given equal support to avoid emptying out neighbouring schools where school feeding is not offered but the level of education is decent. Early-learning centres should be supported only if there are no negative effects on school feeding in primary schools, which should remain the priority for WFP. Lastly, the Integral Development Initiative approach should be studied and, if justified, its results should be circulated and the approach recommended to partners.

Logistics

37. WFP should continue to reduce costs, particularly by setting up FDPs in Katanga from which partners will be fully responsible for logistics. WFP should determine the fee to be charged for trucks loaned to NGOs and, drawing the sums required from the pooled fund, speed up the works on the Kalemie–Nyunzu–Kabalo corridor, which will also contribute to ending the economic isolation of the region. WFP should undertake road repairs only if they help overcome isolation and if local people are prepared to maintain them.

Local Purchases

38. Policy on local purchases must be clearly defined. If WFP wishes to participate in agricultural development under Purchase for Progress (P4P) by re-activating centres for agricultural export to Tanganyika and in Equateur, it is necessary to establish with stakeholders the objectives to be achieved and to set up an intervention plan to ensure that prices are competitive in local markets.

Monitoring

39. The effectiveness of programmes should be measured regularly through robust surveys or, failing that, on the basis of data obtained from reliable partners. Direct beneficiaries should be distinguished from their families. Joint monitoring surveys for malnutrition, including underlying causes, and mortality should be conducted in all intervention areas to measure the impact of activities. With regard to school feeding, data should be further disaggregated by gender and school year.

Internal Organization

40. WFP should continue to decentralize its implementation mechanisms by giving local offices greater programming and financial autonomy in line with their needs. In Katanga, a permanent presence in some remote areas would enable more effective monitoring of activities and reduce costs of missions and logistics. An overall coordinator should be appointed for the eastern provinces who is given extensive responsibility and put in charge



of communications with Kinshasa. The basic tasks of the country office in Kinshasa should therefore be redefined. More room should be made in the organigram for the gender focal point and gender equity should be improved among national personnel.

Partnerships

41. Partners should be trained as part of a continuous process throughout the operation to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of achievements and to facilitate the hand-over of responsibilities to national stakeholders. Communications with some donors should be improved with regard to estimated beneficiary numbers, budget figures and budget revisions.

Advocacy

42. The number of contacts must be increased and advocacy intensified to improve the participation of government partners at both national and provincial levels. The work accomplished through WFP programmes will not be sustainable without government involvement. In-depth and continuing awareness-raising initiatives for beneficiaries are also necessary.



ANNEX

Democratic Republic of the Congo PRRO 106080



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDP	final delivery point
FFA	food for assets
FFT	food for training
GDP	gross domestic product
GFD	general food distribution
GTZ	<i>Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
IDP	internally displaced person
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC
NGO	non-governmental organization
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PLHIV	people living with HIV
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SO	special operation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VSV	victim of sexual violence