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SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – GLOBAL LOGISTICS CLUSTER

Jointly commissioned by WFP, the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNICEF

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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation, jointly commissioned by WFP, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Children's Fund, analysed the global logistics cluster's performance and results from 2005 to 2012.

The evaluation assessed the overall satisfaction with, and the effectiveness, efficiency, utilization and results of, the cluster's products, services and activities at the global and country levels. The evaluation was conducted by an independent team from November 2011 to July 2012.


The evaluation found that logistics cluster operations led to better logistics approaches, enhancing programme delivery and thereby the effect of humanitarian operations on affected populations. The cluster's operations were found to be relevant and effective, and provided value to participating organizations; however, it was difficult to make quantifiable analysis. WFP's financial, reporting and tracking systems did not enable the level of transparency required to ensure partners' trust, accountability and performance benchmarking. WFP's special account for the global logistics cluster and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced timeliness and the likelihood of achieving outcomes.

The Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell was well established and had strong human resource capacity. The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership enabled the cluster to undertake the expected global and country activities in information management, operations support, coordination and funding. The support cell's management and staff were primarily oriented towards field support, in line with the objectives of the cluster system; the evaluation found that they could have invested more in global-level management, performance monitoring, partnership and the development of tools, guidance and systems.

The evaluation found that under WFP's leadership the cluster strengthened partnerships and increased coordination in humanitarian logistics. Although the cluster's ability to learn and apply lessons, especially from country-level operations, was hindered by the lack of systematic approaches, the cluster improved over time, largely owing to its core group of skilled staff.

The evaluation made six recommendations for improving the overall work of the global logistics cluster. These recommendations seek to engage the cluster's support cell, its partners and WFP management in designing a three-year strategic plan, strengthening financial and reporting systems, enhancing the organizational structure and decision-making, improving management of the cluster's human resources, extending partnership outreach, and engaging in global policy and inter-cluster coordination.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report – Global Logistics Cluster (Jointly commissioned by WFP, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNICEF)” (WFP/EB.2/2012/6-B) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2012/6-B/Add.1 and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Features

1. The joint evaluation of the global logistics cluster (GLC) was commissioned by WFP's Office of Evaluation in partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy and Operations Evaluation Department and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Evaluation Office, at the request of WFP's Logistics Division. It covers GLC work from 2005 to 2012.
2. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the satisfaction with, and the effectiveness, efficiency, utilization and results of, GLC products, services and activities at the global and country levels. The evaluation was conducted between November 2011 and July 2012 by an independent team comprising a leader, two logistics specialists, an information management specialist and a research analyst.
3. With a strong emphasis on learning and accountability, the evaluation aimed to inform future strategy and preparedness for emergencies. It coincided with development of the GLC strategy and, more broadly, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC's) Transformative Agenda.¹ The primary intended users of the evaluation are WFP senior management, GLC Support Cell (GLCSC) leadership and partners participating in the logistics cluster at the country and global levels.

Approach and Method

4. A theory-based approach was taken to assess the extent to which GLC inputs and activities resulted in the expected outputs and outcomes, and how external factors and assumptions affected results. The expected relationships between GLC inputs and their anticipated outcomes were structured as a GLC theory of change (see Annex). The GLC theory of change builds on past IASC evaluations and incorporates logistics cluster policies and plans, and stakeholder perceptions; it serves as a framework for the evaluation.
5. The evaluation analysed qualitative and quantitative data gathered from more than 200 key informant interviews, survey respondents, primary and secondary source documents, Google analytics on the Logcluster.org website, and direct observation of operations in Haiti, Pakistan and South Sudan and at a GLC partner meeting. It addressed four main evaluation questions:
 - i) What are the results of logistics clusters' operations at the country level?
 - ii) To what extent did the GLCSC's activities and products provide value to users?
 - iii) To what extent have logistics clusters at the global and country levels worked effectively with partners under WFP's leadership?
 - iv) To what extent have the lessons derived from logistics cluster experience informed decision-making?
6. Seven case studies from 42 GLC operations were selected, representing the diversity of emergency and activity types, scales of need and cost, inter-cluster coordination, civil/military relations, preparedness work, and national capacity development efforts. The case studies were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Libya,

¹ The Transformative Agenda seeks to make the humanitarian response system more efficient and effective by addressing lessons learned regarding leadership, coordination and accountability.

Myanmar, Pakistan and South Sudan. Two emergency responses where the cluster was not activated – in Ethiopia and Liberia – were also reviewed for comparison purposes.

7. Given the wide array of GLC stakeholders, effort was made to expand ownership of the evaluation by discussing and developing initial recommendations at an international workshop in May 2012 and a later GLC global meeting.
8. *Limitations.* Although the limitations do not diminish the credibility of the findings, the conclusions must be understood in the context of the cluster's global scope and complex operational structure, the different combinations of logistics services and coordination activities required to respond to the different contexts, and the time that elapsed between cluster events and the evaluation, which limited respondents' recollection. These challenges were compounded by missing and inconsistent data, difficulties in locating key informants because of staff rotation and turnover, and the relatively short time available for site visits.

Context

9. The IASC established the GLC as one of nine clusters in December 2005. WFP was designated lead agency, partly to address deficiencies identified by the humanitarian response review,² including insufficient coordination among humanitarian partners to provide appropriate and timely goods and services to affected populations. Humanitarian logistics continue to evolve in the midst of increasingly frequent and severe disasters in progressively more complex operating environments, including conflict situations. In addition, there continue to be restrictions related to access for humanitarian workers and to import of humanitarian supplies, a proliferation of actors, and persistent under-recognition by humanitarian agencies of the importance of logistics. Funding and overarching accountability trends within the humanitarian sector drive the growing demand for efficiency, professionalism and high-calibre logistics response.
10. Although the GLC is important for participants, and crucial for populations affected by disasters, its work represents a fraction of total global humanitarian logistics. Total annual humanitarian logistics spending is estimated at between US\$7 billion and US\$14 billion,³ while estimated total civilian and military logistics expenditures are more than US\$6.7 trillion.⁴ In contrast, the GLCSC's total budget for 2005–2012 was only US\$16.6 million, and the total budget for all 26 Special Operations associated with GLC operations from 2006 to 2011 was US\$490 million.

Characteristics of the Global Logistics Cluster

11. The GLC is a group of humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders committed to addressing logistics needs during humanitarian crises, through broad partnerships. There are no criteria for membership, as the cluster seeks to avoid exclusivity.

² Adinolfi, C., Bassiouni, D., Lauritzsen, H. and Williams, R. 2005. *Humanitarian Response Review 2005*. Geneva, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

³ Majewski, B., Navangul, K.A. and Heigh, I. 2010. A Peek into the Future of Humanitarian Logistics: Forewarned is Forearmed. *Supply Chain Forum – An International Journal*, 11(3).

⁴ Rodrigues, A., Bowersox, D. and Calantone, R. 2005. *Estimation of Global and National Logistics Expenditures: 2002 Data Update*. East Lansing, Michigan, USA, Michigan State University.

12. The GLCSC's mission is to facilitate the humanitarian logistics community in exploiting shared assets, aptitudes and competencies at the global and field levels.⁵ Over time, the GLCSC's structure and functions have adapted to changing operational demands and expectations. The table below outlines the GLC's main components.

COMPONENTS OF THE GLOBAL LOGISTICS CLUSTER		
Component	Global level	Country level
Partnership	Open platform and collaboration coordinated by GLCSC. <i>Participants:</i> United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donor governments, corporate partners, standby partners, the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services <i>Activities:</i> meetings (in person and by conference call), information-sharing and training.	Open platform and collaboration coordinated by country cluster cell. <i>Participants:</i> United Nations agencies, international and national NGOs, donors and national governments. <i>Activities:</i> cluster meetings, information-sharing, operational coordination, and use and provision of common services.
Support Cell	GLCSC – staff from WFP and seconded from international NGOs, other United Nations agencies and standby partners.	Country cluster cell – staff from WFP country office or, as needed, deployed on short-term assignments from GLCSC and/or other WFP offices as a logistics response team.
Cluster lead agency	WFP assigned by IASC. Leadership involves: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • appointing a global coordinator; • resourcing, and providing back office infrastructure and support for the GLC; and • carrying out representational and leadership responsibilities for partners and donors, accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the IASC. 	Assigned by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or Resident Coordinator; to date has always been WFP. Leadership involves: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • providing/arranging logistics services as provider of last resort; • resourcing the country office, and providing back office infrastructure for the cluster; and • carrying out representational and leadership responsibilities for managing cluster staff, accountable to the HC and in coordination with the humanitarian country team.

13. The first logistics cluster was activated for the Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 at the request of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and prior to final endorsement of the clusters. By February 2007, 11 country logistics clusters had been activated and the GLCSC was formally established with clear guidelines and expanded staffing.

⁵ Global Logistics Cluster. 2010. *Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform*. July 2010: http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/general_overview

14. From September 2006 to November 2011 the GLCSC received income totalling US\$16.6 million. Since 2009, WFP has provided 32 percent of GLCSC funding,⁶ largely through the mainstreaming of 9.5 positions into WFP's core staff at Headquarters. Expenditures totalled US\$13.9 million.
15. *GLC operations.* Between 2005 and 2011, the logistics cluster was active in 42 humanitarian responses across 29 countries. GLC Special Operation funding appeals were launched for 26 of these responses and totalled US\$490 million, of which 61 percent was funded. Some Special Operations attracted a wide range of donors, especially Pakistan and Haiti in 2010; others relied on the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund. More than 200 staff have been deployed for the cluster since 2005, increasing from 10 in 2006 to a high of 71 in 2010.
16. *Mandate and roles.* Guidance for the GLC's mandate and roles is divided in three tiers:
- i) overarching coordination policies and decisions of the IASC, which establish the purpose, architecture, expectations and coordination mechanisms;
 - ii) strategies, policies and decisions of WFP's Executive Board and management, which determine how WFP undertakes its lead agency responsibilities; and
 - iii) business plans, preparedness and deployment plans, guidance and systems developed by the GLCSC to operationalize IASC and WFP decisions and the direction set by GLC partners in global meetings.
17. Along with the emergency telecommunications cluster, the GLC is designated by the IASC as a "common service area". Unlike other thematic clusters, these two provide services for other clusters and humanitarian organizations, as well as coordination, but this additional role is not formally defined.

FINDINGS


Country-Level Results of Logistics Cluster Operations

18. *Overview.* The evaluation confirmed the links between GLC inputs and activities and expected outputs related to collaborative response, information-sharing, pooled resources, rapid deployment, increased funding for common logistics services and delivery of goods. The cluster's operations enabled outcomes and results including more use of information, increased coordination, better decisions, reduced duplication, greater efficiency, greater predictability and better national preparedness.
19. However, quantifying the cluster's contributions to outcomes was difficult because of limitations in reporting and financial tracking systems, lack of performance indicators, and inconsistent monitoring and data consolidation. Although common service data showed that prioritization decisions were appropriate, these data were not consistently analysed and transparently communicated. This led to the misperception that WFP as cluster lead agency benefited disproportionately from common services, especially when partners' cargo was not ready for storage and uplift and WFP used the existing logistics capacity rather than leaving it underutilized or idle. Given the humanitarian context, the evaluators see this approach as practical.

⁶ From the Programme Support and Administrative budget.

20. GLC outcomes are influenced by the degree of humanitarian organizations' participation in coordination meetings and as users of common services. Non-participation limits the cluster's achievements regarding coordination, economies of scale and coverage/reduced duplication. Participation is not mandatory and many organizations have limited in-country resources. Qualitative analysis found that most stakeholders judged that logistics cluster operations brought the greatest improvements to the reach of smaller international NGOs – with annual budgets of less than US\$100 million – and other organizations lacking heavy logistics capacity. In Haiti, for example, the logistics cluster moved 5,540 mt from January to May 2010, while the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies alone received total consignments of 11,231 mt from January to June 2010.
21. *Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.* Overall, GLC operations were found to be highly relevant, valuable and effective. In interviews, key informants across locations, field versus Headquarter levels, and organizations shared the view that cluster operations had an overall positive effect on humanitarian logistics approaches. They also reported that improved logistics approaches contributed to enhanced programme delivery, increasing the positive effect on beneficiaries. Survey responses (see Figure 1), analysis of records, and key informant interviews presented consistent findings. Effectiveness was confirmed across multiple dimensions, including increased fundraising, enhanced timeliness, cost savings, improved coverage/reduced gaps and duplication, greater predictability and improved information-sharing.

Figure 1: Respondents' perceptions on results of working in partnership with the Logistics Cluster % positive responses




Source: Evaluation team

22. WFP's special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced initial timeliness and the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes. These mechanisms allowed rapid gap assessment and the establishment of logistics services when other actors most needed information and predictable support.
23. *Cluster activation.* General satisfaction was found with activation processes and the deployment of resources in emergencies, but there was concern about the deactivation processes that permit closure of clusters and transition to other coordination systems, usually government-led. Interview and survey data showed agreement across NGOs, United Nations agencies, donors, national governments and GLC staff that deactivation processes were not clear or effective. Currently, there is no formal IASC guidance regarding deactivation protocols. Some informants from WFP and other United Nations agencies expressed the view that the logistics cluster, unlike programme clusters, should have a clearly defined activation period.

24. *Financial management, monitoring and reporting.* Financial and reporting systems were not geared to supporting the GLC's effective management and monitoring, and were applied inconsistently. WFP's internal systems for financial management and project reporting generate broad financial and implementation information. Many partners have far more detailed financial and programme reports and expect the same level of transparency from the GLC; the evaluators found that WFP systems were poorly constructed for activity-based financial analysis. This limited the GLC's ability to lead on cost-efficiency issues.
25. *Human resources.* Human resource systems and procedures did not support operations adequately; problems were related to selection, hand-over and staff performance assessment.
26. *Service user prioritization.* In each of the case studies the evaluation found that the logistics cluster met the needs of self-identified users and matched the humanitarian community's priorities. Transport data analysis refuted the perception that WFP benefited disproportionately from common services. Prioritization decisions were found appropriate, but lack of performance indicators, tracking systems and transparent communication of costs and benefits were a significant weakness. The evaluation analysed cargo⁷ tracking data for users of logistics cluster common transport in Haiti, Libya and South Sudan. This analysis showed that international NGOs accounted for the most requests and the greatest volume transported, while other United Nations agencies were the largest category of users by weight transported (see Figure 2). Although WFP was in the top three users, the amount of WFP cargo transported by the cluster represented only a small fraction of total WFP commodity movements.

Figure 2: Average percentage total logistics cluster common transport for Haiti, Libya and South Sudan by user type



* IOM = International Organization for Migration; INGO = international NGO; Unlabelled = Other entities

27. *Service gaps.* Primary gaps identified by partners included assistance for customs clearance, procurement and specialized programme logistics. Expectations that the GLC can or should provide such services differed among stakeholders, reflecting the lack of an agreed "service catalogue".


⁷ Cargo transported by the logistics cluster includes a wide range of essential humanitarian items across many sectors, including shelter, health, food and water/hygiene goods and equipment, and fuel and office equipment.

28. *Lasting results.* There was evidence that GLC operations provided significant lasting results. Some stakeholders in interviews expressed the firm view that the cluster is not intended to be activated for long enough to have lasting results. However, three-quarters of survey respondents said that the GLC had slight or major effects on increasing the capacity of national and international actors. In Haiti, for example, the logistics cluster geographic information systems team trained Haitian personnel and established close coordination with the National Centre for Geospatial Information; in Pakistan, the cluster team included a project with the national government to build and hand-over a series of strategic emergency supply warehouses.

User Value of Global Logistic Cluster Support Cell Activities and Products

29. *Overview.* The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership enabled the GLC to undertake the expected global and country activities in information management, operations support, coordination and funding. Prioritization of support to field operations limited the GLC's focus on performance monitoring, cargo tracking systems and partnership activities. Partners were generally very satisfied with GLC information products, and the website was heavily used. Training courses were widely appreciated for their high quality and inter-agency value.
30. *Capacity, structure and functioning of the GLCSC.* The GLCSC was well established and capacitated, but staff skills and demand were primarily oriented towards field support rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership maintenance and the development of tools, guidance and systems.
31. The GLC Global Cluster Coordinator position is combined with that of Head of WFP's Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE), which allowed inadequate time for GLC leadership responsibilities. In qualitative interviews, some GLC participating organizations perceived the dual reporting relationship and nature of the position as a possible conflict of interest.
32. Secondments of staff from other agencies to the GLCSC reinforced the inter-agency character of the cluster. However, the rationale for using seconded staff was generally too heavily based on representation rather than on needs linked to a clear GLCSC strategy.
33. *Global activities, information products and guidance.* Partners were generally satisfied with activities, but identified gaps in support for country-level emergency preparedness and a forum for strategic discussions. Preparedness activities emphasizing operational readiness and contingency planning were viewed as effective, but the GLC lacked a strategy for building the preparedness capacities of national actors.
34. *Website.* The logcluster.org website has been well used, with half a million visitors and 1.6 million page views from January 2008 to September 2011. There were substantial spikes related to emergencies (see Figure 3) and small but significant use in field locations. Analysis of website traffic found heavy use of operational products, country information and maps. Interview respondents reported that the site was more advanced than those of other clusters, and that it was useful for operations and planning.
35. *Information products.* Survey data found overall high levels of satisfaction with GLC information products, averaging 74 percent, with operations products, especially mapping, obtaining the greatest appreciation and use. Preparedness products – customs and logistics capacity assessments – were appreciated, but viewed as being incomplete or not updated. From 2009 to 2011, 54 logistics capacity assessments of national-level preparedness were conducted, but only 13 are currently available on logcluster.org because of delays in implementation of a new digital database.

Figure 3: Logcluster.org website traffic



36. *Training.* Evaluation survey responses and end of training questionnaires showed that participants and their sponsoring organizations viewed GLC training courses⁸ as having had moderate to high effects on enhancing participants' knowledge, skills and abilities in coordinating with and obtaining access to GLC services. Primary gaps identified were in training for logistics cluster coordinators, the targeting of staff for deployment as cluster coordinators at the country level, and general awareness training for WFP field staff and managers in their representational, leadership, operational and back-office support roles for managing a country-level logistics cluster.

Effectiveness of Partnership Management at the Global and Country Levels

37. *Overview.* Activities including meetings, training, contingency planning and information management increased collaboration and information-sharing, leading to strengthened partnerships and better coordination at all levels. Coordination and partnerships contributed to improvements in coverage, predictability of service provision, capacity and preparedness. However, the evaluation found that partnership outcomes were limited by factors related to organizations' inconsistent participation in global-level meetings and a decline over the previous three years in GLCSC's outreach to humanitarian logistics leaders and organizations for participation in its strategic planning.
38. *Global-level partnerships.* Under WFP's leadership, the GLC has been inclusive in its meetings, staffing and some special projects, leading to improved outcomes of increased coordination and stronger logistics partnerships.
39. Six-monthly global meetings were attended by 35 to 45 participants each, representing a mix of stakeholder types. However, the turnover of institutional representation was significant: many international NGOs did not attend, and GLC/WFP and United Nations attendance was disproportionately high.
40. Engagement between senior WFP logistics staff and their counterparts in partner organizations had diminished over the previous three years. Although senior GLCSC staff participated in some broader humanitarian logistics platforms, strategic and sustained engagement with significant logistics initiatives and actors from academic, research and professional logistics organizations appeared to be lacking. Issues related to a shared vision of the GLC's role and mandate, its leadership and transparency caused some disengagement from the GLC. It is plausible that drop-off in outreach and disengagement are linked.

⁸ Including training in logistics response; in the "service mindset", via distance learning; for standby partners and the corporate sector; and in a variety of topics for partners and field staff. On average, GLC spent between US\$250,000 and US\$300,000 per year on training.

41. Between global meetings, the GLC worked well with partners on some projects; partners expressed high satisfaction with the logistics operational guide and its collaborative development process.
42. *WFP leadership.* The evaluation found widespread agreement that WFP is best positioned to lead the GLC. Although stakeholders had initially been concerned about WFP's ability to create a participatory and collaborative cluster, most reported that the GLCSC exceeded their expectations for inclusiveness and efforts to work together.
43. *Inter-agency rapid response roster.* The GLC has not been able to develop and sustain an emergency roster in recent years because of partner reluctance to deploy staff. In addition, WFP country offices were very interested in working with people they knew, usually drawn from WFP's worldwide pool of staff, redeployed through temporary assignments.

Adaptive Learning and GLC Decision-Making

⇒ Overview

44. The evaluation found that discussions at global and country coordination meetings, GLC training sessions and some information products contributed to informal learning and adaptation over time. However, GLC efforts to learn lessons were limited to specific internal exercises and basic surveys of partner satisfaction. The GLCSC demonstrated improvement and learning, but this relied heavily on the core staff consistently employed or deployed in the cluster. Combined with limitations in reporting systems, this situation reduced the ability to quantify achievement of outcomes and identify areas for improvement in the GLCSC or wider system. The cluster system as a whole is undergoing transformation, driven by lessons learned from implementing humanitarian reform. The GLC may benefit from the additional clarity and emerging guidance, but it will have to adapt to the evolving system.

⇒ Learning systems

45. No formal systematic efforts were found for collecting, documenting, sharing and discussing lessons learned with GLC/WFP staff and consultants and partners deployed in country-level logistics clusters. Unsystematic recruitment, one-time deployments and lack of debriefing were found to reduce institutional memory. Following operations, participants' satisfaction was gauged, and GLCSC staff attempted to document lessons learned internally. A good practice example was identified in the global shelter cluster.

⇒ Unintended consequences

46. Positive unintended consequences included improved long-term capacity in contingency planning among participating organizations and enhanced logistics knowledge among staff. Credibility and relationships with national and local authorities also increased following logistics cluster operations. Cluster efforts to rehabilitate transport infrastructure enhanced response logistics and facilitated long-term development and commercial activities.
47. Unintended consequences with mixed results included increased requests from national and international military actors for GLC contact. In addition, the cluster website enabled direct beneficiaries, and not just organizations with logistics requirements, to contact cluster staff regarding needed assistance. The cluster's reputation for successful fundraising for its operations may have increased WFP country offices' incentive to seek cluster activation, irrespective of needs. The influx of cluster staff during major operations

enables training sessions and activities that benefit partners, but this can raise expectations that are difficult to meet.

48. Negative unintended consequences included the potential for heavy logistics capacity to lie idle because of the cluster's "no regrets" approach. With its large quantities of cargo, only WFP can employ capacity that is underutilized by partners, potentially reinforcing negative perceptions about the use of funds and services. Successful provision of common services can create dependency if other organizations reduce their investments in logistics capacity, and risks enabling the deployment of organizations that lack logistics capacity and the ability to sustain programmes in the recovery phase. Increased expectations of support can continue after cluster deactivation, with no alternative mechanisms for coordination, information management, common transport and storage.

Factors Explaining Results

⇒ *Internal factors*

49. Internal factors enabling cluster results were the strength of WFP's core logistics capabilities, infrastructure and scale. Strong infrastructure for global and country office transport, highly experienced logistics staff, and WFP's practical results-oriented culture provided the logistics cluster with a strong foundation for its work.
50. Internal factors that hindered cluster operations included WFP's human resources systems and culture, which treated seconded staff as outsiders. The reporting lines between cluster staff and WFP country offices can be a hindrance when country offices are unfamiliar with cluster responsibilities or WFP operations are so large that the cluster is unable to secure support and representation with the humanitarian country team/HC. WFP financial management and reporting systems were not designed for inter-agency operations supporting many sectors, and do not readily allow analysis of cluster performance. A self-reliant culture within WFP often prioritized rapid problem-solving rather than including partners.

⇒ *External factors*

51. External factors that enabled cluster results included WFP's credibility on logistics issues among other actors, and its strength in attracting donors to fund significant logistics costs.
52. External factors hindering cluster results related to partners' willingness and ability to participate in coordination meetings and use common services, the complexity of the operating environment, challenges in managing civil-military relations for a partnership of agencies with different policies, external security restrictions, and the multiplicity of actors in large-scale emergencies.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

53. Overall, the evaluation found the theory of change underpinning the GLC's operations to be valid, although the relative emphases on elements and the strength of causal linkages varied. Assumptions and external factors affected the strength of outcomes, particularly in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

⇒ *Effectiveness and results*

54. Overall, GLC operations were relevant, effective and provided value to participating organizations. Logistics cluster activities undertaken at the global and country levels from 2005 to 2011 resulted in better logistics approaches, which increased the effects on beneficiaries by enhancing partners' programme delivery. However, the common logistics services provided by the cluster were only a small proportion of total humanitarian logistics activity. Achieving significant impact on the overall performance of humanitarian response would require expansion of the GLC mandate to address persistent bottlenecks, and increased use of cluster services by humanitarian organizations.

55. Country-level results were strongly supported by the GLCSC, which evolved since 2005 into a well-established unit with good human resource capacity. The GLCSC was primarily oriented towards field support rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership, and the development of tools, guidance and cargo tracking systems, although strong positive results were found in many of these areas.

56. Under WFP's leadership, the GLC worked well with partners. Global meetings attracted participants from a range of stakeholder groups, but many significant international NGOs did not participate. GLC and WFP outreach to humanitarian logistics leaders and organizations diminished over time.

⇒ *Efficiency*

57. The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership enabled the GLC to undertake the expected global and country activities in information management, operations support, coordination and funding of common logistics services. However, WFP financial, reporting and tracking systems did not enable the level of transparency required to ensure partners' trust, accountability and performance benchmarking for logistics services. WFP's special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced timeliness and the likelihood of achieving outcomes. GLC prioritization decisions were appropriate, but the costs and benefits of common services were not well communicated.

⇒ *Utilization and satisfaction*

58. Partners were generally very satisfied with GLC information products, and the website was heavily used. Training courses were widely appreciated for their high quality and inter-agency value. Partners were satisfied with the GLC's activation and deployment of assets in initial phases, but viewed deactivation as more problematic. Partners valued operation products and activities highly, and viewed them as the best developed. Preparedness information products were valued, but were generally perceived as incomplete and not updated frequently enough. Customs clearance and procurement remained strategic operational bottlenecks for humanitarian logistics, and partners desired more assistance in these areas.


Recommendations

59. The following summarized recommendations reflect contributions of the evaluators and key stakeholders, as noted above. The same recommendations are presented in detail in the full report,⁹ and these form the basis of WFP's management response.
60. **Recommendation 1: GLC strategy.** Design a three-year GLC strategic plan that settles mandate issues, establishes a shared vision and partnership attributes, identifies core ("mainstreamed") budget requirements, sets key performance indicators, and identifies communications and branding approaches. (GLCSC and partners, by December 2012)
61. **Recommendation 2: Financial and reporting systems.** Develop specific systems and practices for the GLC at the global and country levels, to enhance transparency, performance monitoring and management, including financial tracking of key performance indicators for the outputs and outcomes of global- and country-level projects and operations, cargo/storage tracking and analysis, and project/operations reporting. (GLCSC and WFP Logistics Development Unit, by June 2013)
62. **Recommendation 3: Organizational structure and decision-making.** Strengthen GLC management and the coherence and consistency of cluster lead agency decisions by clarifying the need for WFP country directors and staff to consult the GLCSC on activation and staffing decisions and separating the Global Cluster Coordinator and Head of ALITE positions. (WFP Director of Logistics, by December 2012)
63. **Recommendation 4: Improved partnerships.** Improve partnerships within the GLC by conducting stakeholder mapping, increasing strategic outreach to key humanitarian logistics actors, considering the establishment of a strategic advisory group, including partners in a systematic lessons learned process, and developing a collaborative project management approach. (GLC Coordinator and WFP Director of Logistics, by December 2012)
64. **Recommendation 5: Human resource management.** Improve cluster human resource management by establishing a dedicated GLCSC staffing coordinator, developing and maintaining a robust GLC response roster, improving briefing and debriefing of deployed staff, developing a deployment toolkit, finding cost-effective ways of bringing cluster staff together to discuss lessons, and reducing the use of unfunded secondments by exploring alternative external recruitment approaches. (GLC Coordinator and WFP Director of Logistics, by June 2013)
65. **Recommendation 6: Global policy and inter-cluster coordination.** Increase engagement in inter-cluster coordination at the policy and operations levels by sharing and seeking good practice with other clusters, contributing timely inputs for field testing of IASC reforms, training cluster staff on the evolving system, collaborating with programme clusters to operationalize new IASC assessment and operations planning tools, and sharing the results of this evaluation with other clusters and major humanitarian actors. (GLC Coordinator, WFP Cluster Working Group, WFP Policy Officer – Geneva, and partners, by June 2013)

⁹ Available at <http://www.wfp.org/about/evaluation>

ANNEX

GLC THEORY OF CHANGE



CAP = Consolidated Appeals Process; Civ/Mil = civilian–military; CONOPS = concept of operations; GIS = geographic information systems; IM = information management; LCA = logistics capacity assessment; LOG = logistics operational guide; SPHERE = The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response; SitRep = situation report; SO = Special Operation; SOP = standard operating procedure; UNHAS = United Nations Humanitarian Air Service; UNHRD = United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

ALITE	Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies
GLC	global logistics cluster
GLCSC	Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
NGO	non-governmental organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund