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# EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 6

*For consideration*



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## SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – UGANDA COUNTRY PORTFOLIO (2009–2013)



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## NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

**This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.**

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation covered WFP's portfolio in Uganda from 2009 to 2013 under the 2009–2014 country strategy. Serving the dual purpose of accountability and learning, the evaluation focused on four main issues: i) alignment and strategic positioning; ii) quality of and factors driving strategic decision-making; iii) performance and results; and iv) appropriateness and added value of the country strategy.


The analytical framework for the evaluation was based on the country strategy's priority areas, which are reflected across portfolio components: i) emergency humanitarian action; ii) food and nutrition security; and iii) agriculture and market support. The period reviewed was one of stabilization, but despite economic growth, Uganda remains poor, with regional disparities. The evaluation was conducted between February and June 2014 with 30 site visits, more than 200 key informant interviews, including with beneficiaries, and extensive document review.

The evaluation found that WFP had set an appropriate strategic direction in the shift from food aid to food assistance. The country portfolio was closely aligned with Uganda's evolving priorities and policies, and responded to needs of vulnerable communities. Interventions of substantial scale and coverage were relevant and based on systematic analysis. The portfolio's shift from emergency towards development was appropriate, reflecting the national context of peace consolidation and emerging priorities. The country strategy built on WFP's strengths in linking relief and development and operating at scale to enhance coherence and strengthen WFP's role in advocating for pro-poor policies.

However, the country office demonstrated mixed capacity for strategic decision-making and delivering results: while analysis and broad directions were aptly defined, delivery and tracking of results were weaker. The targets of the country strategy were aspirational, but evidence-based reporting on changes at the outcome level for the country strategy was weak; corporate reporting systems remained mainly input/output-oriented, but with improvements since 2012. Findings on performance indicate that implementation was not as coherent as the strategy, with poor attention to the quality of assets created; inadequate addressing of gender and protection concerns; and missed opportunities for strategic partnerships. Standard Project Reports showed consistent shortfalls in actual deliveries against plans. WFP's support to satellite collection points demonstrated potential for benefiting small-scale traders and could be explored as part of WFP's repositioning, given the country office's capacity to deliver at scale.

The evaluation makes recommendations regarding WFP's positioning; sustainability; the development of the country strategy; the quality and performance of resilience, agriculture and market support activities and general food distributions; and staff capacity development on gender and protection issues.

## DRAFT DECISION\*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report – Uganda Country Portfolio (2009–2013)” (WFP/EB.2/2014/6-B) and the management response in WFP/EB.2/2014/6-B/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

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\* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation Features

1. This evaluation covered WFP's portfolio in Uganda from 2009 to 2013 under the 2009–2014 country strategy. Serving the dual purpose of accountability and learning, it focused on the three main issues of all country portfolio evaluations (CPEs): i) alignment and strategic positioning; ii) quality of and factors driving strategic decision-making; and iii) performance and results. As this was the first CPE to cover the full period of a country strategy,<sup>1</sup> an additional issue evaluated was the appropriateness and added value of the country strategy.
2. The evaluation was conducted by an external evaluation team with fieldwork in March and April 2014 including 30 site visits covering the range of operations and activities, more than 200 interviews, beneficiary focus group discussions and document review.

### Context

3. Economic growth of 6–10 percent a year over the past 15 years enabled Uganda to reduce the prevalence of poverty from 31 to 25 percent between 2005/06 and 2009/10. With an estimated population of 37.6 million people, Uganda remains poor, ranking 164<sup>th</sup> of 187 countries in the 2014 human development index; according to the World Bank, 35 percent of the population is undernourished. Economic benefits have not reached the poorest and most vulnerable groups – refugees<sup>2</sup> and smallholder farmers.<sup>3</sup> Regional disparities exist: in 2009, the poverty rate in Karamoja was 75 percent,<sup>4</sup> compared with 24.5 percent nationally; and in 2007, the adult literacy rate was 6 percent in Karamoja against 67 percent nationally.<sup>5</sup> Plagued by chronic hunger, Karamoja reports stunting rates of more than 30 percent in most areas.
4. The evaluation period was one of stabilization and peace consolidation, with significant reductions in the long-term, inter-ethnic and regional conflicts affecting Karamoja. Environmental degradation and natural disasters remain a concern.

### WFP Portfolio

5. WFP's portfolio in Uganda was based on the 2009–2014 country strategy whose overarching goal is to support government priorities and empower communities in reaching the Millennium Development Goal hunger target and ensuring long-term solutions to hunger. Between 2009 and 2013, the portfolio included five projects: one country

<sup>1</sup> The Uganda country strategy (2009–2014) was the first such document introduced under WFP's Strategic Plan (2009–2013).

<sup>2</sup> Uganda has hosted large numbers of refugees for decades; in early 2014, WFP was assisting 330,000 people, including recent arrivals from South Sudan.

<sup>3</sup> International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2013. *Enabling Poor Rural People to Overcome Poverty in Uganda*. Rome.

<sup>4</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2010. Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010 (Abridged Report), Socio-Economic Module. Kampala.


<sup>5</sup> Government of Uganda. 2007. *Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme*. Kampala and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2008. *Education for All by 2015: Will We Make It?* Paris, quoted in WFP country strategy 2009.

programme (CP), two emergency operations (EMOPs) and two protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs).

6. The evaluation's analytical framework was based on the country strategy priority areas, which are reflected across portfolio components (Figure 1):

- *emergency humanitarian action (EHA)*: general food distributions (GFDs) to various beneficiary groups and support to the treatment of acute malnutrition, through four EMOPs and PRROs;
- *food and nutrition security (FNS)*: support to education, asset creation and prevention of malnutrition, through CP 108070 component 1; and
- *agriculture and market support (AMS)*: agriculture and market development, including local purchases through CP 108070 component 2.


**Figure 1: Evaluation framework**



Source: Evaluation team based on WFP Uganda Country Strategy (2009–2014) Roadmap.


7. Data presented in Figures 2 and 3 indicate the variable performance regarding beneficiaries reached, tonnage delivered, and resourcing. Overall, the portfolio secured funding for about half of its requirements: USD 328.7 million received against USD 661.8 million for 2009–2013.

**Figure 2: Portfolio beneficiaries and tonnage, planned versus actual by project**



Sources: Project documents Standard and Project Reports (SPRs) 2009–2013.

**Figure 3: Portfolio funding levels, by project (USD)**



Sources: Project documents and SPRs 2009–2013.

- Analysis of cumulative expenditures by calendar year indicates a significant shift in the balance of the portfolio, with EHA’s share in annual expenditures declining from 100 percent in 2009 to less than a third in 2013 (Table 1). Until 2013, a parallel decreasing trend is observed in the total numbers of beneficiaries reached, as shown in Table 2.

<b>TABLE 1: EXPENDITURES BY PRIORITY AREA (USD)</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>EHA</b>	<b>FNS and AMS</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>EHA share (%)</b>
<b>2009</b>	49.1	-	<b>49.1</b>	100
<b>2010</b>	88.6	18.28	<b>106.8</b>	83
<b>2011</b>	54.0	49.7	<b>103.7</b>	52
<b>2012</b>	82.1	78.2	<b>160.3</b>	51
<b>2013</b>	39.2	98.1	<b>137.3</b>	29

Source: SPRs 2009–2013.

<b>TABLE 2: BENEFICIARY NUMBERS BY PRIORITY AREA</b>				
	<b>EHA</b>	<b>FNS*</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>EHA share (%)</b>
<b>2009</b>	2 458 653	33 593	<b>2 492 246</b>	99
<b>2010</b>	583 060	395 082	<b>978 142</b>	60
<b>2011</b>	272 664	456 508	<b>729 172</b>	37
<b>2012</b>	306 872	450 001	<b>756 873</b>	41
<b>2013</b>	432 921	401 734	<b>834 655</b>	52
<b>Yearly average</b>			<b>1 158 218</b>	

\* AMS beneficiaries are not included because activities do not provide direct transfers.

Source: SPR data.

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### Alignment and Strategic Positioning

⇒ *Relevance and operational responsiveness*

9. WFP interventions were appropriately focused on providing food assistance to vulnerable populations in Karamoja and to refugee populations across the country; all external informants recognized their substantial scale and coverage. As shown in Table 2, WFP EHA and FNS interventions reached an average of 1.2 million people annually, fluctuating between 729,000 and 2.5 million; only the Government's interventions achieved similar coverage:

- Support to both established and newly arrived refugees was sustained throughout the period; WFP currently assists more than 300,000 refugees.
- The CP's extensive coverage of vulnerable households included a school feeding programme in all of Karamoja's 282 schools, which met a critical community need.



- Food transfers in exchange for participation in public works supported nearly 50,000 moderately food-insecure households in 2010. Following alignment with the Government's North Uganda Social Assistance Fund (NUSAF-2) programme, WFP's support reached 69,080 households in 2013 – almost 30 percent<sup>6</sup> of all households in Karamoja.
10. The shift from EHA reflected the national context of peace consolidation and emerging government priorities. As stabilization followed the 2006–2008 peace agreements, WFP shifted from blanket towards targeted assistance. By the end of 2010, it had switched to GFD for extremely vulnerable households in Karamoja, under PRRO 101213, complemented by conditional transfers through FNS activities under the CP.
  11. WFP's demand for maize for operations in the region had been a major market driver in Uganda since the 1990s, but declined during the portfolio period. AMS objectives and activities, which initially emphasized infrastructure, the private sector and market development, were revised to target smallholders more directly through support to satellite collection points, training of farmers' organizations, and capacity development of national authorities in grain quality standards.

⇒ *Alignment with government and national policies*

12. During the period evaluated, WFP enhanced its engagement and alignment with the Government. WFP activities directly supported government plans and programmes such as the Karamoja Integrated Development Programme, the National Development Plan and NUSAF-2; its safety net activities<sup>7</sup> were linked to the Government's expanding social protection programme; and its school feeding supported the Government's 2004–2015 Education Sector Strategic Plan. WFP implemented nutrition activities in partnership with government health departments and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in line with Uganda's Nutrition Action Plan.

⇒ *Coherence, complementarity and alignment with partner organizations*

13. The Government acknowledges WFP's crucial support in two main areas: i) advocacy and technical support for establishment of regional grain trade standards, the Ugandan Commodity Exchange and warehouse receipt systems; and ii) research in fortification and micronutrients to support the development of national policies.<sup>8</sup>
14. Complementing its advocacy efforts, WFP Uganda worked with international and local non-governmental organizations and district technical authorities to implement its food assistance activities. However, its relationship with cooperating partners was mainly contractual; capacity-development initiatives for project staff – from both WFP and partners – was oriented towards processes for delivering activities.
15. Expansion of AMS activities gave WFP a stronger, longer-term orientation in rural poverty reduction through support to livelihoods, food security, production and post-harvest handling, but AMS activities overlap with those of the Food and Agriculture Organization

<sup>6</sup> Based on an estimated total population of 1.2 million people and an average of five people per household – 240,000 households.

<sup>7</sup> GFD for extremely vulnerable households, food for assets (FFA) and school feeding.

<sup>8</sup> Including within the inter-agency Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH) initiative for ending child hunger.

of the United Nations (FAO), as noted in another recent evaluation.<sup>9</sup> While appreciating WFP's agricultural development efforts with smallholder farmers, external stakeholders<sup>10</sup> emphasized the need to demonstrate WFP's comparative advantage by translating its analysis work into effective delivery, and to clarify respective roles and mandates.

16. Despite their – limited – technical collaboration on AMS and food for assets (FFA), WFP and FAO have not developed a strategic partnership, and are perceived as competitors. Other than dialogue<sup>11</sup> at the national level, there is no clear evidence of efforts to develop complementarity or synergy between the agencies' support to two similar government initiatives: the Karamoja Livelihoods Programme for FAO, and the Karamoja Integrated Development Programme for WFP.<sup>12</sup>

## Strategic Decision-Making, Appropriateness and Added Value of the Country Strategy

### ⇒ *Analysis of needs, context and vulnerability*

17. As well as on WFP's capacity for operating food distributions at scale, the country strategy also built on WFP's strengths in linking relief and development, as evidenced in the portfolio's successful combination of relief through EHA activities, safety nets through GFD in EHA and FNS activities, and development through FNS and AMS activities addressing long-term vulnerability. NUSAF-2, school feeding and GFD for extremely vulnerable households helped to reposition WFP by shifting the portfolio from food aid towards enhancing resilience to shocks, in line with the 2008–2013 Strategic Plan.
18. The evaluation confirmed the perception of external stakeholders that WFP's historical identity as the "food and logistics" agency was changing through its nutrition work and support to the Government's grain quality standards, although food distribution is still considered WFP's core competency.
19. Overall, WFP programme design and targeting reflected both the context and strategic direction of the country strategy and was based on comprehensive needs assessment and food and nutrition analysis, with evidence of periodic reviews of tools and partnerships.
20. The evaluation found that WFP targeted women successfully, with progress reports showing gender-disaggregated data. However the emphasis was on women's participation in activities rather than on analysis of gender-based roles and needs. While WFP has clear policies for humanitarian protection, actions in this area received inadequate attention during programme implementation.

### ⇒ *Strategic decision-making and results orientation*

21. The country strategy enhanced the possibilities for coherence and linkages between short-term and longer-term interventions and objectives, and strengthened WFP's role in advocating for pro-poor policies. By sharing the results of its analysis, WFP was able to

<sup>9</sup> International Organisation Development Ltd. (IOD PARC) and Department for International Development (DFID). 2012. *Formative Evaluation of World Food Programme's Livelihoods Programme, Karamoja, Uganda*. Sheffield, UK and London.

<sup>10</sup> Government, United Nations agencies, donors and cooperating partners.

<sup>11</sup> A joint FAO/UNICEF/WFP resilience strategy was developed in 2013, funded by DFID.

<sup>12</sup> IOD PARC. 2014. *Evaluation of the Impact of Food for Assets on Livelihood Resilience in Uganda (2005–2010)*. Sheffield, UK.

influence policy on such issues as grain standards and agricultural markets, nutrition and food fortification, safety nets and school feeding.

22. However, evidence indicates that implementation was not always as coherent as the strategy. Dissemination and assimilation of the country strategy throughout the country office was weak or uneven, with poor attention to the quality of assets created, activities to address protection concerns, output-level reporting and process-oriented training. There were lost opportunities resulting from the outsourcing of monitoring.
23. These weaknesses were partly because the targets of this first country strategy were aspirational, and the strategy was not intended to be a results-based management tool. The targets did not lend themselves to measurement, and proved unrealistic. Evidence-based reporting on the strategy's intended changes in capacity, farm productivity/incomes, community mobilization and similar outcomes was weak; reporting was mainly input/output-oriented, although the evaluation noted improvements since 2012.
24. WFP made high-level investments in deploying qualified staff from Headquarters for the initial development and communication of the country strategy. Under-investment in programme design and implementation capacity prevented full realization of the objectives.
25. WFP has an elaborate corporate system for tracking inputs and outputs, but limited ability to monitor and analyse the outcomes of activities. Project logical frameworks often have weak links between activities and outcomes, and are difficult to use for field staff.

⇒ *Internal capacity and structure*

26. The country office undertook periodic reviews<sup>13</sup> to align its organizational structure and staffing levels to requirements and funding realities. Efforts to build staff capacity through training and workshops in the early years were reduced after budget cuts in 2011 led to restructuring, with decreases in WFP's field staff and operational capacity when new programmes required a wider range of expertise.
27. This and other evaluations<sup>14</sup> found that the use of contractors for food-basket and post-distribution monitoring, although cost-efficient, limited the opportunities for WFP to interact with beneficiaries and for staff to understand the situation on the ground.

## Performance and Results

⇒ *Emergency humanitarian action*

28. GFD reached more beneficiaries than planned (Figure 2 and Table 3), but with smaller rations (Table 4). Five annual distribution/transfer cycles were planned, but only three or four were carried out each year.<sup>15</sup> GFD faced consistent shortfalls throughout 2009–2013; WFP met its EHA target in tonnage only in 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Deployment records and the 2011 staff review exercise.

<sup>14</sup> Broughton, B., Tumuhimbise, G. and Basalirwa, R. 2012. *Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 101213 – Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees*. (unpublished)

<sup>15</sup> SPRs 2011–2013 for PRROs 101213 and 200429; evaluation data from interviews.

<b>TABLE 3: EHA BENEFICIARIES REACHED AS PERCENTAGES OF TARGETS</b>					
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
GFD	133	102	104	91	94
Supplementary feeding	20	84	71	54	94
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>94</b>

Source: SPRs for EMOPs 108110 and 200123, and for PRROs 101213 and 200429.

<b>TABLE 4: TONNAGES DISTRIBUTED AS PERCENTAGES OF TARGETS</b>					
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
EMOP 108110	66	67	n/a	n/a	n/a
EMOP 200123	n/a	49	n/a	n/a	n/a
PRRO 101213	17	87	100	67	n/a
PRRO 200429	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	72
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>72</b>

Source: SPRs for EMOPs 108110 and 200123, and for PRROs 101213 and 200429.

29. Delayed distributions – postponed, rescheduled or conducted after dark – were a major concern for both refugees and EHA cooperating partners. Refugees reported that unannounced delays resulted in repeated journeys over considerable distances to final distribution points; cooperating partners were concerned about the associated security risks for women and from the potential for riots.<sup>16</sup> Evidence indicates that as well as resource constraints, causes of delays included irregular deliveries to final distribution points in the camps because of poor local transport infrastructure and inadequate management of transporters' contracts, particularly since 2012.
30. Under EHA, WFP implements a supplementary feeding programme for which coverage was low in the early years. By modifying its approach to include a community-based supplementary feeding (CBSF) component, WFP increased the population basin's coverage from 53 percent in 2009, to 71 percent in 2011.<sup>14</sup> Although the evaluation lacked documentary evidence for updating this figure, community focus group discussions indicated a sustained increase in outreach of supplementary feeding.
31. No readmission data were available, but a recent review by DFID suggested that CBSF was inefficient, with children being repeatedly readmitted.<sup>17</sup> Evaluation sources indicated intra-household sharing of rations, while discussions with partners and direct observation suggested that in response to deficiencies in the distribution of GFD for extremely vulnerable households, CBSF assisted many non-target elderly people. Despite these shortcomings, the recovery and default rates were better than the targets<sup>18</sup> of 75 percent recovery and 15 percent default, indicating that both the supplementary feeding programme and CBSF operated effectively throughout the period.

<sup>16</sup> There is a history of riots associated with food at some camps in southwest Uganda.

<sup>17</sup> DFID. 2013. *Sustaining Nutritional Assistance in Karamoja. Project Completion Review*. London.

<sup>18</sup> WFP. 2009. PRRO 101213 Standard Project Report.

32. WFP had intended to transfer its caseload of extremely vulnerable households to the Government's Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment safety net programme, but interviews with government and WFP officials suggested that transfer is unlikely as the future of this programme is uncertain.

⇒ *Food and nutrition security*

33. SPR data show consistent shortfalls in actual deliveries compared with plans (Table 5).

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Planned	19 541	31 613	24 825	20 829
Actual	15 750	13 196	16 412	10 859

Source: SPRs for CP 108070, 2010–2013.

34. WFP's FNS activities in Karamoja were designed as safety nets to contribute to social protection, and included conditional food/cash transfers, school feeding, mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) and early childhood development.<sup>19</sup> The evaluation team found that only school feeding met two of WFP's four good practice principles for social protection and safety nets;<sup>20</sup> none of the other FNS interventions provided an effective safety net.
35. Until 2012, WFP's comprehensive school feeding met needs, and was timely and predictable. Following withdrawal of the main donor, by 2013 the number of meals served and school attendance rates had dropped. WFP reports and stakeholder interviews identified the reduction in WFP's food basket as the main factor in reduced attendance. Coincidentally, national statistics<sup>21</sup> also reported a drop in school attendance in Karamoja in 2013.
36. With the abrupt decrease in funding, the sustainability of school feeding remains uncertain. Since 2013, WFP and other stakeholders such as the World Bank have been working with the Government to develop a viable national school feeding programme.
37. Overall MCHN attendance increased throughout the portfolio period. Health centre staff reported that food assistance increased attendance, and that substantially more babies were being delivered at centres rather than at home. Staff reported a drop in attendance since a pipeline rupture affected the MCHN programme at the end of 2013. Focus group discussions with mothers suggested that entitlements lasted only 10–15 days, and rations were shared within households.
38. In Acholi, following hand-over of MCHN activities to district health authorities, interviews with health officials indicated that while outreach and health education activities were maintained, the food supplement was no longer provided.
39. The short duration of FFA activities – implemented as a relief intervention to provide a seasonal safety net – often undermined their potential contribution to disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resilience, emphasized in the country strategy.<sup>12</sup> Recent assets – which were appropriately focused on soil and water conservation and woodlots – were of weak

<sup>19</sup> The evaluation of WFP's role in social protection and safety nets included MCHN activities but argued that preventive measures do not qualify as safety nets unless coordinated with other activities.

<sup>20</sup> See "Summary Report of the Strategic Evaluation of WFP's Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets" (WFP/EB.A/2011/7-B).

<sup>21</sup> Government of Uganda. 2012/13. *Uganda Education and Sports Sector Annual Performance Report (ESSAPR)*. Kampala.

technical design,<sup>22</sup> and seasonality was an issue, with work cycles of a maximum nine months.<sup>23</sup> This short-term approach meant that once an asset was complete, cooperating partners and WFP moved to new communities without providing follow-up, which undermined maintenance prospects.

⇒ *Agriculture and market support*

40. WFP AMS activities have been instrumental in establishing market standards.<sup>24</sup> WFP's sustained advocacy for regional standards in the grain trade facilitated the creation of institutions and mechanisms such as the Uganda Commodity Exchange and warehouse receipt systems, which promote quality standards for maize in the country.
41. Focus group discussions revealed that farmers became more aware of the need to improve grain quality, as the members of farmers' organizations and satellite collection points (SCPs) saw how the quality of grain and storage determined selling prices.
42. SCPs faced challenges in attracting very poor farmers; a study of SCP utilization<sup>25</sup> noted that farmers who did not use an SCP focused on immediate food security concerns. To address this challenge, WFP is piloting different models of household storage facility, while village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) linked to SCPs provide access to small-scale credit. Focus group discussions and beneficiary interviews suggested that these efforts were showing results, with smallholders beginning to use SCP facilities. By 2013, VSLAs had mobilized about USD 339,000 in savings, but operate without a regulatory framework.

## CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

### Relevance and Strategic Positioning

43. WFP's country strategy set an appropriate strategic direction in the shift from food aid to food assistance. The country portfolio was closely aligned with Uganda's evolving priorities and policies, and responded to needs of vulnerable communities. Despite budget cuts, WFP achieved extensive coverage in the most vulnerable geographical areas and of refugees. In most cases, WFP worked with government and other stakeholders to ensure that activities were coherent and addressed critical needs not met by others. WFP used evidence to inform the redesign and targeting of interventions and increase their relevance.
44. The country office demonstrated mixed capacity for strategic decision-making on the one hand, and for delivering on results on the other, defining analysis and broad directions aptly, but lagging behind in delivery and results tracking.

<sup>22</sup> Of 12 recently constructed water ponds visited, 11 were not properly designed or located.

<sup>23</sup> Partners reported this period can be shortened by funding delays and protracted tendering and contracting processes.

<sup>24</sup> "Summary Report of the Strategic Mid-Term Evaluation of WFP's Agriculture and Market Support in Uganda" (WFP/EB.2/2011/6-A).

<sup>25</sup> Kizito, A.M. 2013. *Thematic Case Study on the Level of Utilization of Satellite Collection Points by Farmers and Traders in the Agriculture and Market Support/Purchase for Progress Catchment Areas in Uganda*. Kampala, WFP.



⇒ *Effectiveness and efficiency*

45. The strategy's objectives were aspirational and were inadequately translated into implementation and delivery of results. WFP's monitoring and reporting remained input/output-based, and outcome-level progress was inadequately tracked. Technical and field staff capacity did not match the country office's strong strategic and analytical capacity.
46. Recurrent pipeline breaks jeopardized effectiveness and efficiency of all activities, undermining the adequacy and predictability of GFD transfers in particular. Besides resource constraints, other influencing factors are within WFP's control – such as weaknesses in WFP's secondary transport and logistics arrangements – and should be addressed by the country office.
47. WFP's support to the Government in implementing comprehensive nutrition interventions to address undernutrition – particularly through CBSF and MCHN – were partially effective. School feeding appeared to have a positive effect on enrolment and attendance rates in Karamoja, with key informants attributing the 2013 reduction in those to the 2013 reduction in transfers, and there is evidence that AMS activities are having effects on policies and markets, showing a potential for scaling-up.
48. WFP's support to SCPs demonstrated potential for benefiting smallholders. WFP could leverage this success to develop SCPs and farmers' organizations on a large scale, covering hundreds of villages, as part of its repositioning, especially given its capacity to deliver at scale.
49. The quality and sustainability of assets created under FFA have not received adequate attention; the short-term relief approach to FFA activities undermined effectiveness in the medium to long term. WFP needs to take a more analytical approach to its programming for DRR and resilience.
50. WFP's interventions ensured women's inclusion but made insufficient effort to assess the potential impacts on gender roles and dynamics within households and communities, or on protection.

⇒ *Sustainability*

51. Hand-over strategies for safety net activities were limited and uncertain in all areas. WFP will need to maintain its role in social protection while it engages with the Government in developing a comprehensive framework.
52. The Government demonstrated strong ownership of the grain quality standards initiative and the development of market infrastructure. The SCPs, although far from self-sustaining, attracted significant participation from farmers, with reasonable prospects for greater ownership by farmers' organizations following a period of WFP support. Regulatory and institutional frameworks now need to be established to capitalize on SCPs' potential for growth and sustainability.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

53. **Recommendation 1: *WFP's positioning.* The country office should continue to focus on the three priority areas identified in the country strategy.** Within WFP's shift to food assistance, in its developmental programming, WFP Uganda should:
- i) scale up nutrition and social protection interventions in partnership with UNICEF and the Government, while engaging in the development of national social protection policy;
  - ii) advance joint programming by developing an action plan for the resilience strategy in Karamoja and – specifically – an integrated approach for agricultural and smallholder-related work with FAO; and
  - iii) where AMS is implemented, use SCPs and farmers' organizations as a pivot for scaling up and exploring integration of WFP's FFA and DRR interventions with its support to VSLAs and agricultural development, using a long-term planning perspective.
54. **Recommendation 2: *Sustainability.* The country office should maintain a dual approach of advocacy and service delivery in Karamoja.** It should:
- i) continue to support extremely vulnerable households and refugees through food/cash transfers based on vulnerability assessments and verification, while advocating for realistic and sustainable mechanisms for predictable and adequate safety nets; and
  - ii) continue to support school feeding in the next programme cycle, while engaging with the Government and the World Bank on the schoolgarden and nutrition initiative for launch at the end of 2014, and working with authorities, communities and schools to ensure that they take over responsibility for the programme incrementally and effectively, while WFP gradually reduces support in a phased and predictable manner.
55. **Recommendation 3: *Future country strategy document.* Headquarters and the country office should make the next country strategy a results-based document.** This will require action to:
- i) enable tracking of impacts and changes, with reporting of measurable targets to which WFP contributes directly in the country overview section of SPRs;
  - ii) translate country strategy aims and outcomes into action plans that can be systematically monitored; and
  - iii) revise the corporate SPR system to integrate country strategy outcomes in annual reports, in the longer-term.



56. **Recommendation 4: *Resilience and disaster risk reduction.*** Headquarters, the country office and the regional bureau should continue to implement the recommendations of the 2014 FFA evaluation and the recent FFA guidance for the country office, while improving the planning, design, implementation and monitoring of resilience and DRR interventions by:
- i) hiring a specialist to work with sub-offices on the planning and design of a coherent multi-year approach to WFP FFA and DRR, and ensuring that activities are implemented together with relevant technical partners;
  - ii) under the 2013 joint resilience strategy for Karamoja, developing joint operational plans with FAO and UNICEF to increase the synergy and impact of WFP interventions; and
  - iii) using multi-year plans to advocate with donors for multi-year funding for the country programme.
57. **Recommendation 5: *General food distributions.*** Under EHA, the country office should:
- i) urgently resolve the secondary transport problems facing deliveries to refugee settlements, through more efficient management of transporters' contracts and enhanced monitoring of deliveries;
  - ii) complement the current outsourcing of post-distribution monitoring with regular, tracked joint monitoring plans by WFP field staff and contracted partners, so WFP staff can engage with target populations, fostering deeper understanding of the problems faced by communities that WFP assists; and
  - iii) record readmissions to supplementary feeding programmes and investigate their causes, which are likely to be partially addressed by ensuring that full food entitlements are distributed regularly and predictably to target populations.
58. **Recommendation 6: *Agriculture and market support.*** To enhance the security of farmers' savings, the country office should support the Government in developing an appropriate regulatory framework and operational procedures for VSLAs, so that they become legally registered bodies with legal statutes.
59. **Recommendation 7: *Protection and gender.*** The country office and regional bureau should:
- i) provide field-based staff and cooperating partners with training and practical orientation on WFP's protection policy to ensure that assistance does not put beneficiaries at risk; and
  - ii) develop staff capacity for integrating gender analysis into programme design and implementation, and verification check-lists to ensure that standards are respected.

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## ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

AMS	agriculture and market support
CBSF	community-based supplementary feeding
CP	country programme
CPE	country portfolio evaluation
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	disaster risk reduction
EHA	emergency humanitarian action
EMOP	emergency operation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFA	food for assets
FNS	food and nutrition security
GFD	general food distribution
MCHN	mother-and-child health and nutrition
NUSAF-2	North Uganda Social Assistance Fund
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SCP	satellite collection point
SPR	Standard Project Report
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VSLA	village savings and loan association