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**Executive Board
Annual Session**

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WFP SECURITY REPORT



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NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for information.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal point indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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* Field Security Division

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document reports the security and safety incidents in 2013 affecting or involving the staff and assets of WFP, its partners and contractors. The year was notable for a large number of complex emergencies, particularly the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, insecurity in Afghanistan, the breakdown of law and order in the Central African Republic and the deteriorating situation in South Sudan. A terrorist attack on the United Nations in Somalia and damage to a WFP facility in Kabul during an attack on the International Organization for Migration highlight the continued need for security measures to protect staff, assets and operations.

The Board approved security expenditures of up to USD 10.0 million from the General Fund in 2013; country offices were required to provide an additional USD 8.8 million in cost sharing (see: CEB/2010/HLCEM/FB/8/Rev.2). Funding was also provided for jointly financed security activities: WFP contributed USD 12.2 million to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security in 2013.

The Field Security Division continued to implement its five-year strategic plan (2012–2016). Changes in the division to increase its presence in the field and reduce the headcount at Headquarters have helped to improve coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and to continue to mainstream security risk management in WFP. In 2013, the division worked to address the issue of risk-sharing with WFP's implementing partners, to find ways in which it could work with the Policy, Programme and Innovation Division to support the delivery of WFP's programme delivery, and to develop security measures related to the cash and voucher modalities.

The number of field security officers increased in 2013, reflecting the increase in Level 2 and Level 3 emergencies. The division led work on technical issues related to blasts, conducted technical assessments on behalf of other agencies, funds and programmes and has started to develop training in blast mitigation for security professionals. WFP continues to evaluate the presence and effectiveness of risk-mitigation measures at WFP offices.

The division will continue to work with other divisions and risk management functions to enhance risk management, focusing on training for security professionals and information management and analysis. It will also continue to promote maximum transparency in security costing at the operational and strategic levels.

REVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY

1. In 2013 the Field Security Division (OMF) continued to implement its strategic plan for 2012–2016, providing technical expertise and leadership in risk management and security training and analysis. In complex environments where the determination of “how to stay” rather than “when to leave” was regularly challenged, OMF continued to ensure the safety and security of WFP staff, assets and operations.
2. The division continues to support WFP’s organizational changes. The increase in the OMF field presence and the reduced headcount at Headquarters reflect the shift of operational emphasis to country offices and beneficiaries. A Deputy Director position was created at Headquarters to provide more effective resource and knowledge management, and security analysts were posted to the regional bureaux. Changes in the structure of OMF have facilitated more effective coordination with the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) and with other risk-management functions, benefitting WFP operations.
3. The Business Process Review identified ten potential projects relating to budget management, development of security expertise, information management, security risk management, liaison and coordination, and staff security management. These initiatives will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of security performance and will increase value for money, in line with WFP’s Strategic Objectives.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INVOLVING WFP STAFF OR ASSETS AND PARTNER STAFF ¹

4. The main observations regarding WFP security in 2013 are as follows:
 - In 2013, no WFP staff² were killed in work-related incidents.
 - National staff and their dependents were more affected by violence in incidents unrelated to work than international staff, suggesting that local populations are more exposed to threats and that international staff are better protected at their residences.
 - Fatality and casualty rates among cooperating partners and contractors were significantly higher than among WFP staff, indicating that security measures for WFP staff are more effective than those for partners and contractors.
 - Kidnapping remains a concern, primarily in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Sudan; most of the victims are the staff of contractors.
 - Reported incidents affecting WFP staff and assets increased by 19 percent compared with 2012, indicating that WFP is more exposed in high-risk areas and that reporting of incidents has improved.
 - The Syrian Arab Republic has the highest rate of reported incidents, largely because of the high number of incidents affecting overland transport of WFP food by contractors. The Syrian Arab Republic accounts for almost as many attacks on contracted trucks as Afghanistan, the Sudan and South Sudan combined.

¹ This report is based on security incidents reported to the Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System (SIMSAS).

² “WFP staff” refers to all those employed by WFP, with the exception of people locally recruited on hourly pay rates.

- More than half of reported incidents were crime-related. Incidents related to armed conflict dominated in the Central African Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic. Terrorism dominated in Afghanistan. Ethiopia is noteworthy for the high number of traffic accidents.

WFP Personnel³ Fatalities

5. No WFP staff members were killed in work-related incidents in 2013, but five staff were killed in terrorist and criminal incidents unrelated to their work in Pakistan, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda. Two staff members lost their lives in traffic accidents unrelated to their work in Lesotho and Liberia. One dependent of a national staff member died in a car bombing in Somalia.

WFP Staff Injuries

6. There were fewer injuries from acts of violence in 2013 than in 2012, and no WFP staff member was injured by violence in the line of duty; four staff members were injured in violent incidents unrelated to their work. Two staff members were seriously injured in work-related accidents in Kenya, and seven were injured in accidents unrelated to their work. Three dependents were seriously injured – one in a robbery in Honduras and two in traffic accidents in Kenya.

Contractor and Partner Staff Fatalities and Injuries

7. Three employees of WFP cooperating partners lost their lives while providing services for WFP in two violent incidents in Pakistan and the Sudan. Fourteen contractors' employees lost their lives while providing services for WFP: seven in acts of violence in Afghanistan, South Sudan and the Sudan, and seven in accidents in DRC, Rwanda and the Sudan.
8. Twenty employees of WFP cooperating partners were injured as a result of violence in the line of duty in Jordan, Pakistan, the Sudan and Yemen. Sixteen WFP contractors were injured in acts of violence in work-related incidents in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Jordan, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic; five contractors' employees were injured in work-related accidents in Haiti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Abductions/Kidnapping


9. No fewer than 41 people were abducted while serving WFP operations in 2013, of whom 31 were contractors' staff. The incidents occurred in Afghanistan, Guatemala, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. This is a significant increase from 2012, when nine staff of WFP and partners and contractors were kidnapped.

GLOBAL TRENDS

10. There were 1,031 security incidents involving the staff and assets of WFP and its partners and contractors in 2013, of which 72 percent were work-related. This is an increase of 15 percent from 2012, when 899 incidents were reported.
11. The number of reported incidents involving WFP staff and assets increased from 798 in 2012 to 948 in 2013, an increase of 19 percent (see Figure 1).

³ “WFP personnel” refers to WFP staff and their dependents.


Figure 1: Security incidents involving WFP staff or assets from 2009 to 2013



12. The distribution of reported incidents by country is largely consistent with 2012. Most incidents affecting WFP operations⁴ occurred in South Sudan (152) and the Sudan (146); there were 80 incidents in the Syrian Arab Republic, 55 in Kenya and 51 in Afghanistan.

13. The numbers of incidents involving only WFP staff and assets were 133 in South Sudan, 133 in the Sudan, 78 in the Syrian Arab Republic and 53 in Kenya – the “top four” – and 48 in Ethiopia, 39 in DRC and 36 in Afghanistan (see Figure 2).


Figure 2: Countries with highest numbers of security incidents involving WFP personnel or assets in 2013



⁴ WFP operations refers to incidents affecting WFP personnel/assets and/or partners and/or contractors.

14. But the ranking changes significantly if WFP's presence⁵ and the number of incidents involving WFP staff and assets on a per-capita basis are considered. The largest number of incidents per capita affecting WFP assets and contractors' staff occurred in the Syrian Arab Republic, reflecting the high number of reported incidents affecting WFP food transported by contractors. Other countries have varying risk profiles and characteristics: in Zimbabwe there are relatively few risks but significant funding constraints, whereas risk levels in Afghanistan are high but the number of incidents per capita is relatively low (see Figure 3). These observations suggest that the exposure of staff to security risks is not only related to the security situation, but also to factors such as funding, risk awareness and humanitarian access.

Figure 3: Countries with highest per-capita rates of reported security incidents involving WFP staff or assets in 2013, per 100 staff




DISTRIBUTION BY REGION

15. The highest numbers of security incidents affecting WFP staff and assets and those of contractors and partners were reported in Africa and Asia, as in previous years. The Nairobi Regional Bureau (OMN) reported 30 percent of all incidents, and the Cairo regional bureau (OMC) reported 29 percent (see Figure 4).

⁵ Human Resources Division statistics for number of WFP employees by duty station at 31 December 2013.


Figure 4: Security incidents involving WFP staff or assets in 2013, by regional bureau



Regional bureaux: OMB: Bangkok; OMC: Cairo; OMD – Dakar; OMJ – Johannesburg; OMN: Nairobi; OMP – Panama City.

16. OMC has the highest per capita number of reported security incidents, followed by OMN (see Figure 5).


Figure 5: Security incidents involving WFP staff or assets in 2013, per 100 staff



DISTRIBUTION BY INCIDENT TYPE


17. Property crimes are the most reported type of incident, accounting for 40 percent of all reported incidents: theft, burglary and robbery rank first, third and fourth (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Reported security incidents in 2013, by type




18. Traffic accidents are the second most reported incident type. Most were reported in OMN – 61, a figure equal to the numbers in OMJ, OMD and OMB combined (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Number of traffic accidents in 2013, by regional bureau




19. OMN had the most traffic incidents per capita – 20 per 1,000 staff; OMC had the lowest per capita rate (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Traffic accidents in 2013, by regional bureau (per 1,000 staff)




20. As in previous years, the largest number of reported incidents were criminal – 58 percent in 2013; hazards – mostly traffic accidents – accounted for 23 percent. Armed conflict accounted for 14 percent, civil unrest for 3 percent and terrorism for 2 percent (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Distribution of 2013 security incidents by threat type



21. Most reported incidents of property crime were non-violent, but 33 percent of all reported security incidents involved violence or threats of violence (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Distribution of violent versus non-violent incidents in 2013



HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES

22. With effective security measures in place, many threats faced by WFP staff did not materialize into security incidents and were therefore not included in statistics. Such threats were particularly common in high-risk countries, with negative effects on WFP operations in terms of high investments in security measures and restricted access.
23. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic resulted in various levels of threat, the most lethal incident being the use of chemical weapons in a Damascus suburb that killed hundreds of civilians.
24. The increasingly hostile security situation in Afghanistan limited humanitarian access in large parts of the country. A WFP guesthouse was damaged during the attack on a compound of the International Organization for Migration in Kabul on 24 May. Concerns about insecurity led to changes of location for the country office and guesthouses in Kabul. The risks to staff remain significant.
25. As sectarian violence increased in Pakistan, threats to the security of WFP staff and operations from armed clashes, suicide bombers and other attacks were pervasive.
26. In Iraq, the security situation further deteriorated in 2013 as civil unrest increased.
27. In the Central African Republic, a complete breakdown of law and order led to inter-communal violence and religiously motivated killings. The resulting humanitarian crisis posed significant security challenges for WFP in terms of negotiating and maintaining access. Violent acts aimed at gaining possession of assets – mainly food – accounted for most of the incidents involving WFP.
28. The security situation in South Sudan deteriorated sharply in December 2013, when the political conflict escalated into violence that spread to several states. The generally low level of law and order has resulted in high rates of crime.

29. Heavy fighting broke out in the Sudan in November 2013 between government forces and armed groups in South Kordofan state. WFP movement was severely restricted, and food distributions eventually had to be suspended. In Darfur, the formidable security challenges included vehicle hijacking, access issues and inter-ethnic clashes, with severe risks for WFP staff.
30. The al-Shabaab attack on the United Nations compound in Mogadishu in Somalia on 19 June 2013 was coordinated by an al-Qaeda operator who had earlier listed the United Nations headquarters in Nairobi as a potential target.
31. In Kenya in September 2013, WFP staff managed to escape unharmed from the four-day siege of a shopping mall in Nairobi that left at least 70 people dead.
32. In Yemen, humanitarian access was frequently restricted by fighting between ethnic groups in the north. Kidnapping of international staff remained a serious concern: an example was the kidnapping of an international staff member of the United Nations Children's Fund in October 2013.
33. Despite the end of the conflict in Mali, the security situation remained volatile throughout 2013. Extremists carried out several bomb attacks against Malian, French and United Nations forces. Kidnapping of westerners remained a severe risk in northern Mali, and two kidnapped journalists were murdered in Kidal in November.
34. Fighting in eastern DRC led to significant restrictions of access.

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

35. Armed conflict and terrorism will continue to pose the most significant threats for WFP operations; robust security measures are required to counter them. Security management, risk awareness and funding will remain determining factors for the safety and security of WFP staff.
36. The socio-economic dynamics in many developing countries that result in crime, armed conflict, extremism and terrorism are often causes of hunger. Such countries are therefore potential operational areas of WFP: the Middle East, the Sahel and other parts of northern Africa are areas of concern.
37. Crime is expected to remain the most frequently reported threat type affecting WFP. Traffic accidents will probably remain a significant cause of casualties and fatalities among staff. Kidnapping incidents – mainly for ransom – are expected to increase.
38. Complex attacks are likely to increase in frequency and sophistication. WFP is exposed to this threat as a member of the United Nations, whose programmes are viewed by some groups as contrary to their ideological objectives; hostility also arises because such groups oppose cooperation between WFP and host governments. WFP is a high-profile international target, and its staff may be threatened or its assets damaged in attacks against other entities.
39. As a result, OMF expects to face increasing numbers of complex challenges in the coming years as it seeks to support WFP's programmes by ensuring the safety and security of staff.

OVERVIEW OF WFP FIELD SECURITY ACTIVITIES

Security Risk Management

40. WFP continued to institutionalize security risk management in 2013. OMF worked with the Performance Management and Monitoring Division, particularly to address the issue of risk-sharing with partners in line with WFP's commitment at the 2012 Annual Partnership Consultation. This involved joint missions by the two divisions to South Sudan and Zimbabwe, where WFP partners were invited to participate in workshops on risk-sharing.
41. The project reflected the fact that security is a significant component in risk-sharing with partners. In cases where security concerns were low, humanitarian access was straightforward and partners were not expected to accept risks, particularly risks to life, in working for WFP. In such cases it was relatively easy to ensure that risk-sharing was effective. For this reason, OMF focused on ensuring that the Saving Lives Together initiative is understood and implemented in the field, particularly in high-risk locations: in South Sudan, for example, WFP runs the inter-agency radio room and provides security for aviation services and information for non-governmental organizations.
42. OMF and the Programme, Policy and Innovation Division (PPI), and particularly the Humanitarian Crisis and Transition Unit, worked together to enhance the role of field security in support of safe and accountable programme delivery, and to exploit synergies in the areas of context analysis, protection, accountability, access and acceptance approaches, with a view to producing training, guidance, humanitarian access mapping and other deliverables.
43. The division also worked with the cash and voucher team to ensure that such projects do not put beneficiaries, staff members or WFP property at risk. In this respect, security risk assessments identify mitigation measures specific to the transport, storage and delivery of cash or vouchers; the location, design and construction of distribution points; acceptance by beneficiaries; communications; and monitoring of cash and voucher programmes.
44. The OMF circular and directive on Security Risk Management Escalation and Decision-Making Structure (OMF2013/001) ensured that senior management continued to oversee major security risks and to participate in decision-making to mitigate such risks, particularly in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen.
45. OMF and the Aviation Service began a revision of the risk-management approaches in relation to staff using scheduled air travel with a view to minimizing exposure to security and safety risks. This work will integrate aviation security and safety with general security risk management.

WFP Field Security Capacity

46. The security challenges of 2013 were complex and unpredictable. It was therefore important that OMF maintain its field presence to address evolving needs and to minimize risks to staff.
47. There was a slight increase in the number of field security officers (FSOs), many of whom were consultants hired to provide additional security coverage in emergencies. By using consultants OMF was able to respond flexibly to country office needs, particularly where budgets were insufficient to cover the hire of security professionals: examples included Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, DRC, Niger, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab

Republic. As of 31 December 2013, there were 50 FSOs deployed to various duty stations, compared with 42 in 2012, and six regional security officers (RSOs) in post.

48. Surge capacity in the cadre of FSOs was used to fill temporary positions that could not be immediately filled by consultants. The Chief of OMF Operations, for example, was deployed to Kenya as RSO while the incumbent was absent, and also provided security assistance in Burundi, Lebanon, Mali and Rwanda. OMF Operations and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch (OMEPR) led a project in 2013 to identify the geographical coordinates of all WFP facilities for inclusion in the Archibus database.
49. The RSOs and FSOs continued to benefit from WFP and UNDSS training to enhance their skills and learn about the latest developments in humanitarian security assistance with a view to providing robust and timely security support, guidance and advice.
50. The RSOs and FSOs were deployed to 30 countries in 2013, particularly to provide security support in volatile environments: these countries included Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic.
51. In countries where there is no FSO presence, OMF is supported by local security assistants or security focal points (SFPs). Workshops for SFPs were held in four of WFP's five regions in 2013; all training was completed in early 2014. The workshops enabled OMF to engage with SFPs and address questions about their role in the WFP security apparatus.

TRAINING

52. Security training is one of the most cost-effective ways to minimize risks to WFP personnel, premises and assets. It supports the security-related responsibilities in the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) Framework of Accountability, and promotes WFP's security culture by improving people's understanding of their roles in maintaining their own security and that of colleagues, partners and beneficiaries.
53. In line with the new UNSMS policy on security training and WFP's security management policy, OMF training focused on security professionals with a view to ensuring that the benefits cascaded down to all personnel. The training was delivered mainly through UNSMS certification programmes, with a focus on WFP-specific considerations. Competency-based learning was introduced to identify levels of competency in knowledge, attitude and skills for each function and position. The outcome was an increase in the number of security professionals trained and certified from 11 in 2012 to 56 in 2013.

⇒ *Security professionals*

- In 2013 27 local security assistants were certified to increase support for security risk management in field offices.
- Twenty-two security officers completed the Security Certification Programme, which targets P3 posts and focuses on security risk management to enhance interoperability among UNSMS organizations.
- Seven security officers were certified in the Intermediate Training Programme, which prepares FSOs for management positions.
- Thirty staff attended RSO and FSO workshops in Kampala to discuss best practices in security risk management challenges faced by WFP staff in the field.

⇒ *Managers with security responsibilities*

- In 2013 and early 2014 a total of 81 SFPs attended workshops at regional bureaux to ensure compliance with WFP security reporting requirements and to enhance understanding of security risk management documentation, budgeting and procurement. An online learning programme launched by UNDSS in 2013 aimed to enhance the ability of Senior Management Team members to evaluate security risks affecting the United Nations in a given country and take appropriate decisions. It is mandatory for all WFP managers with security responsibilities to complete this training.

⇒ *WFP staff*

- WFP's field security professionals provide training to enhance the security culture of WFP and to minimize the risks to staff in the field. In line with the new UNSMS policy on security training, there was increased cooperation between UNSMS organizations in providing security-awareness training. WFP security professionals contributed to this, and supported training conducted by other WFP divisions; they also assisted with training for the Rome-based agencies and for Junior Professional Officers at the United Nations System Staff College in Turin, Italy.
- Safe and Secure Approaches to the Field Environment is mandatory training for travel to 34 countries. The OMF training unit provided five training sessions for 100 Headquarters staff from the Rome-based agencies who may have to travel to high-risk field locations. WFP security professionals continue to support training in country offices, for example by simulating scenarios such as illegal checkpoints, hostage-taking and bomb attacks to give staff the skills and awareness to operate in hostile environments. The training will continue in Rome in 2014.

Specialist Training

⇒ *Hostage incident management training*

54. In line with United Nations policy, WFP has pledged to make every effort to secure the quick and safe release of hostages. In 2013, WFP trained 12 staff in hostage incident management to enable them to manage crisis situations and ensure safe and effective resolution. The training included a focus on coordination with host governments, family liaison and media management.

⇒ *Functional and support training for emergency response*

55. In 2013, OMF supported training in emergency systems, protocols and procedures developed in 2013 and led by OMEP. The aim is to integrate approaches among WFP functions to improve responses to sudden-onset emergencies.

⇒ *Security information and analysis*

56. The security analysis team has developed close coordination with OMEP to provide early warning and emergency preparedness information and regular reports on emerging crisis situations. In 2013, the team took over management of OMF's security database SIMSAS and further developed it to better meet the country office requirements. WFP is working with UNSMS to standardize reporting and the taxonomy of security incidents and to improve the exchange of data between the UNDSS Safety and Security Incident Reporting System and SIMSAS.


⇒ *Premises security and blast mitigation*

57. Since the last OMF report to the Board, WFP has started to reform the Blast Assessment Working Group, which it currently chairs. In 2013, the group recommended the skills and qualifications for blast assessments and had them ratified by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN). WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have started to develop a training module for security professionals to be delivered in the third quarter of 2014.
58. WFP continues to lead on technical issues in the United Nations working group on premises security. WFP has also increased its assistance to other United Nations organizations, advising on blast-related technical assessments in Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Thailand in 2013; this work is expected to continue unabated in 2014. Assessment missions were also conducted for WFP in Mali and in Bangkok.

SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSIONS

59. WFP continues its security assessment missions at WFP offices to evaluate the status of risk-mitigation measures and to identify vulnerabilities that may have developed since previous missions. The missions make recommendations to regional and country directors with a view to optimizing safety and security, and review their implementation.
60. External consultants carried out 14 assessments of physical and procedural measures for security at WFP offices in 2013 and made 1,472 recommendations. In particular, the findings indicate a major deficiency in equipment and facilities for minimum operating safety standards (MOSS).

Figure 11: Deficiencies identified by security assessment missions, 2012–2013



61. Table 1 shows the main deficiencies in the categories set out in Figure 11.

TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF MAIN DEFICIENCIES	
Equipment	Construction and reinforcement of doors and walls Fencing Medical kits Communications equipment
Processes and practices	Security training Access control procedures Communications procedures
Documentation	Evacuation plans Standard operating procedures Warden maps
Contingency and emergency planning	Contingency or emergency plans Safe havens Evacuation exercises
Roles and responsibilities	Improvement of the warden system Improvement of the country SFP system

WFP SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND

62. At its 2012 Second Regular Session, the Board approved expenditures of up to USD 10.0 million from the General Fund for UNDSS costs and the WFP Security Emergency Fund; the remaining USD 8.8 million was charged to individual projects.


63. The amount estimated for 2013 – USD 18.8 million – takes into account WFP’s estimated USD 11.5 million share of UNDSS costs and USD 7.3 million for the Security Emergency Fund and for the purchase of security equipment not covered by country projects.

TABLE 2: WFP SECURITY EMERGENCY FUND, AS AT 2 JANUARY 2014 (USD)			
Funded programme	Allocations 2012–2013	Commitments and actuals 2012–2013	% of total
Staffing	7 886 000	7 070 061	21
MOSS	2 155 129	1 830 661	5
Security assessment missions	527 636	518 396	2
Training	1 307 732	1 189 226	3
UNDSS	23 212 645	23 212 645	67
Afghanistan special upgrade	510 852	510 852	1
Finance and budget working group	100 000	72 282	1
Total	35 700 000	34 404 127	

64. OMF continues to allocate funds to WFP offices for equipment and enhancements to premises to ensure MOSS compliance in line with the policies of “no programme without security” and “no security without resources”, especially for operations with low direct

support cost income or in cases where additional mitigation measures are needed. Funds were provided for 40 country offices for these purposes in 2013.

Figure 12: MOSS allocations 2012–2013, by regional bureau



65. A major area for improvement in WFP emergency preparedness and response is to ensure that crisis-response stocks are available at the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots: these should include armoured vehicles, Hesco bastions,⁶ personal protection equipment, under-vehicle search mirrors and hand-held metal detectors. OMF works with the United Nations forum on armoured vehicles, and facilitated meetings of the group in Budapest and Copenhagen.

UNDSS JOINTLY FINANCED ACTIVITIES, 2013

66. At its 2005 First Regular Session, the Board agreed on financial support for the Secretary-General to implement a unified security management system. This jointly financed activities (JFA) system involves WFP in work with UNDSS and other United Nations bodies to develop security policies and standards.

⁶ Fabric-lined collapsible wire mesh container that can be filled with sand or stones as a barrier against small-arms fire.

67. WFP's projected share of UNDSS costs for 2013 was USD 11.5 million, shown in the initial budget for jointly financed UNDSS field-related security costs in 2012–2013 (A/66/6, section 36). This cost is based on the number of WFP staff in the field calculated in the Chief Executives Board document CEB/2010/HLCM/FB/8/Rev.2. The 2012–2013 cost-sharing budget was later revised to give a WFP cost share of USD 23.5 million. WFP contributed USD 12.2 million to UNDSS in 2013.

	UNDSS	WFP share
2002–2003	42.9	6.5
2004–2005	113.1	13.2
2006–2007	172.3	20.2*
2008–2009	174.4	17.3
2010–2011	209.9	24.4**
2012–2013	218.6	23.5

* Credit of USD 3.2 million received in 2006.

** Credit of USD 1.4 million received in 2010.


68. After receiving USD 10 million from the General Fund in 2013, country offices were requested to provide the difference of USD 8.8 million from projects, as shown in Table 4.

Country office size	% recovery of USD 8.8 million	No. of country offices	USD million	Country office share (USD)
Very large	50	16	4.40	290 000
Large	30	14	2.64	190 000
Medium	20	20	1.76	80 000
Total			8.80	

Country office size	Country
Very large	Afghanistan, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Yemen
Large	Bangladesh, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Medium	Algeria, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Djibouti, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan

69. Figure 13 shows each regional bureau's percentage share of JFA costs in 2013.

Figure 13: Percentage share of JFA costs by regional bureau in 2013



70. Security issues continue to be a significant concern for WFP. But because resources are scarce, there is a need for a review of the costs involved. OMF is a member of IASMN and supports UNDSS in maximizing the transparency of the JFA budget, which is a permanent agenda item for IASMN. WFP will ensure that the JFA budget of USD 218.9 million established by the Finance and Budget Working Group will not be exceeded. OMF is evaluating the services provided by UNDSS to ensure that they are proportionate to the costs in the JFA budget.

71. WFP assists UNDSS in addressing concerns about the high cost of local cost-sharing budgets, identifying areas where savings can be made and calculating the security funding required for safe and secure programme delivery. OMF works with UNDSS on the JFA and is a member of the minimum operating residential security standards working group revising United Nations policy related to these entitlements.

LOOKING FORWARD

72. In addition to implementing the projects identified in the field security business process review, OMF will support an internal audit of security in WFP in 2014 that will focus on value for money in the provision of security services. The Joint Inspection Unit will review the UNDSS and the UNSMS to address safety and security issues that have been a persistent General Assembly agenda item.

73. OMF will continue to work with WFP divisions and risk-management functions to enhance overall risk management. The Director of Field Security will seek to ensure that security staff have the skills to communicate and lead in security risk management. In this context, OMF will continue to train security professionals and ensure that staff with security responsibilities are competent to carry out their responsibilities. The division will also continue to guide the regional bureaux and country offices with regard to security.

74. The security analysis team will focus on security information management, reporting and analysis, the improvement of internal cooperation and engagement with other divisions, and the enhancement of data-management technology.
75. WFP will continue to ensure that UNDSS remains accountable and transparent and that it provides updates as to changes in its structure and its allocation of resources to JFA. A budgeting guideline and cost-tracking templates are being developed for operational use and to improve the management of costs in WFP as a whole.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FSO	field security officer
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
JFA	jointly financed activities
MOSS	minimum operating safety standards
OMB	Bangkok Regional Bureau
OMC	Cairo Regional Bureau
OMD	Dakar Regional Bureau
OMEP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch
OMF	Field Security Division
OMJ	Johannesburg Regional Bureau
OMN	Nairobi Regional Bureau
OMP	Panama Regional Bureau
RSO	regional security officer
SFP	security focal point
SIMSAS	Security Information Management and Security Analysis Support System
UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNSMS	United Nations Security Management System