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WFP SECURITY REPORT



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.


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Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact Ms I. Carpitella, Administrative Assistant, Conference Servicing Unit (tel.: 066513-2645).

* Field Security Division

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “WFP Security Report” (WFP/EB.A/2010/13-F).

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

FOREWORD BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

1. In 2009 acts of violence affected more people advancing WFP's mission of fighting hunger than ever recorded before, showing that WFP staff function in an environment of increasing security challenges. When our office in Islamabad, Pakistan was attacked by a suicide bomber on 5 October 2009, it was the first time that WFP was specifically targeted and the tragedy alerted the United Nations system that we have entered a new level of danger. This event tested the United Nations security system in a way that no one would want. Important lessons were learned from this incident and from others, both about what went right and what we need to change so that we can create a safer environment for all of our staff.
2. The threats WFP staff are facing are increasing. In 2009 nine staff members were killed, including five in the attack in Islamabad. A further 23 staff were injured by acts of violence, an increase from 17 in 2008. In addition to WFP staff members, 6 contractors working with WFP were killed in acts of violence and 11 were injured.
3. As horrible and devastating as the losses were in 2009, they could have been much worse if we had not already taken measures to strengthen our security. In Islamabad, we had reinforced the building earlier in the year, which prevented a complete collapse that would have resulted in even more tragic losses. WFP's guidance for the mandatory installation of blast film meant that not a single person was injured by glass shards in the attack. Even with these actions, we can and we must do more, and we are taking action now, including escalated compliance with minimum operating security standards at WFP offices around the world.
4. This report cites security incidents affecting WFP staff and operations as well as incidents affecting contractors and partners, whose services are crucial to feeding hungry people. It shows that WFP is increasingly targeted, a situation which is being made worse by militants who are encouraging violence against humanitarian workers. The report also outlines the objectives of field security, and includes steps for the identification and prioritization of security enhancements to help WFP stay in the field safely. The strategy addresses the need to enhance flexibility, internal security management, training, information and analysis, and the implementation of key risk mitigation measures.
5. Through its participation in the United Nations Security Management System coordinated by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, and its commitment to fulfilling its mandate of providing assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies, WFP is committed to enhancing its security activities to ensure the most vulnerable are served. We are doing everything to balance our responsibility to protect our frontline staff and our mission to feed hungry people.



Josette Sheeran
Executive Director

BACKGROUND

6. During 2009, WFP staff members faced increasing safety and security threats. The United Nations system and humanitarian community operate in unstable conditions characterized by armed conflict, terrorism, abduction, harassment, banditry and intimidation. This report provides information related to significant incident reports in 2009 related to WFP operations, and supplements the Secretary-General's report, "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel" (A/64/336).
7. The Secretary-General noted in his report that "the trend of a lack of respect for the emblems and efforts of humanitarian organizations continued unabated". He has also expressed deep concern regarding the increased vulnerability of United Nations and humanitarian personnel and assets. Specific reference was made to the disturbing trend of politically or criminally motivated targeting of United Nations and humanitarian personnel resulting in an increased number of security incidents.
8. Reaffirming the responsibility of Member States as host governments for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations staff, the Secretary-General called for concerted action to respond to the threats faced by United Nations staff members. The implementation of sound security programmes and policies will improve the capacity to address multifaceted vulnerabilities and identify appropriate and timely mitigation measures. The Secretary-General called upon Member States to support the enhancement of United Nations security structures to allow the United Nations to deliver its mandate in areas where host government capacities are limited.
9. On 7 December 2009, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel" (A/RES/64/77). The resolution urges Member States to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and humanitarian personnel, and to respect the inviolability of United Nations premises. Particular attention should be paid to the safety and security of locally recruited personnel, who are particularly vulnerable to attacks and who account for the majority of casualties. Member States were encouraged to take strong action to ensure that acts of violence committed on their territory against United Nations and other humanitarian personnel are investigated and that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The General Assembly noted the importance of reinforcing collaboration between the United Nations and host Governments in contingency planning, information exchange and risk assessment on issues relating to the safety of United Nations and humanitarian personnel.
10. This report details threats to the safety and security of WFP staff and assets, and partner and contractor staff supporting WFP operations. While not exhaustive, this report is indicative of the threats experienced in 2009 by WFP and its partners.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF OR ASSETS, AND PARTNER STAFF

11. WFP faced deteriorating security conditions in many locations, hindering its ability to deliver assistance. In 2009, 620 security incidents involving staff or assets were reported. Although the number of security incidents decreased slightly compared to 2008 (when 657 incidents were registered), the 2009 data showed an increase of 68 percent since 2006

(see Figure 1¹). Work-related incidents accounted for 80 percent (445) of security incidents reported.²

12. WFP staff members were increasingly targeted in attacks by armed groups and disenfranchised elements; this situation has been exacerbated in some places by disinformation campaigns by militants urging violence against humanitarians. While militant threats to the United Nations are not new, in 2007 a clear shift was noted towards anti-United Nations propaganda to include the humanitarian work of its agencies, funds and programmes, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has resulted in an increase in targeted attacks against humanitarians.

Security Incidents by Type

⇒ *Staff fatalities*

13. The proliferation of attacks targeting humanitarian actors has resulted in an increased number of deaths and injuries from acts of violence. In 2009, nine WFP staff members died as a result of violence – a 125 percent increase from the previous two years.
14. The deadly attack on the WFP country office in Islamabad, Pakistan on 5 October 2009 demonstrated that all United Nations organizations have become major and priority targets for militant groups, increasing the number of operations at risk. Five WFP staff members were killed in this suicide bombing claimed by the Taliban: Information and Communication Technology Officer Botan Ahmed Ali Al-Hayawi; Finance Assistant Mohamed Wahab; Senior Finance Assistant Abid Rehman; Receptionist Gul Rukh Tahir; and Office Assistant Farzana Barkat. Four other WFP staff members were injured.
15. Four other staff members were killed by acts of violence in 2009:
 - Food monitor Ibrahim Hussein Duale was killed by unidentified gunmen while monitoring school feeding in a village near Garbahare, Somalia.
 - Food monitor Mohamud Omar Moallim was killed by unidentified gunmen at a food distribution site north of Mogadishu, Somalia.
 - Ali Farah Amey, a supervisor of local security guards at the WFP compound in Beletweyne, Somalia, was shot by unknown gunmen close to the compound.
 - Local security guard Inammulah was among eight people killed in a suicide car bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
16. In the last two cases, the WFP employees were not on duty.
17. In addition, two WFP workers died in warehouse accidents in Georgia and Ethiopia, and five staff members were killed in traffic accidents.

⇒ *Staff injuries*

18. Injuries sustained as a result of acts of violence totalled 23 – an increase of 35 percent from 2008.

¹ All figures are found in the Annex.

² Table 3 lists all types of significant security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2009. Figure 5 shows the percent of significant security incidents involving WFP staff and assets worldwide in 2009. Figure 16 illustrates trends in security incidents from 2005 through 2009 by number and type. The analysis of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets was first prepared in 2005.

TABLE 1: WFP STAFF MEMBERS KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Killed	0	0	4	4	9
Injured	9	2	5	17	23

⇒ *Contractor fatalities*

19. Transport contractors are particularly vulnerable as they deliver food in risky conditions. Six drivers of contracted trucks were killed in 2009: two in Afghanistan; two in Somalia; one in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and one in the Sudan. Two other contractors were killed in work-related accidents in the Central African Republic and Somalia. In separate incidents, 11 contracted employees were injured in 2009.

TABLE 2: CONTRACTORS KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHILE PROVIDING SERVICES TO WFP

	2008	2009
Killed	13	6
Injured	5	11

⇒ *Detention and harassment*

20. WFP staff members were targets of threats and harassment, sometimes as a consequence of their work with WFP. In 2009, 48 incidents of detention and harassment of staff by national authorities were reported, including military and law enforcement officers; 27 of these were work related. WFP staff were threatened by non-state actors in 24 cases – the majority of these incidents were work-related and involved national staff. Generic threats against WFP were received from non-state actors in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia and Uganda.

⇒ *Deteriorating security situations forcing relocation*

21. There were 22 relocations of WFP staff, of which 19 were initiated in response to deteriorating security conditions. Nine relocations were conducted in Somalia, three in Yemen, two in Myanmar, two in the Sudan and one each in Chad, the Central African Republic and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

⇒ *Banditry and criminality*

22. The main threat to WFP staff and assets worldwide was banditry and criminality. In 2009, 197 cases of armed robbery, theft and burglary targeted WFP field staff or assets – 32 percent of all registered security incidents. The majority of property crimes in the field were armed robberies, followed by other types of theft. Theft, robbery and burglary were also the main security incidents reported by staff at Headquarters (see figures 9 and 10 in Annex).

23. There was a 53 percent reduction in carjacking of WFP vehicles compared to 2008. This was the result of appropriate mitigation measures such as the installation of a special global

positioning system for tracking vehicles in the Sudan, which helped to prevent significant losses of WFP vehicles.

Geographic Distribution of Security Incidents

⇒ *Africa*

24. As in previous years, the majority of security incidents involving WFP staff or assets occurred in Africa (427). The countries with the highest numbers of incidents in 2009 were: the Sudan (117), Somalia (47), Ethiopia (41), Liberia (33), Kenya (25), the Central African Republic (23) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (16).

The Sudan

25. The Sudan remained the country with the largest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets (see Figures 2 and 3). In 2009, there were 30 percent fewer security incidents in the Sudan than in 2008.
26. In Darfur, the situation improved for the first time since 2006, with a 44 percent reduction in security incidents affecting WFP (see Figure 4). This decrease can be partially attributed to the reduction in WFP's field presence given that the nominal presence of government authorities resulted in serious restrictions on humanitarian movement. The upgrade of all WFP properties in 2009 and 2010 – in addition to minimum operating security standards (MOSS) – has improved office and guest house security. In addition, much effort has been given to update security management plans, standard operating procedures, emergency procedures and new security awareness training (SAT). These efforts have contributed to the safety and security of WFP staff and assets.
27. In Southern Sudan, the number of security incidents affecting staff and assets increased by 27 percent. This can be attributed to: inter-tribal fighting; general lawlessness throughout the region; the lack of centralized control and discipline of security forces, particularly the Sudan People's Liberation Army; a dysfunctional political system; and the unstable political environment ahead of the 2010 elections. An upgrade of all WFP premises in Southern Sudan has begun in 2010.
28. The Regional Office leadership continues to communicate that as a humanitarian organization, WFP should be afforded freedom of movement to deliver assistance. Security management plans, standard operating procedures and emergency procedures are regularly updated and are complemented by security awareness training for staff.

Somalia

29. WFP has continued to face significant security challenges in Somalia as Al-Shabaab and other armed groups fight the Transitional Federal Government. With the humanitarian crisis at its worst since 1993, threats against the United Nations staff members escalated in 2008, and forced a rapid adjustment of security arrangements. Local capacity to respond to security incidents is effectively non-existent. It is almost impossible to ensure the required protection, medical support and other basic infrastructure for WFP's operations. Despite increasingly direct and lethal attacks, United Nations security personnel were able to mitigate some risks by adapting security arrangements in coordination with the Government, the African Union Mission in Somalia, local clan administrations and militants in order to continue the most critical humanitarian assistance. United Nations missions to Mogadishu, which were suspended in 2008, resumed in March 2009.
30. The security situation in southern Somalia deteriorated towards the end of 2009, putting WFP staff at increased risk. As mentioned above, three WFP staff members were killed in

separate incidents last year in Somalia; two were killed in the line of duty. There has been an alarming increase in killings, abduction and harassment of staff, arrests, detentions, death threats and compound seizures by Al-Shabaab. Harassment and demands for money by local authorities have placed national staff at risk. The threats, attacks, and extortion by armed groups rendered WFP's operations in southern Somalia almost impossible, prompting a temporary suspension of operations in that region. Staff and food supplies were relocated to safer locations. Operations in central and northern Somalia continued.

31. Somalia's ongoing conflict has begun to affect neighbouring countries and poses a threat to stability in East Africa. Al-Shabaab has specifically threatened to attack Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. These threats must be taken seriously and further risk mitigation measures must be undertaken.

Ethiopia

32. Ethiopia experienced an 86 percent increase in security incidents involving staff and assets. As in previous years, there were many incidents of harassment and detention of staff by national authorities in the Somali region, where the security situation is volatile and military operations continue against rebels and militant elements infiltrating from Somalia.

⇒ *Asia*

33. Asia registered the second largest number of security incidents, with 132 in 2009. There were 49 incidents in Afghanistan, 31 in Pakistan, 16 in Sri Lanka, 11 in Nepal and 9 in Laos (see Figure 2).

Afghanistan

34. The number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in Afghanistan in 2009 decreased by 36 percent from 2008. However, the deterioration of Afghanistan's security conditions continued: 2009 was assessed as the most volatile year since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The country presents one of the most dangerous security environments in which the United Nations operates. Complex and coordinated militant attacks, abductions, rocket attacks and blasts aimed at government buildings, guest houses, diplomatic vehicles and aid organizations are increasingly frequent in Kabul. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are making direct threats against the United Nations in Afghanistan.

Pakistan

35. The security situation in Pakistan deteriorated significantly in 2009 with an increase in militant activity. High-profile attacks targeting the Government and the United Nations have become a major threat. Militants have the intent and capability of staging attacks on international targets in well-guarded areas, such as the targeted attack on the WFP country office in Islamabad. In early 2009, WFP conducted a blast-vulnerability assessment in Islamabad and initiated a series of improvements such as security barriers, wall reinforcements and the installation of blast-resistant film. As a result, the force of the blast was contained: only one window blew out in the explosion and no one was injured by glass shards.
36. Following the deteriorating security situation, the Secretary-General in consultation with the United Nations Policy Committee recommended that the United Nations reduce the exposure of its personnel to security threats in Pakistan. United Nations agencies operating in Pakistan reviewed and adapted their implementation modalities to minimize risk to staff. Following this review, WFP temporarily reduced the number of international staff in Pakistan.

Sri Lanka

37. The security situation in Sri Lanka has improved significantly since the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 2009. There were fewer serious security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in the second half of the year.

Security Incidents by Regional Bureau

38. The Regional Bureau for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa and the Regional Bureau for Asia reported the largest number of incidents involving staff and assets, followed by the Regional Bureau for West Africa and the Regional Bureau in the Sudan. The Regional Bureau for the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe had the fewest number of incidents (see Figure 6).

Security Incidents by Security Phase

39. As in previous years, the highest number of security incidents involving WFP staff and assets in 2009 occurred in countries in United Nations security phase three (326 incidents). Phase three is characterized by a substantial deterioration in security that may result in the relocation of staff or dependants. Countries in security phase four had the second highest number of security incidents (106). These findings, presented in Figure 7, reaffirm the challenge faced by the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS): to strike a balance between operational objectives and the need to provide for staff safety and security.
40. In 2009, there was a 21 percent increase in incidents involving WFP staff and assets in countries with security phase two ("restricted movement"). The sharpest increase in incidents last year (71 percent) was registered in countries at no security phase (see Figure 8). These findings will be considered in the revision of staff security awareness training.

Security Incidents Affecting Nationally/Internationally Recruited Staff

41. Nationally recruited WFP staff members are especially vulnerable to security threats and these staff accounted for the majority of casualties. Eight of the nine WFP staff members killed by acts of violence last year were nationally recruited. Since 2006, the number of security incidents involving nationally recruited WFP staff has increased by 111 percent (see Figure 11). Over the same period, there has been a 17 percent increase in incidents in which international staff members were targeted. This indicates that WFP staff members are operating in increasingly hazardous environments.

Security Incidents Affecting Contractors, Cooperating and Standby Partners

42. WFP monitors security incidents involving staff of contractors and standby and cooperating partners supporting WFP, whose services are critical for operations. In 2009, contractors were targeted in 92 incidents and partners in 21 incidents. While these figures show a decrease of 25 percent from 2008, they remain very high.

Security Incidents Involving Contractors

43. As in previous years, the largest numbers of attacks on trucks contracted by WFP were reported in Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sudan (see Figure 12), although there has been a 45 percent reduction in their overall number. While attacks on contracted trucks decreased in all these countries, the most significant decrease (67 percent; see Figure 13) was recorded in the Sudan. In 2007 and 2008, three Khartoum-based contractors were

responsible for the movement and distribution of food in Darfur. In 2009, WFP switched to Darfur-based contractors, which yielded positive results.

44. In Afghanistan, there was also a notable reduction (32 percent) in attacks on trucks contracted by WFP. Factors contributing to this positive trend included cooperation between the WFP security team in Afghanistan and national authorities on police escorts for food convoys. In addition, improved capacity of the Afghan national police, an increase in police deployment and better police equipment had positive impacts on security along main supply routes.

Security Incidents Categorized as “Other”

45. Road traffic accidents accounted for the majority of incidents categorized as “other” in 2009. Alarming, there was a 20 percent increase in traffic accidents compared to 2008 (see Table in the Annex) and a 133 percent increase since 2006 (see Figure 14). Five staff members died as a result of traffic accidents (a 150 percent increase over previous years). The majority of accidents were reported by the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Regional Bureau for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa, followed by the Regional Bureau for West Africa.
46. By country office, the Sudan reported the highest number of accidents in 2009 (17), followed by Afghanistan (13) and Ethiopia (10) (see Figure 15). One Headquarters staff member was killed in a traffic accident in 2009. The increased number of traffic accidents, often resulting in staff injury or death, indicates a need for training in driving skills. WFP is coordinating with the Global Vehicle Leasing Programme (GVLP) to develop a specific training course under the aegis of the SAT programme.

OVERVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY ACTIVITIES

47. WFP seeks to promote three main principles for its security activities: ‘how to stay’, ‘no programme without security’ and ‘no security without resources’. These principles, in line with the new vision for a more effective United Nations security management system, were developed in coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The new policy guidance reflects a shift in the security culture throughout the United Nations system by: i) mainstreaming security management; ii) continuing initiatives such as implementation of MOSS and conducting security assessment missions; iii) conducting blast vulnerability assessments and building upgrades; iv) undertaking security training and safety-awareness campaigns; iv) improving security information management; v) implementing a new framework for threat and risk analysis; and vi) developing crisis management capacity.
48. Targeting of the United Nations has resulted in the increased vulnerability of humanitarian personnel and premises around the world. The bombing of the WFP country office in Islamabad was the first attack on a United Nations office with a person-borne improvised explosive device, demonstrating the development of attack methods. Only complex security measures can properly mitigate against new attacks. The Executive Director has launched a review of security measures and procedures at all WFP country offices and regional bureaux. WFP’s Field Security Division (ODF) plays an important role in this process.

Blast Mitigation

49. WFP has taken a proactive approach to blast mitigation and advocated in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) to provide to security management teams and security personnel in the field the procedures, tools and guidelines necessary for implementing measures to mitigate the effects of attacks using improvised explosive devices.
50. In 2009, WFP completed blast vulnerability assessments in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, DRC, Ghana, India, Jordan, Mauritania, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Uganda.

Premises Security Committee

51. The Premises Security Committee (PSC) was established for allocation of critically needed funds provided through the Board for office relocations and other investments in blast mitigation. In line with the criteria proposed by UNSMS and the United Nations Blast Analysis Working Group, the PSC assists in developing criteria to guide WFP's decision-making regarding mitigation measures. The PSC also approves mitigation projects, office relocations and the use of United Nations common premises versus United Nations multi-agency compounds and single agency offices.
52. After an initial assessment was presented to the Board, resources were allocated to the Emergency Security Fund. During 2009, the PSC approved US\$14.6 million in improvements to existing physical security measures, such as by improving adequate stand-off distance and reinforcing building structures. Where improvement of office compounds was not possible, the PSC approved relocation to, or construction of, safer premises. Instead of using a commercial company for assessments and mitigation measures, a joint task force was created to manage the process internally.
53. The PSC joint task force initiated, monitored and implemented 105 projects in 41 countries. To date, 16 projects have been completed: nine in Afghanistan; two in Burundi; and one each in the DRC, Egypt, Jordan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Yemen.

WFP Field Security Capacity

54. As of 31 December 2009, WFP's field security capacity included nine professional security staff at Headquarters and 54 field security officers (FSOs) supporting WFP field operations in cooperation with UNDSS. Three security advisers at Headquarters ensure the capacity for immediate deployment in emergencies. Growth in field security capacity allows for timely and flexible responses, and operational support with the clear objective of "how to stay". In 2009, additional security support was provided to country offices in Algeria, DRC, Haiti, Madagascar, Mauritania, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. The establishment of two additional posts of regional security advisers in the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Regional Bureau for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa, and the transfer of one security adviser from Headquarters to the Regional Bureau for the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe will enhance surge capacity and operational support at the regional level.

Field Security Officers

55. The presence of FSOs ensures that robust security measures are taken to counter threats and minimize the number of incidents involving staff and assets. FSOs serve as advisers to country directors on security management, crisis readiness and the security and safety of WFP staff and dependants, operations and facilities. WFP Field Security has been widely recognized as a necessary component of operations.

WFP Security Policy and Training

56. The expansion of the field security function required enhancing ODF to make it commensurate with increased challenges and tasks. A policy and training unit was formed in ODF in 2009 to concentrate on WFP security policies, guidelines, plans and training. In its first year, the unit: i) revised the 2003 WFP Security Policy (ED2003/001), including the Framework of Accountability; ii) reviewed initiatives related to the “Saving Lives Together” framework for security collaboration among United Nations and non-governmental organizations/international organizations/intergovernmental organizations; and iii) recommended revisions to WFP’s security policy for better integration and cooperation with cooperating partners on security and safety matters.

Security Information Management and Analysis

57. The collection, analysis, and dissemination of security information are essential for identifying threats and trends. The analytical section of ODF should be strengthened to provide more focused analytical support to regional bureaux and country offices. This includes monitoring and analysing security trends and their impacts on WFP staff and operations in order to enhance mitigation and preparedness.
58. Field security identified the need for a global Security Information Management and Security Analysis System (SIMSAS). This system will enable security staff and security focal points to collect, report, store, analyse and present information relevant to the security and safety of WFP staff, assets and operations. Work on SIMSAS has already started; the system will be rolled out to all countries with FSOs before worldwide release.

Security Training

59. Following the attack on the WFP Office in Islamabad, a sustained and coherent security strategy was developed, harmonizing and regulating the content of all security-related training. WFP’s security training strategy for 2010–2011 targets: i) senior managers with security responsibilities; ii) security professionals; iii) local security personnel; and iv) staff.
60. WFP field security and the Human Resources Division collaborated with UNDSS to review the SAT programme. A training session was delivered at Headquarters, followed by field testing in Kenya in March 2010. The revised SAT will be ready for rollout across WFP later in 2010. This course will supplement the mandatory “Basic Security in the Field: Staff Safety, Health and Welfare” – available in the six official United Nations languages – and “Advanced Security in the Field”, which is mandatory for United Nations staff working in or travelling to locations designated as security phase one or above. Staff are encouraged to complete both courses and use the WFP staff safety and security website for updates on security information relevant to work, travel and training. As the Chair of the IASMN working group on a special SAT for women, WFP developed a specific training programme that was piloted at WFP and will be rolled out throughout the United Nations system. As already noted, WFP will increase attention to driver skills

training (with GVLP) in response to the increasing number of traffic accidents involving WFP staff and assets.

61. WFP field security will continue to conduct specialized training, including training on trauma, hostage incident management and essentials of humanitarian negotiation. The work of FSOs has always required high specialization, but in light of increasingly direct and lethal threats to the United Nations, their work has become even more demanding and requires regular training in a variety of subjects to allow FSOs to carry out their responsibilities in challenging environments. WFP field security has recently begun to deliver security information analysis training to FSOs. This new training course on identifying and understanding threats facing staff and operations will help to address vulnerabilities and emphasize mitigation measures.

Security Funding

62. The financial sustainability of the security function in WFP is a challenge because of difficulties in preparing medium- and long-term strategies to address security issues. The threats and risks faced by the United Nations in general and WFP in particular endure: threats may be reduced in one area while appearing in another. Many initiatives that are well received in the field are discontinued when funding expires. Increased security challenges necessitate an extensive review of operating procedures, driven by the need to expand or sustain operations, particularly in conflict and post-conflict areas. WFP should maintain an effective presence even in situations of extreme insecurity. However, resources are required to keep pace with evolving security situations.
63. The latest management review conducted by the new UNDSS Under-Secretary General suggests a reduction in operational capacity of UNDSS to concentrate on its core functions: policy, planning, training and risk assessment. Agencies, funds and programmes will need to compensate this reduction in order to continue operations. In 2009, the Chief Executives Board called on Member States to: provide core resource support for the UNSMS at a level sufficient to match the new reality of the evolving security environment in which United Nations system staff must operate; and ensure that United Nations agencies have appropriate and sustainable funding for security to enable them to execute their mandates safely and effectively.

Inter-Agency Security Activities

64. WFP continues to implement mainstreaming in security management and planning for a strengthened United Nations security management system. WFP supports the actionable recommendations by the steering committee of the High-Level Committee on Management, including: i) the shift in culture from “when to leave” to “how to stay”; ii) a greater focus on the safety and security of national staff; iii) the introduction of a threat-focused concept for a security level system; and iv) the development of a United Nations policy and guidelines for estate safety and security.
65. WFP took part in developing proposals for improving the security of nationally recruited staff. WFP and other IASMN members will promote the new security level system working jointly to make human resources available for its introduction. The system needs to be understood throughout the United Nations system; and WFP field security has started explaining the new process to managers. In addition, WFP continued to promote the “Saving Lives Together” framework for security collaboration among the United Nations and NGOs, international organizations and intergovernmental organizations. A review of this framework has been initiated with WFP cooperating partners; findings will be shared with IASMN members for follow-up.

ANNEX: 2009 SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF AND ASSETS: ALL TYPES

NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS	Total 2005	Total 2006	Total 2007	Total 2008	Total 2009	Total 2009 (%)	Increase/decrease 2008/2009 (%)	Total work related 2005	Total work related 2006	Total work related 2007	Total work related 2008	Total work related 2009	Total 2009 (%)	Increase/decrease 2007/2008 (%)
Detentions	30	25	26	45	48	8	7	17	18	12	20	29	7	45
Injuries	20	14	8	20	23	4	15	9	2	4	7	13	3	86
Deaths	16	13	17	11	17	3	55	3	0	4	3	5	1	67
Subtotal	66	52	51	76	88	14	16	29	20	20	30	47	11	57
Evacuation	4	1	2	4	0	0	-100	4	1	2	4	0	0	-100
Relocation	23	28	16	19	22	4	16	23	28	16	19	22	5	16
MEDEVACs*	23	8	19	11	21	3	91	23	8	19	11	21	5	91
Subtotal	50	37	37	34	43	7	26	50	37	37	34	43	10	26
Road accidents	56	52	64	86	121	20	41	38	40	49	69	95	21	38
Thefts	85	91	89	104	74	12	-29	63	64	80	75	62	14	-17
Robberies	34	21	80	121	92	15	-24	22	2	68	94	59	13	-37
Threats	25	12	22	29	24	4	-17	20	9	18	18	18	4	0
Assaults	14	9	29	30	8	1	-73	11	5	21	14	3	1	-79
Damages to WFP property	2	8	15	19	21	3	11	2	8	15	19	21	5	11
Harassment	2	5	8	17	15	2	-12	2	3	4	11	8	2	-27
Carjacking	14	4	5	17	8	1	-53	13	4	5	15	5	1	-67
Plane incidents	8	6	5	2	1	0	-50	8	6	5	2	1	0	-50
Food rebagging	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	1	0	0	0	0	0
Burglary	9	13	10	17	23	4	35	5	6	4	5	5	1	0
Others	38	59	69	105	102	16	-3	37	47	52	87	78	18	-10
Subtotal	297	281	396	547	489	79	-11	231	195	321	409	355	80	-13
TOTAL	413	370	484	657	620		-6	310	252	378	473	445		-6

* medical evacuation



ANNEX

Figure 1: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2005/2006/2007/2008/2009




Figure 2: Countries with Highest Rates of Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2009




Figure 3: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2006/2007/2008/2009: Key Group of Countries







Figure 4: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in Sudan in 2008/2009





ODB: Asia Regional Bureau (Bangkok) ODC: Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe Bureau (Cairo)
 ODD: West Africa Bureau (Dakar) ODJ: Southern Africa Regional Bureau (Johannesburg)
 ODP: Regional Bureau Panama City (Latin America and the Caribbean) ODS: Regional Bureau Sudan







Figure 9: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2009: Property Crime











Figure 10: Significant Security Incidents Involving WFP Staff/Assets in 2008/2009: Property Crime









ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FSO	field security officer
GVL	Global Vehicle Leasing Programme
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
NGO	non-governmental organization
ODB	Asia Regional Bureau (Bangkok)
ODC	Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe Bureau (Cairo)
ODD	West Africa Bureau (Dakar)
ODF	Field Security Division
ODJ	Southern Africa Regional Bureau (Johannesburg)
ODK	Regional Bureau Kampala
ODP	Regional Bureau Panama City (Latin America and the Caribbean)
ODS	Regional Bureau Sudan
PSC	Premises Security Committee
SAT	security awareness training
SIMSAS	Security Information Management and Security Analysis System
SIR	significant incident report
SOP	standard operating procedure
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System