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**Executive Board
First Regular Session**

Rome, 9–10 February 2015

EVALUATION REPORTS

Agenda item 5

For consideration

E

Distribution: GENERAL
WFP/EB.1/2015/5-D
9 January 2015
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUMMARY EVALUATION REPORT – INDONESIA COUNTRY PORTFOLIO (2009–2013)

Executive Board documents are available on WFP's Website (<http://executiveboard.wfp.org>).

NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

This document is submitted to the Executive Board for consideration.

The Secretariat invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document to contact the WFP staff focal points indicated below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting.

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* Office of Evaluation

** country portfolio evaluations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indonesia portfolio evaluation covered all WFP operations in 2009–2013, along with the 2011–2015 country strategy. It assessed WFP’s alignment and strategic positioning; the factors in and quality of its strategic decision-making; and the portfolio’s performance and results. Capacity development was a central theme in the portfolio.

During the review period, Indonesia was changing fast, moving from the challenges, needs and opportunities that WFP generally faces in most countries. WFP was also changing, shifting from food aid to food assistance, from logistics to capacity development, and from needing mainly technical skills to needing at least as many strategic and institutional skills for this context.

In spite of being severely under-resourced – which inevitably impaired performance – the country office made important strategic progress. It shifted WFP’s roles and profile and enhanced the portfolio’s relevance to the country’s humanitarian and development needs, increasingly aligning it with the national agenda and policies.


However, this strategic progress was not supported by uniform effectiveness across the portfolio. While there was good progress in some fields, including vulnerability analysis and mapping and school feeding, old operational habits persisted, with WFP continuing direct engagement in food deliveries although preferable alternatives existed. The central challenge in adapting operations to strategy was in using prototypes to link small-scale field implementation to large-scale adoption through advocacy. The portfolio’s effectiveness in achieving this vital link was limited by insufficient technical, capacity development and advocacy efforts.

A related challenge was the inadequate focus on efficiency in the design, delivery and monitoring of prototype strategies. The portfolio did not perform well according to the limited criteria of efficiency that the evaluation was able to apply.

These two challenges regarding prototypes compromised the technical and strategic sustainability of the portfolio’s overall outputs, although vulnerability analysis and mapping achieved strategically sustainable results.

The evaluation made nine recommendations on: i) clearer strategy for institutional capacity development and prototype activities; ii) and iii) more in-depth formulation of strategies for each type of capacity development, advocacy and awareness-raising intervention; iv) equal resourcing of school feeding and mother-and-child nutrition activities; v) research to improve mother-and-child nutrition strategies; vi) adjustment of WFP monitoring and reporting systems to the types of work now done in Indonesia; vii) sustaining a basic minimum operating presence for the country office; viii) ceasing of food supply and distribution in Indonesia, except in Level 3 emergencies; and ix) assessment of the cost-effectiveness, sustainability and replicability of WFP’s food assistance-for-assets activities to determine whether its continuation is justified.

DRAFT DECISION*



The Board takes note of “Summary Evaluation Report – Indonesia Country Portfolio (2009–2013)” (WFP/EB.1/2015/5-D) and the management response in WFP/EB.1/2015/5-D/Add.1, and encourages further action on the recommendations, taking into account considerations raised by the Board during its discussion.

* This is a draft decision. For the final decision adopted by the Board, please refer to the Decisions and Recommendations document issued at the end of the session.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation Features

1. The country portfolio evaluation covered all WFP operations in Indonesia in 2009–2013 and the 2011–2015 country strategy. It assessed the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP in Indonesia; the factors in and quality of its strategic decision-making; and the performance and results of the portfolio. Evaluation fieldwork took place in April 2014 and included site visits in two provinces, focus group discussions, interviews with 140 people and extensive document review.

Context

2. Indonesia is a populous and diverse nation that has made impressive development progress and is now classified as a lower-middle income country. However, some of its 33 provinces – such as Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) – are significantly poorer than the national average. Income inequality is increasing. In 2011–2012, only 25 percent of households in a district of NTT could afford to meet their nutrient requirements, compared with 80 percent of households in urban Surabaya.¹ Located in an active tectonic zone, Indonesia ranks fifth among countries most affected by natural disasters. Climate change also has significant influence on vulnerability.
3. While undernutrition remains the greater challenge – with a global acute malnutrition rate of 12.1 percent and stunting of 37.2 percent – the “double burden” of malnutrition is increasing: adult obesity increased from 13.9 percent in 2007 to 19.7 percent in 2013.
4. Indonesia’s classification as a middle-income country, national economic progress and the Government’s enhanced fiscal position and more solid ownership of the development process (see paragraph 11) have led to reconfiguration of development funding and reappraisal of the roles and budgets of international agencies such as WFP. Total official development assistance to Indonesia has been falling since 2010.
5. While national leaders are committed to structured and orderly growth, the Government of Indonesia is still fragile, lacks capacity in many areas and has high employee turnover. Inflexible institutional structures reduce the Government’s ability to adapt to changing conditions. Financial management and accountability systems limit the ways programmes can be funded. Lines of authority and processes of decision-making that are hard for outsiders to understand constrain advocacy and necessitate long-term investment in building relationships. The major decentralization launched in 1999 has posed additional challenges.

WFP PORTFOLIO AND STRATEGY


6. The portfolio comprised one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) for 2008–2011, one emergency operation (EMOP), two special operations and one country programme (CP) for 2012–2015. The evaluation focused mainly on the PRRO, the CP and the country strategy, which guided formulation of the CP and realigned the portfolio overall. Table 1 shows the funding shortfalls facing the country office; WFP contemplated closing the country office early in the review period.

¹ Baldi, G. *et al.* 2013. Cost of the Diet (CoD) tool: First results from Indonesia and applications for policy discussion on food and nutrition security. *Food and Nut. Bull.*, 34(2, supplement): S35–S42.

TABLE 1: FUNDING OF INDONESIA COUNTRY PORTFOLIO 2009–2013 BY PROGRAMME CATEGORY					
	Number of operations	Requirements (USD million)	% of total requirements	Actual received (USD million)	% of requirements received
PRRO	1	112.6	65.34	46.208	30.04
CP*	1	44.8	25.99	11.914	26.6
Immediate-response EMOP	1	0.5	0.29	0.459	92.73
Special operations	2	14.5	8.39	8.297	57.41
TOTAL		172.3		66.878	38.30

*Data for the CP show funding received to end 2013 for the full four-year budget to end 2015.

7. The PRRO supported mother-and-child nutrition (MCN) services at health posts; primary school feeding, combining fortified food with curriculum-based training; support for tuberculosis patients through food for treatment; food assistance for assets (FFA) in food-insecure rural areas; and community development projects in parallel with MCN and school feeding. It also provided for flexible response to emergencies.
8. The country strategy introduced significant changes in WFP's approach using prototypes, "maximizing its comparative advantage, leveraging strategic partnerships and building on incremental successes". It identified three priority areas for national capacity strengthening: i) monitoring, analysing, mapping and addressing food insecurity; ii) strengthening Indonesia's capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters and shocks; and iii) strengthening Indonesia's capacity to reduce undernutrition below critical levels. Four "core areas of engagement" were pursued: i) technical assistance; ii) prototyping of high-impact, replicable interventions; iii) enhanced monitoring and evaluation to improve knowledge management; and iv) advocacy to develop and support sustainable food and nutrition security policies and interventions.
9. The CP was designed to address the three priorities identified in the country strategy. In line with the corporate Strategic Plan for 2008–2013, the country office increased food assistance for capacity development interventions. The unstated assumption was that successful advocacy and capacity development – including through prototyping – would ultimately enable the Government to resolve Indonesia's food security and malnutrition challenges.
10. WFP's analysis of issues in Indonesia intensified over the review period, but the scale of operations shrank considerably. From 2009 to 2013, the total number of beneficiaries declined from 843,718 to 34,475 (Figure 1), with food distribution dropping from 12,955 mt to 1,222 mt: less than half of planned distributions were actually distributed. With major budget shortfalls (Table 1), which were only partially mitigated by the emerging shift to prototype strategies, WFP cut staff numbers in Indonesia from 187 at nine locations in 2009 to 81 at five locations in 2013. For much of the review period, the country office was operating in sub-survival mode.

Figure 1: Beneficiaries by activity, 2009–2013

Source: Standard Project Reports 2009–2013.
FFW – food for work; FFT – food for training.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

11. The country strategy significantly adjusted WFP's alignment and strategic positioning in Indonesia, increasing the emphasis on consultation, partnership and alignment with the Government and its policies – including the Jakarta Commitment on Aid for Development Effectiveness, which reinforces Indonesia's signature of the Paris Declaration and is asserted through instruments such as the medium-term development plan (Table 2). Meanwhile, Indonesia became a major source of food for WFP operations, both at home and in other countries. The country strategy and the CP mainstreamed capacity development as a priority in most WFP interventions and introduced the concept of prototypes as a way of working on a small scale while influencing policy and practice on a much larger scale. However, they did not explain exactly how prototyping would work, which was a weakness for an approach that invested so much in the concept of prototypes: documents failed to explain sufficiently how successful prototypes would be scaled up.

Jakarta Commitment principles	WFP alignment*
Stronger national ownership in defining aid architecture and processes	Steady progress made.
A shift from a donor–recipient relationship to a paradigm of equal and innovative partnerships	Progress made, but the Government continues to assume that WFP will take the technical lead.
Move from financial assistance to a more strategic and catalytic role of aid	Progress made; the Government recognizes that WFP financial inputs are limited and is committed to helping to fund WFP operations in Indonesia.
Transition from scattered project-based assistance to a more programmatic approach	Progress made, but WFP’s geographically scattered prototypes are not fully integrated.
Stronger focus on capacity development and results orientation embedded in national programmes	Capacity development now central to WFP programming, but this commitment is only partially reflected in the Government’s stance. Both WFP and the Government make less reference to results orientation.
Greater mutual accountability and alignment between the Government and international partners	Progress made by WFP and the Government.

* Assessed by the evaluation team comparing the WFP Indonesia country strategy with the Government of Indonesia’s 2009 Jakarta Commitment: Aid for Development Effectiveness, available at: http://pendanaan.bappenas.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22

12. The portfolio’s emphasis on capacity development was highly relevant to Indonesia’s food and nutrition security challenges. However, according to interviews with stakeholders, WFP was better at achieving formal alignment, complementarity and coherence with partners than at genuine collaboration and synergy. With the overstretched staff in the underfunded country office having to devote much of their time to distant small-scale prototype operations, it was impossible to invest the necessary time and effort in building deeper relationships. While inconsistencies and overlaps were largely avoided, the whole rarely became more than the sum of the parts. Interviews indicated that collaboration with bilateral agencies in emergency preparedness and response (EPR) was hindered by poor performance by WFP for part of the review period. There was limited practical collaboration through the United Nations Partnership for Development Framework, and less synergy.
13. The global Project Laser Beam, which aims to eradicate child malnutrition through collaboration between United Nations agencies and the private sector, strengthened WFP’s interaction with some private-sector partners; interviews with businesses confirmed that collaboration became an important part of WFP’s profile in Indonesia. The country office made good progress in establishing funding relationships with the private sector.
14. The Indonesia portfolio was well aligned with WFP’s 2008–2013 Strategic Plan and generally conformed to its policies, although social and organizational policies – such as capacity development – achieved less than expected.
15. WFP made significant progress in adapting to the changing context in Indonesia. Its comparative advantage as a convenor of the public and private sectors and civil society was important in this regard, although progress was uneven. WFP succeeded in moving upstream and recognized the central importance of capacity development in Indonesia, but did not respond adequately to this need. Acknowledging the Government’s enhanced ownership in

the sectors where it worked – evidenced by a USD 2.8 million contribution to WFP over four years – WFP strengthened its working relations with the Government.

Factors in and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making

16. WFP took the goals of the Government and its partners into increasing account. Preparation of the country strategy and the CP demonstrated significant improvements in strategic decision-making and supporting analysis, including recognition of the rapidly changing country context and the need for non-food-based interventions. However, like a super tanker that takes time to turn, WFP's strategic thinking lagged behind developments; too much was expected of conventional funding strategies, despite the efforts to revise them, such as through innovative engagement with the private sector. The need for new skills to achieve the planned focus on capacity development and advocacy was underestimated.
17. Part of the lag in strategic thinking concerned WFP's continued engagement in procuring and distributing food and complementary feeding products. The commodity-focused format and content of Standard Project Reports are poorly suited to presenting the main issues in the activities involved in the shift from food aid to food assistance, as in Indonesia. WFP's heritage also made it slow to discard direct procurement and distribution, despite their inefficiency and limited relevance in a country with opportunities for private-sector production and distribution, albeit there are significant challenges with increased private-sector involvement. The country office developed a proposal for distributing food through a voucher transfer system² – for which it could not secure funding – but more could have been done to move away from the “business-as-usual” delivery system.
18. The logical framework included in the PRRO document did not adequately elaborate how, and under what assumptions, sustainable change would be achieved. The document emphasized the importance of collaboration with the Government, capacity development and alignment with government policy, but the PRRO remained a package of standard WFP interventions with little integration of components.
19. Introducing the concept of prototyping, the country strategy recognized that WFP's direct interventions would be on a very small scale, and that rather than directly achieving food and nutrition security for many beneficiaries, WFP would facilitate others – primarily the Government – in doing so. However, the strategy document's explanation of how this goal would be achieved was, at best, implicit. Focusing, understandably, on how WFP would work, it did not explain how the strategy and its operations would achieve the intended outcomes and impact.

² WFP and Oxfam Indonesia. 2011. *Cash Transfer Feasibility Study in Nusa Tenggara Timur and Nusa Tenggara Barat*. Available at <http://www.wfp.org/content/cash-transfer-feasibility-study-nusa-tenggara-timur-and-nusa-tenggara-barat>

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS

Effectiveness

20. WFP's vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) activities contributed directly to food security and vulnerability atlases for the national level and two provinces; Indonesian authorities replicated the atlases in more than 20 other provinces. Interviews in Kupang showed that the provincial VAM process is well established in NTT. Overall, WFP's VAM work generated effective technical,³ capacity development and institutional outcomes.
21. Interviews and documentation indicate that WFP's EPR was of limited effectiveness. With expertise that was mainly technical and periodically distracted into emergency response operations, WFP did not tackle the political and institutional challenges involved in developing new national and provincial disaster management agencies, which were not easy to work with. According to external and internal stakeholders, this weak performance significantly damaged WFP's reputation in EPR, although by 2013 the country office was developing a better skill set and a clearer understanding of capacity development and institutional development needs.
22. Methodological problems with surveys resulted in inconclusive data on the effectiveness of WFP's MCN work in reducing stunting and wasting during the review period. Interviews and analysis of reports showed that opportunities for linking local implementation of prototypes to national strategy were not systematically grasped.
23. According to interviews at schools, school feeding approaches promoted by the portfolio were effective in enhancing children's concentration. The impact on attendance was less clear: according to interviewed staff and WFP's baseline survey, attendance did not vary between days with and those without school meals, but it had increased since school feeding was introduced. School feeding could build on the benefits of MCN that focuses on the first 1,000 days following conception, and exploit the strong local support that WFP elicited for local food-based school meal (LFBSM) strategies. Again, however, promising local prototypes were not effectively linked to advocacy and policy at the national level.
24. Monitoring data collected on FFA activities in the latter part of the review period indicated positive short-term results on the food security of those receiving food. This echoes the findings of other FFA impact evaluations,⁴ but there was no evidence that these interventions would prove to be sustainable and would achieve lasting enhancements of food and livelihood security for participants. Ensuring long-term technical and institutional arrangements for maintaining assets was not included in the WFP strategy. The CP's FFA component did not include assessment of the extent of food insecurity, context and risk analysis, capacity assessment or a clear indication of how WFP's FFA interventions complemented government policy and strategies.⁵ The evaluation team did not find sufficient evidence that WFP's FFA activities were of more than transient benefit or that local work had been structured effectively as prototypes to influence national strategy.

³ See, for example, Dewan Ketahanan Pangan, Departemen Pertanian RI and WFP. 2009. *A Food Security and Vulnerability Atlas of Indonesia 2009*; Pemerintah Provinsi NTB, Dewan Ketahanan Pangan, Kementerian Pertanian and WFP. 2010. *Food Security and Vulnerability Atlas of NTB 2010*.

⁴ "Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002–2011) and Lessons for Building Livelihood Resilience" (WFP/EB.A/2014/7-B*), p. iii.

⁵ As recommended in WFP. 2014. Using FFA – the bigger picture. *FFA Manual: Module A*, p.28.

25. Overall, the portfolio's increasing focus on capacity development was only modestly effective. Interviews confirmed that while the country office recognized the importance of capacity development, it was unable to focus on the task. Targeting of capacity development activities was hindered by the lack of adequate capacity assessments and a comprehensive advocacy strategy. Application of WFP's National Capacity Index process to assess WFP's performance revealed an insufficiently systematic approach to capacity development. However, by the end of the review period there was a marked improvement in planning of capacity development, with a more systematic focus on the individual, organizational and institutional levels.
26. The country office recognized the importance of advocacy for promoting effective and relevant techniques and strategies to enhance food and nutrition security, linked to capacity development where needed. However, partly because of resource shortages and the demands of managing scattered small-scale prototypes, the country office was not systematic enough in formulating, delivering, monitoring, assessing and reporting its advocacy strategies.
27. According to interviews with government and development partners, WFP made a positive contribution at the national policy level by working with the United Nations Children's Fund and the Government to include nutrition in the 2010–2014 medium-term development plan and by helping to prepare the national food and nutrition action plan. WFP had less policy impact on school feeding, to which it gave less attention – school feeding was not mentioned in the country strategy – despite the local enthusiasm for LFBSM. VAM was the only field in which WFP achieved significant enhancements in national analytical capacity during the review period. WFP had no impact on national policy priorities in gender issues, and stakeholders reported little impact in EPR – the most institutionally challenging sector in the Indonesia portfolio. Despite the potential for using WFP's FFA activities in advocating for actions to adapt to climate change at scale, there was no evidence that these prototypes achieved significant impact on the national agenda.

Efficiency

28. The evaluation found that efficiency was not systematically addressed in the portfolio's prototype approach. There was no evidence that the unit costs of activities were adequately considered in the design and management of prototype interventions, and cost monitoring was inadequate. Staff reported generally high operating costs, which may be justifiable at the prototype stage if advocacy and awareness-raising then lead to more efficient implementation at scale by the Government. Towards the end of the review period, the country office was exploring the potential for reducing staffing costs by employing more Indonesians.

Sustainability

29. WFP took sustainability into consideration in its nutrition activities and made limited progress towards improving sustainability by collaborating with the private sector on local food fortification. Promotion of LFBSM provided a basis for sustainable school feeding, although more should have been done to capitalize on local enthusiasm for LFBSM. The sustainability of WFP's EPR interventions dwindled in the middle of the review period because of ineffective performance by WFP and the institutional instability of the principal partner – the new national disaster management agency. The technical sustainability of FFA interventions was doubtful in the absence of medium- to long-term monitoring data.
30. WFP made more progress towards strategic sustainability in areas of its portfolio where it was engaged in broader, multi-partner efforts and underpinned its advocacy with technically competent implementation. Examples included its collaboration with local food companies

on nutrition interventions, and its long-established VAM effort, which achieved strategically sustainable results.

CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

31. The evaluation assessed WFP's performance in two contexts of change: in Indonesia, which no longer posed the conventional challenges, needs and opportunities with which WFP has generally worked; and in WFP, which was shifting from food aid to food assistance, from logistics to capacity development, and from needing mainly technical skills to needing at least as many strategic and institutional skills.
32. In this dynamic and unstable environment, the Indonesia country office had to struggle against steadily increasing budgetary challenges. For much of the review period, the country office survived on the margins of viability, and sometimes credibility, operating at unsustainable levels in conditions that inevitably impaired performance. Nevertheless, it managed to make important progress in terms of strategy by shifting the roles and profile of WFP, strengthening the portfolio's relevance to the country's humanitarian and development needs, and increasing alignment with the national agenda and policies. However, by the end of the review period, resourcing problems put at risk WFP's ability to maintain the minimum capacity needed for a credible profile and performance in the new directions that it was rightly taking.
33. WFP's strategic decision-making process is likely to evolve as its government partners become better resourced and more technically competent. Increasingly, decision-making will become a shared exercise in developing the national agenda, with WFP making specific contributions. The challenge is for WFP, as a global organization, to adapt its operations promptly to reflect strategic change. In the Indonesia portfolio, significant strategic progress was not supported by strong effectiveness in all programmes, as some old operational habits persisted.
34. Effectiveness varied widely across the portfolio. The central challenge in adjusting operations to match strategy was in using prototypes to link small-scale field implementation, through advocacy, to large-scale adoption. The portfolio showed limited effectiveness in this regard, with insufficient technical, capacity development and advocacy efforts to achieve this vital linkage. A related challenge was the inadequate consideration of efficiency in the design, delivery and monitoring of prototype strategies. The portfolio did not perform well according to the limited criteria for efficiency that the evaluation was able to apply. These two challenges regarding prototypes compromised the sustainability of the portfolio's outputs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

35. **Recommendation 1: To clarify the structure and rationale of its portfolio in Indonesia, the country office should plan and implement its work in two categories: institutional capacity development and prototypes.**
36. This explicit categorization will facilitate the country office's understanding of challenges and development of appropriate strategies. Institutional capacity development – currently VAM and EPR activities – focuses on strengthening the relevant institutions and staff capacity at the national, provincial and, where relevant, district levels. Prototype activities – currently in FFA, MCN and school feeding – should focus on developing evidence-based strategies for support at beneficiary level that can be adopted and scaled up by national public- and private-sector agencies, and on initiating a sustainable capacity development strategy to make this possible.
37. Institutional capacity development programmes should specify: the capacity development approach; the advocacy and awareness-raising strategy to be employed; and how to monitor and report on the implementation of this strategy.
38. Prototype design should specify: the scale of the intervention, the ultimate intended scale-up and how it will be achieved; WFP's roles in field implementation; the methods, tools and approaches to be developed, demonstrated and advocated; how capacity development will be undertaken; the cost-effectiveness of the prototype and the ultimate scaled-up activities; the advocacy and awareness-raising strategy to be employed for effective policy engagement; monitoring indicators and methods; and WFP's strategy and schedule for exit.
39. **Recommendation 2: The country office should articulate a comprehensive capacity development strategy for each of its VAM, EPR, MCN and school feeding sectors.**
40. Each strategy should be supported by a resourcing plan and should include: stakeholder analysis; expected vision and outcomes; approach and tools for assessing each direct partner; types of intervention, which should exploit and develop WFP's comparative advantage and mainstream gender; strategic partners for delivery; progress indicators and processes; reflection and learning processes; and related capacity development required for WFP country office staff.
41. **Recommendation 3: The country office should articulate a comprehensive advocacy and awareness-raising strategy for each of its VAM, EPR, MCN and school feeding sectors.**
42. For effective policy engagement, each strategy should include: stakeholder analysis, identifying the policy-makers – at all levels – to be influenced; the role of partners, including civil society actors; the changes in policy, regulation, resourcing and practice that are to be advocated; the approaches to be used, which should exploit WFP's comparative advantage and mainstream gender; how WFP can serve as a convenor and broker among the Government, the private sector, civil society and other international agencies; and plans and indicators for measuring progress. Each strategy should be supported by a resourcing plan.
43. **Recommendation 4: With support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, the country office should commit as much effort and as many resources to its school feeding work as it does to its MCN activities.**
44. Implementation of this recommendation will require adequate staffing; a clearer capacity development strategy for implementation at the district level; and an advocacy strategy to

capitalize at the national level on the local enthusiasm generated by WFP school feeding approaches.

45. **Recommendation 5: The country office should seek funds, with support from the Private Sector Partnerships Division, for further research to identify enhancements to its MCN strategy, based on evaluation of the impacts of approaches used so far.**

46. This research should compare the effects of different packages of interventions, such as food products versus education and the promotion of behaviour change; interventions during the lean season versus at other times; and nutrition-specific versus nutrition-sensitive interventions.

47. **Recommendation 6: Headquarters should enhance its monitoring and reporting systems to make them more relevant to WFP's work in Indonesia and similar countries.**

48. The Standard Project Report format should be revised to allow reporting on the operation's logical framework, where relevant; the capacity development and advocacy strategies articulated for the operation; the technical and institutional viability of the operation, linked – where relevant – to the food and nutrition security and related benefits for prototype beneficiaries; the contribution to WFP's Strategic Objectives; and compliance with selected WFP policies, notably nutrition, school feeding, capacity development and gender.

49. **Recommendation 7: For as long as it maintains a country office in Indonesia, WFP should ensure and sustain a basic minimum operating presence.**

50. This presence could comprise fewer international personnel and a higher proportion of senior, experienced Indonesian staff supplemented, when necessary, by senior international or local consultants. For at least the remainder of the current CP period, the office should include full-time capacity development and school feeding specialists. Total staff numbers do not need to increase. All technical specialists should be competent in capacity development. All staff contracts should be for at least 12 months.

51. Funding for this purpose is a corporate responsibility for WFP and is likely to require an unconventional combination of sources, such as funds from the host government and the private sector, as well as the usual – and possibly some new – bilateral and multilateral sources.

52. **Recommendation 8: Except in Level 3 emergencies, WFP should not supply or distribute food, including complementary feeding products, in Indonesia.**

53. With support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, the country office should phase out all direct involvement in the supply or distribution of food and complementary feeding products as soon as viable alternative arrangements can be put in place.

54. **Recommendation 9: With support from the Policy, Programme and Innovation Division and the regional bureau, the country office should carry out an urgent, thorough assessment of its FFA work to determine the cost-effectiveness, sustainability and replicability of the approaches it has pursued and to decide whether continuation of FFA activities is justified.**

55. The assessment should include a thorough investigation of relevant food security, institutional and environmental variables at a minimum of 20 sites where WFP supported FFA work during the review period. Following the study, any recommendation for continuing support to FFA should be premised on acceptance that WFP would not undertake the food supply or distribution itself.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE DOCUMENT

CP	country programme
EMOP	emergency operation
EPR	emergency preparedness and response
FFA	food assistance for assets
LFBSM	local food-based school meals
MCN	mother-and-child nutrition
NTB	Nusa Tenggara Barat
NTT	Nusa Tenggara Timur
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
VAM	vulnerability analysis and mapping