

# Operation Evaluation

Sudan EMOP 10760.0: Food assistance to  
populations affected by conflict:

## An Operation Evaluation

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**Office of Evaluation**

*Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons*

Prepared by

John Cosgrave, Team Leader

Hugh Goyder, Livelihood Specialist

Annemarie Hoogendoorn, Nutritionist

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## **Evaluation Management**

Evaluation Manager:	Initially Maureen Forsythe, then Caroline Heider
Director, Office of Evaluation	Caroline Heider

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## Operation Fact Sheet: Sudan EMOP 10760

<b><u>Title of the Operation</u></b>	Food assistance to populations affected by conflict				
<b><u>Number of the Operation</u></b>	EMOP 10760				
<b><u>Approval Date</u></b>	September 2008. Budget Revisions in June 2009, again in June 2009, and November 2009.				
<b><u>Objectives</u></b>	The overarching goal of this operation is to save lives and reduce food insecurity, and to restore the livelihoods of conflict-affected and vulnerable populations in Sudan.				
<b><u>Operation specs</u></b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>End Date</b>	<b>Beneficiaries<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Metric tons</b>	<b>US\$ million</b>
Approved design	10 1.09	31 1.09	5,900,000	677,991	921.3
At the time of the evaluation	10 1.09	31 1.09	6,175,000	659,830	868.7
<b><u>Activities:</u></b>			<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Metric tons</b>	
Total GFD			4,650,500	525,729	
Demobilization			59,500	7,736	
Food for Work			172,500	17,110	
Food for Recovery			255,000	29,245	
Food for Education			1,000,500	46,642	
Food for Training			54,200	6,777	
Supplementary Feeding			551,000	13,371	
Therapeutic Feeding			6,100	196	
Institutional feeding			59,500	13,023	
<b><u>Main Partners</u></b> (in Darfur)					
Government	Ministry of Education (1.3% of all food distributed), Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture				
NGO <sup>2</sup>	Africa Humanitarian Action 8.3%, Care International - Sudan 9.2%, Catholic Relief Services (US) 7.4%, Danish Refugee Council 4.3%, Germany Agro Action 13.0%, Samaritans Purse 3.0%, Save The Children (US) 3.1%, Sudan Popular Committee For Relief & Rehabilitation 2.6%, Sudanese Red Crescent (23.9% of all food distributed). World Vision 8.4%,.				
Multilateral	WFP Distribution Team 12.3%, UNICEF				
<b><u>Main Donors</u></b>	Canada 3%, Carryover 14%, CERF, CFH and agencies 2%, European Commission 10%, Japan 2%, US 64%,				
<b><u>Other ongoing WFP Operations in Sudan</u></b>	CP 10105.0 US\$43.7 million, SO 10845.0 US\$27.3 million, SO 10342.2 US\$23.0 million, SO 10368.0 US\$265.4 million, SO 10181.5 US\$89.0 million				

<sup>1</sup> This number is not the sum of numbers for the different activities as the total number has been adjusted to avoid double counting of beneficiaries who benefit from different types of assistance.

<sup>2</sup> Care, Samaritans Purse, Save the Children and other WFP partners were expelled in March 2009.

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

This report summarises an evaluation of the World Food Programme's general food distribution (GFD) in Darfur in 2009 as part of emergency operation (EMOP) 10760. The team of three international evaluators carried out the fieldwork in March 2009. The evaluators used various methods including key-informant interviews, document research, beneficiary meetings, direct observation, and online surveys.

The outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 led to deaths, the destruction of productive assets, and large-scale displacement. This displacement led to the loss of livelihoods not only for displaced, but also to a lesser extent for the nomadic and settled communities who were economically linked with the displaced agricultural communities.

WFP has been aiding the whole conflict-affected population in Darfur since 2003, and the programme is now a mature one. Even now, seven years after the conflict started, there has been little return in Darfur as the causes of the displacement are still unresolved.

WFP's programme in Sudan was the largest WFP programme in terms of cost (but not in tonnage terms). The EMOP had the highest cost per ton of any major EMOP, due to the high costs of operating in Darfur. The programme targeted 6.2 million beneficiaries of which 3.8 million were GFD recipients in Darfur.

Darfur is a difficult context in which to work. Even in the best of times it is food insecure, with a history of famines, and chronic malnutrition in some areas. Security for international staff has steadily worsened since 2004. Aid agencies are the targets for criminals stealing cars or, since March 2009, kidnapping international staff for ransom. Added to these problems are difficult logistics, leading to high operating costs.

## Overview and strategy of the operation

The EMOP was the largest of six WFP operations in Sudan in 2009. The other five operations were the country programme and four special operations, three of which were relevant to Darfur, and one of these was wholly concentrated on Darfur.

WFP revised the EMOP three times during 2009. The first revision saw a reduced budget due to lower food and transport prices. The second revision was a minor administrative revision, and the third revision increased the caseload in the south.

The EMOP had a total budget of US\$868.7 million for the year. It included several food distribution methods, the most important of which was GFD. WFP planned to distribute 443.8 thousand mts in Darfur by GFD, 84 percent of all the GFD planned in the EMOP.

After the Government of Sudan expelled some of WFP's most important cooperating partners in March 2009, WFP developed special operation (SO) 10845 to augment the operational capacity of WFP and partners. This SO was intended to: cover the extra costs arising because of the expulsions; and to increase the number of locations where WFP staff could work while complying with the UN's security rules.

The overarching goal of the EMOP is to save lives, reduce food insecurity and restore livelihoods of conflict-affected and vulnerable populations in Sudan. This fits into WFP's strategic objective one: "*Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.*"

While protecting livelihoods was one of the EMOP objectives, the plan gave no indicator for this objective, as the EMOP predated the formal adoption in 2009 of a livelihood indicator by WFP. The follow-on EMOP or 2010 included an appropriate livelihood indicator.

The WFP operation is the largest humanitarian intervention in Darfur. Therefore, WFP is not gap-filling and complementing the work of others so much as providing a framework which other can complement. However, there are only a small number of complementary activities by others, and this problems was worsened by the March 2009 expulsions.

The objectives stated in the project document were fully coherent with WFP's policies and goals. WFPs approach is using an indicator compendium, and the project review process both help to ensure that project documents are compliant with policies.

When the Darfur operation began in 2003, all those in the affected population were in need of food-aid. Over time, the affected population developed alternative livelihoods. In many cases these livelihoods are inadequate to support families on their own, are maladapted in that they damage other livelihoods or are unsustainable, and are contingent on good security locally.

The pattern of alternative livelihoods means there are big variations in need across the affected population. However, the affected population strongly opposes any targeting at the household level. There appears to be several reasons for this. First, the community recognise the fragility of many of the current livelihoods. Second, providing aid to some and not to others would threaten social cohesion. Third, the community confuse the entitlement to food with the conflict-affected status.

Even with the low quality of many alternative livelihoods, these are better than the livelihoods that some of the poorest previously had in the rural areas. This, coupled with increasing years in the urban environment mean that even if there were peace a significant proportion (interviewees estimated from 15 percent to 50 percent) of the internally displaced persons (IDP) population would not return. Permanent returns to villages have been minimal, but there is a growing pattern of temporary returns for the agricultural season.

WFP has reacted to the difficulties of targeting different levels of need within the population categories by reducing the overall. The Darfur Food Security Monitoring System (DFSMS) set up by WFP in 2009 has provided excellent data on food security, and this shows that reducing the ration had no major negative impact on food security in the monitored sites.

## **Results**

### **Outreach**

WFP reached 96 percent of the number of beneficiaries specified in the EMOP and 99.5 percent of the number specified in the operational plans. This was a significant achievement given the difficulties of operating in Darfur.

Another remarkable achievement was that the loss of cooperating partners in March 2009 have very little impact on the numbers of beneficiaries reached or the tonnages distributed. WFP launched into direct distribution very effectively.

WFP distributed 83 percent of the planned GFD tonnage. However, as the EMOP was only 73 percent funded, this tonnage represents 107 percent of the funded tonnage. The tonnage distributed was 101percent of the tonnage in the operational plans.

WFP managed to reach almost all of the beneficiaries with only 83 percent of the planned tonnage because the rations were less than planned in the EMOP. From 1 January 2009, WFP reduced the rations to a 70 percent ration for IDPs. This reduction was not because of resourcing constraints but because food security data showed a positive picture following the “good” 2008 harvest (with as much as 25percent of the pre-conflict yield in south Darfur).

WFP reduced the ration due to resource constraints in November 2009. This reduction took the IDP ration to roughly 60 percent of the EMOP ration. These

rations were notional, and pipeline breaks in the supply of different commodities sometimes reduced them more.

Factors such as milling losses, milling costs, transport costs, and taxes to sheiks at some locations reduce the notional ration further. Thus the notional 70 percent ration provides less than half the food needs. The need for recipients to sell some food to pay for soap, education, or other goods and services reduced the notional value of the ration even further.

WFP varied the numbers of beneficiaries and the ration composition throughout the year in response to the season pattern of need (with rations for resident populations during the hunger gap) and vulnerability assessments.

While WFP had planned changes to the programme in 2009, including the greater use of non-GFD mechanisms to better target assistance, this was derailed by the need to respond to the expulsion of cooperating partners in March 2009. However WFP maintained, and in some cases increased, key non-GFD mechanisms including Food for education (FFE), Supplementary Feeding Programmes (SFP), and Blanket SFP (BSFP). A major achievement in 2009 was the introduction of the DFSMS.

### **Attaining objectives**

The indicators given in the EMOP for the "saving lives" were the Crude mortality rate (CMR) and the level of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) in the under 5s. However, the selected indicator levels have been largely met since late 2005, although there are some areas which have persistent problems with acute malnutrition. However acute malnutrition can be caused by other factors including poor hygiene in the home. WFP's assistance has not reduced the CMR or the GAM, but has helped to prevent them from rising in the face of sub-optimal alternative livelihoods.

The introduction of the DFSMS dramatically improved food security monitoring in 2009, effectively replacing what was previously an annual survey with a series of four surveys. While the EMOP included no livelihood indicators, the DFSMS shows that livelihoods generally provided adequate food security at most of the monitored sites in 2009. The DFSMS also showed that WFP assistance was an important source of food for the affected population.

Contribution of the operation to the national humanitarian/development changes. Without peace there can be no development. This is certainly the case in Darfur where the lack of an effective political settlement means that IDPs do not consider it safe to return. WFP assistance means that the affected population in general, and IDPs in particular have not been forced to engage in livelihood strategies that pose greater risks than those they currently use.

### **Factors explaining results**

WFP succeeded in attracting 78percent of the needed funds for the EMOP. The US was the biggest donor and the US also gave funds early. Given the time needed to mobilize resources, and to transport food into Darfur, WFP Sudan needs to have funds well in advance of the start of the year. The US provided over two thirds of its funding in the third quarter of 2008, and WFP had received 63 percent of the eventual funding for the EMOP by 1 January 2009.

In March 2009 the Government of Sudan expelled a number of cooperating partners. These cooperating partners accounted for nearly half of the total capacity of WFP's cooperating partners.

The failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement to bring peace is another factor that drives the continued need for assistance. Security for the aid community has worsened every year since 2004, and almost the whole of Darfur is subject to UN travel restrictions.

In addition to the constraints imposed by the security situation, the UN security rules impose further constraints. The kidnapping threat is focused on international staff only, but UN security rules make no distinction between national staff and international staff. The security threat to national staff depends on their origin and on what part of Darfur they are working in, but UN security rules take no account of these factors.

Some WFP assistance is traded by beneficiaries to fund school fees and other costs, or because local varieties are preferred. Those with multiple ration cards also sell their surplus. The impact of these sales has been to stabilise food prices in Darfur. Thus the EMOP indirectly supports the access of non-targeted groups, such as the urban poor, to food.

WFP is constrained by the limited number and capacity of cooperating partners in Darfur. The relatively small number of non-governmental organization (NGO) working in Darfur in comparison to the overall humanitarian needs means that WFP has relatively little choice in selecting partners. The difficulties of working in Darfur mean that cooperating partners have difficulty in attracting appropriately qualified staff.

Even before the expulsions WFP has begun work on an improved management information system – the Sudan SOs to make better use of monitoring data and to address, among other issues, problems with partner performance. Engaging in direct distribution made WFP even more aware of the capacity problems of partners, and WFP has instituted a special project to support developing the capacities of partners.

The WFP operation in Darfur was only able to cope with the expulsion of such a large part of the distribution capacity because it is a mature programme that has learned lessons over the years and incorporated them into the programme. The non-WFP key informants interviewed generally had a very high opinion of WFP, and were full of praise for how well WFP had dealt with the expulsions.

One of the reasons that the WFP programme in Darfur has learned lessons is because the programme has invested in research. One small example of this was the expert consultation in February 2009, where WFP staff held a three days meeting with four of the most knowledgeable academic experts on Darfur, and exchanged views on what it was reasonable to expect to be able to achieve in Darfur.

Direct distribution highlighted problems that should have been picked up by routine monitoring but were not. This has led to WFP investing more resources in monitoring, and is introducing a new Sudan operating system software to integrate all information to make monitoring easier and more effective.

WFP had planned to significantly expand non-GFD modalities in 2009, but was overtaken by the expulsions. The security situation was very tense prior to the expulsions, so there was no space for other modalities. Special assistance for the most vulnerable was expanded through BSFP, but this was constrained by capacity. However, non-GFD modalities generally need more management capacity than does GFD, and such modalities normally serve far fewer beneficiaries than GFD.

WFP has supported what few permanent returnees there have been, but these are very few in number.

Cooperating partners generally praised WFP as a good partners, but said that partnership goes out the window when WFP is negotiating the Field Level Agreements (FLAs) with partners. Partners complained that WFP negotiated very aggressively, and that the existing FLAs represented an unfair sharing of financial risks between WFP and its cooperating partners.

WFP engaged in direct distribution in those areas where it could not find a partner willing to manage the distribution at a reasonable cost. However, direct distribution



had a high opportunity cost for WFP, as staff engaged in direct distribution did not have the time to follow up on new projects that might have used other modalities.

WFP piloted milling vouchers in north Darfur. These are an excellent initiative as they are a far more cost effective way of meeting milling costs than having beneficiaries sell or barter part of their food to meet these costs.

There are two types of inclusion errors in the distribution lists in Darfur. The first are those who should not be on the lists as they are not *bona-fide* members of the affected population; the second are those who have strong alternative livelihoods and do not need WFP assistance. WFP is planning further research in 2010 that will investigate the links between livelihoods and household food security.

The current distribution lists have remained largely unchanged since late 2005. With a few exceptions, the distribution lists do not include: children born since late 2005; new arrivals since late 2005. The lists are thought to contain a good number of persons who are either double registered, or are not entitled to food assistance.

However, sheiks are strongly opposed to re-registration. WFP has conducted one re-registration exercise at a small camp in west Darfur but only did so after leaving the camp without food for three months. This was wholly appropriate as the bloated ration rolls are an obstacle to proper targeting.

Sudan is expensive, and Darfur especially so. Local transport, storage, and handling (LTSH) costs are high in Darfur, as are direct support costs ([DSC] - largely the costs of maintaining a WFP presence). DSC costs are high because of the costs of meeting the UN security rules. However, despite the cost, there is good evidence from the DFSMS that without WFP assistance there would have been a food crisis in Darfur.

## **Overall assessment and recommendations**

### **Overall assessment**

#### **Relevance and appropriateness**

WFP's programme in Darfur was relevant to the affected population and largely appropriate for their needs. GFD continued to be appropriate in the context of 2009. Although affected communities have developed a range of new livelihoods, many of these are fragile or maladapted and are, in most but not all cases, far inferior to the communities' pre-conflict livelihoods.

Although it would have been ideal to have moved more to self-targeting modalities like Food for work (FFW), and targeted food within communities the context, this was not a realistic option in 2009. WFP was constrained by the capacity of cooperating partners and by community opposition to targeting. The limits on partner capacity existed prior to the expulsion of cooperating partners representing about half of the distribution capacity in March 2009, but were much more severe after these expulsions.

The biggest issue facing the programme is the growing disconnect between needs and assistance. This is driven by the growing obsolescence of the five-year old distribution lists and the development of alternative livelihoods within the affected community. These alternatives are often sub-optimal and incomplete, and are not an adequate replacement for the former livelihoods.

However, matching assistance is very difficult. The leadership of the affected community is strongly opposed to any rationalisation of the distribution lists, and the affected community is similarly opposed to any targeting within communities. The distribution lists are the responsibility of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) rather than WFP directly.

WFP has successfully addressed these problems in the short-term by adjusting rations to reflect overall need. In 2009 WFP implemented the DFSMS. This provides WFP with good information on the food security situation at the monitored sites, and demonstrated that reduced rations had no major negative consequences in nutritional or food security terms in 2009.

In most emergencies, displaced communities establish alternative livelihoods, and WFP can reduce and eventually stop assistance. However, the alternative livelihoods established by the affected community in Darfur are fragile and are often predicated on improved security. The failure to reach an effective political settlement in Darfur means that the need for WFP assistance for the broader community is likely to continue.

### **Efficiency**

The reliance on GFD is historical as there was no other option at the start of the operation in 2003/2004. GFD offers a lower overall implementing cost per mt, and requires less skill from cooperating partners than do other modalities. However the disadvantage of GFD is that it is untargeted. WFP continued with GFD in Darfur in 2009, although it had planned to switch more food to targeted modalities.

The March 2009 expulsions meant the WFP had to concentrate on getting food to the affected population rather than fine-tuning the delivery modality. In any case, the food deficit in Darfur is still so large that it would be impossible to meet this through other modalities with the current cooperating partner's capacity. However it is still possible to gradually introduce other modalities. WFP will only be able to completely move from GFD to other modalities when the overall food deficit declines.

WFP's operation in Darfur is one of the most expensive WFP operations in the world. This is driven both by the logistics difficulty posed by Darfur and by the high costs implicit in meeting the UN's minimum operational security standards (MOSS). WFP began a concerted campaign in late 2009 to drive down the overall cost per ton. Again earlier action was constrained by the expulsion of cooperating partners.

WFP introduced milling vouchers in 2009. Milling vouchers represent a more efficient way of having families meet their milling costs than by selling part of their food ration.

WFP has also successfully put contractors and cooperating partner under very strong pressure to reduce their costs. Partners have not always been transparent about their true costs, but direct implementation by WFP has given WFP a very accurate picture of such costs. However, such hard negotiation with cooperating partners raises questions about the meaning of partnership.

### **Effectiveness**

WFP reached the affected population in Darfur very effectively. WFP delivered 107percent of the funded tonnage to 95 percent of the number of beneficiaries planned in the EMOP. WFP responded very well to the challenged posed by the sudden loss of distribution capacity with the expulsion of cooperating partners. While WFP dealt very well with this shock, engaging in direct distribution meant that there was little time for promoting other modalities or rationalising the ration rolls.

The humanitarian crisis in Darfur, as measured by the conventional indicators of large-scale excess mortality or malnutrition, has been over since late 2005. However if it were not for WFP assistance the continuing large food deficit in Darfur would lead to a return of a humanitarian crisis.

## **Sustainability and connectedness**

Darfur is a political crisis rather than a humanitarian one, but only because of the continuing efforts of WFP and other humanitarian agencies. Agriculture, the economic powerhouse for Darfur, is still operating at only a fraction of its pre-conflict level, and will continue to do so until the displaced population feels that it is safe for them to resume their former livelihoods. Until that time, there will be a need for some continuing assistance in Darfur.

Darfur is a very complex environment. WFP has demonstrated a constant effort to deepen its understanding of the complex dynamics in Darfur and has benefited from the insight of some of the most knowledgeable academic experts on Darfur to develop its programme.

### **Overall assessment**

Overall the team concluded that WFP has done a good job in Darfur in the face of very difficult circumstances.

### **Recommendations**

The team has made eight recommendations based on the findings of the evaluation:

**Recommendation 1:** WFP Sudan should continue with GFD in Darfur for 2010.

**Recommendation 2:** In the face of the inability to effectively target GFD within communities, WFP Sudan should continue to reduce the GFD ration level so that all food modalities combined match the overall community need for external food assistance.

**Recommendation 3:** WFP Sudan should extend the Darfur food security monitoring system to provide manager with good information on the impact of ration changes on different locations.

**Recommendation 4:** WFP Sudan should move away from a single ration for all beneficiaries of a single category to a menu of rations that are allocated to a category in a single location based on food security information.

**Recommendation 5:** WFP Sudan should consider introducing a targeted ration especially for vulnerable cases.

**Recommendation 6:** WFP Sudan should continue working with IOM to rationalise the distribution lists, and should suspend distributions at sites where the community refuses to accept re-registration.

**Recommendation 7:** WFP Sudan should try to avoid direct distribution if at all possible. This may involve developing cooperating partner capacity for sites where no acceptable distribution partner has yet been found.

**Recommendation 8:** WFP globally needs to look at a mechanism for negotiating costs with partners that better reflect partnership.

# Map



Map No. 3707 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS  
April 2007

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

# 1. Introduction

## 1.A. Evaluation objectives and design

### 1.A.1 Rationale

1. An evaluation of the Sudan emergency operation (EMOP) was included in both the EMOP project document and in the OE work plan for 2008-2009.

2. An evaluation of the Sudan EMOP is particularly appropriate because Sudan is WFP's largest programme country<sup>3</sup> in terms of cost. Although Ethiopia overtook Sudan in terms of tonnage needs in 2009, the higher costs of operating in Sudan mean that it remained the largest WFP programme in the world and is expected to remain so in 2010. The Sudan EMOP was also the largest in the world in 2009<sup>4</sup>.

**Table 1: WFP's two largest programmes by country compared<sup>5</sup>.**

Country	2008		2009		2010	
	mt	US\$ million	mt	US\$ million	mt	US\$ million
Sudan	657,289	750	690,506	1,059	668,381	983
As % of global	15	23	12	17	13	18
Ethiopia	410,307	238	989,307	789	946,948	803
As % of global	9	7	17	13	18	15
Global	4,342,743	3,301	5,965,471	6,233	5,131,084	5,361

### 1.A.2 Objective

3. The objective of the evaluation was both accountability and learning. Accountability in this case refers to determining the extent to which the stated project objective has been achieved. Learning refers to the identification of lessons that can assist with the planning of further operations in Sudan and elsewhere.

### 1.A.3 Scope

4. The size and range of the Sudan Programme means that the scope of the evaluation had to be limited so that the evaluation team could examine part of the programme in-depth. The overall scope was therefore limited:

- Programmatically, to just the EMOP in Sudan. The EMOP accounted for the bulk of programmed WFP food tonnage in Sudan (98 percent). However, this does exclude the SOs that account for 12 percent of the programmed cost and are essential for the implementation of the EMOP. The team have only examined those parts of the SOs with a direct impact on the EMOP;
- Temporally, to calendar year 2009. This makes sense as the EMOP is for a single calendar year;
- Geographically, to Darfur. Darfur accounted for 76 percent of the planned tonnage in the EMOP (with 15 percent for the south and 9 percent for the

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<sup>3</sup> WFP programmes consist of a number of elements: CP which are often development programmes, EMOPs, PRROs, and SOs.

<sup>4</sup> Somalia was second, and Pakistan was third in terms of food volumes. The large Ethiopia operation was a PRRO. Source: [http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected\\_needs/documents/2009/Table\\_1.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected_needs/documents/2009/Table_1.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Sources: [http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected\\_needs/documents/2008/Table\\_1.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected_needs/documents/2008/Table_1.pdf)

[http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected\\_needs/documents/2009/Table\\_1.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected_needs/documents/2009/Table_1.pdf)

[http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected\\_needs/documents/2010/Table\\_1.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected_needs/documents/2010/Table_1.pdf)

Centre, east and the Three Areas<sup>6</sup>). Focusing on Darfur also avoided duplicating the concurrent multi-donor evaluation of support for south Sudan;

- Modally, to the GFD modality and to other mechanisms used to improve targeting and cope with the lack of partners. It should be noted that this was a broadening of the scope of the evaluation as given in the Terms of reference, which refer solely to the GFD programme;
- The Scope was been broadened at the request of the Sudan programme with the agreement of the Office of Evaluation. The justification for this broadening of scope was WFP Sudan's estimate that modalities other than GFD represented about one fifth of the total tonnage in Darfur, rather than the 7 percent that was planned in the EMOP.

#### **1.A.4 Intended Users**

5. The main intended users for the evaluation are the staff of WFP and partners for learning elements, and the WFP Executive Board and Donors for the accountability elements. Other stakeholders may also make use of the evaluation.

#### **1.A.5 Evaluation stakeholders**

6. A detailed stakeholder analysis, based in part on the desk study and on the fieldwork, is presented in Table 16.

7. Stakeholders can be divided into five groups:

- Those, such as WFP staff who are involved in managing the programme;
- Those, such as beneficiaries, contractors, and cooperating partners, who would be directly affected by any changes in WFP programming brought about by the evaluation;
- Those such as traders, United Nations (UN) agencies, and NGOs with whom WFP does not have direct operational or contractual relationship but who are affected by WFP's operations;
- Those, such as local authorities, who are indirectly affected by WFPs operations;
- Those such as the Executive Board, other WFP programmes, academics, and other who may be informed by the outcome of the evaluation.

#### **1.A.6 Methodology**

8. The team used a multi-method approach with the following methods:

- An online survey of both WFP staff and for WFP Cooperating partners. Relatively few responses (four only) were received from WFP cooperating partners, but a total of 31 WFP staff completed the survey;
- A document review of relevant material on Darfur. The WFP Darfur operation is in its seventh year, and is quite a mature operation. This, together with WFP's policy of sponsoring high quality academic research, had generated a pool of good source documents;
- Analysis of the food distribution data, of food security data, and of nutrition data. This allowed the team to draw quite general conclusions about the

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<sup>6</sup> The Three Areas are the three parts of Sudan that are claimed both by the north and the south. They are *Abyei*, Blue Nile, and southern *Kordofan*.

impact of the expulsions of cooperating partners on overall performance, and the impact of reduced ration sizes on food security and nutrition;

- Key informant interviews. These were a key source of information on the programme. The team used an interview guide developed from the Terms of reference (ToR) and the initial meeting in Rome. This was fine tuned after the initial interviews in the field. The team interview 226 persons in individual interviews and small groups. Some informants were interviewed more than once. The summary of interviews is presented in Table 2 and a detailed list of persons met is presented in Appendix 3. The other category includes traders, and the staff of other UN agencies;
- A further 398 beneficiaries were interviewed in group interviews;
- The team also used direct observations of operations in Darfur, paying particular attention to the operational constraints imposed by the need to operate with escorts, and with the realities of distribution in Darfur.

**Table 2: Details of key informant interviews.**

<b>Details of key-informant interviews</b>				
<b>Summary of Interviews by category of person</b>				
<b>Category of person interviewed</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>as %</b>	<b>of which</b>	<b>as %</b>
WFP Rome staff	3	1	0	
WFP Sudan Staff	64	28	19	30
Cooperating Partner staff	63	28	6	10
Government Officials	6	3	0	
Donors	7	3	3	43
Beneficiaries	23	10	10	43
Other	60	27	17	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Summary of Interview Methods</b>				
<b>Type of interview method</b>		<b>as %</b>	<b>of which ♀</b>	<b>as %</b>
General meeting	39	17	6	15
Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee)	32	14	11	34
Semi-structured Interview (Group-two or more interviewees)	110	49	24	22
Brief Discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)	26	12	6	23
Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)	19	8	8	42
<b>Total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>24</b>

9. The team made particular use of triangulation, comparing data from different sources, different types of interviewees, different camps, different states, and collected by different methods.

10. A key tool for the team was the evidence tool used by the team to record the evidence they found on different topics of interest. Each piece of evidence recorded the source and the team member entering the evidence. Typically each piece of evidence was a short paragraph (average length of 27 words). The evidence tool was chiefly used to record evidence from the analysis of interview notes and observations rather than from documents. Many pieces of evidence represented the consensus view at particular interviews or meetings rather than just individual opinions. The evidence tool is not included in the annexes as to do so would breach the confidentiality under which interviews were conducted as the tool clearly identifies the source for each statement, and it is the sources that lend weight to the statements.

**Table 3: Number of pieces of evidence for each topic.**

<b>Topic</b>	<b><i>No of different pieces of evidence gathered on this topic</i></b>
Coverage of needs in Darfur, Inclusion/exclusion etc	49
Transition to development, return etc	46
Partnership	36
Responding to the expulsions	28
Security constraints	27
Matching needs	26
Coherence with other actors (including other food actors)	24
Enough food for both life saving and livelihood protection (or does it do these things at all?)	23
Management	17
Synergy between GFD and other channels	16
Achievements of the operation	13
Distribution modality	10
Evidence of learning in programme design	10
Main effect: Nutrition, transfer, or protection	10
Market impact	10
Sustainability of EMOP	10
Bureaucratic constraints	8
Overall impact	8
Perception of WFP	8
Synergy from working with others	7
Capacity building	6
Internal coherence and WFP policies	6
Strategic direction	5
WFP support for Darfur operation	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>408</b>

11. The team faced a number of constraints in Darfur including:

- The sheer scale of the operation in Darfur. Darfur is the size of France and travel is very difficult. It was only possible for the team to visit a limited sample of sites;
- Sampling of sites to visit within each state (north, south, and west Darfur) was dictated more by practical concerns of access, flight schedules, and security, than by any random selection process;
- The need to attend a two-day security training (in addition to the two electronic security-training courses undertaken prior to the field work) reduced the time available for fieldwork by 10 percent<sup>7</sup>;
- Ongoing fighting in Darfur between the Government and armed opposition groups, and between different armed opposition groups meant that it was not possible to visit some of the sites it have been planned to visit;
- The onset of the pre-rains dust storms meant that flights were grounded for a few days in the middle of the fieldwork. This lead to cancelled visits, changed itineraries, and the use of time-consuming road transport, for all of the consultants;

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<sup>7</sup> This was a new requirement since the initial preparatory mission to Darfur by the Office for Evaluation.



- The limits to the scope of the evaluation, while essential to ensure that the evaluation could be conducted in any depth, mean that there was very limited attention to such key modalities for food for education. Similarly, the team focus on the special operations was also very limited;
- Beneficiary attitudes to assistance proved to be a major constraint. Beneficiaries consistently overstated the importance of food assistance, and understated the prevalence and importance of other livelihoods for the affected population;
- The nature of the programme. It is simply very difficult to determine, with certainty, if lives have been saved by the provision of food aid, especially in a context like Darfur where food-aid is only one part of the overall food security resource of the affected population. The indicators selected in the EMOP such as CMR and the under 5 acute malnutrition rate can be difficult to establish, especially when the population size (the denominator for calculating rates) is uncertain. The EMOP, in line with the WFP policy guidance at the time the EMOP was developed, included no indicators for the livelihood objective<sup>8</sup> of the EMOP.

### **1.B. Country context**

12. The largest country in Africa, Sudan has enormous diversity, from the deserts of the north through swamps and mountains to the rainforest of the south. One of the first British African colonies to gain independence (in 1956) Sudan has been wracked by conflict almost from the early 60s. The main axis of conflict was between the mainly Muslim north and the mainly Animist and Christian south. Civil war ranged between north and south from 1962 to 1972, and then again from 1983 to 2002.

13. Shortly after the 2002 ceasefire between north and south, conflict flared up in Darfur. The facts of what happened in Darfur are highly contested between the Government and western countries. Even the number of IDPs is contested. The 2010 Work Plan for Sudan (United Nations and Partners, 2009 pp 122,134, 136) gives the total of IDPs in Darfur as 2.7 million. The violence in Darfur led not only to large-scale death (directly and indirectly), the destruction of productive assets, the displacement of millions of people away from their homes and livelihoods, and economic dislocation for those who were not displaced.

14. The Darfur conflict is now in its seventh year, and Young notes that the conflict "has drawn in a complex web of local, national, and transnational interests, which play out in different types of inter-connected conflict throughout the region" (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. vi). The Darfur Peace Agreement in early 2006 has increased conflict rather than reducing it as the rebel groupings fragmented after some elements signed the agreement.

15. The presence of the large hybrid African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur United Nations/African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has not delivered

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<sup>8</sup> WFP policy guidance changed with the adoption of a new Strategic Results Framework in February 2009 (<http://one.wfp.org/eb/docs/2009/wfp194066-1.pdf>.) that include indicators such as the Household Food Consumption which can serve as a proxy for livelihood status. Indicators such as malnutrition rates and mortality rates can be affected by many other factors other than livelihoods and food security (including water and sanitation access and quality, disease patterns, hygiene practices and many other factors)

security for the affected population or freedom of movement for humanitarian workers despite the high cost<sup>9</sup>.

16. Even without the conflict, Darfur was subject to frequent bouts of food insecurity and had seen famine on several occasions (*de Waal*, 1989). WFP had a project in north Darfur, addressing chronic food insecurity there, even prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

17. Although Sudan has a Gross National Income per capita equal to the average for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008, p. 1), it is ranked lower than others in human development terms. Sudan is ranked 150th out of 182 countries ranked in the 2009 human development report, 13 places lower than its ranking on gross domestic product would suggest (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2009, p. 173).

18. Sudan is still a significant food deficit country, and the Global Hunger Index (GHI) Report shows that Sudan is in serious GHI category and is highly vulnerable to the global downturn (*Grebmer et al.*, 2009, p. 18). However the same report shows that Sudan had reduced its GHI from 26.3 in 1990 to 19.6 in 2009 (p 13)<sup>10</sup>.

19. Sudan is a very expensive country for WFP to operate in. The average cost per mt of food for EMOPs (excluding Sudan, but including other high-cost locations like Somalia) in 2009 was estimated to be just over 1,000 US\$ per mt. The planning figure for Sudan was 1,351 US\$ per mt, 35 percent higher than the average cost per mt for other EMOPs<sup>11</sup>. This calculation excludes the SOs which are essential to facilitate the EMOP. In 2009, SOs in Sudan were almost half of the total of all WFP SOs in that year.

20. The 2007 WFP evaluation noted that partner performance was a problem and that "*the performance of some partners was not good enough*" (*Cosgrave et al.*, 2006, p. 14) even though they were good cooperating partners in other contexts. The same report noted that SFP were limited to areas where WFP could find willing and capable partners, rather than being implemented in all areas of need.

21. The problem of competent cooperating partners was compounded in March 2009 when, following the issuing of an international arrest warrant for the Sudanese President, Sudan expelled 12 NGOs and one United States Agency for International Development (USAID) aid contractor (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], 2009). There was immediate concern as the expelled agencies were said to represent more than half the operational capacity in Darfur (United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF] *et al.*, 2009). Four of the expelled agencies were major WFP partners (ACF, CARE, Save the Children-US, and *Solidarités*) channelling WFP assistance to over one million people between them (*Pantuliano et al.*, 2009, p. 4).

22. Apart from partner capacity, targeting has been a recurrent problem in Darfur. The 2007 Food Security and Nutrition Assessment estimated that 11 percent of food aid recipients may have represented inclusion errors (Government of Sudan *et al.*, 2008, p. 114). Estimates provided to the team by key informants were typically higher than this, possibly because, while almost no-one has been added to the relief rolls since 2007, neither has anyone who died or moved away been removed.

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<sup>9</sup> The UNAMID budget for July 2009 to June 2010 is \$1.6 billion, is more than two and half times the cost of the WFP operation in Darfur (assuming that the actual EMOP cost for Darfur was approx \$500 million and that the Darfur component of the SO was approximately \$100 million.)

<sup>10</sup> However, the report also indicated that the underlying data for the GHI calculation may not be reliable.

<sup>11</sup> Sources: by calculation from:

[http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected\\_needs/documents/2009/Overview.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected_needs/documents/2009/Overview.pdf) and

[http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected\\_needs/documents/2009/Table\\_1.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/appeals/projected_needs/documents/2009/Table_1.pdf).

23. The 2009 targeting study highlighted the difficulties of targeting in Darfur, noting that: "the accepted basis of entitlement of food assistance in Darfur is based on group status (IDP, host/resident, rural), not need (food insecurity)" ... *As long as food aid entitlements are so closely linked with wider and more highly politicized claims, there remains very limited potential for community-based targeting in this complex setting*" (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. viii).

## 2. Overview and strategy of the operation

### 2.A. Overview of the operation

#### 2.A.1 Objectives

24. The overarching goal of this operation was to save lives and reduce food insecurity, and to restore the livelihoods of conflict-affected and vulnerable populations in Sudan.

#### 2.A.2 Programme activities

25. WFP in Sudan had six operations in Sudan in 2009, of which the EMOP was by far the largest (Table 4).

**Table 4: WFP's Operations in Sudan in 2009.**

Operation ID and description		Budget US\$ million	Relevance to Darfur
10105	CP: country programme 2002-2008.	43.7	Very low relevance currently. (WFP CPs generally concentrate on development interventions).
10760	EMOP: Food assistance to populations affected by conflict.	868.7	72% of planned tonnage was for Darfur <sup>12</sup> .
10845	SO: Operational augmentation for WFP and NGO partners in Darfur in support of EMOP 10760.	27.3	Very high. However the SO is less than 30% funded. (see the discussion below on this SO).
10342.2	SO: UNJLC-United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, Common Logistics Services, Logistics Planning and Facilitation, and Support to Non-Food Items and Emergency Shelter Sector.	23.0	Assistance divided mainly between south Sudan and Darfur. (Darfur was an add-on to the project which was originally designed for south Sudan).
10368	SO: Emergency road repair and mine clearance of key transport routes in Sudan in support of EMOP 10048.2.	265.4	This is for south Sudan. The SO has been running since 2004 and is 96% funded.
10181.5	SO: Provision of humanitarian air services in Sudan.	89.0	This covers both Darfur and south Sudan.

26. The EMOP included a range of activities including GFD, a pilot voucher scheme for the demobilized, FFW, FFR, FFE, FFT, Supplementary Feeding (both targeted and blanket), Therapeutic Feeding, and Institutions Feeding. This evaluation concentrates on the GFD component in Darfur.

27. The most relevant SOs for Darfur are SO 10845, SO 10181.5, and SO 10342.2 (Table 4).

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<sup>12</sup> Tonnages and budget are not equivalent. The 73 percent of the tonnage for Darfur probably cost more than three quarters of the budget. Getting food to Darfur is more expensive than getting food to south Sudan, where river barges can be used to shift large amounts at low cost.

**Table 5: Planned programme activities by tonnage under EMOP 10760.**

EMOP 10760 tonnages by area and activity in thousands of mts	Tonnage as per the project document			Tonnage after the first revision			Tonnages after the third revision		
	Darfur	other areas	Total	Darfur	other areas	Total	Darfur	other areas	Total
GFD for Conflict IDPs	480.6	28.7	509.3						
GFD for Refugees	3.2	10.2	13.4						
GFD for Returnees		21.2	21.2						
<b>Total GFD</b>	<b>483.8</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>543.9</b>	<b>443.8</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>503.9</b>	<b>443.8</b>	<b>81.9</b>	<b>525.7</b>
GFD as % of all areas	89	11		88	12		84	16	
Demobilization		7.7	7.7		7.7	7.7		7.7	7.7
FFW	7.8	9.4	17.1	7.8	9.4	17.1	7.8	9.4	17.1
FFR	1.1	28.2	29.2	1.1	28.2	29.2	1.1	28.2	29.2
FFE	13.7	32.9	46.6	13.7	32.9	46.6	13.7	32.9	46.6
FFT		6.8	6.8		6.8	6.8		6.8	6.8
Supplementary Feeding	10.4	3.0	13.4	10.4	3.0	13.4	10.4	3.0	13.4
Therapeutic Feeding		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2
Institutional Feeding		13.0	13.0		13.0	13.0		13.0	13.0
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>516.7</b>	<b>161.3</b>	<b>678.0</b>	<b>476.7</b>	<b>161.3</b>	<b>638.0</b>	<b>476.7</b>	<b>183.1</b>	<b>659.8</b>
All food as % of all areas	76	24		75	25		72	28	

### 2.A.3 Approval date and planned duration

28. The EMOP was approved in September 2008 for 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2009.

### 2.A.4 Total resource requirement at design

29. The original EMOP document gave the needed level of resources as 921.4 million US\$. This was reduced in the first budget revision in June 2009 (Table 6).

### 2.A.5 Approved changes

**Table 6: Total budget for EMOP 10760.0**

Description	Effective Date	Total budget (Millions of US\$)
Original project	Sep-08	921.4
Budget revision 1	Jun-09	829.4
Budget revision 2	Jun-09	832.1
Budget revision 3	Nov-09	868.7
Total mobilized	18 Jan-10	675.0

The project budget was revised three times.

30. The first revision in April 2009: an overall 10 percent reduction in budget with:

- Reduced tonnages due to security constraints and reduced need for rations for IDPs and missed communities following a good harvest and growing livelihoods. The reduction was based on both learning from the 2008 Darfur food security and livelihood assessment as well as the first round of the DFSMS:

- Reduced commodity prices and external transport rates;
- Increases ascribed to increased direct support costs, due to security and office costs.

31. Second revision in June 2009: an overall increase of 0.3 percent - appears to have been a minor administrative adjustment. The evaluation team holds no documentation on this revision as it was not available on the WFP website<sup>13</sup>. The size of the revision has been calculated by comparing the first and third revision. There were no tonnages changes in this revision.

32. Third revision in November 2009: This was not for Darfur, but to cover increased needs in the south, and a pilot voucher scheme in *Kordofan*.

33. In addition to the budget revision, the project also specifically benefited from SO 10845.0 *Operational augmentation for WFP and NGO partners in Darfur in support of EMOP 10760.0*.<sup>14</sup> This SO runs for 18 months from May 2009 to November 2010 to "cater for the equipment, staff, systems and facilities necessary to re-establish a stable, strong and safe field presence in Darfur for WFP and its NGO partners" in the wake of the expulsion of NGO partners.

34. The context of the SO was that WFP was being forced to do direct distribution in areas which were far from their current offices and WFP therefore needed to establish new offices which were compliant with the UN's MOSS. The SO also covered the augmentation of WFP's operational capacity (and that of partners). A final unused element of the SO was for an operational contingency in the event that other WFP partners were expelled<sup>15</sup>.

35. The original plan was to build six humanitarian hubs (which would serve as MOSS Compliant bases for WFP, other UN agencies, and NGOs) at *Muhajeriya* in south Darfur, *Um Dukhun* and west *Jebel Marra* in west Darfur, and *Shangil Tobay*, *Um Baro* and *Malha* in north Darfur. In addition to these hubs, WFP planned to support the set-up of NGO offices in *Mornie*, *Zalingei*, *Mukjar*, *Habila* and *Kass*.

36. This SO had attracted US\$9.8 million of funding by November 2009<sup>16</sup>. However, of this, US\$4 million was returned to the US in early 2010 (due to the inability to develop all the planned operational hubs after a worsening of the security situation in late 2009) and a further US\$2.2 million was pledged by Sweden. This meant that the total funding for the special operation was US\$8 million as of 22 April 2010<sup>17</sup>.

37. WFP reacted to this lack of funding by incorporating the planned hubs into EMOP 200027 (the Sudan EMOP that followed on from EMOP 10760). However the number of planned hubs was scaled back to two in the first budget revision of EMOP 20027<sup>18</sup>.

## **2.B. Strategy of the operation**

### **2.B.1 Analysis of the project log frame**

38. The overarching goal of the EMOP is to save lives, reduce food insecurity and restore livelihoods of conflict-affected and vulnerable populations in Sudan. Of the three immediate objectives of the project, only one is relevant to the central focus of

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<sup>13</sup> The CO holds a full set of documentation on this.

<sup>14</sup> [http://one.wfp.org/operations/current\\_operations/BR/108450\\_0906.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/BR/108450_0906.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> At the time of the expulsion there was considerable speculation in the humanitarian community that the March expulsions were only the first wave of a new Government policy towards NGOs.

<sup>16</sup> WFP Sudan update on SO 10845 dated November 2009.

<sup>17</sup> [http://one.wfp.org/operations/current\\_operations/ResUpdates/108450.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/ResUpdates/108450.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> [http://one.wfp.org/operations/current\\_operations/BR/200027\\_1003.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/BR/200027_1003.pdf)

the evaluation This objective is "To reduce acute malnutrition and protect livelihood amongst IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups". This fits into WFP's strategic objective one: "Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies."

39. The overall objective was appropriate in the Darfur context given the inability of the affected population to meet their own food needs due either to displacement, or to economic *dislocation* caused by the displacement of the crop-producing population.

40. Although protecting livelihoods is given as part of the sub-goal, it is not referred to in the outcomes, nor is any indicator given. At the time of the development of the EMOP document (mid 2008), WFP did not have an appropriate indicator for livelihoods. However, the indicator compendium for 2006-2007 includes the proportion of beneficiary household expenditures devoted to food as a pilot indicator (WFP, 2005, pp. 9, 26) and the 2008 informal consultation paper on the strategic framework includes Household Food Consumption Score (HFCS) as a livelihood indicator (WFP, 2008b, p. 5).

41. However, it was only with the adoption of the new strategic results framework in February 2009 (WFP, 2009c, p. 8) that this became a formal WFP indicator. This indicator was used for the follow-on EMOP 200027.

42. The problem with the use of GAM as an indicator for saving lives with food aid is that, like the <sup>19</sup> CMR, it has multiple causes, not just the availability of food aid. Hence there is a flaw in the project logic model. The evaluation logic model is further limited by the evaluation scope (Figure 1) GAM is more useful as an entry indicator for supplementary feeding than as an output indicator.

43. A CMR of 1/10,000 per day higher is generally taken to be indicative of a humanitarian emergency<sup>20</sup>. However, this standard was originally developed by UNHCR as an indicator that a refugee situation was getting out of control, not that conditions were acceptable. The normal baseline rate in developing countries is less than half this figure. The Sphere handbook (Sphere Project, 2004, p. 260) quotes a base-line rate for sub-Saharan Africa of 0.44/10,000/day. The handbook also suggests (p. 259) that a doubling of the baseline CMR indicates a significant public health emergency.

44. The use of a CMR for 1/10,000/day is questionable for a long-running crisis like Darfur. A CMR above the baseline rate means that excess deaths are occurring in a population. For the population of approximately 6 million being assisted by WFP, a background CMR of 1/10,000/day would be about 120,000 excess deaths a year above the baseline level. This is an issue for WFP at a corporate level, and not for WFP in Sudan as the 1/10,000 per day indicator is part of the standard corporate indicators.

45. The logical framework for the follow-on EMOP in 2010 (EMOP 200027)<sup>21</sup> drops CMR as an indicator, but maintains the GAM indicator, as well as adding the HFCS indicator. HFCS is now included in WFP's Strategic Framework (WFP, 2009c).

46. The team consider that the coping strategies indicator (Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008) and the HFCS (Wiesmann *et al.*, 2009) both of which are used by the Darfur Food Security Monitoring System, are better indicators or the overall outcome of

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<sup>19</sup> "Crude" here refers to the fact that the mortality rate is not adjusted to account for the difference between the demographic profile in the sample to the demographic profile of the national population.


<sup>20</sup> Much higher CMRs were seen at the start of the crisis in Darfur. In Kass, the CMR in August/September 2004 was 3.2/10,000 per day (5.9/10,000/day for the under 5s. (Grandesso *et al.*, 2005)

<sup>21</sup> [http://one.wfp.org/operations/current\\_operations/project\\_docs/200027.pdf](http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/project_docs/200027.pdf)

WFP's intervention than indicators such as GAM and CMR, especially in a long-running crisis like Darfur. While both GAM and CMR are very useful as alarm signals when something goes wrong, coping strategies indicator and HFCS are better indicators for managing the programme and for preventing the creating of situations where GAM and CMR generate alarm signals.

47. Only two risks are identified in the logical framework, renewed conflict and the closing of roads (presumably due to banditry or conflict). The incidents that affected the programme, the expulsion of NGOs, were not included. Neither was the general issue of administrative constraints (such as slow or limited numbers of visas and clearances for WFP and its cooperating partners) included. However, it could be very impolitic to include such risks in the logical framework.

48. The team developed a general logic model for the intervention (Figure 1). The versions presented here are slightly modified from that presented in the pre-mission report. The change is in the inclusion of livelihood interventions by the affected population themselves as a factor outside the evaluation which is likely to have impacted on the achievement of WFP's Strategic Objective One. This change reflects the fact that compared to 2006, when the team leader conducted fieldwork for the evaluation of WFP's operation in Darfur, the conflict affected population had developed a wider range of livelihoods and were less dependent on the aid of the international community.



**Figure 1: Logic model for the evaluation**

49. The issue of other livelihoods is one of the key issues in the Darfur operation and this will be discussed further below in this chapter and also under the results section.

### **2.B.2 Filling gaps and complementing other work**

50. WFP in Darfur is not so much gap-filling and complementing the work of others as providing a framework which others can complement. However, the big issue for WFP is the lack of complementary services. WFP in Darfur has always faced a limited choice of cooperating partners, and the lack of skilled partners has restricted the extent of activities like supplementary feeding.

51. The limited range of complementary initiatives has been compounded by the March 2009 expulsions of cooperating partners, and by the withdrawal of NGOs from, or the curtailing of their programmes at, some sites in response to a worsening security situation for NGO staff. Several interviewees bemoaned the loss of key agencies in such sectors as health, nutrition, and water supply and sanitation.

### **2.B.3 Relevant to WFP policies and goals**

52. WFP published an annual policy compendium. The prevailing policy compendium for EMOP 10760 was the October 2008 policy compendium (WFP, 2008a); while this compendium was adopted by the Executive Board after the project was designed. However the dates of adoption of policies are normally prior to their inclusion in the compendium. However, the date of adoption of the policies is of little import for the current evaluation as the main differences between the October 2008 policy compendium and the preceding one (WFP, 2007) were the policies on private-sector partnership and on fundraising strategy.

53. WFP adopted new policies during the life of the EMOP, including policies on vouchers and cash transfers as food assistance instruments, evaluation policy, gender policy, policy on disaster risk reduction, the strategic results framework, and WFP's strategy for managing and developing human resources. These were included in the November 2009 policy compendium (WFP, 2009a).

54. The objectives stated in the project document are fully coherent with then WFP's policies and goals. The same applied to the indicators given in the project plan. Given current practice in WFP, with the use of a pre-approved compendium of indicators linked to WFP's strategic objectives, it would be difficult to have project objectives that were not coherent with WFP's project objectives.

55. The review system to which EMOPs are subjected also tends to ensure that the EMOPs as planned are consistent with WFP policies. The biggest opportunity for deviance from policy comes in implementation rather than in programme design.

### **2.B.4 Intended to reach the right people**

56. The target group for the assistance (conflict affected populations), is a group which is consistently indicated as priority for assistance in Darfur. The targeting in the EMOP is on a group basis rather than a household basis. There are several questions arising here:

- To what extent is it appropriate for the EMOP to target IDPs as a group rather than trying to target the most vulnerable within the IDP group?;
- What role does WFP assistance play in overall food-security, and how critical is it to the affected community? This will be discussed under results below;
- To what extent have IDPs settled in the camps and towns? This raises the questions of whether those who fled from the countryside are still displaced or are newly-urbanised.



57. The targeting in complex emergencies study (Young and Maxwell, 2009) makes clear that food needs vary between households in the same group. The problem is that at the very start of the emergency operation, targeting by category was the only realistic option to provide timely assistance that would save lives. However, the concept of a category-based entitlement to food-assistance is entrenched and "*IDP identity and food aid entitlement are intertwined*" in Darfur (*ibid*, p. 39). This makes any move to needs-based targeting on a household basis very difficult.

58. The evaluation team confirmed the finding of the Young and Maxwell study that food needs vary between households, and not just on a category basis. This finding is also confirmed by the DFSMS reports, which show that even with a single category (such as IDPs, there is a wide variation in income, with 22 percent having an income equivalent to less than the cost of the minimum health food basket in November 2009, and 49 percent having an income of equivalent to more than twice the cost of the minimum health food basket in north Darfur (WFP, 2009d, p3). Similar variations can be seen in south and west Darfur (WFP, 2009e, 2009e). The same DFSMS reports show large changes throughout the year, and even on a year-to-year basis (WFP, 2010) as livelihood opportunities fluctuate.

59. The team repeatedly raised the question of household targeting with beneficiary groups and with key-informants in Darfur. Beneficiaries, while acknowledging that there were differences between households were very strongly opposed to any changes to the ration rolls on a household need basis.

60. This reflects the findings from the Darfur expert consultation of February 2009 (WFP, 2009b) where one of the participants noted that differentiation in a camp is suicidal and WFP can only think of adjusting the overall rations.

61. A further problem in Darfur is that the distribution lists have been effectively frozen since 2005, when the last formal Darfur-wide registration took place. While there have been some limited registration exercises<sup>22</sup> since then to cope with large-scale movements or new displacement, children born since the last registration are not included on the distribution lists. Neither are families that missed the original registration in 2005. However, as will be made clear below, this has not resulted in any significant nutritional or food security distress. Nevertheless, WFP have prioritized the verification of camp populations in 2010, and had already completed the first one during the evaluation team's visit.

62. Differences in need arise because families and family members have differential access due to:

- Gender: Gender is a strong determinant in livelihood access in Darfur. Women appear to have greater access to livelihoods for a number of reasons. First, some jobs are traditional female occupations (laundry, house-cleaning, construction-labouring) etc. Second, the wage rates paid for daily labour are said to be below the rate that men work at, this is given as the reason why women predominate even in areas like brick-making. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, while women may run some risk of rape in travelling outside the camps or towns, men face a higher risk of murder<sup>23</sup>. This latter

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<sup>22</sup> These include 80,000 individuals added to *Nyala* town camps from December 2007 to December 2008. Half of these were new cases, the rest had moved from other camps. Over 60,000 IDPs who fled to *Zam Zam* from other camps were also registered there.

<sup>23</sup> The fact that men hardly ever leave the camps shows that the community consider that the risks of rape are less than those of murder. Women interviewed for the 2006 evaluation laughed at the idea that it would be safer for men to collect firewood etc. During the present evaluation several Sudanese interviewees referred to a local saying "a woman has no enemies" to explain why women could pursue

factor this means that many occupations that involve travel beyond the security of the camp are restricted to women;

- Financial or other resources: Some families have greater financial resources or other resources than others, and have been able to use these to establish livelihoods in the displaced setting. An example here are the milling machines in the camps, which were owned by community leaders in more than half the cases where the team asked about their ownership;
- Differences in the resource base of family networks. Families with members who are sending remittances are in a good position to build their resource base to develop new livelihoods;
- Skills: Some of the displaced or conflict-affected have pre-existing skills such as tailoring that allow them to establish new livelihoods;
- The camp location and size: This plays a very large influence on livelihoods as camps adjoining large towns (or informal settlement of IDPs in the towns) offer many opportunities for casual labour. However, larger towns and camps tend to have less access to agricultural land, firewood, or grass in their immediate vicinity because of competition. A major constraint on all of these livelihoods is security.

63. There appear to be a number of reasons why beneficiaries are opposed to differentiation on a household basis. Firstly, the population raised the concern that external actors are not well placed to identify which families are in the greatest need.

64. Secondly, some interviewees expressed the concern that singling out particular families for assistance may damage social cohesion within the population as a whole. Thirdly, as the affected population perceive the entitlement to assistance to flow from category membership and not from the individual level of need, there was an implicit concern that removing entitlement to assistance would signal that those removed were no longer conflict affected.

65. A fourth, and much greater concern raised by the affected population, or implicit in their comments, was that the livelihoods they are exploiting are transitory stop-gaps and are not sustainable:

- Many of the livelihoods rely on unsustainable exploitation of environmental resources. This is very clearly the case with livelihoods like firewood collection, brick-making, and grass collection. Several interviewees reported that there is a widening zone of depletion of all of these resources around the bigger camps, and the affected population have to travel further all the time to harvest them;
- The livelihoods are transitory, such as those provided through working for NGOs or UN agencies. The expulsion of NGOs led to job losses among the national staff of the agencies, as only some found employment with other agencies;
- The livelihoods are based on servicing the displaced community themselves. This was the case of those providing services such as tea-shops or petty kiosks to the displaced population. Displacement has also driven a large demand for construction and for bricks. Major changes in the amount of displacement would destroy some of these livelihoods;

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livelihood that involved travel while men could not. Interviewees suggested that while killing a man from an opposing group was socially acceptable, raping a woman was not.

- Many livelihoods, such as firewood harvesting, or seasonal agricultural work, or seasonal cropping, are very sensitive to the security situation. One Government source in *Gereida* noted that security concerns there led to women stopping collecting firewood and cultivating for a few months;
- Livelihoods for many of the displaced are inferior to the livelihoods that they had previously. This was a point strongly made by beneficiaries interviewed, but was contested by some NGO, UN, and Government interviewees.

66. The last of these issues, whether livelihoods and the quality of life are better in the towns than they were before in the villages was a major point of disagreement between different interviewees. In general, IDPs argued that conditions in the villages up to 2003 had been far better, that that almost all would return when security conditions permit this. However, some acknowledged that access to services was better in the towns. Other key informants argued that the IDPs were becoming urbanised and that few would return to the farms. This issue is a critical question for the design of the EMOP, as if IDPs have in fact settled in the urban areas, then they are no longer really displaced.

67. One very good measure of the quality of life for the IDPs that resonates strongly with the affected community is the number who have fulfilled their religious duty and made the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Interviewees estimated that making the Hajj from Darfur typically costs about US\$4,000. Interviewees reported that someone had gone from every village every year before the conflict. However, since 2003, almost no-one from the conflict affected community has been able to make the Hajj except for those sponsored by the Government or others or who worked for the UN or NGOs<sup>24</sup>.

68. Key informants with the greatest depth of knowledge of the community pointed out that questions of livelihoods, urbanisation, and possible return are closely intertwined:

- Some IDPs had a better quality of life now than they had had previously in the villages;
- Social infrastructure in the villages has been destroyed in many cases, and even with return, it would take many years before livelihoods were restored to their previous levels;
- The occupation of land by others, especially in west Darfur, mean that return was not an options for some;
- Some IDPs have become used to the advantages of living in towns, and that decisions on return might be based on other than just livelihood factors<sup>25</sup>.

69. The most knowledgeable interviewees estimate that, depending on the local context, one-third to one-half of the IDPs might choose to continue living in towns, with some commuting to their agricultural land. What is very clear is that as well as forced displacement, there is also an underlying current of urbanisation.

70. WFP had evidence from the Darfur Food Security and Livelihood Assessment and the DFSMS that alternative livelihoods were increasing and that food aid was decreasing in importance within households, WFP reacted to this not by targeting within the category, but by reducing the ration size. The team concluded that not only

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<sup>24</sup> The only person who had gone from one location with about 12,000 IDPs was a WFP security guard who had saved up his salary to do so.

<sup>25</sup> Countering this argument, one IDP noted that while there are a lot of services available in towns, these services are only accessible to those who can afford to pay for them.

was this was the only real option in 2009 in the face of the challenges brought about by the expulsion of some cooperating partners, but that it was appropriate given the fragility of many of the alternative livelihoods adopted.

### 3. Results

#### 3.A. Beneficiaries and assistance provided

##### 3.A.1 Actual targeting

71. While the logical framework refers to assistance for IDPs displaced by conflict, it is clear that in some cases, the host population is also included in distributions. This is because the livelihoods of many of the resident community were interlinked with the former agricultural livelihoods of those who are now displaced. The Summary of GFD in Darfur Dashboard for September shows that residents accounted for 46 percent of the beneficiary population (an increase from only 17 percent of the caseload in February).

72. Table 7 shows the number of people provided with food against the planned levels. The EMOP foresaw 3.82 million beneficiaries, and WFP distributed food (at peak) to 3.73 million beneficiaries. Distributions reached 96.2 percent of the levels planned in the EMOP and 99.5 percent of the operationally planned level. The difference between the EMOP and the food distribution plan is that the food distribution plan is drawn up on a monthly basis and takes account of the changing security situation, changing needs, and other factors.

##### Actual vs planned beneficiaries

73. Given the complexity and difficulties of the situation in Darfur in 2009, reaching 99.5 percent of the planned number of beneficiaries (and 96.2 percent of the EMOP plan) is a remarkable achievement and is an indicator of the way in which the WFP programme in Darfur was able to overcome different challenges.

74. WFP's typically also presents the numbers of beneficiaries covered by field-level agreements (FLAs) as an intermediary between the EMOP figures and the operational plan figures. This data has not been introduced here because direct distribution was done without FLAs.




Figure 2: Variation in planned and actual GFD beneficiaries through 2009

**Table 7: Actual vs planned distribution numbers. (WFP Data summary report checked against Sudan Executive Briefs, WFP Monthly Situation Reports, and Dashboard summaries).**

<b>Actual beneficiaries compared with planned numbers</b>					
	<b>Millions of beneficiaries</b>			<b>Actual as a % of:</b>	
<b>Month</b>	<b>EMOP</b>	<b>Plan</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>EMOP</b>	<b>Plan</b>
January	2.38	2.24	2.21	93	99
February	2.38	2.26	2.20	92	97
March	2.38	2.45	2.34	98	95
April	2.48	2.71	2.75	111	101
May	3.16	3.13	3.08	98	99
June	3.82	3.24	3.28	86	101
July	3.82	3.75	3.67	96	98
August	3.82	3.75	3.71	97	99
September	3.72	3.69	3.73	100	101
October	3.59	3.68	3.67	102	100
November	2.67	2.24	2.37	89	106
December	2.53	2.38	2.32	92	98
<b>Average</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>2.94</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>99.5</b>

### **Variations over time**

75. The number of beneficiaries varies over time in response to a number of factors. The largest of these factors was the additional support in the peak "hunger season" in the middle of the year<sup>26</sup>. A relatively minor factor in the variation was the changes in access due to the security situation. The September "Dashboard" (Summary of GFDs in Darfur) shows that 5 percent of beneficiaries were inaccessible in March 2009. The pattern of inaccessibility has varied throughout the year.

### **3.A.2 Actual vs planned outputs**

#### **Actual vs planned Tonnages**

76. The data on tonnages is more illuminating than that on beneficiaries, because the ration size in 2009 was less than the planned ration size throughout the year. The average monthly tonnage for GFD in Darfur was planned as 37 thousand mts in the EMOP. WFP delivered 83 percent of this planned tonnage. However, the EMOP foresaw full rations with donor support for the full budget. In the first case WFP operated with reduced rations from the start of the year, and in the second, the EMOP was only 78 percent funded overall.

77. The Funded column in the table shows the product of planned tonnage multiplied by percentage level of funding. This gives an estimate of the tonnage that WFP could reasonably be expected to distribute given the financial resources available to it. In the event, WFP distributed 107 percent of the tonnage it could have been expected to distribute given the resourcing available. This is again a remarkable achievement in the context of Darfur, and reflects again the ability of this mature WFP programme to respond to the challenges in Darfur.


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<sup>26</sup> Residents populations got a 50 percent ration for five months in the peak hunger season from June to October.

**Table 8: Actual vs planned and funded tonnages. (WFP Data summary report checked against Sudan Executive Briefs, WFP Monthly Situation Reports, and Dashboard summaries).**

Actual tonnages compared with planned and funded tonnages							
	Thousands of mts of food				Actual as a % of:		
	EMOP	Funded	Plan	Actual	EMOP	Funded	Plan
January	30.34	23.57	25.99	25.67	85	109	99
February	30.06	23.35	20.63	23.62	79	101	114
March	30.06	23.35	36.30	33.56	112	144	92
April	31.70	24.62	20.48	23.30	73	95	114
May	37.33	29.00	35.46	36.17	97	125	102
June	44.66	34.69	34.95	30.35	68	87	87
July	44.66	34.69	47.34	47.20	106	136	100
August	44.66	34.69	32.42	29.70	66	86	92
September	43.84	34.06	39.79	41.43	94	122	104
October	42.74	33.20	27.80	30.36	71	91	109
November	32.45	25.21	26.18	28.89	89	115	110
December	31.29	24.31	19.96	18.96	61	78	95
<b>Average</b>	<b>36.98</b>	<b>28.73</b>	<b>30.61</b>	<b>30.77</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>101</b>

78. Figure 3 illustrates that the choppy nature of food distributions throughout the year in response to the constraints. The March peak is due to an effort to distribute double rations in March in repose to the expulsion of cooperating partners in that month. This then reduced the need for distribution in April, giving breathing space for WFP to try to find new cooperating partners. The July peak comes from the prepositioning of food in advance of the rainy season.



**Figure 3: Variations in GFD tonnage throughout the year**

### Rations provided

79. WFP served almost the all the planned number of beneficiaries in Darfur with less than 80 percent of the required resources by reducing the ration. Essentially the planned number of beneficiaries were almost all reached with reduced rations.

However, the initial reduction of the ration was not due to resource constraints, but due to the impact of a "good" harvest in the 2008 agricultural season, as clearly seen in WFP's monitoring data.

80. In order to place the "good" harvest of 2008 into context, this harvest was estimated by grain traders to have been only 25 percent of the pre-conflict level in south Darfur. Several interviewees noted that even this modest harvest in the 2008 season, coupled with a moderately better security situation for IDPs in 2009, led to a great deal more planting in the 2009-10 season. Unfortunately the 2009 rains were poor and one agency running a targeted supplementary feeding programme in west Darfur noted that the usual fall of new registrations in November did not happen in 2009, and that the mothers of the malnourished children attributed this to the poor harvest.

81. The ration scale for the operation included a number of elements that applied only to Darfur. First Darfur had a higher ration scale than other areas due to the large number of people in camps within Darfur, and CSB for FFE was supplied only in Darfur. dried skim milk (DSM) was being introduced as part of a premix for both the targeted SFP and the BSFP in Darfur. However, the high cost of DSM meant that its use was limited to blanket SFP only.

82. However, as noted earlier, this ration scale did not apply even from the start of the operation. From 1 January 2009, the target ration scale was reduced to approximately 70 percent of the original kilocalorie value for IDPs (Table 10: Actual WFP GFD ration in Darfur for IDPs from January to October 2009).

**Table 9 Ration scale for the operation EMOP**

Commodities	GFD, FFR and Demob outside Darfur	GFD, FFR, and IF in Darfur	FFW /FFT	TFP	SFP	FFE	Girl's Incentive
Cereals	450	450	450			100	167
Pulses	50	60	50			20	
Vegetable oil	30	30	30	15	20	15	27
Salt	10	10	10			5	
Sugar		30	30	10	20	10	
CSB		16.5		100	200	503	
DSM					304		
Total	540	596.5	570	125	240	200	194
<b>Nutritional value</b>							
kCal	1,942	2,156	1,742	552.8	1,017	731.3	794.4
kCal (less milling)	1,789	2,006					
Protein(gm)	59.5	64.3	59.5	18	36	22.9	18.4
Fat (grams)	43.8	45.4	43.8	21	32	20.9	32

83. The ration for non-displaced recipients was a 50 percent ration, less than the ration for IDPs. Sometimes values were reduced further due to breaks in the pipeline. The IDP ration was more affected by pipeline breaks (as it contained a wider range of commodities) than the rations for the resident communities.

84. From November 2009 IDP rations were reduced further to approximately 60 percent of the original EMOP ration due to the dropping of CSB from the general ration. At the same time, the ration for the host community was reduced to Sorghum and Oil (a 50 percent ration).

**Table 10: Actual WFP GFD ration in Darfur for IDPs from January to October 2009.**

<b>IDP GFD Darfur Ration from 1 January 2009</b>					
<b>Commodity</b>			<b>Kcal</b>	<b>Protein</b>	<b>Fat</b>
Beans	<b>30</b>	gm/p/d	101	6.0	0.4
Sorghum	<b>300</b>	gm/p/d	1,017	35.7	9.9
Oil	<b>15</b>	gm/p/d	128	0.0	15.0
Sugar	<b>15</b>	gm/p/d	60	0.0	0.0
CSB	<b>60</b>	gm/p/d	228	10.8	3.6
Salt	<b>10</b>	gm/p/d	0	0.0	0.0
Totals	<b>430</b>	gm/p/d	<b>1,533</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>29</b>
Gen Popn. Sphere (Min)			2,100	52	40
Gen Popn. Sphere (Max)				78	
%of sphere min			<b>73</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>72</b>
As % of EMOP ration			<b>71</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>62</b>

*Notes: Reduced rations followed good harvest*

85. The actual rations varied over time due to pipeline breaks in various commodities. Figure 4 shows that there was almost no CSB distributed for GFD in April to June due to a break in the pipeline then<sup>27</sup>. They also show that the removal of CSB from rations in November was somewhat different from plan, in that CSB continued to be distributed in some locations until stocks were consumed. The complete removal was as a long-running discussion about how the product was used by households and a decision to prioritize its use for SFP and BSFP.

**Table 11: Actual WFP GFD ration in Darfur for November - December 2009**


<b>IDP GFD Darfur Ration from 1 November 2009</b>					
<b>Commodity</b>			<b>Kcal</b>	<b>Protein</b>	<b>Fat</b>
Beans	<b>30</b>	gm/p/d	101	6.0	0.4
Sorghum	<b>300</b>	gm/p/d	1,017	35.7	9.9
Oil	<b>15</b>	gm/p/d	128	0.0	15.0
Sugar	<b>15</b>	gm/p/d	60	0.0	0.0
Salt	<b>10</b>	gm/p/d	0	0.0	0.0
Totals	<b>370</b>	gm/p/d	<b>1,305</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>25</b>
Gen Popn. Sphere (Min)			2,100	52	40
Gen Popn. Sphere (Max)				78	
%of sphere min			<b>62</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>63</b>
As % of EMOP ration			<b>60</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>54</b>

*Notes: Introduced after break in CSB. This was also the ration for non-displaced recipients in Darfur from January to October.*

86. Figure 4 is complicated by the fact that the ration mix varied throughout the year. Generally, IDPS in camps got a "full-ration" (typically a 70 percent ration for January to October). The host community, or non-displaced communities generally got a "half-ration" (typically a 50 percent ration - although some such communities were provided with a full ration based on a vulnerability assessment and mapping (VAM) assessment). The "other ration" category was the special ration provided for the lean season to those outside the IDP camps.

<sup>27</sup> The available CSB was prioritized for FFE, SFP, and BSFP in April to June.





**Figure 4: Monthly average distribution of non-cereal food items per GFD beneficiary. Note, the averages are complicated by the balance of different rations at different times.**

87. The mix of ration types varied through the year in response to changing assessments, pipeline breaks, and the plans to cope with the lean season (Table). Other factors adding to monthly variability were: the effort to provide two or three month rations in advance to areas likely to be cut off by the rains; the provision of a two month ration to deal with the expulsion of cooperating partners; and the impact of pipeline breaks.

**Table 12: GFD Tonnages per month by nominal ration size**

Thousands of tons distributed via GFD in Darfur in 2009 by nominal ration size												
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
"Full" ration	19.2	19.3	23.7	12.2	21.9	14.6	22.1	15.7	19.9	19.8	19.2	14.2
"Half" rations	6.5	4.3	9.9	11.1	14.3	15.8	15.2	10.4	4.8	7.8	7.7	4.7
Other rations	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.9	3.6	16.7	2.7	2.0	0.0
Average Ration grams/person/day	388	358	477	283	392	309	430	267	371	276	405	272

88. One final element that the evaluation team looked at was the BSFP. This was aimed at all under 5s, regardless of whether their family held ration cards or not. Although blanket feeding was introduced in 2008, it was extended in 2009 to cover other parts of Darfur. However, the bulk of the BSFP was in north Darfur (77.6 percent) of the total tonnage, with a significant amount in south Darfur (15.5 percent), and a small amount in west Darfur (4.9 percent).

89. BSFP ran from April to October, as nutrition normally improves in November<sup>28</sup> due to the early harvest. As with the GFD, BSFP was also impacted by pipeline issues (Table 13).

<sup>28</sup> As noted earlier, one cooperating partner with a targeted supplementary feeding programme noted that the decrease in November 2009 was far less marked, but attributed this to the poor harvest.

**Table 13: Variations in BSFP rations due to the impact of pipeline breaks**

Month	Grams per person per day					BSFP	Food
	CSB	Oil	Sugar	DSM	Total	Beneficiaries	Tonnage
April	170	28	28	26	252	110,259	834
May	173	29	22	22	246	218,726	1,616
June	178	28	22	22	249	174,651	1,305
July	156	27	21	21	226	363,045	2,461
August	59	10	10	10	89	350,899	939
September	157	29	26	26	238	211,820	1,512
October	78	13	12	12	114	169,251	581
Average	132	23	19	19	193	228,379	
<b>Total</b>							<b>9,247</b>

### 3.B. Attaining Objectives

#### 3.B.1 Planned vs actual outcomes

90. The planned outcomes were saving lives and protecting livelihoods. On the first of these, the outcome indicators relevant to this evaluation are:

- GAM in under 5s of less than 15 percent;
- CMR of less than 1/10,000/day.

91. In the case of the GAM, Nielsen concluded in his meta-analysis that the humanitarian crisis in Darfur has been largely contained since the end of 2005, but that there is a very significant seasonal pattern (2009, pp. 3, 19). However Darfur is still very marginal, with the confidence limits of the seasonal model fitted by Nielsen fluctuating between less than 10 percent to over 30 percent GAM. There are also regional differences between the different Darfur states. This means that Darfur remains on the edge of a humanitarian crisis.

92. CMR has generally been below the level of 1/10,000/day since 2005, and reached 0.29 by 2007 (Government of Sudan *et al.*, 2008, p. 18). While this level is below the expected baseline rate, this is quite common after major emergencies due to the deaths of large numbers of weaker individuals. CMR rates were slightly higher in the surveys quoted in the Darfur nutrition update 22 for July to September 2009, but again were clustered around the expected baseline rate.

93. WFP dramatically improved food security monitoring in 2009 with the introduction of the DFSMS. This conducted four surveys throughout the year and provided WFP with good information on food security at those sites.

94. While the EMOP contained no livelihood targets, the Darfur food security monitoring reports use both <sup>29</sup> HFCS and the coping strategy index as a reasonable indicator for the adequacy of household income as reflected in food consumption. The VAM survey also looks at household income and expenditure. What the surveys show is that WFP food is a big part of the livelihoods of the assisted population.

95. Together with nutrition surveys the DFSMS surveys clearly showed that there were no exceptional general nutrition problems in Darfur during 2009 even though food rations were less than planned in the EMOP. There were of course, areas with specific problems, but this was the norm (especially in north Darfur) even prior to 2003. The first round for 2010 show increasing food insecurity in north and south

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<sup>29</sup> The household food consumption score is based on frequency of consumption of particular food groups over seven days. Each food group is given a weighting and the score is obtained by multiplying the consumption frequency over seven days by the weighing.

Darfur compared with the same time in 2009. This is probably due more to the poor harvest than to WFP's ration cuts in November (WFP, 2010).

96. There are still areas of Darfur with unacceptably high malnutrition, even though the DFSMS food security indicators are generally acceptable. The DFSMS only collects data on malnutrition among adult females and not on child malnutrition, so there is no direct basis of comparison between the DFSMS and the nutritional surveys. There are three possible explanations for this mismatch:

- Acute malnutrition is not related to food insecurity alone but to a range of factors. These other factors may include food insecurity, but malnutrition can exist even in there is food security. WFP is part of a group that is currently working on the question of indicators for food security (Young and Jaspars, 2009). The poor linkage of malnutrition with food security in Darfur is supported by the findings of the 2007 food security and nutrition assessment (Government of Sudan *et al.*, 2008). This study found no correlation between food security and acute malnutrition in Darfur;
- Nutritional surveys are expensive. They are not conducted wholly at random but tend to be concentrated in areas where there is already some concern about nutrition. Even though there is a broad background network of sentinel sites in Darfur, the nutrition updates are based not only on these but also on data for selective feeding centres, and localised nutrition surveys. The latter two sources tend to be concentrated in areas with nutritional problems<sup>30</sup>;
- The DFSMS is not extensive enough. The DFSMS findings apply to the particular sites surveyed and cannot be generalised to the whole of Darfur. Normally, food security results can be generalised to food-security zones, but the livelihood context in Darfur varies so much between camps that this approach cannot be taken.

97. The 2008 research by Tufts on the impact of conflict on trade found the WFP food was extensively traded and that its affect on urban cereal markets was probably greater than had been previously estimated, and that trading in relief commodities had kept the cereal market alive (*Buchanan-Smith and Fadul*, 2008, p. 15). Cereal traders in Darfur confirmed that food aid remains an important part of their cereal trading<sup>31</sup>.

### **3.C. Contribution to changes in the country**

98. The issue of WFP alignment with overall Government strategy is not discussed here as the extent to which humanitarian actors should be aligned with one party to the conflict in Darfur is a very contentious one.

99. WFP has cooperated closely with relevant ministries. After the expulsion of some cooperating partners active in targeted supplementary feeding, the Ministry of Health (MoH) took over the SFP programme in some places. However, some interviewees noted that the MoH was not as effective as NGO partners had been as the MoH did not conduct active case-seeking.

100. In 2009, UNICEF supported the MoH's costs for running feeding centres taken over from the expelled NGOs. It is not clear if these centres can continue to operated

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<sup>30</sup> If nutritional surveys and the DFSMS were based on random samples from the whole population of Darfur, then it would not matter that the nutrition survey data and DFSMS data comes from different families. However the fact that the separate samples for both are purposive may introduce differences between the nutritional and food security data.

<sup>31</sup> Cereal traders interviewed estimated the proportion of their annual trading volume represented by food-aid. The estimates ranged from 25 percent for traders in *Nyala* to 70 percent for traders in *El Geneina*.

in 2010 as , at the time of the fieldwork UNICEF did not have the funding to continue this support.

101. The FFE programme was another example of close cooperation with the Government, in this case with the Ministry of Education. However this partnership was not always so successful. In west Darfur the Ministry of Education proved unable to properly supervise the FFE programme, and WFP has sought a number of local NGO partners for FFE in 2010.

102. WFP's programme is more about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe than about bringing about change. The problem in Darfur is a political rather than a humanitarian one. Nevertheless, the nature of WFP's programme has changed over time to better match changing needs. This will be discussed further below in section 4. Although WFP food was slightly less important than other livelihood sources overall, it was still a very important source of income for conflict-affected population.

103. Without WFP food the affected population and IDPs in particular, would have been forced to engage in alternative livelihood strategies at greater risk to their safety. Several interviewees commented that IDPs were engaging in livelihood strategies that were slightly more risky because of ration cuts<sup>32</sup>. However, the consensus among key informants was that there were no major negative results from these riskier strategies because the security situation for IDPs had improved.

104. The importance of food aid is shown by the example of north Darfur where IDPs depended on food aid for almost 80 percent of their cereal intake (WFP, 2009d, p. 5). This was higher than for south Darfur, but even in south Darfur, IDPs relied on food aid for over 60 percent of their cereal intake (WFP, 2009e, p. 3). Given that less than half the IDP households are classified as food secure, it is clear that without WFP assistance there would be a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.

105. One Government priority that WFP has supported has been return. However, there is almost no permanent return of IDPs in Darfur<sup>33</sup>. There are a few high profile projects, but these represent a very small proportion of IDPs. Much more common than permanent return is a pattern of seasonal return to plant and harvest a crop. Beneficiary interviewees indicated that they would return once they felt it was safe to do so.

106. Almost every informant interviewed stated WFP was playing the key humanitarian role in Darfur not only in terms of its own programme but also in the wider context. WFP's presence and the related UN Humanitarian Air Service operation support the broader humanitarian operation. Several interviewees noted that WFP food aid had helped to control food prices for non-recipients and not just support food recipients.

#### **4. Factors explaining the results**

107. As noted earlier, despite a very difficult context in 2009, there was no general increase in malnutrition or food insecurity. Not only this, but WFP managed to introduce new initiatives such as the DFSMS, and expand initiatives such as the BSFP. The reasons for this are very complex, and are due both to factors external to the management of the programme in Sudan and factors over which WFP has some direct control.

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<sup>32</sup> Increased activity outside the camps, either for firewood and grass harvesting, or for seasonal cropping were given as examples of this.

<sup>33</sup> This is in contrast to the large number of returns in south Sudan, even though there is very little in the way of services available in many rural areas of south Sudan. This illustrates that what prevents return is not a lack of services in the areas of potential return, but the lack of security.

## 4.A. External factors


### 4.A.1 Donor Resourcing

108. EMOP 10760.0 was 78 percent funded for 2009. This is similar to the 2008 level of funding, but is less than the level of funding that the EMOPs for Sudan raised in 2006 and 2007 (Table 14).

**Table 14: Resourcing history for EMOPs covering Darfur<sup>34</sup>**

	2006	2007	2008	2009
EMOP	10503	10557	10693	10760
%funded	88	85	77	78

109. The biggest donor for the EMOP has been the US, responsible for 64 percent of all funding for the EMOP. However, this understates the value of the US contribution, as carryover and miscellaneous income amounts for 14 percent of the funding. The US accounts for 75 percent of the EMOP funding in Sudan when carryover is excluded.



**Figure 5: Funding sources for EMOP 10760.**


110. All WFP programmes operate under the constraint that procuring and transporting food takes time. Turning contributions into distributions takes time. This time can be anywhere from three to six months in Darfur given the distances involved. The need to stockpile food in advance of the rainy season that starts in July is another complication. WFP has two options for dealing with this problem:

- Using the carry-over from the previous year's operation. The carryover (plus some minor miscellaneous income) accounted for 13.6 percent of all resourcing for 2009<sup>35</sup>;

<sup>34</sup> Source: <http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp204339.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> While there was significant carry-over into 2009, there was relatively little carry-over into 2010. This was due in part to the increased need for food in south Sudan in late 2009.

- Asking donors for their contributions long before the start of the year to ensure that food is available to beneficiaries on January 1st. WFP Sudan has had a policy of trying to secure 65 percent of the requirements before the start of the year<sup>36</sup>. This policy target was almost met in 2009, with 63 percent of the eventual funding confirmed by 23 December 2008. With carryover, 77 percent of the eventual funding had been confirmed by January 1 (Figure 6).



**Figure 6: Cumulative funding for EMOP 10760**

**Table 15: Donors to EMOP 10760 ranked by quarter of confirmed donation and support in US\$ million.**

Donor	2008 q3	2008 q4	2009 q1	2009 q2	2009 q3	2009 q4	
US	296.87	100.02	33.17		2.50	1.84	434.40
Switzerland	2.33	0.72	1.89		0.56	0.38	5.88
European Commission		23.96			36.57	6.66	67.19
Greece		0.73	0.57				1.30
Japan		0.34	10.20		6.93		17.47
New Zealand		0.44					0.44
Carryover and misc. income			92.12				92.12
CERF, CHF and UN			2.17	2.46		11.82	16.45
Australia			1.67				1.67
Canada			1.61		16.65	1.00	19.26
Private Donors			0.06		0.19	0.02	0.28
Multilateral				6.62			6.62
Germany				2.64		1.48	4.11
Finland				2.04			2.04
Luxembourg				0.66			0.66
Republic of Korea				0.50			0.50
Italy					2.81		2.81
Norway					0.10	0.23	0.33
Ireland					0.05	0.12	0.17
Denmark					0.04	1.06	1.09
Sweden					0.04	0.11	0.15

<sup>36</sup>

<http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/WFP%20Sudan%20Monthly%20Situation%20Report%2010693.0%20-%20October%202008.pdf>

111. The United States stands head and shoulder above other donors not only in terms of its total support but also in terms of the timeliness of its confirmed contributions (Table 15)

112. Donors other than the United States and the European Commission provide only 10 percent of the total funding from bilateral state donors. This is very surprising given the high profile of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and conflicts with the overall pattern of humanitarian support.

#### **4.A.2 Government of Sudan policies**

113. The policies adopted by the Government of Sudan have been a major factor in determining what WFP can achieve. In 2009, this was illustrated very clearly with the expulsion of several of WFP's cooperating partners (accounting for about 42 percent of the total tonnage overall). In west Darfur, WFP overnight lost 70 percent of the cooperating partner capacity.

114. Government policies also affect local procurement of food. Although Sudan is a major sugar producer and exporter, WFP buys its sugar on the international market. This is because it is Government policy to sell locally produced sugar in Sudan at a price above the international price, even though the same sugar is exported at a lower price.

115. Sudanese labour law is a constraint that was mentioned by several interviewees. The labour laws mean that national staff numbers cannot be adjusted rapidly in response to the workload, as the law provides for long notice periods and severance payments, even for staff with relatively short service.

#### **4.A.3 Cultural factors**

116. The cultural norms of the affected population represent both a powerful constraint and a powerful advantage for the operation.

117. One of the constraints flowing from the cultural norms is the power of the Sheiks. Sheiks are a semi-democratic form of leadership, in that they can, in the last resort, be removed from their post by the community. Many of the Sheiks have a vested interest in the current distribution rolls. Many informants related instances of Sheiks with large numbers of ration cards and Young and Maxwell (2009, pg. 5) note that "*Resistance to improved registration on the part of sheikhs and other leaders who had acquired multiple ration cards became a significant security issue*".

118. The evaluation team saw individual Sheiks who held the cards for whole distribution groups, and IDPs reported that some Sheiks retained the ration cards and only issued them out for distributions.

119. One very knowledgeable key informant made the point that in many cases the Sheiks in the camps were not the same individuals who had been Sheiks in the villages, and the social disruptions caused by displacement have removed the external controls that had previously existed (through a hierarchy of traditional rulers) on the behaviour of individual Sheiks. This meant that the balance of power between the community and the Sheiks had changed to the advantage of the individual Sheiks<sup>37</sup>.


120. Social solidarity is one of the factors that leads the community to be very opposed to any differential targeting of assistance within the community, despite differences in need between different families.

121. Other cultural factors are more positive. Clearly, the lack of nutritional distress in the circumstances of unequal distribution of resources (through different

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
<sup>37</sup> Young and Maxwell devote a whole section of the targeting study to issues of governance.

livelihood access, and the non-registration of some families and the under 5s) suggests that there is a very powerful informal redistribution mechanism of some sort operating within the community<sup>38</sup>.



<sup>38</sup> However, there is no free lunch even in Darfur, and it is possible that those who benefit from redistribution are building up social or other debts in consequence.





**Figure 7: The deterioration in security in Darfur for humanitarians from May 2006 to July 2009. White areas are areas which are relatively safe to travel to.**

#### **4.A.4 Continued conflict and insecurity**

122. The failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement to bring the conflict in Darfur to a close is another major factor that is driving the continuing need for assistance, as well as demands for the assistance and the associated protection. Young and Maxwell (2009, p34) argue that the conflict, and the resultant need for protection are very important drivers in the demand for food assistance.

123. 2009 has been a very dangerous year for the international community, with the sudden appearance of the kidnapping for ransom of international staff. Almost all of Darfur is classed as "limited access" by UN Security. Paradoxically, although a very bad year for the security of aid-workers, security for IDPs has been better than for many years. This is one of the factors that has allowed the expansion of livelihoods discussed below.

124. When the first kidnappings of international staff happened in March 2009, it was suggested that particular agencies were being targeted because they were

working exclusively with the IDP community, and not at all with Arab communities. However, the kidnapping of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff, showed that this analysis was not correct as ICRC has a very extensive programme with Arab communities in Darfur.

125. Food aid is only one part of the overall humanitarian intervention. However, the relatively small number of NGOs working in Darfur<sup>39</sup> and the restricted size of their (and UN humanitarian agency) programmes, mean that WFP is the largest humanitarian actor by far in Darfur.

126. WFP is not the largest UN actor in Darfur. The enormous UNAMID is the largest UN actor. However, despite a growing UNAMID presence in 2009, and that one part of its mandate is to: "*contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance...*"<sup>40</sup>, it was the most dangerous year yet for humanitarians in Darfur.

127. While WFP and other humanitarian actors benefit from escorts provided by UNAMID, interviewees complained that the UNAMID escorts were inflexible and were often not on time. Several WFP interviewees pointed out that, where they were acceptable, National Police escorts were more reliable and flexible.

128. A further complication is that while national police escorts are not safe to use in some areas, UNAMID escorts are not safe to use in other areas as some parties to the conflict accuse UNAMID of siding with the Government<sup>41</sup>.

#### **4.A.5 UN Security rules**

129. The UN security rules constrain the WFP operation significantly. The UN's Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) is responsible for *providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system to enable the safest and most efficient conduct of the programmes and activities of the United Nations System*.<sup>42</sup> Part of this responsibility includes assessing security risks in Darfur and advising the designated official on security.

130. UNDSS operates by declaring access limits for different location through setting security phases<sup>43</sup>. However many interviewees were critical of the way in which phases were set, and of the quality of analysis provided by UNDSS.

131. One of the reasons that WFP invested in creating humanitarian hubs was to get around the constraints inherent in the UN security rules by providing sites that staff could stay overnight at. Under the UNDSS rules, UN staff cannot overnight at NGO compounds, but only at UN facilities that comply with the MOSS. Staff interviewed noted that this could lead to the situation where they had to travel long distances daily to visit distant sites several days in a row even though travelling was more dangerous than staying at the sites in some cases.

132. WFP has resisted attempts by UN security to treat drivers employed by contractors to drive WFP supplied vehicles as if they were WFP employees. If WFP did so, it would no longer be able to deliver food throughout Darfur, as these drivers use routes that have been declared closed by UNDSS, and operate without escorts.

133. Interviewees freely acknowledged that Darfur was a dangerous environment, but argued that the UN security rules did not provide a good balance between risk and programme requirements. In particular, they pointed out that the kidnapping threat

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<sup>39</sup> WFP has only 25 cooperating partners in an area the size of France.

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/mandate.shtml>

<sup>41</sup> A typical criticism of UNAMID is <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33710>

<sup>42</sup> <https://dss.un.org/dssweb/>

<sup>43</sup> The security phasing system has been revised and a new system is about to be launched.

applied only to international staff, and that the risks faced by national staff depended on their background and the area in which they were working.

#### **4.A.6 Market conditions**

134. Some WFP recipients trade their food for cash or other items. The amount trade varies from month to month with varying food prices and varying income. This is for a number of reasons including:

- Millet is the preferred cereal for many communities, rather than the WFP sorghum;
- Some families need to sell part of their ration to pay for transport, milling, school fees, medical fees etc;
- Groundnut oil is much preferred to the oil distributed by WFP;
- People have incomes from other livelihoods. Food is being targeted on a category basis, rather than on the basis of the level of individual family need.

135. The sale of WFP food into the market is positive, in that it reduces the price of food. This makes food accessible even to those who do not receive WFP rations. Such groups include the urban poor, IDPs without ration cards etc. One senior Government informant identified the impact of the WFP operation on stabilising food prices as the biggest impact of the operation.

136. As well as stabilising prices, WFP food has been important in preserving cereal markets in Darfur. The study of the conflict on markets found that *"the significance of relief grain in urban cereal markets may be even greater than previously estimated. It has kept traders in business and has lowered and stabilized prices throughout the crisis at a time when purchasing power has been at an all-time low"* (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008, p. 5).

#### **4.A.7 Partner presence and capacity**

137. One of the biggest constraints for WFP in Darfur is the limited number of cooperating partners on the ground. This lack of partners was an issue even before the expulsions. The introduction of BSFP in north Darfur (initially) was in part a response to the lack of nutritional partners who could implement targeted SSFPs and partly to the low rates of coverage in some SFPs.

138. The low capacity of partners was already identified as an issue in the 2006 evaluation report. Essentially, NGOs have great difficulty recruiting suitably qualified staff for Darfur. Darfur is a tough environment to work in and WFP faces some of the same problems. NGOs face bigger problems recruiting as Darfur is a major programme for WFP and attracts staff who want to be involved in one of the largest WFP operations in the world. The Darfur programmes of NGOs have no such special cachet.

139. Partner capacity issues were highlighted after the expulsions when began to distribute directly. WFP staff quickly learned that some partners had been taking short-cuts at some sites and that what they had been doing was in some cases questionable.

140. In response to the issue of partner capacity, WFP began a special capacity building programme for partners, and partners interviewees were very positive about this initiative. They were also very positive about earlier capacity-building work by WFP.

141. These problems with partner capacity have worsened since the expulsions. This worsening is not just due to the expulsions, but also to the dramatic worsening of the security situation of humanitarian agencies in 2009. Attacks, kidnapping, and the

threat of further incidents have led to NGOs withdrawing from outlying areas. Several key-informants commented that the international community now has a far less thorough understanding of what is happening in Darfur because of these withdrawals from deep-field sites.

142. Some of the NGOs expelled were important nutritional partners for WFP. In the wake of the expulsion WFP, UNICEF, and the MoH took over the SFPs of the expelled partners. While this worked in 2009, in 2010 UNICEF's inability to continue funding MoH means that the future of the MoH run SFPs is in question.

143. Some key informants made the point that the real impact of the expulsions was not the immediate loss of food distribution capacity, but the loss of experienced partners with a longer term view who could be expected to implement more sophisticated transitional programmes than just relief food distribution.

144. The limited number of partners has also made negotiations with potential cooperating partners difficult. In many contexts WFP has a choice of potential cooperating partners for GFD, but in many instances in Darfur, WFP had little choice of partner.

#### **4.B. Factors within WFP control**

##### **4.B.1 Maturity of the programme**

145. One important factor in the success of the programme is its maturity, the ability of the programme to take large changes in its stride due to:

- The experience built up by the programme during many years of responding to new constraints in Darfur;
- Adaptation of the programme to the conditions in Darfur, incorporating lessons from previous years into the current programme.

146. It is debatable whether the maturity of the programme is a factor inside or outside of WFP's control. To one extent it is not as the length of time the programme in Darfur has been running is determined by factors outside of WFP's control. However, the extent to which the programme has matured is a factor within WFP's control.

147. The fact that a programme has been running for many years is not a sufficient condition in itself for maturity. Maturity in a programme requires that lessons learned from earlier years are incorporated into the programme. WFP has incorporated many lessons into the programme over the years, and it is this ability to learn from experience that has made this such a mature programme.

##### **4.B.2 Operational strategy in practice**

148. The pattern of distributions closely follows the plans drawn up by WFP (Figure 3). This suggests that final distribution plans were realistic. The deviations of the planned level from the overall EMOP levels is not only understandable given the constraints applicable in Darfur, but also shows that the team worked hard to overcome these constraints to achieve the overall targets of the programme.

##### **4.B.3 Management of the programme**

149. The donors the team spoke to had a very favourable view of WFP. The same story was repeated with partners and other UN agencies generally. This is an indication that the programme in Sudan is well managed. Donors were particularly complimentary about the way in which WFP had managed to successfully cope with the loss of capacity due to the expulsions of cooperating partners. Again, the ability to weather such a major shock successfully is an indicator of good management.

150. WFP is structured with three Area Offices in Darfur reporting to Khartoum which is a Regional Bureau rather than a country office. This arrangement springs from the original separation of the north and south Sudan programmes. In comparison to 2006, the current arrangements are working much better.

151. One issue for the programme is that what was the Darfur Coordination Unit is now part of a larger Field Coordination Unit for both Darfur and south Sudan. This allows learning from the Darfur operation to be applied to south Sudan, but risks the dilution of the attention on Darfur. However, the appointment of a new Darfur Coordinator should help to reduce this risk.

#### **4.B.4 Management of the programme: knowledge-based programming**

152. What is remarkable in the Darfur operation is the large investment that WFP has made in research to ensure that its strategic and operational decisions are well grounded. Some example of this include:

- The expert consultation on Darfur in February 2009. This was an excellent initiative by WFP that drew on the knowledge of some of the most knowledgeable academic researchers on Sudan<sup>44</sup>, as well as the knowledge of the WFP staff working in Darfur. The format of the three day meeting allowed for an exchange of views and the comments of the expert panel provided a good base for programming.
- The complex emergencies targeting case study in Darfur (Young and Maxwell, 2009). While this was one of a larger series of case studies, it provided good information on the situation in Darfur. This study highlighted the difficulty of trying to target assistance on a household vulnerability basis in Darfur.
- The setting up of the DFSMS in 2009 was a huge leap forward in providing a picture of actual food security conditions in Darfur. It replaced a previous annual exercise with four quarterly assessments in sentinel sites. The change to more frequent monitoring provided good information for WFP, showing for example, that the hungriest season happened at a different time than originally thought due to the demand for agricultural labour at the start of the agricultural season.

#### **4.B.5 Management of the Programme: Monitoring**

153. The engagement of WFP in direct distribution showed that there were problems with the way in which some cooperating partners had been working at particular sites. While WFP was aware of some of these problems previously, direct implementation showed that WFP monitoring of partners needed to be more effective.

154. This issue was recognized by WFP Sudan and the programme placed more emphasis on monitoring. To a certain extent the DFSMS have taken over from some of the monitoring function. VAM has been more closely integrated with the Monitoring and Evaluation function since January 2009.

155. WFP is introducing a new Sudan Operating System to allow for more effective data capture of monitoring data. This system was rolled out first in north Darfur, and was being introduced in west and south Darfur during the evaluation fieldwork. Essentially this is a management information system database that allows staff to collate information from different WFP systems and from monitoring reports to get a coherent picture.

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<sup>44</sup> The four experts were Helen Young, Dan Maxwell, Susanne Jaspers and Margie Buchanan-Smith.

#### 4.B.6 Programming: Ration scales

156. As noted earlier, WFP's assistance in 2009 for all communities has been less than the ration scales presented in the EMOP Table 9. However, even the notional rations scale presented in Table 10 and Table 11 overstate the actual food contribution to the household. That is because:

- Recipients at some sites have to pay for piling and guarding the food prior to distribution. These costs average between 2 percent and 4 percent of the ration kilocalories<sup>45</sup>;
- Recipients in many cases have to pay someone to transport the food to their homes (in one site visited, recipients had come 10km to collect their ration), but the use of hired transport<sup>46</sup> was common at all the distributions visited. Transport costs were typically of the order of 2-5 percent of the ration;
- Milling losses. Milling typically involves the loss of nutrient value, typically 10 percent of the un-milled grain. Losses can be greater if recipients want a more refined product;
- Milling costs. Although WFP is now introducing milling vouchers, and there was a milling voucher pilot scheme in north Darfur in 2009, milling costs significantly reduce the ration. Where milling costs are paid in kind, milling was typically 25 percent to 33 percent of the ration cereal content. When paid in cash, the cost could be as low as 12.5 percent of the cereal content<sup>47</sup>;
- Taxes to Sheiks. These are now largely clandestine following an NGO campaign against the practice in 2005-2006. It is quite common for beneficiaries to deny that there are taxes. However the practice continues, although it varies greatly between sites. One beneficiary said that if they didn't pay, the Sheik would cut them off from non-food-items and other distributions. Taxes were of the order of 0 percent to 5 percent. Beneficiaries noted that most of the current Sheiks did not fulfil this role in their villages. One knowledgeable key informant noted that.
- WFP rations are all calculated on the basis of a 30 day month, but the average length of a month is 30.44 days. This is equivalent to a reduction of 1.4 percent of the ration value;
- Families have other costs such as firewood<sup>48</sup>, education, water, or soap which are not fully subsidised or provided by other humanitarian actors. Families may have to sell part of their food ration to meet these costs. WFP cannot address all of these issues on its own;

157. When all of these factors are taken into account, the actual value of the ration is reduced to less than 70 percent of the notional value. This means that even the 70 percent ration probably provides slightly less than half the food requirements for the household in IDP camps. Despite this, there is no wide-spread malnutrition. The team were offered a number of suggestions why this was the case:

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<sup>45</sup> All of the estimates here are based on interviews with beneficiaries, and the order of costs was confirmed by key informants or specialists.

<sup>46</sup> The hired transport ranged from boys with wheel-barrows to men with donkey or horse carts.

<sup>47</sup> This cost calculation is based on the cash and in-kind prices provided by beneficiaries and by millers.

<sup>48</sup> WFP plans to introduce fuel-efficient stoves in 2010. While such stoves use fuel more efficiently than open fires, they usually demand some additional work to make the firewood suitable for use in the stove. Traditional open fires may have other benefits such as heating. The labour demand for fuel preparation and reduced secondary benefits can lead to low rates of uptake of fuel efficient stoves.

- Widespread inclusion errors. Some WFP informants offered the argument that there was such widespread over-registration that the reduced rations were equivalent to a full ration for the real number. However this argument does not stand-up. The estimates of inclusion errors were generally given by key informants of the order of 10 percent to 30 percent<sup>49</sup>. 88 percent of the respondents to the online survey estimated that the inclusion errors were 30 percent or less. Part of the inclusion errors are balanced by exclusion errors<sup>50</sup>, including births in the last five years. This issue will be discussed below under inclusion and exclusion errors;
- Alternative livelihoods. Beneficiaries and interviewees identified a large range of livelihoods for IDPs in Darfur. These included: casual labour; petty trading; construction labour; brick-making; grass collection; domestic work; transport; tea-shops and other services; tailoring; milling; water selling; agricultural labour; irrigated dry-season cultivation; rain-fed cultivation, and fire-wood collection. As noted earlier, many of these livelihoods are very fragile, unsustainable, and very sensitive to the security situation. Some of these unsustainable livelihoods have been described as maladaptations<sup>51</sup>. However, the presence of these livelihoods, maladapted and flawed though they may be, is the reason why reductions in rations have not led to widespread nutritional distress or food security problems.

#### **4.B.7 Interventions by WFP other than GFD**

158. WFP planned to significantly expand non-GFD modalities in 2009 to provide a safety net in the face of declining general rations. WFP was not able to implement this strategy due to having to concentrate efforts on the coping with the expulsion of cooperating partners.

159. The big advantage that non-GFD modalities offer is that they allow more effective targeting on those most in need of food assistance. They also allow a focus on food quality rather than just on tonnage. However, there a number of issues around non-GFD modalities:

- All such modalities have a higher cost per ton than does GFD. This is because they demand higher levels of input from partners in order to be successful. For example, even a project as straightforward as FFE requires local food storage, cooking utensils, cooks, cooking water and firewood. One informant noted that there were many;
- problems around the later two issues in north Darfur. Modalities such as FFW, require high levels of technical inputs, supervision, and tools etc. In the case of targeted, WFP generally only provides the food items and the other costs of the targeted SFP are met by other donors. This reduces the implementation cost for WFP although SFP is still expensive because of the high value elements of the ration<sup>52</sup>;

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<sup>49</sup> (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. 7) note that inclusion errors were estimated to be 22% by the 2007 Darfur food needs assessment.

<sup>50</sup> (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. 7) note that exclusion errors were estimated to be 28% by the 2007 Darfur food needs assessment.

<sup>51</sup> (Young; *et al.*, 2009, p. 9) refers to livelihood maladaptations as livelihoods that undermine the livelihoods of others. Maladaptations may also be livelihoods strategies that are unsustainable due to undermining their own future use (such as excessive firewood harvesting).

<sup>52</sup> This is why the ending of UNICEF assistance for the MoH threatens the continuance of the targeted SFP programmes being run by the MoH.

- All such modalities demand greater levels of capacity from partners (due to their greater complexity) and closer monitoring than does GFD. Even BSFP, the option that is in many ways most similar to GFD, requires the ability to be able to screen potential beneficiaries to identify those in need of more assistance than can be provided through the BSFP programme;
- The tonnages that can be distributed through such mechanisms is very limited in comparison to GFD. This is an important issue in Darfur as there is still a major food deficit, with agricultural production still far below the pre-crisis levels. Although GFD may be 'leaky', in terms of food aid entering the local market, this leakiness helps to stabilise food prices and prevent large-scale nutritional distress;
- In a context where agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, modalities such as FFW demand security of tenure, and end to occupation, security and a comprehensive peace before they can be implemented on a sufficient scale to meet the food needs of the population.

160. These factors suggest that there is currently only limited scope for non-GFD modalities in Darfur. However, while still channelling the bulk of food through GFD, WFP is focusing on increasing non-GFD modalities in 2010 because they offer more effective targeting.

#### **4.B.8 Programming: The return issue**

161. As noted earlier, interviewees were divided on the extent to which the affected population would return to their homes and under which conditions they would do so. IDPs were very clear that the reason they displaced was insecurity, and that they would return to their homes when it was safe to do so. Some WFP staff suggested that IDPs were staying in camps because of the assistance that they were receiving, and that food assistance was delaying return, but the team found that reasons for non-return were more complex than this.

162. As noted earlier, there has been almost no return, despite reducing rations size, and the reduction in services in several camps due to the expulsion of NGOs in March 2009. Neither food aid nor services in the camps are stopping people from returning. However, the lack of services in the areas of likely return does not encourage return. At the same time it is clear that not all the IDPs would return even if it were safe to do so. Some had very marginal livelihoods in the rural areas, and returning to their former homes has no attraction. Others are vulnerable, and do not have the resources to re-establish their old livelihoods. Others have no livelihoods to return to as their original land has been occupied. Others again have become urbanised and are less likely to return to a rural setting with each passing year.

163. WFP has support return in the few instances where there has been some return, but large-scale return is unlikely unless people feel safe to return. One key informant commented that Darfur was always a somewhat dangerous place, but now the perception of risk has changed for the IDP community to the extent that even a small event such as the theft of a donkey is seen as a major security incident<sup>53</sup>.

#### **4.B.9 Programming: Partnership relations**

164. Partners are very positive about WFP generally. For example, partners praised the training that WFP has provided (including a new training initiative targeting areas of weakness identified in partner operations). Partners also appreciated the

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<sup>53</sup> This is probably not very surprising given that, for many IDPs, one of the features of displacement was the theft of livestock and productive assets.



support they have got from WFP on other issues including security<sup>54</sup>. At one meeting with cooperating partners they reported that WFP was a great partner except for one aspect.

165. The one exception to good partnership are the FLAs. FLAs are the agreements that WFP signs with its cooperating partners, that set out the volume that they are expected to distribute and the rates of payment. WFP in Sudan has been engaged in an effort to drive down costs and part of this effort has included what cooperating partners described as aggressive renegotiation of FLAs. However, several experienced NGO staffers made the point that FLAs are often an issue in places other than Sudan.

166. Some partners complained about the slowness of WFP in paying them. However, the delays in payment varied between partners. This suggested that the reason WFP offered for these delays, that partners varied in their capacity to submit complete documentation on time, may well be correct.

167. One partner complained that WFP was obliging them to use roads that were not cleared by UN security. Again, these roads are used by WFP trucks with contracted drivers to deliver the food, and most of those interviewed argued that road closures by the UN were not always a good reflection of the actual risks.

168. Partners were generally far more positive about WFP than WFP staff were about partners. WFP staff criticised partners and provided examples where partners:

- Lacked capacity, even for simple thing like preparing budgets;
- Had excessive staff turnover, increasing costs and problems;
- Billed WFP for services (such as oversight and monitoring) that they did not provide;
- Failed to implement agreed policies such as the enhanced commitment to women or providing shade at distribution sites;
- Wanted to cross subsidise their other operations from their food distribution activities. However, in this case, the examples given were not convincing and partners strongly argued that far from subsidising other operations, other operations were subsidising the food operations.

169. Partner criticisms centred on the pressure on them to reduce costs in a very difficult environment. There are several issues around the FLAs:

- WFP divides costs in FLAs into tonnage-based costs (based on the tonnage of food handled) and time-based costs (based on the duration of the FLA). WFP is very keen to have as many costs as possible given as tonnage-based. However, the reality is that the bulk of partner costs are time-based. Due to Sudanese labour laws, it is not possible to shrink staff in response to reduced tonnages. Partners try to allow for this by inflating some costs to give them some fat in the budget in case tonnages are less than foreseen;
- WFP has a very good picture of the actual costs of food distribution, stemming from its own distribution experience. This means that partners have very little opportunity to pad the budget to aim off for reduced tonnages;

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<sup>54</sup> One example of good partnership was when WFP went beyond its legal contractual obligations when it provided funding to cover the six-months pay that the Government demanded the expelled CPs pay to their now-jobless staff.

- WFP has a responsibility to its donors to ensure that the funds it is entrusted with are well used. It is therefore appropriate for WFP to challenge cost estimated presented by partners, to ensure that its resources are well used;
- Tonnages that partners handle may be reduced by security problems, pipeline breaks, and ration reductions. Partners argue that WFP has much greater control over these than partners have and so should bear the financial risk. Similarly, they argue that WFP is much better able to bear the financial risks relating to security than cooperating partners are<sup>55</sup>.

170. The issue of FLAs was a very contentious one, and the points made by both WFP and partners are valid. Cooperating partners have great difficulty in recruiting appropriately qualified staff for Darfur, and the quality of their performance suffers as a result. It is also true that the present FLA system represents an unfair sharing of financial risk between WFP and its cooperating partners<sup>56</sup>.

#### **4.B.10 Programming: Direct distribution vs partner distribution**

171. One issue that interviewees differed on was the relative costs of direct distribution (by WFP) compared with distribution through cooperating partners. Some WFP staff argued that it was cheaper for WFP to distribute directly than to work through cooperating partners. WFP is currently using a set cost per ton as a target for all FLAs.

172. In discussion with WFP staff, it was clear that staff were basing their estimate of the cost of direct distribution on the marginal cost. Given the WFP already has staff and vehicles, the marginal cost of using them to manage distributions is not all that high. A second factor that helped to produce low estimates of the cost of direct distribution was the use of former NGO staff by WFP for direct distributions in 2009. These staff were contracted at NGO terms and were not treated as UN staff for security purposes.

173. This made them much cheaper than WFP staff. Those NGO staff who have been retained are now regular WFP employees and much more expensive. While the marginal cost of direct distribution in 2009 was low, this ignores the full economic costs.

174. Quite simple, it is a lot more expensive for WFP to distribute than it is for partners to do so. This is because WFP has a higher cost base than most partners, with level of UN salary and benefits typically being higher than the levels paid by cooperating partners.

175. However the real cost of direct distribution is the opportunity cost of having WFP staff doing distributions instead of their main tasks. WFP managers in one area acknowledged that they had made little progress on alternative distribution modalities as they were so involved in direct distribution.

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<sup>55</sup> WFP staff face the same security risks that its partners do, what is being discussed here is the financial risk to the organization.

<sup>56</sup> To put it succinctly: If the tonnage falls, partners lose their income, but WFP does not have to refund donors if tonnages are less than planned (although it make future donor funding more difficult). Partners can present WFP with additional costs resulting from reduced tonnages, but these costs have to be well documented, whereas the FLA rates are on an agreed rate rather than a documented cost basis. However, NGO accounting is normally quite primitive, and costs may not be recorded against cost centres, making it difficult for NGOs to properly document additional costs.

#### **4.B.11 Programming: Milling vouchers**

176. WFP has piloted a milling voucher programme in two IDP camps in north Darfur. Each voucher entitles the recipient to mill 9kg of cereal. The millers are paid 1.50 new Sudanese pounds (about 0.65US\$) per 9kg by WFP at *El Fasher*. WFP has signed agreements with 37 millers.

177. The attraction of milling vouchers is that food sells in the market in Darfur for far less than it costs WFP to deliver it to Darfur. In 2009 the budget cost of WFP sorghum was US\$1,193 per mt<sup>57</sup>, while the market price for was only US\$358 per mt - just 30 percent of the cost to WFP. Thus it is more than three times as efficient for WFP to provide milling vouchers than it is for WFP to provide food which beneficiaries sell to pay for milling services<sup>58</sup>. The team found that where people paid for milling with sorghum, the amount of sorghum needed to pay was equivalent (on the local market) to twice the cash cost of the milling.

178. The impact of the milling voucher programme was positive. Before the vouchers were introduced households without cash had to exchange 22 percent of the food ration to pay for milling costs. They were also selling about 34 percent of their cereal ration to pay other costs. After the introduction of the scheme, none of the ration has to be sold to pay for milling, and the amount of food aid sold has also fallen dramatically. WFP's monitoring suggests that a combination of food aid and vouchers is far more useful for beneficiaries than food aid on its own<sup>59</sup>.

179. In order to reduce the security risks inherent in cash payments WFP pays the millers by cheque drawn on bank accounts in *El Fasher*. WFP also pays the transport costs for the millers to come to

#### **4.B.12 Programming: Inclusion and exclusion errors**

180. Inclusion errors can exist at two levels:

- Persons may be given a particular status (e.g. IDP status) when they are not in fact internally displaced. This was the sense in which the term was used by most key informants;
- Persons who are entitled to a particular status and are given assistance, but who do not need it because of the resources that they have access to. Such inclusion errors existed, but most key-informants regarded these less significant than the first category.

181. It should be noted that WFP is not responsible for registration. This responsibility was given by the IOM in the first year of the response by the then humanitarian coordinator. This is because registration is used not just for WFP food, but also for non-food-items and services.

182. The evaluation team were offered the following reasons for inclusion errors relating to status:

- Registration of townspeople as IDPs. The reasons given for such registrations included the temporary migration of urban poor to the IDP camps near urban centres, the facilitation of the registration of town-based relatives of IDP, or of urban families who had hosted IDPs (as a repayment of their hospitality);

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<sup>57</sup> This is the average total budget cost of US\$1,351 per mt less the difference between the price of sorghum and of the average price for the overall food basket.

<sup>58</sup> The same logic could be applied to other services, such as transport, that beneficiaries currently pay for with food. However, there is a very large food deficit in Darfur, and moving too much of the food assistance to cash would lead to big increases in the cost of food.

<sup>59</sup> WFP *El Fasher* (2010) milling voucher programme, impact monitoring report

- Continuance of people on the list even though they have left the camp or have died<sup>60</sup>. Interviewees commented that IDPs leaving the camp, either to travel to another camp, or to migrate to an urban area, typically give their ration card to extended family members, or sell the card to those with the resources;
- Multiple registration by some IDPs.

183. Unsurprisingly, IDPs interviewees focused more on exclusion errors. They typically raised the exclusion of the following from the ration rolls:

- Those children born since the ending of general registration in 2005. Typically, children under 5 are not on the distribution lists. In the five years since general registration new births are likely to have amounted to 16 percent of the original IDP population<sup>61</sup>. It is important to highlight that despite this, there is no evidence of generalised under 5 nutrition. WFP has tried to cover this group through support for SFP and BSFP, but coverage is not universal for either of these<sup>62</sup>;
- Those who had arrived in the camp after registration had closed. There is constant low level movement between different camps for family reasons or for livelihood opportunities<sup>63</sup>. The team talked to one beneficiary who was about to leave the camp she was in to travel to *Geneina* where she had lined up a job in a brick-yard. Other beneficiaries also gave examples of moving between camps;
- Those who missed the registration because they were away attending to family ceremonies or other responsibilities.

184. It should be noted that WFP intends to address the two issues around inclusion and exclusion errors:

- First: Status. in late 2009 WFP adopted re-verification as a key priority in order to identify whether people on the distribution list are genuine IDPs and to remove non-IDPs and the double-registered;
- Second: Need. WFP is undertaking in-depth studies of IDP livelihoods to better understand what factors are associated with the need for food assistance. The intent is to develop some means of targeting food at the most needy. However, there is even greater opposition in the affected population to the targeting of GFD than there is to the verification of lists.

185. WFP has recently completed a re-verification exercise at one small site (Masteri in west Darfur) and plans to continue with similar exercises at the remainder of the IDP camps. However, it took four attempts to get the community leaders to agree to this exercise, and in the end they only did so after WFP had suspended food deliveries for three months.

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<sup>60</sup> Since the ending of general registration in 2005, at most 0.8 percent of the IDP population can be expected to have died, as CMR can be expected to have been no more than 0.2/10,000 per day after the very high mortality in 2003-2004. Depressed mortality rates are typically found after disasters such as famines and epidemics as the stresses lead to the deaths of many people with other underlying conditions.

<sup>61</sup> This is based on the assumption that the average crude birth rate for Sudan of 32/1,000/year applies (UNICEF, 2008, p. 140).

<sup>62</sup> Despite the extension of BSFP in 2009 it is still quite limited.

<sup>63</sup> Although some IDPs threatened to move camp because of small differences in the ration, and some WFP staff took such threats seriously, it is very hardly unlikely that people will move for a slightly different ration as food aid is generally less than half the income for a household.

186. In *Masteri*, the community as a whole were in favour of verification, as they believed it would lead to the inclusion of those born since November 2005 on the distribution list. Opposition to the verification came from the Sheiks because they are the biggest gainers from the holding of multiple ration cards. *Masteri* is a small rural camp and bigger inclusion errors can be expected at the urban camps. In the event, 14.5 percent of the existing distribution list did not attend for verification, but this was balanced by almost the same number of new births. The verification team expected to exclude some of those who did attend for verification when the details they gave were checked against the original registration database.

187. The difficulty of registration and verification are perhaps illustrated by the fact that when the registration team announced the child vaccination certificates would be acceptable as proof of identity for those children under 5 without birth certificates, some enterprising person set up a stall outside the registration area to sell vaccination certificates.

#### 4.B.13 Resources and costs

188. Resourcing has already been dealt with under factors outside of WFP's control as while WFP may attempt to influence donors, donors take their funding decisions based on their own agendas. As noted earlier Sudan is a very expensive country for WFP to operate in with the budget cost of the Sudan EMOP costing 35 percent more than the average cost per mt for other EMOPs.




Figure 8: Breakdown of costs for EMOP 10760 (based on Budget Revision 3).

189. There are a number of reasons for this high level of cost. Table 8 shows the breakdowns of budget costs for EMOP 10760. It can be seen that cost of LTSH cost in Sudan is more than the food cost. Darfur is said to be the furthest point from any port in Africa, and costs are very high.

190. DSC (largely the costs of WFP salaries and office costs) are very high in Sudan. This is due to a number of reasons including:

- The large number of staff to staff and support a large network of sub offices in Sudan; and

- The high costs of operating in an insecure environment. Hazard pay, rest and recuperation costs, and compliance with security rules all lead to significantly increased costs<sup>64</sup>.

191. Since late 2009, the country team have been working hard to drive down the cost per ton, and the cost per ton has fallen by one sixth. However part of the reason for this fall has been the increased tonnage of food targeted for south Sudan. Transport costs are much lower for south Sudan as large amounts of food can be moved by barge.

192. WFPs operations in Darfur in 2009 were effective, but they were expensive. There is good evidence from the DFSMS data that without WFP assistance there would have been a food crisis in Darfur in 2009. While IDPs continue to develop a range of alternative livelihoods, many of these are fragile, unsustainable, maladapted, and contingent on good security. Few provide a sufficient income for the affected population.

## **5. Overall assessment and recommendations**

### **5.A. Overall assessment**

#### **5.A.1 Relevance and Appropriateness**

193. WFP's assistance was relevant and appropriate to the context in Darfur as there are continuing food security needs there demanding large tonnages of food assistance. These needs are driven by the continuing conflict as large-scale displacement affects both the displaced and those who were economically intertwined with them.

- The biggest threat to the appropriateness of WFP's assistance is the growing gap between needs and assistance. The gap is driven both by increasingly obsolete distribution lists from 2005, and by the wide variations in the levels of need at the household level due to differential access to alternative livelihoods. Many of these livelihoods are fragile, maladapted, or predicated on improved security. WFP has reacted to reduced needs by reducing the overall ration.
- The most useful tool that WFP has to ensure the relevance of appropriateness of assistance is the DFSMS. This ensures that the general reduction in rations have not have any major food security impacts at the surveyed sites.

#### **5.A.2 Efficiency**

194. WFP relied mostly on GFD in Darfur. While this has the lowest operating cost per mt, and is less demanding of the skills of cooperating partners than other modalities, it is also untargeted. WFP had planned to move a greater amount of food to targeted modalities in 2009, but the expulsion of partners both removed partners with the necessary skills for such modalities, and coping with direct distribution mean that WFP staff had little time for modalities requiring greater management input.

- WFP increased the use of targeted modalities to a small extent in 2009. However, the huge food deficit in Darfur, and the issue of limited partner capacity for non GFD modalities both limited the use of such modalities.
- WFP's operation in Darfur is one of the most expensive in the world. This is driven both by logistics and security costs. WFP began to drive down these

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<sup>64</sup> The salaries of guards account for half the DSC costs in Sudan.

costs in late 2009. WFP also increased efficiency through the introduction of milling vouchers on a pilot basis in 2009.

### **5.A.3 Effectiveness**

195. WFP was effective in 2009, delivering 107 percent of the funded tonnage to 95 percent of the planned beneficiary numbers. WFP was only able to do this because it built on a mature programme that learned lessons from previous years, and incorporated them in the programme.

- Generous donor support, largely from the United States, and the willingness of donors to provide resources in the third quarter of 2008, were a key factor in enabling WFP to be effective.
- WFP's targets, in terms of reducing mortality and malnutrition rates below critical levels were not true targets, as they have been largely met since late 2005. However, WFP assistance had helped to prevent any new humanitarian crisis developing in Darfur in the light of the failure to resolve the political one and bring large-scale displacement to an end.

### **5.A.4 Sustainability and connectedness**

196. WFP's assistance is not sustainable. The fact that WFP has been able to fund such a large operation for such an extended term is a tribute to the quality of the WFP programme and to its ability to interest donors in the crisis.

- Assistance to Darfur is unlikely to continue at the present levels. The likelihood of the country splitting in two following the forthcoming referendum suggests that donor funding will also be split, with less for Darfur.
- WFP has taken great efforts to ensure that its assistance is coherent with longer term issues in Darfur. WFP has invested in academic studies on issues such as livelihoods in Darfur and has benefited from the insights of some of the leading researchers on Darfur.

### **5.A.5 Overall assessment**

197. WFP has done a good job in the face of very difficult circumstances. WFP responded very well to the challenged posed by the sudden loss of distribution capacity with the expulsion of cooperating partners. While WFP dealt very well with this shock, the impact of fighting this fire was that less was done than planned in terms of rationalising the case-load or introduction other modalities more widely.

198. One of the key achievements in 2009 was the introduction of the Darfur food security monitoring system. This provided WFP with good quality information that demonstrated that there were no large problems related to the provision of a partial ration rather than a full one.

199. WFP has demonstrated a constant effort to deepen its understanding of the complex dynamics in Darfur and has benefited from the insight of some of the most knowledgeable academic experts on Darfur to develop its programme.

## **5.B. Recommendations**

200. There is a continuing need for food assistance in Darfur. GFD is the modality with the lowest cost per ton, and the modality which is least demanding in terms of the capacity of cooperating partners.

### **Recommendation 1**

#### **WFP Sudan should continue with General Food Distribution in Darfur for 2010.**

201. GFD suffers from a number of disadvantages, the first of which is that, the need for food assistance varies greatly within communities. Six to seven years after first being displaced, IDPs and other member of the conflict-affected communities have developed alternative livelihoods. However, the affected community are very opposed to any differential targeting of GFD within the community, partly because the entitlement to food assistance is confounded with recognition of their conflict-affected status, and partly because the affected community correctly understand the alternative livelihoods to be fragile, and a poor substitute in many cases for their original livelihoods.

### **Recommendation 2**

#### **In the face of the inability to effectively target GFD within communities, WFP Sudan should continue to reduce the GFD ration level so that all food modalities combined match the overall community need for external food assistance.**

202. The alternative livelihoods developed during the last seven years are not only fragile but vary greatly between different sites due to differing access to land and markets for labour or other services. The present Darfur food security monitoring system provides good information about the areas which it covers, but because of variations in livelihood opportunities between sites<sup>65</sup>, the situation at the monitored sites cannot be extrapolated to other sites.

### **Recommendation 3**

#### **WFP Sudan should extend the Darfur food security monitoring system to provide managers with good information on the impact of ration changes on different locations.**

203. The extension of the DFSMS is necessary to ensure that any further reduction in rations scales do not lead to suffering and death. Extending the DFSMS will provide more information about the average level of need in different settings.

204. The variations in livelihoods opportunities between different sites means that the average need for food assistance varies between sites. While beneficiaries talked about moving to take advantage of different rations, this is not an option for other than a handful of beneficiaries as most rely more on their current livelihoods than on food-aid. Moving to access more generous ration scales only applies when communities are wholly dependent on the ration.

### **Recommendation 4**

#### **WFP Sudan should move away for a single ration for all beneficiaries of a single category to a menu of rations that are allocated to a category in a single location based on food security information.**

205. In other words, information from the DFSMS about particular sites should be used to set the ration level for that site. Obviously there cannot be more than two or three basic rations to avoid excessive complexity.

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<sup>65</sup> Each site is effectively a unique livelihood zone, because potential livelihoods are determined not only by the presence of natural resources, but also by access to these, which may be determined by security among other factors.



206. Given that those born after 2005, and other unregistered persons, are not included in GFD, the general lack of grave food-security and broad nutritional problems, suggests that there is some sort of redistribution mechanism at work within the affected population. The planned WFP research into livelihoods may reveal the extent to which any such redistribution involves those benefiting assuming social or other debts and obligations. The DFSMS data also suggests that even with redistribution, there are still large differences between the food security of different families within communities.

#### **Recommendation 5**

**WFP Sudan should consider introducing a targeted ration especially for vulnerable cases.**

207. If vulnerable persons within the community, and vulnerable communities (such as those in north Darfur experiencing nutritional problems), are effectively targeted then this would the separation of food need from the broader conflict-affected entitlement issue, and would allow the GFD ration to be reduced to a nominal level, with a possible eventual abandonment of large-scale GFD.

208. There are two broad types of inclusion errors in the distribution lists in Darfur. The first source of inclusion errors, the inclusion of those who are members of affected communities but who do not need assistance is very difficult to address. The other source of inclusion errors, the inclusions of persons not entitled to assistance because of double registration or non membership of the assisted category of persons is easier to address.

#### **Recommendation 6**

**WFP Sudan should continue working with IOM to rationalise the distribution lists, and should suspend distributions at sites where the community refuse to accept re-registration.**

209. While opposition to registration is normally from the sheiks, sheikdom is a semi-democratic institution and the population have the capacity to oblige sheiks to accept re-registration.

210. WFP is still conducting direct distributions. Direct distributions have a large opportunity cost for WFP. It may be that WFP is underestimating the price point at which direct distribution becomes more economic than working through partners. The problem that WFP faces is that direct distribution prevents its staff from concentrating their efforts on alternatives to GFD.

#### **Recommendation 7**

**WFP Sudan should try to avoid direct distribution if at all possible. This may involve developing cooperating partner capacity for sites where no acceptable distribution partner has yet been found.**

211. WFP has already engaged in developing partners' capacity. Partners see this as a very vital support and rated it very highly.

212. Cooperating partners felt that WFP had been very aggressive in negotiating the costs of FLAs, and that this was a departure from otherwise good partnership. Partner's costs are largely time-based but WFP drives hard to treat costs as tonnage-based. Experienced cooperating partners noted that the friction around costs is not unique to Sudan, but is much higher with WFP than with other UN agencies.

## **Recommendation 8**

### **WFP globally needs to look at a mechanism for negotiating costs with partners that better reflects partnership.**

213. Such a mechanism could include a global agreement on costs, or setting fixed rates for services that apply to all partners (so that partners with a lower cost basis have greater opportunity to build their capacity). It might also include provisions for greater transparency and accountability on the use of funds.

## Annexes

### Annex 1: Terms of reference

Evaluation of Sudan EMOP 10760.0 “Food assistance to populations affected by conflict”

#### I. Background

##### A. Context of the evaluation

Sudan is a low-income, food-deficit country that continues to be wracked by conflict, displacement and country-wide insecurity. It is ranked 147 out of 177 countries on the 2007/8 human development index<sup>66</sup> and it is ranked 56 out of 88 countries on the IFPRI GHI. On the Human Poverty Index for developing countries Sudan ranks 69 out of 108 countries for the index has been calculated. In Sudan there is a 26 percent probability of not surviving past age 40 and the percentage of children ages 0-5 that are underweight for age is 41 percent.

In **Darfur**, despite the emergence of a fragile Darfur Peace Agreement in early 2006, conflict continues among armed opposition factions, the Sudanese military, militias and ethnic groups. In 2009 violence newly displaced an estimated 137,000 individuals<sup>67</sup> in Darfur and simultaneously humanitarian agencies have experienced reduced access to affected populations since 2006 due to heightened insecurity, targeted attacks against aid workers and bureaucratic obstacles to aid operations. In **southern Sudan** the National Congress Party and the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement continue to implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement through the joint Government of National Unity. Since 2005 the UN estimates that 2.2 million people have returned to southern Sudan and the Three Areas of southern *Kordofan*, Blue Nile and *Abyei*; their return has strained scarce resources and weak infrastructure. In **eastern Sudan**, where the Government of National Unity and the Eastern Front opposition coalition signed the eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in 2006, slow recovery from decades of conflict means that humanitarian needs in the area persist.

Part of the context for this evaluation is the evaluations of humanitarian assistance in Sudan, particularly Darfur, that have already been conducted in recent years. In the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) Review of Humanitarian Action in 2004, Larry Minear analyzed the humanitarian sector’s assessment of its response to the Darfur crisis up to early 2005<sup>68</sup> and his assessment was based largely on a desk review of six evaluations of recent work in Darfur<sup>69</sup> and a wider literature review on the Sudan. Minear reviewed the following eight thematic areas, which represented the main recurrent concerns expressed by humanitarian agencies in assessing their own performance in the Darfur crisis: mobilizing humanitarian action; addressing the crisis of protection; supporting IDPs and refugees; saving livelihoods; managing tensions between the humanitarian and the political; situating humanitarian action in relation to the

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<sup>66</sup> UNDP Human Development Report 2007/8

<sup>67</sup> UN estimates as per USAID Situation Report #11, -(FY) 2009 August 07, 2009

<sup>68</sup> Minear, Larry (2004) Lessons Learned: the Darfur experience.

<sup>69</sup> The six evaluations included: UN Interagency Evaluation (2004); Joint UNICEF-DFID Evaluation of UNICEF’s Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency (2005); Real-Time Evaluation of UNHCR’s Response to the Emergency in Chad (2004); Real-Time Evaluation of CARE International’s Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis (2004); Real-Time Evaluation of Oxfam Darfur Crisis (2004) and Darfur 2004: a Review of MSF-H’s Responsiveness and Strategic Choices (2005).

conflict; improving coordination; and crafting an appropriate and accountable international presence.

In 2006 WFP OE managed an external evaluation of the *WFP EMOP 10339.0/1: Assistance to populations affected by conflict in greater Darfur, west Sudan*. This evaluation covered the period April 2004 to December 2005. The key evaluation questions took the form of 20 hypotheses that were derived from detailed preparatory work, including field work, carried out by a team from the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University.

In mid-2006 WFP and Tufts University jointly organized a three-day Food Aid Forum in Khartoum to discuss the use of food aid and the potential roles and activities of WFP in Sudan. A special issue of *Disasters*<sup>70</sup> was compiled: it contains a selection of the best papers presented at the forum and moves beyond past analysis to current issues.<sup>71</sup> In their editorial paper, Gelsdorf, Walker and Maxwell conclude that WFP Sudan is, of necessity, undergoing a range of strategic change processes that need to be considered as it plans and operationalizes its future.

Specifically, the authors above identify a number of key outcomes/issues emerging from the forum, including:

- the challenge for WFP to create true partnerships at multiple levels in Sudan;
- the need for WFP to focus on the protection of livelihoods and saving lives and not just the latter;
- the need for WFP Sudan structures and business practices to evolve to fit a resource base that is likely to be reduced in the future;
- the need for WFP to take specific but interrelated approaches to specific problems or areas given the complex operational environment;
- the challenge for WFP globally and in Sudan to re-think food aid as a positive contribution to the development of markets and not only as a deliverable product; and
- the need for WFP to evolve its partnerships with UN agencies, especially FAO and UNICEF in Sudan, in the face of a rapidly changing global environment.

In addition, the same authors recommend five key areas of focus for WFP's future development in Sudan, as follows:

- The creation of true partnerships that help to guide, implement and evolve its future programming;
- The critical need for evidence-based programming, for example, to ensure effective targeting of emergency food aid (and minimize inclusion and exclusion errors) and to allow meaningful comparison of food-market and livelihood indicators across regions and time through systematic and standardized monitoring;

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<sup>70</sup> *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies, Policy and Management*, Volume 31, Supplement 1, March 2007.

<sup>71</sup> The papers of particular relevance to an assessment of WFP emergency operations in Darfur are the following: Gelsdorf, Kirsten, Walker, Peter and Maxwell, Daniel (2007) "*Editorial: the future of WFP programming in Sudan*"; Keen, David and Lee, Vivian (2006) "*Conflict, trade and the medium-term future of food security in Sudan*"; Maxwell, Daniel (2007) "*Global factors shaping the future of food aid: the implications for WFP*"; Young, Helen (2007) "*Looking beyond food aid to livelihoods, protection and partnerships: strategies for WFP in the Darfur states*"; Buchanan-Smith, Margie and Jaspars, Susanne (2006) "*Conflict, camps and coercion: the ongoing livelihoods crisis in Darfur*".

- The need to integrate factors beyond traditional food security indicators, such as political assessments, into ongoing assessments and monitoring of livelihoods and continually to assess the implications for WFP operations and its overall objectives;
- The opportunity for WFP to nudge the market in Sudan toward more equitable distribution of entitlements, given Sudan's approach toward food self-sufficiency and the distance separating hungry populations from regions with surplus food production, for example, by:
  - purchasing significant amounts of food in Sudan even at higher than prevailing market prices;
  - trying to stimulate surplus production in deficit areas;
  - considering how to buy surpluses from small farmers more effectively;
  - critically examining its purchases from the small number of large-scale investors, which may undermine land resolution issues;
  - spelling out its role in developing road and rail infrastructure; and
  - reassessing the ways in which cash- or voucher programmes can be used to boost viable demand for traded food.
- The need for WFP to embrace innovative approaches in its livelihood interventions in order to unlock the full potential of livelihood systems and change food security, by understanding how local economies function and then identifying the leverage points where resources and knowledge can most fruitfully be applied.

There are six WFP operations ongoing in Sudan: EMOP 10670.0, which is the subject of this evaluation, and CP Sudan (2002-2006)<sup>72</sup> 10105.0, together with SOs 10368.0, 10181.5, 10342.2 and 10845.0. The CP Sudan acknowledges the prevailing complex emergency situation and aims to exploit the limited opportunities available to promote recovery and development through school feeding and FFW activities. The special operations deal, respectively, with i) emergency road repair and mine clearance; ii) the provision of humanitarian air services; iii) the UNJLC common logistics services and coordination and support to NFI and emergency shelter sector and iv) operational augmentation for WFP and NGO partners in Darfur.

The main objective of the Sudan emergency operation is to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (WFP strategic objective one<sup>73</sup>). To the extent possible, the operation also aims to restore and re-build livelihoods in post conflict situation (WFP strategic objective three) and to reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition (WFP strategic objective four).

The Sudan emergency operation planned to assist 5.9 million conflict-affected/displaced persons, refugees and returnees during the period 01 January to 31 December 2009 through the provision of 677,990 mt food commodities at a total cost of US\$ 921.4 million.

Subsequent to project approval in September 2008, there has been one budget revision in April 2009. The purpose of the budget revision was to reduce the total cost to WFP from US\$ 921.4 million to US\$ 829.4 million in order to take into account decreased project food requirements and associated decreases in commodity costs and external transport costs together with reduced commodity and external transport

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<sup>72</sup> The CP Sudan (2002-2006) has been extended in time until Feb 2010 through budget revision 7.

<sup>73</sup> As per the new WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011.

rates. The budget revision also reflects decreased LTSH costs and increased DSC and other direct operational costs (ODOC) costs. The decreased food requirement was due to the fact that WFP reduced food rations from January-April 2009 following the harvest.

In terms of operational design, the EMOP comprises nine activities and the allocation of food requirements among the activities is as follows: GFD (80 percent), demobilization (1 percent), FFW (2 percent), FFR (4 percent), FFE (7 percent), FFT (1 percent), supplementary feeding (2 percent), therapeutic feeding (0.02 percent) and institutional feeding (2 percent).

The allocation of food requirements among geographical areas is as follows: South Sudan (14 percent), Centre, east and Three Areas (9 percent) and Darfur (76 percent). Some of the main discussions revolving around the operation at the Sudan regional bureau level include the following<sup>74</sup>:

- the NGO expulsions of March 2009 and how to cover the resulting gap in operational capacity in parts of Darfur;
- increasing levels of insecurity in south Sudan and how to maintain access to areas (such as *Akobo County* in *Jonglei state*) where the resident population is becoming increasingly food insecure;
- the need to reconsider the planned phase-out of GFDs in south Sudan partly due to;
- the impact of the current economic crisis;
- the impact of anticipated poor harvests in Kenya and Uganda and associated food price increases; and
- the risks associated with the upcoming elections, which have been postponed until April 2010, and the run-up to the 2011 referendum that will determine the future status of south Sudan.

## B. Stakeholders

The interest and range of stakeholders for the Sudan EMOP is necessarily complex given the geographic scope of the EMOP (including Darfur, the Centre, east and Three Areas and south Sudan), the huge number of planned beneficiaries (5.9 million), the number of different operational activities (nine) and the number of WFP sub-offices (29).

A summary of the key internal and external stakeholders for this evaluation are detailed in Table 1.

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<sup>74</sup> Extracted from the WFP Executive Brief: Sudan, 04 August 2009.

**Table 16. Stakeholder matrix<sup>75</sup>**

<b>Key stakeholder group</b>	<b>Interest in the Sudan EMOP</b>	<b>Interest in the evaluation</b>
Local NGO partners	- Play a key role in implementation - Field presence of WFP is crucial to other humanitarian assistance actors (who are not WFP cooperating partners)	- Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur and the role of specific NGOs - Evaluation may draw attention to specific issues of interest of different NGOs
International NGO partners	- Play a key role in implementation - Field presence of WFP is crucial to cooperating partners and other actors	- Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur and the role of specific NGOs - Evaluation may draw attention to specific issues of interest of different NGOs
Government of National Unity	- Possibly conflicting interests in EHA - Scale and scope and history of WFP operations in Sudan pose special partnership issues	- Possibly conflicting interests in the evaluation
Local authorities in Darfur states	- Involved in constantly evolving security and access issues that directly affect the operation	- Possibly conflicting interests in the evaluation
UN Country Team	- Involved in a high-profile, large-scale emergency humanitarian programme - Different UN agencies have different interests in the EMOP and WFP's presence in Darfur	- Evaluation may identify policy, strategy, partnership or coordination issues of interest to the different agencies
OMS Regional Bureau	- Responsible for strategy, management and coordination of emergency food assistance	- Evaluation may identify policy and/or design and implementation issues that will inform future programming
WFP HQ	- Some involvement in policy and implementation guidance	- Responsible for management response to the evaluation
WFP Executive Board	- No specific role in the operation	- Interested in the evaluation as part of WFP's commitment to learning and accountability

## II. Reason for the evaluation

### A. Rationale

The main rationale for this evaluation is that an evaluation of the Sudan EMOP was foreseen both in the Sudan project document and the OE biennium work plan for 2008-2009.

Since the Sudan operation remains WFP's largest humanitarian operation, it is particularly important that evaluations are carried out on a regular basis. The last OE-managed evaluation of the Sudan emergency operation was carried out in 2006.

### B. Objective

The objective of the evaluation is two-fold: accountability and learning. Specifically, the first objective is to determine the degree to which stated project objectives are being achieved in order to be accountable for aid expenditures to stakeholders, including donors and beneficiaries. The second objective is to draw lessons from the current operation and to make recommendations, if and as necessary, to contribute to the improved performance of the next Sudan emergency operation.

<sup>75</sup> A more detailed and context-specific stakeholder analysis will be prepared by the evaluation team during the pre-mission phase based on a review of key background documents and discussions with key stakeholders.

### III. Scope of the evaluation

#### A. Scope

Given the complexity and vast geographic coverage of the Sudan EMOP, it is important to define carefully the scope or boundaries of the present evaluation, especially since available resources are limited. It will not be possible to address adequately the myriad aspects, challenges and concerns of an emergency operation as large and complex as the Sudan EMOP. It is therefore in the interest of WFP Sudan, OE and WFP more generally that the evaluation appropriately delineate the programme<sup>76</sup>, temporal and geographic scope of the evaluation exercise in order to maximize utility and added value. The delineation of the scope (and focus) of the evaluation must necessarily take into account the following:

- the relative allocation of resources to various activities and geographic areas;
- the findings of academic and action research work that has been done in recent years in Darfur and the Sudan; and
- the fact that WFP Sudan may also commission specific (additional) research work in the future to guide its strategy and operations, as it deems necessary.

In terms of programme scope, the evaluation will focus on **GFD activities** since these account for approximately 80 percent of planned food requirements. The evaluation will therefore focus on **Strategic Objective One** (saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies) since GFDS are the main activity meant to contribute to this strategic objective. The evaluation will pay attention to issues related to the protection of livelihoods, and not only the saving of lives, although there are no specific performance indicators given in the project document or logical framework that are explicitly linked to livelihood outcomes.

In terms of temporal scope, the evaluation will focus on the period **01 January to 31 December 2009**. This period corresponds to the full twelve months of the ongoing EMOP 10760.0. To the extent necessary to explain or understand events in 2009, the evaluation may also take into account operational details and events related to the previous emergency operation, EMOP 10693.0, which was implemented in 2008.

In terms of geographic scope, the evaluation will focus on **Darfur** since it accounts for 76 percent of planned food requirements<sup>77</sup>. The evaluation will not explicitly cover either south Sudan or the centre, east and Three Areas.

#### B. Evaluability assessment

**The logical framework.** The logical framework summary or logic model that is presented as Annex II to the project document summarizes the various outcomes and outputs expected together with associated performance indicators and assumptions and risks. The logic model highlights three key assumptions related to adequate security conditions, access and operational capacity of WFP and its partners and the adequacy of the food commodity pipeline as particularly relevant to the achievement of project objectives.

The logic model presents three strategic objectives, indicating immediate objectives for each one, according to the new WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011, as follows:

- Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (strategic objective 1);

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<sup>76</sup> Programme scope refers to those activities that will or will not be covered by the evaluation.

<sup>77</sup> General food distribution accounts for 94 percent of the total planned food requirement for Darfur.



- to reduce or stabilize acute malnutrition, mortality rates and protect livelihoods amongst IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups and communities;
- Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations (strategic objective 3);
- to support the return of IDPs and refugees and the re-establishment of livelihoods and food security of communities;
- Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition (strategic objective 4);
- To increase access to quality education, particularly for girls, and improve the nutritional status of those affected by chronic disease.

As noted in paragraph 21 above, the evaluation will focus only on Strategic Objective One with its dual aspect of saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies.

The project logic model is broadly consistent with the new WFP Strategic Results Framework, which presents the WFP Strategic Objectives, associated goals, outcomes, outputs, indicators, corporate target and performance measures and project targets and data sources. The following features of the project logic model with respect to Strategic Objective One are particularly noted:

- Only one immediate objective (to reduce or stabilize acute malnutrition, mortality rates and protect livelihoods amongst IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups and communities) is presented under SO1 but this is actually a combination of the three goals as presented in the strategic results framework (namely, *to save lives in emergencies and reduce acute malnutrition caused by shocks to below emergency levels; to protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery; and to reach refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups and communities whose food and nutrition security has been adversely affected by shocks*);
- Only one outcome is presented under SO1 (reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition and mortality rate of the targeted conflict affected and displaced population) but this is actually a combination of the first and second outcomes as presented in the strategic results framework (namely, *reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted, emergency populations and reduced or stabilized mortality in children under 5 and in adults in targeted, emergency-affected populations*). Although only one outcome is presented, two associated corporate indicators (*prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight for height as a percent) and CMR*) are indeed presented as two performance indicators for the stated outcome; the project logic model also presents a target for each of these two indicators (*<15 percent and, 1/10,000, respectively*). An additional (third) indicator (*recovery rate in targeted supplementary >70 percent and for therapeutic feeding >75 percent*) is also presented in the project logical framework.

It may be noted that for each of the two outcomes included in the project logic model (and discussed above) there is one additional corporate performance indicator that is not reflected in the project logic model (*mid-upper arm circumference and age-specific mortality rate for children under 5, respectively*). In addition, the third outcome under SO1 identified in the strategic results framework (*improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households*) is not included in the project logic model.

**Nutrition outcome data.** It is anticipated that the evaluation will be able to access data on recent rates of global acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute

malnutrition (SAM) from sources such as CDC, UNICEF and WFP. The nutritional surveys include cross-sectional nutritional surveys carried out by WFP and surveys that cover a limited area such as an IDP camp or a specific urban or rural area. It is expected that survey coverage may be patchy and that survey timing may be irregular.

**Mortality outcome data.** It is anticipated that updated CMRs and mortality rates for children under 5 will be available from sources such as CDC, UNICEF and WFP. Mortality surveys are susceptible to certain weaknesses and many do not take into account the pattern and severity of conflict during the mortality-recall period. Previous reviews of mortality data have yielded widely divergent estimates of the total death toll in Darfur.

**Livelihood outcome data.** There is considerable information available on food security and livelihoods, although there is not yet a nation-wide food security information system. The WFP/VAM regularly produces Darfur food security monitoring updates for north, south and west Darfur as well as periodic food security and livelihood assessment reports. Importantly, there is also a wealth of recently updated academic and action research on livelihood systems in Darfur that is readily available.<sup>78</sup>

**Output data.** It is anticipated that WFP Sudan can readily provide updated monthly food distribution and beneficiary figures, disaggregated by activity and geographic area, through its internal monitoring and reporting systems and the Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System. It is recognized that the final standard project report (2009) may not be available before the planned field work in Feb/Mar 2010 but in any case figures may be compiled and consolidated based on existing reporting systems.

#### IV. Key issues and evaluation questions

In accordance with international and good practice standards, the evaluation will assess WFP performance against stated project objectives, in particular, the main objective of saving of lives and protecting livelihoods, in terms of the standard evaluation criteria of relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability/connectedness.

The acknowledged gap in operational capacity triggered by the expulsion of 13 international NGOs and the closure of 3 national NGOs in Darfur in March 2009 means that implementation/efficiency issues assume particular importance for this evaluation. The evaluation will try to assess:

- the impact of these NGO expulsions and closures on the provision of WFP food assistance and the achievement of strategic objectives;
- the extent to which WFP has been able to fill these operational gaps.

The evaluation will try to ensure that balanced attention is given to both programme and logistics issues and to both saving lives and protecting livelihoods in the development of the key questions given below.

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<sup>78</sup> Young, Osman *et al* (2005) *Livelihoods Under Siege* (2004); Buchanan-Smith & Fadul (2008) *Adaptation and Devastation: The Impact of the Conflict on Trade and Markets in Darfur. Findings of a Scoping Study*; Young, Osman *et al* (2009) *Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the northern Rizaygat, Darfur*; Young, Jabobsen *et al* (2009) *Livelihoods, Migration and Conflict: Discussion of findings from two studies in west and north Darfur, 2006-2007*; Young & Maxwell (2009) *Targeting in Complex Emergencies: Darfur case study*.

Within the overall framework of the standard evaluation criteria, and recognizing the special operational challenges presented by the NGO expulsions and closures, the evaluation will attempt to answer the following key questions:

- To what extent is WFP covering the assessed food assistance needs of vulnerable individuals in Darfur, taking into account needs covered by other food assistance providers? (relevance/coverage);
- How successful is WFP in targeting the most vulnerable and food insecure populations (IDP, rural and urban) in Darfur in order to minimize both inclusion and exclusion errors? (targeting efficiency);
- Is WFP food assistance for targeted beneficiaries in Darfur adequate to support both the saving of lives and the protection of livelihoods, particularly in light of ration reductions in 2009? (effectiveness);
- How (and to what extent) is WFP re-orienting its existing partnerships and/or developing new partnerships that will guide and implement its future programming in Sudan? (sustainability/connectedness);
- How (and to what extent) is WFP taking advantage of the multiple opportunities that exist to help develop local markets in Sudan? (impact).

The evaluation team will take into account the findings of available research and background documentation in developing a few related sub-issues for each of these five key questions.

## V. Evaluation design

### A. Methodology

The overall approach for the evaluation will be developed by the evaluation team. It is anticipated that the evaluation will use a range of data collection methods including *inter alia* structured document review, key informant interviews and focus group discussions and a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, as appropriate, to ensure the impartiality, transparency and credibility of evaluation findings.

### B. Evaluation Quality Assurance System

WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the (United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP) and Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the ToR. All these tools are available with OE. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation.

### C. Phases and deliverables

The evaluation phases and corresponding outputs are detailed in diagram 1 below.

**Diagram 1: Evaluation phases and outputs**

Description	Responsible	Key Dates
<b>Preparatory Phase</b>		
Preparation of ToR	Evaluation Manager	Aug 2009
Circulation and revision of ToR	Evaluation Manager	
Preparatory mission	Evaluation manager	Nov 2009
Identification and contracting of firms	OE	Sep-Nov 2009
<b>Pre-mission Phase</b>		
Team briefing (Rome)	Evaluation manager	
Submission of pre-mission report	Evaluation Team	Jan 2010
Quality Feedback	OE	
Submission of revised pre-mission report	Evaluation Team	Feb 2010
<b>Field Mission Phase</b>		
Field mission	Evaluation Team	Feb/Mar 2010
<b>Reporting Phase</b>		
Submission of draft evaluation report	Evaluation Team	Apr 2010
Quality Feedback	OE	
Submission of revised evaluation report (1)	Evaluation Team	
Circulation of revised evaluation report	Evaluation Manager	
Compile stakeholder comments	Evaluation Manager	
Respond to stakeholder comments	Evaluation Team	
Submission of revised evaluation report (2)	Evaluation Team	May 2010
Circulation of executive summary (summary report)	Evaluation Manager	
Revision of executive summary (summary report)	Evaluation Team	
Submission of final evaluation report	Evaluation Team	Jun 2010

**Pre-mission report.** The purpose of the pre-mission report is three-fold:

- to review and clarify elements of the ToR, if necessary;
- to validate and confirm the overall evaluation approach and details of the method, tools and data sources to be used to undertake the evaluation;
- to present the preliminary findings of the desk review;
- to identify specific information gaps to be filled with data collected during the evaluation mission;
- The pre-mission report is prepared by the evaluation team under the responsibility of the team leader, on the basis of a desk review of all available documents and discussions with key stakeholders. It assures the evaluation manager that the evaluation team has a good grasp of what is expected from the evaluation and begins the field work fully prepared.

The pre-mission report will include the following annexes:

- a completed reading grid or matrix in which key relevant issues for WFP Sudan and the evaluation are identified from key background documents and mapped against the standard evaluation criteria;
- a confirmation of the various sub-questions related to each of the five key evaluation questions, presented, for example, in the format of an evaluation matrix;
- a detailed stakeholder analysis that identifies the specific interests and concerns of stakeholders, especially those of external stakeholders in Darfur and Sudan, based on a thorough review of key background documents and initial discussion with key stakeholders;

- a tentative schedule of planned field meetings;
- a tentative schedule of planned project site visits, as per clear selection criteria;
- questionnaire guidelines and data collection formats to be used during the field work in different types of interviews and discussions and;
- a list of graphs and/or tables to be included as annexes to the final evaluation report.

**Evaluation mission.** Fieldwork will be undertaken in Khartoum and in areas of WFP emergency operations in Darfur. Fieldwork will be carried out in accordance with the details of the evaluation methodology developed by the evaluation team.

**Evaluation report.** The evaluation report will bring together the findings of the evaluation team in a concise and analytical report as per the EQAS report template. The draft report will be shared with stakeholders and the response of the evaluation team to these comments will be documented in the evaluation report.

## VI. Organization of the evaluation

### Expertise of the evaluation team

The evaluation team should have expertise and experience in the following areas:

- Confirmed extensive experience in the **evaluation** of humanitarian action and/or development evaluation. Ability to draw out lessons and implications for operational strategies, design and implementation. Proven experience in “best practice” evaluation methods and techniques for the evaluation of operations and/or policies;
- State of the art knowledge of the socio-economic and political dimensions of international development, humanitarian action and **food security**, including access to specific expertise in **livelihoods, nutrition** and **logistics**;
- Proven updated and in-depth knowledge and understanding of the development and humanitarian context, specifically in **Darfur** and more generally in Sudan;
- Ability to understand and analyze links between the overarching goal of food security and various development policies at agency, national and international level;
- In-depth understanding of WFP strategic objectives, policies and operations, globally and in the Sudan. Appropriate experience across the range of WFP programme categories and types of activities;
- At least 3 years of work experience with a United Nations humanitarian agency and/or an academic research institution, preferably in more than one region and including the Sudan;
- High level of skills in both written and oral communications;
- Proven ability to deal sensitively with Government authorities in various regions in multi-cultural environments, to build effective working relations with clients and colleagues and to reach balanced judgements;
- Availability of comprehensive and clearly written reports based upon the aggregation of material from a wide range of sources.

## B. WFP Stakeholders' roles and responsibilities

This evaluation is led by the WFP Office of Evaluation and the evaluation manager, Maureen Forsythe, is responsible to:

Prepare the terms of reference of the evaluation;

- Select and recruit the consulting company to carry out the evaluation work in coordination with the WFP Dubai office;
- Organize an initial evaluation team briefing in WFP HQ;
- Organize the field mission in coordination with the Sudan Regional Bureau;
- Provide a first level of quality feedback and assurance for the evaluation products;
- Disseminate reports to the various stakeholders; and
- Act as the principal interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP.

The **WFP Sudan Regional Bureau**, which will host the evaluation mission for the field work, is responsible to:

- Provide data and information requested by the evaluation team;
- Provide logistics support for the evaluation team in terms of lodging and transport to and from the airport and to and from project areas;
- Arrange meetings with cooperating partners and Government officials, as requested by the evaluation team and detailed in the visit itinerary;
- Participate as key informants and interviewees by allocating sufficient time for meetings;
- Accompany the evaluation team to various meetings with cooperating partners and Government officials, if requested by the team leader;
- Assist the evaluation team with interpreting during field visits by making available two or three national staff who can speak the local language and/or assisting with local recruitment of external interpreters, as necessary;
- Provide management responses to evaluation recommendations, as appropriate.

The main responsibility of the **WFP HQ** staff is to:

- Participate as key informants and interviewees, as required by the evaluation team;
- Provide management responses to evaluation recommendations, as appropriate.

## C. Communication

The dissemination strategy for the evaluation includes the following: an in-country de-briefing and presentation of preliminary findings, the presentation of the summary evaluation report to the Second Regular Session of the Executive Board 2010, the posting of the final evaluation report and summary evaluation report on the WFP external website and the sharing of new learning products that will consolidate key evaluation lessons. All reports will be prepared and presented in English.

#### D. Budget

Funds will be provided from the 2009 OE PSA budget.

Annexes: (Not included here)

Annex 1: Bibliography

Annex 2: Sudan EMOP project document

Annex 3: Annex II (of Sudan EMOP project document): Summary of Log Frame

## **Annex 2: Evaluation methodology**

### **Logic model**

#### **Internal logic and consistency with project documents**

The project documents are broadly consistent with WFP's approach in Darfur. However, the EMOP logic model suffers (as do all logical frameworks) from the assumption of linear causality. The team used the logic model displayed in Figure 1, but even this presents a very simplified picture of the complex reality of Darfur.

#### **Analysis of assumptions and risks**

The assumptions in the logic model are very limited. A great many more assumptions are implicit, but stating them explicitly could be politically difficult. The same is true of the EMOP document. The Government has not been slow to expel international staff who have published views that they dislike as can be seen from the expulsion of Jan Pronk<sup>79</sup> and Mukesh Kapila<sup>80</sup>.

#### **Availability of quantifiable targets**

There are quantifiable data at the input level and output level. However, the preservation of livelihoods is not covered by any identified indicators.

The outcome indicators were met before the start of the project, so they are wrongly expressed as targets, rather than as thresholds that the project should prevent the affected population from exceeding. However, here WFP staff are limited in the wording of indicators to the formats available in the indicator compendium.

#### **Implications for the evaluation**

The complexity of the underlying logic in Darfur means that the team adopted a backwards approach; instead of working forward along the logic model, the team will work back, asking what was achieved in terms of outcomes, and then asking interviewees about outputs, and thus what inputs led to these outcomes.

They found that while there was general agreement on the outcomes, the underlying causes was more disputed. Beneficiaries in group meetings exaggerated the importance of food aid to their livelihoods and minimised alternative livelihoods<sup>81</sup>.

The complexity of some of the issues means that the team has had to place a lot of reliance on key-informant interviews.

### **Methodology**

The team took a multi-method approach and used a range of tools to try and establish the questions posed in the Terms of reference.

#### **Survey**

The team conducted two online surveys, one of WFP staff and the other of WFP partners. The surveys were conducted immediately prior to the fieldwork partly to bring the evaluation to the attention of potential interviewees.

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<sup>79</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6076022.stm>

<sup>80</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3559621.stm>

<sup>81</sup> This was not the case in individual meetings where beneficiaries were quite candid about the relative importance of different livelihood sources.



## **Documentary research**

The documentary research concentrated on finding sources on the three intermediate indicators:

- Mortality data;
- Malnutrition data;
- Livelihood data. There was relatively little documentary evidence on this and observation and key informant interviews were the main source of data on livelihoods.

The fieldwork in Darfur supplemented the information that the team had gathered from the documents. The fieldwork data tended to deepen and nuance the team's understanding from document research rather than contradicting it.

## **Statistical analysis**

The team used statistical analysis of the available food delivery and other monitoring data. This analysis was completed for the full year using data supplied by WFP in Khartoum.

The team paid particular attention to DFSMS data and nutritional surveys to form a view on the overall food security and nutritional situation.

## **Key informant interviews**

Key-informant interviews were a principle data sources for this evaluation. This was natural, given the complexity of the context. Even where the team uses numerical indicators developed from the documentary research or statistical analysis, it still relied on key informant interviews to put these into context. Interviews were generally semi-structured, based around the questions in the evaluation matrix.

Given the extent to which factors outside of the evaluation influenced the achievement of the strategic objective, key-informant interviews were essential to try and establish what perceptions are held about the contribution from different sources towards the strategic objective.

The team conducted key-informant interviews with:

- WFP staff (in the Regional Office, and in the Area Offices);
- Donor representatives;
- Local and international partners (NGOs and parts of the Red Cross Movement);
- Government (especially in Darfur);
- Informal community leaders;
- Individual beneficiaries;
- Market traders (an important source for livelihood data);
- Other UN agencies.

## **Group interviews**

The team conducted group interviews<sup>82</sup> with the affected population in Darfur. The team tried to use these interviews to get the view of the affected population on the assistance that they have received. In particular, the team expected that these would be an important source of information on livelihoods. However, the team found the group interviews tended to be dominated by the "IDP narrative" (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. 35) which challenged the idea that alternative forms of livelihood were important, or food aid could be reduced or targeted.

The team paid close attention in group interviews to avoid any topic of discussion that might pose a risk to members of the group in such a contested environment as Darfur.

## **Observation**

The team made greater use of observation than had originally been expected. Observation was used not only as a triangulation technique to validate information from informants, but also to learn directly. The team made limited use of photography, given the restrictions on photography in Sudan.

## **Briefing and debriefing**

The team held debriefing meetings with area and country offices, as well as with cooperating partners and donors. These meetings served not only to brief the participants about the evaluation team's conclusion, but also served to test the hypotheses that the team was generating.

## **Triangulation**

When Webb *et al.* coined the use of the term triangulation in social research in 1966 they noted that the "most persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of measurement processes. If a proposition can survive the onslaught of a series of imperfect measures, with all their irrelevant error, confidence should be placed in it." (Webb *et al.*, 1966, p. 3).

The team used the following means of triangulation<sup>83</sup>:

- Data source triangulation (collecting data from different sources (for example, interviewing both WFP and cooperating partners' staff);
- Temporal triangulation (collecting data from the period prior to the March expulsion of NGOs and the period after to see how operations have changed);
- Geographical triangulation (collecting data from the different operational areas in Darfur). The team found that while there were some similarities between the different parts of Darfur, there were major differences not only between the three Darfur states, but also within these states;
- Researcher triangulation (collecting data with the three team members). This is confounded somewhat with geographical triangulation as the team split up with one researcher in each of the three Darfur states;


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<sup>82</sup> These interviews are sometimes called focus-group interviews, but we expect that the interviews will not meet the criteria for focus-group interviews established by Krueger and Casey (2009), in that the meetings will generally be open rather than closed.

<sup>83</sup> The first three types of triangulation correspond to the three types of data triangulation listed by Denzin (2009, pp. 310-311). The fourth and fifth correspond directly to Denzin's methodological and researcher triangulation.

- Methodological triangulation (collecting data through different methods -for example, comparing policy documents with information from key-informant interviews).

The team used triangulation not just in a simplistic way to try and achieve convergence, on a single idea (as illustrated below) but also as a tool for analysis, where inconsistency and contradiction between different sources were used to develop a deeper understanding<sup>84</sup>. One such example was the understanding that the lack of convergence between livelihoods at different sites was due to the different livelihood opportunities that applied even in apparently similar context across Darfur.



### Approach to analysis

The focus of the team as on the production of robust conclusions based on a clear chain of evidence. In order to promote this, the team used, from the start, an issues and evidence matrix (based on the evaluation matrix) to record all of the key pieces of evidence to ensure that the report's conclusions are well founded. In total the team recorded 408 separate pieces of evidence based on group meetings, observations, and key-informant interviews.

### Ethics

Darfur is a dangerous environment, not only for WFP staff and the evaluation team, but especially for the affected population. The team was very careful to ensure that the evaluation research does not put anyone in harm's way. The ethical standards for the evaluation were the UNEG guidelines and code of conduct (UNEG, 2008a, 2008b).

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<sup>84</sup> Mathison suggests that triangulation may lead to convergence, inconsistency, and contradiction, but that triangulation should not be seen as a mechanical method of ensuring validity, but as a tool to help the researcher construct plausible explanations for what is observed (Mathison, 1988, p. 17).

## **Limitations**

### **Scale**

The sheer size of the Darfur Operation means that any evaluation cannot simultaneously be comprehensive and in-depth. Therefore the evaluation had to focus on some aspects of the overall operation.

### **Nature of the evaluand**

The nature of the evaluand raised methodological constraints. For example, in the case of Strategic Objective One it was very difficult to determine in the data if lives had been saved. At least here, indicators such as the CMR were useful. In Darfur, there was no complete data on either the extent of mortality or denominator (the size of the population). The team had to rely on the mortality rate estimated from different surveys. Even then, it simply is not possible to say what exact impact food aid has had on mortality (although it is possible to say, based on the views of knowledgeable key informants that it has some impact).

Livelihoods posed even more of a problem. The ToR notes the lack of indicators for livelihoods. Livelihoods are not static, but dynamic. This dynamism makes “protecting” livelihoods a very difficult area to access. Which livelihoods are protected? The previous ones, or those that have adapted to displacement? To what extent are the new livelihoods "maladapted" and damaging other or future livelihoods? The difficulty of answering questions around livelihoods without strong evidence created difficulties for the evaluation team, especially given the reluctance of the affected population to discuss livelihoods in any way that might lead to a reduction in rations.

### **Security**

Security imposed significant constraints on the evaluation, both in terms of the need to limit risks to team members and to any accompanying WFP staff, as well as the need to meet the formal security requirements for travel permits etc. The team will at all times complied with the security advice of WFP. One example of the security constraint was the need for the evaluation team to spend 10 percent of the fieldwork time in two day security training in Darfur<sup>85</sup>.

### **Logistics and access**

Darfur is a large area, larger than France, with poor roads and a difficult security context. Travel on many routes could only be undertaken with military escorts, and other areas are closed to UN staff. This means that the plan of work had to be developed in conjunction with the country office, and sites could not simply be picked at random.

Even these plans came unstuck as weather forced a grounding of all flights for a few days during the mission, forcing the team to change the programme and reschedule, curtail, or abandon some of the planned visits.

### **Evaluation team**

#### **John Cosgrave (team leader)**

An independent consultant based in Ireland. He has more than 30 years of experience of humanitarian action and development in nearly 60 countries. His initial academic training was in engineering, but he holds further qualifications in management and social science. John spent the better part of two decades managing

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<sup>85</sup> Even the team leader, who is a security trainer and has conducted security training in Darfur was obliged to attend the two day training.

projects and programmes for NGOs in the aftermath of natural disasters and complex political emergencies before starting to work as an evaluator and trainer in 1997.

Since 1997 John has led a great many evaluations, mostly of humanitarian action, for a wide variety of clients including Donors, NGOs and the UN. John led the last WFP evaluation of Darfur operations (Cosgrave *et al.*, 2006).

### **Annemarie Hoogendoorn**

A senior consultant with over 20 years of experience on food and nutrition for development and humanitarian aid, including policy and management issues. Based in the Netherlands she provides consultancy services on all phases of the project cycle. She has taken part in major thematic evaluations on food and nutrition and a wide range of programme and project formulation and evaluation missions.

An experienced evaluator, Annemarie led the thematic review of WFP's mother and child nutrition interventions (Hoogendoorn *et al.*, 2005). She has also participated in some other WFP evaluations (PRROs in Indonesia and Ethiopia) and conducted the 2008 Safety Nets study in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Hoogendoorn, 2008). Annemarie will be focusing on nutritional aspects in this evaluation.

### **Hugh Goyder**

Originally trained as an economist, but then worked as a UN volunteer in India, before joining Oxfam in 1976. Hugh worked as an Oxfam Country Director, first in India, and subsequently in Ethiopia, where he led Oxfam's response to the 1984 famine. On returning to the UK he worked for Oxfam on evaluation issues, and in 1992 joined Action Aid UK, initially as their co-ordinator for west and southern Africa, and later as their first Co-ordinator for Impact Assessment.

Hugh is an independent humanitarian consultant, with special interests in M&E and impact assessment, and previous experience both of managing and evaluating major emergency programmes. Hugh was the team leader for the real-time evaluation of WFP's Tsunami response (Goyder *et al.*, 2005) and in the same year also reviewed the (ECHO) European Commission's Humanitarian Office -funded Strengthen Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity project for WFP. His focus in this evaluation is on livelihood aspects.

### **Quality assurance**

Quality assurance was conducted by the WFP Office of Evaluation. WFP has developed an EQAS based on the UNEG norms and standards (UNEG, 2005a, 2005b) and current good practice in evaluation as typified by guidelines from the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, and the DAC of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)<sup>86</sup>.

The EQAS sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the ToR. All these tools are available with OE. EQAS was systematically applied during the course of the evaluation.

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<sup>86</sup> Relevant DAC guidelines include evaluation quality standards (OECD/DAC NDE, 2006) and the guidelines for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies (OECD/DAC, 1999). Relevant ALNAP guidance includes the guide to using the OECD/DAC criteria (Beck, 2006) and the ALNAP quality pro-forma (ALNAP, 2005).

## Evaluation stakeholders

The following stakeholder analysis has been developed from the analysis initially presented in the Terms of reference. This version of the stakeholder analysis includes learning from both the desk study and the field work.

All those who have an interest in the ongoing EMOP may be considered to be stakeholders in the evaluation because of the risk that the evaluation will lead to changes in the way in which WFP implements its projects.

**Table 17: Evaluation stakeholders**

Stakeholder	Assumed interest in the Sudan EMOP	Assumed interest in the evaluation
WFP beneficiaries in Darfur	Currently receive assistance from WFP. Are affected by WFP operations through the impact on local prices and terms of trade.  Beneficiaries have a strong interest in presenting WFP assistance as key to their survival. The evaluation team found strong evidence of what Helen Young refers to as the IDP narrative.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the assistance that they get or in prices and terms of trade.
WFP GFD non-beneficiaries in Darfur	Currently do not receive assistance from WFP. Are affected by WFP operations through the impact on local prices and terms of trade.  This group was significant, and included most children under 5 in Darfur. These have not been included in the GFD rolls because of concern about large inclusion errors in the distribution lists. In some cases, the under 5s benefit from blanket or targeted supplementary feeding.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to their inclusion to changes in prices or terms of trade.
Traders in Darfur	WFP operations influence local prices and terms of trade.  Traders estimated that WFP food accounted for 70 percent of all cereal trading in Darfur.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in prices or terms of trade.
Community leaders	Whether community receives assistance or not may influence how leaders are perceived. Community leaders were found to be the biggest beneficiaries of inclusion errors. Some community leaders were levying taxes on food recipients.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the assistance that their community gets. In particular any reduction in inclusions errors represents a threat for those community leaders who have built up collections of ration cards.
Local authorities	WFP assistance represents a significant resource flow into Darfur. Local authorities were balancing local concerns with national political ones.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the WFP resource flow.
Contractors	Earning an income from WFP.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in contracts.
Contracted academics	Engaged in research in Darfur funded by WFP.	Evaluation may influence issues for further research in Darfur.
Evaluation community	Nil	Evaluation as an example of evaluation conducted under WFPs EQAS system.

<b>Stakeholder</b>	<b>Assumed interest in the Sudan EMOP</b>	<b>Assumed interest in the evaluation</b>
WFP cooperating partners	Cooperating with WFP provides part of their income stream and may help them to carry out their mandated action. However, there were differences between WFP and cooperating partners on the extent of cross-subsidy between WFP funded actions and others.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the relationship with cooperating partners.  Evaluation may highlight issues of key interest to them.
All NGOs in Darfur	Field presence of WFP is crucial for access to resources such as transport and increases security.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that change WFPs presence or practices.
Other UN agencies in Darfur	WFP has the largest presence of any of the UN agencies and plays a significant role in supporting the work of other UN agencies, even when they are not direct partners.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that changes WFP ability to support the work of other agencies.
Government of National Unity	WFP assistance represents a significant resource flow into Darfur. Relations with the international community are fraught.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the WFP resource flow and part of the international presence in Darfur.
Anti-Government elements	WFP assistance represents a significant resource flow into Darfur. International staff represent both external witnesses and a potential source of publicity and income.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the WFP resource flow and part of the international presence in Darfur.
Security authorities	Involved in constantly evolving security and access issues that directly affect the operation.	Evaluation may influence future programming in Darfur that leads to changes in the WFP resource flow and part of the international presence in Darfur.
UNAMID	The UNAMID provides security escorts for some WFP operations. It also has objectives such as the sustainable return of IDPs that are directly affected by WFP operations.	Evaluation may influence future WFP programming in Darfur that has an impact not only on WFP's need for escorts, but also on some of the other areas covered by UNAMID's mandate.
UN Country Team	Different UN agencies have different interests in the EMOP and WFP's presence in Darfur.	Evaluation may identify policy, strategy, partnership or coordination issues of interest to the different agencies.
OMS Regional Bureau	Responsible for strategy, management and coordination of emergency food assistance. Trying to balance needs in Darfur with growing needs in south Sudan.	Evaluation may identify policy and/or design and implementation issues that will inform future programming. Evaluation may influence internal perceptions of the operation and of the responsible staff.
Other WFP country operations	Interest in Sudan as the largest EMOP in WFP, and a possible competitor for donor resources.	Evaluation may identify policy, strategy, partnership or coordination issues applicable to other programmes.
WFP HQ	Some involvement in policy and implementation guidance.	Evaluation may identify policy and/or design and implementation issues that will inform future programming.
WFP Executive Board	Overall oversight.	Interested in the evaluation as a tool for learning and accountability.

## Annex 3: List of persons met

### Summary of persons interviewed by type

Category of person interviewed	Cat	No	as %	of which ♀	♀ as %
WFP Rome staff	R	3	1		
WFP Sudan staff	W	68	28	19	28
Cooperating partner staff	P	63	26	6	10
Government officials	G	6	2	0	
Donors	D	12	5	6	50
Beneficiaries	B	23	10	10	43
Other	O	67	28	17	25
<b>Total</b>		<b>242</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>24</b>

Only 24 percent of key informants were female, this reflects gender imbalance in the senior staff of Cooperating partners, and in operational staff in WFP.

### Summary of persons interview by interview method

Type of interview method	Type		as %	of which ♀	♀ as %
General meeting	gm	41	17	7	17
Semi-structured Interview (individual interviewee)	ssi	34	14	11	32
Semi-structured Interview (group - two or more interviewees)	ssg	120	50	26	22
Brief Discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)	bd	27	11	6	22
Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)	dd	20	8	8	40
Telephone interview	ti	0	0	0	
Other	ot	0	0	0	
<b>Total</b>		<b>242</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>24</b>



## List of persons met

Only the main encounter with each individual is shown. Some persons were met multiple times

Surname, Forenames	Org. and function	♂ ♀	Meth	Cat	Place	Date/ Mar
Abakar Yusuf, Mariam	IDP with 3 children and 2 rations	♀	dd	B	Morni	18
Abbute, Woldeeslassie	FAO south Darfur, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Abdalla	WFP Geneina, FFE Programme Officer (WFP Darfur since Aug 04)	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Abdalla, Musa	WFP Nyala, Field Monitor	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	15
Abdalla, Nurein	WFP Nyala, Programme assistant	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	14
Abdelini, Hajai	Elderly Widow without rations	♀	bd	B	Sallah	20
Abdella, Abdelarahman	WFP Kutum, Senior Prog Assistant	♂	ssg	W	Kutum	17
Abdelmajid, Bakri Osman	WFP Nyala, VAM National Officer	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	14
Abdelmanjled Abderman, Asha	IDP running a tea shop, Morni	♀	bd	B	Morni	18
Abdul Ahmed, Fadil	UNAMID Geneina, Head of Office	♂	gm	O	Geneina	21
Abdul Hamid Ali, Ayataib	ZOA Gereida, Head of Office	♂	gm	P	Gereida	16
Abdulla Mohammed, Hassan	Cart driver (15) waiting for business at Sallah Market	♂	dd	B	Sallah	20
Abdulla, Musa	Riyadh Camp, Head of Sheiks, and head of Food Relief Committee	♂	bd	B	Riyadh Camp	15
Abdur Rahman	Shopkeeper, Sallah Market	♂	bd	B	Sallah	20
Abdur Rahman, Asadic	Shopkeeper's son (15), Sallah Market	♂	dd	B	Sallah	20
Abdur Rahman, Mohammed	Shopkeeper's son (13), Sallah Market	♂	dd	B	Sallah	20
Abram, Walieldin	CRS Geneina, Sr Programme Officer	♂	gm	P	Geneina	16
Abubaker, Baker Hissan	IIRO Nyala, Director	♂	ssi	O	Nyala	15
Abubaker, Mohammed	FAO, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	15
Abukabr, Ahmed	Team leader for GFD group of 40 persons in Riyadh Camp	♂	bd	B	Riyadh Camp	15
Adam, Abdul Karim	AHA Operations Manager	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	13
Adam, Atif Ismael	WFP Nyala, Nutrition Officer	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Adam, Omer Mohammed	Sudan Council of Churches Nyala Office	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Adar, Mohammed	UNHCR Sudan, Dep. Representative	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	08
Addalla, Ssman Gafr,	Sudanese Red Crescent, Secretary General	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Ahmad, Aisha Hessin	Merciful Hands Organization	♀	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Ahmed Anzul, Mohammed	Mill owner, Sallah	♂	dd	B	Sallah	20
Ahmed Giballa, Giballa	CRS Geneina	♂	gm	P	Geneina	21
Ahmed, Omer	WFP Habila, Security Advisor	♂	gm	W	Habila	19
Akello, Jackson	WVI Nyala, Operations Manager	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	15
Al Khudairi, Zainab	Darfur Coordination Unite, Programme Officer	♀	ssi	W	Khartoum	21
Alamu, Degnachew	Samaritan's Purse Nyala, Food Aid Programme Manager	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	15

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂ ♀</b>	<b>Meth</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date/ Mar</b>
Alaurad, Khalid	UNICEF-ND, Nutrition Officer	♀	ssg	O	El Fasher	14
Alemir, Musa	WFP Habila, Administrator	♂	gm	W	Habila	20
Alfatih, Bushar	Sudanese Red Crescent, west Darfur State Director	♂	ssi	P	Geneina	16
Ali, Abulghasim Ahmed	Sudanese Red Crescent, Geneina, Sr Programme Officer	♂	gm	P	Geneina	16
Ali, Ahmed Mohammed	WFP west Darfur, Programme Officer, Geneina and Kulbus Sub-Office	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Ali, Azhari El Haji	WFP- Prog. Officer - Education	♂	ssg	W	El Fasher	21
Ali, Mohammed	National Security Gereida	♂	ssg	G	Gereida	16
Ali, Sinan	WFP Nyala, Logistics Officer	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Amdin, Yusuf	FAO, M&E Officer	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	24
Amella	ICRC Gereida,	♀	ssg	O	Gereida	16
Andrea, Peter	WFP Habila, Field monitor (acted as translator)	♂	gm	W	Habila	19
Arbat, Mohammed Jubar	Food Relief Committee, Member, Abu Zar	♂	bd	B	Abu Zar Camp	16
Arup, Sefadil	Grain Trader, Geneina Market	♂	bd	O	Geneina	16
Awadalla	WFP Geneina, GFD Programme Officer (WFP Darfur since Feb 04)	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Ayurse, Joyce Akandu	UNICEF, Nutrition Officer	♀	gm	O	Geneina	15
Baba, Hassan	Grain Trader, Geneina Market	♂	bd	O	Geneina	16
Babaeva, Mohira	WHO Geneina, Head of Office	♀	gm	O	Geneina	21
Baghi, Abdul	Sudanese Red Crescent, Logistics Assistant	♂	bd	P	Abu Zar Camp	16
Barrow Boy	Boy ferrying sacks of grain at 1SDG per bag in Abu Zar Camp	♂	bd	P	Abu Zar Camp	16
Bashar, Guma	WVI, SFP coordinator	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Beyene Teshome	AHA-ND. Director	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	13
Bishara, Ahmed	HAC Gereida	♂	ssg	G	Gereida	16
Carcani, Lida	UN Resident Coordinator's Support Office, Darfur Senior Field Coordinatoin Advisor	♀	ssi	O	El Fasher	09
Carrera Narvaez, Juan Carlos	ICRC Sudan, Head of Operations, Darfur	♂	ssi	O	Khartoum	24
Conte, Barbara	WFP Nyala, Programme Officer Nutrition	♀	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Corinne Fleischer	WFP CO Sudan Darfur Coordinator	♀	ssg	W	Khartoum	07
Daoudi, Amer	WFP Sudan, Country Director and Representative	♂	ssg	W	Khartoum	07
Delbaere, Jan	WFP, Deputy Chief, Food Security Analysis Service	♂	ssi	R	Rome	08
Diallo, Ibrahim	WFP Geneina, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	13
Din, Nasaral	MSF Belgium - Medical Focal Point	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	14
Dix, Detlef	Regional Director, GAA, N.Sudan	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Duwa, Eric	WFP Habila, Sr Programme Advisor	♂	gm	W	Habila	19
Ebedalla, ElKhidir Elyass	CRS Geneina, Assistant Programme Officer	♂	gm	P	Geneina	16
Edler, Johan	WFP Nyala, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12
El Hatiiz Ibrahim, Mohammed	FAO Geneina	♂	gm	O	Geneina	21
El Tigani Mahmoud, Abu	Sudanese Red Crescent, International Cooperation Director	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂ ♀</b>	<b>Meth</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date/ Mar</b>
Baker						
Eldin, Mohamed Salah	FAO south Darfur, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Elkenani, Barakat Faris Badri	Sudanese Red Crescent ND, Director	♂	ssi	P	El Fasher	14
Eskalam	UNHCR Sudan, Sr Supplies Officer	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	08
Essa, Abdelhaleen Haliz	RDHA Nyala	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Farah Abdrafulla, Siddiq	FAO Geneina	♂	gm	O	Geneina	01
Fernandez, Gloria	OCHA Sudan, Head of Mission	♀	ssi	O	Khartoum	08
Fleischer, Corrine	WFP Sudan, Darfur Coordinator	♀	ssg	W	Khartoum	07
Gashim, Abul	Sudanese Red Crescent, Senior Program Assistant	♂	dd	P	Riyadh Camp	15
Gbanya, Miatta Zenabu	Merlin, Medical coordinator	♀	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Greve, Betty	UNHCR Darfur Coordinator and Head of Sub-Office, Geneina	♀	gm	O	Geneina	21
Guma, Nasir	UNHCR Geneina, Programme Officer	♂	gm	O	Geneina	14
Habtegabriel, Resom	WFP Geneina	♂	gm	W	Geneina	21
Hallim, Abdul	Sudanese Red Crescent, Food Monitor	♂	bd	P	Abu Zar Camp	16
Hassan, Aladdin	SPCR, Executive Director	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Hassan, Ashraf	IOM west Darfur, Head of Office	♂	gm	O	Geneina	14
Hassan, Mohammed	Mill owner, Sallah	♂	dd	B	Sallah	20
Hassan, Salah	SPCR, former coordinator Nyala	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Hassan, Yassir	IOM Sudan, Registration Officer west Darfur	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	12
Hassan, Yousuf	Dept of Education, El Fasher	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	21
Haydock, Sally	WFP, west Darfur Coordinator	♀	ssg	W	Geneina	13
Hercyk, Darren	Catholic Relief Services, Country Director	♂	ssi	P	Khartoum	08
Horie, Masanobu	WFP Morni, Head of Office	♂	dd	W	Morni	16
Hughes, Sean	DFID Sudan, Humanitarian Adviser	♂	ssi	D	Khartoum	08
Ibrahim, Mohammed	Habila Locality Commissioner and former responsible for Al Zakhat	♂	ssg	G	Habila	19
Ibrahim, Ibrahim Mohamed	WV Nyala	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Ibrahim, Mutasim Hashim	RCO Nyala	♀	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Ibrahim, Rahama Mohammed	Sudanese Red Crescent, west Sudan Sector Coordinator	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Ibrahim, Yassir Rahman	Grain Trader, Geneina Market	♂	bd	O	Geneina	16
Idris Hassan, Fatima	Elderly IDP with a single rations	♀	dd	B	Morni	18
Idris, Md Ali	WFP, Food Monitoring Assistant	♂	ssg	W	Kutum	17
Iqbal, Mohammed	UNDP Geneina, Head of Office	♂	gm	O	Geneina	21
Ishmael, Adam	HAC Coordinator, Mourni	♂	ssi	W	Morni	16
Ismael Idris, Fatima	IDP with five children and no ration card	♀	dd	B	Morni	18
Isoldi, Fabio	Intersos Geneina	♂	gm	P	Geneina	21
Issa, Abdirahman M	UNHCR Sudan, Assistant Representative (Operations)	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	08

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂ ♀</b>	<b>Meth</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date/ Mar</b>
Issa, Adam	WFP Geneina, GFD Programme Officer (WFP Darfur since Aug 04)	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Jabal Ahmed,	WFP Geneina	♂	gm	W	Geneina	21
Johannes Pascal	WFP Sudan, Head of Procurement Services	♂	ssi	W	Khartoum	24
Kangori, Angela	WFP Fasher, Programme Officer Nutrition	♀	ssi	W	El Fasher	12
Kangori, Angela	WFP Geneina	♀	gm	W	Geneina	21
Kassa, Tamiru	Nutrition Co-ordinator, Relief International	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	14
Kemayo, Geoffrey	WVI Nyala, Communication Officer	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	15
Kemp, Olivia	WFP Khartoum, Programme Officer - Information Management	♀	gm	W	Khartoum	07
Kenmadin, Salahedin	NCO Nyala	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Khalafalla, Selma	GOAL, Nutrition Co-ordinator	♀	ssi	P	Kutum	17
Khalafalla, Selma	WFP Nutrition Co-ordinator, Khartoum	♀	dd	W	El Fasher	18
Khalil, E.	WFP, Food Monitoring Assistant	♂	ssg	W	Kutum	17
Khalis, Abdul Malik	Sudanese Red Crescent, Food Monitor	♂	bd	P	Abu Zar Camp	16
Kinloch-Pichat, Stephen	UNDP, Sr Regional Co-ordinator	♂	ssi	O	El Fasher	15
Krakolinig, Peter	OCHA Nyala, Head of Office	♂	ssi	O	Nyala	15
Krimat, Sanjay	ARC, Nutrition coordinator	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Kuplerberg, Karly	FAR Geneina	♀	gm	P	Geneina	21
Kwenin, Henry	IOM Sudan, Registration Officer north Darfur	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	12
Lagerweij, Elizabeth	WFP Nyala, Security Officer	♀	ssi	W	Nyala	12
Lakot, Beatrice	OCHA, Hum. Affairs Officer	♀	ssi	O	El Fasher	15
Lanzer, Toby	UN, Deputy Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator	♂	bd	O	Khartoum	25
Lattouf, Sandra	UNICEF south Darfur, Resident Programme Officer	♀	ssi	O	Nyala	18
Legg, James	WFP Geneina, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	13
Lillicrap, Susan	UNICEF Sudan, Nutrition Coordinator	♀	ssg	O	Khartoum	08
Lujuo, Emmanuel	FAO, Deputy Emergency Programme Coordinator	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	24
Luka, Gloria	Concern Geneina, Nutrition Assistant	♀	dd	B	Morni	18
Madibo, Mohammed Yahaher	Gereida, Head of Education	♂	gm	G	Gereida	16
Mahjoub, Talal	UNICEF south Darfur, Head of Nutrition Section	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Mahmouh, Mohamoud Yunis	SOFR Nyala	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Makeshe, Roy	Unamid Geneina, HRD	♂	gm	O	Geneina	21
Makki, Nader	UNICEF south Darfur, Nutrition officer	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Makuoth, Victor	GAA-ND Dep. Head of Projects	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	13
Malik, Ashfaq	MSF Belgium - Darfur Co-ordinator	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	14
Mamdole, El Habib	UNDP Geneina	♂	gm	O	Geneina	21
Mangoni, Arduino	WFP Gereida Head of Field Office	♂	ssi	W	Gereida	16

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂ ♀</b>	<b>Meth</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date/ Mar</b>
Manuel	ICRC Nairobi, Regional Nutritionist	♂	ssg	O	Gereida	16
Martinez, Carla	IOM Sudan, Darfur Coordinator	♀	ssi	O	Khartoum	08
Matos, Pedro	WFP Nyala, Information Management	♀	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Matunga, Leo	UNICEF-ND, Nutrition Specialist	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	14
Mayo, Atalie	WFP Security Officer	♀	dd	W	El Fasher	18
Midel, Monika	WFP Sudan, Deputy Director	♀	ssg	W	Khartoum	07
Mietek Maj	WFP, Logistics	♂	ssi	R	Rome	08
Mohamed, Ahmednur	Concern, Assistant Country Director	♂	gm	P	Geneina	15
Mohamed, Manal	WFP Habila, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	♂	gm	W	Habila	20
Mohamed, Manal Elswar	Al Manal	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Mohammed Ahmed, Ibrahim	SRCS Geneina	♂	gm	P	Geneina	21
Mohammed, Abubakar Abdulla	Beneficiary, Abu Zar Camp	♂	bd	B	Abu Zar Camp	16
Mohammed, Achmed	Grain Traver, Morni Market	♂	bd	W	Morni	16
Mohammed, Ahmed Adam	Food Relief Committee, Deputy Head, Abu Zar	♂	bd	B	Abu Zar Camp	16
Mohammed, Aisha Abdalla	Sudanese Red Crescent, Relief Coordinator	♀	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Mohammed, Bakri	Sudanese Red Crescent, Geneina, Programme Officer	♂	gm	P	Geneina	16
Mohammed, Mujahid	FAO south Darfur, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Mohammed, Sallah	FAO, Emergency Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	24
Mohmoud, Jameil	FAR Geneina	♂	gm	P	Geneina	21
Monika Midel	WFP Regional Bureau Sudan, Deputy Director	♀	ssg	W	Khartoum	07
Monim, Abdul	WFP Geneina, Food Monitor	♂	dd	W	Geneina	14
Moyo, Edward	WFP Habila, Head of Sub Office	♂	gm	W	Habila	19
Mukaram, Abdala	WFP Habila, Senior Food Aid Assistant and Cluster Manager	♂	gm	W	Habila	20
Mukkath, Selwyn	CRS Geneina, Head of Office	♂	ssg	P	Geneina	15
Mulbah, Isaac	CRS Geneina, Food Programme Manager	♂	ssg	P	Geneina	15
Mulbah, Issac	CRS Geneina	♂	gm	P	Geneina	21
Murad, Wahid	WFP, Head of M&E	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	21
Murakami, Yasuhito	Japanese Embassy, First Secretary	♂	ssg	D	Khartoum	08
Musa, Faisal	WFP Nyala, Sr. Programme assistant	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	15
Mustafa, Azza	German Agro Action, Programme Officer	♀	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Mustafa, Tariq	FAO, Emergency Programme Officer, and Former WFP VAM officer	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	24
Mutisha, Raymon	NCA, Health & Nutrition manager	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Nardini, Anne	WFP Nyala, Programme Officer	♀	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Neezan	WFP Geneina, Nutrition Focal Point	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Not named	HAC Geneina, Deputy Commissioner	♂	bd	O	Geneina	14
Not named	HAC Geneina, Special assistant	♂	bd	G	Geneina	14

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂ ♀</b>	<b>Meth</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date/ Mar</b>
Nsubuga, Stephen	WFP Sudan, Head of Logistics Section	♂	ssg	W	Khartoum	24
Nyat, Lupod	WVI Nyala, M&E Officer	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	15
Ochon Raymond	WFP Programme Officer, ND	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	21
O'Gormon, Dierdre	Concern Darfur, Health Advisor	♀	dd	B	Morni	18
Olusanmi, Iyabode	UNICEF Sudan, Dept. Representative	♀	ssg	O	Khartoum	08
Omer, Fatima A.	ARC, Nutrition manager	♀	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Onyango, Simon	UNHCR-Field Protection Officer	♂	ssi	O	El Fasher	14
Oumow, Serge	WFP, CPs Focal Point, Khartoum	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	21
Owani, Jimmy	FAO, Emergency Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	Khartoum	24
Palatini, Laura	IOM, Head of Sub-Office	♀	ssi	O	Nyala	13
Paul Burke	WFP CO Sudan Security Officer		ssi	W	Khartoum	07
Petty Grain Trader 1	Petty grain trader in Geneina Market	♀	bd	O	Geneina	16
Petty Grain Trader 2	Petty grain trader in Geneina Market	♀	bd	O	Geneina	16
Quideau, Jean Yves	WFP Geneina, Security Officer	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	13
Rahman, Abdur	USAID Khartoum, Food for Peace Officer	♂	ssg	D	Khartoum	24
Rahman, Bashir Abdel	FAO, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	15
Rashid, Salma	USAID Khartoum, Food Monitor	♀	ssg	D	Khartoum	24
Rasi, Abdur	Cart driver (13) waiting for business at Sallah Market	♂	bd	B	Sallah	20
Reed, Barbara	USAID Khartoum. Food for Peace Director	♀	ssg	D	Khartoum	24
Rhodes, Jonathan	WFP Sudan, Donor Relations and Report Officer	♂	dd	W	Khartoum	25
Rodriguez, Mario	World Vision, Operations Director, north Sudan	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Rotival, Bruno	ECHO-SUDAN, Head of Office	♂	ssg	D	Khartoum	08
Rowe, Eddie	WFP Nyala, Head of Area Office	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Sabeel, Ahmed Sabeel	HAC south Darfur, Commissioner	♂	ssi	G	Nyala	13
Salahrin, Musa Abdul Karim	Chairperson Cereal Trading Committee Nyala	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Salih, Mohammed	WFP VAM Officer-ND	♂	ssi	W	El Fasher	21
Scarletti, Alessandro	WFP Sudan, Darfur Logistics Coordinator	♂	ssg	W	Khartoum	24
Sharef, Mutassim	FAO, Programme Officer	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	15
Sidig, Mohamed	Practical Action, ND Programme Director	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	13
Sigei, Dickson	Nutritionist, German Red Cross	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	14
Sissay, Alemmayehu	African Humanitarian Action, Country Representative	♂	ssi	p	Khartoum	08
Sugino, Chie	Japanese Embassy, Second Secretary	♀	ssg	D	Khartoum	08
Suleiman Yusuf, Kamal	WFP Morni, Food Monitor. Ex Care and UNAMID Employee	♂	bd	W	Morni	18
Suleiman, Abdullah	AHA, Project Officer, Milling Vouchers Project	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	13
Suleiman, Fatia	Beneficiary, Habila	♀	bd	B	Habila	20
Suleiman, Taj Edeim	UNICEF-ND, Nutrition Officer	♂	ssg	O	El Fasher	14

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂ ♀</b>	<b>Meth</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date/ Mar</b>
Swanson, Will	Tearfund, Geneina	♂	gm	P	Geneina	15
Tafere, Maereg	World Vision, Country Programme Director	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Takenoshita, Kayo	WFP west Darfur, Head of Geneina and Kulbus Sub-Office	♀	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Tani, Bashir	WFP Geneina, Training Consulatant	♂	ssg	W	Geneina	14
Tucker, Prince	WVI Nyala, Area Coordinator	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	15
Tuku, Bereketsehai	FAO south Darfur, Head of Office	♂	ssg	O	Nyala	17
Txend Ayusr, Ariunyuna	WFP Geneina, Reporting Officer	♀	ssg	W	Geneina	13
Usman Abdulla, Fadija	IDP with family of four and only one ration per month	♀	dd	B	Morni	18
Usman, Adam Hassan	Riyadh Camp, Head of Sheiks, and head of Food Relief Committee	♂	bd	B	Riyadh Camp	15
Van Asch van Wijck, Henrick	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Second Secretary	♂	gm	D	Khartoum	25
Van t Westende, Peter	GAA, Head of ND Projects	♂	ssg	P	El Fasher	13
Varghese, John	World Vision, Commodities Manager	♂	ssg	P	Khartoum	08
Vasquez, Inma	European Union Khartoum, DG Echo, Technical Assistant	♀	gm	D	Khartoum	25
Vazquez, Inma	ECHO-SUDAN, Technical Assistant	♀	ssg	D	Khartoum	08
Wainrooij, Reinout	OCHA Geneina, Head of Office	♂	gm	O	Geneina	14
Wakashima, Yoichi	Japanese Embassy, Counsellor	♂	ssg	D	Khartoum	08
Wanmali, Samir	WFP Nyala, Head of Programme	♂	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Wanrooij, Reinout	OCHA Geneina, Head of Office	♂	gm	O	Geneina	21
Warambo, Alice	WFP Nyala, Head of Sub-Office Nyala	♀	ssg	W	Nyala	12
Wulliman, Chris	Samaritan's Purse Nyala, Programme Coordinator	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	15
Yagoup, Sayeed,	WFP, Food Monitoring Assistant	♂	dd	W	El Fasher	18
Yahaya, Zenia Sabir	Tea Lady in Sallah Market (Non-beneficiary)	♀	bd	B	Sallah	20
Yamazaki, Haruka	Japanese Embassy, Aid Co-ordination Officer	♀	ssg	D	Khartoum	08
Yeneneh, Alemseged	WFP Morni, Food Monitor	♂	dd	W	Morni	16
Yousif, Bashir	IOM Sudan, Geneina Office	♂	gm	P	Geneina	16
Yunus, Ahmed	GAA, Head of Kutum Sub-office	♂	ssi	P	Kutum	17
Yunusa, Eric	WVI, Team leader Food Aid	♂	ssg	P	Nyala	17
Yusuf, Mohammed	Sudanese Red Crescent, Food Program Assistant, ex-Save the Children employee (2004-march 2009)	♂	dd	P	Riyadh Camp	15
Forsen, Yvonne	WFP Regional Bureau Sudan, VAM Coordinator	♀	ssi	W	Khartoum	07
Zacharia, Abdul Latif	Grain Trader, Geneina Market	♂	bd	O	Geneina	16
Zanussi, Abdallah	SPCR Nyala, Programme Coordinator	♂	ssi	P	Nyala	15
Le Roy, Jean-Pierre	WFP, Logistics	♂	ssg	R	Rome	08 Jan

## Group Meetings

Date/ March	Attendees	♂	♀	Location	Team Member
15	Sheiks, and DRC members in Riyadh Camp Geneina	13	2	Riyadh Camp	jc
16	Sheiks, and DRC members and beneficiaries in Abu Zar camp	43		Abu Zar Camp	jc
16	Women beneficiaries in Abu Zar camp		80	Abu Zar Camp	jc
15	Sheiks, and DRC Sheiks, and beneficiaries in Zam Zam IDP camp. ND	15	6	Zam Zam	hg
16	Large group of beneficiaries	20	25	Kebkebiya	hg
16	KCSS - staff and volunteers	5	2	Kebkebiya	hg
17	Sheiks and DRC members in Morni	12	9	Morni	jc
17	Women beneficiaries in Kassab IDP camp Kutum	2	8	Kutum	hg
19	Sheiks in Habila	43		Habila	jc
20	Nomadic group leaders, Habila	16		Habila	jc
20	Female group leaders in Habila	2	20	Habila	jc
20	Female group leaders in Sallah	1	47	Sallah	jc
20	Beneficiaries in Habila	2	5	Habila	jc
18	Beneficiaries in Shangil Tobay, ND	6	10	Shangil Tobay	hg
18	Millers in Shangil Tobay	4		Shangil Tobay	hg
	<b>Total</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>214</b>		

## Evaluation Itinerary

### Initial Briefing

Date/ Jan	John Cosgrave	Annemarie Hoogendoorn	Hugh Goyder
05	Arrive Rome	Arrive Rome	Arrive Rome
06	Briefing at WFP	Briefing at WFP	Briefing at WFP
07	Briefing at WFP	Briefing at WFP	Briefing at WFP. Team Planning
08	Meetings at WFP, team planning. Return to Cork	Meetings at WFP, team planning	Meetings at WFP, team planning. Return to London



## Fieldwork

<b>Date/ March</b>	<b>John Cosgrave</b>	<b>Annemarie Hoogendoorn</b>	<b>Hugh Goyder</b>
06	Arrive Khartoum	Arrive Khartoum	Arrive Khartoum
07	Briefings at WFP	Briefings at WFP	Briefings at WFP
08	Meetings with CPs and Donors	Meetings with CPs and Donors	Meetings with CPs and Donors
09	Travel to el Fasher. Briefing, security briefing	Travel to el Fasher. Briefing, security briefing	Travel to el Fasher. Briefing, security briefing
10	SSAFE training	SSAFE training	SSAFE training
11	SSAFE training	SSAFE training	SSAFE training
12	Preparing formats	Preparing formats	Preparing formats
13	Travel to El Geneina, Security Briefing and general briefing	Travel to Nyala. Briefing by Area Office	Meetings with Practical Action; AHA, and GAA; briefing from Programme Unit
14	Meeting with HAC. Meeting with programme. Meeting with Geneina/Kulbus sub office	Meeting with cooperating partners	Meeting with SRC; observation of Area Security Meeting; Meetings with Nutrition cluster and UNHCR
15	Distribution at Riyadh camp. CP meeting. Meeting with CRS	Meetings with cooperating partners	Visit to Zam Zam camp; meetings with Food Security cluster, OCHA, and UNDP
16	Distribution at Abu Zar camp. Meetings with traders and SRC. Food distribution committee meeting.	Field Visit to Gereida	Visit to Kabkabiya; meeting with WFP Logistics Dept, ND
17	Travel to Morni Meetings with Sub Office, Sheiks and HAC	Meeting with nutrition partners	Field visit to Kutum
18	Waiting for cancelled flight. Meetings with beneficiaries and grain trader.	Meeting with UNICEF	Field visit to Shangil Tobay
19	Travel by road to Habila with UNAMID escort. Meeting with Locality Commissioner and Sheiks	Writing up	Stranded by dust-storm in Shangil Tobay
20	Meetings with Habila Beneficiaires. Travel with police escort to Salah for distribution.	Writing up	Return to El Fasher in UNAMID Road convoy
21	Travel to Geneina. Meeting with ACT. Meeting with partners. Debriefing area office.	Writing up	Meetings with ND Ministry of Education; WFP Programme staff; Debriefing
22	Travel to Khartoum	Travel to Khartoum	Travel to Khartoum
23	Debriefing Field Coordination Unit. Meetings in WFP.	Debriefing Field Coordination Unit. Meetings in WFP.	Debriefing Field Coordination Unit. Meetings in WFP.
10 & 24	Meetings with donors and other stakeholders	Meetings with donors and other stakeholders	Meetings with donors and other stakeholders
10 & 25	Meeting with donor relations. Debriefings for: 1) WFP management; 2) regional bureau staff; 3) Donors and partners.	Meeting with donor relations. Debriefings for: 1) WFP management; 2) regional bureau staff; 3) Donors and partners.	Meeting with donor relations. Debriefings for: 1) WFP management; 2) regional bureau staff; 3) Donors and partners.
26	Depart Khartoum	Depart Khartoum	Depart Khartoum

## Evaluation Matrix

Questions	Expected indicators	Expected Information Sources
<b>What is the economic and social context in which the operation is taking place?</b>		
What is the level of poverty, food security, hunger?	Index values for poverty etc.	General country documents. UN general reporting. VAM reporting
What are the humanitarian issues?	Consensus view from different sources.	Work plan and other country documents
What are the background livelihoods?	Distribution of livelihoods in different zones.	VAM and livelihood reports
<b>What were the main features of the operation</b>		
What were the objectives?	Objectives given in project documents	Project document and logframe.
What groups were targeted?	% of total by group	Project documents
What geographic areas were targeted	% of total by area	Project documents
What activities did the programme undertake?	Tables of tonnages etc	Distribution data from WFP
What period did the project cover?	Start date and duration.	Project documents.
What was the resource requirement?	Initial budget.	Project documents.
What changes were there in these features over time?	% Changes in numbers served, etc	Budget revision
<b>Is the logic model a good basis for the project design</b>		
Is the logic model comprehensive?	The extent to which the logic model encompasses all of the factors evident in the project and other documents.	Project documents. General documents
Were risks adequately stated in the logical framework?	The extent to which the constraints encountered were foreseen and could have been foreseen.	Project documents. General documents
How good a match is there between the stated objectives of the operation and the indicators selected?	The match between objectives and indicators	Analysis of the log frame
<b>Is the project design based on learning?</b>		
Have lessons from previous evaluations been incorporated into the programme design	Triangulated examples of changes in project planning	Key informant interviews. Verification of examples from documents
Have lessons from academic research been considered in the programme design	Triangulated examples of changes in project planning	Key informant interviews. Verification of examples from documents
Have lessons from other WFP operations elsewhere been incorporated in the programme design	Triangulated examples of changes in project planning	Key informant interviews.
Has learning by WFP staff during previous operations been reflected in the current operations	Triangulated examples of changes in project planning	Key informant interviews.
Are M&E findings incorporated into day to day management of the programme	Triangulated examples of changes in project planning	Key informant interviews.
<b>Is the operation coherent with the interventions of other actors</b>		
To what extent is there synergy with other actors in Sudan?	Triangulated clear instances of synergy with other interventions.	Interviews with other actors and WFP staff. Beneficiary interviews. Observation.

Questions	Expected indicators	Expected Information Sources
Are there aspects of the operation that conflict with the interventions of other actors?	Triangulated clear instances of conflict with other interventions.	Interviews with other actors and WFP staff. Beneficiary interviews. Observation.
What impact has pooled funding had on the operation?	Comparison of funding patterns prior and post the introduction of the pooled funding mechanism	Key informant interviews. Records of resource flows in Sudan.
How well integrated is the operation with the Work Plan and other collaborative frameworks.	Inclusion of all activities in the work plan and associated mechanisms	Work plan and other country documents
<b>Is the operation internally coherent?</b>		
To what extent is there any divergence between the programme and WFP policies (ECW etc.)	Triangulated clear instances of policy divergence.	Observation, key informant interviews, programme documents
Are there particular WFP policies that have proved problematic in the operation	Triangulated clear instances of problematic policies.	Key informant interviews. Review of underlying reasons where any outcomes have fallen short
Is there any synergy between the GFD component and other WFP operations and components in Sudan?	Triangulated clear instance of synergy	Key informant interview, Review of project documents.
<b>What did the operation achieve</b>		
What outputs did the project achieve?	Tonnages, and people served	Distribution reports
How did the outputs compare with the plans	Comparative table	Distribution reports and project documents
Who was assisted? (Actual targeting vs planned)	Table of assisted groups vs planned groups including gender if available	Distribution reports and project documents
<b>To what extent is WFP covering the assessed food assistance needs of vulnerable individuals in Darfur, taking into account needs covered by other food assistance providers? (relevance/coverage)</b>		
How well does the assessment reflect the pattern of underlying need	Strong, triangulated evidence that assessments match or do not match the pattern of needs	Staff survey, Partner survey, Beneficiary Interview, Desk Study, Key Informant Interviews, Alternative Assessment Mechanisms, Monitoring reports
Has the VAM changed in response to underlying changes	Strong, triangulated evidence that VAMs have changed to match changes in underlying vulnerability	Beneficiary Interviews, Desk Study, Key Informant Interviews, Alternative Assessment Mechanisms, Monitoring reports
How well do GFD plans match the assessment	Comparison of assessment with GFD Plan	Assessment, Plan
How well do actual GFD distributions match the assessment	Comparison of assessment with Actual GFD	Assessment, Pattern of actual distributions from WFP Sudan Data
<b>How successful is WFP in targeting the most vulnerable and food insecure populations (IDP, rural and urban) in Darfur in order to minimize both inclusion and exclusion errors? (targeting efficiency)</b>		
What inclusion errors are there	Strong triangulated evidence that recipients do not need food assistance.	Staff survey, Partner Survey, Beneficiary Interviews, Desk Study, Distribution Report, PDM reports, Household data from NGOs? Nutrition Surveys?
What exclusion errors are there	Strong triangulated evidence that some of those in need do not get food assistance.	Staff survey, Partner Survey, Beneficiary Interviews, Desk Study, Distribution Report, PDM reports, Household data from NGOs? Nutrition Surveys as

Questions	Expected indicators	Expected Information Sources
		available
<b>Is WFP food assistance for targeted beneficiaries in Darfur adequate to support both the saving of lives and the protection of livelihoods, particularly in light of ration reductions in 2009? (effectiveness)</b>		
What is the balance between acute food needs and household livelihood support needs in Darfur	Estimates of the relative importance of food as calories and food as an income transfer (over the different seasons).	Desk Study, Key Informant Interviews, VAM
To what extent are acute food needs being met	Changes in nutritional status	Nutrition Surveys, VAM data, key informant interviews
To what extent is WFP meeting food gaps at the household level	Household food consumption scores	Staff survey, Partner Survey, Beneficiary Interviews, Desk Study, Distribution Report, PDM reports, Household data from NGOs? Nutrition Surveys as available
<b>How was the operation implemented?</b>		
How has implementation changed over the year?	Triangulated examples of changes	Budget Revisions, Key informant interviews
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different GFD implementation approaches	Table of advantages and disadvantages	Key informant interviews, group interviews
How did the operation cope with the expulsion of partners in March 2009	Table of impacts	Key informant interviews, distribution data
To what extent was WFP ECW reflected in the implementation?	Triangulated examples of the implementation of ECW principles	Key informant interviews, observation
<b>What has the operation cost?</b>		
What funding had the operation had?	Total volume of donor funding	Resourcing table
Has the operation faced problems due to funding timing or overall availability?	Triangulated examples of constraints due to funding	Key informant interviews
How has the operation changed to meet any funding constraints?	Triangulated examples of changes to meet	Key informant interviews
How have costs changed over the year?	Table of initial and final costs	Key informant interviews
How do unit costs compare with other WFP operations?	Ratio of costs per mt for the Sudan EMOP compared with others	Document Review
<b>Has the operation been adequately supported?</b>		
Has the operation been adequately resourced with staff?	The proportion of time the key posts were unfilled.	Key informant interview, staffing table.
Have any technical issues that arose during the year been quickly addressed?	Triangulated examples of technical issues that arose during the year, and the time it took to resolve them	Key informant interviews
What tensions have there been in the relationship between Rome and the Regional Bureau?	Triangulated examples of issues which generated tension	Key informant interviews
<b>How (and to what extent) is WFP re-orienting its existing partnerships and/or developing new partnerships that will guide and implement its future programming in Sudan? (sustainability/connectedness)</b>		

Questions	Expected indicators	Expected Information Sources
How have partnerships changed over the year?	Triangulated examples of changes in partnership	Key informant interview, survey
How is WFP perceived by its partners?	Ratings from survey	Survey, key informant interviews
What is the future direction of WFP partnerships?	Perceptions of key informants	Key information interviews
To what extent has WFP engaged in capacity building of its partners?	Triangulated evidence of capacity building	Key information interviews
<b>To what extent have the outputs achieved led to the desired outcomes?</b>		
How do the achieved outcomes compared with the outcomes planned in the logframe?	Comparison of planned with actual results	Key informant interviews, document review
If there are differences, why have they arisen?	Triangulated evidence of causes	Key informant interviews, document review
<b>How (and to what extent) is WFP taking advantage of the multiple opportunities that exist to help develop local markets in Sudan? (impact)</b>		
What impact has WFP had on local markets?	Triangulated examples of price and other impacts	Price data, VAM data, key information interviews, beneficiary interviews.
Where was the food procured?	Table of procurement locations	Procurement data
How did the pattern of procurement compare with previous years and why?	Table showing changes in procurement sources	Key informant Interviews
<b>What impact has the operation had?</b>		
What impact has the operation had on protection?	Triangulated clear examples of the impact on protection.	Key informant interviews. Beneficiary interview (with discretion) (Note records of protection incidents are not a reliable guide as these records only exist where there is an international presence)
What unexpected impacts has the operation had?	Triangulated clear examples of unexpected impacts.	Observation, key informant interviews, beneficiary interviews.
How has the operation impacted on broader livelihoods?	Triangulated clear evidence of impact	Document study. Beneficiary interviews. Observations. Key informant interviews
What impact has the programme had on cross-cutting issues?	Triangulated clear evidence of impact	Document study. Beneficiary interviews. Key informant interviews. Observation
<b>Sustainability</b>		
What is the likely impact of the programme on longer term development goals?	Triangulated clear evidence of impact	Document study. Beneficiary interviews. Key informant interviews. Observation

### \*Data Collection Tools

The two online surveys were quite complex. They can be found at:

- <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/EMOP-Eval-Staff> for the survey of WFP staff.
- <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/EMOP-Eval-Partners> for the survey of WFP cooperating partners.

## Budget Revision History

<b>Budget Revision 1</b>			
<a href="http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/BR/107600_0906.pdf">http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/BR/107600_0906.pdf</a>			
First appearance in Executive Brief on 15 June			
<b>Element</b>	<b>Original budget</b>	<b>Increase</b>	<b>Revised budget</b>
Food cost	353,802,411	(74,138,214)	279,664,197
External transport	83,716,641	(30,032,499)	53,684,142
LTSH	283,129,592	(16,015,116)	267,114,476
ODOC	9,842,633	9,165,669	19,008,302
DSC	130,607,673	25,085,877	155,693,550
ISC (7%)	60,276,927	(6,015,400)	54,261,527
<b>Total cost to WFP</b>	<b>921,375,877</b>	<b>(91,949,684)</b>	<b>829,426,193</b>
<b>Budget Revision 2</b>			
Derived by calculation from Budget Revision 1 and 3			
First appearance in Executive Brief on 29 June			
<b>Element</b>	<b>Original budget</b>	<b>Increase</b>	<b>Revised budget</b>
Food cost	279,664,197	54	279,664,251
External transport	53,684,142	2,472,955	56,157,097
LTSH	267,114,476	-	267,114,476
ODOC	19,008,302	-	19,008,302
DSC	155,693,550	-	155,693,550
ISC (7%)	54,261,527	173,110	54,434,637
<b>Total cost to WFP</b>	<b>829,426,193</b>	<b>2,646,120</b>	<b>832,072,313</b>
<b>Budget Revision 3 (Source WFP)</b>			
<a href="http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/BR/107600_0911.pdf">http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/BR/107600_0911.pdf</a>			
First appearance in Executive Brief on 2 November			
<b>Element</b>	<b>Original budget</b>	<b>Increase</b>	<b>Revised budget</b>
Food cost	279,664,251	7,259,561	286,923,813
External transport	56,157,097	1,029,210	57,186,307
LTSH	267,114,476	25,629,554	292,744,030
ODOC	19,008,302	57,334	19,065,636
DSC	155,693,550	258,889	155,952,439
ISC (7%)	54,434,637	2,396,418	56,831,055
<b>Total cost to WFP</b>	<b>832,072,313</b>	<b>36,630,966</b>	<b>868,703,279</b>

## Portion of Log Frame

**Table 18: Portion of Logical Framework relevant to this evaluation**

<b>SO1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies</b>			
Immediate objective: To reduce or stabilize acute malnutrition, mortality rates and protect livelihoods amongst IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups and communities			
Results-Chain	Performance Indicators	Risks	Assumptions
<p><b>Outcome 1.1:</b></p> <p>Reduced or stabilized acute malnutrition and mortality rate of the targeted conflict affected and displaced population (Darfur, south and CETA).</p>	<p>Prevalence of acute malnutrition among under 5s in WFP intervention area (assessed using weight-for-height as %). Target: &lt;15 %</p> <p>CMR in targeted population: at end of project. Target: &lt;1/10,000</p> <p>Recovery rate in TSF &gt;70% and for Therapeutic Feeding &gt;75%.</p>		<p>The following three top working assumptions are very relevant for the achievement of this EMOP expected results and objectives.</p> <p>Security conditions allow delivery of food and implementation of activities.</p> <p>WFP and partners have sufficient access and capacity to conduct assessments surveys, visibility studies, and appropriate timely M&amp;E.</p>
<p><b>Output 1.1.1:</b></p> <p>GFD rations provided timely and safely to about 4,100,000 conflict affected IDPs, vulnerable residents (particularly in rural areas)*, and Refugees**, (CETA, south and Darfur).</p> <p>*IDPs: south 198,000; CETA 84,000 and Darfur 3,800,000.</p> <p>** Refugees: south 5,215; CETA 48,500 and Darfur 15,000</p>	<p>Actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance through GFD as a percentage of planned beneficiaries, by beneficiary category, food distribution modality disaggregated by gender and age group.</p> <p>Actual mt of food distributed through each activity as a percentage of planned distributions, by project category and commodity type.</p> <p>Percentage of GFDs occurring after seven days from planned.</p> <p>% (or numbers) of distributions affected by pipeline breaks.</p>		<p>Adequate and uninterrupted food commodity pipeline in place.</p> <p>Other basic needs are met (water, health, education, protection, etc) which will influence nutritional outcomes.</p> <p>Government's capacity to clear goods in a timely manner.</p> <p>UNMIS/UNAMID and host nation escorts available and sufficient.</p> <p>Adequate and timely resources are available.</p>
<p><b>Output 1.1.2:</b></p> <p>Supplementary rations provided to about 400,000 vulnerable beneficiaries and caregivers* including malnourished children under 5, pregnant and lactating women. (Darfur, south and CETA)</p> <p>*Darfur 248,000, CETA 100,000 and south 50,000</p>	<p>Number of beneficiaries supported through supplementary feeding against the plan, disaggregated by beneficiary category, gender and age group.</p> <p>Number of caregivers supported against the plan, disaggregated by beneficiary category, gender and age group.</p> <p>Actual mt of food distributed through supplementary feeding as a percentage of planned distributions.</p>		

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## Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BSFP	Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CMR	Crude mortality rate
CP	country programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFSMS	Darfur Food Security Monitoring System
DSC	direct support costs
DSM	dried skim milk
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Office
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EMOP	emergency operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FFE	Food for education
FFR	Food for recovery
FFT	Food for training
FFW	Food for work
GFD	general food distribution
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GHI	Global Hunger Index
HFCS	Household Food Consumption Score
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced persons
IF	Institutional Feeding
ISC	indirect support costs
LTSH	local transport, handling, and storage
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
mt	metric ton
NDE	Network on Development Evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
ODOC	other direct operational costs
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OE	Office of Evaluation (ex OEDE)
PDM	post-distribution monitoring
PRRO	protracted relief and recovery operation
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SO	special operation
TFP	therapeutic feeding programme
ToR	Terms of reference
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US\$	United States Dollar
VAM	vulnerability assessment and mapping
WFP	World Food Programme

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