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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – NIGER EMERGENCY OPERATION 200170



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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* Office of Evaluation


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation was conducted at the request of WFP's regional bureau, in order to ensure that sufficient light was shed on the differences between WFP's responses to the crises in Niger in 2010 and in 2005, to ascertain whether responses were improving and if lessons had been learned. Because Niger and other countries in the Sahel experience repeated hardships, it is particularly important to draw lessons from the responses.

The evaluation focuses on the emergency operation, but covers those parts of the protracted relief and recovery operation that funded initial response activities. It was conducted for purposes of accountability and learning, and addressed questions of relevance and coherence, performance and results, and an analysis of factors that explain these results. The evaluation determined that there was no question about the rationale for this operation, given the severe crisis in Niger: by April 2010, 48 percent of the population was food-insecure and 22 percent was severely food-insecure.

The primary objective of the operation – to save lives – was appropriate, but the evaluation found the second objective – to improve the nutritional status of the population – ambitious given the situation. The activities addressed urgent needs at the time, and thus were relevant. While the operation had started with a shorter timeframe, it was extended by six months, by the end of which 92 percent of the initially planned tonnage was distributed, but only 53 percent of the total planned tonnage for the entire response period. These resources were distributed to 74 percent of the planned recipients of food assistance. Effectively, this distribution performance resulted in a dilution of rations and ration sharing. In spite of these shortcomings, positive outcomes were observed, and the evaluation concluded that given WFP's prominent role in the crisis response, its operation contributed to saving lives. The improvement of the nutritional status of the population was still a far-off goal at the time of the evaluation, given the magnitude of the problem and the size of the response. Performance and results were explained by positive external factors – such as the political environment, the availability of food in neighbouring countries and positive terms of trade – as well as factors under WFP's control. In particular, the evaluation highlighted the strategic choices, efficiency, partnerships and staff commitment as positive influences on the results of the operation. Less positive influences were limited resource availability and monitoring.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report Niger Emergency Operation 200170” (WFP/EB.2/2011/6-G) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2011/6-G/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Objectives

1. The crisis of 2005 strongly affected WFP morale. With the international community and the Nigerian Government simultaneously pointing a collective finger at WFP, it was a sort of trauma not to be experienced again. The 2010 crisis was therefore given the greatest attention, to avoid repeating the experience. This evaluation is designed to measure WFP's response on two levels. First, in line with the usual method, EMOP 200170 was evaluated in terms of the "preparation–implementation–results" process, as a way to assess WFP's response. This is the main rationale for the evaluation. The 2010 crisis was then examined in the context of the cycle of events that – regrettably but almost predictably – have struck Niger repeatedly over a period of several decades. Between 2005 and 2010, WFP continued carrying out its activities, and it should be instructive to see how the lessons of 2005 have been integrated into the WFP process, and how lessons learned from the last two crises will improve efforts to prepare for – and even mitigate – the next crisis.

Concept of the Evaluation

2. In line with the terms of reference, the evaluation deals with three major questions, which serve as the structure for this report, and which include the usual parameters of such evaluations:
 - i) Strategic elements: How, and on what basis, was the operation designed (relevance) and what choices were made (coherence)?
 - ii) Performance and results: How was the operation implemented (efficiency)? Did it attain its objectives (effectiveness)?
 - iii) Factors explaining the results: What external and internal factors explain the evaluation's analyses?

Proposed Methodology

3. The proposed methodology included: i) an evaluation matrix covering the three major areas described above, broken down into a series of questions, respondents and indicators; ii) interview guidelines by type of respondent, detailing the questions; and iii) an evaluation matrix with reference to each element addressed, using a series of indicators. The team was composed of four consultants: one health/nutrition epidemiologist, one nutritionist, one logistics expert and a team leader. Conditions for the evaluation were favourable, despite security constraints and a fairly tight timeframe.

General Context

4. Niger is one of the world's poorest countries, with two thirds of the population living under the poverty line, and with the various development indices pointing to major health and economic problems. The economy is dominated by two types of activities: i) subsistence agriculture that has not been modernized and that is largely dependent on rainfall and subject to unpredictable events; and ii) livestock activities, primarily cattle. These two activities account for approximately 40 percent of GDP, and employ 85 percent of the active population, although they fail to provide self-sufficiency for those engaged in these activities. The purchasing power of rural inhabitants remains extremely low and is subject to the impacts of highly volatile markets, thus increasing vulnerability to shocks.

Finally, Niger has experienced a number of periods of political turbulence in recent years, with the most recent coup d'état occurring on 18 February 2010.

The 2010 Crisis

5. Anticipated already by mid-2009, given the unusually small harvests and low yields from forage (shortfalls of 31 percent and 67 percent, respectively), the 2010 crisis developed gradually, reaching its full extent after the February coup, as shown by two surveys with clear findings. The first of these, conducted in April 2010, indicated that 48 percent of the population was suffering from food insecurity (with 22 percent experiencing severe food insecurity), while the second, in June 2010, showed alarming levels of acute malnutrition throughout the country – close to or beyond the WHO emergency threshold (15 percent) – with figures of 26 percent for children aged 6–23 months. Lastly, despite a peak in May, grain prices remained fairly stable, so that the crisis was mainly one of access for households whose resources had been reduced to zero by extreme poverty.

OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATION'S STRATEGY

Overview

6. Beginning in late 2009, WFP initiated its response to the crisis through protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 106110 budget revisions 5 and 6, which made it possible to conduct major blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) and targeted free distribution (TFD) activities. EMOP 200170 was a logical follow-on, strongly reinforcing the most recent efforts. The operation was originally intended to last five months (August–December 2010), with a projected budget of US\$213.4 million and a total of 212,518 mt of provisions, targeted to 7.9 million people in the country, through seven different activities.

Operational Strategy

7. In general terms, the operation's rationale is not in question. Its alignment with the strategies of the Government, technical and financial partners, United Nations agencies and basic values of WFP, along with the operations' logic in relation to humanitarian priorities are still relevant. Despite the response capacity of the PRRO, the decision to launch a "corporate" emergency operation (EMOP) made it possible, internally, to mobilize the necessary material and human resources and, externally, to make clear to donors the urgency of the situation. Two main objectives were established: the first, entirely appropriate, was "to save lives"; however, the second, "to improve nutrition in Niger", seemed very ambitious. The objectives were broken down into three, rather disparate, expected outcomes: i) to reduce the rate of acute malnutrition among children under the age of 5 –which appears difficult to achieve; ii) to improve food consumption over the assistance period for the targeted population – which is rather difficult to measure; and iii) to improve food consumption for emergency-affected households targeted by the CFW programme – which seemed a marginal undertaking in the initial version of the document, where it targeted 22 villages in Oualam.
8. The choice of activities was relatively coherent, inasmuch as the activities addressed matters that were of urgent importance at the time:
 - i) **Emergency support** relating to the crisis and to the alarming findings of recent surveys: blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) for children 6–23 months old,

supplemented by protection rations, in order to limit the sharing of rations that was seen during the first two rounds under the PRRO. These two activities were fully justified.

- ii) **Support for the most vulnerable groups**, in the form of nutritional support – entirely appropriate – to counter moderate acute malnutrition, or MAM, among children 6–59 months of age and among pregnant and nursing women, consistent with the WFP mandate. This support was extended to the caregivers for children hospitalized at the CRENIIs (intensive nutritional rehabilitation centres), in order to reduce the high rate of treatment drop-out resulting from limited means.¹
 - iii) **Support for vulnerable households** that were not beneficiaries of the above, but that were faced with severe food insecurity, using targeted distribution and CFW activities.
9. WFP's other choices for the operation were generally coherent, though some reservations remain:
- i) The choice of partners was based on the emergency needs, utilizing partners already working with WFP. However, this led to some geographical bias in favour of the areas where these partners were already working. For the BSF, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – essentially local organizations – were chosen jointly with the Office of Nutrition. At the field level, however, some officials were puzzled by the choice of some of these, which lacked familiarity with the sites and led to targeting errors.
 - ii) The choice of foods was consistent with normal WFP practice and with the needs for each activity. The NGOs expressed some reservations about the use of CSB to treat MAM, promoting instead the systematic use of ready-to-use supplementary foods (RUSF).
10. The targeting criteria were coherent in theory. Geographically, for BSF, the EMOP took into account the national malnutrition figures from the June 2010 survey, and used data from the government early-warning system to determine the most vulnerable areas and villages where BSF and targeted distribution were both needed. There is some doubt about the Rehabilitation Centres for Moderate Malnutrition (CRENAMs) for which the only geographical criterion seems to have been that they were already set up and were receiving support from a partner (including sometimes through the Government). Aside from this, the beneficiary selection process for each activity was clearly defined: children 6–23 months of age for the BSF, adapting criteria for identifying recipients to the realities of Niger; for protection rations, families of these children; children 6–59 months old who met WHO's criteria for moderate malnutrition; and pregnant and lactating women. As will be seen, however, in practice these theoretical criteria were difficult to apply.
11. In the end, a budget revision extended the EMOP by six months and increased the number of beneficiaries and tonnage, expanded the CFW component to address vulnerability at the national level, and added a cash transfer component in place of the BSF's protection rations, due to the availability of grain in the market resulting from successful 2010 harvests. While this latter initiative seems well tailored to the situation, engaging in operations involving cash – an area in which WFP does not yet have great expertise – in the midst of the crisis (or in the post-crisis period) would seem to be

¹ The relevance of this activity seems less obvious (it requires additional effort at a time of crisis for a marginal activity for children covered by UNICEF), but this observation is the team's, whereas the country office considers the activity to be justified.

problematic; moreover, tons of food remained in storage. Similarly, WFP seemed intent on addressing all of the priorities without prioritizing them, implementing seven, and then eight, different activities, whose implementation and management were potentially challenging.

| TABLE 1: RESULTS | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| | Original operation (5 months) | Budget Revision 1 (11 months) | Results as of 31/12/2010 | EMOP 200170 progress as of 31/12/2010 | |
| Period | 01/08/2010–31/12/2010 | 01/08/2010–30/06/2011 | | Initial: 5/5 months | BR1: 5/11 months |
| Confirmed contributions (US\$) | 213 405 202 | 279 401 687 ¹ | 173 854 282 ² | 81% | 62% |
| Number of beneficiaries | 7 886 655 | 10 246 420 | 5 045 487 | 64% | 49% |
| Food distributed (mt) | 212 518 | 265 591 | 111 710 ³ | 53% | 42% |
| Food delivered (mt) | | | 167 344 ⁴ | 79% | 63% |
| Total food costs (US\$) | 96 915 700 | 129 903 089 | 93 353 820 ² | 96% | 72% |
| CFW & voucher costs (US\$) | 500 000 | 4 920 000 | 1 698 282 | 100% | 34% |

¹ EMOP Budget Revision1



² WINGS figures – Project Management Overview extract 4/01/2011 – Situation as of 31/12/2010

³ COMPAS figures: total deliveries to partners (1/08/2010–31/12/2010)

⁴ mt delivered (111 710) + stocks in warehouses (38 219) + mt in pipeline or in transit (17 415) = 167 344

12. With regard to food, of the budgeted 212,518 mt, 111,710 mt had actually been distributed as of 31 December 2010 – or 53 percent of the total, which is low.² However, this represents 91.7 percent of the amount called for in the five-month operational plan (121,867 mt), which show the effectiveness of implementation, in spite of monthly variations of up to 18 percent (8,000 mt of food). By activity, these percentages are also relatively poor (see Figure 1), and a breakdown of the figures by region shows three distinct groups, with Zinder and Maradi receiving 55 percent of the food distributed, Tillabery (with Niamey) and Tahoua 35 percent, and Diffa and Agadez receiving just 10 percent. This corresponds quite closely with population figures.

² 167,344 mt (79 percent) had been delivered, but this includes food in warehouses and ordered as of 31 December 2010. The difference between that figure and the 111,710 mt figure basically corresponds to food for the budget revision (and thus is not covered by the evaluation).



RP: Protection rations. ACCE: Children 6–59 months. ACC: Caretaker rations. ACCFEA: Pregnant and lactating women. DGC: GFD.

13. With regard to beneficiaries, three preliminary points should be noted before explaining the results:
- i) Data varied from source to source (sub-offices, vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit, programme units), and choices had to be made, with the programme units generally preferred.
 - ii) The implementation of targeted distribution and BSF targeting (both geographical and by beneficiaries), and the choices made owing to the limited food supply referred to above, were especially confused, with different versions in different WFP sub-offices and/or partners – even, at times, within the same area. A number of different approaches were used, making it difficult to define a profile of the beneficiaries actually reached.
 - iii) Finally, owing to the limited food supply and the inevitable exclusion of potential beneficiaries, the BSF, protection rations and targeted distribution rations were practically all shared, either within families in the case of the BSF, or between families for the provisions as a whole (BSF, protection rations, targeted distribution, CRENI). This does not seem to have greatly affected people, who considered the practice, in its various forms, to be socially normal.
14. Overall, 74 percent of the beneficiaries were reached. This figure accounts for close to 53 percent of the food available, leading to some dilution of rations, in addition to the sharing already mentioned. More specifically:
- i) BSF reached 75 percent of the targeted population, and rations were consistent with WFP planned quantities: the issue of CSB versus RUSF was raised. However, the dilution and redistribution of rations between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries rendered this debate somewhat moot. Protection rations reached 88 percent of the beneficiaries.
 - ii) Nutritional support for the 6–59 month age group in the CRENAMs reached 52 percent of the targeted population, with support to pregnant and lactating women reaching 72 percent, rations for caregivers in the CRENIIs 68 percent, CFW 78 percent, and cash transfers 81 percent. This set of ratios was established on the basis of the data, in order to avoid double counting.
15. In terms of outcomes (see paragraph 7), it is difficult to evaluate aspects for which several indicators are not measured, not quantified or omitted, beneficiaries are identified in different ways, and rations shared and/or diluted. The relation between the results obtained and the role of WFP support is not obvious. The team did attempt to determine certain factors:
- i) For the BSF activities and the accompanying protection rations, there seems to have been a real reduction in mortality among the 6–23 month age bracket covered by the activity. With regard to the reduction in malnutrition, there is no basis for judgment (no systematic measurements were made). The protection rations distributed with the BSF were welcomed by all of the families, and while these did not sufficiently compensate for the sharing of BSF, using them together probably helped reach the maximum possible number of families.
 - ii) In terms of support for CRENAMs (children in the 6–59 month age bracket), results appear to be positive, despite the variations in results from different sources (SPR, programme unit). The rates for cure (>75 percent), mortality (<1 percent) and attrition (<10 percent) are generally consistent with the established objectives. Most of the indicators show recurrent weaknesses in the regions of Tahoua and Agadez.

However, these figures should be interpreted with caution, given the variability in the form, quality and regularity of the recordkeeping.

- iii) For the CRENIIs, the cure rate averaged 85 percent for the year, and the attrition rate was determined to be 5 percent. However, the EMOP established no indicator to measure these outcomes.
 - iv) Finally, the cash operations in Ouallam (CFW) were monitored (in November 2010), with results that appear positive, although without making comparisons with control groups. Similarly, a broader survey (January 2011) showed that this department has very low rates of food insecurity, which could be attributable in part to the combination of assistance measures, including those of WFP. With regard to replacement of protection rations with cash transfers in November and December of 2010, the only noticeable outcome is the reduced indebtedness of the beneficiary families (three times less than other families). Otherwise, there is little difference between them and the protection rations, and very few significant results.
16. Lastly, in terms of impact and the contribution to changes in the country, WFP's dominant position in providing food assistance in Niger (accounting for 70 percent of the total) has meant it plays a leading role in "saving lives" through its core intervention (BSF + protection rations), despite the fact that the planned protocols were not always fully respected. On the other hand, in nutritional terms, little change has occurred at the national scale. Not only was the initial WFP coverage partial (dependent on the presence of the CRENAMs, although these doubled in one year), but the percentage of beneficiaries reached did not exceed 60 percent, with only 50 percent of available food distributed. Finally, the October 2010 survey, despite its poor timing, is the only point of reference for the still-alarming malnutrition rates in Niger.
17. Other than the humanitarian aspects, WFP has unquestionably had an impact at the political and structural levels through its efforts to bolster the Government of Niger and its institutions – *Cellule crises alimentaires* (CCAs, Food Crises Unit) in particular, and the *Haute autorité à la sécurité alimentaire* (HASA, High Authority on Food Security) for activities addressing food crises, in addition to the Office of Nutrition (in collaboration with UNICEF). In this latter area, the reinvestment in support for the CRENAMs (since 2009) has helped re-establish equilibrium between the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM), thus limiting the duration of peaks of malnutrition during times of crisis.


FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR THE RESULTS

18. Four external factors account for both the choices made by WFP and the overall success of the operation's strategic aspects:
- i) Politically, the coup d'état in February not only focussed attention on the crisis and led to the official launch of international assistance, but also allowed the establishment of a participatory and constructive transition government, with which WFP has developed excellent synergies.
 - ii) With regard to food availability, neighbouring countries benefited from favourable agro-climatic conditions in 2009, so that Niger's markets were regularly supplied at reasonable prices, with WFP reaching its objective of making nearly half of its purchases at the sub-regional level.

- iii) Economically, the terms of trade between the Nigerian *naira* and the CFA franc have been favourable to the CFA franc, in contrast to the situation in 2005. This has prevented a drain of food and other products to Nigeria, which is a large consumer.
 - iv) Finally, the 2010/11 growing season was excellent, producing surpluses that brought relief to people and allowed support to be provided through cash operations, without destabilizing markets.
19. The internal factors fall into several broad categories:
- i) **Strategy:** WFP was in a good enough political position to be able to implement its activities in total tranquillity, with no conflict with the Government – clearly an accomplishment.
 - ii) **Financial resources:** Despite a highly effective real-time transition from the PRRO to EMOP, at the height of the crisis only 50 percent of the expected contributions were received. This explains the food shortages, as well as the strategy of refocusing BSF and protection rations activities, which at times was poorly implemented in terms of targeting and the lack (21 percent) of systematic targeted distribution.
 - iii) **In terms of efficiency,** the operation was a success. Logistics was able to increase the food supply by a factor of 30 without major problems (despite a fleet of WFP trucks that in the end were not very useful); there was a judicious combination of international and sub-regional purchases – a risky innovation for a crisis situation, but one that proved successful; and the distribution methods worked well, despite some inevitable deficiencies.
 - iv) **The partnerships** were quite positive. Synergies with the Government were optimal. With other partners, the cluster system allowed for improved coordination, although there were some exceptions, particularly on the ground, where decisions made in Niamey were not always carried out. At the United Nations level, except for the clusters there was very little specific synergy; there were even concerns about UNICEF and its involvement in the management of MAM in certain centres, where there was the sense that it had trespassed on the WFP mandate. There were no particular problems on the ground in relation to the agreements with cooperating partners, except for the recurrent (and reasonable) complaint about unit costs not always being in line with reality.
 - v) **The management of outside personnel** (100+ people) seems to have been handled effectively by the country team, both in Niamey and at the sub-offices, which avoided the pitfalls of the 2005 crisis. Task forces – both cross-cutting and thematic – generally carried out WFP work during the crisis although the efficacy of the groups and the dedication of their participants were not always evident.
 - vi) **The monitoring and evaluation process** is one of the system's main weaknesses. Tools were not always harmonized or standardized within each activity; information circuits varied widely, and capturing of data was fragmented and inconsistent. The SPR – which is difficult to use, with indicators bearing little relation to the logical framework – highlights this problem.
20. Lastly, with respect to cross-cutting issues, an EMOP is not the most appropriate context for such issues. Nevertheless, in this operation, women were the main beneficiaries, and the question of sustainable development was raised in Tahoua, in connection with a solar-equipped logistics base. At the same time, communication – both internal and external – was a major area of weakness in the operation, and was probably at the root of a number of targeting malfunctions on the ground.

GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

21. Several main points stand out in this evaluation. First, from a strategic point of view, WFP is suitably positioned, and has made the proper choices. The management team succeeded in maintaining a strong enough position to, on one hand, not give in to government interference in dealing with the crisis (in contrast to 2005), and on the other, channel the energies of the regional bureau and Headquarters, particularly regarding the flow of personnel. From this perspective, the operation was a success.
22. It is important to remember, however, that WFP found itself in an exceptionally favourable environment, which it cannot count on for future crises: a coup d'état “at the right time”, with a transparent and participatory transition government, a positive economic situation that curtailed flows of exports to neighbouring countries, a favourable 2009/10 agricultural season in those countries that led to food availability and relative market stability and, finally, 2010 crop surpluses that gave the population some breathing room. WFP proved capable of exploiting this opportunity.
23. With its quite high level of technical implementation, this operation can be considered a success from that perspective as well. The management, logistics and procurement processes made significant achievements in a very short time. However, some aspects of the operation failed to meet expectations, and this had negative impacts on qualitative dimensions. Targeting was the system's main weakness, associated with significant gaps in monitoring and capturing of data. WFP (and its partners) did not manage to address the shortcomings. The outcomes of the EMOP are difficult to measure, given the weakness of the monitoring indicators and the rather irregular measuring of them, along with problems in identifying beneficiaries and the issue of diluted and/or shared rations, which made it difficult to interpret certain findings. The weakness of the communication strategy also played a significant role in certain malfunctions.
24. Nevertheless, the operation as a whole permitted Niger to weather the crisis without too many problems, and the most important objective, that of saving lives, was largely achieved, even if the way this was done was not always the most appropriate. The diagram below summarizes the issues covered by the evaluation.



25. In terms of lessons learned, basically the Government of Niger has a sufficiently solid structure to benefit from support and assistance for managing crises. The population also showed an ability to adapt, and a genuine flexibility in the face of certain malfunctions in the system – an ability that should make it possible to integrate this dimension in the management of future crises. For its part WFP has “confirmed” its traditional strengths and weaknesses. It is exceptional in logistics (in the broad sense), but there is room for improvement where it does not have control over all aspects involved and must work and communicate with other stakeholders. Moreover, its monitoring and evaluation, and its work in the field (such as targeting) are not strong, and significantly limit the impact it could have.

Recommendations

⇒ *Cross-cutting*

26. **Recommendation 1:** Continue to support and accompany the Government using the existing arrangement, which is effective, although it could be improved.
27. **Recommendation 2:** Strive to understand the agricultural, economic and political elements that create crises – developing or bringing in the needed skills – so as to better mitigate them when they occur and to prevent them from arising.
28. **Recommendation 3:** Develop skills and synergies with the other stakeholders working on cash operations, which is still an experimental area.
29. **Recommendation 4:** Strengthen (in fact, create) cross-cutting skills in communication and monitoring and evaluation which are frequently lacking in WFP.

⇒ *Logistics and finance*

30. **Recommendation 5:** Develop a system of analytic accounting or the equivalent, particularly in order to provide better management of cash operations. Also, make efforts to apply the same accounting rigour to all cost components.

31. **Recommendation 6:** Enhance the food purchasing chain (which already works well), from Rome all the way to the field.
32. **Recommendation 7:** Enhance efforts to set up a WFP fleet.
33. **Recommendation 8:** Enhance political and technical relations with the Office for National Food Products (OPVN).

⇒ *Nutrition*

34. **Recommendation 9:** Continue BSF for the 6–23 month age bracket during the lean season, and rethink the BSF caregiver rations (their usefulness, modality, type).
35. **Recommendation 10:** Continue to support the Office of Nutrition (entities at the central level as well as in the districts and Integrated Health Centres), and support the systematic integration of the CRENAMs through adequate funding.
36. **Recommendation 11:** Unify the data collection tools and harmonize information circuits.
37. **Recommendation 12:** Provide more training in nutrition for WFP personnel.
38. **Recommendation 13:** Think more about the use of RUSF (opportunity, comparative advantages and new calculations of budget ratios).
39. **Recommendation 14:** Resolve the MAM mandate problem with UNICEF.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

| | |
|--------|--|
| BSF | blanket supplementary feeding |
| CRENAM | rehabilitation centres for moderate malnutrition |
| CRENI | intensive nutritional rehabilitation centres |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| PRRO | Protracted relief and recovery operation |
| RUSF | ready-to-use supplementary foods |
| SAM | severe acute malnutrition |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| WHO | World Health Organization |