



Office of Evaluation

Evaluation of WFP Timor-Leste PRRO 10388.1 Assistance to Vulnerable Populations

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Fact Sheet

Title of the Operation	Timor-Leste PRRO Assistance to Vulnerable Populations				
Number of the Operation	PRRO 10388.1				
Approval Date	5 September 2008				
Objectives	<p>Short term overall objective: <i>to improve vulnerable people's food security and nutrition through food-assisted activities.</i></p> <p>Long-term overall objective: <i>food security and nutrition is to be improved through the establishment of national systems and programmes.</i></p>				
Operation specs.	Start Date	End Date	Beneficiaries	Metric tons	US\$
Approval design	1 Sept 2008	31 Aug 2010	255,600 annual average	30,263	36,038,233
After budget revision of April 2009	1 Sept 2008	31 Aug 2010	334,362	31,942	38,913,700
Activities			Beneficiaries At mid 2009	Metric tons	US\$
FFA/FFW			16,328	6,852	9,105,806
FFT					
GFD/TFD			67,202	474	622,619
HIV&AIDS					
MCN			58,933	11,180	14,826,120
School meals			135,000	10,802	14,359,155
Supplementary Feeding					
Therapeutic Feeding					
Main Partners					
Government	Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health, and Social Solidarity, districts and Sub-districts				
NGO	CARE Australia, Caritas, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, and World Vision.				
Bilateral					
Multilateral	FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNMIT, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO				
Main Donors	Australia, Denmark, European Commission, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Spain, UAS, Government and private.				
Other ongoing WFP Operations	Special Operation No.10797.0 <i>Logistics Augmentation and Capacity Building for the Government of Timor-Leste</i> , to support PRRO 10388.1. Support for Timor Global local blended food production in 2009.				

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1. Background

1.A Context

Country situation overview

1. In 2009 Timor-Leste had not yet recovered from the considerable destruction caused during conflict before independence in 2002. Ethnic and political tensions are unresolved and conflict may reoccur, as in 2006, 2007 and 2008 - the last involved near-fatal attacks on the President and Prime Minister. It is indicative of the situation that the Government hosted a conference on fragile states¹, with special reference to Timor-Leste in September 2009. Since independence, in addition to insecurity, violence and destruction, Timor-Leste has experienced floods, droughts, destructive winds and locust infestations.

2. Although most of the 150,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) who fled following serious unrest in 2006 have resettled, food security remains precarious and dependent on large rice importation, furthermore in 2007 food shortages led to more insecurity. Child malnutrition is chronic, maternal health is poor and the maternal mortality rate in 2005 was 380 per 100,000 live births², in 2007 half of under-fives were underweight and half the population lived in poverty.³ The average per capita annual income in 2007 was US\$358.

3. After decades of violent conflict, little human capital has been developed, and there is a small pool of sufficiently educated people to provide suitable staff for the World Food Programme (WFP) and other agencies or for the Government itself. Transport of commodities is slow and expensive, mainly using narrow un-surfaced roads, with the risk of landslides on the steeper slopes.

4. There are, however, signs of recovery: IDPs have left the camps; the coffee industry is recovering; economic growth is increasing as government expenditure rises, thanks to a rapidly increasing Petroleum Fund (PF), now worth US\$5 Bn in foreign exchange assets⁴. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) insists that withdrawals should be consistent with preserving wealth for future generations. The Government has been able to use these assets to speed development, but the resources may last a little more than a decade⁵ therefore there is not much time left to achieve sustainable development results, including food security.

5. This economic recovery and improved security make the present time appropriate for transition from relief to recovery, stability and development. The Government supports this progress, but is still developing the capacity to manage change. However, there is still no comprehensive National Development Strategy, and priorities are presented on a yearly basis, which leads to *ad hoc* planning and a limited planning framework for donors and agencies. The challenge for WFP is to help speed the transition to development through supporting the Governments creation of food security systems able to respond quickly to nutritional emergencies.

¹ The Second Consultative Conference on Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations: Defining Peace building and State Building Objectives for Timor-Leste.

² UNICEF (2008) Humanitarian Action, Timor-Leste in 2008.

³ IMF, July 2009, Country Report No. 09/219 Timor-Leste

⁴ A ten-fold increase in such assets since 2005.

⁵ IMF, July 2009, Country Report No. 09/219, Timor-Leste.

1.B Description of the operation

Previous assistance

6. WFP first operated in the territory that is now Timor-Leste in 1999 under EMOPs 6175 and 6177 in response to the effects of the conflict following the 1999 referendum. EMOP 10317.0 in 2003-04 followed La Niña droughts. From 2005, when the Country office (CO) opened, emphasis switched to developing a safety net approach via Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10388.0, "*Investing in People's Future*", 2005 to 2007. WFP support for school feeding (SF) started in 2005. Sub offices opened in 2006 at Suai and Pante Macassar.

PRRO activities

7. Specific objectives and activities cover the full range of WFP Strategic Objectives (SOs) in WFP Strategic Plan 2006-2009. In relation to the SOs the Specific Objectives are:

- SO 1 - *Save Lives in Crisis situations*: maintain a contingency reserve (through maintaining immediate response capacity).
- SO 2 - *Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks*: increase community capacity to meet food needs through FFW/A and support IDP resettlement.
- SO 3 - *Support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people*: improve the nutritional status of vulnerable people and health care through Maternal Child Health Nutrition (MCHN).
- SO 4 - *Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training*: improve primary school enrolment and attention spans through school feeding programme.
- SO 5 - *Strengthen the capacities of countries and regions to establish and manage food assistance and hunger-reduction programmes*: improve government capacity and systems with regard to disaster response, logistics, assistance to chronically vulnerable groups through safety nets and local food processing, improve Government capacity in relation to food security; support development of a national School Meals Programme (SMP).

8. In order of importance as measured by food resources supplied, planned activities were:

- Daily SF; support for the setting up of a national free SF programme; improved school kitchens and training of cooks. SF would provide mid-morning food for 124,000 to 324,000 school children of Grades 1 to 9;
- Through MCHN, provision of nutritional support for children 6 to 23 months and malnourished children 24 to 59 months and nutritional support to malnourished pregnant and lactating women. There would be 51,600 to 64,000 beneficiaries;
- Support for FFW/A⁶ to rehabilitate and create new rural assets, and rehabilitate rural roads. Half of the assets produced would be allocated to women;
- Provide a return package to facilitate reintegration of IDPs. Here would be 40,000 IDP beneficiaries in 2008 only;
- Develop contingency plans and provide contingency stocks of 550mt; and

⁶ The CO uses the term FFA to emphasise the creation of assets, but the term FFW/A is used in some documentation.

- Develop the capacity of WFP staff, and support the capacity of Government staff to respond to food-related needs.

Table 1 Approved Budget of PRRO 10388.1 September 2008-August 2010 and April 2009 Revision

	Original budget US\$	April 2009 revision US\$
Total costs to WFP	36,038, 233	38,913,700
Food commodities	21,175,975	22,906,242
Direct operational costs (DOC)	29,375,987	31,601,226
Direct support costs (DSC)	4,304,605	4,768,718
Indirect support costs (ISC)	2,357,641	2,543,756

9. Table 1 shows the approved budget of PRRO 10388.1 and its revision in April 2009. It was planned to distribute 30,263mt of commodities. Following two budget revisions in December 2008 and April 2009, there was some reallocation in food cost, LTSH, other direct operation costs (ODOC), DSC, and ISC. The total cost to WFP increased by eight per cent to US\$38.913,700.

The logical framework

10. Two separate two-page logical frameworks were prepared for the PRRO:

- the original PRRO Document in Annex II, and
- an amendment proposed by the CO, with help from the RB, in Feb 2009, and designed to align with the new WFP Strategic Plan.

Both use the WFP Strategic Results Framework and are structured as five sets of outcomes and outputs under the SOs.

11. The amended framework is now operational. Risk and assumptions are included in the Project Document though not in the revision, but the same risks are to be carried forward to the revision. The logical framework is discussed in Section 2.A.

Stakeholders

12. The main stakeholders of the evaluation are: staff of the CO and sub-offices in Timor-Leste, particularly managers, programme and logistics staff; WFP RB staff and HQ staff dealing with nutrition, school meals, capacity development and logistics. In Government, the Ministry of Planning and Finance has the key position in aligning policies and plans, while the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture and Fisheries and Social Security have interests in the specific PRRO programme areas. Main UN partners include FAO, UNICEF, IOM, WHO, UNIFEM and UNDP. Major donor partners are USA, Australia, Japan and Spain. CARE, Caritas, Oxfam, World Vision and hold stakes as Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs). Japan International Research Centre for Agricultural Science (JIRCAS) an incorporated administrative agency is within The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) supports the German Government's development objectives in Timor-Leste. District administrations, *sucos*⁷, village leaders, school staff, parents of pupils, staff of Maternal Child Health (MCH) clinics, and more than 334,000 direct beneficiaries are also stakeholders.

⁷ *Sucos* are administrative districts within sub-districts. In Timor-Leste there are 13 districts, 68 sub-districts (also known as *postos*), 442 *sucos* and 2100 *aldeias* (villages). *Aldeias* may be divided into sub-villages.

1.C Evaluation features

Rationale and Objective

13. Evaluation at mid-point will inform changes, based on experience, to PRRO activities. According to the ToR the main purpose of the evaluation is to improve future performance by identifying reasons for current successes and failures. This will lead to better practices. A second objective is to analyse the degree of successes and failures and account to stakeholders for aid expenditures.

Scope

14. Planned outcomes of the PRRO were related to five WFP corporate SOs⁸ as expressed in the *WFP Strategic Plan 2006-2009*. The logical framework was revised in 2009 to relate to the new *Strategic Plan 2008-2011*. Assessment of activities to date, can be found in the context of the *Strategic Plan 2006-2009*, but recommendations for the future of the programme must be in the context of the *Strategic Plan 2008-2011*. The evaluation observes the distinction between the Strategic Plans in reviewing the six components of the PRRO: Relief, FFW/A; MCHN, SF; Capacity Development and IDP Return Package.

Methodology

15. Standard evaluation techniques were used. Details of methodology are provided in Annex 4 and the mission schedule is in Annex 3. Pre-mission deskwork and briefings built an understanding of:

- the context of intervention in Timor-Leste;
- WFP's planned response in relation to other stakeholders; and
- WFP's activities throughout the operation, which were partly based on its previous activities in PRRO 10388.0.

16. Visits to Dili and field sites in Timor-Leste were used to amplify and test the validity of conclusions from analysis based on data available for deskwork. Critical examination of data obtained in the field has allowed a reassessment of some perceptions and conclusions in the desk study, principally the nature of the nutritional status of the population.

Limitations

17. The evaluation interviewed most of the main stakeholders in Dili, and saw a representative range of activities in three districts where they were able to interview communities and stakeholders. It was not possible, however, to interview former IDPs or beneficiaries of relief assistance. Although schools were closed it was possible to interview some teachers and parents and inspect some schools. Some WFP CO staff were no longer at post, and some key informants in the Government were not available to interview. Considerable time was needed for travel, but there were no problems of insecurity limiting access. The evaluation is confident that it succeeded substantially in establishing facts and valid interpretations.

Quality assurance

18. WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the TOR. EQAS has been systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents were provided to the evaluation team.

⁸ These were later modified to accord with the *Strategic Plan 2008-2011*.

2. Findings

2.A Operational design: relevance and appropriateness

Objectives

19. The short term overall objective of PRRO10388.1 is to improve vulnerable people's food security and nutrition through food-assisted activities. In the long-term, food security and nutrition is to be improved through the establishment of national systems and programmes. Seven specific objectives linked to PRRO activity areas support these two overall objectives.

Food security situation in Timor-Leste

20. When the PRRO was designed in 2007 there had been recent incidents of insecurity related to food scarcity and reports by WFP and other agencies showed problems of malnutrition and food insecurity. The WFP Market Profile for *Emergency Food Security Assessments* of April 2006, the *Timor-Leste Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA)* of September 2006 and *FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Timor-Leste* of June 2007 indicated continuing food insecurity, low crop yields, a cereal deficit, including maize, a critical food crop in upland areas, and rising food prices with two-thirds of household expenditure being for food. Oxfam Australia, with three other NGOs, carried out a *Timor-Leste Food Security Baseline Survey* in August/September 2007 in Covalima and Oecussi Districts. This showed moderate to severe food insecurity in 80 per cent of Covalima households and 70 per cent of the Oecussi households. Low yields, endemic and widespread poverty characterised the subsistence farm based population, who had few other sources of earnings.

Needs of the food insecure population

21. These incidents of food-related insecurity in 2006 and 2007 showed that it was necessary to be able to respond quickly to emergency food needs. The Government's wish to resettle IDPs required a short-term provision of food. But the four reports in paragraph 20 also consistently identified widespread, deep and continuing food insecurity, particularly in rural areas dependent on subsistence farming. Paragraph 28 identifies the ways in which the PRRO was designed to respond to these two aspects of food insecurity through food-based programmes targeting specific vulnerable groups.

Targeting

22. Targeting for food-based interventions responded to short and long-term conditions. Short-term beneficiaries were resettling IDPs and victims of sudden disasters. Relief contingency stock was planned for the latter and, in response to an appeal from MSS, following food insecurity reports, was provided to eight districts in February-March 2009. Three other longer-term beneficiary groups were identified: primary school children; under-fives, pregnant and lactating women; and vulnerable people in the most vulnerable *sucos* of seven food-insecure districts for whom food for assets (FFA) activities were designed. In 2009, at the request of the Government, coverage of the SMP was extended to the whole country and, in principle, applied to all primary school children. Targeting is coherent with WFP policies and Strategic Objectives, though MCHN and SMP activities are deliberately and explicitly aligned with Government systems and priorities, which are country-wide and not necessarily targeted according to need, this could lead to a loss of focus on WFP principles. The 2009 expansion of the SMP to national coverage is problematic because of the scale of activity demanded of WFP and limited absorption of the Ministry of Education. Even before the 2009 merger the decision that the intervention should cover all schools within its six prioritized districts, did not follow WFP's targeting criteria for

school meals programmes, nor does it coincide with most models of best practice⁹.

Internal coherence of objectives

23. Although the design is coherent with WFP policies and Strategic Objectives, It did not take into consideration the following¹⁰:

- unit-cost sharing with ministries to raise awareness of running costs;
- clear transition strategies and 'hand-over' arrangements;
- lack of geographical targeting (at least in the design phase of the SMP) and a highly centralized design;
- limited environmental considerations in some programme design (such as use of fuel-efficient stoves and not using food commodities (beans) needing prolonged cooking); and
- insufficient attention to community involvement.

External coherence of objectives

24. Table 2 summarises the relation between Government objectives and priorities and PRRO objectives and activities. The increased importance of food security reflects to some extent the effect of WFP advocacy and support to the Government through this and the previous PRRO. It shows the close link between Government and WFP objectives.

Table 2 Coherence of Government Objectives and PRRO Objectives

Government Policies and Objectives	Links to PRRO Objectives
<i>First Development Plan 2002</i> , prioritised health and education, though food security and nutrition were not discussed in detail at that time.	PRRO10388.1 is closely aligned with the Government's continuing emphasis on health and education, but food security and nutrition are central.
<i>2005 National Food Security Policy</i> , says " <i>food insecurity in Timor-Leste has been one of the main concerns of the first Government</i> "; and notes the lack of a policy framework and that pre-independence institutions no longer existed.	WFP advocacy has continuously aimed to highlight the significance of the latter issues and its Capacity Development activities support the reform of State management, particularly in developing a policy framework and management institutions for food security.
<i>2005 Strategic Plan for Primary Completion by 2015</i> stressed the importance of affordability (food is the major household expense so SF is an incentive)	Primary School Meals Programme is the main food-based activity. In 2009 WFP accepted responsibility for provision of commodities to all primary schools.
<i>2005 Health Sector Strategic Plan 2008-2012</i> included maternal and child health and nutrition, noting that 18 per cent of 12-23 month children are wasted (In SPHERE standards above ten per cent is a nutritional emergency).	MCHN programme is a major food based intervention supporting malnourished mothers, children under 60 months and is an incentive for attendance at health centres.
<i>2007 National Recovery Strategy</i> the Government prioritised resettlement and recovery needs of IDPs.	PRRO supported IDP reintegration in 2008/2009
A key focus of Government development agenda is reform of State management, emphasising development of human resources ¹¹	One PRRO objective is to strengthen Government structures and ability to deliver programmes, explicit in WFP / Government Letter of Understanding (LoU) of March 2009
2009 the Government has identified food security as its first National Priority.	Food security central to PRRO. Objective to Develop Government institutions and capacity.
Government to publish <i>National Development Plan 2008-2012</i> which will emphasise reduction of poverty and vulnerability. ¹²	PRRO title "Assistance to vulnerable people." Emergency reserve created. FFA programme aims to strengthen production.

Source: Government Policy documents and PRRO documentation.

⁹ See: *Learning from Experience – Good Practice From 45 Years of School Feeding*, WFP.

¹⁰ WFP PRRO activities in Timor-Leste are at a relatively early phase of development compared with countries with country programmes running for many years and in which fine tuning of activities has been achieved.

¹¹ UNDAF (2008) p. 11.

¹² UNDAF (2008).

25. WFP objectives and actions are within the *United Nations Development Assistance Framework* (UNDAF). WFP interventions are closely in accord with *UNDAF Country Programme* Outcome 2.1, benefits for vulnerable groups, particularly IDPs and disaster-prone communities. They also support much of Outcome 3 which entails "By 2013, children, young people, women and men have improved quality of life through reduced malnutrition, morbidity and mortality, strengthened learning achievement and enhanced social protection."¹³ They also fit some of the guidelines of the Timor-Leste Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP) 2005¹⁴ to further provision of quality basic education, health, infrastructure, disaster preparedness and tackling poor nutrition. The UNDAF process emphasises the consolidation of peace and stability, to which food security is acknowledged by Government to be critical. UNDAF outcomes are aligned with Government's National Priorities; associated UNDAF strategies include capacity development, decentralisation, social inclusion and developing Government capacity to collect quality data, all of which are components of the PRRO activities.

Learning from previous evaluations

26. Following the 2007 RB *Review of PRRO 10388.0* and in the context of recent insecurity, staff of the CO designed the project, with the secondment of a specialist help and reviews by RB and HQ. PRRO 10388.0 had been on a smaller scale and comprised SF, MCH, relief including general food distribution (GFD) for IDPs in camps with some support to the Government. Recommendations in the *Review of PRRO 10388.0* were followed up at the time, modifications to the SF and MCH programmes, extension of the FFW/A activities that had just started, greater emphasis on emergency preparedness, more emphasis on capacity building, strengthening of logistics; local production and procurement and pre-packing of corn soy blend (CSB) with sugar for MCHs. Many recommendations were also included in the present PRRO, for example; targeting of all pregnant and lactating women; inclusion of food support to improve access to healthcare; recruitment of a competent nutritionist; and consideration of local production of complimentary food. These have all been achieved and the local production of a fortified blended food was planned to start on November 1st 2009.

Logical framework

27. Two logical frameworks were prepared. The one in the project document and an amended version produced during the RB Programme Advisor's visit, February 2009, and relevant to new WFP Strategic Objectives. Performance indicators in the revised framework are fuller and more precise and therefore give better guidance for monitoring, though no details of monitoring, significantly more sophisticated indicators, though the capacity of monitors and time needed for investigation may limit their value; it is understood that they have not yet been measured, though this is planned for December 2009. The evaluation found that there was a monitoring system but that there were limitations in the capacity of monitors. Comments here relate to the amended version. As these comments show the outputs, while relevant to needs and objectives have a range of limitations in practice.

- Output 1 requires that sufficient and adequate quality food items be distributed to targeted beneficiaries from the relief contingency stock, which is intended for sudden emergency needs. It specifies secure distribution conditions. Performance indicators cover the achieved distribution to disaggregated beneficiary categories, but do not mention conditions of distribution or quality of food;

¹³ UNDAF 2009-2013.

¹⁴ *Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Joint Staff Advisory Note* (PRSP), World Bank, 2005.

- Output 2 relates to livelihood protection through support by food for returned IDPs while they develop livelihoods and increased ability of beneficiaries of FFA to meet their own food needs. The output requires community participation in asset creation and the assets actually created. Indicators are numbers of participants, distribution as proportion of planned and the number and types of assets produced. Although the outputs and indicators are appropriate for FFA, in practice they would need elaborate planning and monitoring for the different situation of returnees;
- Output 3 supports improvement of nutrition and health of under-59 month old children and mothers through provision of sufficient quantities of good quality fortified commodities (oil, CSB and salt). A second output is nutrition and health education for pregnant and lactating women. Production of locally fortified products is included under output 5 but directly supports output 3. Improved nutrition is likely to be achieved in the longer-term only if the educational element is carried out;
- Output 4 aims to contribute to human development by supporting vulnerable families by providing food for education through mid-morning snacks, assessment through the numbers of schools pupils reached and the amount of food distributed as proportion of targets. The SO specifies targeting of vulnerable families, though this is not highlighted in the outputs, which mention primary school coverage without specifying vulnerability; and gender disparity is not addressed; and
- Output 5 covers the strengthening of the country's capacity to establish and manage food assistance and hunger reduction programmes. This entails capacity building and systems development. The two outputs are first, the production and blending of local produce and second, agreed hand-over strategies. Success in the other four SOs will be needed to fulfil SO5, production of blended products would be a benefit but successful hand-over strategies are essential to its achievement.

Appropriateness of planned activities in relation to need

28. In Timor-Leste need may be categorised as short and long-term, and at different levels between that of the state itself and of vulnerable individuals. The context of need is that of a fragile state recovering from conflict, in which half the population suffers chronic malnutrition but levels of acute malnutrition are not high. Much of the vulnerable population is rural and dependent on small-scale agriculture. The six PRRO activities showed appropriateness to these needs in different ways and to different extents.

- SMP was planned to support school attendance and performance at school, both necessary to the development of human resources for the future of the state;
- MCHN targeted malnourished children under 59 months, pregnant and nursing mothers. Chronic under-nutrition is serious and the intervention is appropriate for pregnant and lactating women and children 6-23 months; but international opinion¹⁵ now argues that supplementary feeding is unlikely to significantly impact the nutritional status of malnourished 24-59 month old children. Mid upper arm circumference (MUAC) is increasingly accepted internationally as an indicator of nutritional status, rather than weight-for-age, which is used by the Ministry of Health;
- FFA was planned primarily to emphasise asset creation, to aid recovery and produce longer-term sustainable benefits, while being targeted to nutritionally vulnerable people. It was also used to provide food to needy people as in February/March 2009 in response to emergency need, but as

¹⁵ Bryce et al Effective Action at National Level. Lancet (2008) Maternal and Child Undernutrition series.

light food for work (FFW) in which some work was entailed to avoid free distribution. In the different circumstances both forms of FFW/A were appropriate. FFA was appropriate because the *sucos* in which it was carried out were those in greatest need of livelihood support. Some individual households in great need that were not in the most needy *sucos* would not be able to benefit, but it would not be practicable to support individual cases through this modality. FFW was appropriate in emergencies because it helped avoid the threat of welfare dependency;

- Return packs for IDPs were planned to facilitate resettlement. As such they were appropriate as a bridge between the general distributions to IDPs in camps and the recovery of means for self-supply for beneficiaries, whether by agriculture or other livelihood. In practice, however, food was not available before return and tracing of returnees was not achievable;
- Formulation, with the Government, of contingency plans and creation of a contingency stock was, in view of recent food emergencies and the high risk of emergency need, well justified, both in the short term as in February/March 2009, and longer-term in developing Government capacity. Taking into account the short time for the Government to develop its capacity to manage food security, the range of ways in which WFP seeks to help develop systems, establish safety nets, strengthen logistics, planning and management capacity, and develop local food processing to support MCHN is very appropriate.

2.B Outputs and implementation processes: elements of efficiency

29. An overall assessment of outreach is followed by assessments of the outputs of the component activities. The activities in Tables 3 and 4 are arranged according to WFP Strategic Objectives 2006-2009. For continuity Section C on results follow the same structure Strategic Objective 5 "*Strengthen the Capacities of Countries and Regions to Establish and Manage Food-Assistance and Hunger-Reduction Programmes*" has no food allocation and is examined after SO 4.

30. Tables 3 and 4 summarise the first year's achievements in the planned and achieved coverage of PRRO 10388.1.

Table 3 Targeted and Supplied Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries in 2008

Activity Type	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate(%)	Target Beneficiaries*	Reached Beneficiaries**	Access rate (%)
Total	5,217	4,757	91	250,200	259,971	104
Emergency Relief (SO1)	220	0	0	20,000	0	0
IDPs (SO2)	880	240	27	40,000	14,972	37
FFA (SO2)	709	291	41	15,000	8,378	55
MCHN (SO3)	1,589	2340	147	51,600	62,959	122
SMP (SO4)	1,819	1,886	104	124,000	173,662	140

Sources: PRRO document*, 2009 Mid-year Review and M & E Plan**

Table 4 Targeted and Supplied Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries at mid-year 2009

Activity Type	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
Total	16,987	4,152	24	470,000	334,362	71
Emergency Relief (SO1)	220	142	65	20,000	21,565	108
IDPs (SO2)	330	92	28	15,000	30,665	204
FFA (SO2)	4,725	490	10	50,000	7,950	16
MCHN (SO3)	5,636	1,421	25	61,000	61,507	101
SMP (SO4)	6,076	2,006	33	224,000	212,682	95

Source: 2009 Mid-year Review, target beneficiary numbers are totals for the full year from Work plan 2009 Mid-Year Review. Data on Supplied and reached are achievements at mid-year.

31. Data for 2008 cover the four months 1 September-31 December; those for 2009 are for the seven months 1 January-30 July. Targets in 2008 are those listed in Table 1 p. 10 of the PRRO 10388.1 document. The legacy of PRRO 10388.0 significantly influenced the activities, targets and achievements, particularly in 2008, because PRRO 10388.1 followed without a break, but economic recovery and changes in the Government SMP were increasingly important in 2009. In 2008 WFP delivered 91 per cent of the food target and slightly exceeded the target number of beneficiaries. Low figures for emergency-related activities were balanced by higher figures in SF and MCHN.

32. Targets for food delivery in 2009 are for the full year and therefore were not achievable in seven months. If the delivery rate for food achieved up to 30 July were to be maintained through the year the year total would be approximately 41 per cent of the target, though the balance between components would be different as IDPs were now settled. During 2009 there have been difficulties of supply, including pipeline breaks and requests from the Government for more beneficiaries. The number of planned beneficiaries 266,000 in the PRRO document was slightly reduced to 254,266. The 279,933 beneficiaries reached are 110 per cent of the revised target, and 105 per cent of the PRRO document target.

Emergency Relief Assistance

Table 5 Targeted and delivered food, Targeted and reached Beneficiaries of Emergency Relief, 2008, 2009.

Year	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
2008	220	0	0	20,000	0	0
2009	220	142	65	20,000	21,565	108

Source: 2009 Mid-year Review and 2009 M and E Plan

33. Frequent emergencies in the recent history of Timor-Leste have shown the need to be able to respond quickly to food emergencies. Timor-Leste is not self-sufficient in food so contingency stocks are the most efficient way to respond rapidly because it is not possible quickly source large quantities of food locally. In the PRRO document WFP estimated that there might be need to distribute to 20,000 beneficiaries (approximately 4,000 households) in 2008 and 2009. The ration proposed in the project document was 333g cereals and 33g pulses per person/day, for 30 days per year. This would provide 1,309 Kcal per day, about 62 per cent of daily needs and would be a valuable nutritional support.

34. In the event, no need arose in 2008, which explains the nil access rate. In the February-March 2009 emergency WFP, following a request from MSS and in partnership with them, distributed 50 kg of rice per household to 2,111 households in seven districts. Rice was delivered from the 200mt contingency reserve in the Dili warehouse. Pre-positioned rice was available in Oecussi and WFP supplied 2,202 households affected by floods in March 2009. This was provided through food for light work. In total WFP distributed in 2009 to 4,313 households, rather more than the 4,000 envisaged in the PRRO document, though none had been distributed in 2008. In 2009 WFP was able to respond quickly to Government requests and though it did not supply the full quantity, the organization was able to supply a larger than targeted number of beneficiaries. The effect of the increased beneficiaries and reduced supplies was that beneficiaries received about 38 per cent of daily food needs.

35. Timor-Leste has a history of food insecurity so a contingency reserve is advisable. The size of the reserve must balance the needs of the rest of the programme and the advisability of having an immediately available emergency supply. A target of 20,000 beneficiaries per year in need of relief assistance had to respond to unpredictable events. Sudden but prolonged displacement of 150,000 people as in 2006 could reoccur if there were political insecurity. Other needs can arise quickly through floods or more slowly through droughts or other impairments of food production. In 2008 there was no need at all, though the 2007 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSAM) had indicated concern about food production, A reserve of 220mt (eight per cent of the capacity of the Dili warehouse) reduces the amount available for routine distribution. The 220mt reserve proved sufficient for two relatively small events in 2009, and would allow a first response to a larger event such as in 2006. It can be concluded that the 220mt reserve was appropriate provided that if a large event occurred additional imports could be quickly sought and other programmes modified while new supplies were obtained.

36. As yet WFP has not been able to establish partnerships for prepositioning in food-insecure districts. In July 2009 WFP trained local WFP and Government officials in Initial emergency food security assessment techniques.

IDP Return Package

Table 6 Targeted and Delivered Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries, IDP Returnees, 2008, 2009

Year	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
2008	880	240	27	40,000	29,467	73
2009 Jan-Jul	330 ¹⁶	92	28	15,000	30,665	204

Source: 2009 Mid-year Review and 2009 M & E Plan

37. Table 6 shows the progress of the IDP return programme. WFP ceased general distributions to IDPs in camps in March 2008 during PRRO 10388.0. The new PRRO 10388.1 planned to supply return packages to 40,000 returnees in 2008; at this time approximately 30,000 IDPs were in 51 Dili camps but a further 70,000 IDPs lived outside camps with relatives. But the rate of resettlement, which was managed by MSS, was slower than intended because of the fear of violence against returnees, destroyed houses and insecure land tenure¹⁷. Camps remained open until July 2009; this was a Government decision and not related to WFP actions, but explains why fewer beneficiaries than planned received food. The planned reintegration ration of 8kg rice and 3kg beans per person was

¹⁶ The PRRO document planned no distributions for 2009 so the figure was zero. The target of 330mt was that subsequently set by ECHO.

¹⁷ Anon (2009) Timor-Leste Displacement Crisis, Crisis Group Asia Report 148.

intended to be sufficient for two months. In order to encourage resettlement, the ration was to be distributed after the return. The ration would supply 1296 Kcal, 62 per cent of daily needs, for two months.

38. Although the programme was due to start in October 2008, rice provided by the European Union did not arrive until January 2009 and no beans arrived until February 2009. MSS loaned rice for distribution in 2008 and was repaid in January 2009. The 28 per cent delivery rate of food in 2008 is justified by this delay. Because some IDPs remained in camps a further 15,000 beneficiaries were planned for 2009. When beans arrived in February 2009 WFP distributed them to returnees and their hosts in four sub districts of Dili. It was not practicable to identify all returnees so some beans were distributed to vulnerable local people. In fact MSS requested that WFP supply some rations to local people because there was violence against returnees when local people discovered¹⁸ that returnees had not only WFP food but also up to US\$3,000 per household resettlement allowance from the Government. The 25,000 additional beneficiaries in 2009 were those who had been living with relatives and not in camps. In distributing the beans in 2009 WFP used the FFW modality.

39. Delayed arrival of both commodities compromised the efficiency of the reintegration process but WFP responded quickly by borrowing Government rice and distributed in a timely manner when commodities arrived. Delays in distribution were not, however, the reason for camps remaining open. Tension caused by host populations' resentment of the Government's resettlement package threatened the reintegration process. WFP's agreement to provide food for host populations was an appropriate pragmatic action helping to maintain stability.

Food for Assets programme

40. Table 7 summarises data on food deliveries and beneficiaries in the food for assets (FFA) programme. The 2008 component was for October-December. It is important to note that the 2009 programme though planned for the full year, was suspended until August 2009 and delivery data are available only to October 2009. Low food delivery and beneficiary access in 2009 rates must take into account the delayed and restricted time for implementation. By June 2009, 10 per cent of planned food had been delivered¹⁹, as payments for work carried out in 2008 but the programme was suspended. The seven-month gap in 2009 was an appropriate response to the reduction of food available since it would otherwise have adversely affected the SMP, in which continuity of supply is critical. To some extent the light FFW/A relief programme in February/March 2009 compensated for the cessation of FFA. Between December 2008 and August 2009 no projects were undertaken, but in February/March 2009, during the suspension of FFA, food was provided in light FFW as a contingency intervention in response to emergencies²⁰.

Table 7 Targeted and Delivered Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries of Food for Assets Programme, 2008, 2009

Year	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
2008	709	291	41	15,000	8,378	55
2009	4,725	490	10	50,000	7,950	16

Source: 2009 Mid-year Review and 2009 M & E Plan

41. Table 8 summarises the physical assets produced in the FFA programme. While the target output for 2008 was 94 per cent achieved, the seven-month

¹⁸ Lopes I (2009) Land and Displacement in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 43

¹⁹ Work Plan 2009.

²⁰ Light FFW is not included in Table 8 as it was carried out through Emergency Relief Assistance.

cessation of the programme severely limited the production of assets, but activities were quickly started so that 31 per cent of the annual target was achieved in three months, though the present shortage of resources makes it unlikely that the 2009 target can be met.

Table 8 Target and Completed Physical Assets Produced 2008-2009

Description	Time period		
	September-December 2008	2009	Total 2008-9
Summary			
Target number of activities	100	333 (full year)	433
Total completed activities	94	103 (3 months)	197
Percentage completion of targets	94 %	31 %	45 %
Type of activity undertaken	Sept-Dec 2008	2009	Total 2008-9
Feeder roads	22	67	89
Land reclamation	43	2.5	45.5
Irrigation	19	11.5	30.5
Reservoir	3	6	9
Fencing	2	4	6
School buildings	3	3	6
Sloping land technology		4	4
Gabions	1	1	2
Drainage		2	2
Coffee plantation rehabilitation	1		1
Communal gardens ²¹		1	1
Latrines		0.5	0.5
House building		0.5	0.5

Source: WFP FFA files data

42. WFP sets targets for numbers of activities and advises on the activity suitability but FFW/A activities are delivered through local and community level organisations, *sucos*, and *aldeias*. In 2009, for example, it was planned to implement through *sucos* and *aldeias* in the food-insecure sub-districts. Community Development Officers prepare project proposals, which local Project Review Committees, including local Government staff, NGOs and WFP staff review and approve. About half of the proposals are approved. WFP has sought suitable partners in implementation, though there are few NGOs in Timor-Leste with appropriate qualities and some NGOs have withdrawn, but JIRCAS, in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and funding from the *Agencia Española de Cooperación* has been particularly effective in the recovery and development of irrigated areas in Baucau.

43. Targeted communities are in 33 sub-districts that the 2005 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) and Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) in 2007 and 2008 identified as highly food insecure, (see Map 2 Annex 5.A). They estimated 47,200 people to be food insecure in 2009 it was planned that 9,990 people would participate. In principle beneficiaries are identified according to WFP rules, but in practice selection follows community norms. It would not be practicable or desirable for WFP to attempt to impose norms for targeting, but WFP has advocated and negotiated for prioritisation of vulnerable people.

44. The evaluation examined some dozen projects in Baucau and Bobonaro Districts in various levels of detail. These included feeder roads development and maintenance, school rehabilitation, irrigation and land reclamation. A FFA review in Oecussi District ²² examined in detail six of the September-December 2008

²¹ Examination of van Zoggel (2009) suggests that it is possible that some activities such as school gardens have been omitted from the 2008 list.

²² van Zoggel H (2009) Food-for-assets Review, Oecussi District, Timor-Leste.

projects there, finding a large range of quality in their implementation. In reviewing FFA projects in Oecussi, (some of which were also in PRRO 10388.1), van Zoggel.¹⁵ noted the risk of nepotism in selecting beneficiaries and also the possibility of misappropriation of commodities, which are delivered through local structures, not always to the sites of the FFA work, and not necessarily supervised by W.FP. Though there appeared to be cases of nepotism and misappropriation, it appeared to van Zoggel that there was also a level of internal transparency in the locally controlled system. The evaluation considers that similar conclusions can be made from the cases examined in the field visit. But with available monitoring resources, the monitors' big case-loads²³ and local control of much of the system it is difficult to envisage a way of avoiding these negative aspects, apart from internal transparency and WFP staff making clear to local leadership that they must adhere to the spirit of WFP policies, for example in relation to gender and vulnerability. To the extent that is feasible WFP attempts to ensure that the most needy benefit from the food provided for FFA activities and the evaluation saw WFP staff discussing this with community leaders. Despite WFP attempts to ensure that women's participation reached WFP norms it appeared that women were not in fact participating to the extent intended. (see para 141 for further commentary).

Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Programme

Table 9 Targeted and Delivered Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries of MCHN Programme, 2008,2009

Year	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
2008	1,589	2,340	147	51,600	62,959	122
2009	5,636	1,421*	25	45,226*	40,753*	90

* By mid year

45. Table 9 summarises food and beneficiaries of the MCHN programme in 2008 and 2009. Further details of beneficiary categories in the MCHN programme for the first six months of 2009 are in Table 10. The planned ration for all four groups in table 10 was 20g sugar, 20g oil, 17g iodised salt and 200g CSB, providing 1057 Kcal or half of daily needs,

Table 10 Target and Actual Beneficiaries of MCHN January-June 2009

Beneficiary Type	Actual beneficiaries	Planned beneficiaries	Proportion of planned
Pregnant women	3,989	4,346	92%
Lactating women	7,677	6,812	113%
Children 6-23 months	13,827	17,176	81%
Children 24-59 months	15,260	16,892	90%
Totals for January-June 2009	40,753	45,226 (of 61,000 for year)	90%

Source: WFP monitoring data

46. Locations of WFP MCHN centres are shown in Map 3 Annex 5.A. Programme coverage, in this case the proportion of eligible beneficiaries served at health facilities, varies between districts - see Table 11. Coverage ranges from very low to too high - with a small number being over 100 per cent. These figures suggest a lack of consistency in programme delivery with Dili and Ermera districts being poorly served. Coverage of more than 100 per cent may in part be attributable to out of date figures, as Timor-Leste has experienced big movements of IDPs. The next census in 2010 should provide improved data.

²³ About half monitors' time is spent in the field.

Table 11 Range of Coverage of Eligible MCHN Beneficiaries in Districts

Beneficiaries	Percentage coverage		Timor-Leste average
	Lowest	Highest	
Pregnant women	5.6 Dili	48.4 Manufahi	22.2
Lactating women	13.3 Dili	110.9 Manufahi	45.2
Children 6-23 months	8.0 Ermera	78.0 Manufahi	26.0
Children 24-59 months	14.0 Ermera	102. Covalima	50.0

Source: WFP monitoring data

47. The delivery of WFP commodities varies significantly, in both time and locations, with the planned Final Distribution Point (FDP) being the 131 implementing health facilities (51 per cent of those in Timor-Leste, see Table 12), though the evaluation heard many reports that deliveries are made only to the higher community health centre level (some 56 of the health facilities in the Ministry of Ministry/WFP programme are at this level), or to locations other than the health centres.

48. Under an agreement with the Ministry of Health WFP serves half of all health facilities. In comparing the percentage served by WFP with district level food security status there is little systematic relation between the level of food security and the percentage covered by WFP. According to intensity of need, WFP served none in Viqueque (secure) and all in Oecussi (very insecure), but also 86 per cent in Dili (secure), and small amounts in Lautem and Ermera (two of the worst). Apart from the level of need four points are relevant in relation to WFP coverage:

- Accessibility and sub-office location– Oecussi is difficult to access and it was sensible that WFP should handle all the activity since it has a sub-office there. WFP has sub-offices in Bobonaro and Baucau, both districts of great need, so it was appropriate that it should cover a large number of facilities there. Food security is high in Viqueque where WFP does not supply health facilities;
- In fact food insecurity varies considerably within districts, as is shown in the 2007 CFSAM so that there are needy children and mothers even in more generally food-secure areas;
- For political reasons it is important that there is no perception of a WFP realm as opposed to the Ministry of Health. If there is a possibility of a different quality of service. It is also politically essential that there are no distinctions between different groups such as eastern and western. Therefore it was appropriate that WFP should be seen to be active throughout the country; and
- Since WFP intends to build capacity in the management of food security it is essential to have presence throughout the country.

49. *Servisu Integrado Saúde Comunitario* (SISCa) – Integrated Community Health Service - is a basic healthcare outreach programme operating from each health facility. Staff travel from health facilities each month to between one and eight sites per facility. Staff and volunteers deliver outreach services, which include those to WFP target groups of pregnant and lactating women, and to young children. Timor-Leste *Asistênsia Integrada Saúde* (TAIS) – Timor-Leste Integrated Maternal and Child Health Care – is a system of community health workers that supports the SISCa outreach programme. In many sites TAIS volunteers weigh and monitor WFP beneficiaries and distribute WFP commodities. The Ministry of Health considers that this improves coverage of health services but WFP monitoring suggests that the reliability of SISCa delivery varies between districts.

Table 12 Health Facilities Served by WFP Supplementary Feeding Programme at 9 July 2009

District	Food security status			Health Facilities	Number Served by WFP	Percentage served by WFP
	VAM 2007	RFSA 2008	Combined* VAM & RFSA			
Aileu	Best	severe	4	14	6	43
Ainaro	Poor	severe	5	15	9	60
Baucau	Worst	severe	6 Worst	30	22	73
Bobonaro	Worst	moderate	5	25	13	52
Covalima	Worst	moderate	5	17	9	53
Dili	Best	low	2 Best	14	12	86
Ermera	Worst	severe	6 Worst	23	5	22
Lautem	Worst	severe	6 Worst	23	5	22
Liquica	Poor	moderate	4	19	12	63
Manatuto	Worst	moderate	5	24	13	54
Manufahi	Best	low	2 Best	19	11	58
Oecussi	Worst	severe	6 Worst	14	14	100
Viqueque	Best	low	2 Best	22	0	0
Timor-Leste				259	131	51

Source: WFP data. * Combined figure derived from weighing 1-3 according to level of insecurity in the VAM and RFSA lists: thus 2 = most food-secure, 6= least food-secure.

50. Direct observation of a distribution²⁴ confirmed reports that the commodities are distributed (see Figure 1) separately into old bags, sacks and bottles of uncertain cleanliness that beneficiaries bring with them.

51. Due to staff limitations, commodities are not pre-mixed, volunteers spend much time carrying out distributions. To reduce the probability of deterioration of the CSB distribution needs to be rapid, and it is likely that storage items are used communally. WFP currently offers the volunteers a rice incentive but the Government is due to take on this responsibility in January 2010. It is not clear whether TAIS views the WFP incentive as a welcome addition or as a threat that may destabilise the programme if the incentive were to be stopped.

52. WFP has not distributed sugar since July/August 2009, and some health centres had none. For many years WFP had carefully considered supplying sugar, and it is routinely included to increase the palatability of CSB porridge for vulnerable groups including infants and the clinically malnourished. Omission of sugar makes no significant difference to nutrition but it significantly lowers acceptability of the ration and effectiveness of the programme. Not surprisingly some mothers reported that their children often refused unsweetened CSB.

Figure 1: Distribution at Labor Health Post



53. Unpackaged delivery of substandard commodities undermines the messages that they are for the vulnerable targeted beneficiary only, should be mixed before cooking and are intended to supplement regular meals. In practice, commodities are distributed separately into different bags, not all items are always available and at times the quality is not appropriate for vulnerable groups. Currently it is generally accepted that the sugar component, when available, is used in tea, oil used for general cooking and CSB is widely shared in the family.

²⁴ Leber HP. 23rd September, Bobonaro district.

54. The Ministry of Health identifies WFP-supported health facilities, and must formally request the WFP to partner them. A food aid monitor will then assess the facility on behalf of WFP before it is accepted into the programme.

55. Health facility staff identify malnourished children 23-59 months by weight-for-age, and malnourished pregnant and lactating women by MUAC. Assessment of weight-for-age is problematic as it requires knowledge of the actual age and ability to calculate the Weight-for-Age Index. This level of complexity is difficult for some health staff and TAIS volunteers.²⁵ Furthermore it is time consuming, distracts them from other duties, and focuses on growth monitoring which is ineffective against chronic undernutrition²⁶.

56. The main partner for supplementary feeding is the Ministry of Health and the partnership appears to be largely both good and effective, notwithstanding the above limitations of programme delivery. WFP is in a position to influence policy via the Nutrition Working Group (Nutrition Cluster). An effective WFP United Nations Volunteer (UNV) in Dili, while providing technical support for WFP is also actively engaged with both the Timor-Leste Nutrition Cluster and the RB.

57. WFP presence at district and field levels is weak with six food aid monitors in Baucau, four in Maliana, three in Dili and three in Oecussi. Monitors are expected to monitor and support over 1000 schools, 131 health facilities, several hundred SISCa outreach posts and many FFA sites.

School Meals Programme

Table 13 Targeted and Delivered Food, Targeted and Reached Beneficiaries of School Meals Programme, 2008, 2009

Year	Target Food (mt)	Delivered Food (mt)	Delivery Rate (%)	Target Beneficiaries	Reached Beneficiaries	Access rate (%)
2008	1,819	1,886	104	124,000	173,662	140
2009	6,076 Jan-Dec	2,006 Jan-Jul	33	146,000 Jan-Dec	179,000 Jan-Jul	123

Sources: PRRO document, 2009 Mid-year Review and M and E Plan. Target beneficiary numbers from 2009 Mid-Year Review

58. The School Meals Programme under the current PRRO was planned to cover only six districts. Until April 2009 the Ministry of Education covered the remaining seven districts of the country in a state-run programme that was initiated in 2008. The two programmes merged in April 2009 and WFP-supported operations attained national coverage. According to interviews in the Ministry of Education, the Government was enthusiastic to merge with WFP as *"it [the SMP] will help repair the Government's image"*²⁷. Thus, apart from being an incentive to boost enrolment and retention, the current SMP is also part of the Government's policy to address food security. This dynamic is important in understanding WFP's SF operations.

59. The SMP is currently implemented in 1010 primary schools, providing an almost complete national coverage²⁸. Through the SMP almost 179,000 pupils from Grade One to Grade Six receive a daily meal²⁹. This exceeds the 146,000 planned for 2010 in the PRRO, because the programme extended to all 13 districts in 2009. Thus WFP has exceeded the planned number of beneficiaries for PRRO 10388.1 (Outcome 4.1). It is notable that increased enrolment figures do not reflect the expansion from six to thirteen districts. In fact the extension was not supported by a proportionally increased tonnage and consequently rations

²⁵ TAIS Ministry of Health, (June 2009) Evaluation of National Family Health Promoter Programme.

²⁶ Bryce *et al*, (2008) Effective action at national level. Lancet. Maternal & Child Under-nutrition series.

²⁷ Interview with official at Ministry of Education during field mission to Timor-Leste

²⁸ This figure is based on WFP's School Profile data.

²⁹ This data is from 828 of 1010 primary schools, the latest updated figure from WFP.

were reduced in order to reach the increased number of beneficiaries. Table 4 shows how the reduced ration has affected kcal intake.

Table 14 Effect of Programme Expansion on Rations Kg/beneficiary/day (PRRO 10388.0/10388.1)

Year	Rice	Pulses	Oil	Salt
2008 ³⁰	0.120	0.030	0.010	-
2009 - 2010	0.075	0.020	0.010	0.003
Kcal per child/day (estimated)	2008: 621 Kcal – approximately 30 per cent of recommended total daily intake 2009: 426 Kcal – approximately 20 per cent of recommended total daily intake			

Based on data from WFP Timor-Leste Office

60. The current ration supplies around a fifth of recommended daily kcal intake. Figures in Table 14 are calculated by dividing tonnage delivered by beneficiary number; they do not consider the possibility of losses or inappropriate management in schools. Rations may be even less than in Table 4 due to poor management of food items, for example ineffective storage. Reduced rations may be a nutritional problem, as the school meal, according to parents, substitutes a meal provided at home.

61. Inadequate storage facilities at schools is common, according to WFP’s School Profiles Survey, 52 per cent of schools lack storage facilities, and some schools visited, though reportedly with storage, had inappropriate facilities.

62. Some interviews also indicated that meals have not been prepared regularly³¹. This is due mainly to delays in supplies, some schools reported non-delivery of food for some months early in 2009. WFP, UNICEF and NGOs also reported that delayed payments have caused absenteeism among the cooks. Before the merger WFP used rations, intended for children, to pay cooks selected from among parents. Part of the merger agreement is that the Ministry of Education pays cooks – in fact cooks were paid, after some months delay, in August 2009.

63. Irregular deliveries and pipeline breaks have wide consequences because of the national coverage of the programme. The current reduced resources for WFP Timor-Leste threatens the necessary steady flow of food to all primary schools in the country. To avoid pipe-line breaks it is essential to ensure additional resource for PRRO 10388.1. According to WFP calculations breaks are likely to occur from March 2010 – one month after the school year has started. The negative effects might be felt even outside the education sector because the SMP and food security in general have high priority in Timor-Leste.

64. WFP and the Ministry of Education jointly manage the SMP. While WFP ensures deliveries of food items, monitoring and training, Ministry of Education’s responsibility is to pay cooks a monthly fee. Daily management therefore remains a WFP responsibility. Even so, significant efforts are made to ensure coordination and dialogue on issues related to the implementation of the SMP. This coordination takes place at Ministry level with the Department of Social Action and the Ministry of Education school-feeding Focal Point.

65. The Ministry of Education has high expectations of SMP and wishes to implement the new programme soon, even by 2011, according to some Ministry of Education staff. While the Ministry of Education’s commitment to SMP is essential for the future national programme, WFP and the Ministry of Education must take into consideration that limited capacity is an important risk factor. The

³⁰ This is the figure agreed in the MOU of 2009.

³¹ This tendency was reported by WFP staff, both at CO and sub-office levels, by UNICEF staff, NGOs as well as teachers and headmasters in most schools visited).

Ministry of Education's limited capacity was clearly demonstrated when in 2008 it attempted to run a SMP in seven districts. A similar failure at national level, in the fragile situation of Timor-Leste, would represent a serious set-back for the Ministry of Education.

66. WFP's efforts in capacity development among government partners have focused on training of storage managers. The presence of a WFP staff member within the Ministry of Education may also contribute to increased capacity among its staff members. However, currently this presence can best be understood as facilitating the implementation of the SMP rather than developing capacity among Ministry of Education staff. In the light of the Ministry of Education's insufficient capacity to take over SMP, and considering its eagerness to do so, WFP (and Ministry of Education) need to define needs and establish ways of developing the Ministries capacity in the area of SF and for the future the PRRO needs therefore to be seen within a larger framework for institutional development – including decentralized entities (districts and school clusters).

Capacity Development

67. Firstly, in the PRRO document, capacity development involves two components. It entails training of WFP staff on food-based activities and in disaster preparedness and response. WFP carried out training of sub office staff during 2009 on the EFSA, market price surveys, nutrition orientation and report writing. Staff of RB, HQ and other parts of the Region trained CO staff in WINGS II, HIV, TB, nutrition, logistics, EFSA, and GIS. The lack of suitable NGO partners both limits the quality of implementation and the range of possible projects. If suitable NGO partners could be employed, particularly for more technically demanding activities, skills would be imported and efficiency would be significantly improved.

68. Secondly, a medium-term target is significant progress towards national food security. Unlike other PRRO activities capacity development is not food-based, though the drive to achieve national ownership of food security has occupied increasing amounts of the time of senior staff since the resettlement of IDPs was completed in mid 2008. Inevitably there are also significant costs in other staff time in capacity development.

69. The Government, which only exists for seven years, and therefore has limited capacity, can draw on the PF to support its activities, but for a short time only. As security improves in Timor-Leste donors are less willing to invest, so food security-related Government capacity must be quickly strengthened and related management systems developed if WFP is successfully to hand over responsibility for food security and nutrition. To obtain this WFP has been strongly involved in advocacy, on-the-job training, coordinated information sharing and systems planning with the Government. Fortunately WFP and Government priorities for food security and nutrition coincide. Similarly WFP, the UN system, the donors and Government share a common longer-term objective of Government full ownership.

70. A critical phase of WFP strategy for this handover to the Government was its participation with Government Ministries; Social Security, Agriculture and Fisheries and FAO in the 2008 Rapid Food Security Assessment (RFSA). In the RFSA WFP encouraged the Government to be seen to lead the assessment, and WFP, as co-chair of the Food Security Cluster (FSC), sought to develop common and unified approaches to food security in which Government systems aligned *ab initio* to those of other participants. Because, fortunately, at the same time the FSC and Government National Priority One (Food Security) were both being initiated, and with the same participants, the design of congruent systems was possible. Though this was not in itself a planned PRRO output, the level of coordinated planning and enhanced skill development in Government through

RFSA amounts to a significant achievement in hand-over strategy discussion, Output SO5.02.³²

71. A similar achievement was WFP's central involvement with the Government and FAO in developing the National Food Security Information System (NFSIS). WFP then trained well-resourced district units that had security monitoring capacity. It was planned that WFP would train 1000 counterparts, country programme staff and members of civil society in food security assessment. This target was surpassed (1,119), though this latter number includes counterparts in other activities such as logistics, school meals and MCHN. The NFSIS is based in previously existing units of the Government. A standard operating system, common to WFP, other FSC agencies and Government has been agreed. WFP provides tactical support through seconded staff at critical points in ministries. NFSIS is to be presented in October 2009 and the intension is to test in 2010. If successful this will be a significant SO5.2 achievement, though further back-up will be needed.

72. SO5.1 entails the use of local produce in blended food production - the Timor Global (TG) food fortification plant (Annex 5.C), will produce fortified CSB for supplementary feeding in MCHNs. It was planned that the plant would be in production by November 2009 but the machinery, purchased by the Government, arrived late. It will be installed November/December 2009 and WFP will train TG staff in aspects of commodity management. The first trial production is expected early in 2010.

73. In relation to the SMP, the Brazilian Trust Fund (BTF) is a facility intended to promote capacity development of Ministry of Education staff within existing SMPs in selected countries. In the case of Timor-Leste BTF support has, according to key informants within the Ministry of Education, contributed positively in terms of developing specific products for the Ministry of Education, including an Act of SMP (still under development), operational guidelines for SMP together with training manuals. While apparently useful contributions to the Ministry of Education, they do not in themselves develop capacity but seem, rather, to be specific products. Their usefulness will also depend on Ministry of Education's capacity to use the products, an issue that has not been addressed. A further problem is that WFP's staff at CO level had only very limited involvement in the process conducted by the BTF consultant. This approach faces the SMP with two concerns:

- For the Ministry of Education the process seems to be expert-driven and creates products and not processes (in particular capacity development), and
- Neither the process nor capacity development is an integral part of WFP and this prevents WFP and its staff from essential learning.

During three years of support WFP has established a good relationship with the Ministry of Education. Efforts to strengthen daily coordination, regular meetings, information sharing and joint monitoring at district level are the main implementation mechanisms that have been established to date within SMP. There is still, however, a need to strengthen these relations, to allow strategic capacity development to prepare future hand-over strategies. This will be necessary in relation to the recent Ministry of Education's proposal to reorganise the school system into clusters (for details of clusters see Annex 5.B).

74. In the SPM, WFP has trained commodity managers (headmasters and teachers) in the proper management of food items. Despite this training, visits to schools and interviews with WFP, district authorities and school-monitors show that ineffective storage of food items continues. Food is still stored inappropriately, resulting in spoilage and other losses (20mt according to WFP

³² WFP (2009) Workplan Mid-Year Review.

records, about 0.5 per cent of deliveries). This recorded figure may, however, be underestimated because of inadequate monitoring of food deliveries.

75. WFP has placed a part-time UNV within the Ministry of Education to coordinate SMP activities and facilitate dialogue with the Ministry. This position is a strategic key entry point to the Ministry and of critical importance to the future design of SMP in Timor-Leste. While information flow and coordination within the Ministry has improved, it is essential for future technical assistance that the person occupying this position has sufficient experience in designing 'hand-over' strategies and capacity development skills to ensure that the future School Meals model is appropriate and adapted to the Timorese context and capacities.

76. Another UNV has desk space within the Ministry's Nutrition Department and supports its work, specifically with the Health Management Information System. In addition the UNV aims to develop the capacity of the internal monitoring team though budgeting constraints impede this.

Logistics

77. All food commodities are imported in containers via Surabaya in Indonesia and transhipped on feeder vessels to Dili, a small port with one 280 metre wharf, which can simultaneously accommodate only three vessels that must unload using their own gear. A Japanese company and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) are currently improving the port, but use has increased with the importation of 120,000mt of rice for the Government and reconstruction materials and future congestion is likely.³³ Private companies operate stevedoring and transport and a clearing and forwarding firm handles customs clearance and the transfer of commodities to WFP's warehouse in Dili. A cheap but unreliable ferry service (300 passengers, 170mt capacity) operates between Dili, Atauro Island and the Oecussi enclave.

78. Annex 5.D examines the particular logistical problems associated with Oecussi. In 2010 a new ferry will extend services to the towns of Baucau and Lautem. WFP has a good working relationship with the port authorities; documents are processed quickly and there are no demurrage charges.

79. WFP has one warehouse in Dili its capacity is 2,700mt. Containers outside the building are used as an extension to the warehouse mainly for storing vegetable oil. The warehouse is well-kept and clean, stock cards are in order and WFP warehouse rules followed.

80. The logistics unit follows WFP rules and regulations, and the logistics chain is properly controlled but there are weaknesses in the system. Road transport presents a number of problems. There is no axle load limit in Timor-Leste so roads deteriorate and trucks are not insured. The transport contracts do not include a performance bond and the contractual penalty clause is symbolic. In May 2009 The Asian Development Bank³⁴ announced a US\$48 million grant to the Government's US\$52.9 million road programme to rehabilitate 230 km of national roads and improve road maintenance. Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction contributes a further US\$3 million grant. These road improvements will facilitate WFP commodity transport and will aid the development of Timor-Leste, but will not improve minor roads that are currently impassable in wet weather and are the main problem for WFP commodity transport.

81. WFP selects transporters according to WFP contracting procedures. From Dili goods are transported to final FDP within the prescribed period of time. With the exception of the Oecussi enclave, all goods are transported to FDPs in small trucks (2-5mt), which then return empty. Transporters are paid on presentation

³³ A new port is being developed at Tibar but will not be ready for many years.

³⁴ Asian Development Fund (2009) Road Network Development Sector Project, Timor-Leste.

of waybills, signed by the consignee to certify that cargo was received in good condition. Reported damages or shortages are deducted from payments to transporters. The Oecussi enclave has no intermediate warehouse and all deliveries to FDPs are made direct from Dili warehouse.

82. Because the PRRO involves a small tonnage it is difficult to secure economies of scale. Most vessels bringing cargo to Dili return almost empty because there are few exports. Currently Requests for Offer are made on a case-by-case basis but there is now competition in Surabaya-Dili transport and freight rates are open to negotiation for contracts covering sufficient tonnage over a period of time.

83. The Dili warehouse is usually almost full. This causes two major consequences first of all the stacks are too high and then there is the possibility of cross-infestation which is difficult to avoid. Although very professionally built, stacks are dangerously high and the polypropylene bags are slippery, and though this has not yet happened in Dili, the high stacks could collapse, gravely injuring staff. A possible solution to the problems of stacks being too high and the probability of cross-infestation involves changes to fumigation management, road transport and warehousing systems. These changes would also solve problems relating to road transport mentioned in Para 89. This report concludes with recommendations for modifications to the logistics system. Annex 5.E provides full details of the recommendations.

Monitoring and Evaluation

84. Following the visit of the Regional Programme Advisor in February 2009 the logical framework was modified and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) tools reviewed in line with the Strategic Results Framework (SRF), with recommendations for "*streamlining M&E data collection, entry and analysis using the database.*"³⁵ Indonesia CO also provided training in M&E for WFP staff. Discussions were held with the Ministry of Health to standardise data collection by the Ministry and WFP and to confirm that weight-for-age would be used as the indicator. It was decided that community asset scores would be used for FFA. As yet community asset scores are not in use: their use would require further training of monitors.

85. The Indicator Matrix ³⁶ includes baseline data (available in few cases), output and outcome indicator data for 2008, targets for 2009, data sources and collection method, frequency of collection (annual, monthly, quarterly or *ad hoc*), responsibility for collection and use of information. The *ad hoc* category is for SO5 activities only. This data was used in the Mid-year Review of the 2009 workplan and in most cases the required data had been collected.

86. M&E raised some problems as some monitors lack necessary skills and the evaluation saw some reports from communities that were clearly inaccurate³⁷. WFP recognises the problem and prioritises further training of monitors. Planning of the monitoring system has been carried out and appropriate indicators identified but efficient monitoring has been limited. First, data is collected from a large number of locations including schools, MCHs and FFW/A this is for more than 1,000 sites per month, transport on poor roads is a further restriction. Second, limited educational level restricts the capacity of many food monitors, Government counterparts and staff who collect data. WFP undertakes training to overcome this but progress is slow. Some of the monitors met by the evaluators, however, had higher-level skills.

³⁵ Regional Programme Advisor Mission Report 2009.

³⁶ WFP (no date) WFP Timor-Leste; Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (PRRO 10388.1).

³⁷ In two cases communities handed over lists of participants that had been completed to the end of the current month. In each case the lists showed 100 per cent attendance. In both cases WFP staff returned them demanding accurate reports.

Adaptation to changing need

87. Conditions in Timor-Leste have changed significantly since the start of PRRO 10388.1. The economy is recovering, there have been no significant security incidents. IDP camps in and around Dili have closed and normal life is returning. WFP activities supported these changes, particularly up to July 2009 in the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs, which made a large and visible change in the recreation of a non-emergency urban system in Dili. Existence of an adequate contingency stock, some of it prepositioned in the most vulnerable district, Oesussi, and flexible use of staff resources allowed WFP to respond promptly to two short-term food emergencies February-April 2009.

88. Support to the primary schools and health centres has also helped recovery of normality throughout the country, though in these cases interventions were longer term, built on the earlier PRRO and changes were more gradual. As the Ministry of Education is planning the rationalisation of the primary school system into a pattern of local groups, WFP has taken on responsibility for distributing food to all schools. In relation to MCHN, WFP's support for local fortification of CSB is now shifting the emphasis from direct relief activity to a strengthened local capacity to manage nutrition. The need to maintain the School Meals Programme, respond to IDP reintegration and emergency needs led to suspension of FFA activities. In this case the issue was prioritisation of resource use in relation to needs – the need for rehabilitation of rural assets remained, but resources needed to be rationed. With the closing of IDP camps and end of emergency interventions it has been possible since July to resume responding to rehabilitation needs and opportunities through FFA. Also from July 2009 senior staff have been able also to devote much time to enhancing the capacity of the Government, which in effect is the WFP exit strategy. WFP has adapted to changing needs and opportunities.

89. The prime needs are those of the nutritionally vulnerable population, but WFP also responds to Government's needs for quick response to emergencies and to long-term capacity development.

External institutional arrangements: partnerships

90. Partnerships with the Government, particularly Ministries of Health, Social Security, Education and Agriculture and Fisheries, the most significant in planning food-related programmes. WFP has a Letter of Understanding with the Government in relation to the PRRO, listing mutual obligations and understandings. In delivering programmes the same ministries are involved, as are districts and sub districts. WFP is developing the capacity of these partners and this activity becomes progressively more important with a view to their taking full responsibility. Training of members of civil society has the same purpose. While the Government is willing to take control it has, as yet, a limited cadre of administrators.

91. Like WFP, other UN partners have been affected by reduced support for Timor-Leste as the severe emergency has passed and in the current global financial crisis. Under these circumstances WFP and its partners need to coordinate action, fortunately the recently developed FSC with co-leadership from WFP is developing an effective partnership with the Government.

92. WFP has some effective NGO partners such as Oxfam and JIRCAS but few have been available and others such as Concern Worldwide have withdrawn. The lack of implementing partners reduces the feasible range and effectiveness of FFA activities.

93. Partnership with TG, a private company, is new but with considerable significance in developing active participation in food security and nutrition by national entities with the potential for wider linkages to the business and production systems, particularly agriculture.

Internal institutional arrangements

94. In September 2009 WFP Timor-Leste had 76 staff of whom 14 were international, including 6 UNVs, 3 UNVs as heads of sub-offices, one as Logistics Officer and two as advisors on nutrition and SMP to the Government. Many international staff are needed, partly for continuous training and supervision of local staff and because it is not yet possible to find suitably qualified local staff for some key positions because of:

- competition from other agencies;
- a small pool of suitably educated candidates;
- rapid turnover of local staff, and
- poor work ethics among some local staff.

95. A gap in logistics staffing from 28 August 2008 to 24 January 2009 caused problems in a critical area during the development of the PRRO. This gap in logistics has now been filled and WFP has the capacity to deliver the PRRO. There are now three sub offices. Suai sub office closed in December 2008, when Maliana opened, this allowed closer supervision and more effective delivery of the programme. Connectivity is a continuing problem for sub offices. Oecussi has no internet connection and no sub office has lotus notes access. There are also problems in radio communication. These problems of connectivity will be more significant if warehouses are located at the field offices as proposed in this report.

Cost and funding of the operation

96. As of 14 December 2009 the PRRO was 41.7 per cent funded. The donors to the PRRO were as shown in Table 15. Funding was insufficient from 2009 (see Table 16 and Figure 2). Insufficient funding and the late arrival of commodities caused pipeline breaks, to which the CO responded through advocacy with the Government and donors and suspending FFA activities for seven months in 2009. Improved cost control could allow better use of available funds, for example by reassessing the transport policy and saving costs of fumigation by using alternative methods. (See Annex 5E and Para. 108)

Table 15 Donors to PRRO 10388.1 as of 14 December 2009 (US\$)


Donor	2008	2009	Total US\$
Total	13,386,673	2,836,042	16,222,715
U.S.A.	5,184,400		5,184,400
Japan	2,242,991		2,242,991
Australia	959,693	720,049	1,679,742
Spain		1,239,495	1,239,495
East Timor	350,000		350,000
European Commission	324,963		324,963
Private donors		174,850	174,850
Republic of Korea	150,000		150,000
Cary over	2,950,243		2,950,243
Multilateral donors	1,224,383	701,648	1,926,031

Table 16 Funding and Commodity Requirements and Contributions to PRRO 10388.1, as of December 2009

Year	Requirements			Contributions	
	mt	US\$	Cumulative US\$	US\$	Cumulative US\$
2008*				2,950,243	2,950,243
2008	5,217	6,212,200	6,212,200	10,436,430	13,388,673
2009	16,137	19,215,310	25,427,510	2,836,042	16,222,715
2010**	8,910	12,637,179	38,913,700		

* Carry-over from PRRO 10388.0 ** Projected

Figure 2 Cumulative Requirements vs cumulative contributions



97. Following budget revisions the PRRO funding requirement increased by US\$ 2,027,499 to US\$38,913,700. There is a percentage shortfall of 62.5 per cent. Budget revision was due to changed commodity costs, additional DSC, additional ITSH and reduction in ODOC. Donors have been reluctant to fund non-emergency activities and situations. For Timor-Leste this contrasts markedly with the over-funded Flash Appeal of 2006.

98. This shortfall threatens WFP operations and 84 per cent had been spent by late September 2009. Resources could be exhausted by the end of December 2009 but may last until March/April 2010 because US\$ 600,000 is available from the Immediate Response Account. Shortage of funding has contributed to pipeline breaks and limitation of the programme for example when FFA was stopped so that SF could continue January-July 2009. Funding of capacity building to facilitate hand-over to the Government is problematic because it is not food-based but must use DSC or PF or other non-PRRO funds. In the view of the CO food-based and non-food-based activities are complementary and part of the same operation. As yet the Government has not shown willingness to fund WFP to act as an agent for the provision of food for food-based activities, as happens for example in Ecuador.

99. Costs could be reduced by cutting losses due to infestation in the Dili warehouse. Corridors between stacks are very narrow and, if there are pests, cross-infestation is rapid and the whole warehouse is quickly contaminated. When this happened in Dili the whole warehouse had to be fumigated at a cost

exceeding US\$30,000, (more than US\$10 per ton)³⁸. Fumigation is expensive because there are no specialist pest control firms in Dili so experts must be flown in from Australia or Indonesia. This also explains why preventive fumigation is not used.

100. Another problem concerning the transport system is caused by unofficial payments for hand-carrying from the Alternative Distribution Points (ADP) to final destinations. Because commodities are sometimes delivered to ADPs because the final destination may not be accessible, for example if roads are in poor condition, local people may carry the bags and be paid in kind. This additional cost of carrying is comparable to the already high cost of road transport to ADPs. This causes a large, but hidden increase in transport costs. Annex 5.F provides details.

101. In the PRRO document the cost of the SMP, based on its proportion of the planned food distribution, is US\$12,862,054, but the actual cost breakdown for 2008, 2009 is approximately one third of this, as in Table 17.

Table 17 Cost Breakdown of WFP SMP 2008, 2009

Year	Food in mt	Food cost	Associated cost in US\$					Total Cost
			External transport	LTSH	ODOC	DSC	ISC	
2008	1,075	696,975	129,533	89,247	62,682	133,813	57,556	1,169,806
2009	2,852	1,849,511	343,732	236,827	166,334	355,090	206,605	3,158,100
Total	3,926	2,546,487	473,265	326,074	229,016	488,904	264,161	4,327,906

Source: WFP data

The cost to WFP per meal, per student in 2008 was US\$0.11 and in 2009 with a smaller ration³⁹ was US\$0.07. In the Government 2005 *Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion by 2015* (SPUPC), WFP would introduce SMP in five districts from 2005-2007 at a cost to WFP of US\$3.3 million, which is comparable to the 2008 figure. The SPUPC states the total planned budget for primary education for 2008-2009 as US\$10,287,000, while according to the World Bank the total Ministry of Education's budget in 2009 is US\$62.600,000. Expenditure on education has risen, but it is a declining proportion of total Government spending. Table 18 shows that the Government budget for SMP is inadequate to cover current needs. Trends in allocations for education, the limited budget for primary education but with the cost implications of the major reorganisation of primary education suggest that Government funding for SMP will not be sufficient to maintain the programme that WFP has developed.

Table 18 Ministry of Education Budget Allocation for SMP 2008-2010

Year	Allocation US\$	Comments
2008	1,822,094	In 2008 the Ministry of Education managed SMP in seven of 13 districts. WFP managed SMP in the other 8 districts.
2009	1,500,000	Ministry of Education budget covered: salaries of SMP coordinators and guards, incentives for cooks, gas canisters for schools in the seven Ministry of Education districts
2010	1,500,000	This projected budget is insufficient to cover expansion from Grades 1-6 to Grades 1-9. In April 2010 there will be a mid-term review of the budget.

102. In the *Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) 2008-2012* (2007) MCHN is identified as a priority area. In the Medium-term Expenditure Framework 2007-2012 (MTEF) it was planned that by 2012 expenditure would rise in 2012 to

³⁸ In comparison in the *Evaluation of WFP Response to Hurricane Felix in Nicaragua* (2009) the total cost of fumigation was US\$ 0.75 per ton.

³⁹ This reflects the effect of the Government's request to WFP to increase the number of schools supplied in mid 2009 to over 1000. In 2008, 120g. cereals and 30g. pulses. In 2009 this was reduced to 75g. cereals and 20g. pulses. The ration of oil remained at 10g. and salt at 3g.

US\$41 million per year of which recurrent expenditure would be US\$29 million. In this context the cost to the PRRO of US\$13,298,108 over two years, calculated from proportion of planned food distributed, is a significant input to the total Timor-Leste health programme. The MTEF predicts that the gap between requirements and expected funding is less than US\$1 million per year. This would be after the end of the PRRO.

2.C Results

Emergency relief

103. The PRRO objective: *"To maintain a relief contingency stock to cover emergency needs of families affected by the onset of sudden or natural disasters"* was partially achieved in that the stock was not as large as planned. The reserve was used to respond to two low impact events in 2009.

104. The purpose of the emergency relief component was to maintain a strategic reserve sufficient to allow timely response to a rapid onset food emergency. The Ministry of Social Security requested food for distribution in seven districts in February 2009 in response to emergency conditions. Beneficiaries were identified from the Ministry's reports and 50kg rice was distributed per household. The Mid-Year Review 2009 identifies this as a GFD. There is uncertainty about the effectiveness of the Ministries targeting and about the level of need, but the outcome of improved food consumption is likely to have been achieved. The evaluation encountered no beneficiaries and WFP has not yet assessed the outcome of the activity.

105. In March-April 2009 at the request of the Ministry of Social Security a GFD was carried out in Oecussi in response to flooding, with 50Kg rice per household distributed once again. In this case light FFW was undertaken so that beneficiaries contributed for the food and some assets were created. Again the outcome of improved food consumption was achieved, but payment of labour and the amount of time involved avoided the risk of dependence, even though the assets produced would be relatively small and not sustainable. WFP reserve proved adequate to supply a larger than planned number of beneficiaries, but with a reduced ration.

IDP reintegration

106. The PRRO objective *"To support the return and resettlement of IDPs"* was partially achieved, though some IDPs did not resettle in home areas and some of the food was distributed to host communities because returnees could not be identified. It is known that some IDPs did not return to home areas but the evaluation has no evidence of problems caused by failure to reintegrate. As an input of food to areas of rural poverty the food would improve food consumption for a short period. IDPs moved from Camps in and around Dili, allowing recovery of the urban environments and return to livelihood support systems. It is not known whether returnees' livelihoods have recovered compared with before displacement, though the evaluation found no evidence of deterioration.

Food for Assets

107. The PRRO objective: *"to increase the ability of targeted communities to meet their food needs through FFW activities aimed at increasing food production and asset creation"* was sought through fourteen types of FFA project. These were successful in some cases such as irrigation, with a strong technically competent partner, but the lack of technical skills limited achievements, and a seven-month gap reduced effectiveness. This seven-month gap greatly reduced implementation of the activities planned for 2009 so that only 31 per cent of the target for 2009 had been achieved by September (Table 8).

108. In general the FFA⁴⁰ projects implemented (see Table 8 for types of activity completed) are relevant to the intended recovery of destroyed/degraded assets and creation of new ones. In most cases the activity entailed the repair or maintenance of existing facilities, particularly roads. Road maintenance and creation of new roads have improved access to markets, health and educational facilities. The FFW mode has helped maintain social structures and avoids dependence, though women have gained less than men in benefiting from the assets. As intended, FFA mainly benefits communities rather than individuals, at a time when food security is improving, while also providing food for some of the needy people. Guidelines used were those developed for PRRO 10388.0 in 2007⁴¹. These guidelines imply the availability of several NGO partners and a complex management system. Work norms for 14 different types of activity are usefully provided, though as van Zoggel⁴² notes, staff and stakeholders would need considerable training to use them effectively- a view with which the evaluation agrees. The evaluators consider that van Zoggel's recommendations are also appropriate to the projects seen.

109. It is notable that whereas in 2008 land reclamation had been the largest group, with both feeder roads and irrigation as significant activities (see Table 8), in 2009 feeder roads have become absolutely dominant with little land reclamation and even less irrigation. This is unfortunate because land reclamation and irrigation directly support food security, as do fishponds and community gardens (WFP's Objective 2.1). Although irrigation benefits private, rather than communal land, maintenance is likely to be carried out, whereas this is not true of improved roads. Irrigation projects seen, particularly those facilitated by JIRCAS, were impressive.

110. Although diversification of the types of project makes it difficult to establish workable norms and some projects need significant technical inputs, say from NGOs, it would help recovery if a more balanced range of projects were attempted, for example those of which there are a few examples: school rehabilitation/building, reservoir development and latrines and water supply improvement. Only one project directly served women's needs (a house for a women's group to meet) though WFP prioritises women's needs.

111. Positive economic and environmental impacts of individual projects are associated with land improvement activities, school rehabilitation brings beneficial social impact particularly for children, and water and sanitation projects improve health. Benefits from roads are positive in several categories such as health centre, market and school access, provided that they are subsequently maintained. But this is the determinant of sustainability of all projects. An increase in the number of projects that benefited women and/or the elderly could be sought. Sustainability of these results depends very much on continued maintenance of the facilities created in the programme. This in turn depends on perceptions of the utility of the facilities. Those that directly yield tangible benefits, whether communal or private (irrigation, water supply, protected farm land) are likely to be maintained. A sense of ownership, for example of buildings, is also likely to ensure sustainability.

112. In a broad comparable activity, the World Bank and the European Commission have supported the rehabilitation of agriculture since 2004 and recently reported on the third phase of the programme.⁴³ The investment of

⁴⁰ CO uses the term "FFA" in preference to "FFW" to indicate that the intention is to restore and create assets rather than simply supply food, though the programme, targets food insecure people.

⁴¹ Operational Guidelines for Planning and Implementation of WFP-Assisted Food-For Assets (FFA) Projects under PRRO 10388.0.

⁴² van Zoggel H (2009) Food-for-Assets Review Oecussi District Timor-Leste.

⁴³ World Bank (2009) Implementation Completion and Result Report on Trust Funds for East Timor Grants.

US\$9.7 million over six years compares with a target investment of US\$8,794,496 in FFA over two years (though, see Table 8, the actual investment to date has been much less). World Bank's support to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries is partly in the same sector as FFA and in one of the irrigation activities they have been partners. Though the structure of the two projects is different, a comparison is revealing. Both have had problems of technical support and monitoring. Gender has been insufficiently addressed and targets have not been met. The World Bank project, however, found that their project was top-down and remote from the field, in contrast the FFA is community-based in planning and execution.

Maternal and Child Health Nutrition

113. The objective: "to improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups and increase their access to health care clinics" aimed at babies, infants, and pregnant or lactating women. Clinic attendance increased, women thought that they gained from the ration, but it is unlikely that children 23-59 months benefited and some of the CSB was of poor quality.

114. The objective has been met in part as *all*⁴⁴ key health informants at district and field level reported an increased uptake in healthcare services by pregnant and lactating women as a result of the provision of WFP food. The food appears to be a key incentive for attending health services. This information is backed up by data from the *Timor-Leste Health Statistics Reports* for 2006 and 2008, though it must be acknowledged that improvements will be due to the collaborative efforts of the Ministry of Health and all others working in the public health sector. The 2006 report was the first generated from the Health Management Information System (HMIS), and there are some questions about data quality; nevertheless it corroborates an improved uptake, see Table 19.

Table 19 Improvements in Uptake of Healthcare Services 2006-2008

Service usage	2006	2008
Pregnant women making 4 th ante natal visit	17,040 (36.1%)	17,328 (34.5%)
Deliveries attended by health personnel	11,681 (27.2%)	16,261 (35.6%)
Visit to health centre within 6 weeks post (total visits <1 wk plus 1-6 wks.	15,741 (36.7%)	23,549 (51.5%)

Source: Timor-Leste Health Statistics Reports

115. There is some qualitative evidence to indicate that the strategic objective of improving the nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women has been achieved. Health professionals in MCHNs report that pregnant women benefit from CSB, show increased MUAC and 'graduate' from the programme. Furthermore women in the focus group discussion (FGD) agreed that CSB 'helped with lactation' and kept them 'strong'. Health facilities do not yet routinely collect and analyse MUAC data so none is available to support these statements but the message from health workers and women in different locations is consistent. The Ministry of Health reports a two per cent recovery rate for pregnant women,⁴⁵ though it is not clear how this data was derived.

116. Improvement in the nutritional status of children 23-59 months in the supplementary feeding programme is very unlikely for two reasons. First, despite widespread implementation globally there is no evidence based to support the effectiveness⁴⁶ of supplementary feeding programmes (SFPs). Second, it is well known in Timor-Leste that CSB is widely shared⁴⁷ within the family. To

⁴⁴ Including from the MOH, UN agency, NGO during discussions.

⁴⁵ Nutrition department, Ministry of Health, Report of the performance of the Supplementary Feeding Programme for January-June, 2009.

⁴⁶ Navarro-Colorado *et al* (2007).

⁴⁷ Literature review, FGDs Baucau & Maliana, direct communication with mothers, key informant interviews.

accommodate a certain level of family sharing, WFP provides a generous ration, but this level is exceeded in the Timorese context.

117. In the FGDs of CSB it was reported that CSB is often contaminated by 'weevils', that significant losses occur due to poor storage in health posts and that sometimes, when delivered it has been spoiled. The evaluation found no effective mechanism for the monitoring of losses. Mothers told the evaluation that they fed spoiled⁴⁸ CSB to their pigs. Other said that they and their husbands ate it when it contained weevils. Mothers reported that children don't like the CSB as it has a 'bad smell' and don't eat it even if it is of good quality. Low quality produce reduces its acceptability and effectiveness, severely undermining the programme; community perception is crucial, if parents don't give the CSB and other items to the child then the whole programme is compromised.

118. WFP has achieved some beneficial outcomes in partnership with the Ministry of Health in MCHN and these should be sustainable with programme modifications. Successful introduction of locally fortified CSB would significantly improve its quality and acceptability, and cessation of SF for 24-59 month old children would reduce costs. Particularly in the Timor-Leste context the health education/BCC element of the programme is essential to add impact and sustainability to health activities but as yet it is not rigorously being applied.


119. Since 2002 the World Bank with the European Commission has been supporting the rehabilitation and development of the health sector⁴⁹ with grants of US\$12.6 million and €16.2 million. The programme includes rehabilitation of community health centres. The report comments that in the first phase of the programme 2000-2002 there had been no nutrition element and that in the current phase "fertility and nutrition have shown the least improvement" (p. 18). There had been no discussions on nutrition with WFP, but coverage of nutritional services was increasing and all key MCH indicators were improving. In comparison the US\$14,359,155 over two years of the PRRO MCHN is a significant input to nutrition.

120. The MCHN programme has been an incentive for attendance at health centres helping to improve the health of the particularly vulnerable groups targeted by the programme. It also highlights the significance of nutrition in health and keeps nutrition on the Ministry of Health's agenda, and extends the Government emphasis on food security.

School meals

121. The PRRO objective: "To improve the enrolment and attendance of boys and girls in primary schools and increase their attention spans" was achieved in the opinion of teachers, though there is no firm quantitative evidence to support this. Other actions, beyond WFP's control are required to achieve the improved nutrition that education can support.

Figure 3: Primary School Enrolments 2006-7 and 2007-8



⁴⁸ Baucau, FGD with 10 women. Also reported by MCH and WV staff.

⁴⁹ Implementation Completion and Results Report (TF-29888 TF-51363) on Grants in the Amount of US\$12.6 million and €16.2 million to Timor-Leste for a Second Health Sector Rehabilitation and Development Project February 12 2009.

122. Currently an estimated 80 per cent of children of primary age enrol and less than half of those complete primary education⁵⁰. Interviews with parents, teachers and the Ministry of Education staff, combined with data from the Ministry of Education⁵¹, suggest that SMP had a positive effect on enrolment and attendance. But no explicit data exists to show this. Although no precise school data exist, it is estimated that the country has a significant number of school-age children not in school and steady increases of enrolment in the recent past suggest that large numbers are still not enrolled. The school year 2006/07 had a total of 192.437 enrolled, whereas the year 2007/08 registered 208.533 students at primary levels – an estimated 7-8 per cent increase⁵²

123. While there were generally very positive perceptions among teachers and parents regarding the beneficial effects of school meals on enrolment and retention, increased enrolment cannot be attributed solely to the SMP – because there is no useful and concise information baseline or monitored data. Interviewed teachers also informed the evaluators that the SMP increased retention and that their capacity to concentrate in class (PRRO outcome 4.2) has improved. These two factors alone may explain significant improvement in learning outcomes.

124. For WFP the challenge is, however, to ensure a steady flow of food to schools, as interviewees also informed the evaluators that many pupils dropped out when school meals were not provided. For the Ministry of Education, UN and donors, as stakeholders in the system, the challenge is to improve the quality of education by influencing factors such as: teacher training; language of instruction; didactic materials and access to the last cycle of primary education (Grade Seven to Grade Nine). Without significant improvements in these areas, the SMP will have little effect on learning outcomes and thus on more long-term solutions to hunger, such as “*breaking the intergenerational cycle of hunger and undernutrition*”⁵³. Achievements in SMP will be sustainable only if the Ministry of Education institutions are significantly strengthened and decentralisation and logistical improvements are achieved. Without these changes the system will fail. WFP is the only agency capable of providing the necessary support, which will be needed well beyond March 2010, when present resources will run out. If the Government were willing to fund SMP⁵⁴, WFP short and medium-term presence could be assured.

125. The World Bank has been supporting improvement in the quality of schools, with special emphasis on primary level since 2002.⁵⁵ A major objective is the maintenance of enrolment levels, with a US\$20.6 million programme over five years, including infrastructures, learning materials, training of teachers and management skills. The development of water supply was planned and this was achieved for 119 schools, but was not possible at some sites. Water supply is important for the SMP. The programme did not consider school meals, but it was found that attendance had increased.

126. Education is essential to the longer-term development of the country, particularly considering the lack of higher skills, extension of support up to grade 9 should be additionally beneficial in skill development. There is, however, a risk that the Government has overestimated its ability to support the more elaborate

⁵⁰ New Zealand Aid 2009.

⁵¹ Ministry of Education EMIS (Education Management Information System).

⁵² According to the EMIS.

⁵³ As formulated by WFP (Strategic Objective Four, paragraph 57).

⁵⁴ As is now carried out in a number of South and Central American states.

⁵⁵ Implementation Completion and Results Report (TF-050152) on a Grant in the Amount of US\$20.6 million to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste for a Fundamental School Quality Project June 28, 2007 WB Report No: ICR0000472.

education system and that WFP may not have resources after March 2010. Both outcomes could be serious for education and even for security.

Capacity Development

127. A last set of objectives relate to WFP strategic objective 5 (SO5): the Capacity Development Strategy, which is not food-based. This work is at an early stage, but significant Government structures have been developed and a number of initiatives are likely to be successful in the near future.

128. Prioritisation of IDP reintegration delayed work on SO5 activities but subsequently it has occupied much senior staff time in advocacy with Government and coordination activities with the Government and partners. WFP advisors are continually present in ministries to strengthen capacities and develop food security systems. Some initiatives such as cash and vouchers are at an early stage, while others (NFSIS and local food fortification) are well advanced but not yet completed; however although uncompleted the process is cumulative, for example in food security monitoring capacity development and the NFSIS have a synergic effect.

129. Coordination involving WFP, FSC and the Government has developed rapidly and the NFSI is being firmly established within the Government with appropriate support from WFP at a critical point. Systems that involve several ministries and district structures are complex but can have greater effects by developing partnerships within the Government, though support from WFP is necessary to support these internal partnerships.

130. .With an improved NFSIS there will be capacity to anticipate and respond to short-term food needs. This will improve the living conditions of vulnerable people, increase political and economic security, improve health to some extent and permit more developmental activities. Opening of the TG food fortification plant will be a significant media event and an opportunity to advocate for food security. Also a diversification of Timor-Leste's narrow economic base and an indication of the opportunity to stimulate the local economy through purchase of local agricultural products. Capacity development has benefited the aim of food security development, short and long term, but has also strengthened a number of Ministries their more general competencies. This can be seen as an important element of state building, creation of better living conditions and reduction of insecurity risk. The TG food fortification activity could encourage local sourcing, broaden the industrial base, create jobs and replace importation.

131. Sustainability of the achievements of capacity development depends on the Governments developing systems, its willingness and capacity to manage food security and its having sufficient financial resources. In 2009 the IMF⁵⁶ reports a favourable medium-term public expenditure future because economic growth has been strong for two years, security has improved and oil sector income can be used to support Government spending. These financial resources will be sustainable only if they are not overdrawn. The IMF target is the reduction of spending at a sustainable level by 2012. But systems and food security management capacity will also be necessary. WFP has ensured that the Government is seen to lead activities, thus developing their willingness and confidence. In prioritising food security, and by purchasing equipment for food fortification the Government has shown commitment to a long-term locally owned solution. Involving the Government *ab initio* as active and equal participants, rather than as clients and observers in the design of systems, and rather than attempting to hand over ready-made systems to them, is much more likely to ensure continuation and effective functioning of the system. Even so, in the

⁵⁶ IMF (2009) Country report Timor-Leste.

medium term, advisors will be needed to help modify systems in response to changing contexts.

2.D Cross cutting issues

Gender

132. Women's participation was observed by the evaluators to be limited in FFA activities in most meetings with communities. A few women sat at the back, saying nothing unless very directly addressed, clearly women were marginalised in both senses. In these communities, notionally, up to half the beneficiaries were women and documentation claimed that they participated. A marked exception was the home community of a WFP staff member where a vociferous group of women sat at the front, participating actively and forcefully.⁵⁷ In relation to women's limited participation, it is also to be noted that the plan to allocate half of the assets to women was not achieved.

133. There is no evidence that the undernutrition of the girl child is worse than that of the boy child⁵⁸ but a significant factor in chronic childhood undernutrition is the inter-generational effect of small mothers giving birth to small babies. In Timor-Leste motherhood can occur at a young age and often before the girl herself has stopped growing. This stops the growth and development of adolescent girls and prevents their reaching their adult potential⁵⁹. These small women/girls produce small babies vulnerable to stunting and so the cycle of undernutrition continues.

Transition from relief to recovery

134. During PRRO 10388.1 the trend has been clearly from relief to development. WFP operations have contributed to this, both in the two emergency related activities and in the MCHN, FFA and SMP. FFA specifically aims directly to advance recovery and positive effects can be seen within the three-month project timescales. Capacity development activities with the goal of handing-over to the Government's full responsibility for food security, but with real capacity to manage this is an increasingly important element of WFP work, though capacity development interlocks with food-based programmes. Important components are building Government capacity to respond both to chronic undernutrition and promptly and effectively to food emergencies. In the transition to recovery WFP programmes recommenced the suspended FFA component and emphasised activities supporting Government capacity building in individual programmes and in relation to food security systems.

Partnerships

135. The limited number of potential NGO partners, the limitations on funding and the practical problems of working in a testing environment with a fledgling government require that WFP develops strong partnerships with other UN institutions. The FSC is proving a valuable resource here, partnership with the Government is strengthening as a result. A developing partnership with TG for fortified CSB is promising.

⁵⁷ This situation led to a discussion with staff of the sub office on the ethics of monitors intervening in their home communities. It was agreed that this could be seen as unduly favouring these communities, it was also agreed that communities should not be disqualified because they had a member in the WFP team. It was also agreed that the need was for the intervention to be absolutely transparent. In fact the project in that community was one of the most successful visited.

⁵⁸ Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (2003) and Timor-Leste Livings Standards (2007).

⁵⁹ Shrimpton, R et al (2009). Landscape analysis, Annex 2.

Advocacy

136. WFP is still the best qualified agency to alert the Government and others to nutritional and food security emergencies, although this capacity is now developing within the Government. Within SMP and MCHN, WFP is advocating improved policy and systems at a central level and better implementation at the field level. Its most significant advocacy is for the rapid development of an efficient and effective food security system, firmly based within the Government.

Environmental impact

137. Many FFA activities (see Table 8) create, maintain or recover environments. Tree planting, drainage, water management, recovery of damaged agricultural land, road ditch creation and protection against riverbank erosion. These are all examples of environmental creation, maintenance or improvement. There was, however, no evidence of supplying fuel-efficient stoves to school kitchens⁶⁰, whether solar powered or fuel burning. Such stoves would reduce deforestation.

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.A Overall assessment

Relevance and appropriateness

138. The evaluation found that the PRRO modality was relevant to the changing context of Timor-Leste, which though recovering from conflict, is at the tipping point towards development. The state is young and fragile and still at risk from different kinds of food emergency to which PRRO activities were able to respond appropriately, both to emergency conditions and through support to the Government's development of different types of food security and response relating to the chronic under-nutrition of half the population. Targeting focused appropriately on vulnerable groups, for example babies, infants and pregnant/lactating women in MCHNs, primary-age children in SMP, the most vulnerable *sucos* in FFA, victims of extreme events and returning IDPs. In SMP it would have been advisable to target the most vulnerable areas but the Government requested WFP to take responsibility for SMP in the whole country and this will help develop the entire primary School Meals system.

Effectiveness: actual achievements versus planned objectives

139. During 2008, partly due to the availability of carry-over stocks, the PRRO was generally able to meet targets for supplying food and accessing beneficiaries, but for reasons beyond WFP's control the settlement of IDPs was delayed. Both SMP and MCHN exceeded targets, although the FFA programme reached its target of activities it delivered less food and reached fewer beneficiaries than planned. In mid year 2009, although the target for beneficiary numbers was being reached in most programmes, apart from FFA, food deliveries were well below target and in FFA shortage of commodities had led to suspension of the programme (though this has now recommenced).

Efficiency: timeliness, cost efficiency, coordination, resource adequacy.

140. Shortage of commodities, the relatively high costs of logistics, limited human capacity in the new state, competition with other agencies for suitable staff, the need to import services and items, and the limited number of NGO partners have restricted the efficiency of the PRRO and added to costs. Causes outside WFP's control, for instance the long supply chain for commodities, the delay in closing IDP camps and delayed arrival of commodities have affected the timing of

⁶⁰ It was planned to use Brazilian Trust Funds partly for this purpose.

activities, though by mid 2009 WFP was prioritising capacity development in the Government.

141. Timor-Leste is an expensive environment for the PRRO, but the use of UNVs was cost efficient in securing the necessary international staff. Logistics is expensive because of the many problems involved and the complexity of the programme, particularly with the expansion of the SMP nationwide, but it would have been possible to increase logistic efficiency (See Annex 5.E)

142. WFP has supported ministries throughout the PRRO and has emphasised food security management capacity in the Government when other commitments permit. In this activity WFP has worked closely with UN partners in the FSC and NFSIS. MCHN coordination together with TAIS and SISCa, has aided efficiency, but the Government request for WFP to take over most aspects of the School Meals Programme has been a big challenge.

143. Resource adequacy has been problematic throughout; it severely curtailed FFA, and it severely threatens the rest of the PRRO, with current resourcing SMP will be untenable by March 2010.

Impact

144. The evaluation found the impacts have been mainly positive or neutral in all the programme areas though it is difficult to separate the impact of PRRO activities from the general recovery that followed improved security and improved economic conditions. PRRO activities have supported the development of Government capacity and raised its awareness regarding the significance of nutrition and food security. FFA activities, though significantly reduced, have directly involved communities in planning and implementation.

Sustainability of results

145. Although the sustainability of results of WFP activities depends on the quality of these activities, short, medium and long-term conditions in Timor-Leste, including the maintenance of national security and socio-economic circumstances, strongly influence sustainability of results. Factors such as increased agricultural production⁶¹ for food, exportation and replacement of importation will contribute to sustainability. The evaluation found that activities to support capacity development in the Government were critical to maintain achievements both in food security, nutrition systems and in each component of the programme. In both MCHN and SMP there was concern that capacity was insufficiently developed to satisfy Government plans.

3.B Key issues for the future

146. WFP Timor-Leste faces a crisis of resources that will be critical by the end of 2009 and threatens its ability to continue programmes beyond that date. SMP is particularly threatened and its failure could be a big political threat to the Government. The exit strategy for WFP depends on the Government's ability to accept full responsibility for food security. At present this capacity has not been sufficiently developed. The CO has actively sought funding; current and potential donors need to be fully aware of the risks to the future of Timor-Leste if food security is not maintained.

147. Food security management capacity cannot be fully developed within the next year, WFP is advised to carry out a further PRRO with particular emphasis on creating sound structures and skills for food security management within the Government. Dedicated funding is needed to support capacity development. As capacity develops in the medium term, WFP can hand over more responsibility,

⁶¹ It is authoritatively stated by GTZ that Timor-Leste could be self sufficient in food. Coffee exports are already recovering and expected to increase greatly.

but with a watching brief, and tactical intervention as problems arise. This may be needed into the longer term beyond another PRRO. It would be advisable to continue food based interventions during a future PRRO while specific programmes, particularly SMP, were being firmly established.

148. The case for a further PRRO rather than a Country Programme or development project for the next phase is that, notwithstanding evidence of recovery, Timor-Leste is still a fragile state. Evidence of the last few years is that every two years there is a big emergency⁶² requiring large response as well as several smaller ones. The PRRO category suits this situation. The recommendation is for one more PRRO and the new *extended recovery* sub-category seems to be ideal for that. Capacity development will increase in importance through the PRRO as the central activity but with SF and MCHN building their specific key food security areas, though with a progressive reduction in food requirements.

149. Development and ongoing support of Government capacity is now a key focus of WFP activity and will become increasingly its main activity the Government handover approaches as it takes over WFP food-based activity. To support this there is still a need for capacity development within WFP itself. In MCHN a capacity development plan is needed, with strong support throughout the organisation from HQ through the RB and via Dili to the field. Capacity development is ongoing in the TAIS and Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition programmes and linkages may be made to WFP activities.

150. Logistics is still a problem area. The Dili warehouse is overfull⁶³, with dangerously high stacks and a demonstrated risk of costly cross-infection. Pest control is needed. Transport is expensive and has other problems. The system of ADPs causes a loss of control over delivery information and hand transport causes unacceptable additional costs. Development of Extended Distribution Point (EDP) with warehouses, at Baucau and Maliana, with pools of trucks for further distribution would increase efficiency, but add to costs because double handling would be necessary. At present WFP needs knowledge of the state of the whole logistics system both for itself and to advise and support the Government. It would be advisable to start to develop a logistics team within the Government in anticipation of the handover.

151. A common finding in food-based programmes is the limitation of the food aid monitors and the monitoring system. The M&E system is appropriately designed, the weakness is in the ability of monitors to implement it (though the size of their job -over 1500 monitoring sites - is daunting).

152. WFP had difficulty in expanding SMP, and the Ministry of Education is over-optimistic of its own capacity to manage the SMP. WFP needs quickly to develop hand-over strategies, and this requires strong technical support on SF and in training Ministry staff. The SMP is currently over-centralised. The Ministry plan for local procurement and development of school clusters needs to be tested because of the importance of the success of the SMP.

153. The TG fortified CSB project should help improve nutrition in MCHN but the programme could be improved in the medium-term by taking into account the proposals in the Lancet paper on Maternal and Child Undernutrition (See Annex 5.G)

154. FFA programmes have had some marked successes but WFP needs to work with communities and local authorities in the identification of worthwhile and

⁶² This was the view of a senior member of Government, but in line with WFP's experience.

⁶³ This was partly due to the non-distribution of commodities to schools during the long break and the inadvisability of distributing to schools where storage conditions were inferior than the warehouse.

achievable projects. For this, technical skills are needed. The value of created assets to the community and individuals determines their sustainability.

3.C Recommendations

155. Prioritised recommendations are in bold. The WFP Country Office, with support from the RB and HQ where necessary should:

1. Continue to advocate with donors and Government for funding for PRRO 10388.1 because present resources will not allow completion of the PRRO and the Government systems are not yet sufficiently developed to allow the Government to take full responsibility for food security.

2. Continue the WFP presence through a further PRRO with emphasis on enhancing the capacity of the Government to manage food security and nutrition; and consider ways of providing some long-term support to the Government on food security. Some form of funding to support capacity development should be provided. Pending improvement of capacity, food based programmes should continue.

3. Improve the supply chain through developing EDP warehouses at sub offices, pre-arranged deliveries to FDPs, improved storage at FDPs in schools and MCHNs; abandonment of ADPs; and direct contracting of Oecussi transporters. Annex 5.E provides full explanatory details.

4. Make a full inventory of the present logistics infrastructure, with proposals for restructuring.

5. Support the development of a Government logistics team, either based in the Ministry of Social Security or inter-ministry.

6. Throughout the food-based programmes develop the capacities of monitors through further training and respond to the large number of monitoring sites by selective sampling for more detailed analysis.

7. Develop SMP handover strategies related to the specific contexts of Timor-Leste, with technical capacity in CO to support the Ministry of Education with up-to-date knowledge of SF and ability to build Ministry capacity.

8. Support piloting of the Ministry's planned local procurement of commodities for SMP and support scaling up of local procurement if shown to be feasible as a national strategy.

9. Align the MCHN programme with the actions proposed in *The Lancet Maternal and Child Undernutrition Series, Paper 4: National Efforts to Address Maternal and Child Undernutrition, (2008)*. In particular, discontinue SFP for Children aged 24-59 months. Seven detailed recommendations are contextualised for Timor-Leste in Annex 5.G

10. Advocate with local communities and authorities to increase the number of FFA projects that directly improve production of highly valued assets so as to ensure maintenance, and seek technical assistance for implementation.

Annexes

Annex 1 TORs

Terms of Reference

Evaluation of WFP Timor-Leste PRRO 10388.1

Assistance to Vulnerable Populations (September 2008- August 2010)

1. Background

1.A Context of the evaluation

1. Food insecurity is widespread in Timor-Leste due to low crop yields, lack of income, drought, underdeveloped markets, and civil unrest. Over one-third of the population regularly experiences food shortages.

2. About 47 percent of children under the age of five are chronically malnourished (stunted) and 43 percent severely malnourished (underweight). The rate of wasting is about 12 percent nationwide. Malnutrition continues even among children aged more than five, when they go to school. Usually, children do not get to eat any food before going to school and find it hard to concentrate on their studies. Furthermore, more than 30 percent of women suffer from chronic energy deficiency.

3. The WFP protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) in Timor-Leste is approved for the period from September 2008 to August 2010 targeting some 255,600 beneficiaries (yearly average) from among the country's most vulnerable groups and affected by natural disasters.

4. The PRRO consists of three main activities:

- Maternal and Child Health Nutrition (MCHN); aims to prevent and reduce malnutrition rates and improve the nutrition and health status of children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women;
- School meals; aims to increase the enrolment and attendance rates and improve the overall performance of primary education; and
- food-for-work/assets (FFW/A): aims to improve household food security during the lean season, create productive assets for agricultural production and improve road access to public and social services.

5. Food is also allocated as part of the return package for the internally displaced persons (IDP) of the 2006 crisis, aiming to assist in the peaceful resettlement; finally a reserve quantity of food is set aside for victims of sudden natural disasters.

6. In addition to food-based programmes aimed at directly improving the food security and nutritional status of vulnerable people, WFP will also assist in developing the capacity of government institutions and staff in all managerial and implementation aspects of these programmes, as well as in disaster preparedness and response.

7. The operation has a total value of US\$36.9 million⁶⁴ and envisages the distribution of 30,263mt of commodities. As of April 2009, the operation is resourced 36 per cent⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ WFP resourcing update Apr 2009.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

1.B Stakeholders

8. The Timorese authorities and UN main stakeholder groups are composed of the following organisations or ministries.

Timorese National Authority: UN partners		
Ministry of Planning and Finance	World Bank	UNIFEM
Ministry of Health	UNDF	FAC
Ministry of Education	IOM	Office of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance Support Development and Humanitarian Coordination
Ministry of Agriculture	WHC	UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
Ministry of Social Solidarity	UMIT	

9. The stakeholders in this evaluation and their relation to the operation and evaluation are presented in table 1. They include external and internal groups which have a stake in the operation and the evaluation.

Diagram 1: Stakeholder Matrix

Key stakeholder groups	Interest in the subject of the evaluation	Interest in the evaluation	Implication for the evaluation
WFP TLS CO staff Management, Programme, Logistics, VAM, Human resources	• Main managers and coordinators of WFP operations and resources in TLS	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS • Evaluation will provide a mid term assesment of WFP TLS operations • Involved in management response to the evaluation	• Main interlocutor for the evaluation • Evaluation will work in direct coordination with TLS CO, including logistic field support • Main source of data • Important source of information
WFP TLS Sub Office Local level management, programme, logistics	• Main managers and coordinators of WFP logistics and programme at local level	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS • Evaluation will provide a mid term assesment of WFP TLS operations • Involved in management response to the evaluation	• Main interlocutor for the evaluation field mission • Evaluation will work with Pante Macassar and Suai Sub-Offices during field visits • Important source of information
WFP RB	• PRRO in a country within their region of responsibility	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS • Evaluation may provide information on WFP OMB success in providing assistance to WFP TLS CO, as part of their mandate • Involved in management response to the evaluation	• Keep informed • Source of information on support provided to TLS CO (cross-check) • Will be consulted through teleconference
WFP HQ staff School Feeding Unit, Nutrition, Logistics, VAM, etc.	• No specific role in this operation	• Evaluation findings may provide relevant information to technical units (lessons) • May be involved in management response to the evaluation	• Keep informed • Will be consulted through briefing meetings in HQ
Timorese National Authority: Ministry of Planning and Finance	• Ensures programme alignment and integration with national policies and plans	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS • Evaluation will look at partnership issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration • Evaluation may provide insight to Timorese authorities about the development of a capacity development strategy and its implementation	• Important informant for this evaluation • Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level • Source of information on issues like relevance, including appropriateness
Timorese National Authority: • Ministry of Health • Ministry of Education • Ministry of Agriculture • Ministry of Social Solidarity	• Involved as recipient of international assistance, including capacity development • Cooperating partners in Programme implementation at national level	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS • Evaluation will look at partnership issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration • Evaluation may provide insight to Timorese authorities about the development of a capacity development strategy and its implementation	• Important informant for this evaluation • Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level
NGO partners Care, Caritas, Oxfam, Concern, World Vision	• Engage in the PRRO formulation process • Cooperating partners	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS • Evaluation will look at partnership and coordination issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration	• Important informant for this evaluation • A selection will be consulted
UN partners	• Involved in the implementation strategy of the PRRO • Cooperating partners	• Evaluation findings may have an impact on the design of future PRRO in TLS, including partnerships with UN agencies • Evaluation will look at partnership issues and may provide guidance to WFP and partners on future collaboration	• Important informant for this evaluation • A selection will be consulted
Donors Main: USA, Japan, Australia	• Contributors to the PRRO with cash and in-kind food aid	• Evaluation results may affect donors' attitude vis-à-vis funding of WFP PRRO in TLS, particularly regarding capacity development	• Source of information on issues like relevance, including appropriateness • Will be consulted through formal meetings at national level
Communities	• Direct interest in the PRRO as main beneficiaries	• No direct interest in this evaluation • Findings may influence future design of operation, including improved services to beneficiaries	• Key informants on issues like relevance and effectiveness
WFP Executive Board	• No specific role in this operation	• Interest in the evaluation as part of global strategy for learning and accountability (annual report)	• Keep informed

2. Reason for the evaluation

2.A Rationale

10. The evaluation will take place at mid-term of the PRRO implementation and will provide information to guide the design of future WFP intervention in Timor-Leste.

11. The main users of this evaluation will be the WFP Timor-Leste country office and the Timorese authorities. Evaluation findings and recommendations will contribute to the development of the next phase of WFP assistance, expected to start in September 2010.

2.B Objective

12. The objective of the evaluation is twofold. The main focus of the evaluation will be to seek to improve future performances by determining the reasons for the success and/or failure. Lessons will be internalized in new practices. It will also look at past performance to determine the degree of success and/or failure of the operation and accounts for aid expenditures to stakeholders.

3. Scope of the evaluation

3.A Scope

13. The evaluation will focus on WFP activities and operations implemented for the achievement of the PRRO outcomes. The stated outcomes⁶⁶ of PRRO are linked to WFP corporate strategic objectives⁶⁷ and have indicators described as follows:

WFP Strategic Objectives:	WFP Timor-Leste PRRO Outcomes / (Indicators)
1. Save lives in crisis situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved food consumption among targeted populations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number of meals per day in the affected population.
2. Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shock.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased ability of targeted communities to meet food needs through FFW/A <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Actual beneficiaries receiving WFP food assistance, by age group and sex ○ Actual mt of food distributed
3. Support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved attendances of pregnant and lactating women in the clinics to access health services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 95 percent of pregnant and lactating women enrolled using health facilities • Improved nutritional status of children 6–23months and 24–59 months <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 5 percent decrease in prevalence of underweight and 2 percent decrease in stunting among children 6–23 months ○ 75 percent of malnourished children 24–59 months recovered according to MUAC
4. Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased enrolment and improved attendance of boys and girls in primary schools <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Percentage increase in absolute enrolment for girls and boys ○ Increase in attendance rate for boys and girls ○ Decrease in repetition and drop-out rates for boys and girls • Capacity of boys and girls to concentrate and learn in assisted schools <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Teachers' perception of children's abilities to concentrate and learn in WFP-assisted schools
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries and regions to establish and manage food-assistance and hunger reduction programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved government capacity and systems for disaster preparedness and response, logistics and assistance to chronically vulnerable groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improved system for disaster preparedness and response set up

⁶⁶ WFP PRRO 10388.1 project document's logical frame work, annex 2.

⁶⁷ WFP Strategic Plan 2006-2009. A new strategic plan enters in force as of 2009.

14. The geographical scope of the evaluation will comprise the whole national territory; security considerations may limit the evaluation mission's access to some areas.

15. The scope of this evaluation will be the operations as described in the project document WFP Timor-Leste 10388.1 for the period from 01 September 2008 to 31 August 2009, within the historical context of Timor. It will include a review of different components of the PRRO (below) and a review of partnership agreements and their implementation:

Component	Relative Importance (% of total tonnage)		Sub component
	Original design	Revision ⁶⁸	
1. Relief assistance	1.8	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepositioning of contingency stocks for disaster response • Contingency planning
2. Food for work / assets (FFW/A)	22.6	20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation or rehabilitation of productive rural assets • Rehabilitation of access roads
3. Mother and child health and nutrition (MCHN)	36.9	32	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to malnourished children (6-23 months) • Support to malnourished children (24-59 months) • Support to malnourished pregnant women • Support to malnourished lactating women
4. School feeding	35.7	43	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Daily school feeding • Technical support and resources to set up a national school feeding programme • Improvement of school kitchens and storage • M&E training for cooks
5. Capacity development	(n/a)	(n/a)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff training on food based PRRO activities • Staff training for disaster preparedness and response • Technical assistance for developing a local fortified-food processing facility • Support to Government in setting up a food-based social safety-net system for the most vulnerable • Support for the improvement of government logistics systems and infrastructure at national and district levels
6. Return Package			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Return package for internally displaced persons (IDP)

3.B Evaluability assessment

16. The logic model⁶⁹ presented in the project document summarizes the objectives of the operation, including the main intervention components (except return package component) and indicates outcome targets for MCHN. It clearly links the WFP outputs supporting the achievement of outcomes together with their indicators. Targets are described in the project document in term of beneficiary numbers and quantity of commodities to be distributed⁷⁰. The outputs for non-food components are however not fully listed and targets not explicit. Reconstruction of logic model may be required.

17. A logic model update was made in 2009 which proposes news indicators, aligned with output indicators in the WFP corporate strategic results framework.

⁶⁸ Budget Revision, (rounded up figures).

⁶⁹ WFP PRRO 10388.1 project document's logical frame work, annex 2.

⁷⁰ Project document, tables 1, 2 and 3.

In the course of this evaluation, the rationale for the update will need to be clarified together with implications for the success measurement of operations.

18. The availability of a baseline study, the CFSVA (2006), and the Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) (2006 & 2007) will provide valuable base information. A mini survey or rapid rural appraisal/participatory rural appraisal may be contemplated to generate data for trend analysis for the FFW/A and MCHN component.

4. Key issues/key evaluation questions

19. In addition to the issues to be analysed by the evaluation, as per the evaluation report template (annex 3), the following key issues will be studied:

National capacities and Capacity development

20. There is an apparent gap between managerial, implementation, logistics and monitoring requirements for food based programmes vs available means and capacities at national level being a "young nation". The evaluation will review to what extent the gap has had an impact on the operations and on handing over strategies. The evaluation will also review the extent to which current national capacities will be able to continue implementation of food-based programme in case of reduction of donor support.

21. WFP has initiated several capacity development activities in a shift in approach from food aid to food assistance in Timor-Leste. The evaluation will review the WFP Timor-Leste capacity development strategy, activities results and funding mechanisms.

Programme design.

22. The evaluation will inform the country office on the performance and relevance, in the current context, of the particular assistance components and make recommendations for the design and implementation of the following PRRO, in line with the WFP strategic plan – food assistance.

Funding mechanisms

23. The evaluation will review the extent to which the funding mechanisms are supportive of WFP operations in a context of limited national capacities and fairly recent WFP presence in country.

5. Evaluation design

5.A Methodology

24. The evaluation will implement traditional evaluation methods based on programme theory and logical framework approaches. It will use stakeholder discussions and secondary data to verify baseline information and to understand intended outcomes. The evaluation will employ internationally agreed evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability⁷¹.

25. The evaluation will use a range of data collection techniques such as key informant interviews, focus group discussions and other participatory approaches and structured document analysis. It will ensure that gender-balanced stakeholder groups with diverse views will be consulted to ensure the assessment, findings and recommendations are based on a comprehensive understanding of diverse perspectives on issues, performance and outcomes. Evaluators will act impartially and respect the code of conduct for the profession (Annex 1).

⁷¹ see annex 3: report template and annex 5: evaluation criteria.

26. The views of beneficiaries on the operation's success to address their immediate food requirements and longer term goals will be captured through semi-structured interviews with community key informants during the field mission.

5.B Evaluation Quality Assurance System

27. WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products including the TOR. All these tools are available with OEDE. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team.

28. The evaluation team must implement quality assurance measures for data collected during the course of this evaluation.

5.C Phases and deliverables

29. The evaluation will be undertaken in the main phases presented in the diagram below. For each phase of the evaluation, a specific output which is under the responsibility of the team leader and an allocation of time for each team member is defined. The main phases/outputs are as follows:

Diagram 2: Evaluation phases outputs and timeline

Description	Output	Team Leader	Team members	Jul				Aug				Sep				Oct				Nov			
		(days)	(days)	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Evaluation phase																							
1 Pre-mission report																							
Briefing	Briefing report	3	3	■	■	■																	
Prepare draft Pre-mission report	Draft pre-mission report	5	3	■	■	■	■																
Revise pre-mission report	Revised draft pre-mission report	1	1				■																
Final pre-mission report	Final pre-mission report	1	0							■													
2 Evaluation Mission																							
Prepare field mission		1	1																				
Field mission	Aide memoir/debriefing presentation	16	16							■	■	■	■	■	■								
Field mission debriefing	Debriefing	2	2											■	■								
3 Evaluation report																							
Prepare evaluation report	Draft Evaluation report	10	7											■	■	■	■	■					
1 st revision of evaluation report	Reviewed draft Evaluation report	1	0															■	■				
Respond to stakeholder comments	Response matrix	2	1																■	■			
2 nd revision of evaluation report	Reviewed draft Evaluation report	3	1																	■	■	■	
4 Evaluation summary report																							
Prepare summary report	Draft Summary report	4	0																			■	■
Revise summary report	Reviewed draft summary report	1	0																				■

Pre-mission report.

30. The purpose of the pre-mission report (PMR) is two-fold: (1) review and clarify the TOR and present the methodology to be used to undertake the evaluation; and (2) present the preliminary findings of the desk review and identify information gaps to be filled with data collected during the evaluation mission. The pre-mission report is produced by the evaluation team under the responsibility of the team leader, on the basis of a desk review of all available documents. The pre-mission report will follow WFP Evaluation Quality Assurance System.

31. The visit itinerary will be determined during the preparatory phase by the evaluation team, based on their selection criteria. The visit itinerary will include WFP units, partners and government counterparts to be met in the capital and during field visit and locations to be visited. The country office will provide information on security and accessibility issues. The visit itinerary will be submitted to the country office for logistics and meetings arrangements.

32. The report will be shared with the WFP Timor-Leste CO before the evaluation mission, so that the country office is aware of issues and data needs.

Evaluation mission.

33. Fieldwork will be undertaken in Timor-Leste. It consists of 3 main phases:

- **Briefing.** The mission will begin in Dili with a briefing meeting with stakeholders;
- **Interviews.** Data collection phase with interviews in Dili and at selected field sites will follow for a period of 2 weeks. The field visits will be used to discuss with a cross-section of internal and external stakeholders their views on WFP's performance. During fieldwork a range of evaluation techniques will be employed as defined in the pre-mission report; and
- **Debriefing.** Finally, the evaluation mission will present preliminary findings during a stakeholders' debriefing. Stakeholders in HQ will have the opportunity to participate via a teleconference.

Evaluation report.

34. The pre-mission reports, team members' reports and aide-memoir are working documents of the evaluation.

35. The findings will be brought together in a succinct analytical evaluation report that will (1) respond to the objectives set out for this evaluation; and (2) report against evaluation criteria specified in these terms of reference. The outline for the final report is included in annex 3.

36. The evaluation report will follow WFP Evaluation Quality Assurance System. The draft final report will be shared with stakeholders for comments. To ensure transparency, the evaluation will document comments received and how they were responded to in the evaluation report (Comments matrix, annex 6).

6. Organisation of the evaluation

6.A Expertise of the evaluation team

37. Preliminary desk review evidenced the need for the evaluation team to include expertise in the following areas. This expertise will cover the main functions of WFP in Timor-Leste. A set of tasks is included in the Job Descriptions in Annex 4. Profiles a, b and c represent important expertise for effectiveness and capacity development analysis.

- Emergency response and asset creation. Relief assistance, asset creation and return package account for some 27 per cent of WFP programme of work in terms of tonnage.
- Nutrition / food security. Mother and child Health nutrition represents about 37 per cent of food resources allocated in the PRRO.
- School feeding. The school feeding component is also important, representing some 36 per cent of food resources of the PRRO.
- Logistics. WFP's ability to timely deliver commodities during emergencies is key to the success of its operations. Expertise in this area will prove particularly useful in assessing efficiency of response in terms of timeliness, costing, coordination with partners (logistic arrangements), and provide guidance for capacity development.

38. **Team leader.** The team leader will have strong evaluation experience and a good understanding of food assistance. He/she will have good communication and writing skills and the ability to manage the overall evaluation process. He will also have one of the expertises described above.

6.B WFP stakeholders' roles and responsibilities

39. This evaluation is managed by the WFP office of evaluation, the evaluation manager will be Michel Denis. The manager have the responsibility of the overall process of the evaluation, including the following tasks:

- Preparation of evaluation terms of reference;
- Selection and recruitment of evaluation team;
- Budget preparation and management;
- Evaluation team briefing;
- Field mission preparation, in conjunction with receiving country office (see below);
- First level quality assurance;
- Reports dissemination; and
- Principal interlocutor between evaluation team, represented by the team leader and WFP.

40. The WFP Timor-Leste CO will host the evaluation mission and is the main stakeholder of this evaluation. It will be important that time and resources are properly allocated as key source informants and to make available to the evaluation team and the evaluation manager the information deemed relevant during the course of the evaluation.

41. Additionally, the country office will be involved in the evaluation process, including:

- Participation in preparation of TORs (background information, key issues and general comments)
- Preparation of the field mission. Provide logistic assistance to the evaluation (support in arranging lodging, airport pick ups and transportation arrangements to project areas)
- Provide support in organising meetings with relevant cooperating partners and government officials and accompany evaluation to counterparts, cooperating partners or field visits if required by team leader

6.C Communication

42. The Pre-mission report, final evaluation report and summary report will be submitted in English. The final report will be available by November 2009. The Executive Board summary will be presented to the Executive Board, in February 2010. The reports will afterwards be posted on WFP website, for general access.

43. In addition, the evaluation results will be incorporated into OEDE's new lessons' sharing system, once it is established (to come on-stream in 2009) to ensure lessons will be accessible to users in and outside WFP.

6.D Budget

44. The evaluation costs will be covered by OEDE PSA Budget for operations evaluations.

Annexes:

Background documents on evaluation concepts

Bibliography

Reports templates

Evaluation team

Technical annexes

Annexes:

Annex 1: Background documents on evaluation concepts

The evaluation will abide by the following standards and code on the United Nation Evaluation Group (documents available in WFP OEDE):

Code of Conduct for Evaluations in the UN System
Norms for Evaluation in the UN System
Standards for Evaluations in the UN System

Annex 2: Bibliography

2.1 WFP Project Documents, Review and Reports

FFE Food Aid Monitoring Checklist
FFE Monthly School Feeding Report
FFWA CP Completion Report
FFWA Monitoring Checklist
MCHN Food Aid Monitoring Checklist revised
MCHN Monthly report
Project Document 10388.0 – previous phase
Project Document WFP Timor-Leste SO 10797.0
Project Document WFP Timor-Leste 10388.1
Project review committee NFR (April 2008)
WFP Timor-Leste 10388.1 Revised Logframe 1st Q Review 19 March 09
PRRO 10388.0 Budget
PRRO 10388.1 Project Statistics
SPR 10388.0 (previous phase – 2007)
SPR 10388.1 (2008)
Systems for project approval – Comments and answers (April 2008)
WFP Timor-Leste 10388.1 Resourcing update 5 April 2009
WFP Timor-Leste Community FFW Project Application
WFP Timor-Leste Organigram (Jan 2009)

2.2 Assessments and Evaluations

CSFAM (June 2007)
Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (2006)
Demographic and Health Survey Ex. Summary (2003)
Dili EFSA (September 2007)
Education Since Independence Timor-Leste (2004)
Market Profile for EFSA (2006)
Poverty in a New Nation, Analysis for Action (2003)
Timor-Leste EFSA District (September 2006)
TSLS PRRO 10388 Evaluation Report (September 2007)
UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report (2007)

2.3 National Authority Strategic Documents

Food Security Policy (November 2005)
Health sector strategic plan 2008-2012
Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion by 2015 (2005)
Timor-Leste National Development Plan (2002)
Timor-Leste Demographic Health Survey (2003)
Timor Leste Demographic Health Survey ch 9-17 (2003)

2.4 UN Strategic Documents

PRSP Timor-Leste Vol. I
PRSP Timor-Leste Vol. II
UNDAF Timor-Leste 2009-2013

2.5 WFP Policies and Guidelines

Building Country and Regional Capacities Policy (2004)
Evaluation of WFP's Capacity Development
WFP Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies (October 2008)
WFP Corporate Strategic Results Framework
WFP Food and Nutrition Handbook (2001)
WFP Strategic Plan 2006-2009
WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011

Annex 3: Reports templates

EB Summary report
Evaluation report
Pre-mission report

Annex 4: Evaluation team: Job Description / CV

Team leader	J Kirkby, Evaluation team leader/emergency/livelihoods
Team member	K Godden, Nutrition / Food Security
Team member	N Steen, School Feeding
Team member	P Saille, Logistics

Annex 5: Technical annexes

Alpha Value
Cost effectiveness Analysis – DRAFT
Evaluation criteria
Evaluation matrix
Guidance Note on Beneficiary Definition and Counting
Logical framework
Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response Ch.3
Food Aid
Stakeholders analysis

Annex 2 Bibliography

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2007. *Dili Emergency Food Security Assessment, Timor-Leste*.

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2007. *Operational Guidelines for Planning and Implementation of WFP-Assisted Food-For Assets (FFA) Projects under PRRO 10388.0.*

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2008. Project Document WFP Timor-Leste Special Operation 1079.0 Project Document.

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Websites consulted:

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- <http://www.un.org>
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- <http://www.gov.east-timor.org/CAA/gen.pdf>
- <http://encarta.msn.com>
- <http://www.gov.east-timor.org>
- <http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/>
- <http://www.reliefweb.int>
- <http://pid.adb.org/pid/>
- www.bancocentral.tl/en/main.asp
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- www.worldbank.org
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- <http://timor-leste.usaid.gov>
- www.crisisgroup.org

Annex 3 List of persons met and places visited

Schedule of meetings, people interviewed and places visited

Schedule of Meetings			
Date	Name	Organisation	Title
Jul 2	Caroline Heider Michel Denis Rita Bhatia Thomas Mokake Marc Regnault de la Mothe Jose Castillo Domingo Cunha A . Miroshnichenko J Crisci Dino Jerkovich	WFP HQ	
Jul 13	Teleconference CO and RB Caroline Heider Michel Denis	WFP HQ	
Sept 15			
Arrival in Dili	Evaluation planning meeting		
Sept 16			
	Joan Fleuren	WFP	CD
	Xinmin Zhao	WFP	Deputy CD
	Lasarusi Veilawa	UNMIT	Security officer
	Jun Kuita	UNICEF	Representative
	Management and CO staff	WFP	CD, Deputy CD, staff of Programme, Logistics, VAM, MCHN, FFE, ICT, Finance, HR, Security
	Mark Anthony White	USAID	Representative
	Cheryl Williams	USAID	Programme Director
	Felipe da Costa	USAID	Deputy Programme Officer
	John Young	USAID	Economic Growth Programme
Sept 17			
UN agencies	Katherine Lester	UNDP	Project Officer
	Mark Vaughan	IOM	Logistics Officer
	Fabricio Cesazretti	FAO	Emergency Coordinator
	Jun Kukita	UNICEF	Representative
	Paramita Sudharto	WHO	Representative
	Jennifer Kelly	UNIFEM	
	Muriel Lauvige	UNIFEM	
	Rommy Karundeng	Meratus Line	Owner Rep.
	Constancio Guterres	Ariana Oceano Agency	Director/Owner
	Rafael Ribeiro	SDV Logistics	Director/Owner
	Isabel Ximenes	Backy Transport	Finance Officer
	Jose Crisovao Lopes		Finance Assistant
	Mario Soares	Transport Association	Finance and Admin.
	Celestino Jeronimo		Administrative Assistant
	Mariano de Deus	Romante PTY Ltd.	Manager
	Apollinario Magmo	Ministry of Education	Director General
	Dercia Soares	Ministry of Health	Acting Director of Community Health Department, Head of Nutrition
	Maria Moreira, Epifana Deolinda Marques		Focal person for SFP and food security Focal person for Micronutrient deficiency diseases Ministry of Health
		Ministry of Social Security	
	Lorenzo Borges	MAF	Secretary of State for Agriculture
	Octavia	MAF	
	Matthias	GTZ	Advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

NGOs	Tome Guterres Nicole Seibel Reina Inoue Kana Taniguchi Gabi Curwood	CARE Int. T.L. Oxfam SHARE SHARE HIAM	Dep. Prog. Man Dep. Prog. Man Intern Representative Educator
Sept 18			
	Constantino Ferreira Soares	Port of Dili	Director
	Juan Carlos Rey	European Commission	Ambassador
	Colombo	European Commission	Food Security Programme
	Jamal Shamu	Australian Embassy	Counsellor; devel. cooperation
		Ausaid	
	Finn Reske-Nielsen Geraldine Arias	UNMIT	Deputy Special Representative of UNSG and Humanitarian Coordinator. Head UN Res. Coordinator Unit
	Mark Vaughan	IOM	Procurements and Logistics Officer
	Shinobu Yamaguchi	Japanese Embassy	First Secretary
	Sabine Nadja Popoff	Brazilian Embassy	Counsellor
Sept 19			
	Madhav Shivakoti Elizeu Xemenes Silva	WFP Sub-office Baucau	Head of WFP sub office
	Sub office staff	Baucau Sub Office	Sub Office staff, four food monitors and three members of CO
		UNMIT	Deputy Regional Security Officer
	Leonel Guterres, , Abraham Pinto FAM	Regional Ministry of Health	Vice Director, Ministry of Health
	Domingos AM Belo Antonio AC Aparicio Clementino Sarmento	Regional Ministry of Social Security	Chefe Departamento Responsabel Aministrasoun Responsabel Assistencia Social
	Mr Alfredo Nelson, Angelina Corriera. FGD at Vermasse MCHC	MCHN (Baucau?)	Director of the MCHC EPI nurse, focal point for nutrition 11 women and 14 children.
	Domingos Savio Gabral Ribeiro	Regional Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries	Director Servicio Agricultura
	Domingos da Costa	FFA	Group leader Habubo sub-village
	Geraldo da Silva	FFA Kaikua Village	Village leader
	Z. da Silva	FFA Lulehana village	Village leader
	Augustus Boavida		beneficiary
	Moises Sarmento	FFA Yatua village	Youth Community leader
	Jose Lirornas		Sub village leader
	Zanuaru Pinto Ximenes		Sub village leader
	Joan da Costa	FFA Hourobu village	Sub village leader
	Sebastiao Ximenes		Teacher
	Jacinto Ximenes		Headmaster
	Agostino da Costa Agostino de Jesus Ximenes	Health Centre Afaca	Enfermeiro Chef centro Saude
	Candido Ximenes	Afaca EPP 08 Septembre	Head teacher
	Filialo Daranafa	school	
	Egidio Gusamo	school	Head teacher
Sept 20			
	Alice Passos	World Vision	Nutrition Educator
	Domingos	Regional Ministry of Social Security Baucau	Head of office
	Domingos Savio Gabral Ribeiro	Regional MAF Baucau	Head of office
Sept 21 Public Holiday, Travel to Dili			
Sept 22			
	Habib Rab Tanya D Wells-Brown	World Bank World Bank	
	Monica Arara	Sub office Oecussi	Head Sub office

	Administrators CHC chief School inspector Suco chiefs 16 other local officials	Atabae Sub District admin HQ	
	Ravi Anandarajah and Sub-office staff	Sub-office Maliana	Head of Sub-office
		Mandoki aldia, Harambe sub-village Manatokin	Village leaders, beneficiaries Village leaders, beneficiaries
	Alfredo Manuell Sebastiao de Henrique Carlito Pereira	Atabae MCHC	Chief of CHC WFP Field Monitor Assistant Focal point for Nutrition
Sept 23			
	Jose Anuno	Oecussi District, Ponte Macassar	
	Jemi Valenti	Ponte Makasar	
		Marobo Ilatlaun	Village leaders, beneficiaries
		Louba	Village leaders, beneficiaries
	Leonel Serrano, Jose Marcel WFP. Demographic and Health Survey team Cesaltine Pereira	Leber HP	Nutrition focal point Team of 5 enumerators Nurse
Sept 24			
	Anon.	Cooperativa Café Timor	Project advisor
	Nicole Seibel Aguida Da Silva,	Oxfam	Deputy Programme Manager Senior Health Officer
	Laurence M Pochard	Asian Development Bank	Resident Representative
	Octavio da Costa Moteiro De Almeida	MAF	National Director Policy and Planning
	Paul-Mathias Braun	GTZ	Principal Advisor Rural Development
	Jim Hoopper	World Vision, HQ	Livelihood security manager nutrition
	Antoniou Pereira		Co-ordinator Health & Nutrition project
	Joao Cândia Freitas	Ministry of Education	Ministro da Educação
Sept 25			
	Bill Tan Tio Tek	Timor Global PTE Ltd	Director
	Bobby Lay		
		Ministry of Education	School meals focal point
	Masami Okamura	JICA	Representative
	Lucinda Ramos	UNICEF	Education unit
	Nelson	Ministry of Education	
	Maureen Wilson	NZAID	Technical Advisor
		Ministry of Education Escola Foundation	
Sept 26			
	Nelson Stratta	Ministry of Education	Advisor to Minister
	Meeting with CD and DCD		
Sept 27 Report writing			
Sept 28			
	End of mission meeting with CO		
	Debriefing CO staff		
	Teleconference with RB		
Sept 29			
	Francisco de Asis Lopez Sanz	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation	General Coordinator
	Cherryl William	USAID	Director Programme Office.
Flight to Singapore			

Annex 4 Methodology/evaluation matrix

The evaluation's approach was a mixture of inductive and deductive: deductive in that questions, were developed during the desk study, but also, recursively, on the basis of experience and findings in the field; hypotheses derived from these questions were tested in the field investigations and interviews. But field investigations are also inductive in the assumption that the evidence from individual cases examined can be representative of more general conditions. In fact the approach is probably better described as broadly pragmatic. Both quantitative and qualitative data were used.

Data collection was initially based on documentary evidence; different documents were cross-checked with each other and with field evidence. The evaluation also collected information through detailed observation and a variety of interviews techniques, from the very closed to the very open; interview types were tuned to the nature of the interviewees and respondents. Interviews checked and elaborated on, or contradicted desk findings eliciting much data and information that had not been anticipated in the desk study. Analysis is hybrid: partly through acceptance or rejection of hypothesis-related questions, reviewed by individual members and partly through discussion within the evaluation of the findings and new information that became available.

Constraints to the data collection process related principally to the availability of critical data, to the limits of time for observation and interviews, to the unavailability of some key interviewees and respondents provided responses favourable to their interests. The evaluation interviewed most staff in the CO and sub offices, and this was used to clarify further questions and understanding of the context and WFP operations. Interview design and field investigation strategy optimised available time. The team was vigilant for evidence of bias in responses, data, facts or opinions offered to them.

Because schools were closed at the time of the field visit, the CO carried out a survey and the information was made available to the evaluation. The SF specialist found teachers, head teachers, parents and children to interview

In Dili all available stakeholders were visited; NGOs attended an open discussion, followed by selected interviews with those who had specific information to offer particular members of the evaluation. The evaluation divide into four to visit a number of representative sites. The logistics specialist made a solo visit to a Oecussi. Evaluation members interviewed specialist respondents and beneficiaries according to their specific interests and made field visits to examine areas of specific relevance to their remits.

Evaluation Matrix: The CO provided a detailed response showing responsibilities and sources of information:

Component 1. Relief Assistance		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. Prepositioning of contingency stocks for disaster response		
A. What systems have been developed by WFP for this purpose?	Systems in place	Interviews in CO and other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
B. Responsibility in CO for these activities?	Systems in place	Interviews in CO and with other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
C. Size of contingency stocks through time	Size of WFP stocks available in country at points in time	Documentary evidence in CO and elsewhere in WFP Timor-Leste
D. Internal limitations on achieving this aim	Evidence of failure to achieve necessary stock levels due to factors within WFP control	Interviews in CO and with other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
E. External limitations on achieving this aim	Evidence of failure to achieve necessary stock levels due to factors beyond WFP control	Interviews in CO and with other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
F. Planned changes in relief stock system?	Current plans for relief stock management	Interviews in CO and with other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
G. Level of Government contingency stocks	Data on Government contingency stocks	Interviews in CO and other WFP staff, interviews Government, and documentary evidence
H. Government plans relating to contingency stocks (Including prepositioning)	Evidence of Government plans	Interviews in CO and other WFP staff, interviews Government, and documentary evidence
2. Progress in contingency planning		
A. What systems have been developed by WFP for this purpose?	Systems in place	Interviews in CO and other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
B. Responsibility in CO for these activities?	Systems in place	Interviews in CO and with other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
C. Current and planned WFP developments in contingency planning	Current planning process	Interviews in CO and other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in WFP Timor-Leste
D. Current and planned Government contingency planning system	Current planning process	Interviews with Government checked with CO and other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in Government and WFP Timor-Leste
E. Internal and external Limitations, opportunities and risks in Government contingency planning system	Evidence of failure to achieve possible improvements to contingency planning	Interviews with Government checked with CO and other WFP staff. Documentary evidence in Government and WFP Timor-Leste

Component 2. Food for Work / Assets		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. Creation or rehabilitation of productive rural assets		
A. Processes of identification of suitable activities	Accordance with need, risks and opportunities; accordance with Government planning aims	Interviews with CO, WFP staff and Government
B. Processes of identification of appropriate beneficiaries	Accordance with WFP principles	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
C. Processes of selection of appropriate implementing partners	Availability and competence of potential IPs	Interviews with CO, WFP staff, IPs, beneficiaries
D. Achievement of planned outputs	Numbers of FFW / Assets products completed, under way and at various stages of planning. Technical quality of products, arrangements for appropriate maintenance of products.	Interviews with CO, WFP staff, IPs , communities and beneficiaries. Reports.
E. Achievement of planned outcomes	Evidence of improved circumstances of beneficiary individuals and communities; evidence of positive impacts for communities, including sustainability of benefits.	Interviews with CO, WFP staff, IPs , communities and beneficiaries. Reports.
F. Socially and culturally sensitive management	Evidence of appropriate involvement of beneficiaries in planning, implementation, maintenance and assessment. Evidence of suitable involvement of women in different aspects of programme	Interviews with Community, beneficiaries, IPs, WFP staff
G. Existence of effective monitoring system	Monitoring system	Interviews with CO, WFP staff, IPs , communities and beneficiaries. Reports

Component 3. Mother and Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN)		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. Are food items being distributed effectively – quantity, quality, timing, convenience, availability?		
A. How many MCHN attendees have received food? How much, which commodities and when.	Numbers receiving full MCHN food pack regularly.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCHN reports • semi-structured interviews with MOH staff and key informant groups • WFP-Dilli project statistics
B. How many children have benefitted	Numbers receiving supplementary food as a % of planning figures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCHN reports • WFP-Dilli project statistics
C. Have all commodities been regularly distributed	MCHN have constant supply of all commodities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi structured interviews with participants • Discussion with MCHN staff
D. Have the commodities reached the target population	Numbers of children outside of inclusion criteria in the programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi structured interviews with participants • Discussion with MCHN staff • Ad hoc MUAC measurements
2. Has the programme led to improved attendance at WFP supported MCHN?		
A. What was attendance before WFP intervention?	Attendance rates at MCHN, % of planning figures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCHN and other reports • semi-structured interviews with MOH staff and key informant groups.
B. Has uptake of services at the WFP supported MCHN increased?	Trends in attendance rates.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCHN/MOH/WFP reports • Discussions with MCHN staff • Ad hoc observation of clinic numbers
3. Has the programme led to improved food access?		
A. Do participants feel their food access has improved? How	Numbers and proportion of women reporting improved food access.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FGD and/or semi-structured interviews with attendees
B. What problems have they encountered in obtaining food in The MCHN centres?	Numbers receiving full MCHN food pack regularly. Numbers 'defaulting' from programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with beneficiaries • Discussion with MCHN staff • Observation at a distribution/clinic
C. How do they use the foods they receive	Presence of WFP items in markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with beneficiaries • Walk through markets • Observation
4. Has the nutrition status of the target population (clients of WFP supported MCHN services) improved in relation to that of the general population and/or to the clients of non-WFP supported MCHN?		
A. How many WFP supported and not supported MCHNs are there?	Numbers of supported and unsupported clinics, maps of locations,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP-Dili project documents • MOH meetings/reports • Demographic reports • Local authorities.
B. Was identification of WFP supported clinics appropriate?	Numbers registered at each site, Numbers of women/<5yrs at each site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP-Dili project documents • MOH meetings/reports • Demographic reports • Local authorities.

Component 3. Mother and Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN) ctd		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
C. What factors have impacted on nutritional status since project inception? Global food crisis. Government food price stabilisation policies. Climate change/natural disasters. Food security fluctuations. LBW. General food supply.	Exceptional changes in market prices Frequency, severity and impact of natural disasters Change in prevalence of food insecurity Change in prevalence of low birth weight Effectiveness of GFD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key evaluation reports • Discussion with nutrition professionals – MOH, WHO, UNICEF, VAM, Oxfam • Semi-structured interviews with key informants • Food balance sheets
D. What nutritional data is routinely and effectively collected and collated in MCHN?	Availability of data in WFP supported MCHN and other sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCHN reports • Discussion with MOH staff
E. What is the nutritional status of attendees and <5yrs?	Prevalence of wasting, stunting and underweight.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCHN clinic records • Survey reports • DHS reports • VAM officer & reports • Ad hoc MUAC measurements
5. Is the programme in line with internationally accepted standards?		
A. Does it accord with Sphere Standards	Sphere indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sphere Handbook • Observation and • Interviews with MCH staff and beneficiaries
B. Does it accord with WFP standards	WFP standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP Handbook • Observation • Interviews with MCH staff and beneficiaries

Component 4. School Feeding		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. Daily school feeding		
A. Relevance of SF to national priorities	Accordance with key documents	Documentary, interviews with Government and CO
B. Relevance to WFP strategic objectives	Accordance with key documents	Documentary, interviews with CO
C. Efficiency	Cost efficiency, reliability of supplies. Supply and cost of food items used in current approach	Interviews with WFP logistics, logistics documentation
D. Effectiveness	Attendance rates, drop out rates, completion. Adequacy of SF as an incentive.	Mini survey results, interviews with teachers, parents, students, Government, WFP staff. Documentation.
E. Sustainability	Government willingness and capacity to maintain SF programme	Interviews with Government and CO staff. National Strategies or policies, budgetary allocations for SF. WFP 'hand-over' strategies or evidence thereof.
F. Brazilian Trust Fund issues	Potential for support to SF. Outcomes from BTF-support (Policy documents, strategies, training, or others.	Interviews with CO, Government staff and expert posted within Ministry of Education. Document review.
2. Technical support and resources for national SF programme		
A. Progress toward aims of national programme	Accordance with aims of national programme. Evidence of change through time. Numbers of schools served by WFP through time. Policy documents evidencing steps towards national programme.	Documentary evidence on national programme. Records of change through time. Interviews WFP staff, Government staff.
B. Identification of obstacles to development of national programme: resources and necessary technical support.	Specific support and resource mobilisation problems (financial, cultural, social, organisational) identified and to extent possible quantified	Interviews with WFP staff, Government staff. Mini survey findings, educational records.
C. Identification of possible responses to obstacles identified	Analysis of successes and failures in attempts to develop support and resource mobilisation (financial, cultural, social, organisational)	Interviews with WFP and Government staff. Educational records.
3. Improvements in school kitchens and storage		
A. Improvements in material provision for school kitchens and storage systems	Examination of sample of kitchens, records of changes; relation to good practice.	Observation of samples of schools, interviews with WFP staff, including logistics and school staff.
B. Improvements in management systems for school kitchens and storage systems	Examination of sample of management systems: relation to good practice.	Observation of samples of schools, interviews with WFP staff, including logistics, and school staff.
C. Identification of opportunities and risks in improved provision and systems; assessment of obstacles to sustainability	Critical examination of sample of material provision and management systems	Observation of samples of schools, interviews with WFP staff, including logistics, and school staff.
4. M and E training for cooks		
A. Assessment of training and management system for cooks	Examination of sample of schools to identify training system for M&E	Observation of samples of schools, interviews with WFP staff, including logistics, and school staff. Scrutiny of records of training.
B. Identification of opportunities and risks in M&E training	Examination of sample of schools to identify training system for M&E	Observation of samples of schools, interviews with WFP staff, including logistics, and school staff. Scrutiny of records of training.

Component 5. Capacity Development		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. Staff training on food based PRRO activities		
A. Nature of training provided, numbers trained, duration of training, nature and source of trainers. Location of training.	Data in training records	Training records, interviews with trainers and trainees
B. Current deployment of trained staff; any evidence of loss to other agencies/activities of trained staff	Numbers of trained staff in post and at specific locations	Organigrams, WFP personnel interviews, interviews with trained staff
C. Quality and utility of training	Opinions of trainees and managers	Training records, interviews with managers and trained staff
D. Any trainings of non-WFP staff? Such as Government staff or IP staff, quality and utility of such training	Data in training records	Training records, interviews with WFP managers and trained staff. Interviews with managers of other agencies / Government
2. Staff training for disaster preparedness and response		
A. Nature of training provided, numbers trained, duration of training, nature and source of trainers. Location of training.	Data in training records	Training records, interviews with trainers and trainees
B. Current deployment of trained staff; any evidence of loss to other agencies/activities of trained staff	Numbers of trained staff in post and at specific locations	Organigrams, WFP personnel interviews, interviews with trained staff
C. Quality and utility of training	Opinions of trainees and managers	Training records, interviews with managers and trained staff
D. Any trainings of non-WFP staff? Such as Government staff or IP staff, quality and utility of such training	Data in training records	Training records, interviews with WFP managers and trained staff. Interviews with managers of other agencies / Government
3. Technical assistance for developing local fortified-food processing utility		
A. Nature of various types of technical assistance provided.	Records of provision of assistance	WFP and Government records, interviews with WFP and Government staff concerned (managers and staff undertaking activities in utility)
B. Timescale of planning and implementation process	Records of provision of assistance	WFP and Government records, interviews with WFP and Government staff concerned (managers and staff undertaking activities in utility)
C. Effectiveness of assistance as shown by practical value of utility	Amount of production, and quality/ quantity of output. Any technical, managerial, staffing or other problems. Marketability/utility of product	Observation of plant in action, records of production. Interviews with WFP and Government staff concerned (managers and staff undertaking activities in utility)
D. Sustainability of production, durability of machinery; risks and opportunities for further development / replication	Experience so far in operating and managing the facility	Observation of plant in action, records of production. Interviews with WFP and Government staff concerned (managers and staff undertaking activities in utility)

Component 5. Capacity Development		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
4. Support to the Government in setting up a food-based safety-net system for the most vulnerable		
A. Nature of various types of support provided. (Advice, finance, training etc...)	WFP records of support. Range and depth of support	Interviews with WFP staff involved in planning and implementation. Interviews Government
B. Achievements in timescale from planning to implementation up to present	WFP and Government records of provision of support. Evidence of progress.	Interviews with WFP staff involved in planning and implementation. Interviews Government
C. WFP contribution to selection of mechanisms for identification of beneficiaries	Validity of methodology	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff. Documentation of methodology
D. WFP contribution to design of safety net system (with reference to effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability)	Analysis of processes, structures and dependence on continuing WFP inputs	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff.
E. WFP contribution to identification of limits to the planned system, (threats) and identification of opportunities.	Analysis of processes, structures and level of Government ownership and political will.	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff. SWOT analysis
5. Support for the improvement of Government logistics systems and infrastructure at national and district levels		
A. Does the UN in Timor-Leste have a plan for capacity development of Government?	Existence of plan or evidence of intention to develop one.	Interviews with UN agencies and WFP staff, documentary evidence.
B. Nature of planned support in different forms: advocacy, technical assistance, secondment of staff, training, advice.....etc	Records of provision of assistance	Interviews with WFP staff involved in planning and implementation. Interviews Government
C. Achievements in different system components in timescale from planning to implementation up to present	WFP and Government records of provision of support. Evidence of progress.	Interviews with WFP staff involved in planning and implementation. Interviews Government. Observations of physical products
D. Appropriateness of planned system for environmental, economic, technical, social and political contexts	Critical assessment of limiting factors	Interviews with WFP staff involved in planning and implementation. Interviews Government. Observations of physical products
E. Effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of logistics system	Analysis of processes, structures and dependence on continuing WFP inputs	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff.
F. Identification of limits to the planned system, threats, opportunities.	Analysis of processes, structures and level of Government ownership and political will.	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff. SWOT analysis
G.. To what extent is the SO supporting the PRRO in meeting its objectives?	Evidence of specific achievements of SO against planned PRRO objective	Interviews with WFP Timor-Leste staff and Government staff. Documentary evidence.
H. Effectiveness of previous rehabilitation of logistics infrastructure (as indicator of likely success of SO)	Quality of rehabilitation of structures and systems	Observation, interviews with WFP Timor-Leste staff and Government staff. Documentary evidence.

Component 6. Return Package for IDPs		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
A. Planning process for return package	Records of planning activities	WFP records, interviews with WFP staff
B. Progress achieved in planned time scale	Achievement against planned	WFP records, interviews with WFP staff; if feasible interview with returnees.
C. Effectiveness and efficiency of delivery system	Analysis of processes, structures	WFP records, interviews with WFP staff; if feasible interview with returnees.
D. Participation of beneficiaries, including women in distribution system	Analysis of distribution processes	WFP records, interviews with WFP staff; if feasible interview with returnees, particularly women.
E. Effectiveness of reintegration process	Evidence of successes and failures in reintegration (relating to food provision.)	WFP records, interviews with WFP staff; if feasible interview with returnees.

Component 7. Programme Design		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. Relevance of the design of the PRRO		
A. Relevance to needs	Level of demonstrated needs	Needs assessments, interviews with staff of WFP Timor-Leste
B. Relevance to principles of WFP, international humanitarian assistance, and Government	Statements of priorities and principles of WFP, International community and Government	Documentary, interviews with CO staff and possibly RB staff
C. Relevance of components of the PRRO to the environmental, social, cultural, economic, political contexts of intervention.	Relation to need, opportunity and contexts of each component	Interviews with WFP staff involved in planning and implementation. Documentary evidence of need and opportunity
D. Processes of programme design: inputs from CO, RB and HQ and other agencies outside WFP (Government, UN, IPs) in relation to needs and contexts	Assessment of inputs from various stakeholders	Interviews, with WFP staff; documentary evidence
2. Performance of WFP in PRRO. This is the subject of the whole evaluation. It will be achieved through use of the standard evaluation criteria		

Component 8. Funding Mechanisms		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main Sources of Information
1. In what ways has the WFP performance been limited by funding mechanisms?		
A. Which areas of WFP activity have been limited?	Prioritised list of limitations	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
B. What has been the effect on the PRRO of funding limitations?	Perceptions of staff	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
C. In the opinion of the CO would a country programme (developmental) have been more appropriate, effective and efficient?	Perceptions of staff	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
2. Has the funding mechanism threatened the objective of hand-over to the Government?		
A. How has the CO supported SP5 in the absence of specific funding in the PRRO?	Perceptions of staff	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
B. What have been the impacts on WFP activities of using non-PRRO funding to support PRRO objectives	Perceptions of staff	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
C. What sources of funding have been used to support SP5?	Documentation	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
D. Which areas of support to Government have been particularly affected by funding limitations	Perceptions of staff	Interviews with CO, WFP staff
E. Does the Memorandum of Agreement/ Letter of Understanding (MoA/LoU) with Government specify the objective of hand-over	MoAs/LoUs	Documentary with interpretation by CO staff
F. Is there political will in Government to contribute financially to WFP activities	Perceptions of CO staff, any records of Government statements, any relevant agreements, such as MoAs/LoUs	Interviews with CO, WFP staff, interviews with Government
G. Is there any area in which the Government is more likely to pay WFP as contractors for services (whether full cost or a contribution)	Views of CO staff, Government statements	Interviews with CO, WFP staff, interviews with Government


Component 9. Logistics		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main sources of Information
1. Food Deliveries		
A. Examine impacts of and responses to possible shortfalls	WFP responses	Interviews with WFP logistics staff
B. Examine management system for strategic stocks	WFP responses	Interviews with WFP logistics staff
C. Examine mechanisms for ensuring priority (or lack of delays) for WFP stocks in Surabaya	Effectiveness of mechanisms	Interviews with ship agents and C&F agents
D. Check WFP responses to storage problems (shelf life, infestations)	Accordance with <i>WFP Storage Training Manual</i>	Interviews with WFP logistics staff
E. Examine WFP storage structure in relation to delivery system	Analysis of possibility of use of local transporters for secondary transport	Interviews with WFP staff
F. Examine quality of reporting (COMPAS and from EDPs)	Quality of reports (clarity, detail, frequency, accuracy etc....)	Scrutiny of reports, Interviews with WFP logistics staff
G. Examination of CO inventory of repair / construction requirements and evidence of donor willingness to fund	Documentation: donor expressions of willingness	Documentation, interviews WFP staff and donors
H. Examine possibility of infestation of warehouses from badly maintained surroundings	Quality of maintenance of surrounding environment	Observation of sample, interviews WFP staff
J. Whether spoilt food is quickly and appropriately disposed	WFP and Country Guidelines	Observation, records, interviews WFP staff, Guidelines.
K. Conditions to be met in borrowings from strategic stocks	Good practice	Interviews with WFP staff
L. How is stock to be rotated if there are no emergencies?	Good Practice	Interviews with WFP staff
2. Road transport		
A. Detailed description of transport organisation in districts to identify possibility of rationalisation	Quality of current system (as in suitability of vehicle type etc)	Observation, documentation, interviews WFP staff
B. Examine possibility of sharpening up transport contracts and reducing length to (say) three to six months.	Willingness of transporters and WFP CO to modify system	Interviews, WFP CO and logistics and contractors
C. Do transport contracts appropriately indicate percentage of fuel cost in prices quoted?	Examination of contracted prices against fuel costs	Interviews, WFP CO and logistics and contractors, examination of contracts against records of fuel costs.
D. Has Special Operation 10797 affected the transport system?	Views of relevant staff.	Interviews with CO, WFP logistics staff, Government
3. LTSH		
A. Assessment of reasons for high transport costs	Review of possible reasons and verification of evidence	Documentary evidence and interviews WFP and Government, observation.
B. Review present delivery routines	Focus on rotation time	Documentary evidence and interviews WFP and Government, observation.
C. Assess scope for adapting type of truck and capacity to roads in use	Scoping of opportunities and limitations for modification	Documentary evidence and interviews WFP and Government, observation.

Component 9. Logistics ctd		
Issue / Question	Indicators	Main sources of Information
D. Investigation of possible impact of road programme on transport costs	Effects of improvements to roads made so far. Comparison of unimproved / improved roads impact on costs	Documentary evidence and interviews WFP and the Government
E. Investigate possibility of Government financial support through provision of free storage and free ferry transport	Willingness of Government to provide this support	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff.
F. Investigate possibility of Government financial support through the Petroleum fund	Willingness of Government to provide this support	Interviews with WFP staff and Government staff.
4. Procurement		
A. Previous and current problems of procurement for PRRO	Experience of WFP staff	Interviews WFP CO and RB, documentary evidence?
B. Effects on programme of need to import all commodities	Opinions of WFP staff, documentary evidence of responses	Interviews WFP CO and RB, documentary evidence
C. Anticipated problems associated with procurement during PRRO	Opinions of WFP staff	Interviews WFP CO and RB
D. Possibility (opportunities risks and threats) of increased national production of food commodities in medium- and long-terms	Opinions of WFP, other agency (UN and NGO) and Government staff	Interviews with WFP, other agency (UN and NGO) and Government staff
E. Actions that could lead to increased national production of food commodities (where WFP could play a part)	Opinions of WFP, other agency (UN and NGO) and Government staff	Interviews with WFP, other agency (UN and NGO) and Government staff

Annex 5 Technical Annexes

5.A. Maps:


Roads and administrative districts




Food for Assets



Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition:



School Meal Programme



5.B .The Cluster Approach – or *Escola Foun* in the *Tetum* language – is a model of decentralized school management in which schools are managed within units (clusters) consisting of five or six schools. Each cluster has one ‘basic’ school - *escola básica* – that caters for first to ninth grade students, smaller schools with first to sixth grade and *filial* schools with first to third grades. Some 250 clusters will cover all primary schools in Timor-Leste and five people (chief, administration, logistics and so on) will manage each cluster. It is planned that all schools will have separate kitchen and storage facilities; the conditions of which will depend on the type of school. The clusters will receive grants from the Ministry of Education. There will be guidelines for management of grants. It is expected that part of these grants will be spent on procurement of food for SMP. The Cluster approach will go on trial in 2010 in designated pilot areas. The Ministry of Education plans to transfer responsibilities to clusters in 2011.

5.C Procurement: the CSB Project

The CO has negotiated an interesting project with Government and TG, a private firm, for the local production of CSB pre-mixed with oil and sugar and packed in 3kg bags. Equipment, purchased by the Government, will be assembled at TG’s premises. TG capital investment is minimal and is in the form of a simple shed with a concrete floor, which may have been used as storage area. TG also provides management and quality control.

One attraction of the project is the multiplier effect it will have on the local economy, since all ingredients with the exception of the bags will be purchased locally.

TG proposes a price of US\$1088/mt. This price is high considering that TG’s capital investment is small and that in its price structure depreciation must also be small.

The Weekly FOB Price List issued by HQ on 12 October 2009 shows CSB with sugar quoted at a FOB Durban price of US\$439, US\$430 ex Antwerp and US\$540 ex Houston. Which would give a C&F Dili value of about US\$600 for the Durban and Antwerp shipments whereas the ones from the United States would cost between US\$780 and US\$840.

The proposed price is high compared with Durban and Antwerp shipments. Of course TG’s CSB is a pre-mixed but the quantity of oil added is small and would marginally increase the price. The same remark is also true for the packing: paper bags used for the conventional CSB are not cheap whereas 3kg plastic bags are not very expensive.

Certainly the multiplier effect of the new activity on the local economy is a beneficial as are the pre-mix and the convenient 3kg packaging but it is questionable whether these advantages justify an increase in price of 80 per cent on the C&F Dili price on the Durban and Antwerp shipments.

There are, however, considerations other than costs, the shelf life will be greater with reduced transport time, reduced time and costs associated with scooping three commodities;; avoidance of the risk of sugar and oil being inappropriately used for other purposes and the creation of a system that allows transfer to the Government of a system allowing the use of local commodities, supporting local agriculture, rather than importing commodities with the benefits of agricultural production going to other countries.

The project has its merits. It will be advisable for WFP to analyse the price structure together with TG, to allow a fair profit but recognise for WFP, that a higher price means for the same budget a reduced tonnage.

5.D. Oecussi District

Oecussi District is an enclave in Indonesian territory about 100km west of the border with Timor-Leste. A ferry service links it to Dili and there is a good road through Indonesia. Roads in Oecussi, however, are extremely bad. Even though Oecussi is not on a high priority area some road improvements are taking place. The western part is cut off from the rest during the five months of the rainy season so pre-positioning of supplies is essential; it is also out reach for the food monitors so that some of the food is possibly misused or not properly accounted for. WFP sub-office is in Pante Makasar in a building with office space and a warehouse under rehabilitation. Oecussi sub-office is also an EDP. It organises its own distributions from the warehouse. Transport contracts are awarded to transporters based in Dili who in turn subcontract the work to Oecussi transporters. The system is expensive and the subcontractors complain of long payment delays, but in future Oecussi transporters will be contracted directly by WFP so that it will have a more immediate control on the operations. It is expected that this new procedure will reduce operating costs.

Access to Oecussi causes logistic problems: the ferry service is often out of commission for maintenance and repair. Transport cost from Dili by ferry is US\$ 20/mt as against US\$90/mt by road. Forty-eight hours are needed to organize road transport through Indonesia. Negotiations to reduce the formalities are progressing slowly between the two countries. Trucks from Dili can carry a payload up to 20mt.

5.E. Recommended Changes to Logistics System

The system should be reorganised along the following lines:

- In addition to the warehouses in Dili and Oecussi enclave, EDPs could be established in Baucau and Maliana where WFP has sub-offices. Cross-infestation would be contained if at least two Wiik Halls were positioned in each location⁷²;
- Preventive fumigation should be carried out using photoxine or a similar product, which the RB could recommend or supply. As in Lokichokio in northern Kenya, it would be possible to spray a decoction from leaves of the neem tree, which is a powerful pesticide. Neem trees grow in Timor-Leste and Timor Global, the company that will produce CSB for WFP is planning to start the production of a pesticide with a neem base in December 2009;
- At present, contracted transporters have a certain time to deliver commodities from Dili Central Warehouse to the FDPs. Because Timor-Leste is small, loads will normally be delivered the same day. The FDP is informed by telephone of the expected arrival of the truck when it leaves Dili. But heavy rains may prevent a truck reaching the FDP and it offloads at an ADP where the way bill is signed on receipt. No mention is made on the way bill of the actual delivery point and the transporter claims payment as if the cargo has been delivered according to contract. According to WFP Timor-Leste systems the ADP is agreed in advance by WFP CO and the District School Meal Coordinators and not *ad hoc* by the truck driver. Community members then transport food to the final

⁷² There is, however, a risk of theft from unprotected Wiik Halls and for this reason they have not been provided. Moreover this system of additional warehouses entails double handling and thus increased costs.

destination. This is an expensive modality. Transporting small tonnages all the way to final destination is costly. Moreover the trucks come back empty and the transporters include the empty return in their tariff. An alternative would be to locate EDPs at Baucau and Maliana and supply them with commodities as and when they are offloaded in Dili. Both locations are linked to Dili by good roads that can take 15-20mt payload. It should be able to negotiate reasonable rates with the transporters for that service⁷³;

- The breakdown by districts of all despatches from Dili for the 13 month period September 2008 to September 2009 shows that during 8,181mt were transported of which 1,250mt were for Oecussi, leaving 6,931mt for the other districts;
- The following distribution scheme⁷⁴ would have given Baucau and Maliana about 2000mt each to deliver whereas Dili would have had about 2900mt:
 - Distribution from Dili to the districts of Dili, part of Ermera, Ileu, Ainaro and Manufahi;
 - Distribution from Maliana to the districts of Bobonaro, Covalima and part of Ermera; and
 - Distribution from Baucau to the districts of Manatuto, Viqueque, Baucau and Lautem.

Creation of EDPs in Baucau and Maliana with adequate storage would reduce considerably the pressure on the Dili warehouse. With much less cargo to store, stacks could be reorganised at safe distances apart. Baucau and Maliana should have a pool of small trucks at their disposal. With deliveries not exceeding 200mt/month, which is less than 10mt per working day, both locations should have each about three small trucks:

- The sub-offices will decide deliveries after checking with the FDP that the road is open to traffic. Deliveries would not be allowed to ADPs. except by prior agreement;
- IOM could be interested in positioning trucks in Baucau where the Salesian Fathers have a technical school and, according to the Embassy of Spain, would be able to maintain the trucks; and
- Cooperativa Café Timor, which operates in Ermera district, has a fleet of 34 trucks used to transport coffee cherries to factories from May to late September. They may be interested in positioning a few trucks in Maliana for WFP use.

5.F. The high costs of unofficial payments for hand-carrying from ADPs to final destinations⁷⁵

On receipt of commodities from the transporter, the consignee signs the Way Bill and may include comments regarding missing packages and/or damage. Losses/damages thus reported are small but probably do not reflect the true situation.

Transporters sometimes offload at an ADP instead of the designated EDP. Unofficial FFW may occur when the consignee (school or health centre) hires members of the community to hand-carry the food to the final destination. The tariff seems to be 3kg of rice per bag carried. This is much more expensive than it

⁷³ In fact relatively few trucks are available outside Dili, and most trucks in reality work out of Dili, even if apparently based elsewhere.

⁷⁴ See Maps Annex 5A.

⁷⁵ The CO explains that this is not a widespread practice but that every effort will be made to eradicate it.

appears. For example in the case of rice delivered to Afaca in Quelicai sub-district (Baucau district):

- average C&F Dili price for rice under the PRRO = US\$784/mt
- road transport Dili-Alfaca = US\$78/mt
- therefore, not counting costs of transfer from port to Dili warehouse and storage costs in Dili, the landed cost at Afaca =US\$862/mt or US\$0.86/kg
- thus a payment of 3kg of rice represents US\$2.58.
- depending on origin, rice can be in 30kg bags (33 bags/mt) or 50kg bags (20 bags/mt). The price of hand-carrying one metric ton would be US\$ 85.14/mt for 30kg bags, or US\$51.60/mt for 50kg bags.
- these are outrageous prices considering that road transport, which is already very expensive, amounts to US\$78/mt.
- in addition, because there are no remarks on the Way Bill as to where delivery has taken place, the transporter is paid the full price as if delivery to final destination has taken place.

A further problem concerns the reliability stock cards at the FDPs. There are too few Food Monitors and their frequent rotation reduces the build-up of institutional memory. Stock cards appear to be well kept but do not reflect reality if unofficial withdrawals are made for hand-carrying.

Annex 5.G. Evidence-based activities recommended for the MCHN Programme

These proposals are based on Lancet Maternal and Child Undernutrition Series⁷⁶ and contextualised to Timor-Leste.

WFP should:

- Keep nutrition on the national agenda –maintain an active presence within the Nutrition Working Group and in the Ministry of Health Nutrition Department.
- Do the right things – tackle the issues currently reducing programme effectiveness such as quality of product, blanket feeding to all pregnant and lactating women, addressing coverage issues, supporting Behaviour Change Communities.
- Not do the wrong things –discontinue support to ineffective SFP for 24-59 months, reduce focus on ineffective activities such as growth monitoring and the School Meals Programme.
- Act at a scale within current programme size – increase the real coverage of beneficiaries
- Reach those in need - focus nutritional support on women, and children from conception to 2 years to impact on maternal and child undernutrition and to enable economic development.
- Gather data for nutritional decision making – continue support for Nutrition Department and the Health Management Information System.
- Building strategic and operational capacity – both at central and field level but also within WFP.

⁷⁶ Bryce et al Effective Action at National Level. Lancet (2008) Maternal and Child Undernutrition series.

Acronyms

ADP	Alternative Distribution Point
BTF	Brazilian Trust Fund
CC	Climate change
CD	Country Director
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CHC	Community Health Centre
CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CO	Country Office
CSB	Corn soy blend
DSC	Direct Support Costs
EDP	Extended Distribution Point
EFSA	for Emergency Food Security Assessments
FDP	Final Distribution Point
FFA	Food for assets
FFW	Food for work
FGD	Focus group discussion
FSC	Food Security Cluster
GFD	General food distribution
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IDP	Internally displaced person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JIRCAS	Japan International Research Centre for agricultural Science
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Maternal Child Health
MCHN	Maternal Child Health Nutrition
MUAC	Mid upper arm circumference
NFSIS	National Food Security Information System
NGO	Non governmental organisation
ODOC	Other Direct Operation Costs
PF	Petroleum Fund
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme
RB	Regional Bureau
SF	School Feeding
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SISCa	<i>Servisu Integrado Saúde Comunitario</i> (Intergrated Community Health Service)
SMP	School Meals Programme
TAIS	<i>Timor-Leste Assisténsia Integrada Saúde</i> (Timor-Leste Integrated Maternal and Child Health Care Project)
TG	Timor Global (a private company planning to produce fortified CSB)
UNDAF	Development Assistance Framework
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme



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