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## **EVALUATION REPORTS**

**Agenda item 6**

*For consideration*

# **E**

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## **SUMMARY REPORT OF THE JOINT UNHCR/WFP IMPACT EVALUATION ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF FOOD ASSISTANCE TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS – ETHIOPIA**

## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This impact evaluation is one of four evaluations conducted in different countries by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It aims to provide evidence and inspiration for future strategies to improve the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations.

For more than 20 years, Ethiopia has hosted large numbers of refugees. The evaluation used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, gathering information from a wide variety of sources, but mostly from refugees from Eritrea and Somalia residing in selected camps. Testing a theory of change based on WFP and UNHCR policies and programme guidance, it assessed the impact of food assistance provided to these refugees between 2003 and 2010 in relation to stated short- and longer-term objectives – intended results – and unintended effects, including on relations with the host population.

Through the generally stable supply of appropriate food rations, the agencies achieved most of the short-term effects: lives were saved; hunger was mediated; global and severe acute malnutrition rates were improved for most groups; and immediate security and protection were realized. However, the longer-term objectives of food security, improved livelihood opportunities and asset-building have not been achieved. Food insecurity intensifies for refugees during the second half of each month. While approximately two thirds of Tigrigna households consume an adequate diet, the majority of Kunama and Somali refugees have a borderline or poor monthly food consumption score. WFP and UNHCR have not been able to ensure that food is consumed and that it is not sold in large quantities to purchase non-food items, necessitating negative coping strategies. The refugees are not self-reliant, despite UNHCR and WFP corporate policy intentions.


A major contributing factor is that the refugee assistance provided by WFP and UNHCR is dominated by a care and maintenance approach, based on the premise that the refugees are temporary guests who will soon be repatriated or resettled. Repatriation is not an option and only a few refugees have been resettled during the past eight years.

The care and maintenance approach is appropriate in short-term contexts. In the protracted context here, however, food assistance primarily maintains minimal levels of food consumption and does not promote livelihoods or help manage risks. External factors, including government policies, resource constraints and refugees' hopes of resettling, contribute to perpetuation of the care and maintenance approach.

As a result, the refugees have become dependent on food aid and less inclined to pursue alternative livelihood opportunities over time. Without significant policy and programme changes, it is not likely that refugees in camps in Ethiopia will achieve durable solutions, and UNHCR and WFP will simply be perpetuating chronic food insecurity.

The evaluation makes 13 recommendations, ranging from short- to long-term, for shifting the agencies' approach towards more durable local solutions for these refugees.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Report of the Joint UNHCR/WFP Impact Evaluation on the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations—Ethiopia” (WFP/EB.1/2012/6-E) and the management response in WFP/EB.1/2012/6-E/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## INTRODUCTION

1. This impact evaluation is one of four evaluations planned in different countries by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for 2011 and 2012. It aims to provide evidence and inspiration for future strategies to improve the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations. Its assessment of the impact of food assistance provided to refugees in selected Ethiopian refugee camps between 2003 and 2010 is intended to support evidence-based decision-making on appropriate forms of food assistance in protracted refugee situations.
2. The immediate objectives are to:
  - i) evaluate the impact of food assistance to refugees in relation to stated – intended – project objectives, and the effects, including unintended ones, on host populations, which may influence the potential for achieving durable solutions; and
  - ii) make recommendations for minimizing negative effects and optimizing positive ones, to increase the potential for finding durable solutions.
3. The evaluation tests a theory of change, which is based on WFP and UNHCR policies and programme guidance and posits that UNHCR and WFP activities will produce short-term effects, including improved food security, increased access to livelihood opportunities, positive coping strategies and asset-building; intermediate outcomes, including improved nutrition, an appropriate food basket, successful income-generating activities, agricultural activities and improved education; and long-term impact, resulting in self-reliance, resettlement or repatriation.
4. The evaluation team employed a combination of data collection procedures to triangulate information gathered from a wide variety of sources, mainly refugees residing in camps in the Tigray and Somali regions of Ethiopia. Evaluation methods included a quantitative household survey of 1,180 refugee households; qualitative focus groups with 256 refugees and members of host populations; key informant interviews with implementing organizations and donors; positive deviant interviews; observation of conditions in the camps and warehouses; and analysis of secondary data.

## Context

5. For more than 20 years, Ethiopia has hosted large numbers of refugees. According to estimates at the time of this evaluation, the country's total refugee population was near 154,300 and rapidly rising;<sup>1</sup> Somali refugees were flooding into camps in the country's south, which was not part of the evaluation. The most protracted caseloads come from Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudan; the steady repatriation of Sudanese refugees limited the evaluation's scope to the Eritrean and Somali protracted refugee contexts.
6. Somali camps are located in Ethiopia's southeast Somali region and currently host 91,100 refugees. The evaluation team visited Kebribeyah, the oldest camp, established in 1991, and Sheder, established in 2009. Eritrean camps are located in Tigray region, where the team visited Shimelba, the primary camp in Tigray, established in 2005, and Mai Ayni, established in 2009. Both of these camps have particularly high ratios of men to women.

<sup>1</sup> UNHCR. 2011. Global Appeal 2011 Update. Ethiopia. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483986>

7. The Government of Ethiopia has historically had an open policy of allowing refugees into Ethiopia, and has taken measures to protect their human rights, including the recent formal introduction of the “Out of Camp” policy for qualifying Eritrean refugees. However, refugees are generally regarded as temporary guests and have limited freedom of movement or access to education and employment opportunities.
8. UNHCR and WFP have a long-standing partnership committed to ensuring that refugees’ food security and related needs are adequately addressed and that durable solutions are sought. In Ethiopia, UNHCR’s chief responsibilities include supporting the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) with financial resources for the determination of refugee status and registration processes, and providing refugees with non-food items (NFIs), such as cooking utensils, blankets and soap, and complementary foods that make the main food commodities provided by WFP usable.
9. Since 2003, WFP’s assistance has been channelled through a series of protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) and one emergency operation. WFP’s main responsibility is to provide monthly food rations, which are stored in camp warehouses administered by ARRA. Food distribution is supervised by ARRA and monitored by WFP and UNHCR. Over the years, WFP has fine-tuned the food basket by including blended foods to address micronutrient deficiencies, and increasing the amount of cereals to compensate refugees for milling costs. WFP also provides food rations for supplementary and therapeutic feeding and school feeding.

## Results and Factors that Explain the Results


10. **Food consumption and food security.** WFP has provided a stable supply of nutritionally balanced food rations throughout most of the period under review, saving lives, protecting refugees in emergencies, and reducing hunger and malnutrition. Although WFP faced some problems in meeting delivery targets prior to 2008 – mostly resulting from transport inefficiencies and budget constraints caused by insufficient donor commitment to the programme – the expected outcome of ensuring adequate food energy consumption has in large part been achieved, and food energy consumption has improved in recent years.

“We would have died without support”.  
Women refugees – Mai Ayni and  
Shimelba camps

11. However, food insecurity intensifies for refugee families during the second half of each month. Most refugee households are able to eat two or three meals per day, but the quantity and quality of those meals declines in the latter half of the month, when diets include virtually no meat, fish or eggs. Single-member households have greater difficulty making their rations last. Fewer than one quarter consume cereal rations throughout the month, compared with 36 percent of multi-member households. Food rations often run out because refugees are compelled to sell up to half of them to pay for basic needs – NFIs, other food items and milling – which are often purchased at poor terms of trade. Although UNHCR provides most refugee households with a set of NFIs when they arrive in the camps, budget allocations and inadequate targeting and prioritization constrain further distributions of NFIs in protracted-refugee camps. In addition, WFP and UNHCR have not systematically delivered food and NFIs simultaneously, to ensure that food is consumed and not sold in large quantities to purchase NFIs.

12. The degree and intensity of chronic food insecurity vary by refugee group and type of household. Eritrean refugees consume diets that are more diverse than those of Somali refugees, as evidenced in differential household dietary diversity scores (HDDS), of 5.7 at Shimelba camp (Eritrean) and 4.9 at Kebribeyah camp (Somali). The higher HDDS depends on sales of food basket items, which allow Eritrean refugees occasionally to purchase a larger variety of food items, including green vegetables. The food consumption score (FCS)<sup>2</sup> of refugees varies significantly by ethnicity. Approximately two thirds of Tigrigna households (one ethnic group of refugees from Eritrea) consume an adequate diet, but fewer than one half of Kunama households (the other main ethnic group from Eritrea) and fewer than one third of Somali households attain “acceptable” food consumption. The FCS for most of these groups is borderline or poor.

**Figure: Food Consumption Category, by Ethnic Group and Camp**



13. Somali refugees also engage in more frequent and severe coping strategies in response to food insecurity during the second half of each month. Virtually all Somali households – 94 percent – commonly limit portion sizes and reduce meal numbers. Although these strategies are less frequent in Shimelba camp, 74 percent of households there still limit portion sizes, and 65 percent reduce the number of meals. Tigrigna single-person households, most of which are of single men, commonly employ the “11/5” consumption system: wake up late, because few people work, and eat a late brunch at 11 a.m. and an early dinner at 5 p.m. Approximately two thirds of all surveyed households regularly borrow food and eat less preferred foods, and nearly 60 percent occasionally seek meals at other houses.
14. Several other factors act against refugee food security throughout the month. First, large numbers of Somali and, to a lesser extent, Kunama refugees are convinced that the food distribution process undercuts their cereal rations through systematic under-scooping; WFP and UNHCR monitoring systems are not sufficiently intensive to verify the extent of this problem. Second, UNHCR has been unable to revalidate populations in the protracted

<sup>2</sup> The FCS measures the nutrient density and frequency of households’ food consumption, allowing nutrition analysis based on the frequency and types of foods consumed, indexed by higher values for animal protein foods, pulses and green vegetables, and lower values for oil and sugar. (WFP. 2009. Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines. Rome.)

- camps for several years, so it relies on out-of-date databases to plan programme activities, creating the risk of inefficiencies in food and other refugee activities. Finally, camp warehouses are adequate but not fully up to WFP standards. Stack cards are not used at either Kebribeyah or Shimelba, and the ledger used to record Shimelba food commodity receipts, dispatches and distributions had some inaccuracies.
15. **Nutrition.** Nutrition in young children has improved in recent years, largely through the efforts of WFP and UNHCR to target malnourished children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women. Chronic malnutrition/underweight is negligible among Somali and, to a lesser extent, Tigrigna refugees. Malnutrition rates, measured as global acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM), have gradually improved annually among Somali and Tigrigna refugees and have been close to or below World Health Organization (WHO) benchmarks since 2008 and 2007, respectively. However, stunting and SAM rates remain unacceptably high among Kunama refugees, primarily because of inappropriate child feeding practices. This is not currently being addressed in programme modalities. Indicative of iron deficiencies in the diet, refugee anaemia rates have never fallen below the WHO benchmark of 20 percent for children under 5 in either camp. Although the prevalence of anaemia among refugees has gradually declined, its persistence can partly be explained by inefficient consumption patterns for fortified corn-soya blend.
  16. **Livelihoods.** Income-generating opportunities are limited and vary significantly across camps and ethnicities and by sex. Among all refugee groups, only the Kunama, who are traditionally farmers, have access to small parcels of land through sharecropping arrangements. Agricultural production opportunities are severely restricted by the unwritten policy of limiting refugees' access to land, particularly for Somali refugees. Day labour represents the most important income source for all refugees. Very few refugees own businesses or engage in petty trade, and most business activities in and around the camps are owned by local residents. Refugee households' lack of grazing land poses a huge constraint to livestock production, as do restrictions on movements; few refugees own animals other than chickens. With few agricultural production opportunities, refugees are easily exploitable. Remittances play an important role in explaining food security differences: one third of Tigrigna refugees receive remittances from other countries, and another third receive other types of financial support, including gifts. In contrast, substantially fewer than one-tenth of Somali households receive remittances. Remittances can be a vital source of income for households striving to preserve their food rations, and are another explanatory factor for the relative food insecurity among Somali refugees.
  17. Current programming does not include local integration as a potential durable solution, severely limiting an overall food security or livelihood programming strategy. UNHCR and WFP face resource and Ethiopian legal constraints to longer-term livelihood solutions, which contributes to maintaining a care and maintenance approach. In the period under review, donors devoted well over US\$100 million to WFP and UNHCR efforts to save refugee lives in emergency contexts in Ethiopia and to provide refugees with sufficient food and non-food items to protect their food security and nutrition status, while livelihood programming has attracted only a very small proportion of donor assistance. In addition, although WFP and UNHCR regularly engage in high-quality joint assessments and nutrition surveys, recommendations are not always followed up.

18. Although WFP has procured and transported a sufficiently stable supply of food assistance to reduce hunger and malnutrition among refugees in the camps, it has not linked its refugee food assistance to its high-profile, highly resourced food security and livelihood programme activities to benefit Ethiopian rural communities in areas surrounding the camps, such as Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods (MERET), the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and school feeding. Many of these programmes have activities that are similar to those in the camps, but these opportunities for synergies are lost.
19. Although UNHCR offers strong protective services to vulnerable refugee households and supports ARRA, it lacks sufficient funding mechanisms to promote refugee self-reliance and durable solutions. Working primarily through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), few UNHCR resources are devoted to livelihood programming activities that create economic opportunities for refugees to meet their basic needs. This approach is not advocated among partners, NGOs are expected to raise funds separately, and livelihood strategies are developed long after the protracted refugee camp has been established.
20. Linking livelihood outcomes to local durable solutions also requires the participation of host populations, which is currently lacking. UNHCR and its partners have introduced a few camp-based livelihood activities such as kitchen gardens and very limited activities to mitigate environmental impacts, which ostensibly involve host community participation. However, environmental mitigation activities are insufficiently intensive to replenish agroforestry destruction around the camps, which has undermined long-term livelihoods.
21. In addition, the long-term distribution of full rations, coupled with limited economic opportunities, has created a dependency syndrome that permeates all aspects of the programme. Refugees have not come close to achieving self-reliance. In their intervention priorities, both WFP and UNHCR have made resettlement and repatriation the two durable solutions, although repatriation will not be possible for either Eritrean or Somali refugees in the near future. In this context, refugees seek resettlement as their only viable durable solution, especially after living for up to 20 years in camps, with virtually no livelihood options. However, resettlement is a time-consuming resource-draining process that depends on the goodwill of a small number of donor countries. Only a few refugees can be resettled; for example, in 2010 – the year with the highest numbers resettled – only 3 percent of Somali refugees residing in Kebribeyah and 20 percent of Eritrean refugees in Shimelba were resettled.
22. Other external factors help explain why refugees have been denied livelihood opportunities within Ethiopia as a durable solution. As well as being the implementing agency responsible for food distribution and service provisioning within the camps, ARRA is a government regulatory agency concerned with security issues. It therefore oversees Government of Ethiopia policies that limit or deny refugees' legal employment opportunities and access to land for agricultural production. After 20 years in the camps, Somali refugees in particular still lack economic freedom to pursue livelihood options. UNHCR, WFP and major donors have not vigorously lobbied for policy changes that might expand refugees' economic rights, and thus durable solutions.

NGOs are like *“lions in the bush –they come in very quickly, implement a few small activities and then disappear”*.  
Elderly man refugee, Kebribeyah camp

## Gender Relations and Protection from Violence

23. The UNHCR has provided high-quality, valued services in the camps to protect vulnerable refugees from violence. However, women and unaccompanied minors remain vulnerable. Women heads of household tend to be more food-insecure than men and lack income-earning opportunities. Women occasionally engage in transactional sex to support their food security – sex is even bartered for food. Women are also vulnerable to violence when in search of fuelwood and water outside the camps. Unaccompanied minors are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and food insecurity related to their living conditions – they live with other children in extremely crowded conditions – and depend on others to collect their rations, store the food and prepare meals, which were described as extremely repetitive and unappetizing.
24. Camp structures, such as food distribution committees, mirror Eritrean and Somali social patriarchy and deny women a voice in decision-making, even though women are responsible for ration collection and management in the household. This situation exacerbates mistrust, particularly regarding food distribution. Patriarchy also contributes to the very different reactions of men and women to counselling services provided in the Tigray camps.
25. Food assistance also affects marriage patterns. Both camps report that households marry off young girls to increase household support, including access to food assistance. Somali refugees have also devised polygamous marital relations – which are far more frequent among refugees than in the general population – as an important food access strategy. Another common marriage pattern involves Eritrean refugee men entering into cross-marriages with Ethiopian women, theoretically to strengthen resettlement prospects for both parties, and to create larger families to augment food rations.

## CONCLUSIONS

26. As noted, the theory of change evaluated here postulates that UNHCR and WFP programming would produce short-term effects, intermediate outcomes and long-term impact. The pathway for the theory of change was never completely achieved because several assumptions were not met. Through the stable supply of nutritionally balanced food rations, the agencies achieved most of the short-term effects, but did not move from saving lives, hunger mediation, security and protection to improved livelihood opportunities and asset-building.
27. The programme has successfully realized half of the intermediate outcomes, including appropriate food baskets; improved nutrition as measured by GAM and SAM, although Kunama children have unacceptably high stunting rates and anaemia remains problematic; and improved education opportunities, although teaching quality lags behind that in other Ethiopian schools and graduates have few opportunities to use their education.
28. Although WFP has delivered a full basket of food commodities to the camps, Ethiopian refugees are not food-secure throughout the month, have limited livelihood opportunities, are accumulating few assets, have few successful income-generating activities and are not self-reliant. A major factor

*"We arrived at this camp like people with an arrow in our butt and another arrow in our hand. WFP and UNHCR have helped us to take the arrow out of our butt; so now we can sit down. But nobody has taken the arrow out of our hand. We still cannot do anything for ourselves, to help ourselves".*

Somali elder and respected refugee leader

contributing to these outcomes is that the refugee assistance and protection provided by WFP and UNHCR is dominated by a care and maintenance approach, which is based on the premise that the refugees are temporary guests who will soon be repatriated or resettled. External factors, including government policies, resource constraints and refugees' will to resettle, contribute to perpetuation of this approach.

29. Long-term impact has not been achieved over the past eight years, except in the resettlement of a few, mostly Tigrigna, refugees. It is therefore unlikely that refugees in camps in Ethiopia will achieve durable solutions without significant policy and programme changes.
30. The care and maintenance approach is appropriate in short-term contexts. For example, while this evaluation report was being written, UNHCR and WFP in Ethiopia were committing resources and efforts to respond to the emergency in southern Ethiopia, where severely malnourished Somali refugees were streaming across the border to escape catastrophic drought and security conditions in Somalia. In the protracted context of the refugee camps evaluated here, however, food assistance remains oriented primarily to maintaining minimal levels of food consumption, and not to protecting livelihoods, promoting livelihood strategies or managing risks, despite the corporate policy intentions of UNHCR and WFP. As a result, the refugees have become dependent on food aid and are less inclined to pursue alternative livelihood opportunities over time. Without large-scale investment in livelihood programming, UNHCR and WFP will simply be perpetuating chronic food insecurity in the hope that resettlement occurs sooner rather than later.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

31. The following recommendations are devised to assist WFP and UNHCR in promoting durable solutions in protracted refugee situations. They are presented as long-term, medium-term and short-term recommendations. The position of the recommendation does not imply its level of importance.

### Long-Term Recommendations Requiring More Than One PRRO to Implement

32. **Recommendation 1: WFP and UNHCR should develop a livelihood strategy by promoting policy and programme assistance that enables refugees to engage in legal economic activities, paid employment and private enterprise.** As international funding streams for care and maintenance models in camps begin to decline, refugees will need to rely more on their own economic activities in local communities. This strategy would be oriented to local development in which both refugees and the host population would benefit, and programmes would be implemented at scale. Such a strategy could serve as a model for promoting livelihoods at an early stage of refugee camp development, before a protracted situation evolves in which refugees and agencies focus on resettlement as the only durable solution option.
33. **Recommendation 2: Donors supporting the refugee programme should devote a larger proportion of resources to local durable solutions through livelihood programming. UNHCR and WFP cannot promote durable livelihood solutions without the support of donors.** To accomplish recommendation 1, donors should take a more proactive role in promoting livelihood approaches in protracted refugee camps. This should commence soon after emergency conditions have been stabilized. Donors would

have to break some bureaucratic barriers that inhibit agencies or bureaux such as the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration from using resources to support long-term solutions, rather than exclusively for emergency humanitarian programmes, as is their current mandate.

### Medium-Term Recommendations to be Undertaken in the Next PRRO

34. **Recommendation 3: Scale up the livelihood programmes implemented by NGOs.** Livelihood programmes based on economic stimulus packages should be extended to host communities and should include agricultural and pastoral extension services, income-generating activities, vocational training and microfinance. For example, refugee-owned and -operated mills could generate resources that act as a catalyst for livelihood activities. These improvements would allow refugees to provide milling services for other refugee households, and would enable households to retain a greater proportion of their rations. Food processing also has good potential in the camps. Livelihood activities would be tailored to the specific profile of the refugee population and would be initiated from the onset of refugee camp establishment.
35. **Recommendation 4: Improve collaboration and coordination for joint programming and funding activities, including advocacy efforts.** Given the costs involved, joint assessment missions should not be undertaken without agreed follow-up plans. Action plans would include a joint monitoring component to determine whether the actions proposed are actually implemented. Enhanced WFP–UNHCR collaboration would include increased advocacy with the Government of Ethiopia to bring about policy changes that enable refugees to pursue livelihoods more easily. These advocacy efforts should be assisted by donors. Through donor engagement, funding and advocacy can be combined using conditionality to lobby for more economic activities for refugees, and for policy changes such as the Out of Camp policy.
36. **Recommendation 5: Consider alternative food assistance modalities.** WFP employs many food assistance modalities in its global programming, and could consider employing food for work (FFW) to support refugee programmes. For example, FFW could support caregivers and cooks in improving the performance and outcomes related to unaccompanied minors; FFW and food for assets could support refugees' participation in environmental mitigation activities, the promotion of a watershed approach around camps and in host communities, or structural rehabilitation activities. Alternative food assistance modalities should be considered for single refugees who are not living with families. Consideration should be given to enabling young men to use a food voucher card to purchase their food from a local restaurant.
37. **Recommendation 6: Scale up environmental interventions that involve both refugees and the host population, to address environmental degradation created by the refugee camps and mitigate the negative consequences of climate change.** These interventions would be coupled with activities that seek to minimize the use of fuelwood. Donors should support this new approach; an advocacy campaign is essential for engaging Government and donors.
38. **Recommendation 7: Promote greater synergies in the implementation of WFP programme activities.** For example, environmental mitigation activities that have been successful in MERET and PSNP could be promoted in refugee settings to benefit host populations and refugees.

39. **Recommendation 8: Be more strategic and transparent in NFI distributions, given the realities of budget shortfalls.** To address weaknesses in the provision of NFIs, UNHCR should ensure that NFIs are readily available for new arrivals and are replenished in protracted refugee camps, based on needs assessments. The timing of NFI distributions must also be appropriate, to reduce refugees' sale of food items to purchase NFIs, and should coincide with seasonal requirements and the timing of food distributions.

### Short-Term Recommendations to be Undertaken Immediately

40. **Recommendation 9: UNHCR should undertake a revalidation process in the older camps, as soon as possible.** Although expensive, revalidation is essential given the inaccuracy of current camp databases for planning household food distribution and generating lists.
41. **Recommendation 10: Increase women's participation.** To address the gender imbalance in the management of refugee committees, WFP and UNHCR should ensure increased women's participation in food distribution management and decision-making. This would improve food distribution efficiency, increase women refugees' input into programme prioritization in general and reduce mistrust. A sub-committee should be established specifically to address protection issues, including gender-based violence (GBV) associated with fuelwood and grass collection, the problem of transactional sex related to food insecurity, strategies for preventing GBV and female genital mutilation, and the protection of young girls and boys.
42. **Recommendation 11: Intensify food distribution monitoring.** Both WFP and UNHCR need to be present at all food distributions. In cases where under-scooping is a potential concern, WFP should employ other monitoring tools, such as random spot checks, weighing of rations and testing of scoops, to determine whether the proper ration has been distributed to refugee households. WFP should also enhance ARRA's warehouse management practices and consider establishing a stronger presence in the vicinity of the Tigray refugee camps. UNHCR should base officers directly in the Tigray camps, where they currently spend insufficient time. UNHCR and WFP should regularly share monitoring reports to ensure effective inter-agency support and follow-up on reported problems.
43. **Recommendation 12: Implement activities to improve child feeding practices.** This would link food distribution activities to parental training on appropriate nutrition and child feeding practices, implemented by partner NGOs and monitored or supervised by UNHCR nutrition teams.
44. **Recommendation 13: Explore alternative milling options.** WFP and UNHCR should undertake a new improved feasibility study with the objective of instituting solutions for the milling conundrum.

**ANNEX**

**Map of Refugee Camps in Ethiopia Supported by UNHCR and WFP (as of January 2010)**



The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries.

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## ACRONYMS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT

ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
FCS	food consumption score
FFW	food for work
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GBV	gender-based violence
HDDS	household dietary diversity score
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to more Sustainable Livelihoods
NFI	non-food item
NGO	non-governmental organization
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
SAM	severe acute malnutrition
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WHO	World Health Organization